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TRANSLATION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Sergey Tyulenev



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macmillan

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ISBN 978-3-319-78357-4 ISBN 978-3-319-78358-1 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78358-1>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018939230

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Cover illustration: Détail de la Tour Eiffel © nemesis2207/Fotolia.co.uk

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

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INTRODUCTION

This book is about translation in the public sphere (PS). It shall be noted that it is neither about translation nor about the PS, but about translation in the PS. This implies that the book should be less expected to engage exhaustively with either of the subject areas and more with their intersections. In fact, the lack of the engagement with translation in the PS literature and with the PS in Translation and Interpreting Studies was the initial motivation to write this book. It seemed to me that it is obvious that the one subject can hardly be discussed without taking the other into consideration, and yet there has been little discussion of the two ‘in tandem’, in their mutually influential interactions. I will examine the situation in greater detail in the chapters that follow; in this brief introduction I make some necessary clarifications.

Сейоло [...] протянул нам руку. Жена его смотрела на нас [...] Я отдал Сейоло табак и сигары. [...] Потом мы молча стали разглядывать друг друга. [...] Они с любопытством следили за каждым нашим движением и изредка усмехались [...] Нам хотелось поговорить, но переводчика не было дома.¹

—И.А. Гончаров

¹Sciolo [...] held out his hand to us. His wife looked at us [...] I gave Sciolo tobacco and cigars. [...] Then we silently began to examine one another. [...] They watched with curiosity every movement we made and occasionally grinned. [...] We wanted to talk, but the interpreter was not at home. (Ivan Goncharov; translation mine—S. T.)

The term ‘public sphere’ is used in the most general sense, including both a more or less unified PS of a nation-state of the Westphalian model (as theorized by Jürgen Habermas) and any other type of PS regardless of its size or configuration. Kate Nash (2014: 61–65) questions the existence of *the* Public Sphere, rather, she argues, the definite article is a vestige of Habermas’s theorizations of PS bearing in mind the Westphalian world order with nation-states having their unified PSs. In today’s world, the picture is much more complex: there are numerous smaller and larger PSs and the existence of a unified PS in which there is a unified deliberation is questioned by many PS theorists.

PS is understood here in its broader meaning blurring the divide between state and publics as theorized by Nancy Fraser (1992). Indeed, as it will be shown, PS debates unfold not in isolation from state officials’ or professionals’ inputs where both the officials and professionals act or are perceived (at least by some) as acting in their non-private capacities. Sometimes one and the same participant in a PS discussion says different things depending on the overall socio-political context. Therefore PS debate should be theorized broadening its ecology.

The book has a dual audience. On the one hand, it is addressed to PS theorists alerting them against taking translation for granted as a transparent screen and interpreters or translators as mere conduits, bilingual machines who are noticed only when they make a slip or an error. Translation is hardly ever transparent; it is an interface of many factors and allegiances that influence the resulting mediation. Translation is also ubiquitous in the PS (as well as in the society at large). Translation manifests itself in different guises, sometimes very well disguised indeed. It is misleading to associate translation only with interlingual or any lingual transfer for that matter, and with an individual or a piece of technology between the two (or more) communicators.

I hope the book will also be of interest to students or scholars of translation. There have been publications in Translation and Interpreting Studies that considered translation and interpreting in settings that could be classified as belonging to PS. But it would be useful to discuss such matters from a clearer sociological perspective and with the help of a specialized conceptual and terminological apparatus. The PS theory has a well-developed toolkit that can be applied when discussing translation’s behaviour in public debates, offering a better chance to appreciate similarities to or dissimilarities from its behaviour in other settings.

The predominance of examples from Russian PSs in the present study is quite naturally explained by the fact that Russian is my mother tongue and the Russian sociocultural climate is familiar to me better than any other. It goes without saying that the discussion is not limitable or to be limited to the Russian PSs. Rather all the Russia-related examples are to be viewed as case studies or illustrations constituting the basis for theoretical generalizations that are to be verified in other sociocultural settings.

The structure of the monograph is as follows. Chapter 1 is a diagnostic chapter where it will be shown that in the broad PS literature intra- and interlingual translation is at most mentioned, hardly ever discussed, let alone problematized. Such a conspicuous absence will also be questioned there. In Chap. 2, translation will be presented as a capacious genus with many varied species. The most PS-relevant ones will be discussed in detail. Chapter 3 shows translation as a key mechanism of negotiating compromise in public debate. Chapter 4 will look into how translation works in the PS: on the one hand as a catalyst of social interactions and on the other hand as a factor in intersocietally staged communication. Chapter 5 presents translation as a topic of public debate and as a methodological tool for theorizing public debate. Finally, in the Conclusion, the findings of the study are summarized.



CHAPTER 1

A Missing Link

Слона-то я и не приметил.

—И.А. Крылов

Abstract This chapter introduces the notion of the public sphere. Theorizing PS and the communicative ecology has been enriched since their earlier days, yet an important factor, translation, is still missing. Dialogue is identified as a way of socializing in the sense that it is getting out of one’s own ‘bubble’ (one’s own worldview), and contacting another person, another ‘bubble’, another worldview. Dialogue requires a means of bridging the gap between the two ‘bubbles’. This means is translation. Translation should also be considered as a fourth layer of communicative ecology, together with communicating actors, the technology they use and the topics they discuss.

Keywords Public sphere • Communicative ecology • Dialogue • Translation • Fourth layer

‘I did not notice the elephant’ (Ivan Krylov; translation is mine—*S.T.*)

ENRICHING THE PALETTE

Let us begin with the following picture:

In an *arena* a number of *speakers* communicate with each other, observed by an *audience* seated in the gallery. [...] here are *mediators* (that is, journalists) who organize the exchange between speakers [...] In the catacombs below the arena is a *backstage area* in which speakers and mediators prepare their communications and seek advice [...] from public relations coaches. The entire complex of arena, gallery and backstage area can be called a *forum*.

To be sure, this is not a description of the Coliseum or the forum in Rome or an arena in another ancient city. The description comes from Wessler et al. (2008: 4), a book on the modern Public Sphere (PS) and this is a metaphorical description of PS.

Theorizing PS (as any subject of scholarly interest) can be compared to enriching the palette of a painter. More and more is learned about the subject at hand. As a result, the palette required for expatiating on all various aspects becomes richer and ever more sophisticated.

PS is definable as the sphere of public life that serves as a platform in which a range of multifarious and multifaceted topics, considered socially important, are conferred about. In this sketchy definition it is already obvious that PS and its existence depend on several factors.

Firstly, there should be a public ready, willing and enjoying a possibility to exist in such a sphere, more or less actively partaking in its discussions and debates and more or less successfully influencing the course of social and political life through publicly staged parleys or deliberations. This kind of public is different from social agents who participate in other types of discussion, such as authorities, that is, state or governmental officials, or professionals, for example, lawyers, scientists, experts in other fields. This does not mean to say that a president, a past master of an organization or a savant cannot act as a private individual. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, politicians comment on different personages and events; they intervene in the public dialogue about all sorts of issues that find themselves in epicentres of public interest or concern; professionals may be invited to explain the phenomena that come into the public purview. A great deal depends on how they position themselves and how they are perceived by the audience they address. One and the same statement of

one and the same person may be viewed differently and that will affect how it functions in the PS (see Chap. 3).

Yet it is one thing when a cabinet of minister discusses a socially important issue, and it is another thing all together when private individuals discuss the same issue in a tea house or in a chat room on a website. There is a difference between a laboratory staff's collegial assessment of the progress in their work on a medication and the general public's external discussion of their project. PS is found when politics is talked about in a coffee house or a TV talk show, or when public funds spent on medical research become a subject of general discussion. PS debate may be, and usually is, conducted according to different principles and may come to different conclusions as compared to a governmental meeting or a laboratory powwow. In words of one of the PS experts, Nancy Fraser,

[t]he public sphere is not the state; it is rather the informally mobilized body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that can serve as a counterweight to the state [...T]his extragovernmental character of the public sphere confers an aura of independence, autonomy, and legitimacy on the 'public opinion' generated in it (1992: 134).

The public should be socially developed to dare to discuss and they should be informed well enough to conduct a productive and constructive discussion. A productive and constructive discussion is different from spreading rumours or gossip; rather it leads to the formation of what is referred to as 'public opinion'. A strong, well-informed and constructive public opinion may, and should, be able to bring about changes in law and social policies.

Secondly, PS is a platform or a space. It is a public *sphere*. This can be a physical sphere for example, a market place or some other space used for gathering people for public discussions of vital civic matters. In Ancient Greece, such physical spaces were called *agorae*. In early-modern Europe, coffee houses or salons were places where people gathered to discuss publicly relevant topics. PS can also exist in other discursive spaces, such as a plethora of virtual spaces we use today. For instance mass media, journals and newspapers, radio and TV, and the Internet—all serve as examples of virtual spaces in which public discussions take place.

Thirdly, discussion in the PS concerns socially important matters. 'Socially important' is different from 'privately important'. What you eat is normally your private matter; what, according to a famous historical

legend, the Queen consort of the French King Louis XVI ate, became a public matter. When she was told that the French people revolted because they had no bread to eat, Marie-Antoinette (1755–93), allegedly, cynically responded that she did not eat bread either, and that, like her, they should have eaten cakes (or in French, *les brioches*). That answer, if Marie-Antoinette really did say that, was taken as a sign of the upper classes' callous inhumanity towards the plight of the lower classes of French society, and the Queen's eating habits added to an acrimonious and, in fact, bloody public conflict.

It is difficult to draw a clear boundary around PS, the topics discussed in it and the circle of participants in those discussions. PS is in a constant state of flux: the number of people involved changes depending on time and space; the discussions deal with different matters some of which may, at one time or in one society, be considered private while at another time or in another society—socially relevant or public. In fact, even in one society, the line between what is viewed as public and what is viewed as private tends to move, usually towards broadening PS (although not always). Thus, we can hardly speak of one PS, rather there are many PSs.

Yet if we are pressed for an answer as to what, despite all changes and differences, variations and deviations, characterizes any PS structurally, the following features may be singled out:

- *Who* participates in the PS;
- *What* is discussed;
- *How* the discussion is conducted.

This basic structure of PS was introduced in a crystallized fashion in Jürgen Habermas's seminal book *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* [*The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*], originally published in German in 1962 and translated into English in 1989. It still enjoys the status of 'the *locus classicus* of all discussions' on PS (Fraser 2014: 11; also Kurasawa 2014: 79), although Habermas's original model of PS is not the only one (Benhabib 1992) and has passed through a long evolution especially since its English publication, some stages of which were prompted by critics and some by Habermas himself (Calhoun 1992; Nash 2014; Habermas 1996, 2001).

Habermas argued that in the period from the seventeenth century to the mid-twentieth century in Western Europe, PS was practiced among white, educated bourgeois propertied males who acted privately, that is,

their participation in public discussions was outside whatever other involvements they might have had elsewhere, whether in state bodies or in independent businesses. The topics of their discussions included the principles governing social relations in such areas as trade and labour, publicly relevant matters of private family life (for instance, inheritance laws or gender roles), public authority represented by state and court, political matters as well as mass media and culture events and products. The debate was conducted in such a way that participants' status was disregarded (at least in principle), in other words they all were considered equals in the discussion; they had the right to problematize areas that until then had not been questioned by the general public (for instance, governmental decisions); and the discussion had to be based on rational reasoned discourse, that is, only those opinions were taken into consideration that were presented logically and persuasively.

Yet this was the dawn of the modern type of PS in Europe and Habermas (1962/1989) was the beginning of theorizing it. Inevitably, as in any beginning, the picture painted by Habermas, as further developments showed, was not yet sufficiently complex and, to use the metaphor of this section's title, the palette could hardly be considered rich and adequate for the painting attempted, although as has been admitted time and time again, the initial attempts of theorizing PS, firstly, helped seeing society as more complex than a state and a submissive and speechless general public acting as little more than a collective walk-on of early-modern history and, secondly, laid the foundation for further research.

A different view of PS is presented in Wessler et al. (2008: 4), which opened this chapter. The PS there is shown as a more complex social structure: it is an entire arena, a multi-layered public space, in which there are speakers and audience; since the present-day PS exceeds physical spaces, there is a need in mediators, such as mass-media workers, who bring the discussion from the arena, a physically limited space, to the general public. Today, public speakers are coached by public relations experts in order to make their discussions targeted precisely at specific sectors of the audience, some of the speakers may appeal to different age groups, some to different genders, some to different business or interest groups and so on. Overall, while PS is much more inclusive and diversified today, the participants are functionally 'assorted': some speak, some listen, some train those who speak and some broadcast what is being said. (This functional specialism does not mean to say that one and the same individual cannot participate in the PS in several capacities.)

It shall be noted that PS is a major social institution in modern societies ensuring democracy. Democracy is an accepted standard of political organization in the modern world. Democracy means the rule of the people (*demos* in Greek is *people*; *kratia* is *power, authority*). The implication is that the entire population of a given polity, a state as a political unity, is involved in governing their state. Although not everywhere where democracy is proclaimed to be the true and only foundation of society, it is practiced, at least it is generally accepted as the best and fairest form of socio-political organization. Democracy implies a more or less developed PS: ‘[A] good degree of variety in issues, opinions and ideas expressed throughout the mass media forum is vital for democratic public debate, as can easily be demonstrated by contrast with autocratic media systems’ (Wessler et al. 2008: 5). This means that PS is being realized in the absolute majority of modern states, albeit to a greater extent in some and to a smaller extent in others.

In addition to earlier predominantly physical spaces of PS, such as market places, coffee houses, public parks, new and predominantly virtual spaces have been added, notably mass media (Dahlgren 1995) and in the recent decades—the Internet (Gerhards and Schäfer 2009). While in some earlier forms of PS, for example the royal court in a monarchy, the general public was only represented by those enjoying access to the court and their participation in the public debate was minimal, if any at all, in present-day PSs, people can experience a direct and more inclusive (ideally universal) access to public debate.

In all types and forms of PS, discussion—whether face-to-face or at a distance and/or over time, *viva voce* or via an exchange of written texts (printed or disseminated by means of virtual reality techniques)—is a key feature. Indeed PS is a platform for discussion; it is a space where people dialogue with one another. This was true when PS was limited by the boundaries of one collectivity, speaking one and the same language and sharing the same social values. This is also true today:

- when the accessibility to the public debate is constantly growing and embracing ever widening circles of the population, including even what is referred to as subaltern counterpublics (Fraser 1992: 123) who ‘use counterpublicity effectively to pursue a critique of the mainstream PS’ (Kurasawa 2014: 81);
- when the diversification of PS is incomparable to the small-numbered elitist PSs of the past, such as PSs in the *poleis* of Ancient Greece,

- considered a classical example of PS, where there were large parts of the population, such as women and slaves, who were excluded from public debate; or such as eighteenth-century Europe sometimes considered to have been the golden age of the European PS, where the right to participate in public discussions was limited only to white educated propertied males while the rest of the public was left out;
- when PS is internationalized, that is, people with different sociocultural backgrounds and experiences as well as speaking different languages see themselves as sharing common topics and try to discuss them despite various sociocultural and linguistic differences and despite differences in discursive methods.

WHAT IS DISCUSSION?

If discussion is so important for PS, it is worthwhile looking closely at what discussion is. The term ‘discussion’ literally means ‘dashed to pieces’, but later the meaning, in which we use it today, developed. ‘Discussed’ means ‘investigated’ (from the Latin verb *discutere*, where *dis-* is ‘apart’ and *quaterere* is ‘shake’). To discuss means to look closely into a matter or an issue and talk it over with somebody, thinking the matter through by a joint effort. Discussion, thus, is deliberation and this kind of deliberation is always shared with somebody (unlike one’s mulling over or musing on a subject in his/her head).

A discussion has a starting point, then it is developed through considering pros and cons of all possible ways of handling the problem at hand and finally it reaches some sort of conclusion. For instance two people may first state their positions on a particular subject and then, through comparing their positions or the various aspects of the suggested solutions and perhaps coming up with and weighing other options, come to a conclusion where they may together generate a new view on the subject of the discussion or modify their original views. As a result of their discussion they are likely to come up with a plan for how to resolve the problem they faced by reaching an agreement or consensus of their opinions on the problem; they will also mutually adjust the relevant parts of their worldviews. The term ‘consensus’ comes from Latin *consens*—meaning ‘agreed’. Another result, less ideal but rather more realistic, is compromise (from Latin *com-*, together, + *promittere* ‘put forth, promise’, thus a joint making of a decision to be adhered to by all the involved parties). As the worst-case scenario they may agree to disagree, yet perhaps they will still learn to argue

better their take on the issue at hand through articulating their positions. Plato's Socratic dialogues are an archetypal example of discussion. Socratic dialogues are joint meticulous examinations of a problem, usually of some more-or-less fundamental philosophical or moral question (for instance, what is justice? what is self-control?), conducted between two or more people where, through arguments and counter-arguments, an answer to the question may be formulated or, more often, a more logical and critically aware view of it may be suggested.

Discussions may be formatted as dialogues, but a discussion may be constructed in such a way that it would contain a part that is performed by one of the speakers while the others are listening to his/her prolonged presentation of ideas (for example in a lecture) and then, after s/he has finished a detailed presentation of the subject of the discussion, they may ask questions or counter-argue some of the lecturer's ideas. In any case a discussion is a dialogue, that is, an exchange of ideas between two or more people.

Dialogue is a way of socializing in the sense that it is getting out of one's own 'bubble', one's own worldview, the picture of the world in his/her mind, and contacting another person who is also revealing what s/he has in his/her mind. Discussion or dialogue, therefore, requires a means of bridging the gap between the two 'bubbles'.

The gap may be between two persons sharing one language and culture, the dialoguing social actors may understand each other's words and cultural references and yet there may still be an ideational or attitudinal gap between them. There are no identical social actors, sociocultural clones, appreciating their culture as a whole and each of the multitude of its features in the same way and in every respect. In fact, discussion is a way of coordinating various cultural positions and, at least ideally, eliminating inconsistencies presently or potentially causing social or interpersonal tensions.

Obviously, when dialoguing social actors come from different sociocultural backgrounds and speak different languages, the gap to be bridged widens and the number of the aspects to negotiate grows. More discussion is needed when searching for a common ground or common denominators on which further discussion can be based.

Not every social discussion unfolds in the most constructive way: defining key concepts and terms, progressing point by point; rather one or all involved parties may assume that the others understand the subject matter (in the same way) and there is no need to define terms, moreover the

parties may jump from one point to another following peculiar paths of their individual spontaneous associations. However, whatever its properties, firstly, discussion is unavoidable in the social realm and, secondly, it requires some means of connecting the otherwise separate universes—the interlocutors’ minds containing their individual versions of the jointly inhabited social space.

Discussion via dialogue is part of any social structure because the latter inevitably involves interchanging information or negotiating opinions about dealing with issues of shared interest or concern. Discussion via dialogue is even more important when it comes to PS which is all about debate. Debate implies discussion and exchange of viewpoints. Discussion, in turn, as we have just seen, is a dialogue. Dialogue is the process of joining what is otherwise separated by the nature of things: minds exist in separate brains and those minds form their idiosyncratic views of the reality around them separately (although not necessarily independently).

AN ECOLOGY OF THE PUBLIC DIALOGUE

To appreciate discussion or dialogue as they happen in the PS, it is important to understand what is referred to as the ecology of communication or communicative ecology.

According to David L. Altheide, who introduced the concept, ‘the ecology of communication refers to the structure, organization, and accessibility of information technology, various forums, media, and channels of information’ (1995: 2).

The theory of the ecology of communication stresses the importance of a holistic view of the social realm. The term ‘ecology’ comes from Greek *eco-*, or *oikos*, ‘house’ + *logos*, ‘word’ and, in a broader sense, ‘study’ or ‘science’, cf. sociology, psychology, geology and so on. Originally, in biology, the term ‘ecology’ reconceptualized studying the living world from viewing it as a collection of individual species connected typologically and diachronically within their genera in biological genealogical trees to embracing cross-species’ multifarious relations, from symbiotic to antibiotic with everything in between, and to looking holistically at the environment in which they exist. The focus, thus, is no longer on individuality and specificity; nor is it only on the living organisms, outside their relationships with the non-living environmental phenomena. Rather the emphasis is on collectivity and mutuality in a particular habitat with its unique dynamics of relationships between different species belonging both to flora and

fauna endemic or non-indigenous to a particular type of terrain experiencing vicissitudes of local climatic phenomena.

The concept of ecology, when applied to studies of inter-human communication, strives for wide-angle lenses to fit in as much of the social background as possible. Communicative ecology studies human interactions in all their forms and those forms' links, ties and bonds, whether in an intimate tête-à-tête or in a technologically mediated long-distance videoconference:

From a communicative ecology perspective each instance of media use is considered at both individual and community level as part of a complex media environment that is socially and culturally framed. We do not limit the scope of analysis to traditional print, broadcast and telecommunication media but include social networking applications for peer to peer modes of communication, transport infrastructure that enable face to face interaction, as well as public and private places where people meet, chat, gossip. (Hearn and Foth 2007)

Communicative ecology embraces more than PS. Yet, arguably, the holistic perspective developed by communicative ecologists is relevant to the main argument of the present study introducing translation as an indispensable element of the communicative ecology of PS.

A FOURTH LAYER OF THE COMMUNICATIVE ECOLOGY

In addition to the three described layers, communicative ecology in general and the communicative ecology of PS have yet another layer, perhaps hidden from the eyes of many of its participants as well as its students. All communication in the PS implies the necessity of mediation between the discussing parties. Mediation is implied at least in the following aspects: between individuals, between private interests and public authorities, and between social groups. Mediation is inevitable because PS is always a dialogue that is branching over the walls separating individual bubbles.

Communication is invariably associated in sociological and political-scientific literature with mediating structures. Mediating structures are institutions that maintain, promulgate and disseminate norms governing social relations, and they include institutions on various levels from local, such as regional religious organizations or devolved political authorities to national bodies, such as the state government, national mass media and

national NGOs (Berger 1998: xvii). There are also supranational mediating agencies, for instance international and multinational political institutions, such as the UN or the EU Council. There may be drawn stricter terminological lines: mediating institutions may be distinguished from mediating structures. While institutions are more formalized bodies, mediating structures, such as neighbourhood, family, religious community, voluntary organizations, are more fluid in their form, and their function is to connect individual people with social large-scale structures (Berger and Neuhaus 1996).

Notably, amongst these mediators, even in today's pluralism, which 'is not only a phenomenon *within* societies but also *between* them' (Volker Then, in Berger 1998: xv), translation escapes the communicative ecologists' attention as yet another, but indispensable and ubiquitous mediator. Even, in the situation when '[s]ensitivity and care should be directed in particular toward generating a tolerant dialogue on norms and values within and between societies' with a 'focus on mediating structures that allow societies to cope with conflict' (Werner Wiedenfeld in Berger 1998: x–xi), translation falls out of the frame of the painted social picture.

Yet, emphatically, translation can and should also be seen as mediation and, as we shall see in Chap. 5, mediation can be productively theorized as translation. Mediation is more often than not associated with resolving disagreements and conflicts. In what follows, mediation as represented by translation is going to be viewed more like a party in a broadly understood bargaining process (Stevens 1963). This bargaining process cannot be reduced to confrontational relations. Rather the emphasis can be laid on the function of bridging gaps, whether at the lingual, cultural or any other level.

Mediation cannot be considered outside the context of its social functioning:

To focus on the process of mediation only [...] is both erroneous and unrealistic. What mediators do, can do, or are permitted to do in their efforts to manage a dispute [I would add: in a broader sense—*S.T.*], may depend, to an extent, on who they are and what resources and competencies they have. Ultimately, though, this depends on who the parties are, the context of their conflict [once again: in a broader sense—*S.T.*], and the nature of their interaction. (Bercovitch and Rubin 1992: 3–4)

Translation as a type of mediation should also be studied in the context of its social functioning. Considering translation as a social phenomenon is

the focus of the present-day Translation and Interpreting Studies, experiencing what is referred to as the sociological turn (Wolf 2010).

Translation is a type of social activity that acts as an intermediary between parties. Translators and translation have been theorized as expert mediators (Holz-Mänttari 1984; Tyulenev 2011). As any type of mediation it should not be associated only with confrontations, ruptures and other difficulties in communication. Translation is ubiquitous in social interactions. And, in the same fashion as any other mediation, it should be studied in the context of the interaction of which it is an integral part.

The literature on PS is broad and diverse but translation hardly ever features there as prominently as it deserves. However, without taking translation as a crucial variable into account, all theorization of PS lacks a vital component linking all agents, allowing them negotiate and even as much as enabling them to express their views and stating their stakes in the social.

The ecology of communication is also conceptualized without taking translation into account. Yet without translation the ecology of communication is not full. The communicative ecology has been theorized as composed of three layers: social, technological and discursive (Hearn and Foth 2007). The social layer is people and their various groups or organizations. The technological layer includes devices and media connecting people and enabling their communication. The discursive layer is the content of communication, the topics people discuss, the ideas they exchange and so forth. Arguably, a fourth layer should be factored in whenever the communicative ecology is discussed. This fourth layer is mediation or translation in a broad sense of the term (not limited to interlingual transfer). Translation cuts across the three layers of the communicative ecology. Translation is there when people communicate with other people, when they communicate directly or through technology. The contents of the discursive layer are constantly translated and retranslated and thereby undergo countless transformations. In the same way as technology affects communication, its formats and its contents (Altheide 1995), translation also affects the social realm in general and PS in particular.

Amplifying Global Voices

Translation (interlingual or of other types) appears transparent to the theorists of PS: they take it for granted, it is hardly discussed by them and deserves in their writings, at best, little more than mentioning. This is so

even when PS is viewed as a transnational, international or global phenomenon. Translation is never found among the topics worthy of a detailed discussion, the term ‘translation’ is hardly ever included into subject indices, a chapter or a section on translation as a factor in public debate or as a component of the ecology of communication in the PS is unlikely to be found in the tables of contents. Translation does not seem considered worth meriting a focussed examination. Translation is taken for granted, it is not seen as problematic.

For instance, Ingrid Volkmer surveys the evolution of the networks of trans-border assemblages, which are multi-layered and multi-directional nodes of public communication independent of nation-state borders, leading to the globalization of the PS as we see it today. She mentions several times that certain mass-media materials appeared in several languages (2014: 74, 75, 77). Obviously translations from one language into another language or other languages have played a role in constructing the trans-border assemblages in the global PS, yet in her otherwise innovative and informative book, the author offers little discussion of interlingual translation.

One might expect to find some discussion of translators as social agents contributing to the globalization of PS in a special section Volkmer devotes to mediators of public assemblages (2014: 69–72). After we are told that ‘[t]he sphere of public mediator is also a deliberative sphere as “voices” are increasingly forming an “aura” of public communication’ and that ‘the role of a “mediator” gains an increasing relevance in transnational publics’ (2014: 69), one’s appetite for discussing translation is further honed, but alas, it turns out that the discussion is limited only to mediators in the blogosphere—bloggers. Interlingual translation is again mentioned in passing in connection with *Global Voices* (GV), introduced as “a non-profit organization based in the Netherlands, operat[ing] as a public service blog aggregator” (ibid.). We read that, among other things, the organization ‘translates’ (ibid.)—and that is all about that aspect of its work. There the ‘discussion’ of translation ends.

Yet if we check out the *Global Voices*’ self-introduction (see [GV](#) in References), translation figures as a considerably more visible and important activity:

We are a border-less, largely volunteer community of more than 1400 writers, analysts, online media experts, and translators. Global Voices has been leading the conversation on citizen media reporting since 2005. We curate,

verify and translate trending news and stories you might be missing on the Internet, from blogs, independent press and social media in 167 countries. Many of the world's most interesting and important stories aren't in just one place. Sometimes they're scattered in bits and pieces across the Internet, in blog posts and tweets, and in multiple languages. These are the stories we accurately report on Global Voices—and translate into more than 40 languages.

In the list of 'what [Global Voices] do', translation occupies the second place. After stating that the GV editors and writers report on as many as 167 countries, the site tells us that GV's 'international team of translators renders our stories into more than 40 languages' (ibid.). On the list of the projects, translation comes before GV's Advox project intended to defend online freedoms and fight censorship; its project 'Rising Voices' empowering isolated and marginalized communities by offering them tools for self-expression; and GV's summits in which their global contributors and their publics meet.

Who translates for GV? There is another project that is responsible for recruiting translators: 'The Lingua Project amplifies Global Voices stories by translation in languages other than English with the help of hundreds of volunteers' (see [Lingua](#) in References). Let us note the verb 'amplify'. It is repeated when describing the role of the Lingua translators: 'Lingua translators are helping bridge worlds and amplify voices' (ibid.). This amplification has everything to do with the functioning of GV as a globalized blogosphere and—not only in any metaphorical sense. Let us see how translation makes voices truly global.

Translators can choose the texts they translate (<https://globalvoices.org/lingua/#Q6>), this is very significant because by selecting texts translators influence the configuration of the pool of themes discussed, they willy-nilly 'vote' by their very translations for the prominence of certain topics in the globalized blogosphere as compared to some other topics. Different blogs are rendered into more or fewer languages and thereby made more or less visible in the PS. Translators, thus, are granted a say (not alone, of course, but together with editors and whoever else may be involved in deciding the contents of GV). If so, translation gains a higher status in the PS as played out on the GV site. Bracketing it out when analyzing the GV blogosphere, means distorting, at least to an extent, the dynamic of the public discussion captured by the site.

Moreover, interlingual translation in the GV blogosphere can also affect the intensity of the discourse. To give an example, in a blog written by Tetyana Lokot ‘The 5 Most Insensitive Reactions to the MH17 Crash in Ukraine’ (posted 18 July 2014), item four reads as follows: ‘Russia Today’s chief Margarita Simonyan chalked up the tragedy to good ol[d] Soviet absent-mindedness: “I’ve been working at the very heart of various breaking news for so long, that I absolutely do not believe in conspiracy theories. But I do believe in simple Soviet chaos”’ (<https://globalvoices.org/2014/07/18/russia-mh17-ukraine-crash/>). Since every translated text, as this one rendered from Russian into English, is available on the site in its original form, we can see what Simonyan said in Russian and as we do so, we learn that what is termed in English as ‘chaos’ is actually the Russian word *bardak*. The Russian word is colloquial and quite significantly more casual than its English rendition, betraying the speaker’s shockingly cynical attitude especially when used in combination with the adjective ‘simple’ (*prostoi*). The expression in Russian does shock as too light-hearted and casual a dismissal of the tragedy (or its cause), perhaps a closer equivalent would be ‘mess’: thus, it is a simple/usual/good old Soviet mess that caused deaths of nearly three hundred human lives and civilians at that! This phenomenon of intensifying or diluting the original message in translation is well known to translators and interpreters and to translation/interpreting scholars. Not infrequently (although perhaps not in the GV case just discussed), translation’s manipulations may reflect translators’ conscious or unconscious standpoints, institutional norms or ideologies affecting their decisions (see for instance Hermans 2014; Brisset 1996; Mason 2010, 2012).

Automatic Translation: A War of Translations?

Much of present-day public discussion occurs in the vast, globe-embracing yet cavernous plains of the Internet. People naturally speaking a multitude of languages come there to the pockets they favour and communicate with other people not necessarily naturally speaking the same languages. How is this kind of interlingual communication made possible? They can speak a shared language, this is perhaps a desired way of communication, especially in a real-time discussion. There are also translation engines, such as Google Translate, that can help. Yet translation’s proximity, literally at one’s fingertips, comes at a cost. The quality may be less than satisfactory that, however, may be not problematic when one is happy with

understanding only the gist of the original message. But sometimes Google's translation engine makes glitches that look not so innocuous.

In January 2016, some mass media alerted those using Google translation that if the Ukrainian word for Russians (*rossiiany*) was entered, they might be prompted to translate it as 'occupiers' (<https://ru.tsn.ua/politika/google-nachal-perevodit-rossiyane-s-ukrainskogo-na-russkiy-kak-okkupanty-555480.html>). According to the same news article, translating from Ukrainian *Revoliutsiia dostoinstva* [the Revolution of dignity] produced in Russian *politicheskii krizis na Ukraine* [a political crisis in Ukraine]. In addition, the BBC Russian Service reported that Google translated from Ukrainian into Russian the word combination 'Russian Federation' as 'Mordor', which, in Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings*, is the base of Sauron, a negative character. The surname of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, when entered for translation from Ukrainian into Russian, was rendered as *grustnaia loshadka* meaning 'a sad little horse', which is his humorous nickname (http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2016/01/160105_google_translate_russia_mordor).

According to the BBC, a Russian Google representative explained the 'translations' as mistakes of automatic translation systems. Translation, in this case (allegedly) purely automatic, creates target-language versions that reflect certain publics' views of a particular (controversial) subject matter. As a result, what is neutral in the original and should not be problematic suddenly is turned into a centre of discussion (is the Ukrainian 'revolution of dignity' really a crisis?). In the case of the Google (mis) translations, the renditions of neutral expressions and words ('Russian Federation', 'Lavrov', 'Russians' etc.) may be seen as intentional pranks (to say the least), especially because all these 'translations' happened in the period of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Interpreting Ambiguity

Sometimes public discourse may experience problems caused by what in Translation and Interpreting Studies referred to as intralingual translation. Intralingual translation of a word or phrase is rewording them, that is, reformulating them, in the same language by using different lexical units (see more on intralingual translation in Chap. 2). Markus Kornprobst (2008) describes a problem with one of the questions in public surveys conducted in the 1950s and 1960s by Emnid—one of the leading institutes for survey research in the, then, Federal Republic of Germany. The

question was ‘Which one do you consider a happier solution for the future: the restoration (*Wiederherstellung*) of Germany as an independent nation-state with its own custom barriers or Germany as equal member of a European unification?’ (Kornprobst 2008: 64). Kornprobst explains that in the context of the question the German term *Wiederherstellung* was ambiguous: ‘In the public discourse, the term was normally used in the context of reunification [of Germany split into the FRG and GDR]’ (ibid.). The term, thus, had to be interpreted by the public surveyed: the respondents themselves had to decide whether *Wiederherstellung* meant the restoration of Europe or of Germany.

Kornprobst continues: ‘Despite this ambiguity, European unification scored consistently higher than the nation-state option from 1950 onwards’ (ibid.). One may wonder, however, since there had been an ambiguity and the interpretation of the key term in the question had been left to respondents, could the results have been interpreted as unproblematic? The intralingual translation between the usual meaning of *Wiederherstellung* and the Enmid question turned out to be a controversial factor in the public discourse because before answering the question, respondents had to interpret the key term and the entire question one way or the other and their reply depended on how the intralingual translation had been performed in their heads. Yet this clear case of intralingual translation seems to have been bracketed out in the process of analyzing the survey results, and the conclusions were drawn as if there had been no translation hurdle for the respondents to overcome.

This is a case when translation caused a problem and thereby became (or should have become) visible. But actually, each phrase or in fact even each word people use in their interpersonal communication is inevitably a translation: understanding of what is said goes beyond just words or phrases that are said; understanding involves the entire context of when these words are said, by whom and with what intonation, body language and so on. Intralingual translation as any translation is far from transparent.

Another Hurdle in a Hurdle Race

The abovementioned *Global Voices*’ translation activities, Google’s technical mistranslations and the intralingual translation exemplified by a term requiring interpretation in the Enmid survey demonstrate that translation figures prominently as a factor in configuring PSs at least in two ways.

Firstly, the translator can affect understanding the contents of the messages communicated, whether willingly or unwillingly, whether consciously or unconsciously, and affect the addressees' reactions, verbal or extraverbal.

Secondly, translation in the PS can push a particular topic or line of discussion or a voice in a discussion into visibility by selecting it for rendering into one or more languages. By contrast, translation can suppress or pass by a contribution without noticing it and affect accordingly an unfolding public debate or an initiative to generate one. There may be a variety of reasons for such behaviour of translation in the PS—from conscious and intentional decisions on the part of the social agents involved, translators, commissioners or editors, to their subconscious motivations and biases.

Translation and its agents, translators, whether professional, amateur or every one intrapersonally translating when participating in public discussions, as well as non-human translators, translation technology, become a power to reckon with in the landscape of PS. Ignoring them or taking them for granted renders the ecology of PS incomplete and, by consequence, the PS theorization—lacking an important component of the studied phenomenon. The literature on PS and other relevant themes has identified many factors influencing public discourse; it is clear that the latter is far from plain sailing, so to speak. Rather it is a hurdle race, and arguably translation is yet another hurdle there to overcome (and to examine).

TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF PS WITHOUT TRANSLATION?

One of the most prominent PS scholars Nancy Fraser has theorized PS as transnationalizing, that is, going beyond (=Latin *trans-*) national borders (2014). She identified an epistemological issue with Habermas's theorization of PS in that he, starting from *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989) as well as in his later works (1996, 2001) where he attempted to look at PS as a networked transnational social structure, failed to leave behind nation-states as his frame of reference (Fraser 2014: 11–12). He conceptualized state apparatus as a sovereign power exercised over a bounded territory, the participants in the PS as fellow members of the same political community, discussions as focussed on the needs of a particular community, mass media involved as the national press and broadcasting, the participants' subjectivity as nurtured by their national

literature, and for the purposes of the present discussion especially important is the point that Fraser makes about the language used in Habermas's vision of PS:

Structural Transformation took for granted that public-sphere discussion was fully comprehensible and linguistically transparent. Tacitly presupposing a single shared linguistic medium of public communication, Habermas effectively assumed that public debate was conducted in a national language. (2014: 12)

Considering PS in a post-Westphalian fashion, Fraser factors in multilinguality of modern PSs. Even though often used as a lingua franca, English, being a language of global elites and Anglophone postcolonials, fails to offer any universally acceptable solution and 'language remains a political fault-line' (ibid.: 25). This threatens the critical function of public opinion; multilingualism may obstruct the mobilization of public opinion as a political force. Multilingualism can also be a problem for transnational political communities, such as the European Union. Therefore, she concludes, 'language issues compromise both the *legitimacy* and *efficacy* of public opinion in a post-Westphalian world' (ibid.; italics in the original). She seems to come very close to discussing translation as a means, either successful or not, but widely used, of consolidating PSs and public opinions, yet the one step that separates her from examining translation has never been made.

She moves on to rethink PS and poses the question, whether present-day PSs can generate a legitimate, that is, fully representative, public opinion, expressing the opinions of all affected by the topic of the discussion or of all subjected to the governing body capable of resolving the issue under consideration to which the discussants should appeal (ibid.: 30 and 36, endnote 25). One of the problems, she repeats, is the question of language: 'In what language(s) [should the members of a given public] communicate? And via what communicative infrastructure?' (ibid.: 27).

When suggesting another spin to Fraser's idea of the transnationalized PS by looking into ways of national PSs' contribution to creating a translationalized PS, rather than by creating an abstract transnational PS, Nick Couldry also comes tantalizingly close to the place in the PS that is or can be occupied by translation but, as Fraser did before him, Couldry also missed the same spot. Couldry characterizes a national PS as 'operating in

an assumed single national language' (2014: 48). He talks about the need to link up 'the parallel worlds' of English, Polish or Arabic media (in the UK), which 'is hardly happening at the moment, and needs to be developed' (ibid.: 50–51), but he never goes as far as to suggest interlingual translation as a way to link up these (or other) parallel worlds of national publics, as we see actually happening in the case of *Global Voices* and similar platforms. Couldry says that 'migrant workers should have a voice' in social decision-making processes (ibid.: 54).

It is the argument of the present publication that interlingual translation scholars and interlingual translation practitioners can offer advice as to how translators/interpreters have been giving voices to subalterns; translation/interpreting scholars have theorized ways of how to optimize that practice for quite a long time now, thereby contributing to the creation of subaltern counterpublics and promoting a different mode of co-implication in public debate (cf. Fraser 1992; Kurasawa 2014). Couldry (2014: 55) calls for overcoming stereotyped, hostile representations of migrant workers in Britain, arguing that they 'need to be heard more in British media', but there is a question bound to arise: can somebody speaking a language different from the one(s) used in the media of the social surroundings be heard except through translation? Perhaps, experience and expertise of such translators and scholars as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2012), Luise von Flotow (1997), Kwame Anthony Appiah (2012), Keith Harvey (2012) and many more could be of help.

Translation turns out to be a blind spot in many a theoretical discussion on PS. Yet translation can help 'sew up' the disjointed post-Westphalian publics with regards to the 'what' (i.e. shared concerns of a transnational, globalized world community, whether as a whole or parts thereof), the 'where' (present-day deterritorialized cyberspace) and the 'how' of communication ('a vast translinguistic nexus of disjoint and overlapping visual cultures', Fraser 2014: 26). As we shall see, translation, understood broadly, not only as interlingual, can be used and is used, although not always successfully, to bring together disparate, yet communicating publics in today's transnational (cyber)space. Through translation, members of the interacting publics identify their allies and opponents. Through translation, their debates gain legitimacy and political efficacy in the post-Westphalian public debate.

The key aspect where translation has a great potential for PS is what Fraser calls the 'how' of public communication as regards one of the key requirements to all public debate—participatory parity, that is, the terms

on which ‘the interlocutors engage one another’ (Fraser 2014: 28). Fraser suggests applying what she terms the all-affected/subjected principle ‘to the framing of publicity, without going through the detour of citizenship’ (ibid.: 30). She weighs pros and cons, but if this scenario is to be executed, the nitty-gritty of the communication is to be considered. Let us imagine a situation when the all-affected/subjected do not speak the same language, then while framing the circumstantial publicity, translation should be factored in, because it will have an effect on the resulting communication.

As we shall see in what follows, translation, although it does offer a solution to public communication in a transnational landscape, is not unproblematic. It is not transparent contrary to common belief. More will be said on this in the ensuing chapters, for now suffice it to say that, as has been shown above, being dependent on objective and subjective, human and non-human factors, translation may pose problems for parity. For instance, if it is chosen as an instrument of communication salvaging a possibility of communication between the parties, which are different to the point of incompatibility (lacking a shared language or ignorant of one another’s cultural differences), translation should ensure the parity of access to the discussion, the parity of being translated for, on equal terms and with equal faithfulness (whatever that may involve).

Translation’s functioning in transnational or national PSs must be included into the critical theory of PS. If translation is naïvely believed to be transparent and having no tangible effect on (transnational) public debate, the critique will be incomplete and incapable of assessing translation-related aspects of the ecology of PS communication—diagnosing translation-related failures or doing justice to translation-related successes. When touching upon the critical force of PS theory, Fraser mentions that the idealized imagination of PS helps ‘criticize existing, power-skewed processes of publicity’ (ibid.: 36). To be sure, there are also translation-skewed processes (see examples above and below). For PS theory to be able to mete out its productive criticism, it should be based on an exhaustive PS ecology. Factoring in translation helps re-theorize the ‘how’ of PS in general and transnational PSs in particular, as one of their key infrastructural presuppositions. In this chapter, the glaring absence of translation is only diagnosed as a missing link that, however, glues much of what happens in the PS into focussed nodes of public debate, in the next chapter translation will be presented in its *propria persona*.

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Meet Translation

Хотел бы в единое слово...
—Л.А. Мей

Abstract This chapter presents translation as a complex phenomenon with a number of types, out of which three PS-relevant types of translation are singled out—kinetic, intralingual and interlingual. Kinetic translation deals with transfers on the level of gestures. Intralingual translation, otherwise referred to as rewording, handles transfers within one verbal language. Interlingual translation, or translation proper, is the transfer between two or more languages. All the three types are actively used in the social realm in general and in the public sphere in particular. More often than not they combine to facilitate public communication.

Keywords Public sphere • Translation • Kinetic translation • Intralingual translation • Interlingual translation

‘I would like [to pour] into a single word [...]’ (Lev Mei, ‘Iz Geine’ [From Heine]; translation is mine—S.T.).

A WORLD OF TRANSLATION

Our world is a world of translation. Translation is ubiquitous. The following excerpt from J. M. Coetzee's novel *Disgrace* offers a generous handful of examples. The protagonist, David Lurie, considers writing a chamber opera *Byron in Italy* and defines its genre as 'a meditation on love between the sexes' (Coetzee 1999: 4). The opera is outlined as follows:

Out of the poets I learned to love, chants Byron in his cracked monotone, nine syllables on C natural; *but life, I found* (descending chromatically to F), *is another story. Plink-plunk-plonk* go the strings of the banjo. *Why, O why do you speak like that?* sings Teresa in a long reproachful arc. *Plink-plink-plonk* go the strings.

She wants to be loved, Teresa, to be loved immortally; she wants to be raised to the company of the Lauras and Floras of yore. And Byron? Byron will be faithful unto death, but that is all he promises. *Let both be tied till one shall have expired.*

My love, sings Teresa, swelling out the fat English monosyllable she learned in the poet's bed. *Plink*, echo the strings. A woman in love, wallowing in love; a cat on a roof, howling; complex proteins swirling in the blood, distending the sexual organs, making the palms sweat and voice thicken as the soul hurls its longings to the skies. That is what Soraya [a prostitute with whom Lurie used to meet—S. T.] and the others were for: to suck the complex proteins out of his blood like snake-venom, leaving him clear-headed and dry. Teresa in her father's house in Ravenna, to her misfortune, has no one to suck the venom from her. *Come to me, mio Byron*, she cries: *come to me, love me!* And Byron, exiled from life, pale as a ghost, echoes her derisively: *Leave me, leave me, leave me be!* (Coetzee 1999: 185; emphases in the original)

Transfers between several domains are found in this passage. First of all, the writer, J. M. Coetzee, tells us a story, he writes his novel in which he presents an episode from the life of his main character. Next, the above-cited passage is a gist of the plot of the protagonist's opera, which is his rendering of an episode from Byron's life—his love affair in Italy.

Moreover, music, singing and the banjo strumming, are transferred into words. Byron sings and his opening musical line is described as nine syllables, notes on C natural followed by a descending chromatic (in half-tones) to F. Teresa, Byron's lover, sings a melodic line which is 'a long reproachful arc'.

The banjo's accompaniment is reproduced in writing as *plink-plunk-plonk* and *plunk-plink-plonk*. The timbre is expressed by the combination of plosive and sonorant consonants (*pl-nk*) and the notes' pitches are reproduced by means of vowels. In the first sequence (*plink-plunk-plonk*), the pitch movement is from the higher *-i-*, through a lower *-u-* down to the lowest in the succession of chords on the strings *-o-*. The next sequence (*plunk-plink-plonk*) is different: *-u-*, *-i-*, *-o-*; the middle pitch is now first, the highest follows it and the lowest again closes the sequence.

Generally, each sound in the musical domain is characterized by three properties—pitch, rhythm and timbre, and the reproduction of all the three properties is attempted here. Byron's melody moves chromatically from C down to F. Teresa's part is compared to an arc suggesting its trajectory like an undulation between higher and lower pitches. The rhythm is hinted at by the banjo strums. Finally, all the sounds are produced either by the human voice (male, Byron's, or female, Teresa's) or by the banjo.

Moreover, both Byron's and Teresa's singing is not only a representation of the contour of their melodic lines. The description of their singing also hints at how their emotions are coloured in their vocal performance: 'his *cracked* monotone', 'a *reproachful* arc'. When described as 'cracked', the male voice must be low-pitched, deep bass or baritone (hardly tenor). We learn less about what Teresa's voice might be (soprano, mezzo-soprano, alto?); what is made abundantly clear, however, is the emotion with which she sings: reproach. This brings us to another transfer taking place in Coetzee's text: music is transferred into words and music renders psychological states.

Thus, J. M. Coetzee transfers his protagonist's life into his novel; his protagonist, in turn, translates Byron's and Teresa's lives and emotions into music. It will be noted that in both cases the transfers are renditions of something larger (a life or a relationship, in this case, love) into something smaller (an episode or the love between Byron and Teresa). Rendering something larger into something smaller suggests selectivity and selectivity must be predicated on some criteria. In the case of Coetzee's novel *Disgrace*, the author discusses problems of post-apartheid South Africa. The episode in Lurie's life and the life of his daughter (a white woman) raped by a black man and with whose child she is pregnant is connected with the reconsideration of the relationship between the races in the mid-/late-1990s South African society. Disagreeing with her father (the protagonist), the raped woman decides to give birth to her child. Interpreted metaphorically, Coetzee's novel can be read as a parable of an

uneasy civic reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa. If so, the critical period of the protagonist's life is selected by the writer for the novel as a representation of a critical moment in the entire society's history.

What might have been the criterion for the protagonist's selection of the Italian period in Byron's life? Byron's tumultuous life may provide many other and perhaps more intense plots (his conflicts with the conventions of the British society or his participation in the struggle for Greek independence). Yet Coetzee's protagonist chooses a seemingly less socially relevant episode of Byron's life. By this selection, Coetzee may have indicated the angle from which he suggested to consider the post-apartheid society (or social relations in general)—as a relationship akin to the love between man and woman. This perspective connects the plot of the protagonist's opera with his daughter's story, who, like Teresa, seeks love, but is given only lust.

Thus, selection is always suggestive in that it points to the criteria or prisms that inform the interpretation of the described phenomena. There are two prisms. One prism may be a most characteristic manifestation of a particular phenomenon or a most telling situation or event (a white woman raped by a black man and pregnant with a child of their reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa); the other prism is a particular aspect of the described phenomenon hinting at how the author interprets the phenomenon (Byron and Teresa's love-lust relationship, which serves as the prism through which Coetzee suggests to view post-apartheid South Africa). The former prism allows a more direct and more holistic epistemology, while the latter is an indirect synecdochic representation of the described phenomenon. The former is less subjective (many, if not all, would agree that Coetzee's plot reflects the intensity of the social situation taken in extremity and another writer might have thought of a similar plot); the latter is purely subjective (it is unlikely that another writer would have connected Byron's love affair with the situation in post-apartheid South Africa).

Let us move on and see other types of transfer we observe in the passage cited above. Teresa is shown as a particular kind of woman: 'she wants to be raised to the company of the Lauras and Floras of yore'—she wants to be like women who inspired poets, she wants to join their company. From her present status, she wants to be 'raised', translated into another status and another type of woman, from a lover to a muse. This is a social transfer of a kind in that it is a shift of a person from one status to another from the point of view of other people in a social setting.

She is also presented as ‘a woman in love, wallowing in love’. Let us note the indefinite article making Teresa typical, one of many women in love. Moreover, she is also juxtaposed with another image, which translates her into a physiological object: ‘a cat on a roof, howling’. This physiological translation is further borne out by the following description of what Teresa experiences: ‘complex proteins swirling in the blood, distending the sexual organs’. Here, there is yet another transfer—that of a biochemical sort: complex proteins cause distending of sexual organs. This, further, causes sweating of her palms, thickening of her voice. Then, the physiological is transferred into the psychological and sent up to the skies: ‘the soul hurls its longings to the skies’. The trajectory of the transfers is from biochemistry all the way to the skies.

David Lurie, next, projects the Byron–Teresa situation onto his own life. He used to meet with a prostitute, Soraya, whose function is comparable to Teresa’s, that is, she was ‘to suck the complex proteins out of his blood like snake-venom, leaving him clear-headed and dry’. This is again a sort of social translation in which one situation is identified with another and thereby two otherwise different situations may be recognized as similar, comparable, as the same (Renn 2006: 30).

In this sentence, the complex proteins in human blood are compared to snake venom. This is a translation of one image into another, one chemical compound into another. Also, an otherwise neutral compound of proteins is coloured negatively by this translation. This demonstrates the power of the subjective selectivity of translation: it may be not only a transfer, but a coloured transfer.

The closing lines of the passage bring us back to music-into-words and psychology-into-music/words translations. Byron sings ‘derisively’: *Leave me, leave me, leave me be!* This is a representation of Byron’s singing because there is a clearly rhythmical organization of the words where only the third of the repetitions *leave me* is finalized with *be* (probably, a hint at a longer note).

Finally, it shall be noted that at one point, Teresa sings *My love*, but she is Italian, and the writer explains: ‘she learned [this “fat English monosyllable” *love*] in the poet’s bed.’ She translates her Italian emotion for which she has her Italian word into English. Later, however, she reverts to her mother tongue—*mio Byron*. This *mio* is a radically foreignizing translation: while in the medium of English, she simply renders the Italian word as it is in Italian: *Come to me, mio Byron*.

Out of all these multi-layered and multi-faceted transfers interacting in complex ways, with their negotiations between more and less subjective selections, the lingual translations constitute only a part, yet they are what is primarily associated with translation ('translation proper').

A FORMULA OF TRANSLATION

In his article 'On Linguistic Aspects of Translation' (1959/2012), Roman Jakobson proposed a triad: intralingual translation, interlingual translation and intersemiotic translation. Intralingual translation, or rewording, is transfer within one and the same language. When a notion (a word, a term, a sentence, a text) is explained, interpreted; when a theory is applied to concrete examples; when a proposition is verbally illustrated; what we deal with is translation of a notion, a theory, a proposition into other words, terms, sentences, texts within one and the same language. At the basic level, we observe the scheme

$$A \rightarrow M \rightarrow B, \quad (2.1)$$

where A and B are a source text and a target text respectively and M is a mediating agent. This is the same scheme as the one observed and amply theorized in Translation Studies as interlingual transfer, although the transfer is quite often more complex and may be modified as $A \rightleftharpoons M \rightleftharpoons B$, where A and B are source and target texts depending on the direction of interaction. Such view of intralingual transfer makes it akin to interlingual transfer.

The same basic structure is observed in intersemiotic transfer. When a novel is transferred into a film script and then into a film, we observe, once again, $A \rightarrow M \rightarrow B$. Actually, the transfer is $A \rightarrow M_1 \rightarrow B \rightarrow M_2 \rightarrow C$, where A stands for the source novel, B for the script, C for the end product—a film version of the novel, M_1 and M_2 represent, respectively, the script writing and the directing and acting based on the script. Certainly, the transfer should be described in a greater detail if we imagine a group of script writers (M_1), each one with his/her understanding of the novel, coordinating their efforts, when someone comes up with the general idea or a basic story, plot line, and someone else transcribing or developing the idea into a sequence of episodes and someone else writing dialogues. M_2 , too, may be presented as a complex process of the film director's (or directors') mediation between the script and the final version of the film as a

cinematographic text and as actors' interpretations of their parts, which, although prompted by the director's instructions, always and inevitably have the actors' versions in the intonations of phrases, in idiosyncratic voice timbres, in gestures and body movements and so on. But however detailed our description of the process of film creation might be, the basic structure will be the same as in intra- or interlingual translation. Indeed, a retelling of a novel in the same language in which it is written or a translation of a novel into another language can be described as $A \rightarrow M_1 \rightarrow B \rightarrow M_2 \rightarrow C (\rightarrow M_3 \rightarrow D \rightarrow M_n \rightarrow E \dots Z/\infty)$, where A is the source text, B is a translator or a reader, C, D, E all the way to Z and further, ad infinitum (∞), are readers/listeners for whom the text is mediated any number of times ($M_{1,2,3,n}$). Note that the mediations of the literary work at different stages may be either/both intra- or/and interlingual as well as intersemiotic. Real-life renderings of sources are not infrequently long chains of retellings, interlingual and intersemiotic renderings (with gestures, amateurish enactments of recounted stories).

WHY FOCUS ON LINGUAL TRANSLATION?

The next question to ask is, why did Jakobson theorize translation as language centred: the two of his types of translation are lingual transfers— intra- and inter-, and only one which exceeds language? Why did he not theorize translation as lingual and extralingual or lingual, extralingual and any combination of the two? Or why, indeed, did he give preference to the lingual transfer by assigning two 'slots', among the three in his tripartite classification, to it and only one—to an extralingual type of transfer? Is it because he was a linguist and, for him, language was a model medium?

Yet in the history of aesthetic thought, other media were considered as models. For instance, painting was used as the basis for comparing arts. This comparison goes back to Horace's famous formula *ut pictura poesis* ['as is painting, so is poetry']. Father Castel (1688–1757), a famous eccentric inventor of *clavecins des couleurs* and *des odeurs* (colour- or perfume-clavichords), which would bring together sounds and colours or sounds and perfumes, may be said to have put forward music (suggested by the clavichord) as his 'golden' standard, the basis of comparison of sensations, or, as we would say, the translating agent (Babbitt 1924: 3, 56–58).

Why should the pre-eminence be given to language, or to painting, or to music? Perhaps, instead, all translation should be viewed as intra- and intersemiotic, because there are plenty of examples of translating painting

into painting, music into music, architecture into architecture and, arguably, they can be described following the model of intra- and interlingual translation?

Moreover, how *intra* is intralingual translation? Admittedly, any intralingual transfer is essentially *inter*translation: any rewording is a transfer between different parts of the vocabulary of the language. For example, the intralingual transfer is between different stylistic registers, when scientific terms and notions are reworded in the terms of common word stock as it is the case in popular science. Or even, when the rewording is done within one stylistic register, one word or notion is explained by another (=different) word or other (=different) words. The *intra* can always be presented as *inter*; the *intra* turns out to be *inter*, because for any intralingually mediated source notion, the intralingually mediating target notion can be described as the result of an *inter* transfer. It is helpful to imagine any intralingually mediated and mediating notions as two different systems (or subsystems within the same linguistic system) between which the mediation takes place. Thus, any *intra* is an *inter*. In his classification of the transfer types, Jakobson implied language as one indivisible system, hence any transfer within this system is, by this implication, an intratransfer. But actually, as any lexicologist knows, no vocabulary can, at a closer look, be viewed as an indivisible system: any vocabulary as a system is composed of subsystems between which intralingual translation is carried out in the process of rewording. Therefore, any intralingual transfer is unavoidably an intersystemic transfer.

The same can be said about any intrasemiotic transfer. If a painter borrows techniques or alludes to subjects of another painter or a trend, s/he transfers within the same semiotic system (painting) but from another subsystem of this (one) system; thus, once again, the *intra*, upon closer inspection, turns out to be an *inter*. When translated into the formulaic language, this principle can be presented as follows:

$$A_1 \rightarrow M \rightarrow A_2 = A \rightarrow M \rightarrow B, \quad (2.2)$$

where A_1 and A_2 are a source and a target within one semiotic system, whatever it might be—language, or painting, or music, or any other semiotic system, and M between them is mediation described as *intra* (intra-lingual, or intrapictorial, or intrasemiotic in general); A and B are, respectively, the source and target belonging to different (sub)systems

with the mediation (M) described as *inter* (interlingual, or intersemiotic, or *intertransfer* between different subsystems of painting).

To go back to the Jakobsonian triad,

- (a) intralingual translation, or re-wording, is $A_1 \rightarrow M \rightarrow A_2$;
- (b) interlingual translation, or translation proper, is $A \rightarrow M \rightarrow B$;
- (c) intersemiotic translation is $A \rightarrow M \rightarrow B$.

But, by Formula (2.2), intralingual translation is $A \rightarrow M \rightarrow B$ as well as any intrasemiotic translation, missing from Jakobson's classification ($A_1 \rightarrow M \rightarrow A_2 = A \rightarrow M \rightarrow B$). Thus, all translation types can be reduced to $A \rightarrow M \rightarrow B$, the *intra* being only a derivative type of the more general and universal *inter* scheme. The entire Jakobsonian triad is now reduced to a dyad: intrasemiotic and intersemiotic, because the term 'semiotic' includes language and there is no justification for the philological bias that prompts privileging language over any other semiotic system, let alone allocating language two classes against only one overall semiotic class. But, to take our argument a step further, even the dyad can be further reduced to defining all translation to only one, but the most fundamental description, as has been shown above, translation is always, inevitably *inter*, that is to say, translation is always *inter*-(sub)systemic transfer.

We can suggest going beyond Jakobson's triad based on yet another argument. Why should we stop at conscious semiosis? We can surely identify more phenomena that can be described according to Formula (2.1). When we express our feelings and emotions in words, we perform a transfer from the un/semiconscious medium into a conscious sign system. When we weigh different behavioural patterns before deciding how we should act in a particular situation, we select between different subsystems within one system of ethics, which we interiorized in the process of our socialization. When fathers and sons are comparing their different interpretations of social laws, norms and traditions, they mediate differently the same source (an act or a situation), ending up with its different versions. Can all these situations be described as translation? All of them may be seen as realizations of Formula (2.1) and, hence, there is every reason to grant them the status of translation.

All the examples of the previous paragraph as well as the examples of the transfer in the Jakobsonian triad fall under the category of social transfers. But we can go even further. Do we find phenomena that can be described by Formula (2.1) outside the human realm? The answer is yes,

for instance, in the biological world different species interact by interpreting one another's 'language' or behaviour. Do we find phenomena that can be subsumed under Formula (2.1) outside the realm of the living—in the non-living domain? The answer is once again yes, for example, in chemical catalysis.

If the formula is so universal in its applicability, where do we stop? If any transfer, as it seems, can be presented as translation, what will become of the discipline of Translation and Interpreting Studies (TIS), which suddenly loses any chance to justify its existence or secure a place for itself among all the competing humanities and even scientific disciplines? In TIS today the problem of the universality of translation is largely ignored out of the fear of the loss of the emancipated status so hard-won among the adjacent humanities, yet this universality, upon consideration, actually opens the way to present TIS as a strategically positioned discipline with its unique and unrivalled focus of investigation—the intriguing *inter* phenomenon of the universe. TIS would suddenly find itself in the centre of our world, the world that is constituted by translation and the world that always translates.

Translation is an agent of change, but also of stability, because the newly generated elements do not stay where they have been generated and the universe does not end up being so heterogeneous that no part of it could be compatible with another and no elements of one part could be translated into the elements of another; rather through constant translation of elements, the universe is always circulating matter. Such is the case with languages that by constantly translating between each other defy drawing clear boundaries between them, because on every boundary the elements of one language—from the phonological through morphological and lexical and grammatical to syntactic and stylistic levels—intermesh with the elements of another language. Such is the case in semiosis where no clear boundaries can be drawn between arts and other media of expression. Such is the case in the physical world where, despite more rigid classifications, it is still impossible to draw definite boundaries between, for example, the plant and animal kingdoms or between the basin of one river or sea and another. Stars sow their matter throughout the universe. Quantitative changes cause qualitative transformations. The universe may be conceived as being in the constant state of translation.

The goal of this chapter is to outline different types of transfer—rather than to go into details of discussing each of them *in extenso*. Translation is not only an interlingual transfer but a ubiquitous agent of transfer in the social realm and beyond. By way of concluding the opening discussion of

the chapter, let us return to the excerpt from Coetzee's *Disgrace* to show transfers described in it in terms of Formula (2.1):

- The writer tells us a story. That means that he mediates between his imagination or a real-life story and his literary narrative where he interprets the lives of his characters. A: the writer's imagination → M: the writer → B: his novel.
- Within Coetzee's novel, there is another translation that renders an opera into words. A: the plot of the opera—Byron's love affair in Italy → M: the narrator → B: a retelling of the opera's plot.
- Moreover, the music of the opera is also reproduced by means of language. A: the music of Lurie's opera → M: the narrator → B: the description of music.
- The opera characters' singing represents their psychological states and personalities. A: characters' psychos → M: singing → B: the final musical product made accessible for the listener's appreciation.
- Teresa wants to translate herself into a muse. A: Teresa as a woman → M: Teresa as a(n) (auto)translator → B: women-muses.
- Teresa is presented as a woman in love with the emphasis on the physiological side. A: Teresa as a woman → M: the narrator → B₁: Teresa as a woman in love; B₂: 'a cat on a roof, howling'.
- Her desire is shown to cause complex proteins swirl in her blood and distend her sexual organs, her palms are sweating and her voice is thickening. (One may argue, if the causality is correct: does the desire cause the biochemical processes in blood or the other way round? For the discussion at hand, however, it is not as important, so we simply follow the text.) A: Teresa's organism → M: her desire → B: biochemical and physiological changes.
- The physiological-psychological desire is mediated by the soul to the skies. A: the desire → M: the soul → B: the skies.
- The main character translates the Byron–Teresa situation into his own life. A: the Byron–Teresa relationship → M: the protagonist → B: the protagonist's relationship with the prostitute Soraya.

TRANSLATION IN *PROPRIA PERSONA*

Translation is a complex phenomenon and it comes in different shapes and sizes, so to speak. As far as 'shapes' are concerned, it exists in many forms, as was shown in the previous two sections as well as in many works of

Translation and Interpreting Studies. As for translation's 'sizes', its influence on various processes in various semiotic realms, most recognizably in languages and literatures, but also in painting, architecture and so on, and social phenomena, such as cultures and entire societies, may be from negligible to *conditio sine qua non*.

Translation, however 'small' or 'large' it may be or appear in a particular culture or social space, is necessarily a social activity in the sense that it is performed in a situation of social interaction as a social action with all the properties of a social action and in the sense that it is performed by social actors, whether human or non-human. Owing to the fact that translation is performed by social actors with their habituses, standpoints, characteristics, idiosyncratic natures and so forth, translation can hardly be transparent, comparable to some perfect glass or crystal that lets light through without affecting it in any way. Translation is rather hyaline as this term is understood in physiology: it is the translucent and relatively clear substance that is found in organisms, the most common examples are cartilage or the fluid in our eyeballs. Both cartilage and the fluid in our eyes, called 'vitreous humour', let light through, albeit in various degrees, but even in its thinnest form, as is the case of the vitreous humour, the substance is never completely transparent and does influence, however minimally, the image of the world that our brain receives through our eyes.

The same holds true as regards translation. Translation (not only interlingual!) does have a social agency, however hidden and minuscule and in whatever realm, it selects (or participates in the selection of) which phenomena or parts thereof are to be transferred and how their individual elements are to be rendered. That is why any translation is hyaline in the sense of being *volens nolens* manipulative. If translation did not manipulate its source phenomenon, it would stop transferring it, in that case it would simply let its source pass through. Yet this is impossible in principle. Whether a term is explained (= translated) by different terms, or a text in one language is rendered (= translated) by means of another language, or a painting of one artist is copied/redone (= translated) by another artist, or a play is staged (translated), translation always has to *help* the source pass from one realm, sphere, medium into another and translation is needed and, in fact, it is indispensable because without it the source cannot complete this passage. Only translation can execute the transfer. But this help comes at a price: translation, willy-nilly, manipulates the source, sometimes to the source's advantage, sometimes to its detriment, sometimes at a minimal, hardly noticeable cost, sometimes at a high price, when

considerable losses of the source's properties occur. Sometimes translation is translucent as the vitreous humour in our eyes, sometime as dense as cartilage, barely letting light through—but in any case and in any form, translation is hyaline. This is its nature.

IN MANY SHAPES

We have said that translation comes in various shapes. Let us consider some of the commonest kinds of translation in the PS.¹

Kinetic Translation

Kinesics is a type of communication: our gestures and body language are powerful communicators. Some gestures or body movements are only physiological actions. However when they are (intended to be) interpreted as intentional messages, kinetic actions function as social actions.

With social kinesics, translation is as important as with verbal communication. Translation is a means of socialization. Tactile communication is an indispensable component of personality development and is subject to cultural patterning, that is, cultural activating or limiting certain aspects of tactile communication—how and when to express oneself through gestures, to what extent and how to cover one's body and so on (Frank 1960). All this time the person communicates with him/herself, their

¹The discussion in this chapter is not an exhaustive list of translation types; the focus is on those that are used in the PS, that is, on interpersonal types of translation. Intersemiotic translation does not figure as a separate type (unlike in Jakobson's classification) because the term is applicable to so many types of translation that the term means little without a further concretization which sign systems are involved. Using the term 'intersemiotic' makes sense only when it is juxtaposed to 'intrasemiotic' (cf. inter-/intra-lingual translation). When a certain type of translation is discussed in terms of whether it involves different sign systems or is carried out within the same semiotic medium, then the former can be classified as intersemiotic and the latter as intrasemiotic. Such generalizations may be useful only as a common denominator allowing comparisons of otherwise completely different types, for instance a translation of one painting into another can be compared with a translation of one composer's musical idea into another composer's piece both being intrasemiotic translations, while a translation of a novel into a film can be compared with a translation from the medium of architecture into a poem as intersemiotic translations. But in all these cases the generalized comparisons will still require specific descriptions of the involved semiotic systems and their interactions.

environment and people in it. Communication means sending and receiving messages as interpretable signs.

As is the case with interlingual translation, while communication goes smoothly, translation is hardly visible and, as has been discussed above, can be mistaken for being transparent. Yet when something goes wrong, then translation or the need thereof becomes obvious. Let us consider the following story:

In his book *The Ra Expeditions*, the well-known scientist and traveller Thor Heyerdahl describes a sort of parade performed in his and his team's honour in an African village by Lake Chad as follows:

a dense line of horsemen appeared at the end of the square and thundered past us at a furious pace, swords drawn, yelling hoarsely. One of the riders was particularly aggressive. Time after time he raced past, his horse's hooves close to our boot-tips, while he leaned towards us, howling and grimacing savagely, his sword whirling appallingly close to our scalps. I tentatively asked the sheriff what this meant and was told that the rider was simply showing off. But Baba [one of the African drivers on Heyerdahl's team] added that he was showing his contempt for us, who were not Moslem. The sultan, on the other hand, showed no contempt. On the contrary, he evinced the greatest interest when he heard that we wanted to learn how to build papyrus boats. (1979: 60)

Heyerdahl did not understand the significance of the horsemen's show, especially the aggressiveness of one of them. He turned to one of the local authorities, the sheriff, for an explanation and was told that the man simply showed off. Baba adds his interpretation of the situation. Heyerdahl, as is obvious from the phrase 'The sultan, on the other hand, showed no contempt', generalized the sheriff's and Baba's answers. He interpreted not only the behaviour of one of the horsemen but of them all. He took the most aggressive one as an extreme manifestation of the 'contempt' of the Muslim locals for the non-Muslim foreigners. He saw, 'on the other hand', that the sultan, also a Muslim, showed no contempt; on the contrary, he 'evinced the greatest interest' in the goal of Heyerdahl's mission to Lake Chad.

This is a case of translation involving kinesics. Heyerdahl could not understand the message communicated to him and his co-travellers through the horsemen's kinetic show. He requested a translation of the gestures and movements he saw. The kinesics of the show was translated

for him. (Let us note in the parenthesis that two quite different translations were provided and the final interpretation of the original message was to be made by Heyerdahl himself. The process is similar to an inquisitive reader's comparison of several different translations of his/her favourite novel and producing a sort of mental compilation of the different versions.)

In this case we see that the kinesics is culturally determined: what was clear to the sultan, Baba and the other village dwellers, was not clear to Heyerdahl and required an explanation: a verbal translation of gestures and movements. This is a type of intersemiotic translation between kinesics and language. More often than not the translation of gestures is done by scanning the body language or gestures of one's interlocutor and transferring the images directly into one's mind where they are subconsciously or consciously interpreted. A good example of the cultural meanings of kinesics can be found in Morris et al. (1979). There we are told (though not in the same terms) that kinetic translation can be conscious or unconscious (*ibid.*: xvii): some gestures are individual and idiosyncratic and made unconsciously, like beating time to one's words while speaking; some gestures are culturally determined like winking and shaking one's fingers as if having touched something hot in a silent conversation between two men after they saw a woman pass by.

In the PS, it has long been realized that cultures differ in their kinesics. Therefore travellers may be advised to be prepared to interpret (= translate) the kinetic communication of different peoples that may use unfamiliar gestures or use familiar gestures but not in the same way the travellers are accustomed to in their home countries. Some sites on the Internet are designed to teach people how to use gestures when communicating outside one's native social environment. An example is a site <https://life-hacker.ru/special/skincare/entitled> 'The Language of Gestures: How not to embarrass yourself in another country.'² The site is a well-illustrated brief list of the most common gestures used differently in different countries. There is a short introduction explaining that one's verbal command of a foreign language may turn out to be insufficient. This is when gestures are helpful, we are told, because they help express ideas without words. Sometimes our incompetency in gestures may cause the 'locals' to smile, sometimes to laugh, but sometimes the 'locals' may react 'inadequately' (from the traveller's point of view). The site is designed to educate Russian

²In Russian: Язык жестов: как не попасть в неловкую ситуацию в другой стране.

travellers with the help of an ‘expert’—the press secretary from Skincare, a Russian producer of cosmetics. Obviously, the company’s education of Russian tourists is part of its advertising campaign, but what is interesting for the purpose of our discussion is that the company identified the basic information on kinetic translation (although not terming it that way) as an attractive subject for its audience—well-off Russians touring the world. They are educated to be self-translators of foreign gestures: they learn the way gestures are used in the countries of their destination and are prepared to translate their ideas into those gestures when foreign words fail them.

Translation of ideas or emotions into gestures, or as I have termed it—kinetic translation, is practiced both within one culture and between different cultures. Intraculturally, kinetic translation is a type of intersemiotic translation (ideas/emotions are transferred into gestures); interculturally, it is a combination of intersemiotic translation (turning ideas/emotions into gestures) and intercultural translation (translating one’s cultural notions into the repertoire of the gestures and body movements of another culture).

The role of extraverbal communication, such as kinetic translation, may become more important when it comes to interpreting the body language of political leaders, especially in the regimes that tend to be totalitarian or authoritarian and a great deal depends on their leaders. In the Russian liberal Internet portal *Snob*, a test on matching President Putin’s body language and the topic he is talking about is jokingly offered to users. The test is introduced as follows:

Every nation survives as it can: the Eskimos distinguish two dozens of types of snow, the Masais know how to kill lions [for which they need to be able to ‘read’ lions’ behaviour—S.T.]. In Russia they learn to understand Putin without words. Especially this skill is useful for regional governors and other officials: immediately after the ‘Direct Line’ [Putin’s annual televised Q&A sessions—S.T.] they rushed to correct problems in their regions, without waiting for the direct order to do so from above. Take the ‘Snob’ test and find out whether you will survive in Russia or whether you can understand Putin without words. (<https://snob.ru/selected/entry/126495?step=2>; accessed 17 September 2017; translation is mine)

Understanding the President’s kinetic language is shown as a survival skill. The test consists of eleven pictures of the President, and a multiple choice of three topics for each one is offered. Once you have chosen your version of the answer, you are prompted to the next stage where your answer is

assessed as either correct or wrong and the phrase Putin spoke in the picture is disclosed. While you are taking the test, your score is kept and after you have finished, you are ‘diagnosed’. For example, if somebody scores only four out of eleven, as I did, s/he is told that ‘perhaps, you don’t have a TV set and the last time you saw the President in a picture of your hospital manager’ (<https://snob.ru/selected/entry/126495?step=12>; accessed 17 September 2017). Perhaps, to survive in Putin’s Russia, someone like me needs more training in the kinetic translation from the President’s body language into what he communicates verbally.

Kinetic translation is present in all human communication and in all face-to-face public discussions. Now kinetic translation is also exercised in virtual interactions. It has permeated a great deal of informal public communication as the emoji symbols. Emoji are digital images added to written messages as a shorthand for emotions experienced by the authors of the messages. Smiling or winking or crying faces and various gestures, such as a waving hand, are added to verbal messages or used on their own as substitutes of words and phrases. Emoji are themselves imitations or, one might say, translations of human gestures and facial expressions.

Intralingual Translation

In Jakobson’s classification, the term ‘intralingual’ is translated as ‘rewording’ and is defined as ‘an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language’ (2012: 127). The explanations of the term ‘intralingual’ in English are, certainly, themselves, examples of intralingual translation. But let us turn to intralingual translation in the PS. It is one of the commonest types of intracultural translation. Participants retell and reword constantly when they explain their own or others’ ideas; they use words of the same language in order to make other words clear and by doing so they clarify or sometimes perhaps, on the contrary, they obfuscate what has already been said in other words.

Il’ia Mil’shtein, a well-known Russian journalist, started one of his blog posts about the military unrest in the east of Ukraine with his intralingual translation, within the Russian language. He intralingually translated the Russian Press Secretary Dmitrii Peskov’s dismissal of criticisms of Russia for stationing three of its motorized rifle divisions near the Ukrainian border in July 2017. Mil’shtein’s text reads as follows: ‘Translated from the Press-Secretarian [language] into Russian, [Peskov’s] phrase means “none

of your damn business” [*ne vashe sobach'e delo*].³ Mil'shtein explained that he sensed irritation in the Press Secretary's comment, which he made plain in his version of Peskov's officialese.

This is an example of how intralingual translation may work in the PS: officialese is rendered into common, even rude language. In this case, the Russian phrase in the journalist's translation attempted to put a name on the emotion he identified—irritation. Literally, the Russian phrase can be rendered as ‘none of your business, you dogs’. This is a rude expression and obviously the Press Secretary could not afford to use it, but in the less-formal PS sector, a journalist translated the phrase from ‘the Press-Secretarian language’ and thereby made the official's irritation explicit. Intralingual translation often moves between stylistic registers: bookish phrases are translated into neutral or colloquial ones and vice versa; sub-standard words and expressions into standard or, as we have just seen with Mil'shtein's translation above, vice versa.

Another axis of intralingual translation is between the professional and common domains of a language. The above-discussed example shows a translation between the Russian political officialese and the Russian informal language. In the PS, there are plenty of examples of terms, once used only in a particular professional sphere, which at some point have penetrated the PS. When they are first introduced they are intralingually translated. For instance, the word ‘hack’ and its derivatives, which only recently was known exclusively to hackers themselves and perhaps to those hunting them, is still a new arrival to the common vocabulary. Therefore some feel that the term still requires translation. Bradley Mitchell translated the term and its derivatives as follows:

In computer networking, hacking is any technical effort to manipulate the normal behavior of network connections and connected systems. A hacker is any person engaged in hacking. The term hacking historically referred to constructive, clever technical work that was not necessarily related to computer systems. Today, however, hacking and hackers are most commonly associated with malicious programming attacks on networks and computers over the Internet. (<https://www.lifewire.com/definition-of-hacking-817991>; accessed 19 September 2017)

³https://snob.ru/selected/entry/127303?utm_source=push&utm_medium=push_notification&utm_campaign=breaking&utm_content=column (accessed 19 September 2017).

The author translates both ‘hacking’ and ‘hacker’ by using less specialized words of the same language.

But, once again, the term is so commonly used today that a translation like Bradley’s seems hardly necessary; moreover, the term ‘hacker’ is now used in intralingual translations of other words. In her article ‘Hackers Are Hijacking Phone Numbers And Breaking Into Email, Bank Accounts: How To Protect Yourself’, Laura Shin writes:

With just your phone number and a little bit of what’s called ‘social engineering’ in which a hacker doesn’t necessarily need technical knowledge but just to convince a customer service rep that they are you, a maliciously intentioned person can break into all the above accounts and more. (<https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2016/12/21/hackers-are-hijacking-phone-numbers-and-breaking-into-email-and-bank-accounts-how-to-protect-yourself/#14d569b6360f>; accessed 19 September 2017)

Here, the assumption is that the word ‘hacker’ is clear to every reader of the article and safe to use in the explanation of the euphemism ‘social engineering’. The intralingual translation is thus the movement from a less known to a better known, from a more implicit linguistic sign to a more explicit one, to a sign in which its meaning is ‘more fully developed’ (cf. Peirce in Jakobson 2012: 127) and is believed by the translator to be expressed more clearly.

In debates, intralingual translation may be offered because the speaker thinks that his/her interlocutors may not or do not understand what s/he says. Another scenario is when intralingual translation is solicited by such phrases (in English) as ‘What do you mean?’ or ‘What is X?’.

It shall be noted that in the intralingual translation (as in the other types of translation) the source and target are hardly ever completely identical. In the above examples while the translators tried to keep the core meaning of the source, they changed the form, or in other words, while they attempted to retain the content plane, they changed the expression plane. Sometimes the change of the form is not contested. This is likely to be the case of neutral, technical cases such as the translation of ‘hacking’ as ‘any technical effort to manipulate the normal behavior of network connections and connected systems’. Sometimes, in situations when the expression plane is likely to be a more sensitive area (as in diplomacy or in expressing one’s opinion in a controversial situation), the form-changing translation may be found inadequate and challenged. Such is the likeliest

scenario if the Russian Press Secretary were to be asked to assess the journalist Mil'shtein's translation of his words about Russia's troops drawing close to the Ukrainian border. Intralingual translation is, therefore, not always as innocuous as it is in the unilingual dictionaries where the right-hand side of an entry, an instance of intralingual translation, is always neutral regardless of the stylistic intensity of the left-hand side, the lexical unit explained (= translated). Once again to refer to Mil'shtein's translation, the situation with intralingual translation in the PS can be diametrically opposite: Peskov's words were neutral while their translation was made stylistically provocative and even offensive.

Interlingual Translation

Interlingual translation is a necessary component of transfers across linguistic boundaries. Paradoxically, there is little mention of translation in the publications on PS (see Chap. 1). This glaring absence is especially noticeable in discussions of PSs in their present-day internationalized or globalized manifestations. Yet without interlingual translation there is little possibility for communicators to go beyond kinetic translation (using gestures): they cannot rely on intralingual translation any longer, now they face another language and to overcome this obstacle, interlingual translation is indispensable.

Obviously along the way, translation may not always be used straightforwardly by faithfully rendering as much as it can from the source to the target language. Translation between languages can be manipulated in favour of one of the debating parties, especially if the debate is less than friendly.

In 2012, the Russian PS engaged in discussions of the case of the punk band *Pussy Riot*, which had offered a mock prayer in the main temple of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour, imploring the Mother of God to chase Putin away. Later the three members of the band, Maria Alekhina, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Ekaterina Samutsevich, were arrested and tried for hooliganism and religious hatred. All the three were pronounced guilty and Alekhina and Tolokonnikova were imprisoned for two years, while Samutsevich was pardoned.

For the purpose of the present discussion, it is interesting to see how the English title of the group was discussed in the public debate. One of the witnesses, Mr. Ugrik, took upon himself the role of interlingual translator (with no evidence that he was qualified to do so). During the trial, in

a hearing, he rendered the name of the band *Pussy Riot* as meaning literally ‘resembling pus’ or ‘containing pus’ and ‘riot’ as meaning ‘debauchery’ (translation is mine; lenta.ru/news/2012/08/01/riot3/; accessed 19 September 2017). Mr. Ugrik offered his Russian version of the expression ‘pussy riot’ to aggravate the accusation, rather than to clarify the meaning of the band’s name. Moreover, in a TV interview, Mr. Ugrik demonstrated that he knew what the English word ‘pussy’ was more likely to mean in the name of the band, but he chose to suggest another translation in the court hearing. An accurate translation was obviously not his goal. He connected two words ‘pus’ and ‘debauchery’ in his rendition of the phrase ‘pussy riot’ so that the band would look worse than it really was. The absurd translation in which both words were mistranslated did not give rise to any questions or doubts on the part of the judge in the courtroom; no expert translator or linguist were invited. The wrong translation offered by Mr. Ugrik was seen as acceptable for a ‘right’ cause (Tyulenev 2013).

Later, the translation of the name of the band became the focus of a large-scale public discussion. Putin himself participated by claiming that the phrase ‘pussy riot’ is indecent both in English and, when translated, in Russian (<http://www.mk.ru/politics/2012/09/06/745487-perevod-slova-pussy-stal-temoy-diskussiy.html>; accessed 19 September 2017). Maria Alekhina, in turn, commented on Putin’s words by offering her Russian translation *bunt kisok* [the riot of pussy cats] and added that this expression is hardly ‘more indecent’ than some of Putin’s own expressions such as *mochit’ v sortirakh* [rub out in the outhouses] when he was talking about the fighting techniques to be used in the Russian–Chechen war of the early 2000s (<http://www.rbc.ru/politics/10/10/2012/5703fdea9a7947fcbd441449>; accessed 19 September 2017).

This time, in the public discussion, experts, such as Simon Shuster, a *Time* correspondent, and translator Marina Boroditskaia, also contributed to the debate by clarifying that there was nothing indecent in the original English expression (<http://www.mk.ru/politics/2012/09/06/745487-perevod-slova-pussy-stal-temoy-diskussiy.html>). This is an instance, perhaps unusual, when interlingual translation is made a topic of public debate (see another example in Chap. 5).

Distribution of Translation

In this chapter, translation was introduced as a variety of the types of transfer. More often than not, translation is used in the PS as a combination of

several types. In the case of translating the expression ‘pussy riot’ for instance, it was a case of the intrasocietal, interlingual and intralingual translation types: the debate was limited to one society using one language (Russian) about possible ways of translating an English expression.

Common sense may suggest that intralingual translation would be found within one society, while interlingual translation would be found in the transnational PSs. The actual distribution is perhaps more complex. Transnational discussions may be conducted in a language shared by the discussants who may come from different countries; for some the language may not be native or for others it can be their mother tongue. Therefore, the participants may find themselves translating from different languages in which they naturally think or translating within one and the same language in which they explain their ideas, rewording them to make sure that the ideas are understood despite their complexity or despite some imperfection in their expression. Sometimes within one society, more languages than one can be used. More research is needed into mapping the distribution of various types of translation in PS debates both intra- and intersocietally.

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Mediating a Compromise

Хочу я с небом примириться...
—М.Ю. Лермонтов

Abstract Translation is examined as an instrument of negotiating compromise. Compromise is interpreted as a useful social mechanism. Different scenarios of compromise in and through translation are analysed. Substitution compromise is sought when the co-principals do not share common ethical values and identify an option of handling a problem outside their usual ways of acting. Intersection compromise unfolds when the co-principals have an overlap in their ethical values. Conjunction compromise is the only way ahead when the co-principals' ethics conflict: then a combination of solutions that only partially agree with either co-principal's convictions. In all three types translation it is shown to be the underlying mechanism of negotiating compromise. The notion of the density of translation problematizes viewing translation as a transparent social agency.

Keywords Compromise • Substitution compromise • Intersection compromise • Conjunction compromise • Density of translation

'I want to make peace with the Heavens' (Mikhail Lermontov, "Demon"; translation is mine—*S.T.*)

A KING OF COMPROMISE

In Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's classic *The Little Prince*, while the principal character, a young prince, travels around some planets and asteroids in the vicinity of his own asteroid, he meets a king who can be considered somewhat peculiar. The king liked to give orders, as all kings do seeing everybody around them as their subjects, but at the same time he made a point of giving only wise and reasonable orders. When Little Prince, tired from his travel, yawned, the king forbade him to yawn as that was a breach of the etiquette of behaving in the king's presence. But Little Prince explained that he was tired and simply could not help yawning. Immediately the king changed his order and commanded Little Prince to yawn. However, that did not work either: Little Prince could not yawn at will. So the king ordered Little Prince sometimes to yawn and sometimes not to yawn, although this order turned the very notion of order into something contrary to its nature of exactitude: an order followed by its precise fulfilment. This slightly vexed the king. Then we learn more about this mechanism of the King's reasonable yet absolute monarchy. He tolerated no disobedience but commanded only what could be realistically obeyed. He would not order a general to become a sea bird because that was impossible to fulfil; or he would not require the sun to set until it reaches the point where it naturally goes beyond the horizon.

What the king was doing is essentially compromising. He had a really important goal—maintaining his 'absolute' monarchy when none of his orders is disobeyed. Yet he realized, to have all his commands fulfilled he had to order reasonably and realistically. To achieve the main goal, he was willing to sacrifice other things and his unreasonable wishes, although theoretically as an absolute monarch, he was supposed to be able to order whatever he wanted. The king, however, was wise enough to appreciate that it was impossible to reach an absolute 'consensus' between his uncurbed wishes and the world as it was. Therefore his absolute monarchy was not quite absolute after all, for he had to make concessions. And that is what he constantly did. He constantly compromised. He had to be a king of compromise in order to be an absolute monarch.

In Chap. 1, it was said that all communication in the PS is inevitably discussion. Trade-offs are perhaps the most common outcome of communication in the PS (excepting radical forms of dictatorship, but even dictatorships cannot last forever). In today's world, the situation when one party wins while the other parties lose is a rare case. The absolute majority,

if not all, social interactions are necessarily of the give-and-take nature for various reasons of practicality in joint actions.

Involved parties have to negotiate a compromise where they make concessions and are prepared to go halfway when compared to their initial intentions. Translation plays an important role in negotiating compromises. Reaching a compromise requires understanding, at least partial, of the other side(s). This, in turn, necessitates a mediating agency whether performed by the interacting parties themselves or by a separate agent. In the former case, the interacting agents interpret their opponents' acts by turning on their internal translating mechanism. Famously, in an essay of 1813 Friedrich Schleiermacher described this mechanism when he wrote that translation is needed not only between languages or dialects:

even contemporaries who share a dialect but belong to different classes that rarely come together in social intercourse and diverge substantially in their education are commonly unable to communicate save through a similar mediation. Yea, are we not often compelled to translate for ourselves the utterances of another who, though our compeer, is of different opinions and sensibility? Compelled to translate, that is, wherever we feel that the same words upon our own lips would have a rather different import than upon his, or at least weigh here the more heavily, there the more lightly, and that, would we express just what he intended, we must needs employ quite different words and turns of phrase; and when we examine this feeling more closely so that it takes on the character of thought, it would appear that we are translating. (2012: 43)

Besides being an indispensable component of every social communicative act, translation has another role to play. By its very presence, it lets the parties appreciate (1) the existence of differences between them, (2) the difficulties of finding a 'common denominator', which would allow them to compare their claims, and (3) linguistic, cultural and semiotic aspects of communicating with the 'other'. Translation is a mechanism not only for achieving a (compromised) decision, but also a powerful instrument for developing the ability to hear, both literally and metaphorically, the 'other' (see more on this in Chap. 4).

The goal of the PS debate was initially thought to be consensus, but in today's diversified and still diversifying PS, the question of consensus becomes much more complex and complicated, and the hope to reach it is the hope to reach utopia (McKee 2005: 14–19). Rather, compromise

becomes the acceptable and expected goal of public discussions (cf. Smith 1956). Today's PS is the domain in which a king of compromise rules.

AN ACCOMPLICE OR AN AID?

Theorizing compromise ranges from seeing it as something negative to more balanced views, when compromise is said to have both negative and positive connotations. Compromise is needed not only in the context of a conflict. In Lepora and Goodin (2013: 29) compromise is discussed as a type of 'engagement with others who would do wrong'. Such framing of compromise makes it look like a close synonym of complicity in wrongdoing. Yet, arguably, compromise in the PS is the goal of any dialogue, not necessarily of an acrimonious dispute and not necessarily involving wrongdoing.

In Margalit (2010: 5), compromises are 'our second-best choices, and often not even that'. However, theorizing compromise in the political realm Avishai Margalit considers compromise as an ambivalent concept: sometimes it may be good, sometimes bad. He compares compromises with bacteria. Bacteria are necessary for humans to exist. Yet some of them are pathogenic and we use antibiotics to fight them. We need good compromises, they help humans with different views coexist in society, but we need to resist 'rotten compromises that are lethal for the moral life of a body politic' (Margalit 2010: 7). Margalit's message, thus, is a balanced view:

On the whole, political compromises are a good thing. Political compromises for the sake of peace are a very good thing. Shabby, shady, and shoddy compromises are bad but not sufficiently bad to be always avoided at all costs, especially not when they are concluded for the sake of peace. Only rotten compromises are bad enough to be avoided at all costs. But then, rotten compromises are a mere tiny subset of the large set of possible political compromises. (2010: 16)

TRANSLATION QUA COMPROMISE

How can compromise be defined? According to *Oxford Dictionary of English*, compromise is 'an agreement or settlement of a dispute that is reached by each side making concessions' and 'an intermediate state between conflicting alternatives reached by mutual concession'. The word comes from Latin: *com-* 'together' + *pro-* 'forward' + *mittere* 'send'. It is a

joint action aimed at achieving a mutually acceptable decision on which the involved parties promise to act in future, that is, after the decision has been made and agreed upon. The idea of ‘promise’ emphasizes the binding nature of compromise.

Translation is also a joint action that is *always* a compromise. At least, it is necessarily and inevitably a compromise on the level of language (in the broad sense of the word—medium of communication). Kinetic translation is a compromise between semiotic media. Intralingual translation is a compromise of language registers. Interlingual translation is a compromise at least on the level of verbal languages; frequently, it also involves a compromise between cultural values.

THE MECHANICS OF COMPROMISE

Let us look closely at how compromise works. Compromise is an agreement between two or more parties and implementing such an agreement makes compromise a joint action. Lepora and Goodin (2013: 18), while discussing compromise and seeing it as doing ‘something deeply wrong’, says that in compromise the compromisers are themselves compromised. Lepora and Goodin call the people involved in complicity and the next ‘wrong’ thing, compromise, co-principals. Co-principals send us to one of the meanings of the word ‘principal’ used in legal English for ‘the person directly responsible for a crime’ (*Oxford Dictionary of English*). In what follows, the term ‘co-principal’ as well as the term ‘compromise’ are going to be used in a broader sense allowing for both positive and negative connotations (more in line with Margalit 2010). Lepora and Goodin (2013) place compromise next to conspiracy, intrigue, stratagem, plot and those who compromise are seen as conspirators, plotters, connivers. Following Margalit, I will consider compromise as an ambivalent concept and social action, but I will draw on Lepora and Goodin’s discussion of the mechanism of compromise.

The compromising people are all compromised in the sense that their original sets of convictions and beliefs undergo a change resulting from the exposure to the viewpoint of the other co-principal (or co-principals).

Conflict

Conflicts are usually understood as disagreements, arguments and serious disputes which sometimes may imply clashes, ideational or even bloody

physical confrontations. Since my discussion of compromise is more inclusive and aims at theorizing translation as a type of compromise, I propose to understand conflict also broadly, i.e. embracing its metaphorical manifestations—as contradictions between opinions, values, interests, principles etc. Even differences between languages can be understood as conflicts which, in interlingual translation, are compromised. Conflict, thus, is understood in what follows as a broader concept of discrepancy which is to be resolved.

The need for translation arises in a situation of difference. That is how translation was theorized by Roman Jakobson (2012: 127): ‘translation involves two equivalent messages in two different codes’ and belongs to ‘the cardinal problem’ of ‘equivalence in difference’. Jakobson’s statement, however, reflects the situation after translation has identified the equivalence and produced a result, but translation qua process is the medium in which two different codes meet and in which equivalence between what is or can be expressed by them is negotiated. Translation, first, serves as the locus for identifying the common denominator between code A and code B, which are always different, even within one and the same human language or culture (there are no social clones, all use the same language and culture more or less differently). Only after the translating agency has finished its, sometimes quite challenging and painful, job of squaring a circle, the picture painted by Jakobson is observable: equivalence between the two codes is established and the two messages expressed in them are found to be (more or less) equivalent.

Counterarguments of ‘stretching’ the notions of conflict and translation may be that such theorization dilutes both concepts. The answer to these objections can be that, first, the definitions of the word ‘conflict’ in English and ‘translation’ allow that inclusiveness. Second, by permitting this stretching, we make an epistemological move in the direction of putting both concepts in a class of similar phenomena. This allows us to understand their nature better in a context of and in a comparison with those similar phenomena.

Dramatis Personae

Lepora and Goodin (2013: 18) describe compromise as consisting of two parts: agreeing a plan and implementing it. Different parties contribute differently to these two parts: some may ‘do’ things, ‘omit’ to do things, ‘permit’, ‘induce’ or ‘enable’ things to be done or to happen. Obviously

the type of action performed by every party makes their contribution weightier or lighter: they may do something or only permit something to be done/to happen.

It should be noted that compromise starts with intrapersonal juggling of available options. This is a good example of intrapersonal translation-like process: the person takes stock of possible solutions to a problem s/he faces and selects one or combines several and translates those solutions into actions. This makes us all translators, and these intrapersonal processes can be seen as translations (Tyulenev 2011: 68–70). Preparing oneself for a compromise is letting in on one's horizon of action possibilities some principles that otherwise might not have been let in and, therefore, even at this planning stage there is self-compromisation (emphatically, the term is used as having a neutral connotation). This is intrapersonal translation, that is, performed within the person's mind, whether consciously or un-, sub- or semiconsciously. This is how all translation works: it allows the other, the translated side, enter the translating side (I described this mechanism in more formalistic terms and in a greater detail in Tyulenev 2011: 150–157).

Agreeing with somebody to act in a compromised fashion is compromising with that person (or several persons). This is also the interpersonal manifestation of translation qua compromise. The difference between intra- and interpersonal translation is the nature of mediating agency. In the case of intrapersonal translation, the translating agent is intrapersonal; one person can be said to be the realm to which translation is limited. Indeed, one of the person's ideas is a source, and the realm of actions is the target into which the initial idea is translated. In this case, the translation is done by the person's mind, (un/sub/semi)consciously.

In the case of interpersonal translation, there is a translating agency that is separate from the source and the target. A usual case of interlingual translation or interpreting is a typical example. There may be one person (a translator/interpreter) or a group of persons (a translating/interpreting team) or there may be a piece of technology (a computer-assisted translation tool or a translating machine), but in all these cases the translating agency is emancipated from the mediated agencies.

The compromisation of the participants if we factor in translation in the first and second phases of compromise, planning and implementation, needs to be further discussed when compared to what Lepora and Goodin (2013) suggest. First, translation happens even if the co-principals do not have anybody mediating between them, a separate agent (whether a person

or a piece of technology). When entering any social communication (to emphasize once again—any communication is a compromise that implies negotiating between the communicators' differences), all interlocutors do translate, at least intrapersonally—the co-principals weigh their own and one another's actions, words, gestures or attitudes, and juggle available options of reaction. Second, if there is a human mediator who translates the co-principals' communication, the question is: to what extent is the translator compromised him/herself and what is his/her contribution to the co-principals' compromise? Is the translator's contribution beneficial, neutral (if that is possible) or pernicious?

Let us discuss in more detail translation as a compromise. As far as the medium of communication is concerned, any translation, intra- or interlingual, within one semiotic domain or between two or more different ones, is always and inevitably a compromise. Remember, Jakobson spoke of translation as 'equivalence in difference' (2012: 127). Jakobson demonstrates how a compromise of equivalence in difference can be achieved by giving an example of how the Northeast Siberian Chukchees handled new technological notions introduced into their lifestyle: they forged new expressions recycling words of their language, for instance 'screw' was rendered as 'rotating nail' (ibid.: 128). The latter is not a natural expression in the target language. Although expressed according to the grammatical and syntactic rules of the target language and using its vocabulary, the word combination expresses a new content. Therefore, it is a compromise between the source (most probably Russian) and the target language.

In fact, the linguistic compromise is a range of options between the source and target languages. The target text can be either closer to the source text and its language, or more or less removed from it by adapting it to the target language (there is a broad Translation Studies literature on that, see for example an overview in Pym 2014: 11–16). Neither translation procedure is practiced in its absoluteness, otherwise (1) the source text should be left untranslated or (2) it will be so adapted to the target language that no foreignness, or 'otherness', will be left in it. In case (1), the target-language 'rendition' will be equal to its original: it will be a wholesale transfer of the original into the target language and culture and this can hardly be considered translation at all. Indeed, if the source text can be understood without rendering its linguistic and cultural features into the target language, then there is no translation involved, just a physical transition of the source text to another locale. The wholesale interlingual

borrowing from the source into the target text is practicable only on a small scale—a term or a phrase can be borrowed (recall the Italian word *mio* in Coetzee’s novel *Disgrace* written in English (see Chap. 2)).

In case (2), the transfer approximates to an almost complete adaptation of the source text to the target culture. For instance, all the original proper names may be replaced with proper names of the target language and, for instance, an Italian text will appear as a Russian one. In history, some translations have been ‘naturalized’ in their target languages and cultures, but at least some trace of the source is likely to be left. Aleksey Tolstoy’s *Zolotoi kliuchik, ili Prikliucheniiia Buratino* [*The Golden Key, or The Adventures of Buratino*] (1935), being inspired by Carlo Collodi’s *The Adventures of Pinocchio, or The Tale of a Puppet* [*Le avventure di Pinocchio. Storia d’un burattino*] (1883), is such a radical reworking of the original that it is viewed by nearly all its Russian readers as a story written originally in Russian. Yet there are some hints at the Italian original: the name of the main character *Buratino* comes from the Italian *burattino* [puppet], being in Russian only a proper name that does not tell much the Russian reader who may not even suspect its Italian meaning; the names of other characters are also clearly non-Russian *Karlo* [Carlo] or *Dzshuzeppe* [Giuseppe]. Thus, even this radical translation is inevitably and, perhaps, inescapably a compromise.

Languages stand for cultures and consequently trying to achieve a compromise between languages means negotiating between cultures that make the Jakobsonian search for equivalence in difference even more challenging. Eugene Nida gave a very vivid and unusual, geometrical, illustration of what happens when a translator renders a text from one culture into another. Imagine an English-speaking translator, a representative of a culture diagrammed by Nida as a triangle, attempting to convey a Biblical message, a product of a Middle-Eastern culture of a certain period and represented by a square, into some other language-cum-culture represented by a circle (1964: 147–149). The result is never completely ‘neat’ because no matter how hard you would try to overlay a triangle, a square and a circle one on another, something will always stick out. Essentially the same happens when translation is performed technologically: the task a piece of technology is given is to strike a happy medium between the two interacting linguistic codes while expressing the source content with all its cultural aura by means of the target language with its cultural presuppositions and implications. Little surprise that more often than not technology butchers the original message in the target language. Human translating agency, at least so far and especially in more creatively and ambivalently

expressed types of message, is more successful owing to some inherently human ability to comprehend and compromise: on the one hand, to read both the lines and between the lines, so to speak, and to navigate between the Scylla of keeping too closely to the original, running the risk of producing gibberish in the target language, and the Charybdis of flying too far away from the original message. So far, humans are better in acting transculturally (*trans-* in Latin meaning ‘across’ or ‘beyond’), that is, while existing in one culture handling elements of another.¹

Compromise is usually discussed at the backdrop of ethics. What can be said about translation’s and translators’ compromise in this respect? The translator (excluding intrapersonal translation) is not necessarily a co-principal in a compromise but translation, that is, the process and the result or product of the translator’s activity, should be considered as part of the actual compromise because the co-principals act based on translation, its quality qua process and especially qua result. In the present discussion we cannot go into details of the ethics of translation and interpreting. The literature on the ethics of translation/interpreting is growing (see for instance Bermann and Wood 2005; Meschonnic 2011; Venuti 1998; Pym 2001, 2012; Inghilleri 2012; Strowe 2016; Drugan and Tipton 2017), here I will draw on some of the ideas pertinent to translators/interpreters’ contribution to PS.

¹Anthony Pym’s term ‘intercultural’ and ‘in-betweenness’ in reference to translation and translators seems somewhat misleading or, at best, ambiguous in that Pym stresses that he talks about translators ‘work[ing] in the intersections woven between two or more cultures’ (2012: 9). The term ‘intercultural’ primarily suggests that they ‘belong entirely to an intercultural space’ (ibid.), a void between the interacting cultures, a ‘third’ place which would lead one to hypothesize some sort of translators’ culture which is ‘between’ Language and Culture A and Language-Culture B. Pym takes pains to avoid such understanding of the term ‘intercultural’, rather arguing for it to mean the intersections of the languages and cultures. ‘Transcultural’ seems to be a less ambiguous term because it expresses the idea that, while being rooted in one culture, the translator reaches out across the linguistic and cultural boundaries, to another language-and-culture. The translator gains expertise in and operational understanding of another language-and-culture in addition to her/his first language-and-culture and becomes able to operate in the intersections woven from the elements of the two (or more) interacting cultures. The concept of ‘in-betweenness’ of the translating agency is also a rather confusing metaphorization of the physical in-betweenness of interpreters when they are usually placed between (and sometimes slightly behind) interacting individuals. Translation is an oscillation between elements of the interacting linguocultures (Tyulenev 2011: 155–156), which does not produce a hybrid or ‘third’ language-and-culture that would be comparable to linguistic pidgins or creoles, that is why, incidentally, all occurrences of translationese are deprecated.

In his study of compromise in society, T.V. Smith discussed mediation as part of the structure of compromise (1956: 60). He wrote that compromise is a positive and only just solution to conflicts in society. The just nature of such a settlement of conflicts is ensured by a third party. For Smith ‘such settlement is politics; such a third party is the politician’ (ibid.). The focus in my discussion of compromise will be on another social agent who acts as a third party *qua* mediator in the PS—the translator.

Georg Simmel spoke about two types of social communicative units—with two and three elements (1950: 145–169). When a dyadic interaction includes a mediator, it becomes a triad. Simmel distinguished between three types of such triads depending on three different roles of mediation: (1) non-partisan (when the mediator is impartial in relation to the mediated parties), (2) the *tertius gaudens* (literally, ‘the third who enjoys’; when the mediator takes advantage of the conflict between the mediated parties), and (3) the dominant mediator (intentionally creating division according to the principle *divide et impera* in order to gain power over the mediated parties).

The picture with regard to translators and interpreters *qua* mediators is more complex. Anthony Giddens conceptualized social agency as a range of stratified levels from unconscious pressures and motives experienced by every individual social actor through interpersonal communication to social institutions. These levels constantly interact and influence one another. Some of these interactions may be registered by the consciousness of the individual involved; some go unnoticed hidden in the depths of the person’s psyche. On the one hand, agents ‘monitor continuously the flow of their activities and expect others to do the same for their own’ (Giddens 1984: 5). On the other, any actor can consciously only give an account of some of his/her actions. Many an action is performed sub- or semiconsciously initiated by some deep-seated causes of which the actor is often completely ignorant. Giddens brings into his social theory psychoanalysis (1984: 45–60). Such a multi-layered view of social agency makes an analysis of a particular translator’s behaviour a task that cannot as yet be tackled adequately and in all the complexity required. What can be confirmed with a fair degree of certainty by many if not all practicing translators and interpreters that impartiality is in fact a *rara avis*. It is so rare that being impartial in performing their professional duties is something that translators/interpreters have to learn and even with a great deal of experience not infrequently translators/interpreters have to suppress whatever

biases, gut reactions, sympathies and aversions that surface into their consciousness (who knows how many do not!). This interplay of motivations, personal attitudes and moods manifest themselves not only in ‘big’ ways, that is, in clearly biased words or gestures, rather they may add a tincture of emotion here, a shade of meaning there, or they may influence the interpreter’s body language unbeknownst to him or her. Translators and interpreters are not robots after all, like all humans they develop attitudes to what they are doing and to whom they are dealing with.

A recent empirical research into interpreters’ behaviour (although not so much in the PS) confirms what has just been said. According to the present-day ethical imperatives of translation, written and tacitly agreed, translators and interpreters are supposed to act impartially, but in her studies of interpreters involved in the legal work with asylum seekers and refugees, Moira Inghilleri demonstrates that these interpreters are subject to many factors, such as ‘the nature of their relationship to the individuals, communities, or institutions involved; whether they have or can acquire some professional authority or autonomy in the specific context; and their own prior experiences, values, and beliefs’ (2012: 41). Such a complexity of potential allegiances makes it difficult to map interpreters’ and translators’ complex behaviours and motivations onto Simmel’s three scenarios. Also, Simmel’s mediation tends to be rather negative: two scenarios, (2) and (3) are the scenarios in which the mediator pursues his/her own gain from the mediated interaction. Translators may act as mediators with their own agendas in mind, but they can also act by contributing positively and constructively to the interactions they mediate. Examples abound in experiences of many people who benefitted from translation when dealing with a foreigner and in the histories of nations and organizations that, thanks to translation, could act beyond the immediateness of their geographical boundaries and overcome the manacles of the linguistic confines. Inghilleri convincingly argues for a more participatory interpreter ethics according to which interpreters (in her case, but also translators) are viewed as ‘active, key players in interpreted communication, facilitating open negotiations over meaning and maximizing the possibility that the communicative objectives of all participants are met; they require codes of practice in which principles like neutrality or impartiality are not taken to mean the abdication of personal and social responsibility in their role’ (2012: 51). This is an appeal to officials using interpreters’ services in situations of power asymmetries, for example, under interrogation-like circumstances where the interpreter mediates between an official and an asylum seeker,

to view translators and interpreters as more than just talking ‘transparent’ go-betweens or conduits.

In the PS, the imbalances of power occur as well, and there, too, translators/interpreters should be allowed more prominence, both practically and theoretically. As we saw in Chap. 1, translators of *Global Voices* can select materials they translate and that is an important way in which they can influence discussions in the PS. Of course, not all translators in the PS are as free, some of them may work for mass media where they are given texts to translate and where they must observe certain imposed policies. If so, translators can contribute something of their own, but only ‘under the radar’, as some of the interpreters do (Inghilleri 2012: 30).

Thus, as was the case with the discussion of the ecology of PS communication in Chap. 1, factoring in translation and translators/interpreters when the ethics of PS (mediated) communication is enquired into, the repertoire of existing interaction scenarios is to be enlarged. In addition to Simmel’s three cases, which can be imagined graphically as covering the range from zero to negative values on a measuring axis, rather undermining the co-principals’ efforts to compromise, TIS, having looked for decades into translation and interpreting and their social and cultural impact, adds the other half of the axis with the positive values. The translator/interpreter as a mediator can be non-partisan or a *tertius gaudens* or a dominant mediator, but they can also act as offering their own experience and expertise, which may help various publics conduct constructive and mutually beneficial discussions.

Scenarios

At least three scenarios of compromise can be distinguished. In what follows I loosely draw on the discussion in Lepora and Goodin (2013: 20–23), applying their compromise scenarios to translation. Translation is viewed as a means to achieve compromise and as a compromise itself.

Substitution compromise is a situation when Agent 1 has one set of principles as regards an issue—{A, B}, and Agent 2 has another set of principles as regards the issue—{C, D}. The sets do not intersect and the agents arrive at a compromise, a solution that is not part of either agent’s initial set of principles—{E}.

Let us imagine a translator working in a news agency. She and a news presenter work as a team translating news from Language A into Language B and preparing a news release. In the news they are working on today,

there is one item that is controversial because it may be understood as a misrepresentation of the target country, and the translator and the news presenter are thinking whether to render the news as it stands in the original or simply exclude it from the news report. The translator opts for the first scenario, while the news presenter for the second. The translator argues her case by saying that the news may not be what the target audience would like to hear, but it is an important piece of information for them to understand what some people think about their country and the original text should be rendered in full. The news presenter says that the news may be misinterpreted by a part of the less sophisticated audience who may think that it was included on purpose by the news agency in order to cause a strong reaction and undermine the people's self-esteem; as a result, the news agency may be embroiled in a scandal and would have a great deal of explaining to do, which would ultimately backfire on both the translator and the news presenter. Eventually the translator and the presenter agree to couch the news in general terms leaving out the most unsavoury parts. The translator's ideal action would be to render the piece of news in its entirety; the news presenter's ideal action would be to avoid the potentially scandalous item all together. The final decision is a compromise substituting the ideal options of the agents involved. The translator's compromise reflected in the translated text leads to a compromise between several standpoints: the most radical of components of the news are turned into milder variants; as a result, an opinion expressed in the source text is made less harsh; the presenter is persuaded not to remove the controversial piece of news but to introduce it in a softer version. Perhaps in the long run, the two involved countries or communities would retain their ability to continue a dialogue.

Intersection compromise is a situation when Agent 3's set of principles is {F, G} and Agent 4's is {G, H}. There is an intersection {G}, and a compromise is achieved based on {G}. Let us imagine that a translator brings a first draft of the novel she was hired to translate. The editor who works with her on the book notices that the translator is a champion of the idea of the so-called foreignizing approach. The editor explains to her that the policy of the publishing house is to offer audience what he calls 'highly readable translations of foreign authors'. The translator, being a professional able to apply various translation strategies, reworks her draft in accordance with the publishing house's policy. Her set of professional convictions allows for more than one approach to translation and when the editor requested a different approach, she compromised, although now and then she may

have, half surreptitiously and, perhaps, half subconsciously, been leaning towards source-oriented options and chosen translation variants favouring a foreignizing strategy. The publishers and eventually the readers received a compromised or, one might say, more balanced version of the novel. The ideal translation strategy for the translator would have been to introduce the novel to the reading public as a clearly foreign work of literature; the ideal translation strategy for the editor was to produce a novel that would provide the public with a smoothly reading book; the compromise was based on the overlap of the two approaches.

Conjunction compromise is when Agent 5's set of principles {I, J} has nothing in common with Agent 6's set of principles, {not-I, not-J}, moreover the two sets are in conflict with one another and a substitution compromise is out of the question. Then, the solution is found in a combination of some elements of each set, for instance {I, not-J}. Neither side is fully satisfied yet agrees to go along with the other co-principal because both consider having a compromise, even at the expense of some of their principles, would help to improve the situation more than having no compromise, holding back, doing nothing at all and consequently having no hope to remedy the unsatisfactory state of affairs or to do something that needs to be done.

Let us imagine a situation when an interpreter is invited to interpret in a meeting or a conference. He is a professional and always prepares for interpreting sessions: he learns as much as possible about the subject matter, goes through the new vocabulary and brushes up the vocabulary he has worked with already. And this time he asked the organizers to supply him with any materials that might help him learn the terminology to be used, about the topics to be discussed, for example. However in the evening right before the conference he is sent only the finalized programme of the event. He feels disappointed and is put into an awkward situation. He phones one of the organizers and tells her that because he has not been supplied with any helpful materials as was agreed, he is going to withdraw. The organizer begs him to reconsider on the condition that they will not be too demanding as to those aspects of his performance as an interpreter that he cannot improve because of their fault. Next day the interpreter works not as effectively as he would like to and the organizers have to live without the quality of the mediation they hoped for. The interpreter's ideal solution to the situation would be to turn the job down; the organizers' desire is to get the best possible interpreting (although without 'bothering' to provide the interpreter with any materials at all or with a bare

minimum and at the last moment); the compromise is that both have to concede to a scenario that would respect only some, but not all of their ideal expectations.

Conjunction compromise is a situation in which both of the co-principals do something they usually would not do and this conception of compromise can be applied on a broader scale—as unusual or compromising patterns of behaviour of the involved parties. For instance, translators and interpreters, while in their professional settings such as translation agencies or in-house translation services in an organization, do not normally initiate translation projects, they withhold their opinions about what they translate; their managers and clients expect them to handle only the actual interlingual transfer. Sometimes, however, translators and interpreters may offer their comments and suggestions and their superiors and clients may accept such propositions. This kind of interaction between translators and interpreters on the one hand (whether professional or amateur) and those whom they help to communicate is more common in the PS where translators and interpreters tend to assume a more independent role and participate in a discussion on an equal footing with the other interlocutors. While professional translators/interpreters may experience qualms about such behaviour (Inghilleri 2012), outside their professional settings, they may feel freer.

Earlier I discussed the case of the *Pussy Riot* band. In 2012, in Russia, there was a trial of the three young women of the punk band *Pussy Riot* for their punk prayer and song ‘Mother of God, chase Putin away’. Now I would like to consider the same case from another point of view. Besides the tendentious witness Mr. Ugrik, Vladimir Putin, the object of the prayer, also commented on the group’s name. In an article published by the newspaper *Moskovskii Komsomolets* (see MK in References), there is a story about how Putin discussed with a *Russia Today* journalist Kevin Owen how to translate ‘pussy’ from English into Russian. Putin challenged the journalist to translate the first word of the combination ‘pussy riot’ and disagreed with him that the word should be translated as ‘cat’ but did not offer a ‘correct’ version because, according to Putin, it was ‘too obscene’ (www.youtube.com/watch?v=7kKIY8Jskas, accessed 16 October 2017).

Three journalists of *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, Andrei Iashlavskii, Viktoriia Prikhod’ko and Vera Kopylova, took the discussion further and turned to experts, among them a translator, Marina Boroditskaia, with the question ‘How should the expression *pussy riot* be translated?’ Boroditskaia denied

that there was anything rude in the phrase ‘pussy riot’ and she considered absurd any translation of the phrase using Russian obscene or swear words.

Boroditskaia’s participation in the discussion is an example of a translator doing something unusual: she was not giving an interview concerning her own work—rather she commented on the subject of a public discussion. Her action, unusual for a translator, contributed to negotiating an informed appreciation of a controversial situation in a PS debate. The journalists citing her also acted somewhat unusually: they did not interview Boroditskaia but elicited specifically her opinion on a particular topic, with the goal of juxtaposing that opinion with other opinions and balancing the discussion at hand in which even a president’s opinion was, by the word of an expert, made to function in the PS as but an opinion, and not the most informed one at that. Thus, this uncommon, compromising behaviour of both sides served the common good in that it ‘advance[d] informed decision making and contribute[d] to the well-being of the greater society’ (Fitzpatrick and Bronstein 2006: ix).

To conclude this section, compromise in the PS is omnipresent and unavoidable. It starts when there is a choice to be made between conflicting (= different) phenomena or parties. Translators compromise between media, and translation, the product of their compromise between languages and cultures in interlingual translation or in between media in intersemiotic translation, contributes to achieving a compromise between debating parties. The choice made by mediators or co-principals, if they mediate without involving a separate agent, between available options may cause ethical considerations or sometimes even struggles. Conflicts between competing options may start at the level of interlingual transfer. As more involved matters come into play, complex or controversial contents, cultural peculiarities of texts to be translated and so forth, conflicts are likely to intensify, the translator’s contribution to the interaction is likely to grow and the translation layer in the PS communicative ecology is likely to become denser.

THE DENSITY OF TRANSLATION

Translation has been shown in Chap. 2 to be a hyaline screen between interacting parties. The hyaline fluid in cartilage or the vitreous humour in our eyeballs varies in its density, which in turn affects its ability to let light through. In this chapter I will discuss various degrees of the density of translation.

The notion of translation's density should be distinguished from the concept of thickness as used in Translation Studies. For the first time it was applied to describing translation by Kwame Anthony Appiah in his article 'Thick Translation', originally published in 1993 (see a reprint in Appiah 2012). In academic environments students need help and guidance when literary works of different peoples and different periods are introduced to them so that they would appreciate, among other things, the 'foreignness' of the texts they read. Appiah championed the type of translation of such works that contains "[a] thick description of the context of literary production" (ibid.: 341). A thick translation would retain a rich trail of its foreign source text's features, such as culturally specific terms, perhaps unusual imagery or morphological constructs and syntactic patterns. The notion of thick translation was productive in theorizing translation in postcolonial contexts (e.g. Cheung 2007) and in translating 'the other' understood in a more inclusive fashion (e.g. when discussing feminist translation, Wolf 2003).

The concept of 'thickness' (together with the term) came into Translation Studies from anthropology. Clifford Geertz, a leading American anthropologist of the twentieth century, called for ethnography as 'thick description' of studied cultures (Geertz 1993). He borrowed the concept from Gilbert Ryle, a British philosopher, and distinguished between thin and thick types of description as ethnographic methods. Thin description simply names observed phenomena, while thick description gives details of what is observed. Thin description may lead to distortions of observed phenomena that may only seem similar to or reminiscent of something in the observer's own culture but may have significant differences from the latter. Calling a woman living with a man in one culture 'marriage' may give an impression that this cohabitation is little different from what marriage as a legal institution is in another culture, but the union of a woman with a man in another culture may be dissimilar from 'marriage' in any number of aspects. That is where a thick description would help. A thick description of the nature of the cohabitation of the woman with the man would have a better chance of capturing its cultural specificity.

Translation can also be thin or thick, but translation can also be described in terms of its density. How thin or thick translation would be is up to the translator or whoever influences the choice of translation strategy. Density of translation, to the contrary, is an ever-present natural property of translation dependent to a large degree on the semiotic and pragmatic properties of the message to be transferred. Translation is always

dense to a greater or lesser extent. The translator does not need to work to attain (unlike in the case of thickness). Translation is always hyaline and, consequently, it has a degree of density like the vitreous humour or cartilage. However, as with all other hyaline substances, density of translation varies from case to case.

DEGREES OF TRANSLATION'S DENSITY

Let us consider the following passage:

(1) Are you concerned about the welfare of the earth? Do you want to do what you can to save it? With bad news about global warming, dying oceans, and endangered animals flooding us on a daily basis, it's hard to know where to start. It may seem like the actions of one person won't make a difference, but there are actually many ways you can help. Here are some suggestions for changing your personal habits and educating others to make a fruitful impact. (<https://www.wikihow.com/Help-Save-the-Earth>; accessed 7 December 2017)

Interlingual translation here would be quite straightforward if not into all languages, at least into many of them. The content of the passage can be almost universally understood (and it is intended to be so). The translator here needs to overcome only the linguistic boundary: s/he has to express the content by means of the target language.

Let us consider another passage:

(2) This has been bugging me for a while, and finally crystallised on Saturday, when we made a shopping trip across London. The intention was to go to a designer warehouse sale in unsalubrious Finsbury Park, but we ended up going via Chelsea and Kensington. (<http://www.christopherfowler.co.uk/blog/2013/02/16/more-london-paradoxes/>; accessed 7 December 2017)

How to translate this? There are names of several neighbourhoods in London. There is a hint that they are of different degrees of prestige and affordability: the text is worded in such a way that 'unsalubrious Finsbury Park' is clearly contrasted with Chelsea and Kensington, the clauses being separated by a 'but'. The question is how to let the target language reader, who may not necessarily be aware of the London geography and the distribution of prestige and wealth in it, appreciate the message. The translator may leave the markers of the contrast as they are in the original running

the risk to over-rely on the target reader's perspicacity, or depending on the degree of freedom at his/her disposal, s/he may come up with a range of 'pointers' from inserting minimal explanations (for instance, by adding telling adjectives, equivalent in the target language to such English adjectives as 'expensive' or 'posh' for Chelsea and Kensington, syntactically mirroring and semantically clashing with the adjective 'unsalubrious' used for Finsbury Park) to replacing the English proper names with comparable neighbourhood names in the target culture when it is more important that the names are clear to the target reader, rather than that they stand for the particular neighbourhoods in London, UK (cf. radical theatrical translations in Quebec, Canada, as analysed in Brisset 1996). In any case the translation, whatever the translation strategy may be, would require more on the part of the translating agency than in case (1). Translation would involve not only a transfer on the level of the source and target languages but also a handling of the cultural specificity of the original text. Translation is likely to grow denser than in the previous case: it would be language-cum-culture dense.

Let us consider a third passage:

(3) As the refugee crisis worsens, millions of men, women and children face an uncertain future. But what can *you* do about it? (<http://www.refugee-action.org.uk/heres-can-help-refugees/>; accessed 7 December 2017; emphasis in the original)

In example (3), the goal of the statement is to plead with the reader to take the refugee crisis seriously and consider what s/he can contribute to resolving it. 'You' is graphically emphasized; it is like pointing fingers in recruitment posters, such as in the famous British 1914 poster with Lord Kitchener, the WWI Secretary of State for War, or the US's Uncle Sam's poster demanding 'I want YOU' or many other similar posters in other countries and on other occasions urging their citizens to join their country's army or do something equally urgent and important. In the languages distinguishing between the singular and plural forms of the second person pronouns (e.g. *tu* vs. *vous* in French) or the polite/formal and informal pronouns of address (*Sie* vs. *du/ibr* in German), 'you' as used in example (3) can be translated so that the urgency of the message would be made more or less obvious. For instance, in Russian, the sentence can be translated as *No chem mozhete pomoch' vy/Vy?* / *No chto mozhete sdelat' vy/Vy?* (literally, 'But how can you help? / But what can you do?'; 'Vy' with the capitalized 'V' means respectful address, 'vy' is an address to a group). The

‘vy/Vy’ form will make the appeal polite but slightly distanced. Much stronger would be translations with the pronoun ‘ty’, which is used informally or in direct addresses, such as in the straightforward modality of the above-mentioned recruitment posters: *No chem mozhesb’ pomoch’ (lichno) ty?* / *No chto mozhesb’ sdelat’ (lichno) ty?* (‘But how can you (personally) help?/But what can you (personally) do?’) It would be up to those involved in translation (the translating agency) whether to use ‘vy/Vy’ or ‘ty’ in Russian. The necessity and inevitability to choose one or the other pronoun will make the translation screen denser because the translating agency will be made more prominent through its decision to make the appeal of the message *more* or *less* obvious.

Let us consider another situation. In the spring of 2017, there was an outburst of international reaction against the persecution of gays in Chechnya (see for instance, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/18/europe/russia-chechnya-gays/index.html>; accessed 7 December 2017). The US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, was reported as making the following statement:

(4) ‘We continue to be disturbed by reports of kidnapping, torture, and murder of people in Chechnya based on their sexual orientation. If true, this violation of human rights cannot be ignored—Chechen authorities must immediately investigate these allegations, hold anyone involved accountable, and take steps to prevent future abuses.’ (<http://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/18/europe/russia-chechnya-gays/index.html>; accessed 7 December 2017)

The degrees of the urgency of the English message, now expressed not by any additional means, not with a graphical or any other reinforcement as in example (3), was rendered by mass media in the Russian-speaking PSs differently. TASS translated the English phrase ‘this violation of human rights cannot be ignored—Chechen authorities must immediately investigate these allegations, hold anyone involved accountable, and take steps to prevent future abuses’ using strong modal verbs: *takoe narushenie [...] ne dolzhno ignorirovat’sia* and *Chechenskie vlasti dolzhny nemedlenno rassledovat’ [...]*; lit. ‘such violation should not be ignored’ and ‘Chechen authorities have to/must immediately investigate’ (<http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/4189602>; accessed 7 December 2017). The RBK news agency presented Haley’s statement by means of a reported speech, saying that ‘*po ee mneniiu, dolzhny byt’ predprinaty ‘shagi dlia*

predotvrashcheniia budushchikh narushenii” (lit. ‘in her opinion, “steps are/have/must (to) be taken in order to prevent future abuses”). The insertion ‘in her opinion’ [*po ee mneniiu*] makes the statement sound as if it is Haley’s personal view of the situation, and thus the fact that she, in her capacity as the US ambassador to the UN, represents more than just her own opinion, is played down. Consequently, the strength of Haley’s demand couched in very strong terms in English is weakened and the urgency of resolving the situation of the flagrant human rights violation in Chechnya runs the risk of being lost on the reader. In the same fashion, Haley’s statement is presented on some other sites: <http://www.pravda.info/news/152740.html> and https://www.znak.com/2017-04-18/v_oon_obsudyat_materialy_o_pohicheniyah_i_ubiystvah_geev_v_chechne (accessed on 7 December 2017). On both sites, Haley’s view is presented as her personal opinion and her demand to put an end to the persecution of gays in Chechnya is misrepresented as a call for investigations (*Haley prizvala*; lit. Haley called for).

On the site of the Meduza news agency, once again, the news about the persecution of gays in Chechnya is also reported rather than quoted verbatim. The statement is said to have been made by a group of experts (*gruppaa ekspertov [...] opublikovala zaiavlenie*; lit. ‘A group of experts [...] published a statement’). Reportedly, the statement said that ‘*presledovaniia geev dolzhny prekratit’sia, a rossiiskim vlastiam sleduet osudit’ vse gomofobskie vystupleniia chechenskikh vlastei*’ (lit. ‘the persecution of gays should stop, and Russian authorities need/have to condemn all homophobic statements made by Chechen authorities’; <https://meduza.io/news/2017/04/14/eksperty-oon-potrebovali-prekratit-presledovaniya-geev-v-chechne>; accessed 7 December 2017). The reported speech here makes the statement sound less poignant than Haley’s statement as it sounds in English. The statement is presented as a group statement, the name(s) of the experts are not mentioned. This makes the Meduza report go to the other extreme as compared to the RBK report presenting Haley’s statement as her own opinion: the Meduza report makes the statement completely impersonal. Moreover this impression is further corroborated by the impersonal form of the Russian verb used: the persecution ‘should stop’, but the agent(s)/person(s) who should stop the persecution is/are not named. The mention of Russian and Chechen authorities can hardly be read as more than a hint at the agencies responsible for the action to be executed: after all the former should only condemn (not stop/forbid/

prohibit) the homophobic statements of the latter, rather than the latter's homophobic actions or the condoning of homophobic actions.

In examples (3) and (4), translation in the PS appears as having density that, in addition to language and culture layers, includes layers requiring a degree of personal involvement on the part of the translating agency (translators, journalists, editors, etc.): they have to decide on the degree of the intensity and the clarity of the appeal of a (controversial) statement or a piece of news. They can increase or decrease the strength of certain elements and, as a result, present the source text in different ways, requiring more or less involvement on the part of the reader. Among the mechanisms used in interlingual translations of such messages with a strong and often emotional appeal, linguistic means are perhaps the most important and at the same time the most subtle: they are not always easily detected by the reader on the rational level, rather they register on the subconscious level. In Translation Studies works by such scholars as Ian Mason, using methods of critical discourse analysis, have proven quite revelatory (Mason 2010; Fairclough 2015; Tyulenev 2014: 102).

The Translation Actors

The *translator* is not a tabula rasa. S/he is socialized in a particular way and has certain convictions. S/he usually feels certain obligations towards the expectations of his/her audience, colleagues, clients as regards his/her behaviour as a translator and with regard to the product s/he is producing—a text with specific genre characteristics, a degree of intelligibility and readability, and so on. The factors that define the translator's habitus, a conglomerate of his/her previous social experiences determining or at least influencing his/her present actions, together with his/her allegiances become additional factors that are likely to increase the opaqueness of the translation product.

Initially translators and interpreters had been seen as mere conduits of mediated interaction, 'bilingual ghosts' (Collado Ais 2002: 336), language mediators, mere relay stations or interfaces (Reiß and Vermeer 2013: 40). Starting from the 1980s, studying various aspects of the translator's personality has grown to become an important part of the research in Translation and Interpreting Studies. This is so exactly because those aspects inevitably affect the translator's mediating performance. Translators' and interpreters' biographies and profiles have been examined

in terms of the types of their socialization, in terms of their political and ideological views and involvements, their gender and sexuality and so forth (Brisset 1996; Delisle and Woodsworth 2012; Simon 1996; von Flotow 1997; Meylaerts 2008; Baer and Kaindl 2018). The study has been extended to interpreters as co-participants in the mediated interaction (Wadensjö 1998; Angelelli 2004). Sociological theories have proved inspiring for TIS scholars, with Pierre Bourdieu's theory of social fields being by far the most prominent (Simeoni 1998; Gouanvic 1999; Inghilleri 2005; Vorderbermeier 2014; Hanna 2016).

Yet another productive direction of research has been considering translators among other actors responsible for the production of translation. In the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, Justa Holz-Mänttari (1984) and André Lefevre (1992) began considering the relationships of translators with their *clients* and *commissioners*. Applying the Actor Network Theory (Callon 1986; Latour 2005) has further broadened the scope of consideration of the translator agency. Individual translators/interpreters have been shown as working in complex and fluid and flexible networks with other agents (Buzelin and Forlaron 2007), notably *editors* (Bogic 2010). In fact the number of translators' and interpreters' contacts that affect their work more or less considerably and more or less noticeably is so great that it is quite difficult to draw an exact line separating the translation/interpreting agency from the adjacent types of social agency.

All actors contributing to translation/interpreting as a social mediation in one fashion or another also make translation denser because each one of them comes with his/her habituses, allegiances, responsibilities and perhaps biases. Emphatically this en masse contribution needs to be taken into consideration whenever PS discussions are studied. Translation is always a vector resulting from various individuals' more or less significant contributions, nudges and forceful impositions, hints and commands, evanescent trails and well-documented evidence, to the performance and finalized product of translation or interpreting.

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How Translation Works

В каждой машине расчет силы есть...

—Н.С. Лесков

Abstract Translation is shown to work not only at linguistic ruptures as is usually believed but as a ubiquitous means of communication in the social realm. Translation is a catalyst of social interactions. Yet like a chemical catalyst it can facilitate interactions or hinder them. Translation works in the situation known in sociology as double contingency. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas, translation is examined as either a communicative action or an instrumental action. Moreover, translation can aggravate the instrumentalization of social actions or contribute to communicative actions in the public sphere. Translation, if practiced ethically, can help the instrumentally minded mediated parties to enrich their appreciation of the lifeworld of the other and thereby lessen the instrumentalization of modern public spheres.

Keywords Translation • Catalysis • Double contingency • Lifeworld • Instrumental action • Communicative action

‘The power of every machine is calculated’ (Nikolai Leskov; translation is mine—S.T.)

In the previous chapters we saw that translation comes in many shapes and sizes. In Chap. 2, we saw that translation is a genus, and its interlingual species is the most relevant to discussions of globalized and internationalized PSs. In Chap. 3, various factors that make translation's density increase or decrease as a hyaline screen between the communicating parties were considered. Having described the properties of translation, in this chapter we move on to discuss how translation works when enabling social agents, who without translation would be doomed to stay in their impenetrable bubbles, come into contact, exchange their opinions, sometimes agreeing, sometimes disagreeing, but always learning something about one another. Such communication between agents allows them to coordinate their actions, if they are to coexist and act together. More often than not these coordinated actions take the form of various types of compromise and creating these social mortise and tenon joints would be impossible without translating one's mind into one's verbal or extraverbal units of communication which, thanks to that transfer, are made available to and interpretable by the other party/parties who will then be able to react.

TRANSLATING AT RUPTURES

Human communication is largely symbolic, although there is a part of it that is based on signals (Blumer 1969). Unlike signals, symbols imply a variety of interpretations. In other words, with signals, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the signifier and signified; whereas with symbols, communicating parties deal with signifiers that have a number of signifieds. If so, the process of communication as symbolic interaction should be described as a selection process. Communicating parties, thanks to their interaction, constantly try to narrow down the range of options of the meaning horizon and thereby find the most adequate ways to react to the other party's action in order to achieve a particular goal (as they imagine it). This is *mutatis mutandis* what translation does: interpreting/translating the other party's utterance (broadly conceived, not only lingual) is selecting one meaning option among many possible ones in order to contribute to the mediated dialogue.

Communication as symbolic interaction cannot be understood without understanding what factors influence or determine the selection of one option and not another. These factors, among other things (physical and psychological conditions), have been shown to be communicating parties'

backgrounds influencing communication (Berlo 1960). The backgrounds become one kind of filter through which all communication is sieved. Hardly anything that enters the realm of social communication is introduced or taken purely and directly. Everything is ‘stencilled’ with patterns of culture, traditions, agreements, conventions, norms and standards, previous communications and so forth. All communication is therefore mediated communication: $A + M + B$, where the interaction between A and B involves this or that sort of filters (‘ M ’ standing for ‘mediating’), one or several, and only the application of the filters can make the communication possible. In the social domain, there is always some form of mediation at work. Even the understanding of signals takes the application of a filter—even if it is an interpretation of a one-to-one correspondence of the signifier and the signified.

However translation as a form of mediation and filter application is discussed in the social sciences as functioning mostly in lingual ruptures; translation is viewed as little more than as a modal of non-mediated communication. For instance Hans-Georg Gadamer brings in translation in his discussion of language as a medium of hermeneutical interpretation (1988: 345–351). Translation, for him, exemplifies verbal communication involving interlingual mediation. Gadamer views translation as a means of coping with the situation when ‘understanding is disrupted or made difficult’, thus explicit mediation in the form of interlingual translation ‘is undoubtedly not the norm in a conversation’ (ibid.: 346). Communication mediated by (interlingual) translation is considered by Gadamer as an explicit form of implicitly mediated communication. ‘Where understanding takes place, we have not translation but speech’, writes Gadamer (ibid.: 346). Translation and speech are contradistinguished, the latter being viewed as a situation of direct, unmediated communication. Gadamer gives an example of mediation in learning a foreign language. At some point the student reaches a stage when s/he ‘is no longer translating from or into his native tongue, but thinks in the foreign language’ (ibid.: 347). This makes the understanding between two people possible, only provided they speak the same language. ‘[D]ependence on the translation of an interpreter is an extreme case that duplicates the hermeneutical process of the conversation: there is that between the interpreter [not the interpretation as oral translation!] and the other as well as that between oneself and the interpreter’ (ibid.: 347). In other words, it is only with translation that the communication is theorized as $A + M + B$; otherwise, according to Gadamer, it may be viewed as unmediated speech: $A + B$.

For Habermas translation is also transition from one language to another and again translation is necessary only ‘where rules of transformation that allow a deductive relationship between languages to be produced through substitution are lacking and an exact “translation” is not possible’ (1988: 143–144). Habermas equates ‘translator’ (an interlingual mediator) with ‘interpreter’, a partner in a communication within one and the same language:

The role of the partner in dialogue contains in virtual form the role of the interpreter as well, that is, the role of the person who not only makes his way within a language but can also bring about understanding between languages. The role of the interpreter does not differ in principle from that of the translator. (1988: 145)

Habermas comes to the same viewpoint that we saw with Gadamer: translation is ‘a form of reflection that we perform implicitly in every linguistic communication’ (1988: 146). There is one step to considering all social communication as mediated, either intrapersonally by applying various psychological and linguocultural filters (even when this is done within one language and culture) or extrapersonally, when translation is done by a translator/interpreter or a piece of technology. Yet this step was not made.

The discussion of translation in this book is informed by a different view of translation. Translation happens not only when lingual ruptures occur, translation is the *sine qua non conditio* of all social communication because every time ego steps outside his/her ‘bubble’ they experience a rupture and they have to use translation in one of its forms to bridge the gap.

A CATALYST OF COMMUNICATION

Translation’s work can be described as social catalysis (Tyulenev 2011: 134–145). Niklas Luhmann described different types of relations between elements, communication events, in the social system as either reciprocal or catalytic or constraining (1995: 23). Reciprocal relations require only interacting elements (no mediating agency is allegedly found there). Other communication events viewed as elements of a system can take place only provided another communication event also takes place, in other words for two elements to interact, a third element is required. It is the type of

conditioning, which Luhmann termed ‘catalytic’, because the third element plays the part of a catalyst of the other two elements’ interaction. This is, for instance, mediated communication across languages or other barriers. The third type of relationship is found when elements’ relations are conditioned so successfully that the conditions of their interaction turn into constraints in that without these conditioning factors, the elements cannot interact (in the same way). The second and third types may be considered as different degrees of the same kind of mediation—catalysis (in the third case conditioning factors can be seen as a form of mediation). It is a three-part relationship: *A* cannot directly enter the same relationship with *B* that it can enter when *M* (a mediating catalytic agent) is present. (As has been shown above, reciprocal relations can be postulated only if one disregards the social filters at work in the process of the involved parties’ interaction. Therefore, I do not consider these relations in what follows. In a sense, seeing the ubiquity of social filters and other types of mediation, reciprocal relations understood as two-element relations without mediation do not exist in the social domain.)

In chemistry, catalysis is a process of making a reaction possible or making it more active and efficient. Although the catalyst is intimately involved in the reaction sequence by forming chemical bonds to reactants and facilitating their conversion into the end product, it is not consumed in the reaction and is regenerated at the end of the reaction.

The role of the catalyst cannot fail to remind us of the role of translation in the mediated communication event. In the same manner as a catalyst, the translating agent (not necessarily a human being!) passes through the communication and optimizes it. Yet it is not considerably affected by the communication, because the thematised action touches it only indirectly: even if the topic discussed concerns the translator, s/he does not express their interest and tries to mediate as neutrally as possible. In this sense, translation may be said to ‘regenerate’ like a catalyst (translators and interpreters cannot reveal the topics of the negotiations in which they mediate, they, therefore, leave the venue where they worked as if they knew nothing about what happened there).

As a social communication catalyst, translation is as omnipresent as its chemical counterpart. Yet despite its omnipresence, ‘catalysis remains a neglected subject in chemical education’ (Gates 1992: vii). The same can be said about translation: despite its ubiquity and importance as a pivotal factor of all communication, it is largely neglected in the sociology of communication and among PS theorists.

Taking the metaphorization of translation as catalyst a step further, it should be noted that the nature of the interface of the reactants and the catalyst is crucial for the efficiency of catalysis. Metaphorically speaking, translation as a catalyst is ‘porous’ and with low coordination of ‘atoms’ in the sense that it never fully belongs to the bulk, that is, to the commissioning social system in the Luhmannian sense, being exposed to the environment and is always ready to ‘bond’ with that environment.

Translation is ‘located’ on the boundary of a system, whether a psychic or social system (Tyulenev 2011: 146–157). The function of the boundary is twofold: it separates the system from the environment; it also unites them. The catalytic role of translation from the systemic standpoint is more often a manifestation of the latter: translation ‘bonds’ to phenomena of the environment quite easily, seeing that its principal responsibility is to ‘increase the system’s environmental sensitivity’ (Luhmann 1995: 197). Translation brings into the system for the latter’s internal processing whatever translation bonds to in the environment. The goal of the ensuing internal systemic processing is to determine whether the newly introduced environmental phenomenon is worth appropriating by the system.

Catalysts differ in how they affect chemical reactions. Mostly catalysts increase the rate of the reaction. This, however, is not always the case. Some catalysts, called inhibitors, on the contrary, slow down the catalytic reaction. There are inhibitors that compete with the reactants in bonding. Some inhibitors form such strong bonds that the reactants are virtually excluded from bonding with each other. Such inhibitors are called poisons (Gates 1992: 3).

Interlingual translation is usually viewed as positively influencing interaction between different social parties. Hence, translators are metaphorically called builders of bridges between nations. Yet, like catalysts, translation is not always positive. Translation may be ‘too strongly bonded’ to one of the interacting parties. Ideologically distorted translation and translation as it is used in international controversies when translation openly takes sides are the most obvious examples. In this sense, translation may be indeed an inhibitor or even a poison. Translation Studies’ research into translation demonstrates that benignly viewing translation only as a ‘bridge’ between cultures and nations is naïve and groundless (e.g. Baker 2006).

On the positive side, however, translation may be such a vital link between the interacting parties that it becomes a *conditio sine qua non* for the interaction. Under such circumstances, translation works as a

constraint. In such situations, ‘even if [a constraint is] introduced contingently, one cannot reject [it] without destroying what [it] makes possible’ (Luhmann 1995: 23). Such is the role of translation when it becomes a means by which social systems radically reshape their internal communication contours by embracing new discourses (for example, Tyulenev 2012). Thus, translation as a social agent manifests a range of influences: it can be pernicious or beneficial and in both these aspects there are degrees; there may be (and often are) combinations of the two effects.

COMMUNICATING IN DOUBLE CONTINGENCY

The social is about two or more parties interacting. The term ‘social’ comes from the Latin word *socius*, meaning ‘friend’ or ‘ally’. The social is woven of communication units. These are, essentially, interactions of social agents. The interactions may be real or virtual (the virtual social reality has become especially densely populated with the advent of the Internet, but other forms, such as telecommunication, should not be forgotten). The interactions may be face to face or across time and space: when a person reads a text written long before s/he was born and perhaps in another, faraway part of the world, s/he communicates with the text’s author(s) and characters by accepting, refuting, assessing their ideas, words, attitudes, values, actions and so on; all that puts to test the reader’s own ideas, values, his/her entire worldview and thereby another stitch is made in the social. Finally, the meetings may involve humans or non-humans, animals or technology; that is why, incidentally, it is not easy to draw a clear line around the social (as between the humanities and the hard sciences, see Serres and Latour 1995: 70) and the beings in communication with which translation is used (Cronin 2017).

When two parties meet (there may be more than two, but that is the simplest case), when a social communication unit is formed, the situation known in sociology as double contingency arises (Parsons and Shils 1951: 16). Neither of the parties, neither ego nor alter, knows how the other party intends to act, both are encapsulated in their phenomenological bubbles. Communication is the way to get out of their bubbles and, step by step, or rather action by action, communication unit by communication unit, learn each other’s intentions as regards the possibility of a joint action and adjust their own actions in order to achieve their personal goals within the framework of the socially determined and socially possible common goal.

Communication as a means of the very creation of the social is an established fact in sociology. No matter where epistemologically a sociologist places him/herself, whether within microsociology or within macrosociology or somewhere in between the two, communication is recognized as the only way for the social to exist. But, to emphasize, any communication is a negotiation of the involved parties' goals and ideas about how to achieve those goals within the unavoidable presence of (an)other agent(s). This negotiation is essentially translation, an act of interpreting social symbols.

Applied to the situation of double contingency, translation is the only socially available instrument for ego to learn about alter and about alter's intentions. Translation is also the only socially available means for alter to learn about ego's plans and to negotiate a compromise in achieving the goal that would be the closest to both ego's and alter's own goals.

How does translation do that? Translation unfolds as a series of transfers: intrapersonal renderings within ego's and alter's mind and then interpersonal renderings between them. Within one's mind translation takes the form of rendering pre-verbal, sub- or semiconscious feelings, intuitions, amorphous ideas into verbal or extraverbal but socially, that is, interpersonally, interpretable communication units, utterances or gestures. The interpersonal translation may be within one linguistic system (say, in English) or it may require a more complex process of rendering signs of one linguistic system into another (say, Turkish into English and back). There may be all sorts of cultural extraverbal transfers: gestures of one culture may need to be interpreted for the other party to understand them (correctly, i.e. as intended or perceived as intended); some gestures may need to be verbalized requiring a transfer from one semiotic system (gestures/body language) into another (utterances of a linguistic system).

An instance of communication can be referred to as a communication event (Luhmann 1995: 144). The communication event (CE) is an exchange of information in a broad sense (cf. the range of the language functions in Jakobson 1960) between A and B. The CE is structured as follows: there is an utterance that contains a piece of information, for instance A's phrase 'It is raining today' may be intended to convey various types of information depending on the situation of communication and the communicants: it can state a fact about the weather or it can be a suggestion to take an umbrella or to cancel a stroll in a park. Finally there is B's interpretation of the utterance by correct/incorrect or partially correct/incorrect retrieval of the information the utterance contains.

It shall be noted that CE has a key phase of interpreting the initial utterance. This is a moment of intralingual translation: B's reaction to A's suggestion would be impossible without B's translation of A's words done sub- or semiconsciously. If B replies, it is A's turn to interpret/translate B's utterance looking for its informational core. There is no need to go into details about how information is understood or interpreted, suffice it to say that interlocutors interpret each other's utterances by juxtaposing them with the situation of communication, including socially imposed behavioural patterns that help to cope with double contingencies, and their knowledge of, or expectations, about each other.

In the case of interlingual or otherwise mediated CEs, there may appear an agency whose function is to help A and B understand each other across a barrier that they themselves cannot overcome, such as the difference of their lingual codes. This makes the CE even more complex with a chain of various types of translation. Elsewhere I described this kind of CE as a translation communication event (Tyulenev 2011: 38). In fact any CE is by definition translational, not only when there is a separate translating agency, whether interlingual with a translator/interpreter or intralingual, for example, a mediator between two parties where the parties speak the same language but require an expert mediator. An individualized translating agency inserts another set of understanding and reuttering a piece of interpreted information: [A: Utterance₁ > Information₁ >] [Translator/Mediator: Understanding₁ > Utterance₂ > Information₂] [B: Understanding₂]. A mediated CE is two conjoined CEs resulting in a new, not only quantitatively but also qualitatively, CE. The failure to see the qualitative aspect of the translation communication event is a problem of many a discussion of PS in the specialized literature.

COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

Communication can pursue different goals and arguably translation, which is ever present (although not always taken into consideration), may help or thwart communication's goals. To discuss this aspect of translation's influence of the PS communication, some of the elements of Habermas' theory of communicative action will be used.

Having laid the foundation of studying PS, Jürgen Habermas moved on to a more fundamental question of communication as a social action in his influential two-volume book *The Theory of Communicative Action* (in English Volume 1 was published in 1984 and Volume 2 in 1987; originally

in German in 1981). In what follows, I will critically engage with Habermas' examination of social communication and especially the communicative type of action because it claims to provide insights into the very elements that constitute the social and especially the genuinely cooperative social behaviour.

The four foci of Habermas' theory are the fundamental aspects of sociological theory: rationality of actions in particular and social agency in general; generating a theory of social action; the relationship between individual social actions and the overall social order; and finally, the analysis of contemporary society, its evolution and crises. It is beyond the task of this discussion to delve into all these complex issues. Rather, the focus will be on a hallmark of Habermas' sociology—his critique of the over-instrumentalization of social action in modern society. His conceptualization of the social revolves around the contradistinction of communicative and instrumental actions.

Communicative action (CA) is viewed by Habermas as the most productive type of action for social integration because, as is clear from the term, CA presupposes genuine communication, that is, sharing information, rather than strategically instrumentalized communication whose ultimate (and possibly ulterior) motive is to use the other, or his/her actions, to achieve one's own goal. CA emphasizes communication as a means of social integration between two or more actors 'who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or extraverbal means)' seeking 'to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action' (Habermas 1984: 86). Reaching an understanding is carried out by means of 'negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus' (ibid.).

The contrasting type of action is strategic action (SA), which is aimed exclusively at achieving success in action. Strategically acting agents live in society and therefore they *volens nolens* have to coordinate their actions but each of strategic communicants 'is oriented to his own success and behaves cooperatively only to the degree that this fits his egocentric calculus of utility' (ibid.: 88).

If we look more closely, a fundamental difference between CA and SA is their relation to the worlds in which they unfold. Habermas draws on the concept of a three-world social universe: there is the objective world out there or reality whatever it is, the subjective world in the actor's mind and the world of cultural conceptualizations of the objective and subjective worlds. For the third world, Habermas uses the term 'lifeworld',

which he borrowed from phenomenology. Lifeworld is the cultural background shared by a collectivity and it influences individuals' behaviour.

Strategic actors, precisely because they act strategically, that is, striving to achieve their personal goals, deal with the objective world in which their goals are achievable. Strategic actors do, to an extent, consider other decision-making systems, that is, other actors, in their vicinity, those actors' worldviews, the ontological presuppositions of those other actors necessary for realizing their own purposes. Yet strategically minded actors do not become enriched by the other actors' subjective worlds and the other lifeworlds exert only a limited normative influence on strategic actors' behaviour. They start and end within the same ontological picture of the one (objective) world (Habermas 1984: 88).

CA is normatively determined, which means that communicative actors take into consideration the lifeworld, a set of shared traditions, their cultural interpretations and behavioural patterns, which lie at the basis of socially sanctioned norms. CA is at the intersection of the two worlds—the objective and the social within the purview of the psychological world. While SA is a one-world action, CA is a two-world action.

LANGUAGE

Language, understood broadly as including both verbal and extraverbal signs, is the means of the negotiations in the decision-making process of communication, be it strategic or communicative. In various kinds of SA, language is a means of influencing and manipulating alter so that ego's strategic goal is achieved. In CA, language is a means of 'uncurtailed communication whereby speakers and hearers, out of the context of their pre-interpreted lifeworld, refer simultaneously to things in the objective, social, and subjective worlds in order to negotiate common definitions of the situation' (Habermas 1984: 95).

SA makes communication inevitably *carren* because the exchange is aimed at the intentional tipping the balance over to one or the other side. Each utterance turns into a tactical move towards an overall strategic goal. If translation is done internally by the interlocutors themselves, it is always partial and manipulative, taking advantage of the other, ego may use his/her words to intentionally hide the true meaning of his/her actions or mislead alter and misguide his/her interpretation of ego's utterances/information.

If translation in SA is done externally, by a translator/interpreter/mediator, the translating agent may choose to act in non-partisan fashion or, according to Simmel's types (see Chap. 3), to take sides with one of the competing parties, to become a *tertius gaudens* (taking advantage of the conflict between the mediated parties), or, either openly or surreptitiously, to assume the role of the dominant mediator (intentionally deepening the existing gap between the parties). Certainly, the translator (in a broad sense, including the interpreter and the mediator) can try to resist the strategic nature of the action and try and remotivate the strategically acting party/parties. This, however, may not be easy, especially in the situation when translation qua process is seen as a mechanically doubled CE and translation qua agency is viewed exclusively as a transparent screen, which should remain passive about voicing its own view of the situation of communication and be active only in removing the language barrier between the parties. Such attitude to translation, virtually bracketing it out of communication, including the communication in the PS, runs the risk of wasting the translator's expertise, his/her understanding not only of the involved parties' lingual codes, but also of the cultures in which those lingual codes are circumscribed and that those lingual codes express, moreover of the cultures as the parties' lifeworlds. As we have seen, the nature of SA is such that the actors, intentionally or unintentionally, blind themselves to the lifeworlds involved, predominantly limiting their behavioural logic to the objective world. Translation may help them appreciate the lifeworlds and convert the unfolding action from a one-world strategic action to a two-world communicative action, provided translation is taken into consideration fully in the ecology of the communication event.

In a communicative action, internal (intrapersonal) translation acts impartially because the interlocutors make every effort to appreciate the other party's position. They may still make mistakes in translating utterances into information units and thereby misunderstanding the other party, yet such slips have a better chance of being spotted in the process of communication and rectified through corrections or additional explications allowing a better understanding of the information contained in the utterance's essence. In the case of external translation as regards CA, translation may, once again, act neutrally or move along either the positive or negative axis: the translator may take advantage of his/her expertise in a deconstructive way—s/he may cause the parties be separated not only by a language barrier, but also by misinformation about the other party's intentions. Such negative translation may cause a CA devolve into a SA.

If translation cooperates with the nature of the action, it contributes to the communicative efforts of the involved parties. It can do that either passively or actively. In the former case translation tries its best to remove linguistic problems while in the latter case it can take a step further and actively contribute its expertise whenever necessary by adding comments and necessary clarifications enabling the parties to communicate as efficiently as possible. Translation may provide any additional information at the level of the linguistic codes involved, thereby making sure that utterances are understood ‘correctly’ (according to his/her interpretation, perhaps soliciting additional clarifications about unclear utterances from the party which made them, perhaps editing them so that they would be understood by the other party), or at the level of cultural features without which utterances cannot be ‘correctly’ appreciated. This active agency of translation can be practiced only when it is taken as an equal participant of the discussion, rather than merely as a conduit of the exchanged utterances responsible for carrying them across the linguistic barrier.

PUBLIC SPHERE TRANSLATION

Originally PS discussions were theorized for one-collectivity situations and they were thought to be productive and having a hope of reaching consensus only provided they were conducted on the basis of some common denominator. But in the modern world, PS is noticeably much more diversified and fragmented, debates are conducted across collectivities speaking different languages and having different cultural backgrounds. Identifying a common denominator under such circumstances may (and usually does) present serious challenges.

Another school of thought admits that ‘it’s possible to have real debate even if people are speaking from within different paradigms and different demographic cultures’ (McKee 2005: 146). If so, then one of the classical prerequisites of PS discussions, that is, rationality of the debate, needs to be reconsidered. In fact Alan McKee argues that PS dialogues may be conducted not always by means of rational argumentation but using various techniques of persuasion. This, however, would require the interlocutors to make an effort to understand the other’s argumentative language (*ibid.*: 158). Communicants would need to learn and accept their opponents’ conceptualization of the world. In the Habermasian terms, communicants will have to appreciate their opponents’ third-world, or lifeworld, concepts of the objective world that may differ more than within

a relatively tightly knit collectivity of the type of nation-states for which the concept of PS was originally developed. There should be willingness on both sides of the dialogue to learn a different ‘way of seeing the world or thinking about what counts as rational argument’ (ibid.: 160).

Can this be done without translation? There may be particular individuals willing to learn their opponents’ languages, both as verbal systems and ways of argumentation. But as any learner of a foreign language knows only too well, translation (done by this person him/herself in his/her head) is inevitable. This translation involves interlingual translation as well as interpreting cultural phenomena of the acquired culture, initially in terms of one’s own culture and later more independently from the latter, in the new culture’s own terms, but hardly ever in a fully emancipated fashion.

To require from all PS debate participants the ability to communicate with all possible others would however be unrealistic. Expert mediators are needed. That is where translators/interpreters step in and the ecology of such transcultural and translinguistic PS debates becomes more complex.

What makes a person a translator in the PS? According to McKee (2005: 160–161), first of all the translator needs to learn the languages of the debating parties. McKee means argumentative languages, but there are also natural linguistic differences. As far as PS, which is completely voluntary, translators should be willing to learn them. It should be added that the PS translator should have a good command of both linguistic and extralinguistic components of the languages. The linguistic components include vocabulary, such as culturally specific terms, jargon and slang. The extralinguistic components are ways in which arguments are constructed in the cultural worlds, lifeworlds, of the debating parties. Some of the extralinguistic components may require redistributing argumentative priorities of the PS translator: s/he may be used to logic as the fundamental requirement of any discussion, including a PS one, but s/he may come across an argumentative language prioritizing emotions or persuasion or exercise of power and authority (e.g. of an older discussant over a younger one).

The PS translator also needs to understand the subject matter of the discussion, be able to identify the point of the discussion, the cause or causes of controversy. In the case of interlingual PS translation, the translator should be able to predict potential causes of misunderstanding, which may lead to controversy. Such an ability of the translator may lead him/her to request a rewording of an unclear utterance or a faulty

(e.g. agrammatical, intolerant or biased) utterance. The translator needs to increase his/her expertise by constantly studying the involved cultures.

Finally, the PS translator should know how to mediate a dialogue, that is, s/he needs to know how to transfer an utterance with its informational core from one (argumentative) language into another. Translinguistic and transcultural PS translation requires more than the ability to mediate between the languages of the discussion. Therefore, to emphasize once again, translation in the PS should be theorized not as a passive transparent conduit, but as an active, highly skilled agency having a considerable potential in the ecology of PS.

There is also an etiquette of the PS translation: ‘smiling and remaining open-minded that you might persuade members of different cultures to think as you do or that they might persuade you to think as they do; or even that you might create a new hybridised paradigm between you both’ (McKee 2005: 160). The success of translation cannot always be predicted and the translator should be open to experimentation if some features of the argumentative languages used fail to be understood (*ibid.*: 160–161).

As we have seen in Chap. 3, realistically in terms of ethics, there may be a variety of attitudes on the part of PS translators—from objective aloofness to more or less open side-taking, even misrepresenting the ‘other’ or the subject matter of the discussion at hand. Translation Studies scholarship champions the conceptualization of the translator as a responsible decision-maker loyal to the parties for whom s/he mediates. Loyalty is defined as ‘respecting the intentions and expectations of all the partners’ (Nord 2007: 12) even in one of the most radical translation theories that allows the translator more freedom in handling his/her source text than the other theories—in *skopos* theory. Concurring with McKee’s requirement to the PS translator, Christiane Nord demands that the interlingual translator mediates between two cultures without ‘the imposition of the concept of one culture on members of another’ (2007: 3). This resonates well with how Anthony Pym sees translator ethics. For Pym, translation is practiced and theorized as part of intercultural dialogue that requires the need to talk and ‘seek mediation with your enemy at which point you might look for someone prepared to do more than just expound their commitments’ (2012: 60). The translator is seen as someone who contributes to the intercultural dialogue, rather than merely exposes cultural asymmetries.

ACROSS LANGUAGES AND CULTURES

One of the major differences between strategic and communicative actions is the former's one-world and the latter's two-world awareness. SA and CA were theorized by Habermas implying one collectivity speaking one language. In an international setting, SA and CA become more complex. Both with SA and CA unfolding in crosscultural and crosslinguistic contexts, more factors are to be taken into account by the negotiating parties. While the objective world remains the same, its lifeworld interpretations are always different with every social agent, especially when they belong to different collectivities, and the differences may be quite significant. A communicative agent is focused not only on the objective world, but also on the lifeworld as reflected in the subjective world of his/her communication partner, it stands to reason that crosscommunal communication will not surprise him/her as requiring even more effort because the lifeworld of the other may turn out quite dissimilar to his/her own. While a strategic agent may be able to manipulate his/her interaction partner(s) within one community relying on his/her 'feel' of the social environment and its conventions as well as the opportunities this social environment offers and the limitations it imposes, s/he may find that to manipulate a representative of another community, speaking another language and drawing on a different set of social concepts, is more challenging. While the strategic agent can afford to limit his/her consideration of the other within one community to a bare minimum, in a crosscommunal interaction s/he will have to take into consideration more 'things' about the other if s/he wants to take advantage of the other and, ultimately, achieve his/her goal.

In crosscommunal interaction, whether strategic or communicative, translation comes to the fore as a key condition of the success of reaching understanding, since without translation no crossing the communal boundary is possible. Translation Studies is the discipline studying how (primarily) interlingual translation is practiced. In a nutshell, its exposition of translation mechanisms can be described as happening on different levels—linguistic and cultural. Translation between languages presupposes their juxtaposition and comparison. Interlingual translation amounts to linguistic operations that take place at the backdrop of the comparison of the interacting language systems. Not incidentally, comparative studies were very influential at the dawn of Translation Studies as a discipline (Vinay and Darbelnet 1995/1958; Malblanc 1961). Having established

the basics of the correspondences of the languages and cultures involved, the translator produces a text in the target language-cum-culture that would be suitable for the communication situation, the latter including the type of audience for which the text is intended and the type of social and translational professional expectations. Of course this is a complex process with many factors to be juggled, well studied although not exhausted, in Translation Studies.

Translation in the PS, including intralingual and intracommunal mediation, is in principle, structurally, comparable to interlingual translation, except the places of the source and target languages may be occupied by variants of the same language and of the same overall culture—dialects, sociolects, stylistic registers, subcultures and idiolects. (Incidentally, this essential affinity between translation and mediation allowed Alan McKee (2005) to theorize the PS mediation in terms of linguistic translation.) Translation compares the interacting entities as systems and applies established correspondences/differences to elements in a particular context in order to produce a text in the target system.

Translation connects what has so far been disjointed. It tries to identify the best matches of units in language-cum-culture/lifeworld B for units in language-cum-culture/lifeworld A. ‘The best’ here means the best fitting to a particular (1) textual and (2) sociocultural context. (1) The translator works with languages as systems, the Saussurian *langues*, only initially when establishing the correspondences between the interacting systems (or drawing on the correspondences established by somebody else, for example a lexicographer). This stage usually and primarily occurs in the process of learning the involved cultures and their respective languages. Finally, in each translation act, the translator works with concrete texts on the level of the Saussurian *parole*, a concrete realization of the language qua system in this particular unit used in this particular situation. (2) What is ‘the best’ on the language level may not always be the most suitable for a particular situation and a particular text: linguistic choices may require some correction depending on how the target audience is likely to receive the source text ideas and the ways they are expressed and on other factors of the sociocultural context of the translation act, notably how acceptable the translator’s decisions will be found by those agents who ratify his/her translation decisions (cf. Toury 2012: 53–69; Chesterman 2016: 49–84). Eventually, translation connects the two worlds—two languages, two cultures and two interacting parties.

But translation also makes the boundary between the interacting languages-cum-cultures tangible. The very need to interpret the other's words and actions implies a difference, a boundary that is to be crossed in order to either achieve a strategic goal (in the case of SA) or to communicate (in the case of CA). While in the case of intralingual and intracomunal, the presence of a boundary is still rather weak and is ascribed commonsensically to unavoidable frictions of interpersonal interaction. In the case of interlingual and/or intercommunal communication, the boundary is made tangible by the communicants' efforts or complete inability to communicate without a third person, a translator/interpreter (or a piece of technology, a Babel Fish).

Paradoxically, despite of or thanks to the boundary made visible by translation, even the strategic actor willy-nilly learns something of the life-world of the other with whom s/he has to deal and whom s/he hoped to manipulate without going too deeply into the other's lifeworld. Translation, thus, turns out to be a beneficial factor for making social interaction more communicative and less strategic.

GAINING LIFEWORLD THROUGH TRANSLATION

The third world, shared by all individuals of a community and so crucial for their communicative acting, is obtained by each member of that collectivity during his/her socialization, mostly in their childhood but also in their adulthood when they learn more about new aspects of the society in which they live and when they learn to live in a constantly changing social environment.

A lifeworld is an intersubjectively shared set of values, an 'unthematically given horizon within which participants in communication move in common when they refer thematically to something in the world' (Habermas 1984: 82). The unthematism of a particular lifeworld, ubiquitous, yet always implied, lurking in the background, should not blind us to the fact that at some point it is thematised, and translation is exactly the mechanism of thematising a lifeworld. Lifeworlds exist and function intersubjectively: they are shared, and intersubjectivity means translation. Indeed, a child gains knowledge about his/her environment, the objective world and the sociocultural lifeworld, through translation. First gestures and situations are translated in his/her brain into words and phrases of his/her mother tongue; then simpler words are used to translate intralingually, by means of rewording or rephrasing, more complex concepts and

linguistic units. This is the role intralingual and intersemiotic, notably kinetic (but not only kinetic), kinds of translation play in every socialized human being. There is no other way to socialize but through translation. At later stages of socialization this process of translating the world ‘out there’ into one’s own psychological world, which is essentially socialization, continues, although perhaps less intensively.

Two kinds of translation are especially important for socialization: intersemiotic, notably kinetic (see Chap. 2), and intralingual. Interlingual is common, it happens less when the child finds him/herself in special circumstances when s/he grows in a country different from the country of his/her birth or in some internationalized settings. Intergenerational translation, that is, translation between the fathers’ lifeworld and the sons’ lifeworld, is another important kind of translation. Generations mutually interpret their views, the fathers evaluate their sons’ behaviour and the sons assess their fathers’ traditions and ways of life (Habermas 1988: 148).

Translating a lifeworld can be called the rationalization of implications. The rationalization of implications in the process of socialization, the learning process during which individuals internalize collective lifeworld values, is done by both subjects and objects of translation, by both those who translate and by those for whom they translate. At the moment of translating lifeworld features, translation makes communicants, say a parent and a child,

adopt a reflective attitude toward cultural patterns of interpretation that ordinarily make possible their interpretive accomplishments. This change of attitude means that the validity of the thematized interpretive pattern is suspended and the corresponding knowledge rendered problematic [...]. (Habermas 1984: 82)

Lifeworld functions at the background of social actions, therefore it can be said to exist in the form of, and to function by means of, implications. Naturally and usually social agents, after they have been well established in their culture, do not rationalize these implications, although implications are always there, informing each social action. Occasionally, however, social agents come across situations in which they have to think about their actions and reactions rationally. While normally an adult would not think about many of his/her actions doing them automatically, in his/her capacity as parent s/he may want to explain to their children how to behave in this or that situation. In other words, the parent has to rationalize

cultural implications. The children, in turn, also rationalize implications when they learn about their culture. Their translation may be prompted on the instinctive level and be carried out by mimicking the adults but it is translation in the sense of introducing a new, foreign element onto their internal horizon of options available for action. Sometimes certain actions are explicitly translated for them: what they should or should not do under a particular set of circumstances. This is the process of translation of what is normally implied in words and notions.

TRANSLATION AND/AS COMMUNICATION ACTION

Habermas' theory of communicative action is one-society based, in the case of interlingual, intercultural translation this theory should be broadened to include at least two interacting societies. Social integration turns into intersocietal integration. Translation as communicative action is not hiding the fact of the source text but presenting it 'warts and all', because hiding or obscuring aspects of relevant meaning ('relevant' according to whoever receives and evaluates the translation product) may lead to misunderstanding of the source culture on the target culture side, and the result is likely to be a distorted communication. In turn, this distorted communication would obstruct the negotiation of intentions. Why is it dangerous for CA? Because misinterpreting the other's utterances causes misinterpreting the other's intentions, which results in hindering the working out of intersocietal (and interpersonal) orderliness that can be brought about through preference-change (Heath 2011: 81).

Let us unpack this. The following scenarios are possible: The mediated action can qualify as CA, and the mediating translation itself may be either CA or SA. The mediated action may qualify as SA, while the mediating translation can also be SA or, being a CA, it can try to transform the mediated SA into a CA.

CA is a type of social integration that is not about achieving strategic goals, but about understanding intentions and preferences of the acting parties. Each one of them tries to understand the other and if there is any influence of one on the other, the influence is through preference-change. It is therefore important to appreciate communication as intention/preference exchange. Translation can facilitate or thwart such communication.

Interlingual translation is an instrument of intersocietal translation that takes place through instances of interpersonal translation. Interlingual translation itself can be performed as a CA, that is, by encouraging the

interacting parties' understanding one another on the intentional/preference level. This will foster intersocietal communication and, ideally, intersocietal understanding and orderliness in intersocietal relations (and ultimately a 'better' socially integrated world). Alternatively, interlingual translation may be conducted as a strategic action unfolding as an incentive-led system integration. The translator/interpreter may be interested only in fulfilling his/her 'duty' as a facilitator of interlinguistic transaction.

Gideon Toury's (2012: 29) suggestion that translations are defined as products of interlingual transfer as facts of the target culture has greatly influenced translation theory. It has helped to free research from the limitations of linguistically focussed theorizations of translation comparing target texts with their source texts and failing to demonstrate the importance of translation as a cultural phenomenon. Yet Toury's idea can hardly account for all translational processes, even as far as only interlingual translation is concerned. Considering translations as facts of the target culture works well for examining translation within a descriptive cultural approach and mostly for examining literary translation. Descriptivism makes ethics superfluous, because it does not see hortation as its goal. Yet the concentration on the place occupied by the target text does not work as well for situations when translation is engaged in a live dialogue, that is, across shorter time intervals than for example translating a novel from one culture into another. In the latter case there is a dialogue of cultures but it does not require an immediate reaction to an action. Imagine an exchange of letters translated from one language into another and vice versa. Toury's idea will turn even more problematic in interpreting. And the principal limitation imposed by viewing translations as facts of target cultures is in the possibility of misleading the student of translation to think that the goal of translation is ultimately to ensure a suitable position of the translated text in the target culture. Translation stops being a dialogue and looks more like importation; it stops being a two-way road and becomes a well into which things fall never to return.

Seeing translation in lively interactional exchanges in the PS encourages us to view translation differently. Translations in the PS are constantly assessed not only at the backdrop of their target systems but against their contribution (or failure to do so) to the unfolding dialogue. Establishing the source text–target text relationship, their back and forth juxtaposing through comparison of the interacting parties' reactions to one another's actions is constant in intersocietal communication. Translations' functions

are no longer limited to their functions and positions on the other side, across the boundary separating them from their source texts/cultures. Rather translations' functions are determined by their ability to straddle the boundary, on the one hand helping the interacting cultures or their representatives to overcome the barrier, on the other hand enlarging their one-world experience by introducing another world and making even a strategic actor's action a two-world experience.

The comparison of the source and target texts is a means of assessing the measure of success of interlingual translation in a particular case of intersocietal translation and, hence, executing intersocietal communicative action contributing to an ethically beneficial intersocietal social integration. The focus on translation as a fact of the target culture may suggest limiting the observation only to the intentionality of one of the double-contingency's sides, that of the target actor, and ignoring the translation's ultimate intention to aid the target actor's intention to appreciate the intention of the source actor, which is necessary for communication to be socially integrable.

If the translator significantly (leading to distortion, misunderstanding of the source text's intentional status) curtails the source text's message, s/he acts strategically. S/he performs the act of interlingual translation as either an end in itself or as a service to a commissioner's systemically prompted goal: introducing an ideological change (by omission or change of a source text element) may be seen as a way for the translator, in cahoots with her/his commissioner, to misrepresent the position of the source society/person in the double-contingency situation of mutual interaction, in effect, blinding the addressee of the translation to the true status, informational and intentional, of the source. Skopos-target-oriented translation and—an analysis thereof!—may also be interpreted as a case of SA because the goal is to render the source message according to the addressee's lifeworld. Once the brief is fulfilled in that skopos-target-oriented fashion, the goal is declared to have been achieved and the translation's mission accomplished; the translation analysis performed by a skopos-translation scholar confirms that translation was successful. Once again, as with Toury's target-orientedness of translation analysis, observing translation as a dialogical agency questions such target-focussed conceptualizations of translation.

Translation is a special social action in that it is not a full-scale action: it does not represent the intention of its producer—the translator/interpreter; rather translation is intended to represent another social actor's

intention who is in dialogue with yet another actor. Translation is an ancillary action, one might even say subaction. (This claim should not be misunderstood as belittling translation as a less important activity! This claim refers to the nature of translation, not its social role.) The role of translation can be appreciated only in the context of double contingency involving two or more interacting actors. Translation can be driven by the motivation to contribute to CA or to simplify the interaction to an instrumental/strategic, that is, goal-oriented, version. Its density can be unnecessarily attenuated to linguistic mediation or its density can be enriched by allowing the translator's intercultural expertise to help the interacting parties to appreciate one another's lifeworld.

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Public Debate on and as Translation

Abstract The first part of the chapter considers a case from the eighteenth-century Russian public sphere. Translation was at the centre of the entire process of the Europeanization of Russia, and it also surfaced in the discourse of the literary enlightenment among a wider reading public. In the second part, the concept of translation is used as a means of studying public debate itself. Drawing on Eugene Nida's conceptualization of translation as the selection/deselection of the components of a translated unit, a recent public debate in Russia about the personality of Petr Tchaikovsky is analysed to demonstrate how the negotiation between the private and the public can be seen as translation.

Keywords Public sphere • Translation • Topic of debate • Russia • Tchaikovsky

The present chapter is composed of two parts. The first part considers a case in the eighteenth-century Russian PS. In that period, the PS in Russia was modelled on West-European PSs as part of a large-scale Westernization (or Europeanization) of the empire started by Peter the Great and continued by his heirs to the Russian throne, especially enthusiastically by Catherine the Great. The public discussion of the modern type as well as the range of topics was a new social phenomenon in Russia. *Belles lettres* became one of such newly introduced topics. Since

translation of both literary and non-literary publications was at the centre of the entire process of the Europeanization of Russia, it was only natural that it was discussed at the governmental level, involving the highest state officials, and that it surfaced in the discourse of the literary enlightenment among a wider reading public. One of such public discussions provides us with an opportunity to see the public debate on translation.

In the second part, the concept of translation will be used as a means of studying public debate itself, rather than a topic in it. Drawing on Eugene Nida's conceptualization of translation as a process of selection/deselection of the components of a translated unit, I will analyse a recent public discussion in Russia about the personality and heritage of Petr Tchaikovsky. This case study aims to demonstrate how the negotiation between the private and the public, the negotiation lying at the heart of any PS and responsible for the very configuration of the latter's boundary and thematic repertoire, can be productively analysed with the help of translation understood broadly.

PUBLIC DEBATE ON TRANSLATION

Как в просвещенной Европе, так и в просвещенной России...
—Н.В. Гоголь¹

Discussions of translation are known since the ancient and medieval periods of human history in several major regions of the world both in Europe and in Asia (e.g. McElduff and Sciarrino 2011; McElduff 2013; Cheung 2006; Mathauserova 1976; Franklin 2004; Copland 1991). Translation was discussed later in Renaissance and early-modern Europe (e.g. Botley 2004; Morini 2006). Sometimes translation was discussed in professional or semiprofessional circles, but sometimes, like in the case of the discussion to be examined below in the journal *St Petersburg Uchenye Vedomosti* [St Petersburg Scholarly Gazette], translation was the focus of a debate aimed at the general public. The Russian case is perhaps somewhat special in that the journal did not discuss translation episodically or intermittently but did it regularly. Issue after issue for half a year, the journal published reviews of translations and went even further to consider criteria

¹'As in enlightened Europe, so in enlightened Russia' (Nikolai Gogol, translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky).

according to which translations were to be evaluated. Translation, thus, became a visible topic in the emerging PS in eighteenth-century Russia aspiring to be Westernized (Tyulenev 2012).

THE TRANSLATOR IN PARNASSUS

In *St Petersburg Scholarly Gazette* (1777/1873; SPbSG), interlingual translation was brought to the public attention, and the discussion of translation was seen as a powerful means of educating the reading public in terms of critical attitude to the translated texts they read. Discussions of *belles lettres* is one of the prominent themes of the PS in Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Habermas 1989), they also moved into the limelight of the PS in eighteenth-century Russia when its nascent PS was modelled on the Western European PSs and the reading public grew increasingly larger and more secularized.

Noteworthy is that not only new books, but also the way those books were translated, or should have been translated, was in the focus. The reader was introduced into the translator's workshop. In one of the opening articles on translation in SPbSG, the following vivid and impressive picture is painted:

In our times the path to Parnassus has become extremely steep, difficult, slippery and filled with thorns. Recently Apollo has become very fond of the Russian language, but he issued a decree ordering not to admit to Parnassus any writer or translator, who, in their writings, did not strive to understand all the properties and to observe all the purity of the Russian language, and did not honour all of its grammar rules. (SPbSG: 86)²

The translator was declared an equal to the writer and was placed on an equal footing with the writer as an equally significant public figure honoured with the possibility of accessing the literary Parnassus.

The editor-in-chief of SPbSG was Nikolai Novikov (1744–1818), one of the most prominent literary and social figures of the Russian Enlightenment.

² Hereafter all translations are mine.—*S.T.* In Russian: ...в наши времена путь на *Парнас* стал чрезмерно крут, труден, скользок, и наполнен колючим тернием. Сверх того... ныне *Аполлон* весьма полюбил и пристрастился к *Российскому* языку; и для сего издал указ, которым повелевается не впускать ни одного Писателя и Переводчика на *Парнас*, который в писаниях своих не старался о свойствах и чистоте *Российского* языка, и не украсил оные наблюдением Грамматических правил.

The journal was a weekly, published from March to August 1777. In the opening issue, reviewing translated works was introduced as one of the central tasks taken on by the journal (SPbSG: 5). The translation review column was conceived as an arena not only for the staff to express their opinions, but also writers, publishers or translators were invited to share their own views and ideas (SPbSG: 6). At least one externally produced translation review was published later (SPbSG: 86).

The target audience of the discussions was ‘our enlightened public’ (SPbSG: 119), that is, the Russian reading public were now acquainting themselves with West-European literary and non-literary publications. Thus, the discussions of translations were meant not only for literati, writers and translators, but the entire reading public. It was indeed an open inclusive public debate on translation.

What were the themes discussed as regards translation? First of all, the features that made a ‘good’ translation. Here is how a translation of the libretto of Giovanni Paisiello’s opera *Nitteti*, presented in 1777 at the court of Catherine the Great, in Her Imperial Majesty’s Italian Theatre, was evaluated:

The translation of this opera is quite adept. But we should like to express our wish that, for the benefit of the Russian written language, the spelling in *translations* should be kept uniform. So far we see that every writer and translator observes his own rules of spelling and grammar. Uniformity would establish the definite rules from which young writers and *translators* would benefit greatly. (SPbSG: 38; emphases are mine—S.T.)³

The work of the translator is assessed from the standpoint of standardizing the spelling and grammatical norms of the Russian language: the translator must contribute to the establishment of the norms of the target language, Russian in this case. It shall be noted that when discussing an individual translation, the review generalizes; while talking about one translation, it formulates rules by which all translations and all translators should abide (note the italicized plural forms *translations* and *translators*

³In the original Russian: Перевод этой Оперы довольно искусен. Но мы не можем воздержаться, что бы не пожелать к пользе Российских письмен, чтобы в переводах соблюдалось единообразие во правописании. Доныне же усматриваем мы, что каждый Писатель и Переводчик свои имеет правила, как в рассуждении правописания в частности, так и вообще в Грамматике. Сие единообразие утвердило бы неперменные правила, которые молодым Писателям и Переводчикам много бы принесли пользы.

above). Bringing up this requirement in a journal intended for the general reading public was, no doubt, to educate the readers so that they would pay attention to this aspect of the translations they read or were to read.

A good example of a typical SPbSG translation review is found in the discussion of Mikhail Popov's book *Dosugi, ili Sobranie Sochinenii i Perevodov* [At Leisure, or A Collection of Works and Translations]. Once again, noteworthy is the fact that the works Popov wrote both in his capacity of writer and that of translator were treated together and as deserving equal attention:

[...] all of [Popov's] works and translations are adorned with strict observation of the rules and subtleties of the [Russian] grammar; and this is indeed praiseworthy. Our wish is that our budding writers and translators would emulate this model, and would try harder to observe the grammatical properties of the Russian language. (SPbSG: 60)⁴

Moreover, we again see a generalization: a review of Popov's original and translated works set up a model for the younger generations of writers-translators.

Mikhail Il'inskii's translation of Suetonius' *Lives of the Twelve Caesars* entitled in Russian *Zhizni Dvenadtsati pervykh Tsesarei Rimskikh* [The Lives of the Twelve First Roman Caesars] was praised for succeeding in retaining all the beauties of the Latin original in 'our language' (SPbSG: 119). The translation was recommended as accurate and written in a pleasant and pure Russian. It, therefore, deserved 'to be considered among the best historical translations in the Russian language' (ibid.). To the properties of a good translation, this review added the requirement of accuracy of rendition. Besides, the public was encouraged to look at each translation not only in relation to its original but also to other translations—Il'inskii's translation was compared to other historical Russian translations and found to be among the best of them.

The reviewed translation of Marmontel's *Le Misanthrope corrigé* [The Misanthrope Corrected] as *Altsest[,] izlechivshiiisia ot svoenraviia, ili ispravlennyi chelovekonenavidets* [Alceste cured from selfishness, or a corrected

⁴ In Russian: ...все его [Попова] Сочинения и Переводы украшены строгим наблюдением правил и тонкостей грамматических; и это заслуживает великой похвалы. Мы не можем не пожелать, что бы господа молодые наши Писатели и Переводчики, подражая сему примеру, по больше старались о соблюдении свойств языка и правил Российской Грамматики.

misanthrope] served as an example *in contrarium*. According to the reviewer, the attractiveness of the original characters vanished in the translation, they lost all their wit and jocundity; and although they spoke in Russian, or rather in ‘some strange dialect’ of Russian, their speech was incomprehensible and nobody would be able to understand them (SPbSG: 85). Such a bad translation, according to the reviewer, was the result of a kind of disguised envy, ‘a sworn enemy of the great writers’, which tarnishes their glory, and often under the guise of zeal, it wounds great masters by the quills in the hands of inexperienced translators (SPbSG: 84). In other words, a bad translation is more than an unsuccessful literary enterprise—it ruins the reputation of both the original author and of the original text and also damages the target language. A good translation is a work of love and reverence, therefore the reviewer appeals to Marmontel:

[Invite] the translator, who rendered into Russian the first two volumes of your *Moral Tales*. He loves and reveres you: he excelled in conveying the exquisite beauty of the style of your *Tales* into our language. Maybe he would not turn a deaf ear to your request and, to your credit, would cure your poor Alceste with the art of his pen. Without that, we assure you, no one would read it [...] Admittedly there are few so poorly translated books in the Russian language [...] (SPbSG: 85–86)⁵

The reviews examined not only literary translations. For instance, a translation of the treatise by ‘Mr Justi’ *Essential Image of the Nature of the People’s Societies and All Kinds of Laws* (SPbSG: 90) was examined. The translation (the translator’s name was left abbreviated as ‘V:R:M.V:L:K:V’) was deprecated for its ‘darkness and unintelligibility’ and several important inaccuracies in the translation were pointed out (*ibid.*). For example, the reviewer disagreed with the renditions of some key terms such as ‘monarchy’, ‘aristocracy’ and ‘democracy’ and suggested the variants he considered more precise. For instance, the reviewer rejected the translator’s rendition of *Despotische* [despotic] as *nasil’stvennyi* [violent], suitable

⁵ In Russian: ...попроси того г. Переводчика, который первые два тома *Нравоучительных Сказок* твоих перевел на *Российский* язык. Он тебя любит и почитает: он показал отменную приятность и красоту слога твоих *Сказок* на нашем языке. Может быть исполнит он твое прошение, и к чести твоей вылечит бедного твоего *Алцеста* искусством пера своего: —а без того, мы тебя уверяем, право никто читать его не будет... Должно признаться, что весьма мало читали мы на *Российском* языке таких книг, которые бы переведены были слабее сей...

for tyranny, whereas, in his opinion, a more accurate rendition would be *samovlastnyi* [autocratic] (SPbSG: 93). The reviewer told the reader that he did not want to enter the discussion of other numerous and equally grave errors only because ‘predmet rassuzhdenii vozbraiaet’ [because the nature/genre of a journalistic review would not allow going excessively into details] (ibid.). This explanation is yet further evidence that the reviewer clearly addressed the audience that exceeded a narrow circle of experts. The discussion respected the format of a publicly accessible debate.

The same idea was made even more explicit in a comment about the reviewed translation of Virgil’s *Georgics*:

As for the translation of *Georgics*, we did not judge worthwhile engaging in a detailed critical examination, a discussion of the rules of poetry and grammar, of the purity of the language and the accuracy of the actual translation. Otherwise, the description of a small book would have taken too much space. We did not wish to bore our readers. (SPbSG: 36)⁶

To emphasize, the SPbSG reviews discussed both literary and non-literary kinds of translation and the criteria applied to both kinds of translation are similar. All translations should be accurate, and the degree of accuracy was determined by a comparison of the source and target texts; translations had to be written in clear and grammatically correct Russian. Moreover newly published translations had to aspire to emulate the best translations already in circulation.

The reviewers themselves provided examples of what they considered ‘good’ translations. In the case of discussing *Iz’iasnenie ob Uchrezhdeniiakh Publichnykh v pol’zu vdov i umershikh, s opisaniem novogo roda Tontiny, ravnomerno poleznoi kak dlia Obshchestva, tak i dlia Kazny, ischislennoe g. Fusom, Ad’iunktom Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, pod smotreniem g. Leonarda Eilera* [The Explanation of the Public Institutions in favour of widows and deceased, with a description of a new kind of Tontine, is equally useful both for the Society and for the Treasury; calculated by Mr. Fus, Adjunct of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, under the supervision of Mr. Leonard Euler] (SPbSG: 97), the review read as an abridged translation

⁶In Russian: Что же касается до перевода *Георгик*, то не рассудили мы за благо входить в подробное критическое рассмотрение оного, в рассуждении правил Стихотворства и Грамматики, чистоты языка и точности перевода, опасаясь, чтобы заняв несколько полулистов, описанием одной малой книжки, не наскучить Читателям нашим.

and, therefore, it provides us with an opportunity to see how the reviewers followed their own pieces of advice.

The book under review was recommended for translation from French as useful for that part of the Russian reading public that did not read in French. That is to say, the choice for this book was not accidental; the reviewers thereby set an example of how to select books for translation: the translated texts had to be beneficial for the reading public. Overall, the style of the translation retelling is clear, but the key word *tontine* is simply transliterated and no explanation is offered (SPbSG: 97, 102). This is clearly at variance with the logic of the selection of the book: ‘There is nothing more to wish than to see such works translated into the Russian language so that the readers who do not read in French could nevertheless benefit from them’ (SPbSG: 87).⁷ But if this book had been translated in the way the reviewer retold it, that is, by simply transliterating key terms, how could someone who read it in such a translation have benefited from it? The ‘theory’ and the practice of translating in SPbSG seem to have diverged.

How to translate terms non-existent in the target language has always been one of the most challenging problems for translators, but in such periods as the eighteenth century in Russia when the empire was flooded with new cultural phenomena and new concepts all expressed in new words and terms, the challenge was especially acute. Yet the reviewers did not pay all the attention the problem deserved. The SPbSG reviewers seem to have underestimated the creative aspect of translation. Reviewers advised focussing on the best among the existing original and translated works of the Russian literature (and this is quite a reasonable piece of advice), but this was not enough: it would have been desirable, in fact necessary, seeing that the Russian language still lacked a great deal of terms to reflect the translated concepts, to discuss methods of rendering new concepts. In short, the review of the book on *tontine*, in which the key French terms were simply transliterated with minimal explanation, and without applying the usual SPbSG generalizations on how to handle such cases, contradicted SPbSG’s own requirements of clarity and intelligibility in translation.

⁷In Russian: ...нам ничего более не остается, как пожелать, чтобы эти его [Эйлера] труды переложены были на Российский язык, дабы могли пользоваться ими и незнающие Французского языка Читатели.

In SPbSG some aspects of translation praxis were also discussed, such as preparatory stages of producing a translation. For instance, in the review of *Izvestiia Vizantiiskikh Istorikov, ob'iasniaushchikh Rossiiskuiu Istoriiu drevnikh vremen i poseleniia Narodov; sobrannykh, i khronologicheskim poriadkom raspolozhennykh, Ivanom Shtritterom* [Writings of the Byzantine Historians explaining the Russian ancient History and the settlement of the Peoples; collected and chronologically arranged by Ivan Schritter], the review says:

Mr Schritter, a hardworking polyglot who is also knowledgeable about ancient history, undertook this work at the request of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, for the benefit of the Russian readers, who cannot read in Latin. From the numerous extracts in Latin, he made an abridged version in German; and the translation, which we recommend to the enlightened public, was made from that version. (SPbSG: 49–50)⁸

The review also explained the purpose of publishing such materials: they were needed in order ‘to purify our History’ (*k ochishcheniiu nashei istorii*; *ibid.*: 50). The history of the publication of such works was briefly reviewed, from the first attempts made by Professor Gottlieb Siegfried Bayer and Vasiliĭ Tatishchev. It was explained that because Bayer lacked the knowledge of the ‘Slavenorussian’ language (Old Church Slavonic) and Tatishchev ‘had no chance to learn ancient and new foreign languages’ as well as the rules of what we today would call critical textology, ‘some inaccuracies crept into our historical records’ (SPbSG: 50). Later a number of other academics contributed to recovering historical chronicles and manuscripts (*ibid.*: 52–53). Schritter’s collection was translated from German into Russian by Vasiliĭ Svetov. He translated it from the handwritten German original. Schritter and Svetov verified the spelling of all proper names against the Byzantine Greek originals (*ibid.*: 55–56). Noteworthy here is not only the contextualization of translation activity and its results in the literary and in the overall socio-cultural processes but also the detailed fashion of discussing the preparatory stage of the translation.

⁸In Russian: Г. Штриттер, Муж трудолюбивый и весьма искусный в знании разных языков и Древней Истории, предпринял этот труд по приказанию Императорской Академии Наук, для пользы Читателей Российских, Латинского языка незнающих. Из пространных его на Латинском языке Выписок, (под заглавием *Memoriae Populorum, et. c.*, напечатанных при Академии Наук,) сделал он особенное Сокращение на Немецком языке; а с него сделан тот перевод, о котором мы здесь Ученому Свету предлагаем.

Now, let us return to the first issue of SPbSG. There it says that Catherine the Great's *The Instructions to the Commissioners for Composing a New Code of Laws* (1767) was translated from Russian into several West-European languages. While the original written by the Empress herself was kept in the Imperial Academy of Sciences, in a special *gilded* ark, one of the translations, also made by her 'imperial majesty's hand', was kept in the Government Senate, in a specially arranged *silver* 'temple' (SPbSG: 21). This picture may be interpreted as presenting two opposite attitudes to the translation. On the one hand, Catherine was the author of *The Instructions*, but she was also the translator. This shows the equality of the original and the translation. On the other hand, the original was stored in a gilded ark, while the translation was stored in a silver 'temple'. Here the original and the translation are correlated as gold and silver. While generally translation was held as inferior in value as compared to its original (like silver to gold), an effort was made to elevate the translation to the level of writing (the translator is also the author): in SPbSG the translator was shown as an equal to the writer-author, and the entire corpus of the reviews was the actual process of elevating the former to the latter.

To conclude this part, the West-European type of PS in eighteenth-century Russia was a new social phenomenon. The formation of the PS in Russia in that period was part of the process of Westernization in which translation played a paramount role (Tyulenev 2012). That is why translation was indeed a vital part of the emerging PS. An open public discussion of translation, such as the one that unfolded in SPbSG, also made translation a visible part of the social life of the time. That discussion of translation was more than a discussion of translation—rather translation was viewed as one of the key mechanisms of the sociocultural transformation experienced by society not only through the passive consumption of translations but also through understanding how they were made, who made them and how they were to be appreciated.

PUBLIC DEBATE AS TRANSLATION

—Дура!—проскрежетал кто-то сзади.
 —Святая!—принеслось откуда-то в ответ.
 —И.С. Тургенев⁹

⁹'Fool',—somebody whispered gnashing his teeth. 'Saint,'—another voice answered from somewhere else. (Ivan Turgenev; translation is mine—S.T.)

If translation is conceived broadly, that is, not only as a lingual (intra/interlingual) transfer but as a transfer of phenomena from one medium into another, it opens new vistas for understanding how public discussion works. The findings of translation scholarship, then, become relevant to and illuminating for PS scholarship.

The term ‘translation’ has already been used in the PS literature in a broad sense, extending its conceptualization in Translation Studies as (intra- or inter-) lingual transfer. For instance, Nancy Fraser used the term ‘translation’ in the sense of transferring from one sector of social life into another. According to Fraser, the difference between strong and weak publics lies in the degree of a public’s ability ‘to translate [their opinion] into authoritative decisions’ (1992: 135). Thus, the usage of the term ‘translation’ in Fraser (1992) as well as in (2014) pointed to the transformation of public opinion into law.

For Fuyuki Kurasawa, ‘to translate’ means ‘to inform’ as in ‘public authorities are more likely to selectively filter public opinion translated from nation and global civil societies’ or as in: ‘public authorities may serve [...] to translate public opinion ‘upwards’ from civil society to governmental institutions’ (2014: 88).

In his discussion of PS, Alan McKee used the term ‘translator’ as follows: ‘In conducting debate across cultural difference, the role of translators becomes extremely important—people, institutions or texts who communicate in the argumentative languages of more than one public sphere’ (2005: 161). Here translators are mediators between different argumentative languages. It will be noted that languages meant are not natural human languages between translation mediates, as conceptualized in Translation Studies. Rather, McKee means different sets of values and ideas interacting with each other or, one might say, talking to each other in a public debate. These values and ideas are held by different participants of the debate: they may speak the same natural language, say, English, but they may well use different argumentative languages and, therefore, will definitely need translation as a type of intra- or interpersonal mediation.

As was shown in Chap. 2, translation is a capacious notion. The focus in the preceding chapters and in the first part of the present one was on interlingual translation. In this part, the term ‘translation’ will be used in a broader sense. This use of the term will hopefully enrich the theory of PS by laying bare some of the mechanisms of public debate.

To begin with, the whole idea of PS is based on how the boundary between what is considered to be public and what is seen as private is

negotiated. This is the ‘what’ aspect of PS discussions: what is included into and what is excluded from a PS. Originally, in the seventeenth-eighteenth century West-European PS, the public part included such topics as rules governing social relations—commodity exchange, social labour, publicly relevant private family life, the sphere of public authority (state and court), political events, the world of letters (as we saw in the previous part) and the market of culture products. The rest was considered private. But the boundary between the public and the private moves as a function of time and space and, among other things, as a result of the conceptualization of human rights, for example, the right to speak and to be heard, to be a private citizen visible socially. ‘Public’ means public interest, public goods, public policies. ‘In each case ‘public’ is counterposed to ‘private’, the realm of individual freedom [...]’ (Nash 2014: 1).

One of the contested topics of public debate is sexuality. In this aspect, a PS grows larger or smaller as a result of the inclusion or exclusion of the themes related to sexuality and the publicization of such discussions (cf. prides as a public event in the second half of the twentieth century).

To appreciate the potential of translation as a concept in theorizing PS, let us introduce one of the ways of theorizing translation. In his influential contributions to translation theory, Eugene Nida introduced the notion of componential analysis, borrowed from lexicology (Nida 1975). Componential analysis helps understand how in interlingual translation, the translator chooses a target language equivalent for a source text meaning unit. Led by his/her understanding of what a particular unit means in a particular context, the translator consciously or subconsciously selects the relevant components in the total set of components making up the meaning of a word or a phrase. For instance, the French word combination ‘une étudiante’ (a female student) is composed of an indefinite article of the feminine grammatical gender (‘une’) and a feminine noun (‘étudiante’) and includes the following components: (1) student; (2) female; (3) one of many; (4) somebody unknown and so on. This word combination may be rendered into English as ‘a student’ or ‘a female student’. When translating this word combination into languages other than English, more or less components may be selected and they will appear as separate parts, giving perhaps a word combination with more than just two units, or as a set of grammatical features fused into one unit. For instance, in Russian the equivalent may be *studentka* (a female student) or *odna iz studentok* (one of the female students) or even *predstavitel'nitsa grouppy studentov* (lit., a female representative of a group of the students). How many

and which of these components of the meaning will be translated by means of one or several units of the target language depends on the available linguistic features, the context in which the combination ‘une étudiante’ is used, the situation, the goal of communication and so on. When more complex language units are to be translated more factors are likely to play a role: the translator’s or his/her commissioner’s convictions, habituses, immediate goals and ideological agendas. The same process of selecting/deselecting of certain aspects of a phenomenon may be observed in how topics are handled in the PS.

WHY DO WE LOVE PETR IL’ICH?

Recently, in Russia, there have been lively discussions about one of the classics of the Russian music culture—Petr Il’ich Tchaikovsky (1840–93). Tchaikovsky is one of the most famous Russian composers, but also a controversial figure. On the one hand, he is a national classic remembered for his music and commemorated in a number of music events and venues, such as one of the most prestigious music competitions, the International Tchaikovsky Music Competition, numerous music institutions are named after Tchaikovsky, notably the Moscow Tchaikovsky Conservatoire; the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall in Moscow is one of the most important music venues. Also, several films, feature and documentary, have been made about him. On the other hand, there have been disputes about him as a person with a ‘non-traditional’ sexual orientation.

In what follows I will consider the name ‘Tchaikovsky’ as a complex topic with a number of subtopics. To distinguish between the topic and the subtopics I will use the following graphic symbols: <Tchaikovsky> will stand for the topic, while its components, subtopics, will be in the square brackets, for example, [musician]. Thus, <Tchaikovsky> as a topic of the public discourse can be seen as a set of components:

- [a (unique) genius/musician];
- [a genius (comparable to other talented people/musicians)];
- [a homosexual genius/musician];
- [a homosexual man];
- [Russian]; and so on.

To discuss <Tchaikovsky> in a public debate, one has to choose which components represent Tchaikovsky as a publicly acceptable personality.

How many and which of these aspects of the meaning will be translated depends on the context, the translator (their knowledge, openness, convictions, social and cultural background, social position), the situation, the goal of the debate set by the discussants together and each one of them.

The corpus based on which the public debate about Tchaikovsky is going to be discussed includes mass media and Internet materials and several films, some of which will be touched upon briefly, rather as a background for some that will be examined in a greater detail. It is not an exhaustive corpus of films on Tchaikovsky, but the chosen films will suffice to see the trends in discussing <Tchaikovsky> in the PSs.

Igor' Talankin's *Tchaikovsky* is a Soviet film version of Tchaikovsky's biography (released in 1970). The composer was shown as a [Russian] [musician] of [genius], but also someone who is somewhat psychologically unstable, a [neurotic]. The components of this presentation of the composer as a topic of discussing his heritage were carefully selected, and perhaps his neurotic fits were the only socially questionable trait. But neuroticism is shown as pardonable because it is commonly believed that many, if not all artists, suffer from it as a property that renders them socially less tolerable yet their neuroticism comes from their unusual sensitivity that, in turn, endows them with their socially valuable creative abilities.

Ken Russell's *The Music Lovers*, a British film version of the portrayal of Tchaikovsky (also released in 1970). Unlike the Soviet version, the British version, unsurprisingly, presents the composer in a considerably different way. He is shown, like in Talankin's film, as a [musician] of [genius], also quite [neurotic], [Russian], but, differently from the Soviet film, the composer appears as a [queer] person. His predilection for male sexual partners is made abundantly clear. Thus, the topic is introduced into the public domain with more subtopics, one of which, Tchaikovsky's queerness, was excluded from the Soviet portrayal of the composer.

Adel' Al'-Khadad's *Apokrif: muzyka dlia Petra i Pavla* [*An Apocryphal Story: Music for Peter and Paul*] is a post-Soviet (2005) Russian film translation of <Tchaikovsky>. It is made up of the following components: <Tchaikovsky> = [musician], [genius], [neurotic], [Russian]. Once again, the composer's queerness is bracketed out. (See more on this film below.)

A later attempt to make another feature film about Tchaikovsky has never been realized. It was *Tchaikovsky* by Kirill Serebrennikov, a Russian theatre and film director who as this text is being written is under house arrest for an alleged embezzlement or, some would argue, for ideological reasons. However Serebrennikov's film, even without being actually made,

caused an explosive public debate, if not a scandal, concerning the way Tchaikovsky was planned to be represented. Apparently his queer sexuality was going to be shown. Eventually Serebrennikov failed to make the film because the Russian Ministry of Culture offered only a meagre financial support, which Serebrennikov eventually rejected and, hoping to find alternative producers, suspended the project. (See more on the public debate as regards Serebrennikov's project below.)

Ralf Pleger's *Die Akte Tschaikowsky: Bekentnisse eines Komponisten* [*The Tchaikovsky Act: The Confessions of a Composer*] (2014), was translated from German into Russian with a telltale change in the title: *Delo Tchaikovskogo: Priznaniia odnogo kompozitora-geiia* [Tchaikovsky's Case: Confessions of a Gay Composer]. (The translator of the Russian version uploaded on YouTube is introduced as Andrey Stravinsky: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3_mYUof2ds; last accessed 21 December 2017). In his comment under the video translated into Russian, Stravinsky wrote that he saw no problem that Serebrennikov was not allowed to make his film on Tchaikovsky because Pleger had already done it. Here Stravinsky meant the alleged plans to show Tchaikovsky as a queer person, that is, to add to the standard translated set of the components of <Tchaikovsky> in the previous Soviet and Russian films, [musician], [genius], [neurotic], [Russian], the component [queer].

Stravinsky also stressed that in his previous films, Pleger showed that the social issues experienced by his characters, such as Beethoven or Wagner, were still relevant to people's experiences today. Therefore, Stravinsky stated:

It is obvious that this film about Tchaikovsky emphasizing his homosexuality was intended as yet another Western reaction as regards the Russian LGBT state policy. But should the film be considered only in the context of the human right problems and a new Cold War? Certainly not! (ibid.).¹⁰

He critically, if briefly, discussed the aesthetic aspects of the film and concluded by saying that he did his 'voicing-over' (*ozvuchka*) of the film (translated it?) in order to counteract the insinuations of Russian 'liars,

¹⁰ In Russian: Очевидно, что этот фильм о Чайковском с упором на гомосексуальность последнего задумывался как один из ассиметричных ответов Запада на политику в области прав ЛГБТ, проводимую Российским государством. Но нужно ли рассматривать его сугубо в контексте ущемления прав человека и новой холодной войны? Разумеется, нет!

hypocrites and homophobes' (ibid.). Such a stance explains why in the Russian translation of the title, Tchaikovsky is presented as *a* gay composer, emphatically—one of many, thus a translation of <Tchaikovsky> is introduced by Pleger and Stravinsky as a [gay] and a [gay artist]. That is why in the film, some modern gay artists speak not only about Tchaikovsky, but also about their experiences as gay artists.

As is clear from Table 5.1, <Tchaikovsky> is translated into the public discussion with the largest number of components in the films made outside Russia, moreover the added components concern his sexuality. Both Russell's and Pleger's films have been translated into Russian and thereby made available to the Russian audience and they also figure in online discussions in the Russian online chatrooms and in the Russian commentaries made in the online discussions about the problem of representing Tchaikovsky. Russell's and Pleger's films, therefore, can be considered as part of the Russian PS. The difference between Russell's and Pleger's films in terms of how <Tchaikovsky> is translated is that in Russell's film he is shown as a one-off queer musician of genius, whereas Pleger generalizes and transposes Tchaikovsky's experiences into the present time by translating <Tchaikovsky> not so much as an exceptional case but as a case that can be readily encountered among other males (the focus in the film is on male homosexuality), primarily artists.

Quite a special case, as Table 5.1 shows, is Serebrennikov's case: there is little doubt that the director wanted to show Tchaikovsky as a Russian musician, a composer of genius. The composer would perhaps also be neurotic, this was to be expected seeing that the scriptwriter, Yuri Arabov, was the same as in Adel' Al'-Khadad's film made in 2005 where Tchaikovsky's psychology had been shown as unstable to a spectacular degree. But the real trigger of the

Table 5.1 The components of <Tchaikovsky> translated into the five films analysed

<i>Director</i>	<i>[Musician]</i>	<i>[Genius]</i>	<i>[Russian]</i>	<i>[Neurotic]</i>	<i>[Queer artist]</i>	<i>[Homosexual male]</i>
Igor' Talankin	+	+	+	+	–	–
Ken Russell	+	+	+	+	+	–
Adel'	+	+	+	+	–	–
Al'-Khadad						
Ralf Pleger	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kirill	+	+	+	+	?	?
Serebrennikov						

controversy around Serebrennikov's project was that allegedly he and Arabov wanted to show Tchaikovsky as a queer composer (one might guess that probably not to the extent of Pleger's generalizations). Serebrennikov first turned to the Ministry of Culture for financial support, but out of the budget of 240 million roubles asked by the director only 30 million were granted. Serebrennikov decided to return the money after another potential producer, the state-run Cinema Fund, had rejected to complement the rest or a part of the budget explaining the decision by seeing a lack of '*zritel'skogo potentsiala*' ([audience potential] i.e. they saw no potential to attract audience, <https://lenta.ru/news/2013/09/19/back/>; accessed 21 December 2017). The rejection was apparently connected with the, at the time, widely held public discussions of Tchaikovsky's sexuality. Arabov and Serebrennikov were embroiled in the controversy and found themselves on the defensive.

But let us first consider the context in which <Tchaikovsky> was translated into the public debate surrounding Arabov and Serebrennikov's predicament. The highest state officials took part in the debate. President Putin was quoted as saying: 'They say that Petr Il'ich Tchaikovsky was homosexual. However we love him not for that. He was a great musician, and we all love his music'¹¹ (<https://ria.ru/politics/20130904/960605375.html>). While admitting that there are rumours about Tchaikovsky's homosexuality, Putin draws a line between what 'we' love Tchaikovsky for and whatever he might have been as a person.

Vladimir Medinskii, the Minister of Culture, is even clearer as regards what he believes is public and what is private in the discussions of Tchaikovsky:

There is no proof that Tchaikovsky was homosexual. He was a greatest Russian composer. This is a fact. Tchaikovsky was a genius, and the film [by Serebrennikov] as the crew thinks should be about Tchaikovsky's genius, rather than rumours surrounding his biography. [...] For the state in this case it is the person's talent and the service he rendered to his country and his people that are main things—not his private life. That's why it's private.¹² (<http://www.interfax.ru/interview/329409>)

¹¹ In Russian: Вот говорят, что Петр Ильич Чайковский был гомосексуалистом. Правда, мы любим его не за это, но он был великий музыкант, и мы все любим его музыку.

¹² In Russian: [...]ет никаких доказательств, что Чайковский был гомосексуалистом. Чайковский был величайшим русским композитором – это факт. Чайковский – гений, и фильм, как считает творческая команда, надо снимать именно о гении Чайковского, а не о слухах вокруг его биографии. [...] Для государства в этом случае главное – талант человека, его служение стране, людям, а не частная жизнь. На то она и частная.

In other words, it is Tchaikovsky's public service to his country and his people that should be visible publicly and his private life should be kept outside the public concern.

Thus, the crux of the matter is where to draw the boundary between the public and the private, and the boundary is drawn by selecting or deselecting certain aspects of Tchaikovsky's personality: some are allowed, some are denied access to the PS. Putin's words that 'what we [the Russian people whom he represented in his capacity of president] love him for' is his music and Medinskii's references to Tchaikovsky's service to his 'country' and 'people' with his musical talent indicated that <Tchaikovsky> for them was translatable into the public discussion only as a set consisting of [Russian], [musician] and [genius]. It is a conservative translation of <Tchaikovsky> warranted by the government, because both Putin and Medinskii clearly speak not as private individuals but as officials representing the entire Russian people and advocating interests of the country and the people.

The Russian Internet reacted with a series of posters questioning such demarcation between the public and the private. Tchaikovsky was shown as one of queer Russian artists, notably the poet Marina Tsvetaeva and the ballet dancer Rudolf Nuriev. The artists were depicted with brief citations of their own words demonstrating their queer sexualities but with their mouths covered as if preventing them from speaking freely about that aspect of their lives. This translation of <Tchaikovsky> into the public debate seems radical as compared to the governmental one because it strongly hinted that the exclusion of the private life of an artist makes his/her personality as expressed in their art and, by extension, their entire art incomplete and lacking. <Tchaikovsky> is translated here as containing the [queer artist] component.

Yet more radial Internet translations of <Tchaikovsky> went further to include the component [homosexual man]. Such translation strategy, like in Pleger's film discussed above, looked at Tchaikovsky's experiences as a gay man through the prism of our own time and was contextualized as part of the LGBT-related problems with human rights in present-day Russia. For example, several journalists and human rights activists, Dmitrii Adamov, Sergei Mikhailov and Gabriella Schmidt, translated an article originally published in the German online magazine Spiegel, which discussed the difficulties with the state financing of Serebrennikov's film as a case of the large-scale homophobia rampant in Russia (see [Prava](#) in References).

The Russian gay community also reacted to Serebrennikov's problems with the film understanding them broadly as more than problems with the script of an unmade film. On one of the most prominent Russian gay sites *gay.ru*, the comments as follows appeared: 'The bloody fascists won't admit that there can be and are talented people among gays'¹³ (by Constantin, published 17 April 2016; <http://www.gay.ru/news/rainbow/2016/04/17-33616.htm>). Such interpretations of Serebrennikov's failure to secure funding clearly translate <Tchaikovsky> as a gay man or [homosexual man], a member of the gay community, not only as a queer genius.

The next translation is an example of what happens when an artist's biography is as good as bowdlerized. Adel' Al'-Khadad, the director of a 2005 Tchaikovsky film based on Arabov's first script, said in an interview that while making his film he had felt pressure to add some intimate details about Tchaikovsky, hinting at his homosexuality, but he had refused to do so. (He did not specify who had pressurized him.) The problem, however, is that some of Tchaikovsky's actions in relation to his wife, Antonina Miliukova, which can be and are explained in his letters as his inability to interact with her as a female, look in Al'-Khadad and Arabov's film as neurotic whims and unfounded cruelty. In their translation of <Tchaikovsky> they added [neuroticism] to the most conservative (governmentally warranted) set of components, but arguably they exaggerated [neuroticism], especially in what concerns the relationship between the composer and his wife, by refusing to include references to Tchaikovsky's sexuality. This way of translating <Tchaikovsky> here can be placed between the most conservative way and a more inclusive one, but because Al'-Khadad and Arabov refused to include sexuality as part of Tchaikovsky's portrayal their film distorts some aspects of Tchaikovsky's life and character.

In connection with Serebrennikov's film, Arabov spoke publicly and his position became one of the themes of heated discussions. While Arabov's translation of <Tchaikovsky> remains (officially) the same as in Al'-Khadad's film, the situation is perhaps more complex.

Arabov's new translation of <Tchaikovsky> illustrates how the social situation and the target audience can influence a translation of a topic in a PS. In an interview about the planned Serebrennikov film (20 August 2013), Arabov said that only philistines believed that Tchaikovsky was a

¹³ In Russian: Мерзкие фашисты не хотят признавать, что среди геев могли быть / есть талантливые люди.

homosexual. ‘This is not an established fact. No need to film what philistines [*obyvateli*] believe’ (<https://iz.ru/news/555599>). Yet in the same interview he said there was ‘a certain rumour [about Tchaikovsky’s homosexuality] which then all discussed’ (ibid.), and that discussion was to be reflected in the film. This is clearly illogical. Arabov seems to have tried to say something that those who were against bringing up the issue of Tchaikovsky’s sexuality wanted him to say and then, contradicting himself that only facts, not rumours spread by philistines, are to be shown in films, he said that the rumour about Tchaikovsky’s homosexuality had to be reflected somehow. But he remained vague about what exactly and to what extent had to be filmed as regards the ‘rumour’. The interview was one of the occasions during which the line between the private and the public was being uneasily negotiated.

In what follows in his interview, Arabov, again illogically, claimed: ‘First, I am against discussing homosexuality, especially in art. Second, the script passed through five drafts, and in the last of them there is no homosexuality; it is not about that at all’ (ibid.). And he added emphatically: ‘I would not let my name to be associated with a film propagating homosexuality’ (ibid.). Here it becomes clear why he stressed that he personally was against discussing homosexuality (why ‘especially in art?’). Arabov was interviewed in the context of the anti-gay propaganda law. Also his interview was his way of reassuring the powers that be that nothing what they would not want to see in the film, would be included. And the Minister of Culture Medinskii, in his interview referred to above, did make it clear that he heard Arabov. He mentioned Arabov’s interview. The message was heard, although it did not convince all the authorities, hence Serebrennikov’s failure to be granted the full budget asked for.

Arabov actively excluded the component [queer] from his translation of <Tchaikovsky> in its interview version. This exclusion was dictated by the context in which he explained his work on a new film about Tchaikovsky with another director. Now that the public discussion became especially acute and even the President and the Minister of Culture were involved, and since Arabov and Serebrennikov asked for money from the state-run producers, it was important to translate <Tchaikovsky> ‘correctly’, that is, as closely reproducing the set of components that was likely to be found acceptable by the state.

Since the director is usually more in the public limelight and more frequently interviewed, Serebrennikov translated <Tchaikovsky> not once. Serebrennikov’s translations are interesting here in that they show a dynamic. In one of the interviews published on 16 March 2017,

about his planned film, Serebrennikov told about his visit to the Ministry of Culture where it was explained to him that Tchaikovsky could not be gay because—he was a great Russian composer. Serebrennikov continued: ‘I laughed when I heard that. They did not like my reaction. This was the end of the discussion. Petr Il’ich’s sexual orientation turned out to contradict the state policy. But I cannot change the script. I don’t want to lie’ (<https://meduza.io/feature/2017/03/16/odinochestvo-eto-samoe-slozhnoe-i-moschnoe-ispytanie-kotoroe-vypadaet-cheloveku>).¹⁴ Thus, in the script, at least initially, <Tchaikovsky> was translated with the [queer] component present. But it became obvious that no matter what reasons were to be given, no official sponsoring could be counted on, unless the translation of the main character into the script and ultimately into the film changed.

In another, earlier, interview (11 September 2013; shortly after Arabov’s interview to the same news agency, Izvestia), Serebrennikov said that the film ‘would be suitable for the category 0+’ (<https://iz.ru/news/556873>). ‘0+’ is a reference to the age group for which a culture product, such as a film, is deemed suitable. He was talking right after the infamous anti-gay propaganda law had been passed by the Russian Parliament (11 June 2013) and later that same month signed off by the President. If, according to his interview of 2017, Serebrennikov faced problems with showing Tchaikovsky as a gay man when his and Arabov’s script was assessed in the Ministry of Culture, then the film could not have been considered suitable for all ages because the anti-gay propaganda law was aimed specifically at limiting the audience of any type of materials showing so-called non-traditional relations. Thus, Serebrennikov’s translation is also self-contradictory. It should be interpreted in terms of the situation: the 2017 interview was given to the liberal Russian-speaking Meduza news agency based in Latvia, the 2013 was given inside Russia (to Izvestia). In 2013, Serebrennikov had got a seventh part of the budget from the Russian government while still hoping to get more from the Cinema Fund. In 2013, Serebrennikov was also careful to avoid the danger of being accused of gay propaganda and, if that was so, the target audience of his interview translation of <Tchaikovsky> was primarily the state officialdom. It shall be noted that in Serebrennikov’s 2013 and Arabov’s 2013 interviews, the strategies of translating <Tchaikovsky> into the PS converged: both the scriptwriter and the director deselected [queer], however

¹⁴ In Russian: ...в этот момент я засмеялся. Им мой смех в лицо не понравился. Так кончилась эта история. Ориентация Петра Ильича Чайковского оказалась скрепой.

Serebrennikov's 2017 interview seems to indicate that the director re-selected [queer] and reincluded it into his translation of <Tchaikovsky>: he did not want to lie about Tchaikovsky's sexuality.

There was a reaction against Serebrennikov's translation strategies as they appeared in his 2013 interview. In a comment by the user *cryogen-policy*, the following was written:

An honest film about Tchaikovsky is not for the category 0+. Such a film [of the 0+ category] would be suitable for children. It is all the more strange that a serious film director would try to show (the/a?) composer outside his love life, especially since it was/is outlawed in the society in which he lived/s. To listen to Tchaikovsky's music, one does not need a film director; what the latter is expected to show is the atmosphere in which that music was created, the circumstances which were important for the composer. (<http://www.gay.ru/people/star/russian/xx-xxi/chaykovskiy-gey-ili-ne.html>; accessed 27 September 2013)¹⁵

This was a protest of a member of the Russian gay public against the curtailed and thereby distorting translation of <Tchaikovsky> in Serebrennikov's 2013 interview translation. His later interviews, notably the 2017 one discussed above, may have reintroduced [queer] also thanks to such PS reactions.

To conclude, why did the figure of Tchaikovsky as a subject of public debate become so explosive? It is because different participants in the public debate about him chose different translation strategies by selecting and deselecting different components in <Tchaikovsky> as a translated unit. The different strategies resulted in different configurations of the components of the translated unit and those configurations, in turn, drew the line between the public and the private as regards sexuality differently. Tchaikovsky was shown exclusively as a unique musical genius, or as a historical figure whose biography was told more or less fully, or as a cause célèbre, which although happened in the past still holds relevance to the present.

¹⁵ In Russian: Честный фильм о Чайковском не для категории 0+. Для этой категории снимаются детские фильмы. Еще более странно для серьезного режиссера пытаться показать композитора, творца музыки, вне его любовных страстей, особенно если они запретны в окружающем его обществе. Саму музыку Чайковского можно послушать и безо всякого режиссера, а вот что зрителю интересно – это в какой атмосфере, эта музыка возникала, на фоне каких важных для композитора жизненных обстоятельств.

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CONCLUSION

The main goal of this book was first and foremost to impress on everybody who studies public sphere that it is simply impossible to talk about PS without talking about translation in it. It is as impossible to do this as to discuss music and keep silent about composers, instruments and performers involved as mediators between the universe of sounds and the world of those who appreciate music. It is as impossible as to speak about paintings as if they affected their spectators directly rather than through painters, the material media and stylistic devices the painters use. So also PS is inconceivable without this or that manifestation of translation.

PS is the sphere of public life that serves as a platform in which various topics, considered socially important, are discussed. ‘Public’ implies ‘collective’; discussions in the PS are joint efforts of numerous human social actors and infra- and suprahuman socially relevant forces and phenomena. The interaction between them inevitably involves translation. There is no other way to bridge the gap between any two discrete units in the social realm. That is why it comes as a surprise that in all the sophisticated PS literature with its highly developed conceptual apparatus, allowing theorizing PS in various periods and in various locales and reflecting the changes it is undergoing today, little, if any, notice is taken of translation.

Yet the world of translation is a universe. At least three species of translation, notably kinetic, intralingual and interlingual translation, have been shown to influence directly and sometimes even define debate in the PS. Kinetic translation has to do with gestures while the other two types have

to do with verbal languages. More often than not the three types combine in social interactions. In the PS, the three provide the communicants with the medium in which one's individual ways of thinking and *modus operandi* can be juxtaposed with and converted into the ways of thinking and *modi operandi*, which the other can appreciate and deal with.

Translation should not be exclusively associated with translators and interpreters. To be sure, there are translators/interpreters, both professional and amateur, but there are also other manifestations of the translating agency. Every human being practices translation in the process of transferring their feelings and ideas into external, socially visible, gestures or language. Translation is the only way a social actor can get out of the bubble of his/her psyche and enter the social space where s/he meets the other. Translation is performed intrapersonally. Sometimes communication is conducted in a language, which is not natural for one or more discussants. In that case, they interpret for themselves. The need to mediate is more complex than direct communication (if such a thing exists).

Moreover, the translating agency involves not only actor-mediators, such as translators or interpreters, and its intrapersonal manifestations (intrapersonal translation). The translating agency may be closely associated with other types of agency and actors, such as clients, commissioners or editors, all of whom influence, to a lesser or greater degree, the translation process or the translation product. This makes translation a very complex agency indeed. It branches into all types of agency and in a very literal sense permeates every nook and cranny of PS.

When meeting the other, social actors inevitably negotiate a compromise, which is somewhere midway between their plans of action and the intentions of those around them. Translation is the instrument of negotiating compromises as it is itself a compromise of different media. As far as translation in the social realm in general and in the PS in particular is concerned, handling differences of codes means not only linguistic codes, but also ethical codes. There can be distinguished different scenarios of negotiating compromise. In some of them the communicants' ethical principles overlap, and translating their differences into a compromise is relatively easy; in some others communicants share few or none of one another's moral convictions, and the process of translating their opposing standpoints into something acceptable for both may be quite challenging.

Yet, compromise being its middle name, translation is an indispensable element of negotiating all social deals. There is little possibility of

uncompromised action in the PS. PS is all about dialoguing and discussing, which inevitably result in embracing or at least becoming aware of alternative views on the same social issues. It can be safely stated that no participant in a PS discussion comes out of the discussion uncompromised, that is, his/her horizon ends up being enlarged to include yet another option of social action, even if that option is deemed disagreeable with his/her *modus vivendi*. This view of compromise makes it theorizable as translation in a broader sense of the word.

Translation as a screen between the communicating parties can be more or less dense. Sometimes translation is only language dense. Sometimes translation grows denser when it should mediate across cultural differences or convey various degrees of the potency, urgency and immediacy of the messages rendered.

But translation is not only a screen between the discussants (which may suggest imagining it as a static phenomenon). Translation may be theorized as a catalyst of communication. A catalyst may increase the efficiency of communication; it can also become a barrier to communication. Translation can work in the PS as communicative or strategic action and it can also contribute to communicative or strategic action unfolding between actors. Translation, especially in internationalized PSs, not only helps discussants overcome mediumistic barriers, it also makes them aware of such barriers. That can help the discussants, even those acting strategically, appreciate another social world and thereby translation has a chance of turning strategic action into communicative action. The more translation helps communicants to communicate, sensitizing them to the existence of other worlds, the more it contributes to PS as a communicative effort, turning one-world strategic actions into two-world communicative actions.

Finally, sometimes translation surfaces in public discussions as a topic. This was the case in a journal, *St Petersburg Scholarly Gazette* (1977), in eighteenth-century Russia. Translation was realized as an important mechanism in Westernizing Russia, in introducing new cultural phenomena and the standardization of the Russian language. Translation was put on the same level as the original authorship.

Methodologically, translation theory may also productively contribute to theorizing PS. In Chap. 5 I gave an example of one theoretical concept originally developed by Eugene Nida and known as componential analysis. This method, if applied to studying PS, allows seeing public debate as a process of negotiating the boundary between the public and

private social spheres through discussants' selecting different components of the debated topic. This is how the recent debate about the personality of Petr Il'itch Tchaikovsky unfolded in the Russian PS: some participants of the discussion limited the composer's public image to his musical genius in the service to his country and people, some participants broadened the image to include aspects of the composer's personal life, especially his sexuality. The Tchaikovsky case viewed as a translation process in the PS allows capturing not only the moment of negotiating the boundary between the private and the public spheres, but also the very mechanism of this negotiation.

The aspiration of the present monograph is not to exhaust the topic of translation in the PS and translation as a way of analysing PS. Rather the goal is to broach a vast topic, hitherto largely ignored and definitely understudied, and introduce translation into the theory of PS. Seeing the ever growing importance and an extremely lively dynamic of PSs in the time of the democratization and internalization of social spaces, it is of paramount importance to appreciate the ecology of PS in all its complexity and taking into consideration all the factors influencing public debate. Translation is arguably a most important of such factors. It is therefore expedient that both TIS and the PS scholarship pay an adequate attention to translation in the PS and PS as translation.

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