The Moving Text.
Localization, Translation, and Distribution

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Photo: Authors' hands at The Mission, Kellerberrin, Western Australia, August 2002

Pre-print version 2.2
November 2003

Contents

Internationalization is the preparation of a generic text for multiple localizations. The concept can be extended to include terminology databases and controlled languages, occupying the guiding position once accorded to the source text.

Internationalization can enhance rather than restrict the differences between locales, as is suggested by the language varieties that computer programs are marketed for.

The principle factor determining how many texts move may be the relative size of locales. It is possible that the larger the locale, the greater the percentage of texts moved *from* that locale and the smaller the percentage of movements *into* that locale. It is also possible that the distribution a locale receives without localization tends to be directly proportional to the distribution it receives with localization.

Localization is rarely complete, since asymmetries remain in the technical terminology. This incompletion potentially allows end-users to move to the locales of production.

Complete internationalization may be an ideal, but it could involve saying as little as a message sent into space.

3.   Equivalence, *malgré tout*

Industry discourse on localization defines translation in a very restrictive way, in terms of discontinuities that can be identified in practice.

The restrictive notion of equivalence comes at a time when translation theory is moving toward a broader view, like that of localization.

Traditional translation theories associate equivalence with the end result of a one-way process occurring in an apparently subjectless place.

Saussure's distinction between signification and value would make translational equivalence difficult to ground, although the distinction becomes relatively inoperative in fields structured by internationalization.

The kind of equivalence based on internationalization is not like the operative fictions used by translation, where equivalence retains its associations with directionality and constrained quantities.

4.   How translations speak

The operative anonymity of translators is a consequence of translational equivalence. It may be thought of in terms of discontinuities rather than clines.

Translation can be defined in terms of a maxim of first-person displacement and a maxim of quantitative equivalence.

Since the first person of a translation cannot refer to the translator, the discursive operator is best described as "translates as", relating texts rather than people.

Translational discourse also tends to shift second persons to neutral worlds, characterized by third-person relationships.

In these terms, translation or non-translation can be used to change the status of second persons, as seen in the French newspaper advertisement.

The textual frontiers that present translations are in the third person; they can use defining or relative clauses.

In some circumstances, translators can speak through their translations, challenging the representational maxims. In other circumstances, retreat to the third person conceals the positions not just of the translator, but of the source and target locales as well.

In some cases, the need to select between third-person terms must itself position the translator. This is yet another instance where translation can be used to modify and direct discourse.

5. Quantity speaks

The maxim of representational quantity contradicts Zipf's rank-frequency law, making it difficult to maintain in practice.

The maxim is challenged differently according to whether the presentation is with or without a source text, or with more than one target text.

The straight use of source-text material attains a degree of equivalence so absolute as to be often unacceptable.

If a translation is presented alongside its presumed source, the presumed source will tend to be accorded more value than the translation, although this relation may undergo ironic inversion in cases of extreme quantitative discrepancy.

Non-ironic journalistic localizations of the Spanish term "La Movida" suggest that the longer the translation, the more value is accorded to the source.

Translational expansion is difficult to extend beyond the level of the sentence.

When only the translation is presented, there is limited codification of expansion, abbreviation, addition, and deletion.

Translators' notes give the translator a first person not possible in in-text expansion.

Reductive strategies are difficult to justify, since most distributions are away from the centers of highest frequency and thus require longer, more explicit terms.

Explicit deletion and addition mostly require an authority external to the translating translator, although translation has frequently been linked with editorial responsibilities.

The presentation of more than one translation leads to contradictory modes of equivalence. The most recent translation might be accorded more value, but there is also a right of first possession, allowing some translations to be come pseudo-originals.

A translation may adopt a language variety older than that of the target locale, enabling it to work as a special kind of pseudo-original.

6.   Belonging as resistance

Localization opposes non-distribution, which itself depends on the various ways in which texts belong in some locales and not in others.

Performative utterances link texts not just to a first-person action, but also to a second person who recognizes the power to perform.

Performatives can be seen at the base of instrumental translations, as opposed to documentary translations. Translation may thus extend performance away from the locales of primary belonging.

The distribution of discourses is largely restricted by the structuring of the I-here-now. The resulting elasticity may be tested on the thresholds of shared, referential, or unlimited distribution.

The more a text is explicit and codified within its own world, the easier it is to distribute and the weaker is its belonging to an original I-here-now.

The use of local variants can have a performative effect, resisting distribution by creating implicit knowledge. The movement of such texts may require extreme explicitation, creating textual worlds through the use of narrative.

Belonging means that the specific referents of many terms remain vague even in their source locales, creating significant indeterminism even before the moment of distribution to another locale.

Natural languages strongly reinforce relations of belonging because they bind together experience in many different fields, and do so by discursively structuring the subject. This power is overlooked in many models of localization processes.

Natural languages use terms in many different locales, and thus embed language within cultural complexes. This embedding resists distribution.

Relative embeddedness explains why specialized texts are easier to localize than general texts, terminology is easier than everyday language, and distribution over long distance may similarly reduce resistance.

7.   Transaction costs

Everything can be localized into every locale if and when unlimited effort can be invested in the localization processes. Real-world projects then require calculations of how much effort is justified in each case.

In this analysis, the size of the communication act is defined by the mutual benefits to be attained.

Cooperation is defined as the attainment of benefits for all participants in a communication act.

Cooperation is harder to attain in cross-cultural communication because there are more occasions for potential mistrust. More effort is thus put into communication, or the information loads are reduced.

Transaction costs quantify the effort put into communication. The lower they are, the more leeway there is for cooperation to be attained.

Localization and translation involve relatively high transaction costs, although they can be used to structure such costs.

Localization costs can be adjusted in accordance with the diversity of locales and the size of the communication act. These adjustments are different for internationalization, translation, and language learning.

Transaction costs can be reduced by limiting directionality, promoting passive language competence, using internationalization, or reducing the quantities or qualities of texts.

The reduction of transaction costs may be in the long-term interest of intermediaries because they will gain more work from the enhanced possibilities of cooperation.

The neo-classical model can be extended beyond its simplistic psychology, becoming compatible with several realist strands of translation theory.

8. Professionalization

One of the effects of globalization is the breaking up of the market for linguistic mediation into separate segments, with technology as a major hurdle between the segments.

Segmentation leads to a narrowing of the role of translation within localization, and the development of separate professional institutions.

Segmentation may be challenged by controlling the mediating professions bureaucratically, or by trying to develop a shared professional identity.

All intermediaries are subject to mistrust, which has historically been controlled by restricted access to the profession or by hierarchical state regulations.

A later solution to the problem of mistrust was to claim collective inspiration, making the profession its own control mechanism.

The authority of mediating teams was then historically enhanced through the principle of diverse provenance, where professionals are selected because of their differences and can thus check on each other.

The medieval professions also drew authority from the ideological hierarchy of languages, a structure that returns in the age of electronic communication.

Medieval mediation was also characterized by unstable source texts, which allowed the mediator greater professional responsibilities. This too returns in the age of constantly rewritten electronic texts.

Ethical principles also build professional identity, but should not do so on the basis of idealist understanding or assumed neutrality. An ethics of cooperation can avoid those essentialisms.

9. Humanizing discourse

Mediation should seek to humanize cross-cultural relations, working with technology rather than against it.

If humanization involves working at local levels of discourse, it should be the ideological aim of localization. Localization technology, however, brings about significant transformations in the way language is used.

One of the main effects that internationalization and localization have on discourse is the relative loss of linearity. This may not be dehumanizing in itself.

Technical discourse, like translation, tends to avoid first and second persons. This can be reinforced by the loss of linearity and is felt to be dehumanizing.

Professional technical texts are less accessible than technical texts for general users. This might be dehumanizing if localization locks the user into one kind of text or another.

Renaissance humanism sought exchanges between many types and levels of discourse, working against segmentation. Humanizing discourse might be that which pedagogically enables users to move between locales, and uses linearity to this end.

Professional technical discourse is more explicit than non-professional discourse. Explicitness, however, may be pedagogically empowering and should be regarded as a positive value.

Localization and translation can be used to humanize discourse in all these aspects. Complete localization, however, which would position users in just one locale, does not promise the necessary mobility.

Introduction

Since the early 1990s, "localization" has been the name commonly attached to the most successful language industries of our day, particularly in the areas of software, product documentation, and e-commerce. "Translation", on the other hand, is associated with a cottage industry that would seem to have remained unchanged for centuries. Translation is often seen as a small part of localization, and localization is occasionally viewed as an elaborate form of translation. The two terms, however, name potentially antagonistic ways of approaching cross-cultural communication.

For most discourses on localization, translation was long a question of routine, "just a language problem". For some translation theorists, discourses on localization introduce fancy terms but nothing essentially new. Both views are probably right, but only to an extent. As localization has blossomed into an industry conservatively valued at USD 3.7 to 5 billion a year (Fry 2003: 6), the world of traditional translation is obliged to take notice, for economic reasons if nothing else. At the same time, recent years have seen the localization industry pay increasing attention to the importance of translation quality, the lack of which can cost considerable sums in its own right. This is reflected in the naming of a new composite sector bringing together "globalization, internationalization, localization, and translation", under the acronym GILT (Fry 2003), perhaps to expiate the guilt of having believed it was all just localization.

This book will attempt to give meaning to those terms (admittedly somewhat less with respect to "globalization"), setting up a dialogue across their differences. Is there anything really new that translation practice and theory can learn from localization? Can localization theory in turn learn anything from the history and complexity of translation? Does internationalization concern localization but not translation? Is globalization the only wider process in which localization makes sense? To address those questions, we place both localization and translation within a conceptual frame more general than globalization, that of material distribution. Products and texts are distributed in time and space; localization and translation respond to those movements in different ways; their relative advantages might thus meet on some kind of common ground.

In setting up that dialogue we have not sought recipes for more efficient localization or predictions for the next wave of globalization. Nor have we presumed to touch the ineluctable future of translation theory. Ours is an unashamedly academic attempt to understand what is happening in cross-cultural communication. Working within the analytical tradition, we attempt to draw out the principles of what people say and do, without trying to teach, correct, or condemn. Most of the ideas people have about cross-cultural communication are probably idealist fantasies, yet that is no reason for not analyzing how those beliefs actually operate in social contexts. Our first aim here is not to prescribe, not especially to critique, not even to say what is eternally true, but to grasp the concepts that people are using. That in itself will hopefully constitute an intervention in the field, raising awareness and perhaps helping people to improve communication.

Much of this book is a reworking of *Translation and Text Transfer* (1992), which was itself based on an Honors dissertation defended in 1980. The return to that twice-tilled soil is partly justified by the obscurity of the previous fruits. A more vital justification, however, lies in the intellectual interest of replanting the ideas in a new

millennium. As our locales change, so do the values of our texts. Back in 1980, translation theory was of interest as a way of making incipient Cultural Studies talk with Linguistics. In the early 1990s, our ideas were more focused on debates about national sovereignty in the cultural field. Now, in a more clearly globalizing age, the aim is to make analytical translation theory converse with the developing ideas about localization, in a way that might help overcome serious blind spots on both sides. This started as a naïve experiment, taking the old text and simply writing "localization" instead of "translation" on every occurrence. The resulting changes became extensive, not only quantitatively (four of the previous eight chapters might still be recognizable) but also ideologically. The reworking has led to relatively new categories such as "internationalization" (a misnomer we borrow from the localization industry) and "humanization" (our attempt to say what is missing in much technical discourse), as well as "distribution" in order to counter misunderstandings of our previous reliance on the term "transfer". The production of this book thus mirrors part of its theme. We set out to localize a distanced text, the new and the old locales resisted the movement, wide-ranging transformations became necessary.

Our analytical approach requires a model of localization as a discursive act, as a mode of language production in itself. The first part of this book seeks such a model, bringing on board many of the categories specifically operative in the domain of translation. Those categories remain useful, we believe, because they help temper some shortsighted debates about asymmetric directionalities (chapter 2), the nature of equivalence (chapter 3), the translator's relative anonymity (chapter 4), and the quantities involved in translation (chapter 5). That group of chapters more or less updates our position on several key issues in translation theory. It should also indicate the richness of translators' options. Some of the more technical and academic discussion will be of little immediate interest to readers concerned with localization, yet we include those chapters so as to indicate the extent of what translation can do.

Those ideas are then related to localization through an analysis of the costs incurred in the different modes of cross-cultural communication. This involves assessing why various forms of cultural belonging create resistance to distribution (chapter 6) and how that resistance leads to variable transaction costs (chapter 7). We then consider the ways the growing segmentation of the labor market for cross-cultural language workers might be countered by attention to historical and ethical modes of professionalization (chapter 8). The book closes with an inductive attempt to assess the effects of localization technology on technical discourse, and how translation might ethically operate on such discourse (chapter 9). That conclusion, we admit, is more critical than analytical. It is ultimately a search for the specific virtues of translation, over and above the efficiencies of localization.

Acknowledgements

1. Distribution

Localizations, from great to banal, are all around us. The text you are reading was produced using software localized in Iberian Spanish, Catalan, and American English (all in the one computer). This is indeed the sense in which the term "localization" is mostly used, as a part of work to sell ever more software in ever more languages. The version of Microsoft Word we are looking at has had its visible natural-language strings translated, its models for letters adapted, its alphabetical orders adjusted (traditional Spanish has a few more letters than English), its dialogue boxes widened for the changed lengths, its dates reordered, and so on. Those are all parts of the localization process. In this very practical sense, localization is the adaptation and translation of a text (like a software program) to suit a particular reception situation. That reception situation can then be called a "locale", in this case the rather wide locale of Spanish-speaking computer-users in Spain (including the frequent trespassers who write in English), intersecting with a second locale of Catalan-speaking computer users (geopolitics enters our computer as well). That is the kind of localization most commonly talked about.

Why use this new term "locale"? The first reason is that it comes from the localization industry. It thus has sense for many of the commercial undertakings that language workers are now engaged in. One cannot help but look long and hard at the discourses that have made some technicians rich and are changing economies and cultures. When the church ruled discourse, we might equally have started from its sacred words as the exemplary texts to be localized. In the age of Romantic nationalisms, great literary or philosophical works might have provided the instinctive archetype. Yet now, in our age of computers, the sacred is more likely to be whatever gets the right keys pushed or the sales targets met. The national soul is at best partitioned into manageable marketing targets ("locale" is decidedly not a Romantic term). We thus start from electronic texts for computer users. Further on we will be interested in much more than software. The great sacred texts are still there; sublime literature and sensitive philosophy still exist. Even if we start from the technicians' paradise, it is hopefully to extend their insights, and to question their assumptions.

Localization in the computer

The term "locale" is not just a fancy name for what people otherwise call a "culture", a "language", or a "linguaculture" (as in Agar 1994). Our computer's operating system, for instance, is Microsoft's Home Edition XP, showing a distinction between professional and non-professional locales (Home is decidedly non-professional), even though both those locales would generally be said to share the same culture and language. The programs that come with that system have their default language fixed as Catalan, since it was bought in Catalonia by a Catalan-preferring university. However, almost all the menus and Help files are actually in Spanish. This shows a further feature of locales: some will have everything adapted to their norms, others only warrant the adaptation of certain features (for example, the menus but not the Help files), and still others only have localization of the external packaging. Size and purchasing power are constitutive features of locales. Finally, as all the manuals mention, a locale is defined

in terms of coinciding linguistic and cultural options: not just a language, but usually a particular variety of a language, plus local conventions regarding currency, date and hour settings, presentation of numbers, right through to such things as symbolic color coding (we will look at longer lists later).

The workings of localization, like many linguistic operations, are most obvious when they go wrong. Figure 1, for example, shows our computer's calendar, where the days of the week are in Catalan (*dilluns*, *dimarts*, *dimecres…* if the week starts on Monday, or should it start with *diumenge*, Sunday?):

Figure 1. Microsoft's Catalan calendar

Think about it. Is this the kind of error one would expect in a traditional translation? Would it have happened quite so blatantly in a simple binary meeting of two languages or cultures, as when one renders a novel from English into Catalan? This particular kind of error seems more typical of situations where the translator is applying rules, especially when the rules are written so as to address a large number of locales (in accordance with what we shall soon meet as "internationalization"). Perhaps this translator was working with a special localization tool that restricts contextualization, making the output difficult to see or check. Whatever the case, the translator was not actively considering interaction with an end-user. Some especially technological encounter has somehow made every day a D-day. Later we will consider what kind of technological solutions might be able to correct such errors.

Typical localization errors also include fascinating mixes like Figure 2, which similarly haunts the same computer:

Figure 2. An error occurring

Not only do we have the two languages (the user has no choice but to "Aceptar" in Spanish) but the English syntax has stayed in some kind of halfway house (most would feel much happier with "An error has occurred"). The question of locales and

localization is rather more specific, complex, and hybrid than most models of ideal languages or cultures meeting each other face-to-face.

Here we will try to understand the social and cultural functions of localization as a wide set of mediating practices. For us, the concept of localization includes translation. This could be a contentious issue, since it can equally be argued that translation is a set of practices that only occasionally intersects with localization processes (software is often localized but not entirely translated), and straight one-on-one translation processes can often be found without any visible context of localization (as in the translation of a novel). Some approaches include translation as no more than a small step in a localization project, as seen in the following business-process model for the localization of software (adapted from Esselink 2000):

> Analysis of Received Material
> Scheduling and Budgeting
> Glossary Translation or Terminology Setup
> Preparation of Localization Kit (materials for the translators)
> Translation of Software
> Translation of Help and Documentation
> Processing Updates
> Testing of Software
> Testing of Help and Publishing of Documentation
> Product QA and Delivery
> Post-mortem with Client.

Yes, indeed, all those steps should happen and be coordinated if the days of the week are to be identified and errors are not to "have been occurred". Translation need only appear as one small step in this process, if and when it appears at all. Yet that minor optionality is based on a very narrow view. To convert the above business-process model into a theory or area of study would be like arguing that since bilingual secretaries translate, translation is no more than a part of general secretarial duties. Or again, since speech is used on the telephone, phonetics is part of telephony. We are comparing apples with pears. True, when the two fall together in a business model, translation *is* just a part of localization, since localization encompasses the broader range of processes. What we would like to do here, though, is to raise the term "localization" to the same conceptual level as "translation", so that both refer to general processes of transforming language. Only then can we consistently claim that translation is part of localization.

The movements behind localization

If you look hard, something of localization can be found in the contexts where translations have long been carried out. Here we have little interest in restricting localization only to the realm of the electronic or the postmodern. The foreign news we read in the local press can legitimately be seen as a localization of foreign-language texts, at some point transformed by the international agencies, and transformed in ways that go beyond endemic notions of translation. We might see the joke we tell as a localization of the joke previously heard, or Joyce's *Ulysses* as localizing Homer's

Odyssey, or indeed most texts can be seen as whole or partial rewrites and thus recall some sense of localization. In all these processes, binary confrontations of languages or cultures are only a part of what is going on; something more than translation is at stake. Localizations, in this very general sense, are indeed all around us. Their practices have a certain logic, a long history, and a future effect on the configuration of our cultures. One just needs a particular eye to see them.

If localizations are all around us, it is because texts are always in movement around us. By this we mean that texts are material objects that are constantly being distributed in time and space, just as material subjects (people) are. As this chapter should show, the principle of dynamic distribution is essential to our view of both localization and translation.

Here we have in mind a very material kind of distribution, a set of real movements through time and space. This active mode of distribution, based on large sets of movements, is not always seen. Its basis in material things might even be denied. Some say, for instance, that if a piece of English-language software is localized in Spanish, there has certainly been contact between the worlds of English and Spanish, but the actual English-language software has not really moved. It is still there, operating in the English-language cultural system. It might have gained some prestige or have been revised thanks to the localization into Spanish, but it appears not to have undergone any displacement itself; instead of active distribution we only see passive reproduction or adaptation. As in traditional translation theory, the source stays still while the translation acts as a mere token representing it. That view is commonsensical and entirely valid, as far as it goes. Unfortunately it relies on an excessively idealist notion of cultural systems (such as languages, literatures, or even software markets). On that view, the source and target systems are structured in terms of simple presence and absence. Once a text is in the system, it magically stays there for a long time so that its presence affects all other texts in the system (that, at least, is how systems are classically defined). The concept is well suited to Saussurean natural-language systems, to literary canons, and indeed to translation in its more representative modes, but it does not quite fit in with the rapid product cycles that concern the localization industry, publishing houses, or indeed anyone actively engaged in the marketing of cultural products. A localized text is not called on to represent any previous text; it is instead part of *one and the same process of constant material distribution*, which starts in one culture and may continue in many others. This is where translation theory has to learn to think differently.

Rather than jumping between stable systems of mutual difference, distribution is for us more like a massive firework display at night, where texts reach a fleeting form in geography and history, then fade away. As most computer users know, software is not universally available throughout a language space like English; it is used in many specialist niches beyond that language space, and it is fast superseded. Effort is constantly needed to establish and maintain distribution even within the home market (if indeed that term has any sense), which may be configured in terms of any number of minor locales. That effort produces countless acts of minor distribution, testing new locales, expanding old ones, constantly keeping texts in movement, like the burning gunpowder that keeps the fireworks visible in the sky. That effort can take forms like publicity, physical distribution chains, updating, and adaptation to locales within the source-language world. All those acts establish and maintain a distribution pattern within a certain piece of time and space. When those things are not done, distribution

with diminish, the constitutive movements will be shorter and weaker, and the text will eventually be without function. Of course, to extend that distribution across a barrier of language and culture, one has to invest further effort (more gunpowder), including effort of a slightly different kind, in order to obtain distribution of a slightly different kind. But the general principle of material distribution surely remains the same, both before and after the barrier is crossed. Both before and after the jump, people work so that the distribution of texts can be maintained, extended, or possibly diminished. This, we suggest, is a general notion that can be applied to texts of all kinds. A few examples might help illustrate the principle.

Holed up in a cheap hotel in Madrid, little to read save a newspaper from the flight, we allowed our insomniac eyes to stray across *Le Monde*. Such might be reception in a place smaller than the lands of language systems. All we had was an aptitude for the reception of text. What did we read from the French world that night? Was it a linguist's curiosity that was drawn to the advertisement in Figure 3? Or a certain concern with foreign affairs, since the first Gulf War was just over? Whatever the case, the mind lingered on an advertisement in which the State of Kuwait announced "prequalification of international contractors to participate in tenders". Fascinating stuff. Of course, this particular reader was not an international contractor (we were in a cheap hotel, killing time); there was no question of putting in a tender anywhere. What we are calling distribution, even at this most unexceptional level, had brought the text somehow beyond the bounds of its rightful scope of action. The language was still quite meaningful, indeed of particular interest. The French newspaper had presented the advertisement in English, and an anonymous official hand had added three lines of small print below, beginning "La publicité ci-dessus est relative à une préqualification internationale des contractants pour participer aux offres concernant..." ("The above announcement concerns an international pre-qualification of contractors to participate in tenders concerning..."). Why should the State of Kuwait have been speaking English in a French newspaper? Why should someone then tell us, in French, what had been said in English? What kind of localization was this?

Figure 3. An advertisement from Kuwait

Whatever answers we find to such questions (we shall propose a few), they mostly assume there is some kind of rationality at work in the distribution of texts and text-users. Those reasons are much harder to get at in the case of software localization, where there appear to be no people and no real movements involved. The software is anonymous technology speaking to anonymous markets; the newspaper advertisement seems to be doing something slightly more personalized. Hence the interest of trying to see the advertisement as a localization, and then trying to read that logic back into the mysteries of our computer.

Where did the advertisement come from? Let us go back to a moment prior to publication in the newspaper. Texts were moving. Perhaps a prince or minister's verbal reply to a question became an internal memo, then re-drafted by a finance department, sent through various hands in an external relations department, converted into publicity copy. Production itself surely involved complex distribution. Eventually, let us imagine, this multi-authored advertisement was sent from the Kuwaiti Ministry of Public Works to an international agent (where? in London?), then to newspapers all over the world. But also, later, in that sleepless hotel in Madrid, the announcement was still moving through time, relentlessly approaching the closing date for pre-qualification (30 November 1991). And even now, if you think about it, that text is still moving, through time if not through space, as is the one you are reading at the moment. And we too are

in movement. This is a world of moving texts and people, objects, and subjects. Now, for all of us, it is logically too late to apply for pre-qualification. The participation once possible is no longer available. And near the end, when all the newspapers have been folded and filed away on microfilm or whatever, closed to all but the most inquisitive researchers, the Kuwaiti text will have reached a stage of dormant distribution, almost excluded from human observation, awaiting extinction with the final destruction of our libraries.

Our focus here must be on *Le Monde* itself, where all kinds of readers, editors, critics, and various translators were engaged in diverse aspects of localization. The distribution was given directionality, was partly directed, within the networks of a professional workplace. In that place, some of the incoming texts were going to be left as they were, some were destined to die in wastepaper baskets or faulty memories, others were to be shortened, still others were going to be expanded, and a few were going to be translated. Those decisions are not unlike the logics that make our computer multilingual.

Types of locales and localization

Some things can immediately be deduced from our example. For instance, the Kuwaiti advertisement, in its bilingual presentation, sets up at least three kinds of locales:

- Participative: Prior to the deadline, certain receivers are able to respond to the advertisement by submitting tenders.
- Observational: Other receivers are not able to respond, either because the deadline has passed or because they are simply not in that line of business.
- Excluded: Still further receivers are not even invited to know what is going on here, since their languages are not those of the localization, and quite possibly their preferred newspapers have rather more photographs than does *Le Monde*.

The advertisement is ostensibly for the participative locale; our receiving position in that hotel was wholly observational (for want of money and profession); and the translation (those lines of small-print in French) must also have been for a locale excluded by the choice of English. Different communication strategies (to translate or not to translate) direct the text toward different locales. We shall formalize the actual categories later. Even in this rough state, the model might nevertheless be usefully compared with the way software localization has lexicons for "engineers", "expert users", and "normal users" (cf. Carbolante 2001), and no category for excluded receivers (their preferred term for all receivers tends to be "user", bravely suggesting that all receivers actually use texts). One could also force a comparison with what Brooks (2000: 48-50) describes as three levels of localization at Microsoft:

- "Complete localization" or "adapted" versions, where all content and examples are from the new locale.
- "Partial localization", where smaller markets (Thai, Romanian) would have everything enabled for use in that language but only the most popular programs are localized. Here we would also find programs where some parts are

localization (user-interface menus, for example) but not others (often Help files). This would be the case of our Catalan version of XP.

- "Enabled" software, where the interface remains in English but the program can be used for the non-English language.

As in the Kuwaiti example, the degree and mode of localization corresponds to different receiver profiles. That is the easy point to make. One might more critically suggest that the modes of localization actively *position* receivers within pre-set profiles (since no one is actually a "user" before the software comes along). The wandering interests of lonely hotels have nothing to do with the logic of locales for software, but we accept those positions and know how to work with the texts.

The profiles derived from these two examples probably conflict more than they correspond. In what way might "complete localization" (having my entire computer operate in Catalan) place me in a participative position? Does the use of English for interfaces actually exclude large numbers of receivers? In fact, the correlations between the profiles might even be the reverse. By providing not just the English interface but also the programmers' language and the source codes themselves, a software company could allow effective interaction by its purchasers. On the other hand, by carrying out complete localization, by having everything operate in Catalan, localization can create a position that is observational at best, and probably exclusive with respect to the more recent developments. That ideal complete localization in Catalan might ultimately be like the few lines of sub-text in French. Political correctness is achieved by applying language policy, switching languages, letting a wider range of receivers know what is going on, but those receivers cannot respond by participating in the elaboration of software.

From the outset, we have little reason to suspect that localization has a positive social function in itself, nor that the logics of communication explain all its workings.

Determination by distribution

For Brooks (2000), the prime factor determining degrees of localization would be the size of the markets concerned. He should know. He was Senior Director of Microsoft's International Product Strategy, apparently at the time the company adopted localization strategies. The bigger the current or potential locale, the more products can be sold to it, so the more resources should be invested in localization. Big markets justify big changes; smaller markets do not (they will learn to love American English). On closer inspection, though, the calculations also account for various degrees of *resistance* involved. A very different ("exotic") language or culture requires supplementary investment. And once localization has been carried out for one locale, relatively minor changes can make it suitable for neighboring locales, in keeping with a knock-on effect at regional levels (no one pretends that work started from scratch for each of the 20 Spanish-language locales catered for in XP). So the determining factor is not just the current or potential size of any market, but also the resistance to distribution into that market, measurable in terms of a certain diversity. In effect, the locale is defined by both the *quantity* of distribution and the degrees of linguistic and cultural diversity that create *resistance* to that distribution. The effort invested in producing for a locale (and

thus maintaining its definition) should then be proportional to the quantities and resistances involved. All these terms will be explained in chapter 7 below.

That is one way in which the fundamentals of localization can be thought of from the perspective of distribution. The key role of distribution can also be found in the case of *Le Monde*. In that example, the reasons for one kind of transformation or another must have depended to some extent on where the texts had come from and where, once they left the editorial network, they were intended to go. This is the logic we are using if we assume, for instance, that the Kuwaiti fragment is in English because the tenders have to be in English, or that it is in English so that the Kuwaitis themselves could control it better. That kind of analysis is also basically what we are doing when we hypothesize that the French explanation is given because *Le Monde*'s editorial norms are physically located in France, which tends to have specific regulations about the use of foreign languages (in *The Economist* we have found the Algerian government printing similar things in French, with no explanation in English). Such reasoning may be quite unfounded. Perhaps there was no more at stake than the uncontrolled personality of an Anglophile Kuwaiti public servant, a politically cautious publicity manager in Paris, and a fantasizing insomniac in Madrid. Yet all we need claim here is that the possible explanations for transformation refer back to a logic of distribution, of places, of directions, of reasons for movement. Transformation depends on distribution; the changes to text depend on changes in time and space.

There are strong reasons for pursuing this relation with respect to localization. The most general argument is that if texts were *not* moved across time and space (if there were no material distribution), there would be little reason to transform those texts. This suggests that localization, and all modes of text transformation, can be seen as a set of responses to texts that move. We might say, for example, that the small French text was produced because the English text had come in from Kuwait with instructions that it was to remain in English. There is, however, a second reason for talking about material distribution here. Thinking from the perspective of reception, we might propose that the transformed texts not only respond to movement but also *represent* (and often misrepresent) the time and space crossed by texts. For instance, having the French and English texts side-by-side opens up a problematic gap for readers with no English, begging the question of why only the English version is actually inviting tenders. Such gaps in semantic completion reveal traces of the trajectories traveled, imperfectly but still representationally. The problems of misrepresentation are rather more extreme in the case of software localization, as we have seen in the Catalan calendar.

The rest of this chapter will consider exactly how one should approach cross-cultural communication from the perspective of material distribution. Those technicalities will certainly not be of general interest. Worse, they will work here on what is still an incomplete vision of localization, which returns in greater glory at the beginning of the next chapter. With that caveat, we proceed.

What our notion of distribution is not

Our term "distribution" should function more or less the way it is used in marketing, perhaps as a less colorful relative of the "dissemination" elaborated in early deconstruction (cf. Derrida 1972), and with no relation at all to the same word as it

appears in some linguistics (as in "distributional grammar"). We are dealing with material products, we are wary of metaphorically planting seeds (dis-semination), and we are not particularly analyzing sentences. Yes, we know that the Kuwaiti "prequalification of international contractors" was wrongly distributed as "international prequalification" ("préqualification internationale des contractants"), but no one else probably noticed. Our logics of distribution concern where the text goes, and only then the words in the text.

The more problematic aspect appears when we describe distribution as a set of transfers. "Transfer" was actually our preferred term in previous versions of this theory (Pym 1992b, 1992c). It takes a back seat here because of the numerous misunderstandings it gave rise to. Some have objected that transfer is only a metaphor, since source texts do not actually move (an objection hopefully countered by our argument that distribution starts within production, so that everything is always in movement). Others somehow thought we believed in translation as "meaning transfer" (no matter how often we argued that meanings are immaterial illusions and thus cannot be transferred), or that we were interested in the part of translating that can be described in terms of psychological or syntactic "transfer mechanisms" (cf. Nida 1964: 146ff., Wilss 1982: 63). The result of those differences is a terminological mess (on which, see Shuttleworth and Cowie 1997: 176-178). Worse, we actually thought our usage of "transfer" was close to a project to find a wider frame for the study of translation. In that case, the misunderstanding was ours, as we now explain.

The Israeli cultural scholar Itamar Even-Zohar (1981, 1990) has proposed that Translation Studies (the general academic discipline or interdiscipline that studies translation and interpreting) should adopt the wider frame offered by a theory of "transfer". Rather than exclude all the non-translational results of text movements, he suggests we should consider them of extreme pertinence to the very definition of the field:

> Some people would take this as a proposal to liquidate translation studies. I think the implication is quite the opposite: through a larger context, it will become even clearer that "translation" is not a marginal procedure of cultural systems. Secondly, the larger context will help us identify the really particular in translation. Thirdly, it will change our conception of the translated text in such a way that we may perhaps be liberated from certain postulated criteria. And fourthly, it may help us isolate what "translational procedures" consist of. (1990: 74)

That general proposal is very much in keeping with the questions we are developing here. The wider field of "transfer" might even correspond to what we want to do with the terms "distribution" or "localization". In a more recent paper, however, Even-Zohar has glossed "transfer" as "the process whereby imported goods are integrated into a home repertoire, and the consequences generated by this importation" (1997: 358-359). The problem with this is that Even-Zohar's "transfer" is actually opposed to something called "importation", which he sees as the material moving of cultural items. A culture might thus "import" a whole range of cultural products from abroad, only some of which actually take root in the culture and are thus "transferred". The term "transfer" thereby gains a problematic degree of conceptual idealism, rather like a mode of "dissemination" that suggests that some seeds take root while others do not. The very

use of Even-Zohar's "transfer" would invite belief that the foreign can and even must become completely domestic, that this is indeed the general goal of moving things into a locale, and that transfer can thus be judged more or less successful in accordance with the resulting degree of integration rather than, for example, the modification or extension of the receiving locale. All those assumptions might be entirely legitimate in certain circumstances, but they need not be packed into the one deceptively innocent term.

Our own use of the term "transfer" refers to movement in time and space, to motion as change of position, without any necessary modification to the form of whatever is moving. This should be taken as a minimalist concept, applicable to people as well as texts, to anything that can be moved materially (including electronic means of movement). As such, our usage probably corresponds best to Even-Zohar's talk of "importation", except that even there Even-Zohar operates an in/out mode of thought ("import" as opposed to "export") that we would like to avoid. For us, the movement can be to as many cultural half-way houses as one likes, through time without spatial displacement (books getting old on shelves, people aging in front of televisions), across the planet in the relative instantaneity of the Internet, or through the multiple layers of technical mediation that lead to the linguistic hybrids in our computer. All those movements are part of what interests us.

To sidestep what seem inevitable confusions, we will refer to sets of such movements as "distributions". For the rest, we will use "transfer" as little as possible, and other terms as often as necessary. If we want to talk about changing the form of texts, we will talk about localization, or transformation, or adaptation, or translation, or even change of form. If we want to claim that texts are wholly integrated into a receiving system, we will try to talk about cross-cultural integration or somesuch. If we are worried that there is no change of position without a change in quality, then we will stress value (or significance, or importance, or even interest) as the thing that is changed. For the rest, the term "distribution" can best serve us by covering as much material movement as possible, and by inviting as few theoretical assumptions as possible.

Distribution is a precondition for localization

Localization (here including translation) can be seen as a series of responses to things that have been distributed or are to be distributed. In other words, in both loose practice and the theory we are interested in here, localization and translation depend on distribution (and on several hundred other things as well). Let us investigate a few possible objections to this innocuous proposition.

One might complain that since no text need actually be moved in order to be transformed, transformations can take place independently of distribution. Yes, that is possible. However, insistence on one-to-one solidarity (demanding one act of distribution for each act of localization) has little to do with what we should now qualify as a *general* dependence on distribution. Just as no person is an island and no culture is entirely isolated, no linguistic worker ever operates entirely alone or in a strictly one-off situation. Even when localizers are not aware of responding to any particular distribution, they will necessarily be using linguistic and cultural knowledge accrued from previous localizations, depending on previous distributions, which are

themselves responses to previous localizations, and so on in a series of links that unavoidably chain the particular to the general.

Skeptical minds might then interpret the connection between distribution and localization as a question of chickens and eggs. Yes indeed, the "series of links" idea (the one we have just evoked) does lend itself to thoughts of ungrounded dialectics, of pure difference as being enough to keep things going. Then again, the relation in this case has none of the cyclical causality of genetic or generative metaphors. In its purely epistemic dimension (with respect to the way we know the object, regardless of what that object really is) the dependence of localization on distribution is remarkably one-way. Although localization depends on distribution, distribution does *not* depend on localization, or at least not in the same manner. After all, if there were no localization, there could still be distribution; but if no text were ever going to move, there would be no reason even to think about localization as a purposeful activity, and probably no reason to conceptualize it at all. Whatever the material circumstances, no matter whether the actual moment of localization is situated before or after the actual movement of a text, the concept of distribution *precedes* the concept of localization. We offer this as a general principle, with several practical consequences.

Let us suppose that, thanks to this general dependence, localizers commonly have ideas concerning the kind of distribution that has taken place, is to take place or, in a training situation, could take place with respect to the text to be localized. In other words, localizers have ideas about the purposes of distribution, and they use those ideas when localizing. We are working in this way on this particular text because it is going to that person over there and has come from that person back there, and energy is invested in those movements for some kind of reason, hopefully for the sake of enormous quick profits. Of course, it is tempting to imagine that all linguistic workers think that way about every single text they work on. They would ideally ascertain the fundamental purpose of the distributive directionality and then transform texts accordingly. If the distribution is supposed to have such and such an effect, we will work so that our output makes that effect happen. All well and good.

Such a position would be more or less compatible with the deep pedagogical desire of the approach that holds that "translational action is determined by its purpose [*Skopos*]" (Reiss and Vermeer 1984: 101). That proposition is of some interest to us, mainly because the "translational action" it mentions embraces much more than just producing translations (all kinds of adaptations are included, as well as managing relations with clients). Unfortunately that is not quite the road we want to go down here. We are not about to assume that all localizers are automatically good localizers, that conscious decisions are made about distribution purposes and reception effects in each and every case, nor even that the search for purposes can solve all our specific problems about how to work on texts. We gladly concede that relatively few real-world localizers have enough time or pay to engage in ethical teleologies. A lot of work is done in blind accordance with traditions, customs, norms, conventions, or whatever it is that teachers teach; and a lot of translating is done within localization projects that actively blind the translator to any aspect of purposeful distribution, in ways we will review later. In fact, the misrepresentation or concealing of distribution (and the purposes involved) is one of the main problems of contemporary localization and translation across the board.

Our own argument here is strictly general. In accordance with the "series-of-links" model, the ideas that actual workers have about text transformation are necessarily based on previous distributions and localizations, even when those ideas are

naïve or wrong. This is because there is already contact between the locales we know, and thus no pristine context in which any one "purpose" could be isolated in the first place. The Kuwaiti text was not underscored in French because of the nature or purpose of that particular text. It is far more likely to have been glossed because of traditional ideas about the defense of the French language. Similarly, Microsoft cannot really know the size of the potential market in Thailand, nor the exact resistances to distribution there, until its initial localization processes encounter feedback. There is thus rigorously no one-to-one relation between this or that particular distribution, this or that purpose, this or that way of localizing. We cannot adequately conceptualize the relation by just thinking about the individual language worker confronting the individual text. This is precisely why the analysis of historical and culture-bound translational norms has become a keystone of Translation Studies (most prominently since Toury 1995). Something similar is required with respect to localization.

Distribution thus has purely general priority as a precondition for the practice of localization. If nothing has moved or is going to move, then there is no reason to transform texts. If someone is localizing or has localized, then something has moved or is meant to move.

Exactly what is distributed?

There have been several attempts to baptize anew the basic things we work on, the things we are calling "texts". Holz-Mänttäri (1984) talks about *Botschaftsträger* (message-bearers); Hofmann and Mehnert (2000) prefer "information objects"; Lockwood (2000) likes "information elements"; Esselink (2003) opts for "material". Here we will stay with the simpler term "text" to name all those things. The minor flings with new names might be attributed to modes of thought opened up by the electronic transformation of language strings. Texts can no longer be assumed to operate as organic wholes, issuing forth from the mind of a single and coherent creator. They are more commonly fragments comprising fragments of other texts, in a language drawing on several languages, issuing from a series of reworking authors. The newish terms reflect this to some extent. Incubated in the field of corporate technical writing, they invite language workers to accept that they are operating within what is sometimes called a "team process", which mostly means they operate on parts, not wholes. The vision of the whole, of the text as complete product, belongs perpetually somewhere else, perhaps with the mythical all-seeing project managers or all-reading final users. Beyond those idealized points of hypothetical repose, there is no reason to claim that every text has an Aristotelian beginning, middle, and end. Our use of the term should not be read as making any such claim. A text is quite simply whatever unit is distributed as a unit. In the age of printed books, one might have thought of books; in the age of combinable paragraphs, the text will be a "chunk"; and so on.

A more difficult aspect of texts concerns their materiality. If texts are "objects" or "bearers" of messages, then they must have some physical body that is able to move. If not, we could scarcely talk about the distribution of texts. Unfortunately, several generations of literature students have been told that texts are not books, since the one text may appear in many copies, in many editions, in many formats. And now all our texts are in some way electronic, moving across the world in seconds. If we still insist

on the materiality of texts, are we denying the fundamental facts of reproduction and technology?

An example from literature might help address these questions. Apologies are offered for choosing a passage from an obscure novel set in Western Australia. It concerns sheep, indigenous Australians, and communication:

> Patrick turned away from the ewe to look about the cave, seeing the handprints left by the aborigines, for a purpose unknown.
> "My hand is twice as long as that one," said Jane, pointing to a small handprint low down on the back wall.
> "It's a child's," he said, and they felt strange and sad at the thought of the dead piccaninny who had perpetuated himself in this way. (Stow 1956: 126-7)

Here there are two acts of distribution. The first is the movement of the receiving subjects (Patrick and Jane) deeper into the cave, from a scene of death in natural reproduction (a ewe dying after lambing) to a scene of cross-cultural communication as artificial reproduction (the native child had painted its hand-print). The second movement is the distribution of rock-marks across time, from the unknown moment of their production to the moment of their reception by Patrick and Jane. Both movements are important, but they have quite different qualities. Patrick and Jane are subjects; their movement opens up possibilities of reception and thus possibilities for the localization of the things they come into contact with: Western eyes encounter pre-industrial cave-space. The rock-marks are objects; their movement through time opens up possibilities of them being localized by the subjects who cross their trajectory. Subjects can receive, interpret, and transform; rock-marks cannot. That is perhaps why the inert materiality of texts is frequently forgotten.

For some theories there would be no real movement here. The one rock-mark would always approximate the same pre-existing "meaning". If the handprint meant "hand" when it was made and it means "hand" when received by Patrick and Jane, how could one say anything of importance has moved? A universalist semantics thus would have us believe everything was already there before it arrived. In this way, blindness to materiality spirits away one of the basic reasons for transforming texts. For us, however, there is significant movement here in so far as the mark functions as "information", a "message", allowing potentially *new* meaning to be created by the particular receivers Patrick and Jane. Does it matter what the mark might have meant before it reached these particular users? Patrick and Jane do not know what meaning the mark had for its producer. Nor are they likely to become archaeologists or anthropologists to try to find out. But they can be fairly sure the original act had little to do with a dying ewe as a symbol of natural reproduction, if only because sheep were distributed across the land at about the same time as Patrick's great-grandfather migrated there. A new locale ensures that meaning in production cannot systematically be equated with meaning in reception.[1] So should we then abandon all talk of meanings? Should we say each mark is something entirely new in each receiving locale?

Patrick and Jane recognize the mark as being meaningful. However, this is not the kind of meaning Leonardo da Vinci found when looking at the forms of clouds or decaying walls; it is not that of a geologist who might find in the cave certain inscriptions of mineralization. Patrick and Jane consider this particular piece of rock to be meaningful because they believe it has been marked by a human. It is not a natural

piece of rock. It is of the same substance as the surrounding rock but its form indicates it has been intentionally inscribed, that it bears the trace of purposeful work. Ochre liquid spat from an absent mouth outlined an absent hand placed against this particular rock; the production of the archetypal mark was both oral and manual. Without knowing why the inscription was made, the receivers recognize it as an inscription made for some purpose. This is not a natural object; it is a text. More technically, it is an object endowed with what we might call meaningful materiality.

When Patrick and Jane recognize this part of the rock as being meaningful, what happens to the natural rock itself? When Jane focuses on the shape and size of the hand, is the rock material suddenly without consequence?

Linguistic and literary theorists insist that the text's status as an object of knowledge should not be confused with its material support (again, a text is said not to be a book). They sometimes declare that a text only completely exists when concretized in reception (after Ingarden 1973). According to such definitions, the text found in the cave would be no more than the hand-shape, a structural relation between certain conventionalized curves and lines, with the rock material acting as a merely transitory support. If the form were in relief, it could be inked and copied to another support, perhaps a sheet of paper. If Patrick were a photographer, it could be copied to film. And if such simple reproduction were all that was involved, one might happily talk about "structure" as that which is transferred from rock to paper or film. We could adequately regard the text as a question of shapes, a semiotic complex, indifferent to worries about substance or support.[2]

Given our aims in this book, it is strangely important that we question that whole semiotic approach. The analysis of signs is certainly a valid frame for addressing many problems, yet it is not the frame we require here. Several theoretical traditions might help us in raising the necessary objections. We can turn, for instance, to the aestheticism of those who would listen for the qualities of a particular singing voice or violin, or seek books in a particular edition, on particular parchment or paper, since those material qualities are also part of our experience of the world. When electronics attempts to reproduce such supports, as in all the bookish colors, textures, and metaphors of web sites, it is as semiotic homage to that more materialist experience. There is also the more reasoned aestheticism of Derrida (1967: 20ff), who began tracing displacements through "grammatology", the science of the *gramme*, of that fixity that intervenes even between the thinking mind and the speaking voice. Saussure had conceptualized signification in terms of a mental idea being expressed in a spoken word; Derrida insisted that the written word also plays a role, since the fixity of writing is present in all language. Much of Derrida thus elaborates the very basic idea that fragments of distributed texts disrupt any attempt to align intention directly with expression; all of deconstruction would agree with our consequent mistrust of original intentions and transparent representations. We should not forget that those insights required careful attention to materiality, to the consequences of having language inscribed on things rather than retained in heads or thrown to the wind.

Back to Patrick and Jane. They are obviously not just concerned with the hand-shape or with the text as form. They find a text whose materiality indicates it has come from another time. Flaking ochre and weathered rock must say more about the handprint's age than does the simple absence of its producer. Reception is concerned with a text that is at once hand-shape and rock, form and material, since both these

aspects are necessary if the receivers are to conclude that the absent producer is now dead.

This textual materiality allows Jane to attach importance to the physical dimensions of the text (the hand-shape is of a certain size) then to use comparison to attribute meaning to that size (the shape represents a hand smaller than her own). The materiality enables a process of interpretation, a comparison, a figuration of the absent producer, a potential utterance and a complex contextual meaning as an artificial alternative to natural reproduction. For Patrick, as for most of Stow's heroes, writing will sublimate sexuality as distribution of the self. That connection might ultimately be the localization of the rock-mark. And no one need insist that ancient piccaninnies had any such meaning in mind.

Only through the recognition of materiality can distribution become significant. The principle of meaningful materiality has theoretical consequences. It suggests, for example, that coherence and cohesion presuppose a continuity of material support both before and during reception, even when this continuity is not realized because of broken or ruptured transmission. Similarly, when doing the history of localization, fanfares of generalized intertextuality should be limited by quite reasonable criteria of historical contiguity. If there is to have been some kind of transfer from one text to another, then the two texts must at some time have shared the same locale; there must have been distribution across barriers. Further, insistence on material distribution cannot help but point out that apparently globalized communications only touch part of the world, that the logic of separate locales and independent cultures is still strong, and that the excluded spaces are still vast.

Where do locales end?

Localization, particularly its translational parts, is sometimes thought to concern movements between different languages. This might invite us to restrict "translation" to instances where there is contact between two languages. Unfortunately there are no strict divisions between the things covered by the term "language" here, basically because there are no natural borders between languages. The kinds of localization that can take place between proximate varieties (idiolects, sociolects, or dialects) are essentially no different from those between more radically distanced language systems. Consider, for example, the various transformations necessary to rewrite in the English of Queen Elizabeth II a text from American English, from working-class Liverpudlian, from Shakespeare's English, from Chaucer's English, from the French of Jacques Chirac, and from Japanese. Although one would expect to encounter greater resistance with increasing cultural distance, there is no strict cut-off point at which wholly intralingual rewriting can be said to have become wholly interlingual translation. Those who travel on foot or have read the diachronic part of Saussure know that there are no natural borders between languages.

Language A and Language B are insufficient descriptions of the two places minimally involved in localization. Some alternative vocabulary must be sought. The early Chomskyan "ideal speaker-listener in a completely homogeneous language community" (1965: 3) would clearly be inadequate for much the same reasons as Language A: there are no clearly defined language "communities". Since there are many more languages in the world than countries to house them, the fact of diglossic and

polyglossic communities must be recognized and incorporated into any approach to localization. For example, given that numerous languages are spoken in more than one community, texts can be distributed from one community to another and yet *not* require localization because the selected language is able to seek out its appropriate receivers (i.e. the same locale may exist in the two primary communities… perhaps the strange locale of people who read localization theory). We might remember here the Kuwaiti call for tenders, published in English in the middle of a sea of French.

Neither "language" nor "community" provides sufficient criteria for the kinds of places involved in distribution. This is of course the main reason why we have opted for the term "locale", more because of what it avoids than for any of its more expressive benefits.

What then is a locale? How might one define the points where one locale stops and another begins? The borders are admittedly no easier to draw than those between languages or communities. One could perhaps turn to a geometry of prototypes, or even deny the possibility of real contact altogether. But neither clines nor ideological relativism are able to elucidate the specific importance of localization. And there is a rather more elegant solution to the problem. Instead of looking for differentiated or distilled cultural essences, we can quite happily look at localizations themselves in order to see what they have to say about borders. We have said this above when we regarded distribution itself as defining locales in terms of size, resistance, and their composite diversity. What this means is that, instead of giving an abstract definition using slippery terms with no ontological basis, we follow the distributions and allow *them* to reveal where the locales are. The concept of "locale" thus becomes fundamentally empirical: locales do not exist until they show themselves by resisting some process of distribution.

From this empirical perspective, the limits of a locale can be defined as *the points where texts have been (intralingually or interlingually) localized*.[3] That is, if a text can adequately be moved without localization, there is no new locale. And if a text has been localized, it represents distance between at least two locales, at least for as long as that localized text remains functional. In this way, the study of localization avoids having to link up all the points of contiguity in the way that political frontiers do (a locale is not a sovereign state). After all, there is no obvious reason why points of contact and exchange between locales should form continuous lines. Marketing is not geopolitics. Distribution and localization concern situations of contact and exchange, not lineal separations.

Instead of using preconceptions about locales in order to form preconceptions about localizations, we can now use facts about distribution in order to describe contacts and differences between locales.

This sounds circular, but it need not be in practice. If we set out to write a history of Hispanic localization processes (cf. Pym 2000), it would be difficult to start from a locale called "Spain", a country that did not really start to exist before the union of Castile and the Crown of Aragon in the mid fifteenth century. The history would have to follow numerous moving frontier regions, from the Christian push south against the Moors, the inclusion then exclusion of things Portuguese, the colonial extension to the Americas, the Sephardic diaspora, several waves of exile, a massive influx of tourism, and much more. Virtually the only way to describe those complex movements is to start from texts moved across the various frontiers. We have to see the way those localizations themselves defined the limits of Hispanic space. Through the localizations

we come to know the extent of locales. This is because, historically, the distributions and localizations actively define the locales, which may then resist the definitions.

One aspect of the term "locale" remains problematic. We would like the limits of locales to be cultural facts, such that localizations are responses to cultural differences. Yet we hesitate to equate "a locale" with "a culture". This is because cultures are usually thought to be larger than locales, with a systemic nature and traditional stability not easily ruptured by the short-term communications commonly associated with localization. We will later be reflecting on the possible effects globalization can have on the configuration of our cultures, and to ask those questions we will have to talk about cultures as something rather more diverse and human than the technocratic concept "locale". We thus keep the terms separate at this stage.

Localization can be approached from distribution

These few comments provide us with two basic ways of approaching the relation between distribution and localization. On the one hand, localization is partly knowable through the analysis of the "before" and "after" of the texts involved. On the other, to know why and how any particular localization was carried out, we should look at the material and human movements concerned. We could ask what came from where and for what reason, and where, why and to whom the localization is to go. Two complementary approaches are thus available from the outset: one is textual (localization as representation), the other is extra-textual (localization as response).

A linguist would tend to interrogate localization from the first of these perspectives, making vast use of science but in fact basing observations on no more than localized texts as representations. The second approach can sometimes subvert the conclusions thus reached.

Here, for instance, is a text visibly localized because the English translation critic Peter Newmark has enabled us to compare it with a French source:

(1) Car la France n'est pas seule! Elle n'est pas seule! Elle n'est pas seule!

(2) For remember this, France does not stand alone, she is not isolated.

Newmark (1977: 169), with hopefully feigned horror, has pointed out that (2) is a paraphrase of (1). He also insists that this kind of translation (if indeed it is a translation) should not be allowed in the case of citations from what he calls "authoritative" texts. Presumably we should have something as literalist as:

(3) For France is not alone! She is not alone! She is not alone!

There can apparently be no legitimate reason for presenting the paratactic and perhaps hysterical French negatives of (1) as if they were stable hypotactic English logic as in (2). However, we can properly consider the example as an act of localization, independently of our personal ideas about good and bad translations. A sympathetic analysis might have tried to find speech norms that allow the French an exclamatory voice not so readily available in English, thus justifying (2) in terms of shifting registers or dynamic equivalence. A transformational approach might then suggest that the

repeated negatives were derived from obsessive suppression of the idea that France was in fact isolated, in that case justifying (2) as a more successful repression. Could it then be that the parataxis of (1) *had* to be transformed into the hypotaxis of (2), coordination into subordination, spoken into written? Could the transformation have some justification after all?

The comparative analysis of texts alone cannot really grasp what is happening here. A considerable jump has been made from a radio broadcast made by General De Gaulle in 1940 (the "Appel du 18 juin") to a biography published by Major E. L. Spears in 1966. Real fear should have been involved in 1940. De Gaulle was speaking from London, lancing his call to resistance, distributing his text synchronically. He was not wholly sure that France would not become the Vichy regime (the Third Republic had been dissolved the previous day), that she would not in fact be alone. Surely that uncertain vision of the future could not fully be distributed away from that particular locale? We know who won the war; De Gaulle did not. Thus confronted by an inevitable loss of discursive force, the biographer Spears probably should not have bothered to cite the speech at all. Yet he did; he has distributed this text well beyond its productive locale, in a different medium, with an entirely different directionality. He cited and localized De Gaulle's words. Why should he have made De Gaulle speak English in 1966? Why was it important to have it known that De Gaulle himself produced this utterance? In fact, why should a biographer remind readers that non-isolation had been important to the France of 1940 before it was presumably of some importance in the Britain of 1966?

In this way, the analysis of distribution leads to the fundamental question to be asked of all localizations: Why? Marketing statistics do not always provide the answers.

What was happening in the receiving locale in this case? The United Kingdom, long the center of Empire and Commonwealth, was becoming a satellite of what they called the Common Market. Questions of identity and national pride were increasingly vexing. Could that general climate give a military biographer reason enough to do more than translate phrase-for-phrase? Just as military France had needed Britain, so economic Britain needed France. Indeed, this Britain of 1966 did not need a vision of France that included discursive violence, historical paranoia, or excessive Gaullist pride. Closer to material movement than was his translation critic, the biographer perhaps knew that words said in time of war should not be repeated (nor too literally translated) in time of peace.

Unfortunately for the United Kingdom, De Gaulle was also something of an expert in resistance to distribution. He had used this same principle to block Britain's European entry in 1963 and was to do so again in 1967. Localizers are not alone in their responses to things that move.

Distribution can be approached through localization

The above example should illustrate why a sociological and historical approach to localization requires much more than linguistics. The very term "localization" is replacing "translation" precisely in order to involve more than language (not that we believe "translation" itself should then be regarded as a mere language problem). Our call for more-than-linguistics here is not quite the same as those who stress the importance of dialogue boxes, system re-engineering, extra-linguistic semiotic systems,

cultural knowledge, or intuitive competence. What worries us more is that linguistic models fail to conceptualize distribution as a bridging of material time and space. No movement is visible as long as the analyst places two texts side-by-side, calls one input and the other output, and attempts to compare the language used in both. The results of such analyses are often of interest, but they will not automatically advance the materialist view we are trying to develop here.

The most brutal way to subvert textual analysis is to work from the level of material coordinates, as has been done with move from radiophonic extraterritorial French in 1940 to printed British English in 1966. This is to analyze localization from the perspective of distribution. At the same time, distribution itself can be approached from the simple relation between two texts, or even on the basis of one specifically localized text. How might such an approach reach a materialist goal?

The most subtle method here is to consider the absent alternatives to any completed localization. If a localizer has produced a certain text, their work can be represented as a choice *not* to produce one or more possible alternatives. For instance, we might say Major Spears produced the hypotactic citation in (2) as a conscious *negation* of the far more obvious literalism of (3).

Any series of possible localizations is necessarily bordered by two radical alternatives, which are always possible and pertinent:

- Non-distribution, or the absence of the text in a given locale;

- Non-localization, here understood as distribution without localization, in which the new locale receives exactly the same textual forms as an anterior locale.

That is, Major Spears could have ignored De Gaulle's speech altogether (non-distribution) or he could have cited it in De Gaulle's French only (non-localization). Working from the available texts, we can thus locate distribution through conceptual negation rather than through reference to coordinates in time and space. This approach will enable us to define various kinds of source texts.

If a text or reports of a text have not been distributed to a certain point, how can anyone at that point know the text *could* have been distributed there? Indeed, how could anyone know the text exists? In all honesty, non-distribution can only represent the position located through conceptual negation of a movement that has actually taken place. Only once Spears has effective access to De Gaulle's text can it become meaningful to consider what would have happened if such contact had not been made. Only through distribution can the point of non-distribution be projected as the anterior position of a text. This looks like beating about the bush, but negative analysis of this kind does enable us to talk about a point of origin, a "source", even though, ontologically, we cannot claim the existence of any such thing. Further, that "source" may operate in practice, in the way we think about texts, even when we have only the faintest idea of the material locales involved.

Similarly, non-localization can only be meaningful as the negation of a localization that could have been carried out. It only has sense as an abstract point locating the place of a potential localizer. One could of course trace the trajectory of a hand painted in a cave, saying that the distributed text could have been localized at any point over the past 50 or 500 years. But then non-localization would be little more than a description of distribution as a continuum of potential but unmanifested localizations

(which is indeed a nice formal definition). It seems far more fruitful to insist that non-localization concerns a particular point actively pertinent to localization, the specific state of the text at the moment when it becomes the initial object for a potential localization.

Let us call that the position of the "distributed text". It would be the Kuwaiti advertisement as it arrives in the offices of *Le Monde*, the rock-hand as it appears to Patrick and Jane, De Gaulle's speech in French before it is subjected to the typewriter of Major Spears.

When source texts and distributed texts are thus identified through conceptual negation, their theoretical significance far outweighs that of their coordinates in time and space. They become fixed positions only in the sense that they refer to specific stages in a text's capacity to provoke meaning or to be localized.

Our pedantry on this point is due to two concerns. First, we are trying to open the way for a theory able to address phenomena like "pseudo-translations", understood as apparent translations for which the sources and anterior distributions are imaginary (cf. Toury 1995: 40-52). When, for instance, a text was published with the title *Fragments of Ancient Poetry Collected in the Highlands of Scotland, and Translated from the Gaelic or Erse Language* (1760), the moments of distribution ("collected in the Highlands") and localization ("translated from...") were somehow inseparable from the text. Both moments were fictitious, of course, having been created by James Macpherson, who thus virtually invented the third-century bard Ossian. Since such things use the logic of translation, they should be held within a theory of the same, and they certainly fall within the mandate of localization. Thus, the fact that a text is received as a translation is sufficient basis for analyzing the text in terms of localization, independently of the existence or non-existence of an anterior source that one can see and touch. A baser materialism would have to exclude such phenomena.

Second, we want to avoid the problem of the exact geopolitical location of the localizer. In principle, the process of localization is essentially indifferent to the physical location of the people involved, whose virtual position can be surrounded by any culture at all. Like Thomas Mann declaring (from Pacific Palisades?) "Where I am, there is German culture", or like De Gaulle broadcasting French resistance from London, localizers and their end-users can carry a locale to any point on the globe. Localization is not geopolitics.

Internal and external knowledge

Our two ways of approaching localization roughly correspond to a rather more pragmatic distinction between internal and external knowledge (cf. Pym 1993a: 131-132). Crudely put, internal knowledge would be localization as known from the perspective of the localizer, from the person within the actual process. External knowledge, on the other hand, would be localization as known by someone outside the process, most prominently the end-user, who wants to do something with a text but need not be concerned about where that text came from. If we were to force the correlations, internal knowledge would work from the negativity of non-distribution and non-localization, constantly aware of the choices that were possible but not selected. External knowledge, on the other hand, would be the kind of vision based on material distribution and its worldly coordinates. Yes, might say the external user, we know this

text came from Kuwait, that the native hand-print has survived through time, that De Gaulle was speaking from wartime London, but none of that is of any concern to us; we need to use the text here and now. Pure external knowledge would perhaps prefer immediate domestication, recognizing provenance but removing all trace of the foreign. Internal knowledge, on the other hand, would ideally want to tell everyone everything about the past and possibilities of texts, which would retain history, intertextuality, difference.

Although those two positions remain facile characterizations, it is sometimes helpful to map out extreme internal and external approaches, if only to understand why language workers and users can have such different ideas about localization strategies. Most real-world thought is a mixture of the two. Our linguistic reading of the Kuwaiti advertisement is asking questions of an internal nature, without actually occupying the position of an internal localizer. The Australians interpreting the indigenous rock-marks do so externally, but not without constructing internal-type hypotheses about why the marks had been produced. And we have similarly projected both internal and external reasons for the English localization of De Gaulle, without any of the assurance that might come from a truly internal position. Clearly, what we are doing here is a controlled attempt to bring the internal and external kinds of knowledge together. The two *can* be separated, more or less. But actual interpretative and analytical practice tends to run across the distinction, as indeed should a theory of localization.

2. Asymmetries in distribution

We have so far considered distribution in terms of the epistemic work it can call for, creating certain kinds of knowledge about localization and translation. Here we will attempt to find out what distribution actually does in the world, and how localization and translation respond to it. Our main concern will be the asymmetries shown by the movements of texts, and the significant global imbalances that result. To grasp those problems, though, we must first give a more precise definition of localization, particularly of its preparatory phases.

Defining localization

Having seen some examples, what specific sense should we give to the notion of localization? Mainstream translation theory is of little help here. "Localization" does not appear in Shuttleworth and Cowie's *Dictionary of Translation Studies* (1997); it plays no part in the Routledge *Encyclopedia of Translation Studies* (1998). A consensual definition is nevertheless to be found closer to practice, on the web site of the Education Initiative Taskforce of the Localization Industry Standards Association (LISA 2003a):

> *Localization* involves taking a product and making it linguistically and culturally appropriate to the target locale (country/region and language) where it will be used and sold.

Fair enough; we have said as much already, although we have preferred to talk about "texts" rather than "products". LISA then makes "localization" work in relation to at least two further concepts, described in the same place:

> *Internationalization* is the process of generalizing a product so that it can handle multiple languages and cultural conventions without the need for re-design. Internationalization takes place at the level of program design [in the case of software] and document development.

> *Globalization* addresses the business issues associated with taking a product global. In the globalization of high-tech products this involves integrating localization throughout a company, after proper internationalization and product design, as well as marketing, sales, and support in the world market.

We might say that there is one wide process called "globalization", of which "internationalization" and "localization" are parts. In order to globalize, you first make your product general in some way general ("internationalization"), then you adapt ("localize") to specific target markets ("locales"). Unfortunately the terms are by no means as standard as they seem. Microsoft seems to describe "internationalization" as "globalization" (Brooks 2000: 52). The first edition of LISA's own *Localization Industry Primer* similarly used "globalization" for the general way companies should prepare their products for localization (Fry 2001), although it makes a more systematic

distinction between the terms in its second edition (Fry 2003).[4] This could become untidy, especially since "globalization" means many other things in many other places as well, mainly in economics. Unhappy with the slippage, we will try to give our terms slightly more precise descriptions.

Internationalization

The main problem with the term "internationalization" is that nations have little to do with the processes referred to (hence, after all, the quite valid concept of "locales"). The term is also misleading on ideological grounds, suggesting that the one "international" text will do for all locales, somehow placing our technology prior to the Tower of Babel. As for "globalization", it fares even worse on both counts, intimating that none of the planet is excluded (as if there were no digital divide) and that cultural and linguistic universals reign supreme. Such terms no doubt have real advantages within industry discourses, producing neat phrases like "the international market" and "going global" (cf. Sprung 2000). The pretensions nevertheless remain intellectually naïve and ideologically questionable.

The real problem with "internationalization" is that we are unable to come up with a better term. We have toyed with inventions like "interlocalization" (neat, since "locales" would be the conceptual focus throughout), or even "delocalization" (since the processes basically involve the taking *out* of local elements). No matter how justified such neologisms might be, the industry would certainly not welcome them, and we would eventually be left talking with a handful of supportive friends. The cost of rationalizing terminology is sometimes greater than the possible benefits. We thus grin and bear the words in vogue.

Internationalization, for us, minimally covers the processes whereby the culture-specific features are taken out of a text in order to minimize the problems of later distributing that text to a series of locales. We will soon extend the term to cover a broad range of similar processes, but for the moment let us consider the logic behind the removal of specific features.

The main reason for internationalization is that high costs and numerous cultural problems result from just taking a home product (usually software produced for the US market) and directly translating its natural-language strings into another language. That binary translation interface has to be repeated for each new language; it sends costs spiraling. Overall expenses are lower if the home product is first prepared for all or some of its later localizations. Localization-sensitive engineering thus puts much of the hard work into producing a generic product. The elements requiring translation or adaptation are then in some way separated out from that product (this is variously called "leveraging") so that localization processes can operate only on them.

Simple examples of internationalization are close to home. The date 11.12.03 is the 11th of December in British English and November 12th in American English. In order to internationalize either of these versions, it is enough to move to a superordinate level (just write DATE FIELD or something similar). That field can then be formatted in each specific localization. Americans can write their order, the British can insist on theirs, and other locales are free to use as many different calendars as they like. What has been done here? Instead of localizing the natural language of an American text, translators are now asked to work on an artificially defined language or "interlingua". The American date concretizes DATE FIELD; the British date does the same. The two

have their equivalence created not particularly by one-to-one translation, but by the prior moment of internationalization.

Perhaps the most eloquent example of internationalization is the encoding system used for characters. Recent history (recounted in Hall and Hudson 1997: 141-144) tells that in the days when American English was virtually the only natural language used with computers, the 7-bit ASCII encoding system was enough. It allowed for 128 difference characters; more than sufficient for the 26 letters of the English alphabet! However, when IBM started to distribute internationally, it found it needed an 8-bit set to cover all the accents and symbols of Romance languages. This allowed for 256 character positions. That was good enough for some groups of languages, but it did not allow more than two language scripts to be used in the one system at the same time. The solution was then the USO or Unicode 32-bit character encoding schemes, which allow for over four million characters (for USO) or 65,536 (for Unicode). In these systems, every character is two or four bytes long, as opposed to just one byte in the old ASCII system. Instead of creating space for the double-byte requirements of just some languages, internationalization gives all characters the same space, as a kind of highest common multiple. This has clearly been possible thanks to the enormous progress made in computer speed and storage space. The general principle, however, can be applied to internationalization in other areas as well.

If we return to our example of visibly defective localization (Figure 4), we should now have an idea of how it came about and how it could be solved.

Figure 4. Catalan D-days

The D-days respond not to a straight translation of the English days of the week, but to some kind of procedural rule stating "In language L take the first letter of the days of the week". That is internationalization, and it is causing the problem here. Of course, internationalization could also be one of the ways to solve the problem. If we were to think in terms of double-byte encoding (we are making life very simple), we would probably start to give *two or three* letters for each day of the week (as is actually done in Catalan: Dl, Dm, Dx, Dj, Dv, Ds, Dm). However, we would do so not just for this one version but for *all* language versions, including English (perhaps giving Mo, Tu, We, Th, Fr, Sa, Su). A particular localizer might then choose to put in one letter instead of two, but the space for two would be available. As it turns out, the Catalan calendar does not quite have the same market weight as Far Eastern scripts, so the more cost-effective solutions will have to be found in the moment of localization. We could make the box bigger, reduce the size of the font, then put in two letters just in Catalan, or,

alternatively, offer this particular box in Spanish only (no problem there: L, M, M, J, V, S, D), since that is what most users of the defective calendar will switch to anyway.

As we have done with "localization", we would like to extend the logics of such examples to give "internationalization" a wider sense. At one limit of the concept we would place all the ways in which local specificities are removed or standardized so as to facilitate distribution, thus including many forms of pre-translation. At the other extreme, the notion might even be extended to the adoption of a lingua franca for production purposes (international English would thus be one possible mode of internationalization). Between those limits, here are a few of the practices we would regard as internationalization:

- An extension of category superordinates is the compiling of multilingual terminology databases, where terms in different languages are made to have the same function because they are authoritatively aligned next to each other, in the same field box. Here the moment of internationalization becomes the compiling of the database itself.
- A further extension is the use of controlled input language. Texts are written with a reduced lexis and limited syntactic resources precisely so that ambiguities are avoided when being localized. Various degrees of controlled (automatic or semi-automatic) translation then become possible.
- A mode of internationalization can also be achieved by glossing locale-specific items in such a way that the added information makes their meaning unambiguous. The film scripts used for dubbing and subtitles are commonly internationalized in this way, and similar pre-translational glosses have long been prepared for Bible translators. This is in the spirit of making the internationalized version so explicit in its information that it can handle most future questions.
- The web sites of multinational companies and organizations often have the one presentation format developed then adapted to suit a range of different locales. This would be a further type of internationalization.

Parts of these practices have been around for a long time. Some medieval translating involved extensive work establishing a text from manuscript variants, then the drawing up of glossaries, only then followed by translation. The teams translating for Alfonso the Learned in thirteenth-century Castile might illustrate that much. However, there is relatively little evidence of *multiple* translations being catered for at the beginning of the process (only the *Escala de Mohama* went into French and Latin, as well as Castilian), so it would seem difficult to claim any medieval internationalization worthy of a great fanfare. The real blossoming of internationalization is undoubtedly the age of electronic communication and globalizing economies.

In a ground-breaking article, the Belgian translation scholar José Lambert came close to internationalization when he described our age of mass communication in terms of "a multiplicity of receivers—unrestrained by political or linguistic borders—and a reduction in the number of senders" (1989: 216). He quite correctly saw that this new geometry requires a relative homogenization of messages and a relative monopolization of the decreasing numbers of "original" senders. If traditional communication can be modeled as

$$S ---- M ---- R$$

(where a Sender transmits a Message to a Receiver), Lambert proposes that mass communication can be seen as follows:

$$
S ---- M ---- R \cong \quad
\begin{array}{l}
S ---- M ---- R \\
S ---- M ---- R \\
S ---- M ---- R
\end{array}
$$

<div align="right">etc.</div>

That is, there is one powerful communication act, which is then adapted to a series of other, less powerful communication acts.

Lambert's model no doubt says something about the way one kind of institutionalized communication is evolving. It would of course have rather less to say about the relatively non-institutionalized communication flows of the Internet, where countless forums enable a massive *decentralization* of the moment of production. It seems more suited to the way television programs might be produced and consumed in the US market prior to entering a series of secondary distributions across the globe. That, however, is not quite what we mean by internationalization, at least not if we are to think in terms of software. Are we sure, for example, that there is an actual receiver within the primary "inner circle"? Surely the first set of actors (S ---- M ---- R) circulate discourse that stands in a metalinguistic relation to the rest? The software company does not send its generic product to itself; it develops it so that it might be sent to points on a wide periphery. Rather than communicate a "global" message to a "global" receiver (and then to a series of local senders and receivers), those actors are talking *about* the messages that are to go to specific receivers. Similarly, on the right-hand side of Lambert's model, is there really a series of Senders for each of the minor circuits? The evolution of localization would suggest that the people writing the localized versions could be in one professional place (Ireland has become the default country for projects localizing software into European languages). The column of secondary S's would then actually be in the left-hand half of the model. In fact, that entire initial left-hand circuit should probably become the one Sender for the whole project.

This kind of interrogation will hopefully give meaning to the simpler model that we are about to propose. In terms of translation theory, the import of internationalization might be reduced to the following blunt lessons:

1. Do *not* think in terms of directional transfer between the source text (ST) and the target text (TT):

2. Think instead in terms of a generalized version (what Machine Translation would call an "interlingua" version), derived from the ST, from which many target versions can be produced:

3. Now, once your teams are working on that internationalized version, constantly updating and testing it on various target locales, the role of the initial source will fade away. Indeed, the centralized standards will dominate the form of the new sources fed into it (as in the case of controlled writing). We are then left with the following as the basic communication model:

Has the source really shifted sides? That would seem to be the case when Microsoft has to localize its general product for the home American market. What was once a source can become just another end-use locale. A clearer case of this switching of sides might be the more elaborate text-production processes in the European Union institutions, where a series of initial drafts will go through committee processes in several language versions. Modifications introduced in one version are then ideally translated into all others, and so on until the result is a series of texts in many languages, none of which could be called the unique source (see Wagner et al. 2002). Our model would further be justified by the use of databases and translation memories, which would position the EU drafting processes as a series of dances around a shared bonfire of internationalization.

That said, one should not see the EU institutions as any model of an internationalized future. The European Commission's Translation Service is perhaps haunted by the failure of radical internationalization in its discredited Eurotra automatic translation system, based on an interlingua architecture. It now continues to overlook many of the virtues of internationalization by feeding glossaries into its EU-Systran automatic translation system, based on language pairs as in step one above. This works quite well between Romance languages, where the resistance to distribution is low. However, an interlingua architecture, making the most of vastly enhanced memory capacities, would do far more to meet the linguistic challenges of a fully enlarged European Union, as would a range of other forms of internationalization. This is a lesson that has to be learned with some urgency.

The consequences of internationalization are numerous. In terms of work on language, the basic model means that a lot more has to be invested in controlled languages, in field-specific concept mapping, in multilingual translation memories, and in modular text production. All these forms of internationalization then set up the possibility of controlled translation. Some of this is happening in the European Union

bureaucracy, where English is coming closer to the interlingua and English-language workers are consequently becoming official scribes and revisers, rather than translators as such. Internationalization might thus produce situations where inner bureaucrats use a limited number of production languages to work on texts (regulations, directives, publicity campaigns) that then have to be localized by an outer circle of language workers with very specific end-locale expertise. With or without the concepts, some inklings of internationalization are changing the very nature of our jobs.

Internationalization and the differences between locales

We have reached a model where efficient internationalization would ideally solve all the problems involved in selling a product anywhere, as well as governing multilingual empires. That is far from reality, of course, but it might be an honest description of the aim.

That simple model should provide grounds enough to question a few widespread misconceptions about localization processes. Centralized control over internationalization has been associated with the imposition of international English, with the demise of many minor languages, with bland homogenization of discourse, and with a growing global sameness. In a word, internationalization would spell the death of cultural difference on many levels.

Those arguments are only partly founded. Economic globalization has long been recognized as requiring thought not at the level of some planetary Olympic heights but about numerous very local or regional contexts (cf. Appadurai 1996, Hall 1997). Internationalization thus makes no sense without the corresponding processes of localization. The growth is in the number of different locales reached, not just in the scale of universalism required. This apparent paradox is well encapsulated in the slick term "glocalization", in which the local is embedded in the global. So is there no threat at all to cultural difference?

We should fear no annihilation of difference from end-point localization itself, since it clearly requires a local mode of thought. What, however, of internationalization? Surely it imposes universalist straightjackets regulating all signs of difference? Is it not the primary cause of global culture and rampant language death? The problem here is the assumption of direct causation.

Let us begin with the question of languages. English is now undoubtedly the main language of text production in the technical genres most subject to wide distribution. Anything remotely like an internationalized version tends to be in English or its non-native extensions. One consequence is that translations account for only 2 to 4 percent of books published in the United States or the United Kingdom, which would seem to indicate a clear lack of cultural difference (cf. Venuti 1995). This general proportion is much lower than the percentages often cited for other countries: 15 to 18 percent for France, 11 to 14 for Germany, some 25 for Italy, 25 to 26 for Spain, to bring together reports for years between 1985 and 1992 (Ganne and Minon 1992). Further, translations *from* English account for a good deal of the movements into other languages. UNESCO figures indicate that English was the source language for an average of 41% of all translations in 1978-1980 (the years that will interest us here) and this proportion may have been as high as 49% in 1987 (Venuti 1998: 160). The figures are old, but not unrepresentative of general trends. We must accept that the disparity between what is

distributed into English (not much) and what is distributed from it (a lot) is great. It is part of what is happening in the global configuration of locales. But what does that disparity actually mean? And can it be attributed to internationalization?

The establishment of an international language is quite possibly a straight consequence of economic globalization. Once cross-cultural distributions reached a certain frequency and qualitative importance, resistances were logically reduced by the adoption of a shared language in the fields most directly affected (see Pym 1995). As we have said, that adoption of a lingua franca might be regarded as an extreme form of internationalization. There is nothing particularly scandalous about the choice of English. Internationalization would have picked up whatever language held a marginal international advantage in the 1960s and 1970s, at the beginning of current global economics (as happened with French, which held that edge in the European Community of the day).

The catch is that the combination of internationalization and localization (usually just called "localization") has become a powerful model precisely because English is *not* a global language. The evidence is in your computer. In Word, go to Tools / Language / Set Language, and you should find something like Figure 2 (or go hunting in the Settings files of your operating system).

Figure 5. Language varieties in Microsoft Word

Microsoft not only wants to sell in many languages other than English, it wants to sell in numerous varieties of various languages: some 13 regional varieties of English are listed in that menu, and 20 varieties of Spanish. There may not be much actual difference between those dictionaries of Spanish (beyond place names and currency units), but the desire nevertheless remains. The big company wants to sell its mainstream product in the language and variety of the user.

All kinds of riders have to be added here. True, the bigger the locale is in market terms, the more linguistic identity it is going to be accorded. True, this means the larger languages and cultures are going to play a more important role; the smaller ones are

going to be excluded. We are dealing with market economics, not cultural ecology. Yet the fact remains that the target side of these operations is tremendously diversified, indicating a willingness to operate multilingually rather than impose a monolingual world.

One should go further. A language-pair architecture, such as the one still informing machine translation within the European Union, is condemned to operate with large standardized language-systems like French, German, or Spanish. These are the languages of member states; their representations in official language production do not have regional varieties as such. Indeed, their only regionalism tends to be the bureaucratic prose of specifically Euro-French, Euro-German, or Euro-Spanish. On the other hand, an internationalization model is by nature given to producing many target-language versions. As a mode of thought, if not strictly as a range of technical possibilities, it allows for the presence of significantly more language varieties. And this should enhance rather *greater* linguistic and cultural difference.

There is perhaps another message here as well. So far we have associated localization mostly with commercial spheres, which is where the ideas come from. As long as commercial criteria apply, we cannot pretend to save the world's less-used languages. However, if those criteria are relaxed, if the models of internationalization and localization can come across into zones of altruistic zeal, there is no technical reason for any limit on the number of language varieties able to enter the fields concerned. The technologies can be used to bring those languages into the electronic sphere. That alone will not save languages from extinction (using a computer and surfing the web are still not major activities for social relations). But it should put paid to ideologies of English-the-killer-language working hand-in-hand with technology. Localization processes can help the survival of more languages, not fewer. And they can do so by abandoning the nationalism of the larger standardized languages.

The most tangible proof that something like this is happening comes from observations of the translation market. The more we find distribution networks dominated by English as the international lingua franca, the *less* one might expect the use of translation for cross-cultural communication. After all, if people use the same language, they should not need to translate. However, what we find in the past few decades, according to whatever statistics you like[5], is a constant *expansion* of the translation market, running in parallel with the rise of English as the international lingua franca. This constitutes what we will call the "language-difference paradox": the lingua franca would appear to be reducing linguistic difference, translation should ideally be increasing linguistic difference, and both are happening at the same time.

The language-difference paradox can be explained by a two-part model. In our version, the lingua franca is mainly operative in the internationalization process; translation then enters only toward the end of localization, when a multiplicity of locales are reached. With this model in hand, the paradox is resolved, without any great cause for alarm.

Asymmetries based on the size of locales

Many of the asymmetries of cross-cultural communication are not due to localization processes themselves but to the relative sizes of the locales concerned. The bigger markets are accorded the greater investment in localization, as is only to be expected.

There are, however, more worrying asymmetries out there. We have seen, for example, that the proportion of translations into English is exceptionally low when compared with other languages. This might account for the insularity and xenophobia of Anglo-American culture (cf. Venuti 1995), if we were sure that such terms applied.

To test the asymmetries, we need data on how many texts are produced in different languages, and how many texts are distributed across language boundaries. The numbers most readily available are those in the UNESCO yearbooks, although the yearbooks become less complete and appear less trustworthy from 1986 (thanks in no small measure to the withdrawal of the United States). We have thus decided to look at the data published in 1985, which actually include figures for 1978-1983.[6] Given the nature of the data, we are fundamentally comparing the numbers of books published in a language with those translated between languages. In view of the dates and the field concerned (book publishing), we are looking at processes relatively unmarked by internationalization. We are betting that the main factor correlating with the asymmetries will not be localization or translation, nor even distribution as a general set of processes, but simply the relative sizes of the locales involved.

The first principle to be tested says that the more books published in a language, the more translations there will be *from* that language. This makes sense, since a big publication industry has more chances of having its books translated. When we test this principle on our data, we get the results shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Books translated from language, by books published in language
UNESCO data for 1979-1983

English is clearly in an anomalous position. And about twelve languages are huddled together in the bottom left corner, with not many books published and thus not many books that they could have had translated. The regression line here averages all of that out and tells us that the general hypothesis holds. In fact the relation is strong (p<.0001), as might be expected for such a banal hypothesis. Let us simply note that if 41% or so

of all translations are from English, that number is more or less in keeping with what the regression line would predict.

A second principle suggests that the more books there are published in a language, the lower the percentage of translations over non-translations will be in that language. In other words, the bigger you are, the smaller the share of your cultural energy you put into receiving translated texts (in this case "intranslations", those into your home language). This should make sense to anyone who has lived in a smallish culture, but it may not be immediately evident to all nationalists. When we test this on our data we obtain Figure 7.

Figure 7. Percentages of translations, by books published in target language. UNESCO data for 1979-1983

Once again English is out on a limb, at a point difficult to compare with other languages. We might also note that the highest translation percentage in the sample was for Albanian, which in 1979-81 was (falsely?) perceived as the language one of the most closed cultures in the world. Here we find that 25% of its books were translations. Could this be true? As the scatterplot suggests, Albanian perhaps had a high translation percentage not just because of any cultural openness but perhaps also because it had so few books published in the first place. Unfortunately the general relation here is not as strong as one might have hoped for (p=.0009). Yet the picture seems clear enough in general terms, especially for the languages with the larger numbers of publications. As the number of books grows, the percentage of translations tends to decline.

A third hypothesis can be tested in a bookshop next time you travel. Just walk around and try to estimate the percentage of translations on the shelves (if you are not yet convinced that English is dominant, take a close look at the business-management or computing sections). You might get estimates as high as 40% or 50%, or even 80% if the bookshop is at all academic. What you will also find, in many countries, are foreign books that are *not* translated, usually on sale in the major trade languages of our day, increasingly in English. That is, in many countries the tendency is to read directly in

foreign languages, through distribution without localization or translation of any kind. This practice must necessarily skew any attempt to associate "difference" or "cultural openness" (or any such value) with a high percentage of translations. If the Swedes, for example, are all reading in English, they should not really need translations from English, and they will potentially have a very open culture with a rather low percentage of translations. So all the arguments that might be based on translation data, including ours, are at best limited in what they can say about the ways cultures react to globalization.

The hypothesis to be tested, the one that seems quite logical, is that the more a country consumes foreign-language books without translation, the lower the percentage of translations will tend to be in its national language or languages.

To test this hypothesis we need reliable data on exports and imports between a wide range of languages. We do not have any such data. But what we do have, embedded in the UNESCO tables, are numbers of non-national-language books published in numerous countries (e.g. books published in French in Germany). *Faute de mieux*, we might hope that these numbers indicate uses of distribution-without-translation. Of course, the numbers may concern the country's foreign projection more than its internal consumption patterns. But that is no reason for not looking at the data.

What happens to our hypothesis is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Percentage of translations, by percentage of books published in non-national languages.
UNESCO data for 1979-1983

Despite severe limitations on the data (UNESCO does not tell us about non-national-language publications in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Germany), the results are interesting. Our logical hypothesis is shown to be quite wrong. When countries publish many books in foreign languages, they *also* tend to translate many

books from foreign languages. The R^2 here is a high 0.717 (p<.0001), which is a good correlation for a hypothesis that is not at all banal.

Exactly what this means requires more information. It could be that translations and non-national-language publications actively help each other in raising public awareness of foreign products, with each practice stimulating more than its own narrow market, as was argued by Schlösser (1937: 2) when observing similar phenomena in the German reception of English literary texts.

Those issues will be addressed later in this book. All we are really interested in showing at the moment is that the key factor in these dynamics is the relative size of each locale. That much should be abundantly clear from the testing of our first two hypotheses. Instead of blaming technology, or internationalization, or even localization in general, one should seek the secrets of cultural difference in the interactions between variable quantities. Along the way, we have found something that is perhaps rather more intriguing. If translation percentages are to indicate something like the protection of difference and relative cultural openness, *percentages of nontranslations might be assumed to operate the same way*, at least until we find good data able to prove that translation and foreign-language-reading are compensatory rather than complementary intercultural strategies. If we are seriously interested in maintaining the differences between locales, we must clearly study more than translation. This in itself is a good reason for talking about distribution and localization in the most general of ways.

Let us now move back to the vocabulary of localization. We have found that the relative sizes of locales underlie three hypotheses:

- The bigger the locale, the greater the percentage of movements *from* that locale.
- The smaller the locale, the greater the percentage of movements *into* that locale.
- The number of distributed texts a locale receives without localization tends to be directly proportional to the those it receives with localization.

These relations are found to hold, to varying degrees, prior to the intervention of strong internationalization processes. What will happen when internationalization starts to influence the numbers? One can only assume that the result will be an accentuation of relations on all three counts:

- The language of the largest locale is likely to form the basis of internationalization processes, and the percentage of movements from that language will rise accordingly.
- Smaller locales are accorded receiving roles only, allowing texts distributed from the outside to become more numerous than those produced from within the locale.
- Smaller locales will receive mixes of localized and non-localized distribution, operating with complementary rather than conflicting effects.[7]

This final hypothesis might usefully be referred back to the language-difference paradox, which posits that the lingua franca and the number of localizations rise in parallel, not in opposition to each other. We explained the paradox by placing the lingua franca in the internationalization stage, and localization in the end-point stage. Now we might have found a further solution to the paradox, quite independently of the stages. Both localization and non-localization turn out to be complementary distribution

strategies across the board. And this, too, should be a relation accentuated, but not created, by internationalization processes.

Against complete localization

It is often assumed that the aim of localization, like that of translation, is ideologically positive. To give people texts in their own language variety and with their own cultural preferences is surely a good thing. Complete localization thus ideally makes the internationalized product look like a home product, "a product that looks like it has been developed in country" (Fry 2003: 11), with "the look and feel of locally made products" (ibid. 5). That is what the localization experts want, even if budget constraints frequently mean it is not what they get. It is surely a noble intellectual aspiration.

Some of the claims made for localization are quite revealing in this respect. In the second edition of *The Localization Primer* (Fry 2003: 10) we read, for example, that

> Localization allows the benefits of globalization to accrue not only to large companies and powerful nations—localization lets speakers of less common languages enjoy access to the same products that those in major markets use. In addition localization allows the flow of products and information to be two-way, as dominant countries receive goods and services from smaller countries that have traditionally had no access to their markets. When companies localize their products and services they help to "level the playing field" and redress economic inequalities, helping to create a better world in which no one is left out.

Without any statistics or clear examples, this is a lot of whistling in the dark. It entirely overlooks precisely the asymmetries we have been dealing with. It naïvely assumes that the goods and services going one way are the same as those going the other (postcolonial economics suggests that the production center always stays at least one technological step ahead of the periphery). The real problem, however, is that having sung the praises of the "level playing field", on the very next page the *Primer* suddenly remembers that localization is there to *maintain* cultural differences, not to annul them:

> Although the Web may be flattening geographical barriers, other market requirements have not been homogenized. Differences in working practices, legislation, culture and languages—in some cases even in human anatomy—need to be taken into account. (Fry 2003: 11)

This begs the obvious question: If it is so good to bring down some barriers (everyone having access to the same product), why not just bring down them all (everyone using the same language and cultural norms)? Instead of localizing, why not just internationalize? Surely that would "create a better world in which no one is left out"? Surely that is how countries like India and China do indeed benefit from their participation in economic globalization, not by accentuating their particularities but by using their relative size and learning the languages of international markets?

Localization has become the showcase market strategy of international capitalism. Some selected differences are cultivated and maintained. Is that not precisely the way in which a globalizing culture spreads, under the cloak of linguistic difference? Using

Microsoft in Catalan is not the same as using Microsoft in English, but in both cases the mode of operation is still more Microsoft than anything else.

A more serious consequence of ideal localization is that the receiver is effectively *separated* from the language in which the product is developed. The cultivation of difference through localization is also the maintenance of asymmetry. We may learn to identify everything in Microsoft XP's Spanish version, but we are thus kept from not only the source codes but also the technical language in which the system was developed. The developers will say they are catering to the needs of their users. At the same time, though, they are profiling those needs in such a way that the user is positioned, not served. The user is created as a passive consumer, not as an active developer. The result is anything but a "level playing field" in which "no one is left out". Localization effectively sets up a second technological divide, no longer between the haves and the have-nots of machines, but between the active and passive users of language technology

There is, of course, grassroots resistance to this process, with open-source software being developed by networked experts, not major companies. Unfortunately that resistance, restricted to those who already have high levels of technical competence, does little to avoid the second technological divide. In effect, localization would still split the world into producers who can always be producers, consumers who tend to remain consumers, and the excluded, who remain without locale.

The one saving grace here is that, in keeping with our size-based asymmetries, localization is seldom "complete", nor need it be. Consider the terminology chart in Figure 9, taken from Carbolante (2001). It shows two axes in localization projects, not just the one division between languages (English and Italian in this case). The second axis is between "technical" and "non-technical" discourses, both of which exist in both languages (there are technical and non-technical terms in both English and Italian). Complete localization would ideally have the two languages mirror each other, such that everything technical in English would be similarly technical in Italian, and vice-versa. The catch, however, is that users are not necessarily condemned to the mirrors of national languages. Just as there are many regional varieties recognized, so there are many halfway points between both axes. Italian software engineers are going to use technical English terms like "mirroring" and "data-mining". Italian marketing will freely incorporate the Anglicisms "e-commerce" and "Plug&Play". At the same time, the idealized "normal user" would be protected from all of that, finding everything explained in relatively non-technical Italian. And the various degrees of localization can ideally adjust to these levels, incorporating the appropriate terminology in each case.

Figure 9. Microsoft terminology in English and Italian (from Carbolante 2001)

Note that this chart is profoundly asymmetric in terms of directional distribution. One could not invert the English-Italian axis, unless the software were being developed in Italian and localized in English. The importance of a language in technological fields can be measured by what happens in the lower left-hand quadrant, where technical terms are generated to block movement to the Anglicisms of the upper left-hand quadrant. But localization, as we have seen, opens space for all possibilities. In fact, the one virtue of localization here is that it remains incomplete, allowing users a certain degree of movement beyond their profiled quadrants. (We will see other constraints on this movement in our final chapter.)

In thus breaking with the one axis based on national languages, this kind of localization could promote distribution to and from the spheres of text production. If everything were always only in the lower right-hand corner, this would not be possible; we would have a radical technology divide. Yet if the continua are operative, users may effectively shift from passive to active discursive positions; they may move from positions in national language-cultures to the specialized spheres, where languages and competencies are mixed. This is partly why the technical discourses of localization are surrounded by a welter of informal guides, discussion lists, journals, magazines, conversation, cant, and occasional camaraderie, all of which help form a social environment and enable serious learning processes.

The lure of the global

The extreme point of complete internationalization is conceivably a message prepared for all imaginable locales, with feedback from none. The prime example would surely be the Arecibo message (Figure 10), sent into space in November 1974. The message was written so that intelligent life, somewhere out there, could understand it. The message encodes basic information on a peculiarly restricted human identity: decimal numbers, atomic numbers, DNA, the height of humans, the population of earth, the solar system, and the telescope that sent the message. We are, apparently, a lot of numerical knowledge; we will be appreciated for the information we bear. To offer so much basic data to so many potential locales might be seen as a sign of power, in keeping with the critiques of electronic imperialism. And yet, what is this message likely to mean to the form of intelligent life best equipped to understand its intentions, that is, to other humans? Surely most of us decode little more than the cute drawing of a human form in the middle? By virtue of its attempt to address all conceivable locales, the text ends up saying very little. This, our most complete internationalization, merely signals that we are here, a piccaninny's hand sent out into space.

Figure 10. The Arecibo message

3. Equivalence, *malgré tout*

We now turn to translation as a specific part of localization. Our main problem here is that industry discourses on localization manipulate a very restrictive concept of translation, keeping aspects like cultural adaptation for themselves. Translation would thus boil down to a rather narrow concept of linguistic equivalence. Should we go along with that restriction? Our work in this chapter will be to argue that equivalence is indeed what defines translation, but that equivalence is by no means the simple concept that industry discourses would hold it to be. One kind of equivalence comes from translation as bilateral confrontation; another comes from internationalization as an artificial construction of fields. Our discussion here (and in the following two chapters) will be unabashedly theoretical, of little interest to readers more concerned with localization. The main point, for those who choose to fast-forward, is that the concept of translational equivalence deserves rather more respect than it is currently accorded.

Defining translation

Perhaps surprisingly, the term "translation" does not generally appear among the key concepts of localization theory. It is not listed in the glossary of terms in Esselink (2000); it has no prominent place in the LISA literature. Where we do find "translation" is in Sprung (2000), which is a series of case studies of localization projects. Yet even there we learn that "companies that specialize in software localization are quick to distinguish themselves from 'translation companies'" (xi). Why? Because, according to the same source, "localization" means "taking a product [...] and tailoring it to an individual local market". And "tailoring" involves both "translation" ("converting text from one language to another") and "adaptation" (apparently everything else that has to be done) (all these definitions are on p. x). Translation is thus reduced to quite a small thing, perhaps the least interesting aspect of localization.

What exactly is "translation" when seen from this industrial perspective? Basically, it is the replacement of natural-language strings, often in a very literal way (to avoid resizing the dialogue boxes). As such, it certainly is the least interesting part of localization. Since the early 1990s there has been acute awareness that localization is not "just a language problem" (cf. Brooks 2000), and that *translation* might therefore be "just a language problem". Sprung (2000) consistently demonstrates that the real costs are in internationalization, leveraging, structuring hierarchies of target languages in terms of market priorities, organizing complex language-service teams, drawing up schedules, testing localized products, evaluating translations, creating cooperative working relations between specialized service companies, using or developing appropriate software for localization, and working with controlled writing. On the other hand, the replacement of natural-language strings ("translation") is shown to be an almost automatic part of localization. The breakdowns of budgets accord this kind of "translation" about a third of the total costs, at most, with the remaining two thirds perhaps split between "product re-engineering" and "project management". Many

translators and translator-training programs are consequently switching over to the more lucrative mysteries of localization.

Perhaps the major irony in this process is that translation theory has been moving in precisely the *opposite* direction for the past twenty years or so, in tune with developments in text linguistics, discourse analysis, and greater attention to cultural and ethical problematics. No longer do we regard translation as a sentence-level language replacement exercise. German-language *Skopostheorie* and the development of system-based Descriptive Translation Studies have allowed us to see interpersonal dynamics and cultural specificity as playing major roles in the solving of translation problems. And now, precisely when some translation theorists are on the point of affirming that all cross-cultural relations are translational, that translators should be experts in the management of cultural difference and the like, right at this point of maximum expansion, translation theory is being outflanked by the discourses of localization, and translation itself has been returned to the narrow linguistic exercise it was in the 1960s. To little avail might we point out that the more technological aspects of localization actually only touch a handful of the domains involved in cross-cultural distribution. The technicians have developed their discourse with some disdain for all the academic waffle about translation; theirs are the terms that have attracted serious investment in the commercial sphere; theirs is the discourse that has helped build the major companies in the field. Indeed, all "translation" has to show at the top institutional level is the Translation Service of the European Commission and perhaps the fading aura of the UN, neither of which is likely to score highly on ranks of efficiency. There is ground for real conflict here.

One might argue that such conflict only exists on the level of theory. In practice, translators and localizers are ultimately all language workers, perhaps indistinguishable from each other, and many of the people working in localization have a background in translation anyway. Perhaps so. Yet are the terms used in theories entirely without correspondence to linguistic processes on the ground? Click around the various web pages of an international site like Ikea (www.ikea.com) and you will soon find a clear difference between pages that are "translated" and those that are "localized" in a broader sense. Ikea has exactly the same format in Australia, Greece, and Malaysia; the only difference is natural-language string replacement. However, Sweden, Germany, and France have clearly localized sites, sometimes all following the one advertising campaign but all reconceptualized for their target locales. Ikea Hong Kong has completely different colors and presentation, in accordance with its different script and need for a bilingual site. The message of such examples is that translation is indeed used as a small uncreative part of localization, and that there is a fairly clear cut-off point between the two. That is, there is a pragmatic *discontinuity* between translation and non-translation (here, between translation and the non-translational aspects of localization). That might come as a surprise for translation theorists like Halverson (1999), who argues at length that translation is a prototype concept but entirely ignores the discourse of localization (and indeed the discontinuities internal to the reception process). On the interface between translation and non-translation, there is perhaps more evidence of discontinuity than of prototypicality.[8]

The electronic tools of our age are designed to exploit this discontinuity. Consider an advertisement for Atril's Déjà Vu translation-memory software, which asks translators "Would you rather translate this... [image of complex source code] ... or *just this* [computer screen with just those two words]". The world's translators are

apparently supposed to clamor for liberation from all the technical codes; they ostensibly have to buy the software so their natural-language strings can be automatically leveraged away from the rest. The technology condemns translators to remain "just translators", while the big money and more interesting work flows the way of marketing specialists and information engineers. This, again, is a problematic relation that stands in need of conceptual organization.

A brief history of translational equivalence

Whatever the theories, localization practice assumes some quite interesting things about translation. For instance:

- Translation is a text-replacement process suited to natural-language strings (as we have seen).
- Translation is *not* to be confused with all the other things that have to be done in the localization of a product; translation is not text adaptation or re-designing.
- Translation operates on the basis of equivalence (whereas the adaptive aspects of localization need not).
- Internationalization has as one of its prime tasks the efficient assurance of equivalence in translation.

These are all uneasy propositions for contemporary translation theory, which has largely done away with the concept of equivalence. Internationalization nevertheless remains a variety of ways to build equivalence prior to the moment of translation. Indeed, were internationalization in any way complete, translation would become an uninteresting automatic process of producing equivalence, "just a language problem". Happily, there are good reasons why internationalization is commonly inadequate. One of those reasons is the very nature of the equivalence it constructs. To appreciate this, we need to investigate what this strangely necessary term "equivalence" might mean.

Historical research situates the reign of translational equivalence theory roughly in the 1960s and 1970s, with a fading afterlife into the 1990s.[9] Those were the days of structuralism, when many parts of the humanities hoped to look scientific by mapping abstract relations, systems, logical entities that would explain the totality of social life. The prestige of structuralist linguistics was such that its models were applied to cultures. And from there it seemed quite legitimate to consider translation as a mapping problem. A certain element in one culture would have the same position or function as a different element in another culture. The English "Friday the 13th" might thus be functionally equivalent to a Spanish "martes y 13" ("Tuesday the 13th"); the black used for mourning in Western cultures is white in Korea; and so on. This was the basic concept of equivalence, in fact the "dynamic equivalence" (cf. Nida 1964) at the base of the various divisions into types. The concept presupposed that some change of structure was necessary in order to maintain consistency of function. One could always refuse that necessity in favor of literalist or other prerogatives, thus seeking for example "formal" rather than "dynamic" equivalence, but the mode of thought remained within the general equivalence paradigm.

The concept of translational equivalence worked very well for selected examples, not so well on others. For example, would one say that the syntactic transformation in our De Gaulle example in Chapter 1 was strictly necessary in order to attain any kind of equivalence? It might be an interesting debate. But at what precise degree of transformation would equivalence then be lost, if at all?

The equivalence paradigm was politically useful for conservatives who wanted cultures and languages to stay as systemic and as familiar as possible; it was nefarious for others who wanted translation to change the home comforts of languages and cultures. Equivalence was eminently appropriate for the technical domains where the value of a text was its ability to get the user to push the right button; it ran into trouble with literary and religious texts where form itself was deemed of value and retained its own functionalism. Equivalence gave end-users a reason to trust the work of translators; it enabled translators to abuse that trust by introducing profound changes into receiving locales. It also gave translators the right to be mildly creative while maintaining trust. More seriously, equivalence ran into the logical problem that everything that was not equivalent was suddenly either a bad translation or a nameless hybrid. No matter. The concept was in place. It remained useful for as long as those various tensions did not snap.

Translation theory then changed, just as the tasks of translators have changed. The sheer quantities of weakly authored material now being translated have brought about significant changes in the professional tasks of many trained mediators, who are writing summaries, revising, providing linguistic consultation services, producing new texts for new readers, post-editing controlled translations, or managing language services. In such fields, the regulated replacement of natural-language strings often has a priority lower than effectiveness and timeliness. Translations are thus to be assessed as new texts designed to serve new purposes, without any necessary constraint by equivalence.

In response to these changes, the shift to what we might call market-driven translation theory has had many positive consequences. Textbooks now commonly emphasize previously extraneous factors such as specific readerships, client-defined purposes, and large-scale cultural effects. Cultural problems are seen as being more important than questions of lexis and grammar. The old, restricted view of translation has been seriously challenged. Since about the mid 1980s the term "translation" has been expanding its coverage to include far more than the narrow linguistic definitions still in vogue at the beginning of that decade. There is now a real choice to be made: either one allows "translation" to cover almost everything we are here calling "localization", or one insists that the term corresponds to a more limited phenomenon, with inherent definable restrictions.

In the 1980s the concept of equivalence stood at the crux of that debate. For those who clung to the linguistic definitions (of which we shall meet a few in a moment), translation should be defined in terms of one kind of equivalence or another. For those who rejected that stance, translation need no longer be restricted by equivalence: a translator could legitimately make any transformation required and still call the result a "translatorial action" (Holz-Mänttäri 1984). This second position was made to sound progressive, since the old restrictive views of translation appeared to be restricting translators.

Revived interest in translation history also played a role here, since many equivalence-based theories unnecessarily exclude much of the richness of the past. As the American historian Jeanette Beer points out, for medieval translators

> structural equivalence between source and translation was not of prime importance. By the criterion of appropriateness to target audience a treatise properly could become poetry, epic became romance, and sermons drama—or vice versa! Such dramatic changes in form serve as irritants to those modern theorists who, for the sake of anachronistic criteria, categorize a millennium of translative vitality as one thousand years of non-translation. (1989: 2)

The changes in our present have thus helped us appreciate the wealth of the past. As we have argued, talk about medieval localizations is not wholly anachronistic.

Where should one now stand in this debate? On the one hand, the very nature of cross-cultural communication requires much more than the lexical and grammatical replacement of natural-language strings. On the other, the weight of external knowledge—what we might call user expectations, common practice, or conventional wisdom—suggests that not everything can be a translation, and that the difference between translations and non-transations does indeed depend on something like equivalence. As the Italian translator and theorist Ubaldo Stecconi puts it, "in most western cultures today, equivalence is that unique intertextual relation that only translations, among all conceivable text types, are expected to show" (1994: 171). Consider the examples in our first chapter. Because of a certain intuitive lack of equivalence, few readers would count the French version of the Kuwaiti advertisement as a translation. Nor would the White Australian interpretation of an indigenous handprint count as translation in most people's minds. As for the English version of De Gaulle, it would probably fall into the camouflaged territory of the "bad translation", incorporating transformations that Newmark would not be alone in questioning. We thus confront a problematic gap between what translation is to enlightened theorists and practitioners, and what it largely remains to many outside clients and users (with both camps positioned within something as vague as contemporary Western culture).

The advent of localization, which incorporates some quite extreme forms of adaptation, could probably have done away with equivalence for once and for all, thus solving the problem. Yet it has not done so. As we have seen, localization severely restricts translation, and internationalization seeks to guarantee pre-fabricated equivalences. On these two levels, localization would seem to be pushing us back to a 1960s concept of translation; it appears to conform to what the clients and users think, despite the recent insights of theorists and practitioners.

One response to this problem lies in our distinction between internal and external knowledge. "Equivalence" can be described as a popular illusion operating on external fronts (clients, users, localization project managers, and the like), even when, from the inside, translators and analysts know there is much else going on. On external grounds, and in keeping with localization theory, why not regard translation as a phenomenon defined by equivalence? What do we win or lose by taking such a position? Twenty years of translation theory is not necessarily a great loss, especially if it can be re-baptized as localization theory.

An equivalence-based theory of translation

Let us accept, with localization theory, that translation is the replacing of natural-language strings. As such, translation is undoubtedly a linguistic part of localization. How are we then to define the kind of equivalence best suited to this approach? Here we go back to basics. The following are fairly representative of traditional equivalence-based definitions of translation (all the italics are ours):

> Interlingual translation can be defined as the replacement of elements of one language, the domain of translation, by equivalent elements of another language, the range [of translation]. (A. G. Oettinger 1960: 110)

> Translation may be defined as follows: the replacement of textual material in one language (SL) by equivalent material in another language (TL). (Catford 1965: 20)

> Translating consists in reproducing in the receptor language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message. (Nida and Taber 1969: 12)

> [Translation] leads from a source-language text to a target-language text which is as close an equivalent as possible and presupposes an understanding of the content and style of the original. (Wilss 1982: 62)

Many further definitions could be added in this vein (cf. Koller 1979: 109-111, 186; 1992: 89-92). The main variants in any longer listing would tend to concern what is supposed to be equivalent ("elements", "textual material", "functions", "communicative effect") rather than the nature of equivalence itself. Equivalence is simply assumed to exist. Even Quine's definition of indeterminacy in translation feigns to be upset about the same text leading to different translations "which stand to each other in no plausible sort of *equivalence* relation however loose" (1960: 27, italics ours). Who told Quine that translation was expected to depend on equivalence? Equivalence could thus appear in definitions of both what we were supposed to know about translation (determinacy) and what we suspected we did not know (indeterminacy)? So what then was equivalence itself, however loose?
  Note the following:

- In all these definitions, the term "equivalent" is used to describe only *outputs*, the products resulting from the translating process. It is not used to describe the inputs. Even of we believe that the term is implicitly describing the relation between the two sides, the adjective consistently falls on one side only. This very asymmetric use is rather odd, especially when associated with a relationship of presumed equality.
- The verbs employed or implied ("replace", "reproduce", "lead to", etc.) not only refer to processes but are also decidedly one-way. Translating goes from input to output, and if the process is reversed it is called "back-translation", a kind of underhand undoing of the correct way of the world.

- The processes described are peculiarly devoid of agents. Although somebody or something must be doing the "replacing" or "reproducing", this person or thing finds no expressed place in the translation theories. No one particularly cares who or what is doing the work, nor where they are located.

We thus find the old theories associating equivalence with the end result of a one-way process occurring in an apparently subjectless place. Those are not accidental features: translational equivalence is indeed mostly considered directional and subjectless. These distinctive traits might become highly useful for the definition of translation. Moreover, their implicit asymmetry poses serious problems for certain less definite ideals like equivalence as an affair of "equal values". The first of these problems is the nature of value itself.

Here we enter the territory of serious but aging theory.

Signification and value

Although "value" is not a technical term in translation or localization studies, it does play a role in the linguistic origins of the equivalence concept. We find frequent and prolonged reference to the term in Saussure's *Cours de linguistique générale* (first published in 1916), one of the foundational texts of structuralist and systemic linguistics, and one of the key texts used to argue against equivalence.

Saussure describes linguistic elements as having values corresponding to their mutual oppositions:

> Modern French *mouton* can have the same signification as English *sheep* but not the same value, and this for several reasons, particularly because in speaking of a piece of meat ready to be served at the table, English uses *mutton* and not *sheep.* The difference in value between *sheep* and *mouton* is due to the fact that *sheep* has beside it a second term while the French does not. (1974: 115)

Saussurean value is thus positional and relative within a fixed language. Saussure makes a distinction between, on the one hand, "value" as the entire semantic potential left to an element by the presence or absence of neighboring terms, and on the other, "signification" as the particular use made of that element in a given situation (here we might also want to talk about "function"). This distinction is clear in the example of a chess game, where the *value* of the knight is described as its capacity to carry out any number of moves within certain rules, its *signification* then being the import of each individual move. The distinction seems unusually profound.

Why should there be a difference between value and signification? Because, undoubtedly, there are regulated spaces (like chess) where the one element can perform more than one function. A knight can not only move backward, forward or sideways, it can also be a strategic sacrifice, a key point of attack, or an occupier of position. Within that relatively wide range, many things can be done. Imagine, though, an activity with a far more restricted landscape, a Lego kit, in which knights could do nothing but sit on the top of toy castle walls. In this more restricted space, what knights can do and what the player can do with them are virtually one and the same thing. Signification and value would be far closer together. We might then propose that the non-correspondence

between value and signification depends on the alternatives available in the space involved. Large locales are not the same as small locales in this respect. Nor are natural cultural locales like artificial technical ones.

In highly artificial systems, the use of regulated terminology and controlled syntax can mean that the difference between value and signification remains relatively non-problematic. Within those narrow spaces, localizers might claim, with Humpty Dumpty, "When *I* use a word [...] it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less" (Carroll 1947: 222-223). If you are in the technical field of commercial livestock in a given region, *sheep* has the value of *mouton*, and then there are all the standardized terms for different types of sheep (an internationalized version might be *Ovis aries*). If you are Microsoft, you can call a file a *file*; if you are Apple, you can call it a *folder*, or vice versa. This is why, within such spaces, internationalization can indeed take place with reasonably successful results. Equivalence is guaranteed, and only the most vain of theories would pretend to ignore the fact.

That said, in the cultures where end-users unsettlingly allow their domains to overlap and contaminate each other, the difference between value and signification can become highly problematic. Not only is the meat *mouton* translatable as either *mutton* or *lamb* (the internal variation is important), but French allows expressions like *C'est un mouton* (for a credulous or gullible person), English invites one *to feel like a lost sheep* (se sentir dépaysé), French alone apparently lets sea-waves with little crests be considered *moutons* (so says the dictionary); English alone permits a seducer to make *sheep's eyes* as an "amorous glance" (*OED*), and so on. The absolute values, if understood as the range of possible significations, are clearly very different between French and English as the languages of very complex cultures. Translation is traditionally concerned with equivalence on the level of precisely such large-scale complexes. It might thus reply, with Alice, "The question is whether you *can* make words mean different things".

Must we then conclude that *sheep* can never be fully translated as *mouton*? Few doubt that different languages and cultures contain numerous different ways of dividing up semantic space. But that does not mean there is no translational equivalence, and it certainly does not stop localization from bringing about numerous linguistic and cultural changes. As a localizer might retort, now with Humpty Dumpty, "The question is [...] which shall be the master—that is all".

In a highly controlled technical locale, the difference between value and signification is minimal and translational equivalence is quite easily obtained. One simply maps the functions; the process is well suited to the intervention of internationalization. In less controlled locales, however, the slippage between value and signification remains more problematic, and equivalence may only be achieved through the overt use of power.

Saussure wanted to keep everything natural; he consequently saw tongues as totalized natural spaces, as if the big complex locales really were controlled. That vision, good for the development of linguistics, forgot that the big spaces are made up of many smaller spaces; a language is a set of varieties all comprising variations; cultures house numerous professional and ethnic groupings. Saussurean value should not be seen as an absolute fact but as a composite accretion of past significations. For example, the prime difference in value between *sheep* and *mutton* is probably due not so much to the stretch of water separating the languages as to the historical points where they were in contact. Anglo-Saxon servants presented what they called *sceap* to their

Norman masters, who called the same object *moton.* The positional values of the terms were changed—were localized—as soon as the meat approached the master's table and cross-cultural communication was established. Thanks to asymmetric distribution situations like that, Saussure had access to the comparable terms enabling him paradoxically to claim that equal values are impossible. Indeed, if we pursue the points of contiguity rather than separation, we might find historical contact situations underlying items such as *black sheep* and *mouton noir* as similar social outcastes, *sheepback* as a straight rendering of *roche moutonnée*, and the idea of *following like sheep* appears well enough in *les moutons de Panurge* (from Rabelais's *Pantagruel*). There are as many shared situations as differences. Translation can propose equivalence with the one term, or another, or yet another. Indeed, considered from within, there is an almost frightening abundance of conceivable translational equivalences (cf. Robinson 1996: 43-45).

Saussurean value can suggest there is no such thing as equivalence only because that very concept of value is logically posterior to pragmatic beliefs in precisely the possibility of equivalence (at least around the tables where the meat was being served). Just as Saussure received his example from the asymmetrical social relations of a multilingual colonization, so all comparative or contrastive linguists necessarily receive their data from situations of distribution and localization.

Equivalence, no matter what its nature, does not simply exist between locales. Equivalences are created by internationalization or translation of one kind or another. They are necessary fictions without necessary correlative beyond the communication situation. In this sense, translation is not a mapping of one function onto another; it is a productive function in itself. Translational equivalence is thus ultimately determined by what translators actually do or have done in the past, and not by abstract comparisons between falsely discrete languages or cultures.

We thus find that equivalence can be accepted as a defining feature of translation, particularly in the controlled technical domains most subject to internationalization. We also suggest that this acceptance need not deny translators their creativity.

Equivalence in translation and internationalization

Industry discourses describe internationalization in the terms like the following:

> Internationalization primarily consists of abstracting the functionality of a product away from any particular language so that language support can be added back in simply, without worry that language-specific features will pose a problem when the product is localized. (Fry 2003: 14)

The concept of equivalence is at work here in the idea that "functionality" is something that can exist independently of language or culture. Function appears to be something that can be taken out, stored in some non-linguistic and non-cultural space, and then put back in again when required. Our philosophers of language have little trouble arguing that there is no such value-free place; languages and cultures actively participate in the formation of all our ideas, including various kinds of "functionality". At the same time, internationalization seems to do what it aims to do. We have argued that it can actually

produce equivalence, not by referring to a place without language or culture, but by building its *own* technical languages and cultures, which assume authority over less powerful locales.

As we have noted, translational equivalence can be "guaranteed" by authoritative internationalization, or it might be "enhanced" or "supported" by internationalizations with lesser degrees or authority. There is nevertheless an important difference between the two kinds of equivalence. In internationalization, a space is created where authority is assumed over a range of end-locales, and it is with that authority that individual functions are mapped as fields with as few free alternatives as possible. Translators then do the work of filling in the fields in different ways, creating the actual equivalences. If, however, the translating takes place *without* internationalization, the status of the underlying guarantor is not very clear, basically because there is no natural system that underlies functions in all languages and cultures. True, we find many translation theorists making idealist claims like the one about "functionality" above. The Biblical linguists Nida and Taber (1969: 39) briefly toyed with the idea of "kernels" (relatively common to all languages?); the French interpreter trainers Seleskovitch and Lederer (e.g. 1989: 40-41) referred to "deverbalization" as leading to "sense" (invisible and thus infallible?); the English translation critic Peter Newmark (1981: 51, 57) at one stage fell back on "pure thought", which might be a similar act of faith. However, virtually all the examples supporting those concepts concerned specific language *pairs*; there was never much question of translation passing through a wholly internationalized grid; the theorists were reluctant to see their equivalence as actually gaining the authority to change things in the world. The necessary artificiality of internationalization did not sit easily with the translation theorists' ideological desire to maintain the natural status of language. Those theorists were throwing out indefensible ideals; internationalization discourse can fall back on technocratic fiat.

We might thus attempt to distinguish between translational equivalence and internationalization-based equivalence in the following ways:

- Internationalization artificially guarantees a move from one version to many locales (internationalized versions to targets), whereas translational equivalence tends to be based on specific pairs of locales (source to target) and an assumption of naturalness.
- Internationalization imposes an architecture where locales are relatively symmetric in their relation to the internationalized text: different items in different locales may be considered reciprocally equivalent to each other. In translation, the movement is one-way and asymmetric: the output is created as an equivalent form of the input, but not necessarily vice versa.
- Internationalization seeks to establish equivalence with respect to function fields, whereas translational equivalence tends to be more backward-looking, seeking comparison with a source or intention within a wider natural system. When we ask what the indigenous hand meant to the piccaninny, or whether De Gaulle was really afraid, we are within a translational mode of thought.
- Internationalization produces a text that is purely internal in status; the intermediary version is for the professional localizers who are then going to produce the texts for market locales. Translation, on the other hand, must

establish its equivalence on the interface with final-product languages and cultures.

- Authoritative internationalization can solve problems to a certain extent by fiat, deciding what is black and what is white, what is correct and what is incorrect. Independent translation, on the other hand, never has this assuredness from within. Purely translational problems (the ones that are not decided by prior internationalization) must be solved in ways that chase after an always slippery *tertium quid*. Black means "death", but only in certain cultural modes of mourning; Friday 13th means "bad luck", but perhaps not for non-native speakers of English (who actually outnumber native speakers). This "equivalent but..." (cf. Pym 1992a) is part of the internal awareness of translation.

- Size and format are not necessarily significant for internationalization (source codes and category definitions can be virtually as long as necessary); they are significant for translation (because it has particular constraints on quantitative representation, as we shall soon see).

- Internationalization passes through an explicit intermediary term, characterized by fixity and artificiality, whereas translational equivalence can function without such assurance. We might attempt some kind of componential analysis of "Friday the 13th" or "color of mourning", but such things were always rather ad hoc; they never effectively extended to the complete description of any culture; no receiver of a translation would embark on such enquiries rather than simply accept the translation as equivalent.

- In internationalization, equivalence is always institutionally imposed for use in a restricted locale, within a particular discipline or even in a specific company. In non-internationalized translation, however, the locales in which equivalence is supposed to operate are usually more general, overlapping with each other and potentially approaching the levels of entire languages and cultures. When we talk about "Friday the 13th" and "color of mourning", certain widespread situations are evoked (superstitions about bad luck; the rituals of death) but there is no felt need to ensure that the domains match exactly in both locales (are Spanish and English superstitions exactly the same?; are the rites even similar?).

- As a result of the different sizes and natures of these locales (restricted for internationalization, general for translation), translational equivalence always has to allow for non-equated connotations or cultural "leftovers". Internationalization can pretend that a term has never appeared in a different domain, that there will be no contamination from prior or competing usages. Translators, on the other hand, have always recognized that languages and cultures thrive on such contamination.

Perhaps the most obvious of these differences is that of size. Internationalization, indeed the whole discourse of localization, is traditionally concerned with narrow professional locales. Translational equivalence, on the other hand, is traditionally concerned with large-scale complex social entities. To the extent that its problems concern both value and significance, that it has both internal and external faces, translation cannot help but engage in the complexity and overlaps of cultures.

Underlying this difference in dimension, translational equivalence presupposes a specific discursive configuration, its external form. Since this form promotes belief in translational equivalence, we now turn to an analysis of its features.

4. How translations speak

We momentarily leave behind localization and internationalization. Here we will focus more specifically on fundamental translation, the equivalence-bound asymmetric replacement of natural-language strings. In this chapter we will deal with the discursive consequences of translational equivalence. We will discover that the translating translator cannot say "I", that users of translations work with similar restrictions, and that translation can use third persons to create strange neutral worlds. Those are all features of what a translation can do just by being a translation; they are parts of the "discourse of translation" or "translational discourse" (not just of discourses *on* or *about* translation). They should also be what translations can say within localization, even when not heard.

Seeing anonymity

Industry discourses on localization have little to say about equivalence of any kind. If your aim is to produce a product that has "the look and feel of locally-made products" (Fry 2003: 5), then you probably will not care how well one text represents another. In fact, the cloak of anonymity should probably fall over the entire localization process, be it translational or otherwise.

There are nevertheless good reasons why people working on localization should take equivalence seriously, and not only because it is one of the few good ways we have of defining translation in the first place. Equivalence is involved in the psychology of translators when they work as translators, and indeed in the psychology of quality controllers whenever they evaluate the work of translators as translators. If your translators produce texts that are much longer or much shorter than the ones you give them, suspicion is surely raised. If they start using language that marks their individual personality (if their texts express their own subjectivity), you may wonder if that is what you are paying them for. More cunningly, types of equivalence are often involved in the way translations are received. Despite the ideals of localization, in many cultures it is prestigious to have language that sounds like it came from English, especially in the field of information technology. This would lead to modes of "foreignizing" equivalence. As we saw in Microsoft's English-Italian terminology, not all language is entirely adapted to endemic target uses; much new language is created in and through translation; and equivalence plays a role in the way that language is evaluated by producers and accepted by (expert) users.

Most of our arguments here will concern the traditional claim that translators should be "invisible". We believe that claim to be widely held, respected, and used. However, we are not interested in arguing that translators are any better when they are most invisible, nor that they are any worse (as has been done by theorists since Schleiermacher in the early nineteenth century). Here we are concerned with an operative principle that could hold with respect to all translations, not just the most fluent or deceptive, simply by virtue of the fact that they are translations. We also suspect that invisibility may not be the best way of describing the principle concerned.

Based on an allegory of perception, invisibility might depict a certain translatorial ambition ("I do not want anyone to see me the translator") or even a certain

criterion for evaluation ("A good/bad translation is one where we can/cannot see the translator"). Nevertheless, the simple struggle between visibility and invisibility only loosely captures what happens in the space where translations are actually received. Ask receivers if the translator can be "seen". Yes, they might be expected to say (no matter what the quality of the translator's language), the name of the translator is there on the front cover or title page. Or yes, others might answer, there is the interpreter, safely behind glass in a booth at the back of the hall. And yes, still others have added at least since the Renaissance (and very much in our age of hasty software localization), we certainly "see" the translator whenever the text is not quite what we expect it to be. In 1405 Leonardo Bruni complained that whatever was good in a translation was attributed to the author, and whatever was bad was blamed on the translator (1928: 102-104). Much the same thing happens every time we find abundant and obvious mistakes, every time we think this foreignness is calculated or non-calculated error, whenever the language indicates a specific variety we can associate with the translator's name, and so on. On all these levels, if the text is received as a translation, some indication of a translator's existence tends to be visible, and quite commonly so. However, if that external reception is governed by equivalence (as we believe is the case when translations are received as translations) then that trivial visibility is mostly forgotten, sometimes very quickly forgotten. The existence of the translator, obvious to all, may be denied importance. We know a translator has passed this way; we do not consider the fact worth the investment of mind or muscle. Indeed, this is a feature of the enormous and increasing number of weakly authored source texts, localized or otherwise. We might be able to find names or copyright for all the instruction manuals, Help files, publicity copy, news reports, defamatory gossip, free circulating jokes, traffic signs, official regulations, whatever, but the nature of those texts invites receivers to forget about *all* senders and their potential first persons. The complaint about "invisibility" could be a complaint about most of the texts that surround us. To demand that translators now be "seen", as if leaving a closet, appears heroically spurious. Somehow we have to assess the degree of interest invested in what is seen or not seen.

The translator Ben Belitt once lamented that, seen externally, the discursive figure of the translator remains "nobody in particular" (1978). This would fit in with a kind of inconsequential visibility, with what we have called the subjectless place where translational equivalence is produced. We might now say that translators are only potentially known when the receiver's belief in equivalence breaks down; that is, when the translator's language is received as being somehow non-translational. A few well-known translators do achieve authorial prominence; their name on the front cover of a book might guarantee the value of the contents; they could actually be operating as a commentator, anthologist, or editor of a series. Within the realm of equivalence, though, users might know who the translator is but they just do not really care. That figure is "nobody in particular"; a name that might as well be replaced by another, with little or no change in the reception process. This is a very peculiar kind of invisibility.

The general idea of "nobody", of "nobodiness" as a discursive if not entirely human quality, might seem to invite some kind of cline. There are potentially many degrees of anonymity between being "nobody" and becoming "somebody". There are also some fairly run-of-the-mill ways we can think about those degrees. For example, we might try to determine what kind of identity (who exactly?), how much agency (what can they actually do?), and what importance (who cares?) are attached to a translatorial nobody. Identity, agency, and importance are often more or less what is

meant beneath the loose references to invisibility anyway.[10] We might hope that this slightly more demanding way of thinking will allow us to gauge a little more subtly the consequences of being or reading "nobody in particular". Our particular metaphorical frame does at least enable us to ask if the range we are considering is properly continuous, an even gradation from one extreme to the other. Or does it involve discontinuity, in the sense of a point of rupture where, in terms of one quality or another, translational discourse quite suddenly turns into something else? The idea of relative anonymity allows us to ask where such a point might lie.

Our starting position here assumes a discontinuity. We posit that translations are ideally received as equivalents of their antecedents, and that this is not true of non-translations. If the proposition holds, translating translators can be expected to be relative "nobodies" and their work must remain relatively unevaluated as individual labor. This in turn suggests that although equivalence is certainly the result of work, its social function depends on the relative anonymity of that work. Such ideal equivalence can only function for as long as the receiver is indifferent to the translator's individuality. These are all reasons why we might expect to find not a cline, but an *unevenly* graded form of anonymity. There may be prototypes; there may be rough edges; yet we expect to find sudden shifts of quality on the borders between translation and non-translation. We shall soon see further reasons for supposing such discontinuity.

Two maxims describing translation

What exactly do we mean by equivalence? The question is inseparable from the very definition of translation. Our approach here involves two maxims[11] of representation. One concerns first-person displacement, the other concerns quantity:

- The maxim of first-person displacement says that the translating translator cannot occupy an "I", a first-person pronoun. This distinguishes translation from other forms of reported speech and code-switching. It can also be challenged. For example, when a Broadway production of *La Bohème* mentions Marlon Brando in the lyrics, the first person authoring that name cannot be conflated with the first person of Puccini. The implicatures point to commentary rather than translation.

- The maxim of translational quantity says that the translation is more or less as long as the previous text that it represents. Any challenge to this maxim will produce implicatures operating on the boundaries of translationality. For example, when a ten-minute speech is rendered consecutively in two minutes, it too is likely to be received as critical commentary (or a "gist translation") rather than a translation in the fullest sense of the term.

These two maxims are first operative in the space of text reception. This means that any text *received as* a translation is, for the purposes of this description, a translation (cf. Toury 1995: 20). It also means that many interesting and legitimate things can be done by challenging or transgressing the maxims.

In this chapter we will analyze the displacements of the first person, the linguistic form most clearly compromised by relative anonymity. In the next chapter we will look at the maxim of translational quantity in greater detail.

The utterance "I am translating" is necessarily false

We are now at the point where a translation is being received. Distribution is over; internationalization has played its part; localization has produced something that might be recognized as a translation. How that recognition is made, and what it does to the values of the text, depends very much on how the translation "speaks" to its receiver. We will argue that the discourse of translation employs a special configuration of the first person, and that this has implicatures for the other discursive persons (second and third) operative in translational discourse. That particular configuration is one of the ways translations are set apart from the other products of localization.

There is nothing trivial about the claim that the translating translator cannot occupy an "I". The observation concerns a fairly problematic aspect of dialogue interpreting, for example, where the mediator may have to disown explicitly the right to occupy the "I" that they pronounce. That is indeed the linguistic phenomenon we will be analyzing in this chapter. However, the first person is implicit in any feature of discourse, not just the morphological expressions of the pronoun system. The simple fact of linguistic variation means that every time we speak about the world, we also give information about ourselves, and even about our relative anonymity. The use of particularly marked phonetic variants, lexical or phraseological items, or grammatical structures can indicate the speech community we belong to, our age, our sex, our social class, level of education, and desired relation with the person we are addressing. The use of marking on any of those levels can become significant by transgressing the maxim of first-person displacement. So what we have to say about the persons in translational discourse, here and throughout, need not be restricted to the morphology of the actual pronouns.

An example might illustrate the point. At the risk of apparent triviality, Figure 11 shows an apocryphal localization (of the many that circulate on the web) whose entire function is based on breaking the first-person maxim. It is from Windows 2000 (actually *Windaz Too Thowsand*) for Australians.[12]

Figure 11. An error for Australians

Why might this be humorous? Why might it be insulting? Whatever explanation you come up with, it surely depends on these variants *representing* implicit technical variants, a previous text (perhaps "An error has occurred", then "OK") and doing so in a

way that is marked as "Australian" or "tired stereotype of Australian culture". The values of that marking are then attributed to an implicit first person, as when we say that whoever did this was clever, bored, politically incorrect, an idiot, whatever. And then we might say this is not a serious translation. Which means, if you think about it, that the values carried by the marked variants are attributed to the first person (the subjectivity producing the parody) and are radically *not* attributed to the apparently unmarked technical language being (mis)represented. The humor, if any, works by transgressing the maxim. And there are no actual pronouns in sight.

How do we know translational equivalence is pertinent to a given text? A simple answer would be that the text "says so". Yet not all texts say so in the same way, and the actual saying may not always belong to "the text". In fact, the indicators of translational status are strictly neither internal nor external to the translation proper. They belong to a border region between the material and the semiotic, to the published thresholds that comprise objective cover pages and become meaningful within boundary-maintaining systems. To follow the terminology of Genette (1978), who strangely overlooks the paratextual discourse of translation, they belong to the "paratext".

The first and most important principle of a translation's paratext is that it should be excluded from the part of the text that is presented as equivalent. The indicators of translational status are outside the equivalence relation. The paratext thus functions as a kind of instruction for use, saying something like "...the absent Spanish text translates as...". If the indicator is to function, it must itself be a non-translation.

That is why the discursive person who says "I am translating" cannot actually be translating at the moment of utterance. And that is the main reason why translational phenomena incorporate a fundamental discontinuity. The principle has consequences not only for the first person of translations, but also, we shall see, for the implicit second and third persons of translating as a discursive act.

The phenomenon must be approached step by step.

If, in the consecutive or simultaneous situation, the text "J'ai peur" is rendered as "I am frightened", it could be misunderstood as the translator talking about their immediate condition. One way of avoiding ambiguity would perhaps be to jump straight to the third-person version "The speaker is frightened". But this could equally be misunderstood as the translator commenting on the speaker's immediate condition. In that case, the one way to make sure the fear is unambiguously the speaker's is to frame the utterance by indirect speech, as in "The speaker says she is frightened". The indirect speech of this most explicit version might be seen as an elaborate form of the particularly unsuccessful translational utterance "I am frightened". It brings out a certain kind of paratextual operator (a discursive form or "instruction for use") that is otherwise normally implicit: "The speaker says that…". Although successful translation need not be transformed into indirect speech in order to be understood, the relation between the two discursive forms remains of analytical interest.

Let us go back to the Kuwaiti advertisement discussed in chapter one. Was the French text there properly a translation? Remember it began "La publicité ci-dessus est relative à..." ("The above announcement concerns..."). This introductory phrase introduces a deictic distance (one text pointing to another) that effectively stops the French text from functioning as an equivalent of the English. Since it actually has the discursive form of indirect speech, it is felt to be something other than a translation.

John Bigelow (1978) argues that translation is a special case of indirect speech (for similar analyses, see Mossop 1983, 1998; Folkart 1991). Its specificity, says Bigelow, is based on the form "...translates as...", an operator that is both quotational (like "He says that...") and productive of new information (since we are then told something other than what was said, if only because of the change of language). The following are versions of two of the steps by which Bigelow generates the discursive form of translation:

(1) Ludwig said, "I must tell you: I am frightened."

(2) Ludwig's words translate as, "I must tell you: I am frightened."

The shift from (1) to (2) represents the basic progression from a text received as direct speech to one received as a translation. Bigelow draws attention to the fact that whereas (1) refers to a person, (2) refers to a linguistic entity. He then adds, "this departure from the general format for other hyperintensional sentences [i.e. sentences with verbs expressing psychological attitudes and speech acts] is of minor significance and introduces no new problems of principle" (1978: 133). We beg to differ.[13]

It is of considerable significance that the translational operator "…translates as…" refers to things (words) rather than to discursive subjectivity (a person). This is for two main reasons. First, although a spoken version of (1) would remain as fundamentally ambiguous as the translational "I am frightened" (one or both first persons could be attributed to the reporter), the properly translational operator of (2) successfully removes that ambiguity. Second, the same ambiguity could partly be resolved by an explicit third-person subject such as "The situation is frightening" (instead of "I find the situation frightening" or "I am frightened"). This would indicate that the translational operator is associated with the third person not only in its verbal form but also in its specific discursive function. The transition from (1) to (2), from subjectivity to things, represents a move to the translational form.

What is the main difference between (1) "Ludwig said" and (2) "Ludwig's words translate as"? It is not just a difference between a person and the words said by that person. In referring to Ludwig's action in the past tense, (1) positions a first person (non-Ludwig) in the present; it positions its I-here-now in relation to the reported speech. By contrast, (2) uses an eternal and subjectless present ("...translates as...") to project its action as necessary and valid at all times and places. Its I-here-now has no relation to the reported speech. The essential difference between the two operators is that (1) positions an I-here-now for a reporter-translator to stand on, whereas (2) completely eliminates the possibility of situating that position. This is as it should be, since if the mediating subject could manifest itself in relation to a discursive I-here-now, the utterance "I am translating" could be true. Since we believe the utterance to be necessarily false, we accept the operator "...translates as..." as the discursive form of the way translational equivalence is manifested in reception.

Second persons

If (1) positions a first person and (2) does not, this difference should have consequences for the position and role of some kind of second person. Here we are interested in the

second person as a macrostructural position, functioning as a property of the entire text. This is what literary theorists would call an "implied" reader; it is a subjectivity that can be deduced from discursive features of the text itself, in relative independence of whatever flesh-and-blood receivers might come along.

Let us return to Bigelow's example of the explicit translational form:

(2) Ludwig's words translate as, "I must tell you: I am frightened."

We might now compare this with a partial localization, with the operator in English but the cited words in the anterior German:

(3) Ludwig said, "Du musst wissen: ich fürchte mich."

Why would the translational form (2) be preferred to the mixed form (3)? We might suppose Ludwig wanted to address a friend who did not know German and required a mediator who knew English (several dozen other situations would be equally plausible). Before the translation is carried out, the non-German-speaking friend cannot occupy the position of the macrostructural second person.[14] The purpose of the translation is to enable the friend to occupy that discursive position, to fill the place of the implied receiver. In this sense, every act of translation must be for a discursive second person in some way excluded from the communication act. Equivalence seems not to like half measures.

We might go further and claim that the translational status itself functions as a similar tag. The non-translational nature of (3) indicates that its discursive second person understands both English and German. The discursive second person of (2), on the other hand, understands English but not necessarily German. That is, the choice of a language or languages in localization always implies the minimal profile of a macrostructural second person. The status of the text as a translation thus functions in a way similar to a pronominal utterance, only without the morphological pronoun. No one is going to specify that the translation is for "Dear reader, you who understand English but perhaps do not understand German". There is no need to mention this paratextual "you". It is enough that the text be presented and initially received as a translation.

Translational discourse thus functions like a personal pronoun, even though it has no personal pronouns of its own. Slightly more elegantly, one could say that the utterance "I am translating" is no truer than is its extended form "You are reading the translation I am now doing". The translational second person must be as anonymous as the translator.

In sum, translational discourse seems happier referring to words rather than to subjectivity, to neutral objects rather than to positioned first or second persons. If the translator's position is to be without linguistic manifestation, so must the first and second persons of properly translational discourse.

You might object that our analysis has unfairly extrapolated from peculiarly spoken cases like "I am frightened". The translator's physical presence in such situations does entail a special risk of misattribution. However, there are many cases where purely written translation requires the same suppression of first-person and second-person positions. In European Union reports on the Spanish economy, for instance, terms like "nuestro país" (*our* country) or "nuestra economía" (*our* economy) are usually rendered as "Spain" or "the Spanish economy". First-person pronouns are

mostly restricted to expressions of personal opinion where the "we" is clearly exclusive and not inclusive. Is this an isolated stylistic norm? In noting that the Jerusalem Bible is a Christianization of the Hebrew text, the French poet and translation theorist Henri Meschonnic observes that the Tetragrammaton formulas "Yahve *my* Lord" and "Yahve *your* Lord" are rendered as "*the* Lord" (1973: 419). The divinity that belonged to a people has been deceptively internationalized as a Christian God available to all, just as the economy that once belonged to Spaniards is now exposed to the neutral nouns of European Union policymakers.

In this, as in many other aspects of what is generally called "explicitation", translation resembles the results of internationalization, without actually having done the work of internationalization.

Participative and observational second persons

Let us return to the advertisement where the State of Kuwait announced "prequalification of international contractors to participate in tenders", published in *Le Monde*. We mentioned in our first chapter that there were three kinds of locales possibly involved in such cases: participative, observational, and excluded. We are now in a position to formalize that analysis in terms of discursive persons.

Why should the State of Kuwait be speaking English in a French newspaper? No doubt because the receivers it wants to "prequalify" have to be able to understand English; non-English speakers are implicitly not invited to submit tenders. The choice of English in the main text (in fact the choice of localization without translation) is thus one of the determinants profiling the second person. If the entire text had been translated into French, the profile of this second person would have changed accordingly. So what are we to make of this small French text that insists on explaining the English text? For whom was *it* written? If not a translation, could it become translational?

The French text, perhaps like most translations from English, is ostensibly for receivers unable to understand the English text. It thus sets up a locale *excluded* from communion with the locale most appropriate to the English text. At the same time, the function of the French text is apparently to overcome such exclusion, to allow a previously excluded receiver to become a non-excluded receiver. Yet even then the receiver of the French text, although lingually non-excluded, by no means shares the same discursive status as the second person of the English text. Readers of the English text are potentially able to respond to the advertisement and submit a tender to the State of Kuwait; they can accept the invitation to participate in a wider speech act. The reader of the French text cannot. The non-translational deictics point from French back to English; the large advertisement speaks with an authority that the small subtext does not. Although not excluded, the second person of the French text is not properly *participative*; the text sets in place the peculiar receiving position that we have described as *observational*.

We have thus isolated three second persons pertinent to the announcement: the *excluded* person for whom the French text was ostensibly necessary, the *observational* person corresponding to the French text, and the *participative* person who can presumably respond to the English text by contacting Kuwait. In principle, *translation*

enables shifts between these three kinds of second person. This could be its specific work as part of localization.

Now, is the French text properly a translation? There seems to be no clear answer. On the one hand, it must be partly translational in that it overcomes an excluded implied receiver, replacing natural-language strings to the same end as all ostensible translations (although translation can of course also *create* an excluded reader, since the inclusion of one person may well involve the exclusion of another). On the other, we have noted that the French text is not felt to be translational because of its deictics. The phrase "La publicité *ci-dessus* est relative à..." ("The *above* advertisement concerns…") refers to a gap between itself and the English text, distancing its observational person from the participative person of the English. This discursive distancing would appear to be non-translational. The French text is thus partly translational in that it replaces natural-language strings, but not wholly translational because it overtly blocks the potential adoption of a participative person inherent in the communication situation.

Could the French text be transformed into an entirely satisfactory translation? Let us magically remove the disturbing deictics, rewriting indirect discourse as straight translational discourse. The result would be something like "L'État de Kuwait annonce une préqualification des contractants internationaux...", albeit still published in small print below the English announcement. Is the implied receiver of the French text now properly participative? No, of course not. The English text still occupies pride of place in physical terms; it retains the right to attract participation, no matter what the language (we will later analyze this exclusivism in terms of performatives). No tenders are going to be accepted in French, even when the French text is rewritten as a linguistically well-formed translation.

We thus find that although properly translational replacement is designed to overcome the exclusion of a set of receivers, the result is not necessarily a participative person. The observational position we have located through the French text continues to be observational even when the necessary transformations make the text discursively translational. Of course, if we then went one step further and presented the French translation *without* the English text (that is, without any presentational or deictic distancing of an anterior text), then the locale addressed could indeed be participative. But the Kuwaiti tender criteria would have been implicitly altered, creating possible divergence between linguistic well-formedness and a commercially acceptable translation.

The categories we are attempting to illustrate rely on three basic propositions:

- Texts are ostensibly translated in order to overcome the *exclusion* of a macrostructural second person.
- A translation can convert an excluded person into an *observational* person.
- A translation can convert an excluded person into a *participative* person, although there might be doubts about the commercial acceptability of the result.

The categories of observational and participative reception can be made to correspond to distinctions between non-illusory and illusory translation (Levy 1969: 32ff), overt and covert translation (House 1977: 189ff, 1997), or documentary and instrumental translation (Nord 1988, 1997: 47-52). At the same time, the above approach does not simply present the translator with two possible modes of action and leave it at that. There are certain conceptual differences involved. Most obviously, the

choice of one kind of locale or another depends not just on the text, nor solely on translators or the words they fancy, but more directly on the reasons for the localization, the ensuing profile of the appropriate receiver or user, and the mode of text presentation. That is, the discursive logic articulating what can be done with translation concerns factors that are mostly beyond the translator's direct control. Translators receive instructions about them, explicitly or implicitly.

Perhaps less obviously, the way we have distinguished between our two translational second persons ("participative" and "observational") has not been by positing eternal categories. We have worked from a rather cunning kind of discursive operator.

Third persons in paratexts

The operator "...translates as..." is clearly as much an external prop as is the translational equivalence it proposes. Words do not translate themselves; they are translated by humans in society. And since humans in society are historical, words are translated differently according to different locales. In suppressing the I-here-now of its first and second persons, the translational operator attains a neutrality manifestly devoid of terrestrial correlative. Indeed, a stubborn realist might doubt that "...translates as..." corresponds to the form of translational equivalence at all. What we normally see in paratexts is more like the following:

(4)   WORDS BY LUDWIG
        Translated by Bigelow

Is this title-form any better as a translational operator? It is more explicitly a paratext, a threshold situating a translated text. It is composed of three names (Title, Author, and Translator) and the connector "by", which is not the same in its two appearances: "BY LUDWIG" is defining; "by Bigelow" might be relative (preceded by a comma) but is possibly also defining (not necessarily preceded by a comma). The text thus introduced can be approached as the classic WORDS in its eternal form, such that the work of the translator is merely "relative" added value, without consequence for the receiver who begins from an initial "Let's see what Ludwig has to say". Or the text can be approached as Bigelow's particular version of a known original, this second "by" then being defining and the particular receiver asking something like "Let's see how Bigelow (as opposed to some other actual or possible translator) translates". The "relative added value" option would tend to be external; the "defining added value" reading would belong more to an internal receptive position. But it is difficult to say much more than that. On the level of the title-form itself, there will always be doubt as to the relative or defining nature of the translator's presence. The logic is decidedly binary, switching across discontinuities in accordance with the observer's position, in keeping with the deep binarisms of translational discourse.

Should the translational operator ("…translates as…"), which continues to be operative within the text itself, be confounded with the common form of translational paratexts? Something suggests that reading a title page and receiving a translation are quite different activities.

As the physical receiver enters the text and ideally conforms to the profile of the second person, the named persons (author and translator) are immediately transformed into either a first person (in the case of certain modes of authorship) or absent third persons. The ambiguity of the translator's relative or defining presence should disappear. If the "relative" reception strategy has been selected and the translator is a wholly unwanted presence merely disturbing access to the eternal WORDS, the operator "...translates as..." becomes a necessary fiction. It enables the receiver to forget the uncertainty of the paratext, inducing the classical "willing suspension of disbelief" typical of all fiction. On the other hand, if the receiver has selected a "defining" option and is interested in seeing how Bigelow translates, then the third-person status of the operator at least serves to remove linguistic doubts about personal pronouns. In accordance with translational equivalence, such a reader is free to look for Bigelow's voice behind every linguistic element *except* the persons "I" and "you" in the text (we shall test this principle in a minute). In both cases, the third person is the discursive position best suited to the reception of the translation.

The operator "...translates as..." thus makes third persons out of the discursive subjectivities involved in translation. As Benveniste (1966) argued (after Arabic grammarians), the third person is the one who is absent; it is a non-person, a thing and not a subjectivity. Translation turns the world of persons into a world of things.

The discursive creation of neutral worlds

The above analysis has associated translational equivalence with suppression of the mediator's first person. Does this mean the operator "…translates as…" entirely suppresses everything that is not cold illusory equivalence? Does it effectively return us to the authoritative symmetries of internationalization?

Some translators have of course expressed strong personal identities. However, there must remain doubt as to whether their particularity was wholly compatible with the attaining of equivalence. Literary translating is the field where we usually find protests on this point. A few examples might suggest why.

In Robert Lowell's version of Rimbaud's poem 'Ma Bohème' (1969: 87) we find the line:

Tom Thumb the dreamer, I was knocking off my coupled rhymes

This "I was", together with the addition of "coupled" (Rimbaud only mentions "rimes"[15]), allows an informed reader to recall both the French poet's early poetic forms *and* Lowell's own prosodic practice, particularly the coupled rhymes used in his translation of *Phèdre*. And yet, if such connections are made, is the text still being read as a translation? Probably not, especially if we know that the psycho-erotic adjective "coupled" has been added, that Lowell is thus speaking more in autobiographical than translational mode, and that the text appears in a volume called *Imitations*, the title of which expressly avoids the term "translation". Then again, for the reader unable or unwilling to attach value to any of that, perhaps this is a translation, and a particularly engaging translation at that.

Here we do not really have to decide such cases. We merely indicate the kinds of doubts that are raised and the ways they can be used to talk about the limits of

translation. Here we are dealing with maxims that can be broken. As in Grice, the maxim of first-person displacement produces meaning through its transgression.

A similar case, commented by Susan Bassnett (1991: 56-57), involves the following lines from Petrarca's sonnet CCLXIX:

> Rotta è l'alta colonna e'l verde lauro
> Che facean ombra al mio stanco pensero
>
> [Broken is the tall column and the green laurel
> That gave shade to my tired thought]

This was rendered by Wyatt as

> The pillar pearished is whereto I lent
> The strongest staye of myne unquyet mynde

Petrarch was lamenting the deaths of Cardinal Giovannio Colonna ("l'alta colonna") and of Laura ("il verde lauro"). According to Bassnett,

> Wyatt's translation stresses the "I", and stresses also the strength and support of what is lost. Whether the theory that would see this sonnet as written in commemoration of the fall of Cromwell in 1540 is proven or not, it remains clear that the translator has opted for a voice that will have immediate impact on contemporary readers as being of their own time. (1991: 57)

Thanks to play on the edge of representational maxims, translational discourse can include political use of literary allusion and still remain translational for those who do not grasp the allusion. This is akin to the way uncomfortable ideas can be expressed through pseudotranslations (ostensible translations for which there is no source text): "Don't blame me", says the subversive author expressing culpable thoughts, "I'm only the translator… go shoot Petrarca!" In fact, seen in this light, the existence of an actual source becomes of little importance. The purpose of much translation is precisely to import voices for ideas that cannot be expressed directly, in the same way as any management structure trying to introduce change will tend to bring in outside experts to give voice and authority to the innovation.

Let us accept that the operator "…translates as…" allows certain functional ambiguities with respect to the referentiality of first-person pronouns. This implies no more than a capacity to allow two reception strategies to activate the same pronoun in two contradictory ways. The "I" of the translation may refer to the source-text author (as we would normally expect) or it may refer to the author who, although the translation is signed as a translation, also has an authorial voice for whatever receiver is able to perceive it. So a translation may also be received as a non-translation. And no greater mysteries need lie therein.

Let us now try a slightly more intriguing example. In film dubbing from English into Spanish, code-referring utterances like "Do you speak English?" are commonly rendered as "¿Hablas mi idioma?" ("Do you speak my language?"). Here, as we might have predicted, the problem of self-reference in translation is solved by avoiding the third-person name ("English"/"inglés") and retreating to the neutral if highly ambiguous

space of a first-person pronoun ("my"). No one can really say if the "I" of the resulting "my language" speaks Spanish, English or, in a vaguely utopian projection, all languages at once. Reference to the translator's situation would appear to have been avoided by the construction of a very peculiar first-person pronoun. Does this then contradict the general tendency for translational discourse to seek refuge in third-person terms?

We approach through a relatively inventive example. In the film *Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid* (1969), we find two bank-robbing heroes who move to Bolivia. There they are faced with the problem of having to learn enough Spanish to exercise their profession, viz. robbing banks. Of course, in the dubbed Spanish version of the film they already speak very good Spanish. Why should they now have to learn this same language? The localizers might perhaps have made them learn English, but this part of the film is very definitely set in a visual Bolivia. So the localizers hijacked the storyline for two or three sequences: the heroes now decide to learn *French* in the hope that they will not be recognized as Americans. When they enter a Bolivian bank, the rudimentary Spanish of the American film is replaced by rudimentary French in the Spanish version. The neutral space of the third term "French" conceals their identity, not from the bank officials (who take about two seconds to recognize them as Americans), but from the viewer of the dubbed film, who is supposedly spared an upsetting reference to the fact of translation and the presence of a translator.

Why might such a reference have been upsetting? After all, some localized versions of *Pygmalion* and *My Fair Lady* (at least into Catalan and Spanish) make prolonged and repeated references to the English language, setting up the acceptable (since accepted) convention that the target language is to be treated and named as if it were really English. The fictional "as if" of this contradictory self-reference can assume conventional status when structurally prolonged, when it becomes part of a possible world where two "I"s may become one. The bank-robbers' French, however, concerns a language with only transitory status in its fictional context, without sufficient narrative space to set up conventions of its own. The difficulty concerns not a locale, but a border between locales.

Now, exactly where is this "French" referred to by the Spanish? Certainly not in France. It would seem to belong to the same textual world as the "Spanish" referred to in the American film. That is, these third terms (the languages referred to only because they are supposedly unknown) belong to the world of the excluded other. Their world is present only thanks to otherness, which is a form of necessary absence. In fact, in the neutral world of this third term we might also expect to meet the "my language" of the peculiarly translational "Do you speak my language?", since the language referred to only functions as such for as long as it remains unspecified. A certain mode of translation, speaking with neither authority nor foresight, can thus built its own possible world, in a dimension created by the fleeting negation of immediate locales.

In this, again, translation achieves effects like those of internationalization, but without the authority of explicit internationalization.

Let us now return to the operator "...translates as...". So far we have more or less assumed that its correlative is the homogeneous content "WORDS", ascribed to one sole author and thus implicitly to one sole language. This, however, is a dangerous assumption. Maurice Blanchot (1949: 186) pointed out the half-way status of Hemingway's characters who, by speaking Spanish in English (inserting the occasional Spanish term and adopting features of Spanish syntax) created a "shadow of distance"

that could then be translated as such. Does localization deal with words in one language only? The internal distance described by Blanchot, and picked up later by Derrida (1985), suggests that we too-readily assume texts to be monolingual. Surely what is being translated in the case of the American-Spanish-French bank-robbers, for example, is neither English nor Spanish nor the French of France. It would seem to be more like the following:

(5)   Movement from English to Spanish translates as movement from Spanish into French.

One boundary zone or overlap translates another. Interpreted in this way, the linguistic content of the bank-robbers' first person is not in any one language, nor in all languages (no need to dive into metaphysics). It is an asymmetric border, defined by discontinuous distribution yet unlocalized beyond that definition.

If we now go back to the example "Do you speak my language?", we see that the content of the utterance is not whatever language the first person speaks but whether or not the situation calls for translation. Indeed, the question "Do you speak English?" could be rewritten as "Is this a situation requiring translation?". There is no translational schizophrenia, only cultural disjunction.

Once again, the translational operator can override problematic first and second persons in order to set up apparently neutral worlds of third-person terms.

Third persons can conflict

In the Spanish version of the BBC series *Fawlty Towers,* the bumbling foreign waiter Manuel is not from Barcelona (as he is in the British version) but from Mexico. The localizers strove to avoid an embarrassing reference to certain English preconceptions about Spanish culture (they were apparently unconcerned about a negative image of Mexican culture). Problems of self-reference concern not just languages but cultural imagery as well, the way different cultures perceive each other and themselves. Faced with this kind of difficulty, translational discourse tends to prefer neutral worlds where there are no first or second persons, and where there are no marked terms that might belong to such persons. Tuck it away in Mexico, or French, or anywhere suitably other, in the most exclusive sense. Translations work to include certain locales (the move from exclusion to inclusion is one of the things translations basically do), but they also actively exclude other locales, and not just by selecting one target language rather than another (Spanish is still spoken in Mexico).

All this, as we have seen, functions most successfully when pronouns are replaced by proper nouns. However, simple naming may not always allow delusive neutrality.

Quine's treatment of potential synonyms borrows from Schrödinger the example of a mountain-climber who has learned to apply the name "Chomolungma" to a peak seen from Nepal, and to apply the name "Everest" to a peak seen from Tibet (1960: 49; corrected in the French translation, 1977: 87). The mountain-climber believes these names refer to different peaks. But one day his explorations reveal they are actually one and the same peak. This equation presumably solves all problems of reference. Moreover, since the two names continue to exist, "Everest" translates as

"Chomolungma" in the south, "Chomolungma" translates as "Everest" in the north, and no strictly semantic problems should be expected to ensue. There are two names and a common referent, so this should be a simple terminological convention, a case of perfect internationalization. Or is it?

The problem is that, beyond the Himalayas, localizers have to choose between the peak as named from the north and the same peak as named from the south. The name itself cannot be neutral, since there is always a naming position implied, in fact the power (of the parent?, of the state?, of the localizer?) to name. The choice of "Everest" implies that the Tibetans were authors and the Nepalese were translators, whereas "Chomolungma" places the authors in the south and the translators in the north. As still tends to happen when deciding the English names of Catalan/Spanish towns (are there still German names for towns in the west of Poland?), the use of certain third-person terms necessarily positions the author of the term, and therefore its localizer.

We have so far claimed that the relative anonymity of the translator is generally protected by the third-person nature of translational discourse. Yet here, in cases of conflict between third-person terms, we must admit that the anonymity can be successfully challenged. This form of disclosure is moreover of some importance for the ethics of localization, since it is partly in the choice between third-person entities, in the selection of one external term or another, in the choice of translation or non-translation, that localization can exert influence on the way cultures perceive each other.

Over the last few pages we have described equivalence as a fact of reception, as a consequence of the operator "...translates as...". As such, the material location of equivalence is primarily between the translation and the receiver willing to adopt a certain suspension of disbelief. Equivalence exists for a receiver who is willing to accept that, to all intents and purposes, the translation counts as the source text and this voice saying "I" is the voice that said the same "I" in another locale. All this is despite the fact that the text concerned is clearly the work of a translator. Thanks to the operator "...translates as...", innumerable flesh-and-blood receivers have momentarily forgotten about their real place in the world; they have willingly occupied the similarly anonymous position of the translational second person; they have accepted the translation as the ideal equivalent of its antecedents.

We have also seen that one way to maintain such illusions is to hide all the specific mediations involved: the particular translator, the particular receiver, the times and places marked by distribution. This mysterious forgetting is essential to the translator's anonymity, and thus to the maintenance of translational equivalence. It happens all the time. Yet it is a fairly fragile phenomenon, dependent on numerous external factors. What happens, for example, when a translation is visibly longer or shorter than its source? Is it then no more than localization, not really a translation? Does that mean equivalence is no longer involved?

We now shift from the maxim of first-person displacement to the maxim of quantity.

5. Quantity speaks

If most people were asked about the difference between a translation and an "adaptation" (since the term "localization" is not yet walking our streets), the reply would tend to concern the right to add things or to take things away. This would probably rate above questions of ideal equivalence or any specific translational discourse. And rightly so. The idea that a translation should be as long as its source has no less than Biblical authority: "Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish from it" (Deuteronomy 4:2, cf. Revelation 22:18-19). Many a student will exclaim, "If I leave this out (or add something else), the result won't be a translation!" Of course, translators have been omitting and adding things for centuries; the degrees to which they do so have long affected the discursive workings of translational equivalence. Yet there has long been a maxim of non-variance around which such things happen.

Let NANS stand for No-Addition-No-Subtraction (cf. Pym 2000, Mossop 2001). NANS translation would be the ideal that errs on neither of those sides. This ideal is clearly of little relevance to localization in the widest sense (which is nevertheless subject to quantitative constraints). It does concern translational discourse, however, and thus all the forms of translation that huddle around that central ideal.

Why quantity is important

Quantity operates in textual rhythms, not only in regular verse but also the rhythms that beat most deeply within cultural identity, within the most poetic and sacred dimensions of belonging. Quantity is the problematic underlying the more disturbing rhythm with which information is accumulated, manipulated, and accelerated in a highly imbalanced electronic globalization. Or the sexual rhythms mimicked in erotic language. Quantity is the editorial problem of fitting texts into pages, flowing around brochure pictures, to the exact bottom of this or that column. It is the key to successful interpreting, similarly editorial in that texts must be fitted into limited temporal space. It is the main criterion in film dubbing and subtitling, where linguistic values should correspond to the shape and duration of moving mouths or the available space on the screen. In all such areas, criteria of textual quantity can and do have priority over questions of strictly qualitative representation.

The maxim of representational quantity in translation holds that, *since input and output should have the same inherent qualities, there should be no significant difference between their quantities*. And yet there usually is a difference, if only because the same qualities tend to require different extensions in different locales.

One fundamental reason for the difference lies in Zipf's "rank-frequency" law, which basically says that frequency of use correlates with shorter forms of linguistic expression (1965: 20ff.). The words we use most tend to be the ones that are the shortest. Zipf's law is important because localization generally moves from specialized locales with high frequencies of technical language to locales with low frequencies in the same domains. This is because something new is being brought to the receiving locales. Hence the need for different quantities, normally for expansion but also, in

some cases, for reduction of some kind. The maxim of representational quantity ignores this very basic requirement.

Let us immediately admit that Zipf's beautifully simple principle becomes very complex when we actually set about measuring quantities in different languages. Should we count metrical feet, spoken syllables, written characters, words, ideograms, or what? The only solution is to count in whatever measure is pertinent to the specific problem to be solved: inches or centimeters if we are working on layout, seconds and characters if we are subtitling, and so on. Hopefully this distinction will enable us to talk about quantity as a general factor, independently of its measurements. The beautiful principle might thus survive unscathed. The technical difficulties should not blind us to theoretical importance.

If no account is taken of the differences between quantities, localization becomes an abstractly facile concern. When Katz, for instance, attempts to base cross-cultural communication on the naturalist semantic hypothesis that "each proposition can be expressed by some sentence in any natural language" (the principle of effability), he must first declare that length is not a semantic consideration (1978: 205). No matter how difficult the term or concept, if we have several thousand words and a few years in which to explain it, complete localization can be achieved. Of course, the cost of such a project will probably outweigh the benefits (we will study relative costs in a later chapter). So we must conclude that quantity is subject to constraints in all forms of localization, at least for as long as price is no object.

The case of translation has its particularity within localization on this point as well. As Keenan (1978) argues in his reply to Katz, a sentence of a hundred or so words might well be a very precise semantic explanation of a five-word proposition, but it will by no means be universally accepted as a worthwhile translation. Effective translation rarely obeys the NANS principle, but it must nevertheless depend on some reasonable relationship between the quantities involved.

This "reasonable relationship" could be a question of clines. At the ideal of ideals, the quantities are exactly the same; then come the trivial differences that reasonable people would overlook, extending out to the obvious discrepancies that would raise reasonable doubts about any translation. This logic would lead to a prototype view of translation, for which there is much justification. We nevertheless suspect that there are other logics involved as well, imposed upon the gradations at various points between ideal sameness and radical discrepancy.

The following pages will attempt to bring out those hidden logics.

Types of quantitatively based equivalence

Here we will take the simplest quantitative relations and see how far they can reveal categories of equivalence. Certain initial distinctions can be based on the material presence of input and output in the space of reception. Four general cases will be considered:

- *Transliteration:* If a foreign-language string is presented without any visibly translational replacement, the translator is potentially conspicuous by a certain refusal to work. There is no quantitative difference between the distributed text and any translation. The result might be called *absolute equivalence*.

- *Double presentation:* If a translation is presented alongside the untranslated text and the two are visibly non-identical, then the space in which the translator has worked is there for all to see. Minor differences cannot be hidden. The optimal general relation is in this case what might be termed *overt* or *strong relative equivalence.*

- *Single presentation:* When a translation is presented in the absence of any anterior text, fewer questions are likely to be asked, the illusory possibilities of equivalence are much greater, and receptive awareness of a translating subjectivity is more likely to be eclipsed. This is the ideal situation for an amorphous form of *weak relative equivalence.*

- *Multiple presentation:* An important modification of the above modes is when a translation exists in the presence of alternative translations of the same text. In such cases the most recent translation would tend to be considered the better or more equivalent version (principle of translational progress), although values of pseudo-originality might cause this relation to be reversed (see Pym 1998). Either way, the situation involves *contradictory equivalence* in reception (for the translational second person, the different translations will usually have different material quantities, but this difference may nevertheless be held to be non-significant).

Independently of any other awareness of transfer or translational subjectivity, these four modes of presentation promote quite different reception situations. They all modulate the nature of the translational second person.

The "more or less" of relative equivalence is thus not necessarily blind. Most editors are quite aware that translations tend to be slightly longer than their sources, since they commonly seek to make implicit values explicit. At the same time, English translations might be expected to weigh in slightly lighter than their German originals, since there are several principles of compensation written into the structural features of the tongues themselves (German illocutionary particles are compensated for by more expressive word order in English; German compounds are unworried by length). In quick evaluations of translations, such principles operate as trivial normalizing conditions, in themselves of no significance for the value of the work.

Beyond these conditions, however, are there situations where translations can legitimately be considerably shorter than their sources (principle of authorized reduction)? Can they be significantly longer (principle of authorized expansion) and still remain translational? If so, how might such thresholds be determined?

We shall hypothesize the thresholds on the basis of the four fundamental reception situations outlined above.

Transliteration

Transliteration involves distribution without the visible replacement of language strings. Since it leads to the exact quantitative equality between input and output, we might call

the result "absolute equivalence". Or is it simple identity? In fact, in such cases can we really talk about values or a properly translational work process at all?

Here we might consider Borges' short story about Pierre Menard, the fictional Modernist figure who set out to translate *Don Quijote*. The would-be translator studied all the details of Cervantes' life, began to eat and speak like Cervantes, and finally translated the novel into its original seventeenth-century Spanish, in exactly the same words as the original. The result of the translation was thus exact quantitative equivalence.

Borges' story makes the quite obvious point that distribution changes value. Cervantes' *Quijote* had an oppositional value in relation to medieval romance; Menard's point of departure already had an oppositional value in the context of Modernist ideas about authorship. So was Pierre Menard's output really a translation? Two points need to be made.

First, Menard worked enormously to achieve this quantitative exactitude; he invested effort in order to write like Cervantes. And since there is a narrative frame recounting this work, the subjective investment can scarcely be invisible. The Modernist text should indeed be regarded as a replacement of natural-language strings. It is a translation.

Second, the point of maximum ideological conflict lies in Borges' title "Pierre Menard, autor del *Quijote*", suggesting that the translator actually became the author. This sets up a problem for anyone aware that Cervantes is supposed to be the author of that text. Since a translator cannot be an author, Menard cannot be Cervantes. The contradiction thus churns in the space of the proper name, where there is certainly no quantitative equivalence. Borges breaks the rules not because the output has the same form as the input, but because he wants us to recognize two distanced authors for the one text. Translational discourse, such as we know it, will not allow this to be done. The result must be irony, and little more.

Note, also, that some proposed cases of absolute equivalence are in fact unwitting transformations. The eighteenth-century island *Otaheite*, for instance, meant "This is Tahiti". According to Garcilaso Inca de la Vega (1963: 11), the name of the country Peru comes from *Berú*, the name of the first native to be interrogated by Spanish conquistadores, or from *Pelú*, meaning "river", which is where the native was at the time. In the case of Tahiti, a certain authorship has since been restored to the native islanders. In the case of Peru, the translation has perhaps become an improper proper name. In both cases the supposedly absolute equivalents were impositions of mistaken authority.

The quantitative identity associated with transliterated names should be treated with considerable suspicion. It should not be regarded as an automatic index of untranslatability, as was believed by Mounin (1976). Nor is the identity a sign of universal comprehension, as proposed by Lotman and Uspenkij (1977). Proper names are untranslatable simply because they do not have to be translated. Exact quantitative equality should thus be analyzed a special kind of translation. This is minimally because *an apparently untranslated term in an otherwise translated text must be received as a term that has at least been processed translationally*. Hence, of course, the use of loan words (the *fiestas* and *tapas* found in English texts on Spain), which has long been regarded as a legitimate translation solution. Absolute equivalence is thereby established between a manifest text and a virtual text, both of which look exactly the same and occupy exactly the same position.

Unfortunately, the main problem with absolute equivalence is that it is often unacceptable equivalence, unless much language learning is to be done. Alternatives are necessary.

Double presentation

Double presentation is the display of both input and output. We might think here of books that have the original and the translation on facing pages, or the translation in small print at the bottom of the page. We might also think of cases where key terms are printed with their foreign-language equivalents in parentheses. A further example would be conference interpreting, where the input is either wholly available to the receiver (in the case of consecutive) or visually and often audibly present (in the case of simultaneous). In all such cases, what we really find is the distributed text (input) presented in the vicinity of the translation (output).

Two distinct cases should be separated here. Some instances of double presentation present different texts for different receivers, usually in diglossic communities. One finds, for example, signs saying "Entrada / Entrada", where the first is in Catalan and the second is in Spanish (or vice versa?). This might be taken as a special case of absolute equivalence. However, since the receiving locale involves two distinct languages, there is no question of distribution, and indeed no indication of the directionality of any possible transfer. Such hiding of distribution is all the more extreme in cases where the two versions turn their backs on each other, as in the Belgian train magazines that start at one end in Flemish and at the other, upside down, in French (example borrowed from José Lambert). Double presentation may thus either highlight a diglossic situation ("Entrada / Entrada") or conceal it (the back-to-back magazine). In both cases the quantitative differences are considered negligible; the implicatures bear on the perception of the locale.

The second general case of double presentation is where distribution is clearly manifested. One text can be identified as source, the other as target. In such cases there is a further significant subdivision: either the receiver understands something of the untranslated text (which is thus more or less transparent) or they do not (so the input is relatively opaque).

Why should this concern equivalence? Quite simply because such double presentation raises doubts about the possibility of absolute equivalence (where input and output are of exactly the same quantities). Obviously, if equivalence were certain, there would be no reason for reproducing the non-translated text, and if it were entirely impossible, there would be no way of producing a translation. Double presentation plus directionality thus necessarily questions the principle of absolute equivalence, and does so even before exact quantities are calculated or actual texts are read.

Now, although relative equivalence is signaled by double presentation, it is not signaled in the same way for both the texts involved. There is a curious principle of asymmetry by virtue of which the embodiment of value will tend to be unequal, no matter which of the texts is the longer, and no matter what the order of presentation. Consider common cases like the following:

1) Derrida places *écriture* (writing) within speech.

2) Derrida places writing (*écriture*) within speech.

Here we certainly find equivalence presented, yet the French term *écriture* claims more value than does the English equivalent *writing*, and does so in both cases. This basic principle of asymmetric value can be expressed as follows: *If two texts are presented as being in a relationship of relative equivalence, the receiver will tend to consider the more opaque text to have been distributed across the greater distance and will see that text as embodying more value than does the more transparent text, assumed to be the translation.*

This principle of asymmetric value looks something like the comments made by Israeli translation theorist Gideon Toury on situations where source-text forms are accorded greater value than are target-text norms, basically because of the relative prestige of that culture (1995: 278). It might fit in with various critical dichotomies where good cultures privilege foreignness and bad ones do not (cf. Berman 1984; Venuti 1995). The difference, however, is that here we are not even looking at what translators do when they translate. The above principle says nothing about the relative prestige the target culture accords to the source (pace Toury); it does not concern ethnocentricity or cultural openness (pace Berman); it has little to do with fluent or resistant translation strategies (pace Venuti). All it says is that double presentation sets up an asymmetric distribution of value in favor of the apparent source, no matter what the relative prestige of the culture or mode of translation. Indeed, double presentation may be more important than any external prestige (localization causes cultural prestige as much as it is caused by it); it may override whatever is done in the actual text. Unfortunately, double presentation is such an obvious thing that experts in visibility mostly fail to see it.

Our principle of asymmetric value might hold in all cases of approximate quantitative equality. As we have said, it would appear to be commutative in the sense that it is indifferent to the order of presentation (which is indeed why source and target status have been determined by relative opacity).

Several minor thresholds should be considered here.

What happens in cases where the translation is clearly shorter than the source but does not quite break equivalence? Consider, for example, the possible intralingual translation *Orthohydroxybenzoic acid (salicylic acid)*. Does not the longer phrase sound more exact and thus of greater scientific value? Is it not more opaque and thus in some way superior to the shorter, more popular version? Would we not tend to see the latter as a translation of the former, and not vice versa? The same thing, surely, for *Ovis aries (sheep)*, where the Latin speaks with the authority of an anterior internationalization.

Does this possible reception mean that the principle of asymmetry is valid in *all* cases of significant quantitative discrepancy? Let us consider a few of the possible variants:

- If the texts *Orthohydroxybenzoic acid* and *(salicylic acid)* are presented in a situation where the distribution is over a short distance, the receiver would be relatively close to the values of scientific discourse (for example, in a teaching situation). The potential analytical value of the longer and more opaque term would then probably be appreciated and the principle of asymmetry may indeed hold.

- A longer-distance interlingual version such as *acide orthohydrobenzoïque (salicylic acid)*, here bridging French and English, has quite a different effect, since it overtly refuses criteria of quantitative equivalence and is able to suggest that the French term is perhaps pompous or unnecessarily long. Here the visibly shorter output does not break equivalence; it draws on the possibilities of translational irony.

A further example of potential irony would be subtitled or sur-titled opera, where short translations like "Don't go!" typically correspond to a great deal of source-text singing. In a situation involving mid-distance reception (by an observational receiver, not really involved in the performance) or even long-distance encounters (perhaps by an excluded receiver, unable to understand the languages involved), ungenerous minds tend to find the result quite comic, although relative equivalence might yet survive. The effect mainly depends on how far the receiver is from the values of opera.

Here then are two rather peculiar phenomena that occur within the realm of double presentation. First, *when the quantitative relation is approximately equal, the attributed value of the input tends to be greater than that of the output.* However, *when the input is larger than the output and the distribution is mid-distance or long-distance, there may be an ironic inversion of this evaluation such that the output is apparently worth more than the input.*

The dynamics of double presentation thus open various ways in which translations can operate on relations between cultures. Strangely enough, we have found very few cases of double presentation in technical English, and remarkably few in translations from English in the field of information technology. The discourses closest to localization would seem to assume that translation is just one thing, the replacement of natural-language strings. Games played with double presentation just mess up the dialogue boxes, going beyond the processes for which translation software is devised, and generally disturbing naïve assumptions about the quantities involved in translation.

Quantities of translation within localization

Do the above principles apply when a translation is visibly much longer than its source text? Surely here the principle of asymmetry would exceed the limits of defendable equivalence?

To address these questions, let us briefly return to the wider terrain of localization, particularly the journalistic localizations that frequently incorporate translational phenomena. A range of pertinent possibilities can be demonstrated by example. Here we have an input (the Spanish term *La Movida*) accompanied by outputs that vary from a superficial evocation of untranslatability to extended paraphrase:

"La Movida c'est intraduisible. La Movida, c'est la société espagnole tout entière qui choisit d'avancer." (Elisabeth Schemla, *Le Nouvel Observateur,* Paris, July 5-11, 1985)
[La Movida cannot be translated. La Movida is the whole of Spanish society choosing to advance.]

> "[...] the phenomenon known as 'La Movida' ('The Happening')." (*Newsweek,* European Edition, August 5, 1985)

> "[...] 'La Movida', was wörtlich übersetzt 'Die Bewegung' heissen würde. 'Aber mit Vorwärtsgehen hat das nichts zu tun' sagt selbstkritisch der Maler El Hortelano. 'Es ist mehr wie ein Schluckauf, der einen auf der Stelle schüttelt'." (Charlotte Seeling, *Geo,* Hamburg, November 1985)
> ['La Movida', which would be translated literally as 'The Movement'. 'But it has nothing to do with going forward', says self-critically the painter El Hortelano. 'It's more like a hiccup, that shakes you up in the one place'.]

The distributed text *La Movida* is related to a series of longer possible equivalents: *intraduisible* [untranslatable], *choix d'avancer* [choice to advance], *(The Happening)*, *Die Bewegung* [The Movement], *ein Schluckauf* [a hiccup], and many more, since the above passages are fragments from three fairly long articles. What becomes of these translational relations when, as here, different amounts of text are used to suggest equivalence on one level or another? And what kind of equivalence is this anyway?

The German commentary is explicitly longer than any source, since it proposes then discounts the translation *Die Bewegung*. Yet the French commentary, in declaring the source text to be untranslatable and then immediately translating it, merely imitates the German procedure in an implicit way, arriving at similar doubt about the equivalence of *choix d'avancer*. In both cases, double presentation breeds doubt. Much the same procedure underlies the *Newsweek* version, where the presentation of the distributed text and the bracketing of the translation *(The Happening)* could be read as saying, "There is no equivalent for this term, but it means something like...". The English-language approach thus involves essentially the same strategy as the German and French rejections of simple equivalence. The differences between these examples are not so much in their procedures as in the *quantities* of interceding text used to convey doubt about equivalence. As localizations, they are peculiar because they use length in order to talk about translations.

What consequences do these mediating quantities have for the perception of the term *La Movida*? If we can apply the above principles of asymmetric value, we would expect the longer texts to accord the Spanish term more value than does the immediately substitutive rendition *(The Happening)*. And this would seem to be what happens. The relative quantitative equivalence of the *Newsweek* translation (the shortest rendition) even suggests that the Spanish term has no originality beyond its function as a touch of local color. "La Movida" is made to look like a much belated Spanish version of something from the American 1960s, when Happenings were a part of hippie culture. The Spanish term has become a bad translation in itself, ironically reversing the principle of asymmetric equivalence. Happily, a later *Newsweek* article redressed the injury, using textual expansion to give "La Movida" rather greater value:

> "[...] in the years after 1975, Spain celebrated *La Movida,* a sense of explosive artistic, cultural and political excitement." (*Newsweek,* European Edition, "Spain's Weary Generation", October 30, 1989)

In 1985, as Spain was deciding to enter NATO, *Newsweek* was not particularly interested in translating anything more than a superficial Spanish culture based on American

precedents. In 1989, however, during national elections following Spain's presidency of what was then the European Community, the same magazine saw fit to accord Spanish culture a recent history of its own, with correspondingly lengthened explanations.

These examples suggest a correlative of the general principle of asymmetry, this time applicable to all localization: *The more the output quantity exceeds the input, even beyond approximate quantitative equivalence, the greater the value accorded to the input.* However, unlike the general principle of asymmetric value, here it does matter how much more output there is than input. Here the logic of asymmetry goes beyond the leeway of relative equivalence.

Predication is a quantitative threshold

Our final question with respect to double presentation concerns the upper limits of textual expansion. Are there limits beyond which expanded output is no longer conceivably translational? Our previous chapter would suggest that if there are any discontinuities involved, they are likely to concern discursive persons rather than sheer quantities themselves. Let us survey some evidence.

In order to continue beyond the rejected translation *Die Bewegung*, the German rendition of *La Movida* has to incorporate a subjective voice. It cites the painter El Hortelano, presumably from somewhere within the content of the Spanish term. The extended French text (continuing the fragment reproduced above) does the same, citing a Spanish banker and then unnamed Spanish sources to make *La Movida* equivalent to an acceptably French concept: "...the latest news is that 'La Movida' has taken another name, awaiting the next: *postmodernisme*" (our translation from the French).[16]

In both cases, paraphrase of the one term beyond the limits of predication (a sentence-level relation between a subject and a verb phrase or complement) requires location of an authoritative subject external to the localizing subjectivity. That is, continued paraphrase of a Spanish term requires citation of a Spanish source (a painter, a banker, or "the latest news"). If no such external subject were indicated, the second predication would need an operator like "in fact means" or "sometimes means" or "could mean", implying a modulated subjective authority incompatible with the translator's suppressed pronoun. This means that a translator who fails to choose a definitive translation the first time round, with the first verb form, fails definitively to establish equivalence and must turn to or invent the verb of an author.

Since translators are not supposed to be authors (since "I am translating" is necessarily false), *paraphrase extended beyond the sentence tends to become a discourse of addition or non-equivalence.* As a legitimately translational procedure, paraphrase is common but difficult to extend beyond sentence level.

Single presentation

Single presentation (the translation without any visible source) makes the significance of relative quantities more difficult to grasp, quite simply because one of the quantities is absent. Localization often adds or omits large stretches of text, and no user need be any the wiser. A further case would be pseudotranslations, where there is no source

available for comparison. In such situations, how can quantity have anything at all to say?

Cases of eloquent absence are rare but revealing. Consider, for instance, Jerónimo Fernández's knightly epic *Don Belianís de Grecia* (1547, 1579), presented as a pseudotranslation from the Greek sage Fristón. The epic ends with the pseudotranslator asking anyone finding the lost original to continue the tale. Don Quijote, who sincerely lamented the hundred-and-one serious wounds received by Belianís in the first two books of the epic, nevertheless much appreciated Fernández's astute way of thus "ending the work with the promise of a never-ending adventure" (Cervantes 1982: 72). An absent quantity can always promise more.

Is such explicit reference to an absent source enough to allow a text to function as a translation? In most cases, such references are all the receiver has to go on.

When a translation is read as a translation, the equivalence operator should ride over any half-suspected discrepancies; no one should know or care about what might have been left behind. The social conventions determining the limits of relative equivalence remain unexpressed for as long as they are respected. If no doubts are raised, no one need be any the wiser. But when significant doubts *are* raised, a threshold has been reached. This means that single presentation can only really be investigated through cases in which social conventions have not been respected or the translation itself indicates certain quantitative discrepancies. Happily, Jerónimo Fernández was not alone in presenting the traces of such differences.

There are several basic paratextual signs that allow quantity to gain at least minimal significance in cases of single presentation. Translators' notes or added terms in square brackets indicate the translation is bigger in these places; a row of dots across the page or three of them between square brackets signal it is quantitatively smaller. Like the never-ending ending, these signs allow translations to be read in terms of their quantitative relation to absent texts.

Why should such signs exist? It is not always because a translation has to be longer or shorter for the purposes of fitting into a dialogue box. These signs also respond to the non-quantitative criteria involved in strategies of explanation and simplification, in movements between the implicit and the explicit, or in dealing with problems of excessive semantic density.

Receptive logics suggest there are four basic things that can happen here:

- Expansion: Approximately the same semantic material is expressed by a greater textual quantity.
- Abbreviation: Approximately the same semantic material is expressed by a smaller textual quantity.
- Addition: New semantic material is added, with a corresponding increase in textual quantity.
- Deletion: Semantic material is removed, with a corresponding decrease in textual quantity.

In theory, the first two relations lie on the properly translational side of the relative-equivalence threshold; the latter two involve non-equivalence and possibly pseudotranslation or non-translation. But how, in cases of single presentation, should one go about determining the thresholds between expansion and addition, abbreviation and deletion? Everything could depend on how one defines "semantic content", since

the most bizarre implications can be pulled out of the most apparently benign sentence. In practice, however, the divisions are marked out by the translation form itself.

Here we work from the most visible manifestations of the divisions.

Notes are expansion by another name

The translator's note mediates between double presentation and single presentation. The note usually presents or explains source fragments, offering partial double presentation that nevertheless allows the receiver to opt for single-presentation strategies. Parts of the source are apparently there if the receiver is interested, but their distancing from the corresponding translation indicates that no one is obliged to find them. Notes can be at the bottom of the page, the end of the chapter, the end of the book, in a supplementary glossary or even in specialized dictionaries. In principle, the more the notes are physically distanced from the associated text, the more reception is likely to be in terms of single presentation.

Translators' notes have deservedly become unfashionable. Beginner students tend to strew them all over the place, insulting the receiver's intelligence with massive over-translation. Thankfully, students eventually accept that receivers can be presumed intelligent until proven otherwise, that not all details are always pertinent, and that there are several hundred more cunning ways of directing the receiver's attention. But why do they not accept that footnotes are confessions of defeat? Why do their jaws drop just a little when they hear that certain footnoted information can equally well be put in the text? Students seem to share a common belief in equivalence as quantitative equality (as if all equivalence were absolute). The insertion of in-text explanations is felt to be cheating, even when the semantic material to be explained is demonstrably implicit in the source. Some time and considerable training is needed before notes are appreciated as simply less elegant ways of expanding textual quantity.

On the level of quantity, translators' notes and in-text expansion both have much the same effect on textual density. Notes are thus a special case of expansion. On the level of discourse, however, the note obviously allows the non-translating translator a voice, an I-here-now, different from that of the translation. Marcus Aurelius mentions "the times of Vespasion" (4.32); his translator footnotes "Vespasion had died eighty-two years before Marcus ascended to the throne" (1964: 70), where the past perfective situates the translator. An in-text expansion, on the other hand, might be "some three generations ago", where the I-here-now would belong to Marcus, not to his translator.

Deletion and abbreviation

Deletion and abbreviation are generally more difficult to justify than expansion and addition. A trivial reason for this is that quantity is commonly the basis for determining the actual price of translations. Whatever the value of their work, translators tend to be paid so much per word or page (other parts of localization are controlled more by time than by textual quantity). In such circumstances, any translator who seeks to improve a text by shortening it is going to lose money. This part of the profession mostly fails to appreciate the kind of work that results in the reduction of quantities.

There are other reasons as well. Just as no one likes to be excluded from a secret, the more one feels excluded from the implied second person of a text, the more value one tends to attribute to that text. One of the fundamentals of simultaneous interpreting is that, no matter how lost you are, you try not to leave prolonged silences in the outgoing translation. As long as the receivers are getting a fairly continuous non-contradictory text, they will tend not to know what they are missing. If, on the other hand, the receivers are confronted by substantial gaps in the interpreting, they will begin to doubt the value of the rendition as a whole. Overt deletion is likely to promote mistrust.

The same is true of written dots, be they across the page, between brackets, or editing a quotation. Surgery scars talk about the surviving body: something must be missing. And the marks themselves indicate that what is missing is semantic content, of some unknowable kind.

Technically, deletion involves cases where semantic content is actually omitted, whereas abbreviation would mean the content is expressed in a reduced textual quantity. If we decide to leave out two chapters of this book, that would be deletion. But if we judge the book on the basis of the publicity blurb and the table of contents, that would be using abbreviation. Our distinction, however, need not refer to any illusion of stable or passive semantic content. It is enough that deletion be marked as such, in the silences of the interpreter, the three dots between square brackets, or the chapters numbers that mysteriously jump from 5 to 8. The receiver will know something has been left out. Abbreviation, on the other hand, must use all the tricks of apparent continuity in order to create the essentialist illusion that content somehow remains the same when you reduce its space. The interpreter's flow must be as continuous as possible, the paraphrase does not declare its status as a possible translation, and markers of cohesion must be in order.

As reduction of waste, abbreviation is not as difficult to justify as outright deletion is. In a world of deadlines, localization feeds on abbreviation. Translators are increasingly called upon to write summaries and reports, compressing source materials in accordance with the interests of very specific locales. The inevitable restriction of the locale means that abbreviation often resembles deletion in that it leads to second-person exclusion: the more condensed a text, the fewer people will be able to work with it. Just check the sigla and acronyms now used in any technical field that is not your own.

We have noted Zipf's law that the most frequent terms tend to be the shortest (1965). Frequency of use might thus explain and justify abbreviation. However, the message of locales is that use is not spread across a whole language; the frequencies accumulate in highly segmented domains. Frequently *restricted* use tends to justify esoteric secrets, of dubious social virtue. In localization, which presupposes distribution away from the centers of maximum frequency, abbreviation must inevitably seek its legitimacy in terms of a suitably informed locale. However, most locales have to be informed first. A commonsense recommendation would be to give full and translated versions of all sigla and acronyms at least twice in each text, usually upon first mention and in a glossary.

Deletion and addition

Some additions explicitly add semantic content because they could not have been written by the author. Such material could concern events that took place after the author's death, critical variants, or any of the textual items in which translators cease to translate and become editors or critics. In the English Marcus Aurelius we find, for example, "These words suggested to Swinburne the line…" (1964: 73), which is clearly addition and not expansion. Additions may be written by translators, but the translators are not translating at the time.

How could such an analysis be applied to cases of deletion? Since dots and brackets tend not to be eloquent about their subjective sources, the only way of knowing who has deleted is to look for an authoritative defense of the deletion. Here, for example, is Peter the Great introducing a Russian translation of the *Georgica curiosa*:

> Since the Germans are given to filling their books with all kinds of stories for the sole purpose of making large books, none of this was worth translating except the essential points and a brief introduction. But so that this introduction may be more than idle glitter, and for the reader's greater illumination and edification, I note that I have corrected this treatise on agriculture (effacing all that serves no purpose) and present it so that all books will be translated without useless stories, which only waste the reader's time and make them bored. (cited by Lotman 1979: 54)

The distinction between deletion and abbreviation is here based on an authoritative paratextual "I", Peter the Great, in no way to be confused with the actual translator. The treatise has been "corrected" through deletion. In the thirteenth century the Castilian king Alfonso X ("The Learned") assumed similar authority over translators. In the preface to a translation from the latter part of his reign we read, "...he deleted [*tollo*] the phrases that he considered superfluous and redundant and which were not in good Castilian; and he put in [*puso*] other phrases that he considered suitable; and he corrected the language himself" (see Pym 2000: 72). What remains can be assumed both equivalent and authorized.

Although the subjectivity authorizing deletion is necessarily extra-translational, it can be very close to the translator. The following "I" is from the middle of Wace's *Roman de Brut,* which may be regarded as a translation of Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia Regum Britanniæ* (Durling 1989: 9)[17]:

> Then Merlin spoke the prophecies
> Which you have, I believe, heard,
> of the kings who were to come
> and who should govern this land.
> I don't want to translate this book
> since I myself don't know how to interpret it.
> I wouldn't want to say anything
> unless it were as I myself would say.

In refusing to translate at this particular point, the first person manages to say not only "I have been (and will be) translating" but also that the content translated is to be trusted. The effect of explicit deletion is to project a non-said text, which may then authorize that which is said, as if the translator were a full-fledged author. The content thus authorized is by definition distinct from the passage in which the first person appears. In our terms, the passage is paratextual. Two distinct voices can come from the same name: on the one hand, Wace is a translator who wants to translate nothing but the truth, on the other, he is as much an editor as were Peter the Great and Alfonso the Learned, since he takes it upon himself to decide what is or is not worth translating.

Now, how is it that when conference interpreters leave obvious gaps, the effect of deletion is not to authorize their text but to cast doubt on it? What is the difference between deletion in the hands of Wace and deletion by an interpreter? The answer is to be found in the status of the subjectivity involved. The conference interpreter remains relatively anonymous and thus open to either radical trust or radical doubt, whereas some translators become authoritative in their own right. In our terms, such translators break out of the anonymity assigned to them in localization processes. The strange thing is that, in history, such transgressions are really quite frequent in all ages except perhaps our own.

French translators of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries often took on editorial responsibilities, basing their selection criteria on audience acceptability. Letourneur's well-known introduction to his 1769 translations of Young give the aim of translation as "...to appropriate all that is good in our neighbors, leaving behind all that is bad, which we need neither read nor know about" (in D'hulst 1990: 115). Here the authority is explicitly based on the "we" formed by the professional translator and his public. That is, although the translator in this case acts individually (the rest of Letourneur's introduction is mostly in the first person), he does so in the name of the entire receiving locale, assumed to be superior to the source locale. The translator claims to delete very little ("...just one or two fragments by a Protestant disclaiming the Pope...") but in fact cuts out everything considered half objectionable on aesthetic or theological grounds, relegating the material to his "Notes". The function of the introductory paratext is thus partly to instruct the reader not to read the notes, or at least not to consider the translator in any way responsible for any blasphemies that might be concealed therein. Was everything bad really left behind? If, as we have remarked, translators' notes are a form of expansion, their combination with deletion may become a way of dividing a translational subjectivity troubled by problems of public authority. Translation has long been a smokescreen used to confuse censors.

Authorization should work indifferently for both deletion and addition. If you can decide what is not worth translating, you can also decide what would have been worth translating if it had been written. Letourneur did in fact admit to several minor stylistic additions. However, his presumed mandate did not extend to the extremes claimed by Abraham Cowley in another well-known introduction, written in 1656:

> I have in these two odes of Pindar taken, left out, and added what I please; nor made it so much my aim to let the reader know precisely what he spoke, but what was his way and manner of speaking. (in Robinson 1997: 162)

The strategy of deletion is in this case inseparable from addition, since the theory concerns the liberty to betray both quantity and content in favor of a personalist

conception of style (cf. T. R. Steiner 1975: 25). Cowley's repeated first person is apparently sufficient justification for these radical changes, since his actual content is in fact another first person, an individual "way and manner of speaking". In theory, no external authority should be necessary for this intersubjective one-to-one communion; Cowley did not really care whether his work should be called "translation" or not. Unfortunately he failed to establish an authoritative alternative term. His individuated subjectivity thus fell foul escape Dryden's 1680 distinction between Cowley's "imitations" and a properly translational discourse, based on modes of relative equivalence (described by Dryden as "metaphrase" and "paraphrase"). One of the operational criteria of addition and deletion must thus be the ability to maintain the translational status of that which is neither added nor deleted. When this status is radically questioned, the subject responsible for the text risks losing the authority necessary to establish relations of equivalence. The result is sometimes less than translational.

Multiple presentation

Multiple presentation is when more than one translation of the same text is offered. This results in contradictory equivalence because the very multiplicity makes it hard to accept any one translation as the necessary equivalent. The receiver is led to believe that several translations are all equally equivalent to the (absent) source, yet the equivalents remain manifestly different (this is a version of Quine's indeterminacy thesis). We have already seen some examples of this phenomenon. When "La Movida" is translated as "Die Bewegung" (The Movement) and then as "ein Schluckauf" (a hiccup), the translational series splits equivalence between the two possibilities. Both renditions have to be accepted, but both become weaker because of the multiplicity. Much the same creation of doubt is achieved when content is split between in-text renditions and translators' notes, which might also be analyzed from the perspective of contradictory equivalence.

Contradictory equivalence can be resolved by regarding one translation as the "better" or "more ideally equivalent". This is done according to two suitably contradictory principles, one of them based on progress, the other on pseudo-originality.

The principle of translational progress says that *the most recent translation is regarded as the most ideally equivalent*.[18] In the German "Movida" example, the order in which the renditions are presented means that maximum value is accrued in the last-mentioned version, "ein Schluckauf" (a hiccup). The linearity of the translational series means that each version proposed and then rejected passes its positive value on to the next, creating a sort of accumulative interest released in the last term of the series. In principle, the more terms in the series, the greater the value of the final equivalence. This logic is obviously subject to major situational constraints. Although a term like "Schluckauf" can function as a good equivalent of "Movida" within this particular translational series, it will probably not work anywhere else.

Translational progress also has its historical projection, since many new versions of a previously translated text implicitly present themselves as improvements. If a text like Wollschläger's German translation of Joyce's *Ulysses* (1975) were not somehow "more equivalent" than Goyert's previous German version, why should it have been undertaken and published? According to this commonsense principle, versions of the

most translated texts should be coming progressively closer to ideal equivalence. Unfortunately such sense is not quite so common. Many retranslations are done because the target language has changed, creating not only a potential loss of equivalence for new receivers but also a greater distance to be crossed between source and translation. If the principle of translational progress were to hold, increasing approximation to the ideal equivalence of form *and* semantic material would somehow be inversely proportional to the concomitant increase in the distance crossed by distribution. This in fact means that the further one is from the original production of a text, the more one's translation can be equivalent to that text. That is at least an interesting notion of progress.

Clearly, principles of translational progress do not always correspond to the real way of the world. The main reason for this is that previous translations rarely disappear as automatically or as gracefully as they should (for other principles behind retranslations, see Gambier 1994; Pym 1998: 82-83). Influential translations remain in cultural canons or receivers' minds, becoming pertinent points of departure themselves. They complicate matters by becoming pseudo-originals.

Germans are extremely lucky to have a good second translation of *Ulysses.* The French badly need a second translation but are unlikely to get one, since the first French version, which is very different from Joyce's English text, received the author's imprimatur, benefiting at the same time from Larbaud's inflated prestige and even influencing the final form of the original. That translation has attained pseudo-original status, so far blocking future development of the translational series. Such blocking is not necessarily eternal. Goyert's now surpassed German version also received Joyce's authorization. Luckily, its status as an equivalent was publicly contested in the press.

The principle of translational progress is thus contradicted by a rather strange *right of first possession.* The equivalent first produced historically will be accorded special consideration as a candidate for authorization. This very often happens with the titles of books and films, where the first version is repeated simply for the sake of ensuring referential consent. More interesting cases of contradictory equivalence arise from modern translations of the Bible, particularly in English, where the King James Version is very much a pseudo-original carried around in a collective cultural memory (on other pseudo-originals, see Pym 1998: 60). When the *Good News Bible* states, "Then God commanded, 'let there be light' - and light appeared", few English speakers could resist misreading it as a bad translation of "and there was light" (for similar examples concerning German, see Nord 2001). Contradictory equivalence can thus lead to an imaginary *reversal* of source and translation, in fact a reversal of distribution. As Buber noted, "even the Bible in Hebrew reads like a translation, and a bad translation at that" (cited in Kloepfer 1967: 83).

Archaizing translations

To the extent that they can block or even reverse translational series, pseudo-originals negate the principle of progress. A particular case of this is found in archaizing translations, understood as versions presented in a language variety visibly older than that of the target locale. Littré's *L'Enfer mis en vieux langage françois* (1879) or Pézard's Pléiade translation of Dante into archaized French (1965), for example, both use archaic language and may be read as overt and partly ironic attempts to write

pseudo-originals. As localizations, such texts would seem to contravene the very foundations of localization, since they strive to give the receiver something quite other than their domestic norms. They are not universally appreciated. Meschonnic (1986: 78), for instance, criticizes Pézard by arguing that Dante was not archaic for his contemporaries and so should not be archaic for the modern reader. In what kind of French, asks Meschonnic, would the translator have rendered Homer? (Littré had in fact already answered: Homer should be translated into thirteenth-century French; see D'hulst 1990: 98-101) There may, however, be a rather more astute way of accommodating archaizing translations within our framework for contradictory equivalence and multiple presentation.

If Pézard's translation cannot be equivalent to the fourteenth-century Dante, it can still establish a level of equivalence based on movement to the twentieth-century Dante (the distributed text, in Italian). In this sense, the translation offers manifest renditions that refer to implicit renditions, the text that the translator and the receiver would otherwise have exchanged as a non-archaic equivalent. To take an almost random example, Pézard gives:

> Ce seigneur des très hautes chansons,
> qui sur tous les autres vole à guise d'aigle (1965: 904)

A contemporary French reader will understand the last phrase but will mentally translate it into something like the modern French "à la façon d'un aigle" or "comme un aigle", which actually has greater quantitative equivalence to the Italian text:

> Quel Signor dell'altissimo Canto,
> Che sovra gli altri, com'Aquila vola (*Inferno* IV, 95-96)

Archaic translation in this case does *not* approach quantitative equivalence with the source text, which is in fact quite readable in terms of twentieth-century Italian. Equivalence is with neither the source nor the distributed text. Pézard's archaism instead provokes awareness of the distance crossed, thus proposing equivalence not to a text, but to distribution, to the temporal distance of Dante.

It matters little that there was no French language in Homeric times or that the King James Version is chronologically later than the Hebrew Bible. The essential value of these archaizing or archaized pseudo-originals is that they take distance from the level of distribution and convert it into value on the level of localization. In short, they use contradictory equivalence to represent the fact of distribution.

Walter Benjamin claimed that translations are the most untranslatable texts, since their peculiar intertextuality makes meaning adhere to them with "all too extreme fleetingness" (1977: 61). We might go further and claim that all localizations are supposed to be temporary; they do not last as long as the great "originals" of the past; they are disposable, like paperback books and ballpoint pens. Contradictory equivalence nevertheless allows some translations to outlive their translators, becoming hardcover fountain-penned pseudo-originals, overcoming the fragile mortality of most common forms of equivalence.

Does this pseudo-originality require a strong non-translational subjectivity? Is it a serious threat to the translational status of the texts concerned? The above examples would suggest quite the reverse. Split or diffuse equivalence tends to obfuscate the

translator's discursive position. Many of the great pseudo-originals were written by several hands, without a unified subjectivity; and archaizing translation by definition requires a certain suppression of the I-here-now, avoiding the cultural traits of the translator's historical locus. Indeed, the more such translations are discursively distanced from the place of their production, from the potential I-here-now of the translator, the better they can age in step with their projected originals. Translational pseudo-originality should not be confused with the direct volition of an auctorial subjectivity. Translators do not become authors. The pseudo-original instead survives on its own, traversing time as a monument to self-suppressed subjectivity, offering its location to any number of future locales. In terms of the general theory we are seeking here, pseudo-originality operates as yet another form of internationalization.

6. Belonging as resistance

Translation can bring about a wide range of transformations, even within the constraints of equivalence. Here we will ask why those transformations might be needed within the context of localization. This involves considering why some texts are harder to localize than others. In this chapter we find reasons for that difficulty in various modes of "belonging", since some texts are felt to belong more in some cultural locations than in others. This means looking closely at the role of performative utterances, explicitness, textual worlds, and cultural embedding, as well as the strange power that natural languages continue to exert against all the efficiencies of localization. Only once we have understood the forces working against localization can we start to evaluate the relative costs of the communication strategies involved.

The opposite of localization

Theorists and practitioners have little trouble saying what localization is good for: to spread knowledge, to improve time-to-market, to enhance profits, to seek user satisfaction, and so on. Industry discourses tend to assume at least one of the aims is to get a maximum amount of information (or knowledge, or text) to a maximum number of locales. That would embrace the logic of economic globalization: if the costs of transport and communication are ever cheaper, then we should transport and communicate ever more. Translation theory has long made similar assumptions, supposing that translation itself is a good thing, so there should be as much of it as possible. Some have bought into the theory of "memes", which would be the cultural correlative of biological genes, given to reproducing themselves as much as possible. Vermeer (1997: 163) has thus seen cultures as '"meme pools" and translations as "transcultural meme vehicles" (cf. Chesterman 1997). And so, just as the genetic will-to-survive rules our biological existence, similar drives to self-propagation would presumably rule our cultures, our ideas, even our theories. Localization and translation can only be in the service of such visions.

We have some doubts about the benefits of approaching cross-cultural communication in that way. The analogy with biological systems seems partial and forced. Darwin saw distribution ("immigration") as a real and independent factor in evolution, a kind of joker in the evolutionary pack, alongside the struggle for selection; and Dawkins (1976), theorist of the selfish gene, recognizes the non-natural constructs of culture and actually pins some hope on social cooperation as a way out of the eternal struggle for self-propagation. There is no reason why models of nature should be applied to culture; there is no reason why localization and translation should be seen as positive forces responding to anything like primal necessities.

The one thing we would ask of a theory of memes is that it adequately account for the double-edged nature of globalization (cf. Morley 1995, Appadurai 1996, Hall 1997). As more distributions are made, so there are more resistances to distribution. That is why we talk about localization as a response to globalization processes, precisely because there are countless different locales that resist the planetary propagation of central cultural values. Rather than propagation of the self, there would seem to be quite tremendous cultural forces that simply impede the propagation of the

other. Whatever its promises, localization exists precisely because of those resistances. It caters to and appears to promote many of the cultural differences that impede the rise of a global culture.

In order to conceptualize those resistances, one should ask not what localization is for, but what it is against. If localization were all goodness and enlightenment (which is far from the case), what would be the badness and ignorance it should oppose? And even if localization is in some way less than ideal, where should we look to find the values it lacks? In short, what is the opposite of localization? If we can answer that question, we might have some idea about how locales are formed in the first place, and why they seem to resist.

We have so far dealt with this question by assuming non-localization to be the distribution of untransformed text (i.e. transliteration or its extended forms). However, a far more formidable opposite lies not within localization as such, but in the negation of distribution itself, in the imposing of constraints on the movement of texts. This is because certain texts are felt to belong to certain people or to certain situations, making the movement of those texts a question of bestowing some kind of ownership or right to full textual meaningfulness. Seen in this light, constraints on distribution can be thought of as bonds of belonging. And those bonds would constitute the opposite of localization. They are what localization is condemned to work against, either in the initial moves to internationalization (the most obvious attack on specificity) or in resistance to entry into the target locale (the site of the most obvious problems).

This will sound contradictory to anyone who believes that localization does no more than reinforce the bonds of receiving locales (which it can do), or that the internationalization models without source locales represent the true way of the world. Beyond those models, cultures do still exist, both before and after localization. It is their particular belonging that we have to consider here.

In English, the notion of belonging can be thought of with or without a subjective compliment. Texts can belong to someone, or they might simply be felt to belong in a certain social place, so they do not belong when they turn up elsewhere. Here we are not particularly concerned with the first sense, which might be formalized in terms of copyright laws and international publishers' agreements. We are more interested in the way texts themselves resist reproduction and distribution, undergoing a transformation of values when moved from their apparently rightful place.

Our notion of belonging should be similarly untroubled by the idea that texts are never "taken away" from a culture or locale because they are reproduced. According to that idea, what moves would be not the text itself, but a token of the text, an image without effect on the unmoved original. So no culture or locale should ever complain that it has lost anything it owned. Nevertheless, the distribution of secrets does destroy their status as secrets, and much cultural knowledge works in that way. Whole industries of political and industrial espionage thrive on precisely such complaints; laws on the privacy of information struggle against the unchecked movement of data; information security is one of the major growth sectors of our time. Even if we are not directly interested in the legalistic sense of belonging, those complaints, fears, and restrictions are all part of the actual resistance to distribution, manifested in certain discursive and ideological ways.

How does belonging affect the movement of texts? In what follows, we will look at the discursive function of texts as they enter actions, at several notions of social embedding through contiguity, secrecy, and forgetting, and at the powerful binding role

of tongues. Awareness of these forms of resistance should then provide some insight into why certain aspects of localization are more difficult than others.

There are no solo performances

Explicit performatives are no longer performative once translated (give or take a few borderline cases, see Pym 1993b). An utterance like "I declare the meeting open" may well be translated as "Je déclare la réunion ouverte" or "Se abre la sesión", but only the first, non-translational version can actually open the meeting. This is a simple example of a text that belongs in one place and not in another, denying full functionality when distributed away from that place. We could say that translations of performatives are necessarily constative (i.e. they refer to actions outside of themselves). The performing performative, the text as action, belongs with the people who originally open the meeting; it cannot belong in the same way with those who receive only a report of the opening.

Note that the instrumentality or effective performance of performatives has nothing to do with language choices. Whatever tongues are used, only the one *first* used in the appropriate situation will be the one to belong. What resists distribution here is not language as such, but the text's situational ability to become part of an action (cf. Robinson 2003).

The philosopher J. L. Austin noted that properly performative verbs are marked by an asymmetric relation between the first-person indicative active and other persons (1975: 63) and that, in English, this peculiarly performative first person cannot be used with present progressive forms (47). "I declare the meeting open" is performative, but "*You* declare the meeting open" and "I *am declaring* the meeting open" are not. This grammatical singularity is intimately associated with the I-here-now, partly explaining the peculiar power of performatives to belong to their situation of production. Since performatives are thus linked to a discursive feature that is generally unavailable to translation (the translator has no I-here-now, and internationalization could not conceive of one), a translated performative can only be expected to lose performativity.

The place within which performatives are functional also depends on selection and distribution to an appropriate *second* person. Despite the necessarily unique opening of meetings, examples like Pope John Paul II's multilingual Christmas blessings manage to remain performative in numerous languages because each blessing is directed to a different "you" invited to participate in the performance. This second person is a key player. When Austin transforms the implicit performative "Go!" into the explicit performative "I order you to go!" (32), the restitution concerns that second person just as much as the first. Similarly, when a universalistic level of performance is projected onto an implicit operator like "I say..." (the performative operator implicit in all utterances), it would be equally legitimate to rewrite the operator as "I tell you that...", incorporating the second person. This means the discursive person most directly involved in the workings of performatives is not really the "I" of the I-here-now but an inclusive "we" ("I" plus "you"). The most general implicit operator should probably be explicated not as "I say..." but as something like the mathematical "let", rewritten as "let us ('I' plus 'you') suppose that...". Alone, the first-person singular can make as many propositions in as many languages as it likes, ordering and organizing the world to suit

its desires. But a particular proposition can only become a performative when an implicit "we" incorporates a second person.

There are several reasons why the second person is necessary if performatives are to be instrumentally performative. Someone has to receive and understand the text; someone must be prepared to accept the speaker's power and right to perform. The second person creates space for that someone to understand and accord authority to the first person. Such a second person, able to make a performative perform, is the one we have described as "participative".

One final reminder before we leave successful performatives. The existence of discursive positions does not mean there are always real people available to take up those positions. As a text, *Finnegans Wake* projects a second person able to concretize maximum polysemy, but it might fairly be supposed that no flesh-and-blood reader except perhaps Joyce has been fully able to occupy that position. A distinction must be maintained between the asymmetric "we" that discursively presupposes or invites participation in textual performance, and the social participants (actual senders and receivers) with whom the text can belong as some kind of real performance.

Extending performance

So far we have looked at performatives in terms of linguistic well-formedness. The notion, however, can be extended to embrace many ways in which discourse becomes action. Austin's description of performatives was, after all, published as "Doing Things with Words", and localization projects do mostly involve doing things with words (rather than just representing them).

The Canadian translation theorist Annie Brisset (1991) makes much of a Québécois translation of Shakespeare's *Macbeth*. Macduff is reacting to the news that his estate has been destroyed and his wife and children killed:

> I cannot but remember such things were,
> That were most precious to me. Did heaven look on,
> And would not take their part!

The utterance "I cannot but remember" is not a well-formed performative, not even if rewritten as "I remember". Yet it is working here as a kind of performative, since the dramatic speech is in fact the act of remembrance, indeed an act in which the second-person listener participates. If we can accept this as a performative discursive function of sorts, the same could be said of its Québécois translation by Michel Garneau:

> C'que j'ava's d'plus précieux dans l'monde, chu t'obligé d'commencer
> A m'en souv'nir. Comment c'est que l'bon dieu peut laisser fére
> Des affe'res pareilles? Sans prendre la part des faibles?

As Brisset points out, the phrase "A m'en souv'nir" ("to remember") is peculiarly performative not just because of the dramatic situation (which could still involve a Québécois actor constating the grief of a Scottish Macduff) but because the translation uses a series of shifts to associate the situation of Scotland with that of Quebec, seen here in the rendering of the neutral "their part" as "la part des faibles" (the part of the

weak). The performative function also depends on the translation being enacted within the specific locale of Quebec: "The wording of this resolution echoes the declaration *Je me souviens* ('I remember') which is such a prominent feature of Québécois social discourse (it is on every vehicle's license plate)" (Brisset 1991: 126). The translation "à m'en souv'nir" calls up a powerful phrase from the receiving locale. It allows "I remember" to be performed not just by Macduff, not just by the Québécois actor, but also by a specific audience receiving this translation. Such a double (or triple) reception is only possible in the specific social context of Québec, number plates and all, where circumstances allow the second person to *participate* in the performative, to recognize it as a performative and to accord the speaker authority to perform it. If the translation were received, say, in France, absence of this particularly participative receptive context would imply a merely *observational* second person and thus effective annulment of the translational performative.

Our extension of the performative function accords a key role to the second person. It finds an intriguing echo in Christiane Nord's distinction between documentary and instrumental translation:

> ... a target text can basically have two functional relations to a source text. It can be (a) a *document* of a communicative action that has previously taken place in the source culture, and (b) an *instrument* in a new communicative action in the target culture, certain aspects of which have the source text as a kind of model. (1989: 102, our translation)

Nord elsewhere explains, "in documentary translation, the receiver of the target text is informed about a communication event of which they do not form a part, whereas in instrumental translation they are the new addressees of the source text" (1991: 210). This distinction would seem to concern participative and observational second persons. Nord gives several examples. An English political speech telling Britons to "Buy British" would tend to be translated in a documentary way into French or German (since the source-text second person is neither French nor German) whereas a cooking recipe would tend to be translated instrumentally (since the second person is potentially anyone seeking to put the recipe into practice). However, as Nord stresses, "there is no law here, and the translation depends on the instructions received" (1989: 102). Further, "a documentary translation should be possible for all texts, whereas instrumental translation depends on the target receiver's capacity to respond to the subject or content of the source text" (Nord 1991: 211). Documentary translation would correspond to what we have described as an observational second person, while an instrumental translation would require a participative second person. What is most intriguing here is the notion of instrumentality, which would seem close to the performance of performatives but without the restrictions on linguistic form.

The distinction between documentary and instrumental translation appears to be quite fundamental. Indeed, it could well apply to all levels of localization. Although the *choice* between the two strategies cannot be made on the basis of any universal law, this does not mean that the strategies themselves are not mutually exclusive. The distinction might be formalized on the basis of classical examples like the following (adapted from Hart 1970, Burge 1978):

(1) Le premier mot de cette phrase a deux lettres.

which could be translated in a documentary way as:

(2) The first word of the French sentence has two letters.

or instrumentally as:

(3) The first word of this very sentence has three letters.

Interestingly, (2) is both documentary and constative, whereas the instrumental (3), although not a linguistically well-formed performative, is certainly "doing things with words". Such examples suggest that a translation as a whole could be *either* documentary (it may look back to a previous text) *or* instrumental (it may look forward to a future use). Further, the kind of participation involved is similar to that of performatives.

Those are all things that localizations can do, if and when translation is used to operate the required shifts. What remains to be explained is why it is hard for localizers and translators to do those things. In what way might these instrumental functions resist distribution? We have not quite finished with performatives.

How discourse resists distribution

Since the discursive second person "you" can be defined as a potentially participative "non-I", there is in principle no significant distance between the "you" and the "I". If a performance is to be fully performative, both "I" and "you" must somehow be mutually present. The ideal of mutual presence is thus written into performatives, just as its material impossibility informs many other uses of language.

Unfortunately for discourse, there is always time and space between the entities filling the "I" and "you" positions. This extra-textual distance might determine thresholds beyond which certain texts cease to be properly instrumental. Texts can simply travel too far for them to carry out their initial functions.

Consider the isolated question "What is the time?", a key example for Bakhtin's dialogic principle (1975: 164ff.). The question is not only discursively unique in terms of the "now" of each performance but also implies the presence of a *receiver* located very close to the I-here-now. Unavoidable factors like the distance involved in the passage to a real receiver, the processing of the message, the formulation of a reply, and the sending and reception of the reply should, according to discursive logic, involve no time at all. The "now" of the question sent should correspond to the "now" of the reply received. And yet the entire double distribution process clearly must take time and the two "now"s cannot be the same. The discursive logic is at odds with the fact of material distance. For how long can discursive logic win out? For how long can participants pretend there is no distance between them, that they are in fact able to share the same discursive referents? For how long can the "now" of the question be referred to by the "now" of the reply? Within a few seconds perhaps, if the speaker's requirements do not include extreme exactitude. But a minute would create an anomalous and slightly absurd situation, and it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the isolated question could be written down. The utterance "What is the time?" can only be distributed away

from its "I-here-now" within certain pragmatic limits. It has a certain *elasticity,* a capacity to stretch out and remain valid as performative communication. Beyond a certain point, that elasticity will be broken and participation will be defeated by distance.

One can analyze the relative transferability of a text by isolating and assessing all the elements that imply an I-here-now calling for participation by a second person. Those are the elements that most resist distribution. By the same token, as we have seen, internationalization and translation are given to avoiding or deleting precisely these elements. This, we will later argue, is part of their dehumanization of language.

The analysis of language as action has its limits. Not all texts require the same kind of immediate response as "What is the time?", and the non-discursive constraints tend to be material and banal. If I *write* and send a letter in search of a reply, the second person should presumably be located beyond the range of my voice but not beyond the range of my expected lifetime or the value of the stamps put on the envelope.

Participative second persons can be sought on at least three levels, associated with different degrees of distribution:

- *Shared distribution*: For some texts, the participative receiver is present to the extent that a reply can reach the sender and discursively *share the same I-here-now.* The reply should ideally be in the same present tense ("The time is...", or "Do you mean that...?"). Distribution beyond this restricted and usually oral situation will leave the text decidedly out of place. (Example: "What is the time?".)
- *Referential distribution*: When the participative receiver need not entirely share the same I-here-now but should be able to refer to *at least one of these coordinates,* distribution may well extend beyond short-distance situational constraints. If some reply is required, factors of age, space, and time impose practical constraints on mobility. (Example: exchanges via asynchronous email.)
- *Indefinite distribution*: Some texts need neither reply nor reference to an I-here-now; they can in principle be distributed indefinitely, within the constraints of world and time. (Example: the textual world created in any work of art where time and space are structured internally to the work.)

The thresholds between these three modes are imposed on a practical continuum that goes from short-distance to mid-distance to long-distance distribution. They regulate the degrees to which increased distance may break initial elasticity, interrupt performance, and restrict instrumentality.

The above categories can be related to text types, particularly of the kind that Bühler (1982) based on the three discursive persons. This would concern the limited elasticity of certain texts, indicating that greater transferability comes from increased third-person status (such is the message we have already gleaned from both internationalization and translation). However, there is no fatal determinism at stake. A text can be distributed beyond its initial elasticity and assume a new performative status; or the same discourse can be rewritten, with the same pronominal structure but with more elaborate coordinates, in order to heighten its transferability. Texts can be transformed in order to pass over one threshold or another, and the modes of rewriting need not affect text type models based on criteria other than those of transferability.

Textual worlds overcome resistance to distribution

If a text is to maintain instrumental status throughout distribution, belief in the basic referential codes must be shared by the sending and receiving positions. Such beliefs are largely dependent on how well the text itself can function as a semantic world, with its internal codes of completion.

The question "What is the time?" is relatively untransferable because its referent (the time) is highly specific to the "now" of its I-here-now. Further, its assumed code (mechanical clock-time) is not as universally available as the sun and the moon. Now, accepting these restrictions, is it possible to imagine modes of textual presentation in which the same question could become eminently transferable? The utterance could be part of a mathematical problem, explicitly conditioned by a series of cotextual astronomical observations and interpretative codes such that the reply should always be the same. Or it may be structured in a novelistic world, where characters are all restrained by reference to the movement of internal clock-time. Untransferability can be understood as a result of the absence of such cotextual presentation; it ensues from dependence on unexpressed or implicit context.

More metaphorically, if a text cannot be taken away from its owners, it is sometimes possible to convert the owners into signs and to distribute them along with the text. This is one of the reasons why narrative is such a powerful way of conveying foreign cultural categories. In general, then, *the more explicit the codes, the more transferable the text and the weaker the belonging to an original I-here-now.*

Does this mean that absolute explicitness corresponds to absolute transferability? Let us imagine a text that presents all the axioms, definitions, and descriptions needed to understand the exact meaning of each proposition made. This ideal would require the creation of a specific self-contained world wholly inscribed in the text, assuming no prior knowledge and making no presuppositions of extra-textual material. In theory, such a text would remain meaningful and stable throughout even the longest cultural trajectory. But it would be fair to say that there exists no such text. More to the point, a text as willfully explicit as Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13) must effectively defeat its transferability by becoming so painstakingly dense as to be relatively unimportant beyond fairly immediate cultural horizons. If everything is put in the text, what participation is left to the lives of actual receivers? What space is there for participation?

Some distinction must thus be made between things that can be distributed and things that have no reason to be distributed. Unlike the perverse density of the *Principia Mathematica,* the relative explicitness of Euclidean geometry has enabled its stability to be maintained throughout a long series of cross-cultural distributions and adaptations, basically because it remains an important tradition for pedagogical purposes. We thus find certain practical limits to textual explicitness: the text must remain of some importance to the social interests promulgating the distribution, and excessive density or length can destroy that value.

Variation and implicit knowledge

The Bavarian (and Austrian?) "Mia san mia" ("we are we") might be rendered as "Bavarians are Bavarians" (or even "Bavarians will be Bavarians", on the model of "boys will be boys"), but the third-person utterance obviously loses its regional particularity. The words no longer accomplish the act of being Bavarian. Indeed, the words are no longer instrumental once distributed and translated. Exactly what is happening here?

The Bavarian "mia" and the Hochdeutsch "wir" would seem to be variants of each other. They both mean the same thing ("we"), but they do so in different regions or domains. Such variation is a basic fact of all languages. Just think of all the different names by which you are called, in your family, at work, playing sport, officially, in anger or in jest. All those variants somehow refer to the same thing, but their differences indicate the domain in which they are used, and often also the perlocutory force modulating relations in that domain. This general analysis can be formalized through the sociolinguistics of variation, taking its lead from Labov (1972). For our purposes here, it is enough to see the way highly specific variants can have a performative effect, manifesting certain first-person values (usually the identity and social location of the speaker) and soliciting second-person responses (identity, or distance, since variation is the mechanism behind most parody).

Only through the use of such variants can a phrase like "Mia san mia" so strongly resist cross-cultural distribution. In itself, it has no explicit performative and no obviously restricted I-here-now. The utterance activates familiarity; it touches all that remains unsaid because already understood. It implies but does not say, "I declare myself to be Bavarian" and "I declare the 'you' of my inclusive 'we' to be Bavarian", as well as "I declare the 'you' excluded from my 'we' to be non-Bavarian".

To distribute that complex, one has to covert it into a textual world, often a story. This can be tested on the basis of the following text, an Australian indigenous song recorded on Groote Eylandt in 1948:

Nabira-mira, Dumuan-dipa, Namuka-madja, Ai-aijura.

The text has been rendered interlinearly as follows (Mountford 1956: 63):

Nabira-mira	*Dumuan-dipa*
two men ancestors	totemic rocks under water, of metamorphosed spears

Namuka-madja,	*Ai-aijura*
totemic rocks of men	name of island

This English translation gives some information on the linguistic status of the four phrases, all of them proper names of one kind or another. This is achieved, however, at the price of constructing a second I-here-now, that of the linguist able to comment metalinguistically. Much else has been lost, not just on the level of narrative but also the sense of familiarity that requires no gloss. The ethnographic linguist thus offers a rather longer translation as well:

In creation times, a man and his son, the *Nabira-mira*, lived on an island, *Ai-aijura*, north-western Groote Eylandt. One day, the two men were standing on a rocky point, called *Namuka-madja*, when they saw some fish approaching. The son threw his spear at them but missed, and the spear sank out of sight. The father then threw his spear, which also missed and disappeared. The *Nabira-mira*, annoyed over the loss of their spears, transformed both themselves and their weapons into natural features. The *Nabira*-mira became two low wave-washed boulders on a rocky point, *Namuka-madja*, on the northern side of the island, *Ai-aitjura*, and the spears, two submerged boulders, some distance from the shore, which bear the name of *Dumuan-dipa*. (Mountford 1956: 63; italics ours)

This could be described as transliteration plus considerable expansion, only some of it metalinguistic. The added quantity is used to explain what the four proper names, each of them repeated in the translation, could have meant in terms of action over time. The translation carries out a radical movement from the implicit to the explicit. Everything appears to have been rendered; the proper names are glossed as in a terminology data base, plus the story. Indeed, the rendition allows the four proper names of the chant to be read retrospectively as an English-language text, as a kind of back-transliteration. Such might be internationalization as cultural appropriation. But has everything really been transferred?

Since the chant has no explicit I-here-now, it is difficult to analyze its belonging in terms of performative verbs (other chants do contain verbs in the past tense, none explicitly related to a first person). The chant nevertheless unmistakably belongs more to the indigenous tribe than to the people of the translator Mountford. Through the repetition of such ritual texts, through cultural familiarity the spiritual time when humans and land features were interchangeable, the participating subjects have affirmed their status as the tribe of what the Dutch named Groote Eylandt. We are told the proper names represent ancestral dreamtime characters whose continued natural presence gives the tribe spiritual authority for land rights. The repetition made that knowledge implicit in the names. Beyond the locale of the repetitions, that implicit knowledge must become explicit, at the loss of instrumentality. The translator and his readers can no doubt understand and explain the basic structure and social function of the chant; some translators and readers might even believe in the narrative content thus attributed; but only the absent second persons of the recorded text could fully participate in the discursive action. In a sense, without any recourse to pronouns or specifically performative linguistic forms, the cultural knowledge presupposed by the chant enabled its participants to sing their specially instrumental version of "Mia san mia".

Belonging and vagueness

One further point should be made here. The implicitness associated with an element like a proper name does not necessarily mean all participants are able to say exactly what the name signifies. Many elements are left implicit because they are no longer fully understood. Although European nursery rhymes have similarly had their meanings confined to specialist works of reference and research, they are still felt to be "ours" and are still passed on to future generations, even when we have no idea of who Humpty Dumpty was supposed to be.

Such belonging without exact knowledge is very much a problem of localization, even in quite technical domains that depend on explicit knowledge. Just think of the numerous vague metaphors used for stock market shifts, or something like the term "paradigm shift" in the sciences. Closer to home, consider the values at stake in Table 1, which shows terminological equivalents at Microsoft (from Carbolante 2001):

	Search Companion	Wizard	Assistant
F	Assistant Recherche	Assistant	Compagnon
I	Ricerca guidata	[*Procedura*] guidata	Assistente
E	Asistente para búsqueda	Asistente	Ayudante
NL	Zoekassistent	Wizard	Assistent
D	Such-Assistent	Assistent	Assistent
S	Sökassistenten	Guide	Assistenten
N	Søkehjelperen	Veiviseren	Hjelperen

Table 1. Multilingual wizards and assistants at Microsoft (from Carbolante 2001)

The variations here are at once so vague and intimate that it is difficult to say that anything is wrong (even when there is a lack of distinction, as in the German). But that problem lies at the apparent source, in the vague values of the English terms, which are difficult to drag beyond that language. In English, Microsoft seems to want us to think of a friendly dog (Search Companion), a Merlin-type authority (Wizard), or an efficient secretary (Assistant). Or perhaps not. Who could say? And yet they are all accepted.

The bonds of belonging depend not only on the collective knowledge allowing implicitness, but also on the frequencies that enable implicitness to become familiar and to tend toward the forgotten. In such cases, localization of any kind is difficult because there is textual indeterminacy well before the moment of translating. The best the translator can do is often to reproduce this same indeterminacy, the same cultural lacunae, as a trace of the other's indeterminate belonging (cf. Pym 1993a).

The tongue carries forgotten belonging

The analysis of belonging allows us to approach the dynamic identities of cultures without assuming that things are always happening on the level of nation states. Belonging mostly concerns smaller systems. It may certainly be found in artificial professional locales, but its practical difficulties ensue from the complexities of overlapping locales, from the mosaics that we want to associate with the term "culture". As we have presented it, belonging also allows partial explanation of the peculiar powers retained by language systems as tongues, since tongues form powerful webs allowing the overlaps. Although localization is by no means an exclusively linguistic phenomenon, tongues have a very special power over its processes. That almost magical power should not be merely assumed.

Consider the following checklist for localization projects (from Stoeller 1999), in which we find a fair coverage of all the elements that should be modified in, for example, localization of a software program:

1) Formatting requirements:
   Different regions in the world use very different notational conventions for writing time, date, numbers, currency, etc.
   1. Time is represented by both a 12-hour clock and a 24-hour clock. The separators can be period or colon.
   2. Date has many representations: sequence of month, day and year; different separators; different calendars (lunar, Gregorian); different abbreviated names for the months, etc.
   3. Number representations differ in separators.
   4. Currency units and presentation differ greatly from country to country.
2) Writing system (script) and language. There are many linguistic differences, some of the major ones are mentioned below:
   1. Word order varies between languages;
   2. Word delimiters are non-existent in certain oriental languages (Thai, Japanese);
   3. Capitalization: oriental languages often do not have capitalization, some languages allow accented capitals;
   4. Hyphenation;
   5. Spelling and grammar;
   6. Punctuation conventions;
   7. Character sets.
3) Cultural context:
   1. Color and graphics
   2. Jokes, sports and humor
   3. Gender
4) Standards and laws:
   1. Legal
   2. Fiscal
   3. Environmental
   4. Safety
   5. Telecommunications
   6. Measurement units
   7. Paper sizes
   8. Titles and addresses
   9. Keyboard layouts

All these things might constitute pertinent features of a locale. They are mostly quite banal and automatic (which is probably why many novice translators forget about them). The list is also of a length that makes clients aware of cultural differences that they probably had not thought about. Hopefully the clients then pay big money to have those problems addressed. The list is for marketing purposes, and should be appreciated as such.

Assuming we are doing more than marketing, where in this list do the truly difficult problems lie? Quite possibly under "cultural context" (item 3 above), if we knew exactly what was meant there, or what sort of marketing research would solve the problems. What is most striking, though, is the very limited role that language systems play. The whole of linguistics somehow has to fit into the trite observation that "word order varies between languages" (item 2.1) (which apparently places syntax in a different category from "spelling and grammar", item 2.5). Language systems are clearly not the main problems. Or perhaps they are so obvious that they are not worth talking about at length.

The peculiar power of tongues lies not in the mysteries of syntax or marketing, but in the way options on all these levels work together to form locales within a culture. How is it that the above elements tend to come in fixed sets? A language or variety

corresponds not just to a certain way of expressing dates and numbers, to a certain currency, to conventions about weights and measures (all of which may be governmental options), but also to specific symbolizations of color, to gender roles, forms of address, in addition to all other levels on which language problems arise. When options on all these levels are bound together, the tongue becomes the foremost symbol of the resulting cultural identity. Hence its particular importance and power.

How is this power to be explained? One explanation lies in tongues as entities subject to collective ownership. More than other features in primary enculturation, a tongue can be taught and thus distributed, sold, bought, and possessed, as is implicitly recognized in the question "How many languages do you have?". The tongue is thus over-determined by education systems and power hierarchies. This, however, does not explain anything about the tongue itself. Why should it, virtually alone, be subject to such extreme social symbolization?

Of the numerous attempts to explain the power lodged within the tongue itself, at least two are worth retaining. The first is a principle of translatability, as found in the Danish semiotician Hjelmslev:

> In practice, a language is a semiotic into which all other semiotics may be translated, both all other languages and all other conceivable semiotic structures. This translatability rests on the fact that all languages, and they alone, are in a position to form any purport whatsoever; in a language, and only in a language, can we "work over the inexpressible until it is expressed". (1963: 109)

Hjelmslev's position should not be associated with naïve axioms of unlimited expressibility and creativity. Emphasis should instead be placed on what Hjelmslev cites from Kierkegaard as the possibility of "working over the inexpressible until it is expressed". This means that translation from other communication systems ("semiotics" like painting and music) into a tongue is always possible and involves considerably less effort than is required to translate from a tongue into any other communication system (for example, from natural language into painting or music).

If translation into a tongue is easier than translation into any other communication system, a simple principle of least effort would suggest that the contents of all means of expression (and thereby all the various fields of human activity) are most likely to find their common ground expressed in the tongue. Despite an age supposedly given to visual communication, it is in language that a color can most easily enter into syntagm with a mathematical function, that rocks become contiguous with metaphysics, and that the past becomes worry about the future. Like a vast marketplace, the tongue enables exchanges to be established between the most diverse materials, between the most disparate levels. The result of this massive convergence is a certain fusion and confusion, not only of the contents thus brought into contact, but also of the lexis itself, whose corresponding principles of thrift and modulation lead to homonyms and synonyms, the fundamental instruments of semantic contamination, generating fleeting metaphor and ever more subtle and intricate connotation. Part of the privilege and power of the tongue thus ensues from its capacity to tap numerous different aspects of human activity and to overlap, superimpose, and even bury them within more complex wholes. The general result of these processes may be described as embeddedness.

A second possible explanation of the tongue's peculiar power has already been touched upon in our consideration of the I-here-now. Only tongues, it seems, systematically incorporate the basic instrument necessary for the asymmetric expression of subjectivity:

> It is remarkable that among the signs of each tongue, whatever its type, era or region, there are always "personal pronouns". A tongue without expression of the person is unthinkable. (Benveniste 1966: 261)

This is not an idle observation, especially when aligned with Benveniste's explicit restriction of active pronouns to asymmetric first and second persons, along with his recognition of this same asymmetry in performatives requiring "authority of the speaking subject" (1966: 273). If the basic structure of asymmetric subjectivity is one of the intrinsic elements of languages, the tongue not surprisingly becomes a privileged means of expressing belonging.

The tongue thus at once binds together countless domains of social life and incorporates the essential structure of that which can potentially move between different domains of social life, the discursive subject. The tongue is consequently far more powerful than any artificial locale.

Embeddedness is complex belonging

One might try to avoid all the problems of the tongue. We could, for instance, use massive internationalization to define and interrelate all our technical terms, and to control the syntax in our initial drafts and final translations. We might thus attempt to eliminate all indetermination from our localization processes. Everything should be smoothly automatic. Then the tongue returns. The very words we use, drawn from shared stockpiles, are marked by frequencies of usage in other domains, by previous performances, by networks of belonging (cf. the above equivalents for Search Assistant). At the same time, no matter how neutral and exact we want our language to be, someone is always addressing someone else, the pronominal structure is implied even when not explicit, and asymmetric subjectivity cannot be avoided. Even when everything is in the third person, some terms and expressions will be felt to be more "theirs", or more "ours", or to belong to a restricted range of specialized locales. No matter how hard we try, if we use the tongue, we cannot escape embedding.

The complexities of cultural embedding make it the most serious source of resistance to distribution. Embedding can account for what simpler theories terms "cultural realia" or "culture-specific terms", usually understood as things that exist in one place but not in others (as if things like Spanish *tapas* and *corridas* and *fiestas* could not be named as such all over the world). Yet the processes of embedding go well beyond such trivial examples. Its peculiar resistance comes not just from the fact that some elements are repeated far more often in some locales than in others (the cause of abbreviation and implicitness in our applications of Zipf), but from the way they are repeated in numerous *different* situations. The French sociolinguist Michel Bréal described this happening at the end of the nineteenth century, when he saw the modern acceleration of semantic change ensuing from the systems of industrial production:

Thinkers and philosophers have the privilege of creating new words of impressive amplitude and intellectual allure. These words then enter the critic's vocabulary and thereby find their way to the artists. But once received in the painter's or sculptor's studio, it is not long before they extend to the world of manufacture and commerce, where they are used without constraint or scruple. Thus, in a relatively short time, the language of metaphysics feeds the language of advertisements. (Bréal 1897: 116)

In our days, the movements might tend to be the reverse. A term like "La Movida" moves from the street, to art, to publicity, to business, and perhaps finally to philosophy. No matter the direction, when a linguistic item has circulated across contiguous or overlapping social contexts, its embeddedness carries with it a variety of possible participants. This is surely what makes a text difficult to distribute into another culture. Maximum non-transferability thus should not be associated with cultural closure or social homogeneity, especially of the kind presupposed by exponents of "cultural specificity", as if an item were difficult to translate because it exists in one culture and nowhere else. For us, difficulty ensues not from that extreme specificity but from embeddedness, which is itself a feature of intracultural openness and plurality.

Cultural embeddedness conditions difficulty

Our analysis of resistance is of practical consequence for understanding localization and translation tasks. It calls for a revision of conventional notions of difficulty. For example, in the training of translators we still find texts (and whole courses) described as easy or hard on the basis of fairly dubious claims like the following:

- Subject matter: "General" texts are held to be easier to translate than "specialized" texts.
- Social location: Communication between a non-specialist sender and a general public is believed to be easier than communication between specialists.
- Register: "Everyday" language is supposed to be easier to render than "technical" or "literary" language.
- Distance: "Cultural and temporal proximity" apparently presents fewer problems than does extreme cultural and temporal distance.

Failure to consider embeddedness can lead to dubious ideas in all four areas, with consequences for pedagogical progression within training programs. From our perspective, the degrees of difficulty are likely to be quite the reverse. We would disagree, for example, with Jean Delisle's opinion that "initial training in the use of language is made unnecessarily complicated by specialized terminology" (1984: 25). Delisle assumes that "general texts" are automatically free of lexical problems, as if magazine articles, publicity material, and public speeches were not the genres most susceptible to embeddedness, textually bringing together numerous socially contiguous and overlapping contexts in their creation of complex belonging. A specialized text may well present terminological problems (the translator might have to use dictionaries or talk with specialists before confidently transcoding the English "tomography" as French

"tomographie" or Spanish "tomografía"). However, this is far less difficult than going through the context analysis by which Delisle himself takes seven pages or so to explain why, in a newspaper report on breast removal, the expression "sense of loss" (superbly embedded and indeterminate in English) cannot be rendered (for whom?, why?) as "sentiment de perte" (1984: 105-112). No truly technical terms are as complex as this most vaguely "general" of examples.

The fourth of the above criteria attempts to articulate difficulty according to distance. This is perhaps not as evident as the rest. At first glance, any kind of rewriting must be easier from a familiar context than from a distanced locale. As we have argued above (with respect to "What is the time?"), there are theoretical reasons why increases in distance tend to break the performative capacity of texts and restrict transferability. On the other hand, translation theorists like George Steiner (1975) and Seleskovitch and Lederer (1989) argue that certain modes of difficulty are *inversely proportional* to the distance crossed in distribution. This is because, in principle, there is less contamination from embeddedness, and less risk of following form rather than function.

To understand why proximity can be more problematic than extreme distance, let us return briefly to "La Movida". The French translation of the Spanish term, geo-culturally the closest, was by far the most complex and drawn out, and thus presumably the most difficult to produce. This might be explained by the greater knowledge, interest, and competition ensuing from a shared geopolitical border, across which there is considerable embedding. If one knows almost nothing about such embeddedness, texts may well radically change their value in distribution, but they will effectively become far less complicated to translate. Despite performance analysis, complexity can result more from cultural proximity than from extreme distance.

Does this conclusion contradict our comments on performatives and belonging? Consider for a moment the essential difference between short-distance distribution ("La Movida" from Spain to France) and longer-distance distribution ("La Movida" from Spain to *Newsweek*). In the first case, complexity results from the numerous levels on which the two countries are connected and interact; the receivers of the translation are likely to adopt a participative attitude to the text. In the second case, however, where there are fewer contacts and the distribution is directed towards a more restricted and possibly more ignorant locale. In such long-distance distribution, receivers tend to be positioned as observers; the problems of embeddedness and belonging become almost irrelevant. There can be no doubt that a text like "La Movida" will retain more of its original belonging in cases of short-distance distribution, but this is precisely why proximity creates more problems for localization. In the case of long-distance movements, where transferable belonging tends to zero and purposes are more highly focused, renditions may be grossly exotic, inappropriate, or appropriative (cf. "The Happening"), but they are considerably easier to produce.

Embeddedness is ultimately resistance to the distribution of texts. The way to overcome this resistance is usually textual elaboration or explicitness, the bringing to the surface of presuppositions and the reasonable cleaning away of connotations. It follows that, in order to make a text more transferable, additional work must be invested to make it more explicit, just as an additional initial charge is required if electricity is to be transferred over a considerable distance. It also follows that, if this additional work has not been carried out in internationalization, it can be invested at the point of translation.

7. Transaction costs

We have posited that resistances to distribution can be overcome by investing greater effort in the communication act. Here we will try to analyze what kinds of effort are involved and how one might go about calculating the effort to put into any one act. Our calculations will be based on a neo-classical model of cooperation, construed as an ethical aim for all cross-cultural communication. This will enable us to model the relative costs that should be invested in internationalization, translation, and language learning, in accordance with the size of the communication acts and the diversity of the locales concerned. Those quantitative models, however, have to work from the very idealist notion of perfect localization.

Assuming effability

The analysis we are seeking concerns all facets of localization, not just translation. Our approach nevertheless draws on the strong formal idealism associated with translation.

External beliefs in equivalence present the illusion of "perfect translatability", which has become a fiction operative in a great deal of thought and commentary on translation. One does not generally find any corresponding insistence on "perfect localizability", even though the notion is not exceedingly difficult to formulate (actually as the goal of perfect internationalization). Indeed, the notion of perfectibility would have rather more reason to be applied to the internationalization side of business. The very artificiality of internationalization processes liberates them from embedding and thus makes perfection an understandable if not always attainable goal. In order to respect that formal idealism, we propose a very loose principle of effability: *everything can be localized (distributed, translated, adapted) into every language without loss of functionality, if and when unlimited effort can be invested in the localization processes.* Perhaps nuclear physics cannot be expressed in Australian indigenous tongues right here and now, but if we keep working at it, if we keep localizing texts in that field for generation after generation, by a small army of professional intermediaries, if we develop the locale corresponding to the texts (in an indigenous nuclear research center, perhaps), then in theory all the resistance will be overcome. We will have worked over the inexpressible until it is expressed. This mode of thought can indeed be found in the medieval translators who operated in terms of a hierarchy of languages, where a good part of their task was to develop the target language and culture. Equivalence, for them, lay in an unnamed future. The notion of effort spanning generations is also held in the *Bildung* (formation, development) that the French philosopher Antoine Berman (1984) saw as a key idea for the German Romantics: the aim of translation was to make the locale suited to the translation. That kind of aim is not far from many of the mindsets behind localization.

Nevertheless, as we have said, the idea of perfection seems not to be applied to localization in general. This is quite possibly because of the convenient fiction that localization is serving locales that are already fully formed, rather than actively shaping their development. Localization sees the client's deadline, not the generational time-span of cultures. The principle of effability *should* nevertheless apply to localization, if

and when we are interested in asking what effects cross-cultural communication is having on our cultures.

The size of communication acts

Given this possibility of thinking in terms of generations, we should allow that the thing in which we invest effort may be of very variable dimensions. Here we will call that thing a "communication act" (mainly so as not to say "speech act", "exchange", or other terms that have relatively fixed meanings). If we are going to apply effability to localization, how big a communication act might be entailed? Exactly how many hours, weeks, years, or generations could be required?

The spoken question "What is the time?" can only function in a communication act of reduced dimensions, admitting limited investment of effort. Other communication acts, for example a business negotiation, can extend indefinitely in their discursive form but will be restricted, by what? Most probably by the importance of the issues being negotiated. A major merger might merit discussions over several years; a transitory share price might be agreed on in a few seconds. In other situations we find effort invested in a much wider time frame. For instance, if an immigrant family decides to adopt a new language in its home domain, the decision might be based on projected advantages for the children's generation. That communication act, from the perspective of the parents, should be seen as spanning two or more generations. The term "communication act" admittedly looks a little unhappy in such situations, but the minor infelicity is not particularly disastrous for the principles we are trying to draw out.

In all of these cases, the size of the act is in some way defined by the benefits one can hope to gain from that act. Those benefits might be information about the time, a merger, a sale of shares, or social integration for one's children. There is not much we can say here about the nature of the benefits themselves; they are specific in each case, broadly defined as what one aims to gain from the interaction. We can, however, propose that since such benefits derive from communication, they cannot be entirely for one party only. The kinds of communication that concern us here are social; they cannot be carried out by just one person. And if you are going to communicate with someone in order to gain something for yourself, there must also be something for the other person to gain as well, if only as a lure for their participation. The general concept of "benefits" thus defines not only the dimensions of communication acts, but also one minimal aspect of the social interaction involved. The benefits must be to some extent mutual, or at least potentially so. Social communication cannot operate on a model where one person's gain is automatically the other's loss (a zero-sum game). The very call to participation in communication requires a model where benefits are always potentially shared, even if that potential is not always realized.

Our interaction model will be drawn from what is broadly known as neo-classical cooperation theory. The basic lesson goes back to Adam Smith's insight that two people acting in their own personal interests can interact so that each of them gains something (1976: 456). This is the core of the economist's "invisible hand", which moves society toward general wealth even when individuals do not see this aim. People can attain mutual benefits even when their first priority is for themselves. The model uses a subject that is technically egoistic (they want to win for themselves) and, more

problematically, rational (they can calculate the probability of winning, and of how much they might win).

In the following pages we will give some simple game-theoretic examples of that cooperation model, since the various degrees of cooperation will be important for our discussion of ethics. Let us admit at the outset, though, that the calculations are as dry as old bones. Worse, the neo-classical model of human subjectivity is downright insulting for anyone aware that real individuals have an unconscious mind, are moved by and against social norms, have destructive impulses, are given to short-circuiting rational calculations (by acting on "instinct" and the like), and need not be particularly egoistic. Those are all valid criticisms of the model, and they have duly been raised within Translation Studies (cf. Séguinot 1991, Tirkkonen-Condit 1992). On the other hand, the very possibility of cooperation between rational egoists, as a theoretical model, does contain something magic. It offers escape from a world where our genes (or even our cultural memes) are engaged in a perpetual struggle for no more than their own reproduction. Cooperation might explain why different cultures enter into communication with each other, and how they can do so while maintaining respect and diversity. It might even conceptualize a border between ethical and unethical communication, valid for relations both between individuals and between cultures. It could be a reasonable substitute for what we have accepted as idealist effability. Those are very good reasons for taking the idea seriously.

With due apologies, we turn to the model.

Negotiation and mutual benefits

The simplest of the cooperation games is based on people investing in common services. Let us say A and B each has $10 and can allocate any part of that sum to a shared fund through which they will receive a common service. The value of the service is presumed to allow a better outcome than would be the case if the people invested separately. If A and B live in the same street and want to have refuse taken away from their homes, they both stand to gain from having just one truck come to their street rather than have two individual trucks come to two individual houses. They should communicate with each other in order to achieve this mutually beneficial outcome.

Let us now suppose the mutual benefits of cooperation are 33.3% greater than the outcome of non-cooperation. If each of the two participants invests $5, the common fund will be $13.33 (5 + 5 + 33.3%) of value, and the value returned to each could be half that sum, $6.66. When this is added to the $5 not invested (remember that without cooperation they would have been spending $10 each), we find each person finishes up with $11.66 worth of resources plus services. Both have received more value than would be the case had they not cooperated. Benefits exist for both sides. Each person will continue to invest, a common refuse collection service will be established, and social life will be a little happier as a result. That is one very good reason for the participants to communicate with each other. And that reason is operative in every aspect of our social life.

The model is fine for as long as each person invests $5 and can be sure the other person is going to invest the same sum. However, social life is full of inequalities. Not everyone is able to make the same investment. Not everyone wants to. What happens then?

In some cases, unequal capacities do not really matter. Let us suppose B can only invest $3. If A still invests $5, the common fund is $10.66 (5 + 3 + 33.3%) and the outcome (if we can simplify matters by splitting the benefits 50/50) is that A will have $10.33 and B will have $12.33 worth of resources and services. Although the investments and outcomes are unequal, the cooperation is still beneficial for both sides. Participant A has still gained 33 cents. Cooperation will thus still continue. Social life will not only be happier but the process might become compatible with a socially beneficial redistribution of wealth.

Social life is also full of self-interest, however, in accordance with the model of rational egoists. If B is such an egoist and can be sure A is going to invest $5, B can maximize their own benefits by only investing $3, regardless of how much they can actually afford to put in. Mutual benefits will still exist; cooperation will still continue. In fact, a rational egoist B *need* invest only as much as is necessary to ensure that A finishes up slightly ahead and will keep cooperating. Neo-classical economists mostly hold this kind of self-interest to be ethically legitimate; it accords with a rationalist "minimax" principle (maximum gain for a minimum of effort).[19] Participant B has, after all, ensured A's continued existence and economic betterment. A whole branch of mathematics now calculates the minimum thresholds involved, to ensure that economic ethics remain as egoistic as possible. And if postmodern ethics only insist on non-destruction of the other, they should be happy as well.

Some self-interested participants might nevertheless be considered irrational egoists, cheats, or free-riders. If B is sure A is going to invest $5, they could decide to put in only $2. Under the above conditions the outcome would now be that A finishes up with $9.66 and B has $13.66 worth of cash and services. Participant B has gained high benefits but A now has less value than their starting position ($10, remember, was what non-cooperation would have cost them). Participant A, if free enough to behave at all rationally and knowledgeable enough to see that B does have the capacity to pay more, will not continue with the cooperation. They will hire their own individual refuse truck, or go off and start negotiating with someone else, or hopefully initiate civil unrest. B has won the battle but lost the war. Both people will have to find other partners in future, since this particular cooperation should remain a purely one-off affair. Social life will be less happy as a result, making the outcome ethically unacceptable.

We have been looking at the three games shown in Table 2.

	Investments		Outcomes	
	A	B	A	B
Situation 1	5	5	11.66	11.66
Situation 2	5	3	10.33	12.33
Situation 3	5	2	9.66	13.66

Table 2. Investments and outcomes in search of cooperation

Many further games could be added to the table, especially since the common cake can be cut in any number of ways (in proportion to the amounts invested, asymmetric opportunity costs, different risk calculations, etc.). However, an extended list of variants would not alter our main point. Since we are interested in the minimal requirement that

each participant ensure the long-term well-being of the other (rather than apply Mosaic tit-for-tat or nationalist zero-sums), our purposes are sufficiently served by the threshold between games 2 and 3, between successful and unsuccessful cooperation. In cases where B is sure A will invest a certain amount, this threshold can be calculated fairly exactly (under the above conditions, if A invests $5 a rational egoist B should invest just over $2.50). That would be the investment to aim for.

The beauty of neo-classical analysis is that both A and B can be rational egoists. Both can modify the amounts they invest. So neither can be really sure how much the other is going to put in. Social life is full of uncertainty and mistrust. Each participant must now try to predict the other's future actions. This is where rational cooperation becomes interesting, since calculations have to be based on the probability of the other's investments.

The idea of cooperation leading to mutual benefits is not limited to refuse disposal. It can be applied to any form of social contract, from the simple exchange of goods to the development of taxation and state institutions. It is also the basis of international negotiations. If free trade is considered to be of potential mutual benefit, one might try to negotiate WTO accords. Nuclear disarmament might also be of mutual benefit, justifying extensive negotiation in order to achieve cooperation. On all these levels, each participant must try to predict the current status and future actions of all other participants. A restaurant proprietor might look at how a client is dressed in order to predict if the bill is going to be paid; the client looks at the restaurant to see if it warrants the advertised prices. Similarly, the United States and the Soviet Union once looked at each other's nuclear arsenals in order to calculate thresholds for rational disarmament. But the bankrupt client in a restaurant can dress well in order to deceive; insubstantial food can be served in fancy plates; and nuclear arsenals were calculated in many cunningly different ways. Prediction of the other's status and future actions has never been an easy affair.

The information needed for probabilistic prediction can come from many sources. One might look at the way the other person has behaved in the past (a job candidate presents a curriculum vitae and references); one could carry out research into the other's financial status, cultural background, and psychological make-up; one might engage in long haggling processes to find out just how much the other person is really prepared to concede. Any information could prove valuable.

In theory, the more such information is held, the greater the potential relationship of *trust* between the two participants and the more likely a cooperative outcome to their interaction. Trust-building information of this kind may be seen as forming cultural blocks, conveyed by markers of belonging to one social group or another. The activity of gossip can then function as a search for such markers, developing relationships of mutual reliance and even friendship that might better ensure the success of future cooperation. The building up of trust could explain all the modes of implicitness and embeddedness that we looked at in the previous chapter. Indeed, in computer modeling of cooperation games repeated over successive generations (some 50 generations of 24,000 games each), such probabilistic calculations are shown to underlie the evolution of norms and eventually cultures, which would thus exist precisely in order to enhance the likelihood of cooperative outcomes (cf. Axelrod 1997).

The importance of general trust should not be underestimated, particularly in the world of e-commerce and the like, where many of our partners are only seen through electronic representations. Trust is the reason why face-to-face communication is still

essential even in a world of apparently electronic globalization. Face-to-face we convey all kinds of subtle cultural markers, condensed information, implicit indicators of trustworthiness or its opposite, all of which is easy to conceal behind the symbolic order of written words.

Since degrees of trust improve the likelihood of cooperative outcomes, they are in turn enhanced by a restriction in the number of participants. We might, for example, predict the predispositions of ten people we know fairly well but not a hundred people we know only slightly. This will become a key consideration for localization. It is also of some importance for the ethics involved. A decision not to enter into a communication act, either by choosing silence or by not investing sufficient effort for a mutually beneficial outcome, may actually assist the degree of cooperation in the interactions that do take place. To the extent that it reduces the number of participants, a declaration of non-participation or even of war could be seen as benefiting the cause of other people's cooperation.

How this concerns communication between cultures

Our comments have so far dealt with communication in general, where we are interested in the investments involved and the ethical aspects of how those efforts are allocated. Along the way, we have begun to understand some economic reasons behind the nature of belonging in its various forms, and for some kinds of cultural resistance to distribution. Those aspects are of particular interest here because localization, as a set of communication techniques, may be defined in terms of a relative absence of trust. Although communication between cultures (or between locales) is not fundamentally different from communication in general, its relative paucity of shared norms or implicit markers of trustworthiness must have certain effects on the quality of the cooperation obtained.

The differences are fairly obvious. Cross-cultural communication is prone to a greater sense of misunderstanding because, all else being equal, the participants know less about each other. They thus have potentially greater ground for mutual *mistrust*. The risk of non-cooperation is consequently higher than in the case of communication within the one culture, and even more so within the one locale. There will be more resistance; greater effort will have to be invested.

Studies of cross-cultural communication do indeed show something like this happening. They also indicate that participants are aware of the higher risks involved. This does not necessarily mean there is greater misunderstanding of the actual information load. Cross-cultural production tends to involve various degrees of specialized compensation measures such as higher redundancy, explicitness, and various further features of what is loosely known as "foreigner talk" and "foreigner listening". The reception process may similarly compensate through increased back-channeling (White 1989), the discounting of unexpected breaches of maxims, and a correspondingly more concentrated focus on the cooperative aim involved. In short, repeated cross-cultural communication between the same partners is likely to develop its own norms. Further, the development and application of those norms is likely to be closer to rational calculation than is the case of endemic communication, making the role of complex or internal (unconscious) subjectivities less influential. The

assumptions of rational egoism are perhaps more likely to hold between cultures than within them.

In all these aspects, as we have said, cross-cultural communication might be characterized as requiring higher levels of effort, since the communication has to overcome higher degrees of resistance. The added effort may be invested anywhere along the communication chain: the sender may speak louder or transmit with greater force, greater investment may be made in any of the forms of internationalization, the receiver may pay greater attention and compensate for unusual or deviant forms, and so on. The general principle is unproblematic.

The interesting part is that all this extra effort incurs significant costs that must be incorporated into the overall calculation, as we shall now see.

Transaction costs

The term "transaction costs" should cover all the investments made to produce the communication act in itself. Such costs include the effort put into text production, text transformation, and text reception, but also the finding and selection of potential communication partners, the occupation of the channel or contact situation, and attention to feedback in the course of the communication. A general principle of all communication acts would be that, for each participant, *the transaction costs should be less than the projected benefit*. We are not going to invest more in the communication than the benefits we hope to gain. More interestingly, on all these levels, transaction costs are likely to be higher in communication between cultures rather than in situations marked by high degrees of shared belonging. Localization is not going to come cheap.

The transaction costs in the above games have been artificially fixed at zero; they obviously do not involve cross-cultural communication. Let us now suppose each participant has to invest 50 cents to pay for the transaction costs. This is in order to organize the cooperation and attain a position of relative trust. We find that game 2, where A was only 33 cents ahead, has now become unsuccessful. At zero transaction costs, participant A could benefit from that game; at a 50-cent transaction cost, A finishes up making a loss. The game will not lead to any stable social relationship.

This means that *the higher the transaction costs, the more restricted the number of games with mutually beneficial outcomes*. Transaction costs should thus be kept not only below the upper threshold but also low enough to allow for a range of possible successful games corresponding to the probabilistic calculations of the participants. Absolute certainty may be ideal but it is mostly too expensive to attain. Effort must be kept within a range of relative certainty proportional to the potential benefits.

This basic principle here is that the cheaper the communication, the more chances there are that mutual benefits will result. This should be a poke in the eye for any theory that says we should invest massive efforts in order to convey minor linguistic nuances and sophisticated authorial intentions. Such things concord with the idealism of translation and effability, but not with an ethics of cooperation. The world functions quite well with all the examples of imperfect localization we gave in chapter one; we have become used to non-native English; we click on "Aceptar" and proceed regardless.

Should transaction costs then be best fixed as close to zero as possible? There will be a natural tendency toward decreasing costs if two participants keep cooperating successfully. Whatever the initial transaction costs, participants will gradually build up

an affective relationship of mutual prediction that can be maintained with little further special input. However, this kind of assurance is more difficult to attain in multilateral situations. If transaction costs are so low that all information is uniformly available to everyone, each participant can negotiate with every other potential participant, shopping around to fix their investments at the lowest possible thresholds. Indeed, according to Keohane "in certain situations an infinite series of available coalitions may form" (1984: 87). Such situations would not give relationships of mutual trust and prediction a chance to develop, neither rationally nor affectively. This is one of the major problems of economic globalization.

According to neo-classical calculations, some transaction costs should ideally be maintained and structured in such a way that the number of potential participants is restricted. The conventions of friendship do this, as indeed do most international organizations. NATO is an institution for the exchange of strategic information and basic promises between its members. It does little more than structure transaction costs between a limited number of participants. Indeed, NATO's use of transaction costs is so beneficial to its members that the organization continues to exist in the absence of the purpose for which it was originally set up, and does so by carefully controlling the entry of new members. If cooperation is the aim, any restrictive organization is better than none at all.

This idea can be applied to individual tongues and cultures, which structure transaction costs so as to enable cooperation between the participating members, regardless of the initial purposes that gave rise to the structures concerned. One might also see state bureaucracies as apparatuses for the structuring of transaction costs within a society. The idea has numerous applications on many social levels.

Localization and translation can now be put into this framework.

Localization as a set of transaction costs

Transaction costs can include the production, internationalization, distribution, adaptation, translation, and reception of texts, in addition to other costs that are not of key concern to us here (selection and identification of participants, occupation of the channel). Although localization and translation need not always figure in this chain, they can become key elements. There are several reasons for this special importance:

- As we have said, localization and translation are used for communication between cultures, in situations where shared norms have generally not been as firmly established as is the case in communication within a locale.
- The various facets of localization and translation incur relatively high but controllable transaction costs. If kept at expensive levels they can condemn many potentially cooperative relationships to failure.
- There is a link between localization costs and the costs of receiving the output. If a machine-produced translation is relatively cheap to produce but very difficult to read, the low production cost is offset by the high cost at the reception end. By modifying localization and translation costs (for example, by adding pre-editing or post-editing to machine translation), one can also modify reception costs and thus extend or restrict the number of people able to participate in the cooperation.

Each of these points requires further comment.

Negotiation theory has long recognized that the differences between political and linguistic cultures present special difficulties for any international agreement. This does not mean *all* cultural differences are of equal importance. When Rocky or Rambo grunts something idiomatic that the American audience finds difficult to understand (was it English? was it language?), a pedantic dubber or subtitler could spend hours locating the nuance, analyzing its contextual discursive impact, and calculating a target version. But that intermediary would soon be out of business. The pertinent mutual benefits (money for the film industry, visual action for the audience) require minimal localization. In such a situation any grunt will do, although a subtitled one would probably be so obtrusive as to reduce mutual benefits. The intermediary should move on to more demanding tasks as quickly as possible. At the other extreme, however, there are cases where potential mutual benefits are so great and yet so difficult to attain that extremely high translation costs are justified. An Israeli government interested in its relations with Syria employed the prestigious translation theorist Gideon Toury (while doing his *miluim* for the Israeli state) to translate a biography of President Hafez Assad into Hebrew, complete with the employment of Arabists to revise the text and to add an introduction. When the stakes are high, the social effort put into localization can also be high.

The parameters of localization costs

The particular interest of localization and translation is that they form a relatively controllable set of transaction costs. Once the desirability of distributing certain information has been ascertained for certain locales, the costs of initial production and distribution are relatively fixed. Their sum can be acceptable at any level from just below the projected benefits to just above zero (remembering that it is beneficial to have some level of transaction costs). The only way really to control those costs is by limiting the initial desire to distribute the information. The insertion of any kind of mediation into the chain enables greater control. By having more or less effort invested in localization we might, for example, expand or contract membership of the locale for which the reception costs are justified, or indeed the range of locales to be so addressed (low localization costs would generally correspond to high reception costs and a restricted receiving locale).

If we apply this logic across the board to the relative costs of internationalization, localization, and bilateral translation, we find that the correlation between effort and size is not quite as direct as it might seem. Although high effort can still overcome high resistance, there are several other parameters involved.

First, high investment in internationalization should correspond not only to the relative size of locales but also the significant differences between them. We might decide, for example, that the Spanish and Basque languages are used in locales large enough to warrant having their specificities covered in an internationalization project. However, when we get down to the job, we might discover that the differences between the two languages are so extreme as to be prohibitive for the particular product concerned. We might decide not to internationalize for Basque, adopting some cheaper solution for that locale (translating, for example, an instruction manual but not the

strings in the actual product). On the other hand, we might decide that the differences between the many Spanish-speaking locales are so slight that they need not be taken into account in the internationalization project. Or again, we could be distributing something like shop-floor machinery, where safety requirements mean that the language must be as close to the workers as possible. Many small locales would then have to be recognized and accounted for. In one such project, the range of South American Spanishes was reduced to three separate locales (that is, three pertinent varieties of shop-floor Spanish), and localization proceeded on that basis.

This means we have to consider a complex set of factors when deciding how much effort to put into internationalization: 1) how many locales are to enter into the distribution (the more the locales, the more effort will be required and warranted), 2) how qualitatively different those locales are (the more the differences, the more effort), and 3) how different the locales are in size (a smaller and very different locale might not be addressed by the internationalization process). If we can take those three factors together, we should be able to obtain a composite variable that we will call "diversity". High internationalization costs would then respond to distribution to highly diverse locales, as measured by number, qualitative differences, and differences in size. Those costs can be lowered by distributing to a less diverse range of locales.

Similar adjustments can also be made with reference to the time frame of the communication act (bearing in mind that the size of the act is defined by the mutual benefits to be obtained). Internationalization for a long-term project will clearly warrant more investment than for a product with a short shelf-life. Further, the greater the time frame, the more chances there are that further diversity will affect the selected locales. To this extent, diversity and time may overlap.

We thus have at least three parameters in play: general localization costs (here potentially including internationalization and translation), the composite diversity of locales, and the time frame of the communication act. A move in the costs can affect the diversity or time parameters (usually both at the same time), just as changes in the parameters can affect the costs required.

There are very fundamental differences between the ways these parameters interact with the various moments of internationalization, translation, and reception:

- Everything coming under the category of internationalization plus localization presupposes distribution to a number of quite different end-use locales. This would suggest that the greater the size of the locales, the more effort should be put into internationalization. More depends, however, on the number of different locales and the cultural differences between them. As the above examples should suggest, internationalization could become prohibitively expensive in the case of a large number of very different small locales, and in the case of just one or two very large locales (hence the status of diversity as a composite variable).
- Everything like bilateral translation (that is, translation without internationalization) presupposes a communication act of reduced dimensions, where investment in internationalization would be less justified. That is, bilateral or one-off translation finds its role when there are many small end-use locales with significant cultural differences between them, or when there are just a few large locales in contact for a short period of time.
- In addition to these fundamental strategies, we must also consider investments made at the receiving end, either in the form of special training needed to enter

into a technical discourse, or more broadly in the form of language learning. The general strategy of professional, cultural, and linguistic training obviates the need for both localization and translation; it seeks effability by other means. Such training should logically come to the fore in situations like those justifying bilateral translation, but within a considerably longer time frame.

These principles might be represented diagrammatically. First let us consider the relationship between internationalization (including localization) and translation, bearing in mind that the former usually needs the latter for completion.

Figure 12 shows a vertical axis representing transaction costs, and a horizontal axis representing the sum diversity of the locales (accounting for both their number and the cultural differences between them). As can be seen, the costs of bilateral translation are assumed to remain fairly constant no matter what the diversity, since it tends to be paid by the page or hour (the costs are thus schematically represented by a horizontal line). Internationalization and localization costs, however, are in principle directly proportional to diversity (and are thus represented by the rising diagonal line). The greater the diversity, the more resistance to internationalization as a mode of distribution.


Figure 12. Relative advantages of internationalization and bilateral translation

At point D1, let us say, there are just two large locales involved and no greater diversity on the horizon, neither in time nor in space. In that situation, one might as well just translate in a bilateral way or not change the text at all (if we want to make the receivers work). More exactly, whatever transaction costs we incur will be in translation and not in internationalization. At D2 we are dealing with a limited number of different locales, perhaps all of them Spanish-speaking or English-speaking. Here it is worth investing in some internationalization, but the main costs can still be borne by translation in a bilateral scenario, perhaps in combination with post-editing for each particular locale. At point D3, however, diversity has increased to the point where bilateral translation and internationalization costs are about equal. And at any point beyond D3, out into the wild diversity of D4, internationalization costs exceed those of bilateral translation and thus cannot be justified in economic terms. One might as well just translate bilaterally each time, without worrying about internationalization. According to the diagram, internationalization plays its key role in the area between D2 and D3. In real life, of course, there would also be a time dimension involved. This would allow for predictions of things like the future growth of markets, thus justifying internationalization at degrees of diversity beyond D3. Still, our basic principle should

be clear enough: one should combine internationalization and bilateral translation in proportions corresponding to the diversity involved.

A second kind of diagrammatic analysis would compare different strategies not with respect to diversity, but purely over time. Here the main alternatives are translation (since it is fairly constant) and change at the reception end, notably in the form of language learning (although any form of special training program might also fit the bill). These may be mutually exclusive strategies, since language learning can do away with the need for translation. Since language learning requires very high initial effort and costs, it is a bad strategy for one-off or short-term communication acts. However, once a language has been learned to any degree of proficiency, the repeat costs become minimal and will reduce with continued use (as crudely represented in the diagonal descending line in the graph below). Language learning is thus a good strategy for long-term cooperation. Translation costs, on the other hand, decline minimally over time. Some reduction in total effort does come about with repeated translation of the same subject matter, especially once basic terminology has been established and the translator gains familiarity. There is no drastic drop, however. Translators are still paid at fairly constant rates, by the hour or page (as crudely represented by the horizontal line in the graph below). All else being equal (which is never the case), the costs of the two strategies over time might be represented as in Figure 13.


Figure 13. Relative advantages of translation and language learning over time

Area A1 quantifies the relative savings to be made from a translation strategy in short-term situations. Area A2 shows the savings from language learning in long-term situations. If the duration of the communication act is less than T2, translation should be used. If it is between T2 and T3 (the point in time where A1 = A2), translation should be mixed with end-point learning, ideally in the proportion of A1 to A2. For anything longer than T3, of course, learning strategies should become progressively dominant.

Assuming that high transaction costs are generally to be reduced, in this case the modes and degrees of localization should be selected in accordance with the probable duration of the communicative act. Translation is clearly better for an initial contact meeting or a one-off conference. The Barcelona Olympic Games, as a four-year project involving four closely related languages, merited translation strategies but was near the threshold justifying intensive language classes for the main organizers (Pym 1996). The original candidature for the Games, however, was a one-off project that warranted nothing but bilateral translation. And the International Olympic Committee, one would hope, is a long-term project justifying the need for all internal officials to learn both

official languages (English and French). The model seems to work on such cases, but is certainly not accepted by all the institutions concerned.

The European Union, if one believes it to be a long-term project, should rationally adopt language-learning strategies for its internal administrative processes. However, the fact that translation still remains important for communication moving outward from EU institutions contributes to significant and unsustainable transaction costs. Coulmas (1991) estimated that language policy of what was then the European Community, largely based on bilateral translation, was consuming some 40% of the total administrative budget. More recent estimates put the translation costs at just 15% of the administrative budget (Wagner et al. 2002).[20] Whatever the calculation, the massive use of translation is difficult to justify in economic terms. The reason, says Coulmas, is a form of linguistic nationalism that has little to do with the interests of long-term cooperation, since the Union "has been used by member states to defend their languages' privileged position rather than being given the chance to produce a language policy of its own" (1991: 8). That was a pertinent observation then and still rings true today. The politics of symbolic value have so far won out over the analysis of transaction costs.

Reducing transaction costs

People mainly analyze transaction costs in order to reduce them. Within limits, this aim is both economically and ethically sound. Cost-cutting is also of particular importance with respect to translation, which remains an expensive process when not combined with internationalization or learning strategies of some kind. At this point, heading into politically dangerous territory, we should try to make our models fit a few actual numbers.

To continue with our comments on the European Union, the key test of transaction costs should be the total administrative effort per page produced. In 2001 the total cost of the European Commission's Translation Service was 220 million euros (reported in Stecconi 2002 and personal communication). This represented a transaction cost of 175.5 euros per page of output (translations, summaries, editions, etc.). That figure (175.5 euros per page) is about five times as much as could be justified by any private localization company. So something is very wrong.

One way to justify these high transaction costs might be to point out that in 2001 the Translation Service in question employed 1,219 translators, 324 secretaries and assistants, and 281 people in training, informatics, terminology, and so on. Their output thus included not only translations but also the production of glossaries, the building up of translation-memory databases (for the use of Trados WorkBench), such services as the (hodge-podge but free) on-line terminology bank Eurodicautom, and language training for their own staff in view of the entry of new languages. Like any language-service provider, the Translation Service does much more than just translate. And that is very much what our diagrams would like to find. In some circumstances there should be massive internationalization, in others there should be extensive language learning, and in the rest translation should be modified by the various processes of partial or complete internationalization. The actual range of services is, however, something of a smokescreen. All those "extras", which do include elements of internationalization and language learning, can only be justified to the extent that they help to bring the overall

transaction costs down. And those transaction costs are still to be calculated by the page. The fact that the costs are high could mean either that the non-translational processes are not being used efficiently, or that the benefits of the Translation Service (its added value) is indeed about five times what an outside company could achieve.

One begins to suspect that, were it politically possible, the European Commission's Translation Service should have been outsourced long ago.

Given the political constraints, however, a more useful question is how the huge transaction costs might really be reduced. The general answer must be that internationalization and learning strategies should be incorporated whenever justified (see our diagrams above). A more specific answer might run through the following strategies, many of which are currently applied:

- *Controlled directionality*: In the European Union institutions, all outgoing laws and documents of general application must be translated into all official languages (of which there are currently eleven). Incoming documents, on the other hand, need only be translated once, into English or French, since the people dealing with the documents all know both languages (cf. Wagner et al. 2002). This controlled directionality not only incorporates learning strategies (for the central bureaucratic interculture) but also approaches the conceptual geometry of localization.
- *Passive language competence*: A more general application of the above strategy is to encourage a wider range of participants to develop passive competence in the main languages, so that each can understand what the other says and no mediation is necessary. "Multilingual conversations" thus become possible. This solution, ideologically sound and much touted by the linguist Claude Hagège (1992: 273) and the all-rounder Umberto Eco (1993: 292-293), may be operative within central intercultures but remains strangely difficult to find in wider social life. It is, moreover, challenged by studies of code-switching in conversations, where participants tend to move freely in and out of their mother tongue, rather than stay with any strict division between active and passive competence. As a solution to transaction costs, this strategy is a nice idea that appears to come up against some quite mysterious psychological barriers.
- *Translation memory software*: The Translation Service's use of Trados WorkBench is supposed to increase translators' productivity and thus lower transaction costs, in accordance with the logic of internationalization (the one set of paired strings should serve for numerous future translations). Unfortunately the numbers we are looking at suggest this is not happening to any significant degree. Even when the diversity level is low (the documents to be translated are all very similar), the general management of the memories incurs transaction costs that could match the possible productivity gains. The main advantage of translation memories would seem to be the standardization of terminology and phraseology, leading to a more controlled form of translation and ideally allowing translators to focus on the more interesting problems.
- *Machine translation*: The EU-Systran automatic translation system is increasingly used in situations where a lower-quality output is acceptable. This system gives excellent results for distribution involving low diversity, particularly from French to Spanish, Italian, or Portuguese (all similar Romance languages). Unfortunately Systran is a "transfer" based system, developed for

language pairs only, as opposed to interlingua systems that use a controlled central language (as an extreme form of internationalization). This means that the glossaries will virtually have to be built afresh for each new target language (hopefully incorporating translation memories from Trados), so that the savings diminish considerably as we move along the diversity axis.

- *Controlled drafting and translation*: A more effective way of reducing translation costs is to control the input languages and document formats so that the economies of the various forms of controlled translation can then come into effect. This means having a highly standardized central language and fixed document templates. Examples can be found in large companies (cf. Lockwood 2000, on Caterpillar), and could be used profitably in conjunction with an interlingua system.

- *Quantitative reduction*: The French theorist of technical translation Daniel Gouadec (1989: 22-30) usefully describes translation as including anything from a bibliographic reference and summary of contents ("traduction signalétique") to a complete representation of as many textual factors as possible ("traduction absolue"). The choice of one type or another would depend on the communicative purpose of the information. This in fact means that one does not set out to translate entire documents, but to give enough information on the document for the end user to determine if a full translation is warranted. Information flows can thus be vetted, creating loops to and from decisions to produce fuller translations.

- *Qualitative reduction*: The same logic can be applied to translation quality, moving from information-only quality of automatic output through to the publication quality of translations after several revisions and testing processes. Training users to accept lower-quality output can greatly reduce overall transaction costs.

We are not inventing anything new here; many of these strategies are in regular use in our public institutions. If the transaction costs still remain exorbitantly high, that can only mean that the strategies are not sufficiently in use, or that they are being combined in ways that are more politically expedient than economically efficient.

The interests of intermediaries

The above model does not see localization or translation as forms of negotiation. The decisions intermediaries are faced with do not directly concern the nature of mutual benefits, merely the way transaction costs may restrict or favor such benefits. The hermeneutics that interest us thus have to do not so much with how the intermediary comes to terms with a text but how the participants on either side come to terms with each other. For the model, cooperation between those participants is more important than the priorities of the intermediary as a language worker.

Cooperation could nevertheless be in the long-term interests of intermediaries. To put it too simply (the principle will soon be revised), the more the participants cooperate, the greater their mutual benefits and the more resources they can allocate to

those who allow them to communicate. This argument has several less mercenary aspects.

If A has employed you to localize for them, it would seem logical for you to raise your rates to the highest level A can afford and for you then to advance A's cause as much as possible. When your client has won everything, you will be paid even more. Unfortunately this unilateral frame would work against my long-term self-interest in two ways. First, each time you raise the transaction costs, A's scope for bargaining will be reduced and B's probabilistic information will have to be more exact. Transaction costs will thus be raised on both sides (the unilateral frame is delusive) and the scope for mutual benefits will be narrowed. There will be less cooperation and thus less demand for your future services. Second, more obviously, if you advance A's cause to the point where B is destroyed or robbed of any chance to participate in mutual benefits, cooperation will come to an end and there will be no further employment for you in the interaction concerned. The intermediary's long-term interests are thus incompatible with unilateral allegiance.

This principle could inform actual decision-making operations. Situations inevitably arise where one must decide between the priorities of competing participants. No theory can prescribe the way intermediaries should turn in all cases. However, especially on the large-scale level of cross-cultural relations, choices might ethically be made by privileging the interests of the weaker locale. In the years we spent translating into English for the President of Catalonia, our decisions were mostly in favor of promoting English-language awareness of Catalan culture (Pym 1991). This was not because we agreed with nationalist fanatics. It was instead because the extreme imbalance between Catalan and English-language cultures meant that prolonged cooperation required special attention to the interests of the less known side. After all, if Catalan culture became progressively weaker, its range of possible cooperation situations would diminish, the market for translations from Catalan would narrow, and there would be less demand for anyone's competence as a translator from Catalan. Where possible, the collective interests of intermediaries are generally best served by opting in favor of the weaker side in any communicative act, regardless of whether this side is the text generator, client, sender, or receiver.

Although this precept does no more than defend the collective interests of intermediaries, it remains coherent with the ethical value of cooperation as such. It could moreover be incorporated into a wider ecology, arguing that cultural diversity is a value in itself and must be maintained.

A further consequence of the transaction-cost model is that, allowing that their own interests are generally compatible with the ethical value of cooperation, localizers and translators should be prepared to do rather more than localize and translate. If they are in a position to carry out or combine other forms of mediation, including training at the reception end, they should do so. This could involve things like actively pre-selecting information, advising on how a particular text should be localized, and suggesting how best to act in order to attain cooperation. A final consequence is of course that the professionals working in these fields should know the limits of their specialized expertise. We look forward to the day when localization experts will realize that some situations require only traditional bilateral translation, when language experts admit that low-quality texts have a role to play, and when translators can admit to clients that a lot of texts are not worth translating. To reach that day, all the specialists need an overall vision of their collective role.

Defending the transaction-cost model

The model we have presented is based on the simplest level of cooperation. Its only necessary ethical principle is that some degree of benefit should exist for all participants. That is a very minimalist ethics, upon which other criteria might be built. We have, for example, assumed the priority of long-term cooperation over short-term cooperation. That is an ethical dimension brought in by the nature of our analysis (in the definition of communication acts and the attention to time frames). Further ethical principles require attention to the specific professional practices involved, as we shall attempt to do in the next chapter. Here we have not, for instance, insisted that participants be prepared to make substantial short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term cooperative relationships, although one does find cases of this happening (Dutch and Erse are not official EU languages; Spaniards have effectively sacrificed Spanish as a language for the initial announcing of scientific advances). In terms of negotiation theory, our model so far remains optimistically liberal rather than pessimistically restrictive or realist.

The consequences of the model need not be restricted to neoclassical assumptions or to an ethics of crude economic efficiency. The model does not say everyone is a rational egoist; it merely shows that mutual benefits can exist in the case of rational egoists. If the conditions on subjectivity are then relaxed, allowing for non-egoistic generosity, the chances of cooperation in fact become greater (cf. Keohane 1984: 112ff). The model can thus be taken beyond its initial assumptions on that score. Indeed, by the time one gets to two participants making uncertain assumptions about the other's status and future actions, there is no reason why its intersubjectivity could not become rather Lacanian.

A more serious psychological weakness nevertheless lies in the assumption of rationalism, as if people really did calculate the costs and benefits of their actions. No, such calculations are usually not carried out in any explicit way. People act in accordance with intuitions, norms, their cultural conditioning, and political ideals that have not been thought-through. There is a great deal of non-calculated communication out there. Nevertheless, in the specialized professional fields that we are focusing on here, the weight of calculations should be much greater, and the import of endemic norms correspondingly lesser. Rationalist assumptions should be able to address at least some part of that professional mind.

Our model's prime purpose is clearly not to describe everything that happens or could happen in the field of cross-cultural communication. It merely describes something that *can* happen (mutual benefits) and some of the ways various strategies can contribute to that outcome. The model becomes ethical when one argues that cooperation *should* happen wherever possible. Some will claim this is a restrictive ethics, limiting the liberty of the individual. Our search for a professional ethics has been described from the postmodern perspective as "neo-tribalism" (Koskinen 2000: 78). In our defense, we are not moralizing in any narrow prescriptive way; our considerations are explicitly minimalist; and the professions are there, with or without cooperation. The model offers no more than a guide for the perplexed, proposing a course of action for the attainment of a general goal. If someone sees no ethical value in that goal, if hegemonic relations or nationalist priorities are thought to be better than

cross-cultural cooperation, then the model has nothing to propose to that particular person.

Related doubts about the transaction-cost model come from theorists concerned with the translation of literary or philosophical texts. Following Schleiermacher's expulsion of negotiation from the realm of translation proper (1813), some might argue that literary-philosophical translation concerns disinterested aesthetic value or operates on a diachronic relation between texts, rather than on a synchronic relation between people. Several answers are possible here.

First, if one were to ascribe an infinite value to aesthetic appreciation or philosophical enlightenment as a mutual benefit to be attained between author and reader, then one could wholly justify infinite translation costs. That is the logic of Pascal's wager (one should bet on the existence of God because the possible winnings are infinite). The transaction-cost model would thus be able to describe a certain literary-philosophical ideology, if not entirely the actual practice of literary-philosophical translation.

Second, wherever values are less than infinite, a sociologist might insist that any society engaged in the localization and translation of foreign texts, no matter how great, has more than aesthetic interests at stake. Such distributions tend to enter conflicts *within* the target society, making cooperation an intracultural rather than cross-cultural ideal. This is the fundamental message of distribution: the texts exist in the here and now, even without any kind of localization; their continued existence is in the interests of someone in the here and now, often the people paying for their continued ditribution through time (libraries and web sites cost money). If you are translating *Mein Kampf*, you are not seeking cooperation with Hitler, nor with the Third Reich, but with sections of society that have an interest in spreading knowledge of that ideology (either for or against). Nineteenth-century localizations of Greek and Roman texts supported the strong class hierarchy of British culture, ensuring the maintenance of those hierarchies throughout the processes of colonial imperialism. Further, in a more general synchrony, literary-philosophical translations between co-existing cultures provide a thousand intangible pieces of information on the mind sets of major trading partners, potential political enemies, or the controllers of international power relations. Cross-cultural literary formations, Goethian *Weltliteratur* if you like, provide invaluable common references for the social elites forging the most crucial international cooperation relationships. There are many quite non-aesthetic or non-philosophical reasons why a society might invest part of its resources in the localization and translation of great foreign texts. Without falling back on any economic determinism, these reasons can be described by modes of cooperation operating at the level of locales.

Beyond the specificity of great texts, the transaction-cost model fits in with a certain dialogic theory, which has influenced thought on translation at least since Schleiermacher and more recently with reference to Bakhtin or relevance theory.[21] The model nevertheless retains certain peculiarities. It does not assume participants that are axiomatically separate, equal, or defined by unchangeable specificities or intentions. Although distinguished by otherness, both sides are from the outset conditioned by the state and potential of their interrelationships. Theirs is a mutually active otherness. There is no question of having to decide between source and target priorities as they might have existed prior to the interaction. Nor does the model mean the participants are dominated by systems or polysystems within any larger system. Cooperation situations only concern those areas in which mutual benefits can be attained; they are

situations of contact, ports rather than territorial expanses; they do not automatically concern relationships between entire systems.

Applications of postcolonial theory might benefit from the transaction-cost analysis to the extent that the model refuses any systemic read-off from power relationships. Even when A and B are highly unequal they can still cooperate rationally and overcome imbalances in certain areas, independently of any prolonged ideological struggle. This is why negotiation theory talks about the sets of principles and norms required in order to achieve cooperation, explicitly distinguishing such principles and norms from totalizing theories of "international systems" like colonialism (Keohane 1984: 25-28, 57-59). Hegemony, conflict, and exploitation do not infiltrate everything. Nor do they provide good guidelines for future action in the field of localization.

The transaction-cost model should also be compatible with the broad principles of Holz-Mänttäri's *Handlungstheorie* (1984) and Vermeer's *Skopostheorie* (as in Reiss and Vermeer 1984). However, the less careful target-oriented approaches occasionally imply a mercenary ethics based on short-term unilateral rewards (do what your client tells you to do; shoot where you are told to shoot). Acceptance of long-term mutual benefits as the general goal might give our work a more noble purpose.

8. Professionalization

The categories of translation theory are generally not those of the localization industry. Dialogue between those two discourses is by no means easy to set up, and readers on each side will quite possibly question the value of the other. This is one of the inherent challenges of the task we have undertaken here; this might be our own attempt to apply the theory of cooperation. There is resistance, however, from within our social setting. Translators and localizers (along with all the professions included under both terms) are engaged on similar projects, often on parts of the same project, without sharing the same basic modes of thought. Each specialist tends to believe they hold the keys to success, at least for as long as "success" is defined by the specialist and not in terms of some general principle like long-term cross-cultural cooperation. Despite several serious attempts to form a common field under banners like "the language industry", "language-service providers", or indeed the GILT sector ("globalization, internationalization, localization, and translation"), the market would seem to be increasingly segmented, if not functionally fragmented (see Pym 1999, 2000c, 2001; Gambier 2000). That segmentation must be understood before any claims can be made about a shared professionalization.

Segmentation

Economic globalization, it will be recalled, ensues from the reduction of transport and communication costs. This leads to what we have called the "language-difference paradox", where the use of an international lingua franca may rise at the same time as the market for translations expands. In chapter 2 above we found some empirical evidence for this double process in cases where locales receive both translated and non-translated texts, with the two strategies functioning in complementary rather than contradictory ways. We are now in a position to reinforce those explanations of the apparent paradox, since we have seen in chapter 7 that there are degrees of diversity best handled by internationalization-plus-localization, and other degrees best handled by bilateral translation. All these are reasons for seeing general localization and translation activities as a set of complementary responses to the one phenomenon. There is, of course, a further explanation of the paradox, this time within localization itself. As we have argued, within the internationalization-localization tandem production-based communications tend toward just one lingua franca, whereas marketing processes address a wide range of end-use locales. Diversity is thus reduced on the one hand and enhanced in a controlled way on the other. Both these things happen together, accounting for the rising demand not only for internationalization (in effect the reduced diversity needed by the production networks) but also for pluralistic end-point localization (in fact the diversity maintained by translation). Thus, across the board, there is growth in both localization and translation, as well as in their complementary strategies, notably internationalization and language learning.

   The most common manifestation of this model is a world where all professionals have to learn English. The teaching of English becomes a language service alongside and sometimes inseparable from translation. There is a kind of continuum here. Think, for example, of the translator working for a Spanish physicist, rendering a paper from

Spanish into English then checking the terminology with the author, who duly corrects all the technical aspects. Now think of the physicist who has written the paper in non-native English and comes to a translator to have it revised. The work is virtually the same in both cases. What changes is the professional status of the people doing it (a professional translator and a client in the first case, a multilingual author and a reviser-cum-language-teacher in the second). Language-service providers must be prepared to switch between such modes, especially for distribution into English.

What this gives us is a very wide range of services and possible relations with clients. As long as there is professional mobility across this range, there should be no inherent fragmentation. Those on the language-teaching or internationalization side would belong to the same professional environment as the localizers and translators; language-service providers and multilingual text producers would cooperate as members of what we might call a professional intercultural community. All the professions would be different but interrelated and ultimately happy with each other. A further factor, however, means this is not quite the case.

At the same time as the range of language services broadens, electronic communications technology has given the field a more problematic configuration. In areas such as screen translation, software localization, and multilingual product documentation, we find that combinations of short deadlines and fairly complex electronic tools mean that competent professionals are reasonably well paid and have progressively challenged or abandoned traditional concepts like bilateral translation (as indeed the spreading term "localization" would indicate). Those language workers sometimes set up their own specialized professional associations; they standardize their own professional discourses. And they can do all that on the basis of paychecks corresponding to technical competence with a range of electronic tools. On the other hand, in the lower-paid segments traditionally covered by precarious freelancers, we find only limited use of electronic tools, since most of the available technology is designed for large repetitive projects. The people translating anything from menus to promotional material for small companies are operating in a world quite different from that of the top-end localizers, and their notions of "translation" are correspondingly quite different.

This broadening of language services, combined with the unequal distribution of technical competence, gives a highly segmented labor market. If we look carefully, we find signs that the segments are sometimes pushing each other apart. A broad middle class of "professionals" (typically teachers and staff translators) not uncommonly brushes aside struggling freelancers, who apparently have no social status and perform no useful function. Professionals in localization companies are sure that academics know nothing about the commercial realities of their trade. And, indeed, very few of the academics teaching translation skills do know much about current language-service providers, since we tend to assume translation is simply what it always has been. (It *is* what it always has been, but not simply so.)

A mode of segmentation is also inscribed in the organization of localization projects themselves. We find that translation tasks are mostly separated from re-engineering or management tasks, with the effect that translators are left with the most boring work and the slimmer paychecks. This "leveraging" is wholly justified in terms of efficiency and use of technical skills: the IT engineers work on the codes, the language specialists do the translations, and neither side need know about the other (or so it would seem from the case studies in Sprung 2000). Thanks to this separation, the

place of the project manager becomes the sole means of communication between the two sides, thus maintaining centralized power over the project (localization has no reason to be a democratic process). Similar modes of organization are found in large projects such as the translation of the *acquis communautaire* in EU-candidate countries in 2001-2003, where the role of the translator is kept separate from official deliberations over terminology, technology, or policy, often with quite disastrous results (cf. Gambier 1998). More strangely, the translating of the *acquis communautaire* has been organized by the European Commission's Directorate for Enlargement, and not by the Translation Service for which many of the translators will presumably have to work in the future. All kinds of cooperation and consultation can be arranged across such divisions, but the political existence of the divisions remains a problem for the professions involved.

Such segmentation would seem to be enforced by the very nature of the electronic tools we use (and not just by their price or restricted distribution). Figure 14, for example, shows a web site being translated with the translation-memory suite Déjà Vu (cf. Pym and Biau 2003).

Figure 14. User interface of the translation-memory suite DéjáVu

The translator's segment here is actually the box in the bottom right-hand corner (where we find "Si desea realizar…"); that is where the translator writes. The rest of the screen is given to the source strings in sequence (on the left), the translated or pre-translated strings (on the right), and the source strings being worked on at the moment (lower left). The software has hidden all the HTML source codes, and the text formatting is similarly sublimated into tags, the little numbers ({18}, {19}, etc.) that the translator is instructed

not to touch (if the numbers are changed, the whole string goes red). In sum, this layout tells us that the translator's task is to change the words and nothing else. There is no clear view of what the text formatting looks like; there is no easy view of what the web site design looks like. Translators are not supposed to be interested in such things; they are certainly not supposed to know about the cultural values and effects involved. As we have mentioned, Déjà Vu markets this peculiar invisibility as one of their main selling points. For the translation profession, however, this could mean being locked into donkeywork on a long-term basis. And that is indeed what the software is very good for, since it allows terminologies to be controlled and the idiosyncrasies of individual translators to be ironed out. In fact, this kind of controlled translation easily becomes an extension of internationalization. The only way translators could break out of that lower right-hand box would be to gain the technical or organizational skills needed to enter other facets of localization, as indeed they often do. The very design of the software, however, is not inviting them to look in those directions.

We thus find that the technology divides the market, both in its effective distribution (translation memory software, for example, is not viable for small diverse projects[22]) and in its very conceptualization. This division is not mere fragmentation, in the sense that there are numerous little pieces that could form a whole, but proper segmentation, in the technical sense of there being social restrictions on movement from one part to another.

Other descriptions of the market (cf. Pym 1999, 2000b) have used a crude sociology of types to suggest three main segments, with corresponding characterization of the salaries, work habits, and translation concepts of each. In some countries the tripartite model actually has some justification thanks to a perverse mechanism operative in tertiary education systems. As all professionals are obliged to learn English, the demand for tertiary training in other languages declines. Many teachers of those other languages then find employment in translator-training programs, which promise vocational training and mostly oblige students to work with at least two foreign languages. In some European countries, the consequent explosion in translator training in the 1990s quickly saturated the labor market, creating a growing underclass of ostensibly qualified translators willing to undercut any professional rates. The quantitative increase in training thus leads to a deprofessionalization of part of the market. This is then inversely mirrored by a shortage of trainees with the technical skills needed for the highly professionalized top end of the market, leaving traditional staff translators and established freelancers as an aging middle class.

That three-tier model nevertheless tends to flounder in other social situations, and we should not insist on it too much. In some societies the more telling cuts are those that separate the numerous technical fields involved (screen translators do not mix with court interpreters, even though they may earn similar salaries and have related problems in the workplace). The models can become as complicated as you like. The problem is not exactly how many segments there are, but what long-term consequences the fact of segmentation is likely to have.

The effects of market segmentation

The main social effect of segmentation would seem to be a narrowing of the role of translation, and thus an overlooking of the knowledge and advice that translators might

be able to contribute. In short, some of the most sensitive and experienced cultural mediators are cornered into lousy jobs. This might not improve with the advance of technology.

Esselink (2000) has a vision in which all localization projects will be based on what he terms "multilingual database publishing". All texts are broken down into information elements, given appropriate meta-tags, stored in a database with translations into many languages, and recombined and modified in order to create new texts. All texts will thus be "created, managed and published using database technology" (478). The world will be completely internationalized. The strategy should radically reduce workloads, since "only new or changed information is extracted from the database and processed by translation memory" (479). Translators working at the level of natural-language strings would only have to render or edit the new pieces of information, making this level of localization an on-going update process. Localization projects would then have no beginning or end; workloads could be distributed more evenly, and "translators would probably end up working on several small projects each day" (480).

That vision is offered as some kind of brave new world, ruled by criteria of efficiency. Nor is it at all in some way-off future. The logical combination of XML chunking and Content Management Systems is now (in 2003) used to manage updates across corporations and the larger web sites. Exactly how language workers fit into these technologies nevertheless remains an open question. The main problem is the psychology of the translator who, as Esselink puts it, works "on several small projects each day". Will that language worker have any idea about who is actually producing or using the text? Will they be able to refer to any kind of overarching discursive purpose? Could they imagine something like cooperation? Indeed, will the text-replacement process be at all communicative? In a further paper, Esselink (2002) argues that the potential negative answers to those questions can be avoided by ensuring that the one translator has continuity on the one set of projects, so they do know what is happening and who is talking to whom. That would seem to be the right answer; it may become the right practice.[23]

A second general consequence of segmentation is the proliferation of separate industry guidelines and codes of ethics, and in many cases the effective absence of both. This proliferation can only be expected to continue. Some exception might be made for the top end of the market, notably the regulation of software localization and the vendor-client contacts of LISA. However, even there, significant divisions appeared in 2000 over whether the main focus should be localization or company "globalization" services. The gurus need to see the future in one specific direction or another. If not, who would pay them to point the way? Few professionals, it seems, have any interest in seeking out broad common problems and possible common solutions. No one, except perhaps a guileless academic, could risk such largesse.

Let us propose that all market segments have their place. If the precarious freelancers challenge professionalism by doing questionable translations and wandering in and out of part-time language teaching, we have to live with that. After all, their existence as a multilingual workforce helps overcome the language barriers that limit the mobility of labor, and relative immobility is the main reason why workers tend to miss out on the benefits of globalization. Similarly, if the odd pompous professional proclaims, after decades of comfortably living off government salaries or subsidies, that "Translation is..." or "The translator must...", if they resist new communication

demands and thus become negative for their society's efficiency, those staffers nevertheless remain quite effective at getting official money to keep paying for multilingual administrative institutions. Their existence, too, is ultimately positive for an inclusive democracy. Finally, if the high-tech localizer is busy spreading "industry standards" in the name of efficiency, their work might seem to map out a globally glorious future until, as too rarely happens, we delve into the mechanized discourses they work on and the quite tedious translation jobs they produce. What we gain in efficiency, we risk losing in humanism. The efficient experts play their role, but they do not fill the theater.

One of the main effects of segmentation is that all the parts have their place, with their pros and cons, but few are effectively aware of any kind of whole. The market does not speak with one voice, and seems unlikely to do so until some outsider holds up a mirror so that the body can be seen. That is, until language-service providers have some kind of common identity.

Professionalization and professional identity

One way to tackle this problem is to insist on an active professionalization policy. This could involve a rigorous system for the qualification of professionals and/or training institutions, obligatory membership of professional associations or societies, a fixed set of minimum or guideline fees, and official exclusion of anyone who is unqualified, unaffiliated, or undercutting standard rates. To set all of that in place is a very bureaucratic and unwieldy process, increasingly made difficult by the high geographical mobility of both the professionals and their jobs. If we regulate the profession in France, for example, how does that affect French companies that send work abroad, or non-French professionals working in France or exclusively via the Internet? NAATI in Australia at one point set out to recognize all Australian translators and interpreters on the basis of their qualifications, but the officials were then faced with the prospect of evaluating training programs virtually all over the world, since Australia has translators and interpreters from a very wide range of countries.[24] A further ambitious "professionalization policy" is the move in Spain to organize a professional society (*colegio*) of translators, membership of which would require a degree in translation and interpreting from a Spanish university (or a variety of transitory equivalents). This not only fails to come to terms with the high mobility typical of the sector, but it also seeks to impose professionalization by bolstering the very same institutions that have caused much of the current deprofessionalization. Such moves seem doomed to failure.

We thus find that the more up-front attempts at professionalization seek the juridical guarantees of national legal systems and are consequently hampered by the national frame. Significantly, we have had no reports of any of them attempting to incorporate the software localization industry, and very few policies have peeked beyond the diffuse concept of "translation", which is increasingly inadequate to the scope of the profession. Gouadec (2002) argues strongly for a professionalization policy, but he simultaneously describes translators as "engineers in multilingual (and) multimedia communication". No matter how brilliant that description (the French term *ingénieur* works better), it cannot produce a policy until it corresponds to some social institution or well-established identity.

An alternative way to seek professionalization is to ask where the very idea of the profession came from in the first place. One supposes some form of professional identity might ensue from historical awareness. This is territory in which translation theory has much to say, none the least because it has been around for at least two thousand years. It is an approach that might counterbalance the very newness with which localizers would like to describe their own separate identity. The lesson of history is that things like localization practices have been around for a very long time, and the problems they have faced are not essentially different from those of all cross-cultural communication.

At this point our argument is best developed through a few stories. Here we shall briefly recount a long march from slavery to professionalism. Although that evolution mostly concerns translators, the problems involved are rather more general: the key social elements of localization are far from new. Nor is there any substantial novelty in the problem of basic concern to all the sub-professions involved, the aspect that has indeed been described as the prime "good" of translation (cf. Chesterman 2001) but is in fact a key part of any cross-cultural mediation: the winning and maintenance of trust.

Suspicion of the intermediary

The first written references to translation did not mention translators at all. Kurz (1985) notes that in sixth-dynasty Egypt (2423-2263 BC) one of the official titles of the Princes of Elephantine was "overseers of dragomans", with nothing said of the dragomans or interpreters-guides themselves. Similarly, the Biblical references to translation mention not the translators, but the history of the kings, princes, and priests for whom translations were carried out. Or again, although the multilingual Rosetta stone has the priests of Memphis conferring divine honors on Ptolemy V, it mentions no honors for its hidden translators. Performatives belong to kings, princes, and priests; translators remain as unidentified as the overwhelming majority of those who, for at least four thousand years, have sacrificed their extra-textual personalities in the interests of anonymous mediation.

There is perhaps a certain pride to be taken in the fact that political and moral authorities have had to trust their mediating servants. That service role is much vaunted in historical overviews (cf. Delisle and Woodsworth 1995). Yet it is not a simple cluster of values. How, for example, might the prince know that a particular intermediary is worthy of trust? Clients, almost by definition, cannot control the processes involved; end-users are at the end precisely because they cannot do what the mediators have done. Should clients and users then assume that all language workers are equally competent,

that their fidelity corresponds automatically to what they are paid, that loyalty is beyond doubt? Some kind of extra-textual support is ultimately necessary. Perhaps the prince's confidence is based on a diploma from a specialized institute, references from previous employers, advice from other intermediaries, or even on what the individual is able to say about their practice, since theorization is a mode of professional self-defense. The prime reason for that kind of professionalization is an almost axiomatic *mistrust* of the intermediary. After all, only in situations of mistrust, when one cannot control what is being done, does trustworthiness become a value.

Which extra-textual features of the mediator's identity are most likely to be trustworthy? Traditional societies tend to subordinate indicators of technical competence to factors like group identification or birthright. For example, Herodotus (7.133) reports that the messengers in Sparta were all from the same clan and descended from the demi-god Talthybios (Pym 1997). A demi-god is not a bad symbol of identity; it is at least as good as a company logo. Similarly, when Japan dealt with Dutch traders from 1609, the position of interpreter of Dutch, the *Oranda tsuji*, was hereditary. For even greater degrees of trust, the mediating person should ideally be included in the same group as the king, prince, or priest distributing authority. In Spain, sworn translators are authorized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have their certificates issued in the name of the King. If birthright can no longer be controlled, the mediator should at least identify with the central authoritative figure. The truly trustworthy language worker is not only a member of a profession, but also "one of us". This is no doubt why the bodies offering intermediaries professional qualifications have long been associated with nation states.

The only problem with that traditional guideline is that, since our exchanges are between different cultural groups of some kind, there is always at least one double "we" involved. In theory, the mediator's loyalty could always be to the *foreign* prince or trader, the potential enemy or thief. Nor are language workers able to feign the strict disinterest of other kinds of mercenaries: a hired gun can fight in any battle whatsoever, independently of subjective identification, but translators, like spies, can only be employed between cultures of which they have substantial personal experience; they can only be employed in places where their loyalty is open to question. The Princes of Elephantine were not just overseeing linguistic vraisemblance; they also had to trust dragomans as guides, as former nomads and border-dwellers who knew the foreign lands to be crossed and thus partly belonged to a foreign "we". Intermediaries have long come from border regions, from families of mixed background, from situations where language loyalty contradicts national borders. They will never entirely convince skeptical princes that their inner subjective identification is entirely one-sided. That was no doubt the case in Elephantine. And that might be why sixth-dynasty pharaohs decided to make "overseers of dragomans" a princely title in itself, placing authority in a home-grown hierarchy above anonymous linguistic work, to ensure the success of their commercial expeditions to the south.

That sovereign hierarchy was a partial solution to the problem. We control mediation by creating a hierarchical structure, with rewards that flow down and with structures of internal belonging to keep everyone in place. But what happens when, then as now, those structures run across the lines and the guarantees of the princes? When the state no longer suffices, what do we base trust on then?

Inspiration

One simple solution to the problem of divided loyalty is for the intermediary to seek or invent a higher source of authority. In the case of religious texts, this could mean divine inspiration. And for profane texts, there could be direct inspiration from the author, either through literary metempsychosis, as claimed by Chapman (in T. R. Steiner 1975: 23), or perhaps through mystical "Sortes Vergilianæ", as W. F. Jackson Knight intimated with respect to his translation of the *Aeneid* (1976: 23-24). The spirit of the author or text can move, making mediation a kind of "spirit channeling" (cf. Robinson 2001). In both the religious and profane domains, the source of authority thus becomes an author who is physically absent from competing worldly princes. Authority avoids the political "we" by becoming a fact of individual authorship.

If inspiration is best left to the inspired, its sociological import can nevertheless be described on the basis of how its authority is attested. Consider the miraculous translation of the Greek Bible. The Septuagint translation was ostensibly produced by seventy-two rabbis (six from each of the twelve tribes of Israel) who, working in groups of two and in isolated cells, translated the Old Testament with such divine inspiration that the resulting renditions were all absolutely identical. The legend is at least eloquent on the subject of authority. Rather than compare a Greek translation with a Hebrew source, this exemplary professional association insisted that the only valid test was to compare one Greek text with another, implying that *only the translators themselves* were competent to judge the meaning of the original text. The figure of the dominant author thus sets up the necessary figure of the expert reader. Centuries of philology would follow suite. Regardless of whatever tricks or illusions were used to ensure absolute equivalence between those translations, the very fact of such equivalence could then in turn explain away any differences between the translation and the source. For as long as translators agree among themselves, for as long as they have shared philological tools or a very solid professional association, their divine inspiration can even claim infallibility.

The rabbis merit two further observations. First, the political problem of their "we" was overcome not only by their being drawn from all of the twelve tribes of Israel, but also by their status as something more than mere dragomans: they were all religious teachers, with a claim to extra-translational authority even before their miraculous texts were compared. Their professional association thus drew its initial authority from contiguous social structures, notably those of religious and educational institutions. Second, proof of their inspiration did not necessarily depend on their prior isolation. After all, if they had *not* been isolated, would it have been any less remarkable that they could all agree on one definitive rendition? Recall that Quine's indeterminism assumes that "one translator would reject another's translation" (1969: 96-97). And yet seventy-two rabbis would appear to have reached a common accord. This is indeed miraculous determinism! Further, if they could all agree on a translation, surely they would easily agree to say they had been isolated and inspired?

The structure of strong authorship plus spiritual inspiration functions as a double step towards professionalization. It enables mediators to claim authority on the basis of their contiguity with authors and proximity to the institutions controlling interpretations of authorial intentions, be they divine or otherwise.[25] The structure also demonstrates

the usefulness of burying differences and seeking safety in numbers. And that second function does not depend on established sovereign hierarchies.

Those simple elements may be found in the localization companies of our day. Prestige is borrowed from the economic sectors they serve; tight membership of a functional group creates grounds for trust; internationalization creates a focus for authority within the group; and there is only partial reliance on external authorization from an academy or any higher watchdog institution.

Teamwork

A related solution to the problem of trust can be observed in the background of major international summits. When two presidents meet in different languages, there are usually two interpreters on hand for the necessary shadowing. Why two? Since summit-level interpreters are usually competent in two-way communication, only *one* should be necessary from the point of view of linguistic skills. Yet neither president wants their words filtered through a foreign mouthpiece. In practice, two interpreters are necessary so that each can function as a check on the other. One is presumed to be "ours", the other is "theirs". In this way, the problem of trust is partly solved by making specially selected translators their own mutual overseers. This would be like the "divine inspiration" solution (which also involves teams) except that, in this case, the team only operates because of the *different* but complementary identities involved. Diversity of provenance thus becomes a constitutive criterion of the mediating team.

Translation teams can be found in China from the fourth century and in Europe from the early Middle Ages, and no doubt in earlier periods as well. The teams might bring in just two complementary competencies, as in twelfth-century Hispania where there is evidence of Mozarabs or Jews rendering an Arabic text into spoken Romance, and a Christian church official then translating the spoken Romance into written Latin. This complementarity also extended into more or less elaborate control structures. In thirteenth-century Hispania there are records of additional roles for functions of Reviser (*emendador*), Writer of Glosses (*glosador*), and Organizer into Chapters (*capitulador*), with King Alfonso the Learned himself sometimes "correcting" the final translation (Pym 2000a). That was nothing, however, when compared with tenth-century China, where a description of procedures for rendering Sanskrit sutras into Chinese identifies separate state posts for the Translation Authority, the Scribe, the Oral Transmitter, the Verifier of the Sanskrit Text, the Verifier of the Sanskrit Meaning, the Stylist, the Verifier of Meaning, the Psalmist (who "first fills the arena with hymns"), the Compiler, and the Supervising Officer (Kieschnick 1995). Such extended teams allow the "ours" and "theirs" of summit translators to become an internal fact of the mediation process itself. The problem of trust is controlled by complementarity within the team, without recourse to external hierarchies or claims to divine inspiration.

Extended forms of intra-professional checking have long been used in Bible translating. Luther insisted not only that translators be guided by their faith, but also that they talk among themselves as they translate: "Nec translatores debent esse soli, denn eim einigen fallen nicht allzeit gut et propria verba zu..." (*Tischreden*, in Kloepfer 1967: 36); the right words do not always occur to the solitary translator. The discussion within that professional space could be in several languages at once, as we see in Luther's own playful switching between Latin and German. Luther thereby condemned his translators

to painstaking committees: "We often spent a fortnight or three or four weeks questioning a single word" (*Sendbrief*, in Störig 1963: 32). Teamwork in his case not only promoted (sectarian) trust in the translation but also ensured that the result would be closer to the language of the people. Authority, in this context, depends on neither divine authors nor worldly princes (although both were still eminently useful), since the constitution of authority has effectively been transferred to the level of dialogue and mutual recognition. The prohibition of solitude thus marks a further step in the professionalization of translators.[26]

A "we" similar to that of Luther's committees can be found in introductions to modern Bible translations. The *New International Version*, for example, is presented as the work of "over a hundred scholars" selected and controlled by a complex system of committees that "helped to safeguard the translation from sectarian bias" (NIV 1984: v). As in Luther, the work of the overseeing committees is based on subjective identification of the translators themselves as a group of believers: "...the translators were united in their commitment to the authority and infallibility of the Bible as God's Word in written form" (NIV 1984: vi). The structure of divine inspiration still exists; faith is a collective professional qualification; and it works in teams.

Needless to say, complementary teamwork is an essential element of the localization processes of our own age. It is nothing new. As for the importance of faith, we should perhaps not expect to find it in the jaws of Mammon. Then again, the zeal with which some industrial solutions are defended, the collective fidelity to a company identity, even the preacher-like training sessions that occasionally fill localizers with a mission, are these not traces of a wayward divinity?

The hierarchy of languages

The first great age of the individual translator was no doubt the Renaissance. When the French translator Étienne Dolet argued, in 1540, that all translators should completely understand the matter to be translated, that the source language should be mastered, and that liberty was preferable to word-for-word servitude (1830: 14-16), he was thinking in terms that would not have been understood by the teams of the Middle Ages.

The Renaissance was the age of the vernaculars, of languages that represented peoples and that were, in principle, equal in value. That was the conceptual background disposed to use the discursive structures of equivalence. Prior to that moment, Western notions of cross-cultural communication were regulated not by equivalence but by the medieval hierarchy of languages. At the top stood the languages closest to divine inspiration (Hebrew, Greek, then Latin), then the vernaculars based on Latin, then the patois. Since translation normally went from a higher to a lower language, one of the aims of the exercise was to improve the expressive capacity of the target language. As for mastery of the source language, there was no reason why that could not be the responsibility of another person in the team.

The hierarchy of languages was itself a partial solution to the problem of trust. When the Council of Tours declared, in 813, that all pronouncements and homilies from the pulpit should be in the language of the people ("...in rusticam romanam linguam aut theotiscan"), the bilingual or even trilingual church gained the role of mediator not only between Latin and the incipient national vernaculars, but also between the vernaculars and the patois (cf. Balibar 1985). For each distribution, they held knowledge of the

source language, axiomatically in a position of superior prestige and power. Although based on proximity to the divine, this power was also a real force in the secular world, since the church thereby regulated communication between the international order (in Latin) and the kingdoms (in the vernaculars), and then between the kingdoms and the people (in the patois). That power was held by the church as an institution, not by any one intermediary acting alone.

We might say, in general, that the hierarchy of languages enabled the mediator to speak with the prestige of the axiomatically superior source culture, and that this in itself functioned as a way of gaining and manipulating trust.

As much as the divinely inspired hierarchies might have died with the Middle Ages, their technological surrogates are very much with us today. Some languages are close to the creation of technology, others are further away. We find very real hierarchies when, for example, locales are divided into those that warrant full localization plus translation, those that have partial localization, those that might only get the outside wrapping in their language, and those that remain unlocalized (cf. Brooks 2000). Such decisions are certainly based on the diversity and potential market size of the locales, as we have seen, but the criteria also depend on the degrees to which technological discourses are already operative in the languages. When confronted with marketing a shop-floor industrial machine in Spanish America, for example, one must decide whether to localize for each national variety (some 23 of them) or perhaps for just one generic Spanish. In that particular case, where worker safety was a real issue, the solution adopted was to recognize (or even create) three regional varieties of South-American Spanish, thus in fact creating another rung in the hierarchy. That may be a viable solution for many similar problems faced, on a daily basis, in the numerous languages now entering the world of industrial discourses, in Africa, in Asia, in the limbs not yet seen by the gods of technology.

The hierarchy of languages, whether medieval or industrial, may also have an effect on the kind of translational language that is likely to be tolerated by end-use locales. According to Gideon Toury (1995), translations from a culture perceived as being prestigious will tend to bear more signs of the source text and language than when the target culture considers itself more prestigious than the source. In our terms, distribution in a downward direction on the hierarchy will tend to produce a rather literal translation, with the presence of transliterations or simply with some of the text left in the source language. This is indeed what we find in a lot of the software that moves from English into relatively powerless tongues. On the other hand, an upward distribution, from a non-prestigious to a prestigious locale, will tend to require a more complete, domesticated target text, in principle indistinguishable from non-translated texts in the target language. This would be something like the fluent, invisible discourse that some regard as being typical of translations into English (cf. Venuti 1995). In those latter cases, the receiving locale will tend to be less tolerant of deviations from its norms, and that lack of tolerance should apply to the language used in all forms of mediation.

An unstable source

When Étienne Dolet insisted that the translator understand the matter to be translated, he somehow assumed that the matter was there, in the source text, available so that

everyone could potentially understand (or at least so he claimed when accused of mistranslating Plato). Here again the medieval intermediaries would have had trouble following the argument, and not only because the hierarchy of languages restricted the right to understand. Dolet was a printer, as well as a translator. For him, the source text was very much a fixed object. Prior to the age of the printing press, however, source texts were manuscripts, constantly being altered through copying, and often incomplete or defective representations of an absent oral discourse (the medieval translators working from Arabic had texts without diacritics, for example). Each copy and translation tended to add a series of glosses and notes, which the text would then carry along with it. The medieval texts were in fact constantly being rewritten, and translation was frequently perceived as just another step in that chain of rewritings. The translators could expand and abbreviate, interpret or hypothesize, and be extremely literal when in doubt, all with a degree of liberty that was not so freely accorded to the isolated translator of the Renaissance (Dolet was burned at the stake for adding three words to Plato…so much for individual responsibility).

The age of print was perhaps also the age of the stable source text. Both before that age and in our own era of electronic communication, texts are constantly subject to updating and adaptation. The web sites we work on are temporary representations; the software is always preparing its next version; all information carries a use-by date. True, one cannot push the medieval analogy too far. The best parallels are actually with the age of paper, prior to the printing press, where draft translations circulated to rival any final version.

When the source is unstable, as in the constant updates and modifications allowed by electronic and manuscript distribution, what are the consequences for the status of the intermediary? Almost everything changes. One can no longer be faithful to just one written text (although transfer of the spirit still remains ideologically possible). Intermediaries assume an active role, intervening to prolong and direct the life of what is no more than a chain of transformations. In so doing, they become rather more than intermediaries. They are socially present as producers of texts, relatively uncontrolled by necessary recourse to the source. Such language workers ultimately achieve trust not on the basis of where their words have come from, but on what can be done with the texts they produce. Trust, in this case, accompanies target-text function.

Here, again, the dynamics of the pre-print age seem to say more about contemporary localization practices than would the theories of translation that assume a stable source text. On the broad historical view, the unstable and evolving source must be seen as the norm rather than the exception; it is certainly nothing new.

We thus find an interesting handful of ways in which linguistic mediation may seek to avoid axiomatic mistrust. One might claim access to a spiritual epiphany or esoteric insiders' knowledge; there could be operative reliance on modes of teamwork; prestige can be borrowed from a hierarchy of locales; and quasi-authorial responsibilities can be assumed in cases where there is an unstable source text. All these, we should insist, are in addition to the properly translatorial modes of relative anonymity, which use the discursive maxims of translational quantity and first-person displacement. And very little of this, it seems, requires recourse to systems of external assessment or academic qualification. That may be why such external systems have had very little to say in the long history of mediation between cultures.

Our argument here is not that bureaucratic professionalization is wrong or totally unnecessary. Our purpose is simply to point out a series of alternative modes of

professionalization, all of which can be applied to all forms of mediation to one degree or another. They are social practices, not legislative rules. In them, one might hope, a broader sense of identity might be obtained.

Ethical principles

Our search for a common problematic has been based on the general notion of trust and mistrust. Trust would seem to be what is particularly at stake in cross-cultural communication, even if its dynamics are present to some extent in all forms of communication. Not surprisingly, the translation theorist Andrew Chesterman (2001) sees trustworthiness as one of the prime virtues of translators (along with the positive values of truth, clarity, and loyalty). The discussion of professionalization inevitably feeds into discussions of such professional qualities. Ethical principles based on selected and prioritized virtues should perhaps then give substantial social identity to a profession, forging consensus around a core ethos. That, however, is not quite the mode of professionalization that we have been considering here. We should explain why.

Beyond particular virtues like trustworthiness, Chesterman sees "understanding" as the supreme aim involved in translation: "For a translator this is naturally a primary task: to understand what the client wants, to understand the source text, to understand what the readers can be expected to understand, and so on" (2001: 152). Yes, indeed, something like that is certainly involved, in translation as in all forms of mediation. Much depends, however, on the exact nature of this understanding. Need it be perfect, full understanding, in the sense of the effability we introduced at the beginning of the last chapter? Chesterman does nothing to disown that idealist reading of the term, since he invites us to assume that things like intentions, texts, and people's capacities can somehow be ultimately "understood".[27] This kind of understanding would position the intermediary as a passive agent facing a stable object just waiting to be understood. If, however, we seek to apply the logic of cooperation and transaction costs, we would prefer to say that clients' wishes, source-text meanings, and readers' capacities should be estimated and directed, within the limits of the transaction costs available, in order to serve the even higher aim of cross-cultural cooperation. To that end, we would prefer to talk not about "understanding" as a possibly misleading surrogate for the fiction of effability, but about "understandings" (in the plural) as the pragmatic accords that opposed parties reach. A married couple may never feel they understand each other, but they can agree on a series of everyday understandings about the division of household tasks and expenses. For our approach, this dynamic sense of "good enough" understandings (just "good enough" to facilitate cooperation) is quite sufficient. The aim is cooperation, not static meaning.

Chesterman does not particularly want his view of professionalization to extend into the territory of cooperation. He prefers to draw the line at "understanding", which he sees as some kind of boundary of the profession:

> This, I submit, is the defining limit of a translator's professional ethics, and also of their *professional* responsibility, the responsibility of their practice. The translator might of course feel *personally* responsible for the *consequences* of this understanding; and this feeling of personal responsibility might well affect their decisions about whether, or how, to translate. ([This may be compared with a

previous point] about excluding the translator's political engagement from professional ethics.) What communicating parties do with their resultant understanding is a matter of *their* own ethical principles—whether they use it in order to cooperate, for good or evil, or whatever. (2001: 152)

We want to see cooperation itself as a part of the intermediary's professional ethics, and not only because it allows us to discuss transaction costs and thus modify the idealism of singular "understanding". Granted, the parties that intermediaries work for are then responsible for the ends to which they use cooperation, and the intermediary should not be held professionally responsible for that (it makes no sense to condemn the interpreters working between Hitler and Mussolini for propagating fascism). Our more serious argument is with the apparent *neutrality* that Chesterman would thereby seem to attribute to the profession, as if merely trying to "understand" texts, intentions, and capacities were enough to position the language worker in a magic cultural bubble protected by supreme virtues. That seems a very naïve view of professionalism. It would be a rather hard sell to the wider range of mediating activities that we are addressing here, many of which want to change the world rather than remain passively neutral. Hence our desire to discuss trust not on the basis of professional virtues, but in terms of quite Machiavellian strategies for professional self-protection. For us, the process of professionalization is by no means a story of sanctification. The prime task of professionalization is to carve out a social space in which virtues and values, whatever they may be, might stand a chance of winning hearts and minds, and thus joining together the segments that are currently drifting apart. Without that space, without some highly strategic modes of professionalization, one might as well be preaching in the desert.

As we have said, this particularly concerns assumptions of neutrality. Intermediaries have always come from somewhere; they always bear the accents or traces of their provenance, even if it is the geographical location of the localization company's head office. That is precisely one of the reasons why language workers are subject to mistrust. There can be no axiomatically neutral space in which aims such as "understanding" might be cultivated. What can happen, however, is that the strategies of professionalization create illusions of neutrality. They thereby win the trust that might open the space corresponding to the illusion. This is certainly what happens when intermediaries accept and manipulate the maxims of translation, using equivalence and relative anonymity to hide their discursive position in the world. It is also what happens when claims are made to faith, to guiding spirits, to safety in numbers, and to the various versions of expertise that we have just traced. There is no reason to expect intermediaries to be neutral, somehow perfectly balanced between the competing cultures of our world. But they have every professional interest in *appearing* to be neutral, usually on a higher level, and in gaining trust on that basis. Neutrality is not natural; it has to be created; it is as much a strategy as the rest.

A second assumption that pervades idealist ethics (not Chesterman's in this case) is the view that translators are governed by the source text. If the source is wrong but authoritative, the translation should be wrong as well. Translators, it is said, should not try to improve authoritative sources. That question is a touchstone for perennial debates between aging translation theorists, guaranteed to bore almost anyone else involved in linguistic mediation (the multiple forms of internationalization have done away with stable source texts, and the remaining electronic sources are constantly

improving themselves anyway). The debate can actually be resolved quite easily. From the perspective of distribution, source texts cannot be improved because they are not available: they are back there, at the source. The intermediary only gets to work on a distributed text, the one that has been moved in order to carry out a new task. In fact, a text only has to be transformed (translated or otherwise) when it is to reach locales where it no longer has an adequately performative function or no longer facilitates cooperation. If you like, the text is moved to a place where it cannot be properly functional (it is in the wrong language, or makes the wrong cultural assumptions). So the text is transformed. And the transformation, be it localization or bilateral translation, is thus always an improvement. By definition, from the perspective of the mediator, *the first improvement must be fact of transformation itself*. Beyond that, the degrees of improvement concern the participative, observational, and excluded reception positions involved, and those decisions can be handled by an ethics of cooperation.

If we thus accept that there is no primary neutrality and that mediation is not axiomatically ruled by any source, to what should professional intermediaries swear allegiance? A first answer is that they should be loyal to their shared profession. They should swear allegiance to an intercultural space, hard-won, surrounded by myths and illusions, subject to much misuse, but theirs. A better answer should then graft a higher aim onto that space, since few would be content with a profession whose one aim was to reproduce itself. There is no reason why that higher aim should not be more general in scope, available to vast sections of humanity, as when Goethe described the aim of translation as being to "increase tolerance between nations" (in Lefevere 1977: 34). In our version, suited to rather more than translation, *linguistic mediation is only worthwhile if it can promote long-term cooperation between cultures*.

What "cooperation" means here should be clear enough from the previous chapter. What kind of professional space we might have for pronouncing the principle should have been outlined in this chapter. What remains to be seen are the priorities of the "long term", and why, at this point, we should choose to talk about cultures rather than locales. Those questions require one final chapter.

9. Humanizing discourse

Imagine there was suddenly a fully unified profession carrying out all movements between cultures. Imagine, too, that the profession agreed fully on the basic principles of their function, that cross-cultural cooperation was universally recognized as the way to solve the world's problems, and that the profession was actually helping to solve those problems. Given all of that, what could possibly be missing? One would certainly have to regret the lack of guidelines concerning language, given that these professionals all work on language in one form or another. One might also sense that the major challenges of the electronic age concern certain types of language, given that technology is profoundly changing the nature of technical discourse. And one might suspect that what is lacking in that discourse is a certain sense of humanity, a vague cluster of values that remains difficult to define. Our work in this final chapter will be to see what such values might look like, and how they could inform the future of localization and translation.

Seeking the long view

One of the very valuable lessons that localization can learn from translation theory is to take a long view of history. Thanks to this longer vision, some parts of translation theory are given to debating questions that localization discourse has not yet asked itself. For instance, what is the effect of localization on the dimensions of end-use locales in time and space? Does localization enhance or restrict the diversity of locales? Need we accept a world where localization necessarily profiles people in fixed locales? Does the servicing of immediate needs have priority over long-term learning processes? Does such servicing hamper movements from the peripheries to the centers of knowledge? Is localization bridging gaps or creating divides? Are we creating any kind of cooperation or tolerance? Or does localization promote a world where products arrive in locales but betray no provenance, show no otherness, and ultimately lead to cultural closure?

Such questions assume data on huge swathes of human interaction, over expanses of time and space that are not within the localizers' budgets. They involve issues that no longer concern locales in the strict market-based usages of the term. They address the way people live their lives, moving in and out of specific markets, in the same way as sociolinguistics sees people moving in and out of domains, speaking differently in each but crossing them all to form the networks of social life. In short, we reach a point where we must consider cultures, not locales. We must return to the complex modes of belonging we have described as cultural embedding, and to the myriad diversities that resist localization. Our fundamental questions have to do with cultures in this wider sense, not just as shared points of reference or professional association but as a multiple overlaps of locales, bound together by factors of identity and tongues.

Our proposition here will be that all forms of cross-cultural mediation should not only promote cooperation (transaction costs and all), but also humanize relations. This is an unfashionable path, running across a minefield full of divergent interpretations of the terms involved. Appeals to a vague common "humanity" have been used to cover

over a multitude of exploitative relationships, giving rise to an academic anti-humanism with which we have much sympathy. When we insist, for example, that the stability of equivalence is no more than an operative fiction, or that professionalization is basically a series of self-defense strategies, our approach might fairly be described as anti-humanist. We are, in those cases, denying any ontology of substance upon which stable human values might be built; we are building on a meme-like world where difference rules and the basic struggle is for survival. And yet now, at this point, we invoke some kind of universal sameness among humans, knowing full well that this too is an operative fiction for which we can offer no substantial ground.

Humanization should refer in some way to "humanism", a term that has meant an enormous number of things to almost as many people (see, for example, Bödeker 1982). It comes to us from the Renaissance, from the Italian cities of the fifteenth century where the *studia humanitatis* were associated with values like respecting the linguistic integrity of texts, or placing reason above religion. This often meant constructing civil society through secular education and by creating networks between professional intellectuals. In linguistic terms, that kind of humanism placed a high value on the manner of expression, over and above the content of what is expressed. Such were the calls for "eloquence", and the corresponding development of rhetoric as an area of study. Most of us now struggle to appreciate the connection between "eloquence" and "human values", but such things were certainly of a piece in an age just escaping from Christian fundamentalism. Pre-humanists read and translated Plato in terms of how well his pagan ideas fitted in with established doctrine; the humanist Leonardo Bruni read and translated him as a person using stylistic devices, conveying a personality as well as ideas. That might be what is meant by a "humanizing" discourse: Bruni did indeed use philology to put a human face on his texts, including his translations.

What might it then mean to talk about "humanization" as a process, or of some relations becoming more "human" than others? For a start, it means finding a reason to cooperate with others rather than destroying them. That reason, entirely compatible with egoism and self-defense, is then invested with affective values. It might pass through what we have intuitively called the giving of a face, and with multiple kinds of interest in the other, since the more subtle our shared understandings (in the dynamic plural), the richer our overall cooperation. In this, the move from cooperation to humanization shifts from calculated costs to a more iconic way of dealing with complexity. We start to recognize, for instance, that the lives of end-users are not actually lived in locales, just as our lives are not entirely spent in knowledge-producing professions. Such recognitions of commonality need not be an ideological cover for exploitation. They can become the necessary basis for subsequent recognitions of difference, appreciation of diversity, and respect for modes of belonging from which the self is excluded.

Our interest in humanization should not be confused with general complaints about technology. We would broadly agree, with the Catalan anthropologist Eudald Carbonell (in Carbonell and Sala 2001), that the use of technology is a key element of what makes humans human. The more technology we use, the more human we become, transforming the world and our relations in ways that remain impossible for non-human beings. Electronic communication extends our senses, enabling us to cooperate ever more, and providing the increasing information we need for such relationships. The problems with our technologies concern how we use them, how their social distribution is restricted, how the interfaces direct thought, but not what the technologies are in

themselves. Indeed, in the terms of Carbonell, these restrictions on technology are what still keep us from being fully human.

Looking back at the various chapters in this book, humanization would certainly concord with values like the diversity of cultures (which we have argued can be protected by communication technologies) and the power of tongues as weaving the threads of complex belonging. It might even be compatible with the joyous mixes of languages we have found in imperfect localization, with which we learn to live and work. Its opposites, however, the prime impediments to humanization, would seem to work in a field that we have so far only mentioned in passing: that of the type of language we use in our technical discourses. Those discourses are of key importance, not only because they are the most localized and translated, but also because they are progressively dominating the way we think about localization and translation themselves.

But we still have to discover what humanization might mean in terms of language.

Adaptation as humanization

We have posited that technical discourses can be humanizing or dehumanizing; they can have faces or non-faces. Or better: there is often something missing in technical communication, something we sense the lack of, something we would like to recapture, for our own lives if not always for the sake of efficiency. If we could describe what that thing is, we might know what to do with it when we come to localize and translate. Here we will try to bring out this sense of lack, to work on it inductively, appealing to a strict minimum of grand principles.

Part of this is what everyone already knows. It is embedded in the core ideology of localization itself, surely dedicated to giving end-users the language that is most theirs, adapting to their social and cultural conventions, potentially entering the intimacy of everyday lives. Seen in that way, to localize should surely be to humanize, in some nebulous sense. On the other hand, to internationalize, to produce the generic codes proper only to the locale of production, could be to dehumanize, in an equally undefined sense. The computer screen full of source code, although very much part of a communication act, is somehow not what one would want to call humanizing discourse. It might be nearer the upper reaches of our postmodern Towers of Babel, accessible to those able to climb, but with a fleeting universality that is not quite what the end-user is supposed to want. This simple observation develops our first idea of the difference: to humanize a discourse is not just to put a human face on it; it is to bring it closer to the communication acts that belong to many overlapping locales, to cultures beyond the restrictively technical.

Humanization could thus involve the selection of quite local language varieties, the use of short sentences and decidedly non-technical terms, the eschewing of acronyms, the selection of culturally appropriate terms of address, place names, colors, date conventions, currencies, and so on, right through to cuteness conventions like that little dog on Microsoft XP. That is, it should lie within all the kinds of things we associate with the successful localization of software. Even there, to localize should be to humanize.

Humanization might also work according to hierarchies of expertise, recognizing that within the one locale there are many degrees of professional competencies and needs. The marketing of XP in Professional and Home editions would also bring communication as close as possible to the specific user. And this, ideally, would be humanizing too.

Then again, one feels that such adaptation is not quite humanizing in any full sense. The very specificity of the profiling is somehow intrusive; the priorities of commerce remain too obvious. The core ideology of localization might benefit from some more refined formulation of its aims.

The loss of discursive linearity

Since internationalization practices have to serve a range of locales over stretches of time, they lead to the constant rewriting of texts, to what we have described as a rather medieval approach to textuality. This is partly for perpetual updates, but also because of constant feedback from locales, requiring modification. The over-riding reason for the rewrites is, of course, the technological possibilities presented by electronic text storage, translation memories and the like. Many of the rewriting processes occur not because they absolutely have to, but because technology makes it possible for them to occur.

The result of this is often the production of texts like the following:

Welcome to Dragon NaturallySpeaking, the world's most acclaimed large-vocabulary continuous-speech dictation system. With Dragon NaturallySpeaking you can dictate to your computer instead of using the computer to enter and revise text.

We turn two pages and read:

Welcome to Dragon NaturallySpeaking, the world's most acclaimed large-vocabulary continuous-speech dictation system. With Dragon NaturallySpeaking you can dictate to your computer instead of typing.

Easy to see what has happened here: some unnamed hand has modified one of the texts in order to produce the other, in accordance with new parameters (the second text is perhaps more introductory than the first). Such rewriting need not have anything to do with text reception processes. It is innocent enough. But then, when we find these texts in a user's manual, separated by just two physical pages, something strange is going on. As readers, we are seeing the same thing twice. We are thrown into minor *déjà vu*, momentary discontent, and perhaps little more. Yet in that fleeting instant of frustration, we are surely made aware that we are not using the booklet in quite the way we are supposed to. This mode of rewriting is not for people who start at the beginning and read through, line by line, to the very end. Instead, in instruction manuals and more so in online Help files, we are positively invited to select fragments by using the index and table of contents; we are clearly supposed to jump over the repetitions and standard product warnings. The text structure says as much.

The recycling of fragments in this way was probably never intended to be in book form. Its proper place is the online file, where all we will ever read are the chunks we

supposedly need. We will click on the hyperlinks that hop across all linearity save their own; we read the web page with the Find function; we consult the electronic libraries with a search engine; and the texts we encounter are increasingly designed for that mode of use.

That is why electronic texts are given to non-linearity, in terms of both production and reception. Texts are structured in terms of repetition rather than deictics, hyperlinks rather than hypotaxis, and text length has no socially necessary restriction. All this, of course, comes just when linguistics has established disciplines given to analyzing the way texts are put together, in the very age when electronic texts are becoming stand-alone chunks. All this comes just when we have learnt to teach students the fundamentals of text construction, often to little avail. The technical discourses based on internationalization lead us not into the dynamics of real or feigned interaction, nor into any narrativity of beginning-middle-end. All texts become "information objects" (Hofmann and Mehnert 2000), "information elements" (Lockwood 2000), fragments of a textual whole that is not named because it is never seen. Such is non-linearity. And it might be a feature of the kind of discourse produced by internationalization in an electronic age.

Non-linearity on the side of text production more readily goes by industry names such as "leveraging" (where text to be translated is separated from that which is not) and "chunking" (which involves ensuring the coherence of discourse fragments). It ensues from internationalization in two ways.

First, leveraging concerns the breaking up of text into parts that have to be worked on at different levels, usually by different people. Admittedly, when this involves the separation of natural-language strings from source code, the process is actually increasing discursive linearity, since the localizer or translator need then only work on what the end-user (no longer "reader") will actually see. However, the notion of leveraging can also apply to the extraction of terminology from a set of strings, the separation of new from old elements, the isolation of updates, or the tagging of fragments in accordance with reception levels (some elements are for the home user, others are for professionals). In those latter cases, the localizer or translator is invited to work only on the fragments thus separated out, with significantly less regard for discursive linearity.

Chunking may be seen as another level of the same process. Texts are broken down into units that can be mixed and matched to form new texts. If you like, this is the step that makes concept-based leveraging possible. Yet it has far-reaching consequences as a general approach to language production. It encapsulates not only the general logic by which paragraph-like entities are tagged for XLM, but also the apparently innocent alignments achieved by translation-memory suites. The software increasingly invites language producers to work only on the fragments, on the new, on the different, and to forsake linearity, or to trust that the user will create their own lines of use. As we have seen, this risks positioning translators, especially, in situations where they have few ideas about who is actually producing or using the text, and with minimal reference to any kind of overarching discursive purpose. On all those levels, we might claim that the loss of linearity incurs the loss of some fundamental values of human communication.

On the other hand, there are good arguments suggesting that nothing essentially new is happening here. O'Donnell (1998) claims that linearity was lost with the historical move from papyrus scrolls to the bound manuscript, since the latter allows a text to be "thumbed through" and consulted in terms of an index. The great libraries of

antiquity would share the same ambition as the World Wide Web, seen as a virtual library. There would be nothing fundamentally different between surfing the web and using canon tables to jump between sites in the Bible. On this broad historical view, the illusory linearity of the printed book has been a moment of exception rather than the general rule. Both before and after print, the written text was constantly subject to updating and adaptation, localization *avant la lettre*. Arguments could thus be made that leveraging and chunking are actually returning us to a more fragmentary experience of the world, as if we were moving in and out of so many oral conversations, liberating reception from the constraints of authorial control, strangely in keeping with Modernist aesthetics of the independent text.

Let us then merely observe that technology is breaking up the linearity of technical discourse. That may not be a bad thing in itself. In fact, we can have no consistent complaint about non-linearity until we consider how it affects other aspects of discourse, particularly the identification of persons and the facilitation of pedagogical progression.

Persons

We borrow from Arnaud Laygues (2001) the following passage from Martin Buber's *Ich und Du*, published in 1923 and rendered here in unfortunately sexist English (2000):

> The attitude of the man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks.
> The primary words are not isolated words, but combined words.
> The one primary word is the combination *I-Thou*.
> The other primary word is the combination *I-It*; wherein, without a change in the primary word, one of the words *He* or *She* can replace *It*.
> Hence the *I* of man is also twofold.
> For the *I* of the primary word *I-Thou* is a different *I* from that of the primary word *I-It*. (2000: 19)

Buber here is talking about interpersonal relations, about the way subjectivity is positioned by those relationships. The theologian's primary frame of reference is the act of prayer, where the communication positions the Thou, this intimate second person, as God. We are not the same person when we pray (to a *Thou*) as when we work on a computer (with an *It*), or so would posit Buber. Nor are these two kinds of relation ethically equal. The only stable relationship is the content of the primary word *I-Thou*. On the other hand, the relation with the third person, with things, is a constant search for content, as when one definition requires another, one possession needs the protection of another, in the process elsewhere called semiosis.

We might choose to ignore the mysticism of dialogue with the divine. Most would still sense there is a substantial difference between communicating with an intimate "you" (a close friend, a spouse, a parent, a sibling, a daughter or son) and communicating with a "he" or a "she", people relegated to the status of third-person things. This could be no more than the Kantian ethics of treating people as ends rather than means, as second persons rather than third persons. Here, however, it is framed in terms of communication, and specifically of pronouns. Laygues uses this piece of Buber

to insist that translators seek out the *human relations* behind the texts, the readers behind the client, the interpersonal behind the objective. In short, rather than work with language as a set of things, we should work with people as expressed through language. The things of this world, the countless tasks of *I-It* relations, should be seen as exchanges between people able to help each other. Such might be the ethics of humanized cooperation.

Let us illustrate this idea on the basis of a simple example. Although our real concern is what happens when texts are transformed across languages and cultures, the idea can be shown well enough within English. Here we assume that the movement from internationalized English into other languages can be like the movement from professional to relatively unprofessional English. If this holds, much of what we are seeking as humanization might be discovered by working on such comparisons within English, at least to the extent that the conclusions reached might later be tested interlingually.

Here then are fragments of two texts, both about passwords (the first is from the manual for the web site production program Dreamweaver; the second is from Microsoft Word). One text would seem more localized, more humanized, than the other:

> password NN 2 IE 3 DOM 1
> The password object is a form control generated with an INPUT element whose TYPE attribute is set to "password". This object is similar to the text object, except that the characters typed into the text box by the user are converted to asterisk or bullet symbols for privacy.

> Word provides several security and protection features. You can do any of the following:
> · "Protect" a document to restrict the types of changes users can make to it. (For example, protect an online form so users can fill in only the designated areas.) For extra security, you can assign a password to prevent unauthorized users from "unprotecting" the document. For more information, click ☐ .

The first text is for a relative professional; the second is more for a non-professional end-user. We might assume that the logical progression is for concepts to travel from the first type of discourse to the second, since the language of intercultural production precedes the result of localization. Then again, the very technical text is almost certainly the result of a lost oral tradition, the kicking around of ideas, the strange pacts of informality and technicality that mark the professions of this field. Here we can only leave those wondrous developmental dynamics to the speakers involved (suspecting, nevertheless, that some process of dehumanization led to the first of the above texts). Let us study no more than the assumed movement from the center to the periphery, from technical to end-use, the movement that would ideally be that of localization. How might we recognize this as humanization?

Consider the pronouns in the examples. Not surprisingly, the less localized text is entirely in the third person, as a world of relations between things. The less professional text, on the other hand, consistently uses the second person "you"; it allows a discursive position for the user who should be able to carry out the actions described.

To that extent, we might describe the second text as more humanized, if and when we can consider the use of the second person a truly humanizing trait.

Such discursive positioning of the second person is not unambiguous. It is often not followed in translation into Spanish, for example, where devices like the reflexive are felt to be less intrusive, less pushy. Further, when the second person is discursively necessary, as in the many imperatives, it is more often than not expressed as the *formal* second person in Spanish (*usted*). Too many intimate "tú"s are sometimes felt to be condescending, too much like talking to a child.

Even in English, surely, this discursive relation is rather less than satisfying. For a start, Buber was calling for an *I-Thou* bond, and here there is no explicit *first* person anywhere. The person speaking is the program, the machine, the company, the legally responsible party, a thing, never a person. Do we willingly allow objects to command our intimate subjectivity so abruptly? This is essentially the problem of profiling, as when a search engine thinks it is has picked up your preferred language because of your email address (technological return of the national!). Even more frustrating can be the hierarchical profiling that positions the second person in the limited categories of Home or Professional. Social lives are not lived in such places.

What is upsetting here? Great efforts have been made to have machines adjust communication to the profile of the user. This, in discursive terms, is perhaps the closest that technical communication can come to the intimate *I-Thou* relationship, as if God had seen our soul. It should be extremely humanizing. The machine of the primary word *Machine-Thou* is a different machine from that of the primary word *Machine-It*. But the result, of course, is that the second person is felt to be equally mechanized; the discursive "you" stays at the level of convenient convention; the discourse is humanized, but not completely so.

Our reflections here actually come from a very common teaching experience. Let us say we want students to learn to use a new software program. We give a demonstration, explain the principles, and leave them to get the thing going for themselves. To help them on their way, we bequeath our written notes; they have an online tutorial; they have a very complete Help file; all the information they could ever want is there, in written form, with all the written second and third persons imaginable. So what do they do? Within seconds they are screaming out for personal individual attention from a human, hopefully a fellow student, more often the overworked teacher. Why should that be so?

The same thing happens, of course, in discussions between professionals or experts. The information is all in written documents somewhere, but what we want is the insiders' tips, the personal opinions, the individual comparisons, the chatting exchanged between first persons. If a few seconds of searching the Internet does not solve our problem, if we look like drowning in the abundance of available information, the instinctive solution is to contact an expert, someone we can trust.

At both these levels, the second person looks for a first person, even if that person is a company and not an individual. The second-person text goes part of the way there, but it requires completion in another mode, just as a Bible is completed in the communication of prayer. This is where, of course, we might start regretting the loss of linearity, since relative linearity enables texts to be identified with first-person voices (with or without the actual pronoun). Break up the texts into chunks, and you convert the persons into things.

What can localization learn from translation theory here? That one can never entirely do away with the first person, with the figure of the author, the human source, with which translators have grappled for centuries.

Accessibility

The linguistic differences between our two "password" discourses are fairly obvious. As Table 3 shows, it takes less than a minute to get numbers on a few of the features involved (here using no more than Word's Readability tool for the whole texts, not just the above fragments):

	Professional	Non-professional
Words per sentence	17.9	9.9
Characters per word	4.7	4.5
Passives	36%	0%
Flesch readability score	53.7	67.4
Flesch-Kincaid score	10.2	6.3

Table 3. Quick and easy numbers comparing two texts

On the basis of this analysis, we might claim that humanization involves avoiding complex syntax and using short words, since they tend to be the most common (not that there is much difference in word length in this particular case). So humanization might be no more than writing a text that is easy to read. Here the Flesch-Kincaid score indicates that the non-professional text can be read by a sixth-grader (in the American school system); the professional one requires a tenth-grader. However, if that were all, what would keep humanization from being no more than the dumbing-down of discourse? Write as if you were speaking to a child (a sixth-grader, aged twelve or so), and the result will necessarily be human? And if you write with the syntax and syllables most efficient for a technician, as might have been done in the first of our "password" texts, is the result necessarily dehumanized on that score alone?

Like many attempts at purely quantitative studies of communication, the above approach errs by picking up the available tools, getting the numbers, and forgetting about the kind of thought that might make the results meaningful. Our analysis could be carried out on a corpus of several million words, it might take us a year or so to ensure that the numbers are truly representative of some kind of specific technical genre, but all that effort would be to little avail if we overlooked the human dimension of actual text usage.

The sociology of electronic communication, by whatever yardstick you want to measure it, suggests that discursive competence in this particular field tends to be *inversely* proportional to age. Beyond adolescence, the older one is, the more difficulty one has with this kind of discourse. Yet the above analysis, based on tools for all kinds of discourse comprehension, has fleetingly assumed that the opposite is true, that age will bring insight. A youth spent with technical discourse might bring its own modes of comprehension, and the corresponding discursive features have no reason to be located on any kind of general age-graded scale.

The problem here is not age, nor particularly with "dumbing down". The consistency with which the less professional text has been constructed would suggest

that considerable effort has been invested in writing it. It is good technical prose (the corresponding text is actually clearer and more explicit in later versions of Word). Relatively high transaction costs have been invested because of the relatively high degree of diversity involved in the movement (here from professional to a very wide non-professional). Further, the text is explicitly combined with hands-on acts (read about the action, then do the action); it is highly pedagogical. The really critical factor is then whether the end-user is locked into that receiving locale (as they might be if "dumbing down" were the whole story), or if they are given the keys with which to move on to the more technical discourse (as the "click here for more information" would suggest). That pedagogical allowance for mobility should be what we are looking for as humanization, not just the use of simple words to keep people in simple places.

Rhetoric and social segmentation

One of the main debates associated with classical humanism was the extent to which eloquence isolates readerships. For some (including Leonardo Bruni), the full panoply of a tongue's expressive resources should be used to move people (both emotionally and physically), to address a wide range of social groups, and to form the common bonds of civil society. Eloquence most forcefully acts in the mouth of the great politician (which Bruni was); it is able to convince many different kinds of people to cooperate with each other; it is most powerful in a discourse of the general, open to technicalities from all sides, using metaphor to cross-fertilize fields of knowledge. For others, however, eloquence can equally involve an excessive preoccupation with correctness, with complexity, and with abstruse language resources, all of which may lead to quite the opposite result. For Bödeker, "the *studia humanitatis* presuppose a high degree of education with elitist features, which thus compromise their wider effectiveness" (1982: 1070). You set out to move a lot of people, you develop techniques for doing so, but you soon finish up with so many technicalities that you fail to get beyond a narrow professional coterie. In our age of globalized personal computing, technology is supposed to be available to everyone, yet vast amounts of it are locked up in discourses accessible only to the production sectors. The very attempt to democratize through technology can produce its own negation. One is either privy to the obscurities of production, or located as a child-like end-user, fit only to consume, as might be the risk brought out by our examples above. Here we find a problem of social segmentation closely related to the one that troubles the mediating professions themselves.

In our examples, a minor trace of segmentation can be found in the inverted commas. The non-professional text marks the metaphorical status of the terms "protect" and "unprotect", thus implicitly justifying the technical use of the second term as a verb (it does not appear as such in most general dictionaries). The barrier operated on here stands between the technical discourse and the multiple embedding we recognize as the everyday use of language. The non-professional text is written in such a way that the reader can cross that barrier, effectively learning the function of the technical verb. You may be positioned as a child, but you *can* learn to advance, step by little step. In the professional text, on the other hand, the inverted commas mark off the only piece of language that does *not* assume any technical definition. There, "password" is the only term that could be any other term, since it is an arbitrary setting. It is thus distinguished

from a text where every other element is implicitly defined by the concepts comprising professional competence.

The professional text might be seen as protecting the technical domain it assumes. Each unexplained term becomes a shibboleth. The non-professional text, on the other hand, could present barriers only in order to teach across them, effectively unprotecting its origins. The latter quality would appear to be humanizing, in the most positive democratic sense of Renaissance civil society.

Admittedly the verb "to unprotect" is hardly a major advance. Further, considered in functional terms, our professional "password" text is in this case consistently pedagogical as well, since it forms a running interlinear equivalence-based translation between HTML and natural language:

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password   NN 2 IE 3 DOM 1

The password object is a form control generated with an INPUT element whose TYPE attribute is set to "password". This object is similar to the text object, except that the characters typed into the text box by the user are converted to asterisk or bullet symbols for privacy.

HTML Equivalent
<INPUT TYPE="password">

And so on. The non-professional text might teach the user a new verb; but the professional one is teaching a whole language. There are quite good sociological reasons for seeing the professional text as more empowering than the timid exposure to a slightly new verb. One kind of discourse trains its reader to enter an initial locale; the other gives the tools for the creation of texts beyond that locale. Both levels are necessary, but the more effective password could well be conveyed in the more professional text.

Social segmentation is certainly what is at stake here. The extreme discursive gap between the two texts means that the receiver is positioned in one locale or the other, either an end-user or a potential producer. There is nothing essentially wrong with the production of texts that are difficult to read (difficult for whom?), as long as the effort invested in reception is proportional to the value of cooperation facilitated. An easy text that conveys banalities is no better or worse than a difficult text giving the keys to power or insight. Of course, the best text, by far the most humanizing, would be the one that makes the most empowering content available to the widest cross-section of people. In the relative absence of such discourses, in the strangely binary division between reception and production positions, the Renaissance paradox of eloquence as social segmentation remains part and parcel of our most humanizing efforts.

Three lessons here. First, beware "humanist" modes of analysis that would seek to evaluate means of expression independently of functionality or power. Second, given that both our "password" texts have their relative advantages, there is no *a priori* reason why the discourse of Plain English should, through localization, force its Puritan criteria onto other languages. Third, the more serious problem is the gap between discourses, not simplification for the sake of simplification. This gap is setting up a second technological divide, no longer between the haves and the have-nots of material machines, but between the active and passive users of language technology. In effect,

the more condescending forms of localization would divide the world into text producers who will always be producers, any text consumers who can only remain consumers.

That gap can be traversed by pedagogical discourses. The problem, however, is that our electronic texts are losing linearity. Here both our texts are characterized by limited linearity; they are stand-alone fragments, where deictics are reduced to the hyperlink at the end of the non-professional text. Linearity, however, could be necessary for some kind of pedagogical progression, whether it be through hyperlinks or traditional textual contiguity. And pedagogical progression is what should enable people to jump over the technological divides.

We thus have a further reason for reconsidering the virtues of linearity.

Explicitness

One of the most obvious linguistic differences between our two "password" texts is the relative explicitness of the professional text. The text uses no proforms and has no marked instances of syntactic deletion. The non-professional text, on the other hand, uses the pronouns "you" and "it", contracts to the imperative ("click"), and allows quite colloquial deletion such as the connector "that" ("the types of changes [that] users can make to it"). The tendency toward greater explicitness in the professional text is also present in the use of passives (there are none in the non-professional text), since their purpose is not agent-deletion but rather syntactic expansion to facilitate clear attribution (the agent is named extensively in "by the user"). A further consequence of explicitness is the transgression of stylistic rules about repeated terms ("object... object... object", for example). All in all, the professional text is explicit, whereas the non-professional text uses many of the implicitness strategies of everyday or spoken discourse.

If the human face of discourse is configured by the use of everyday forms, then the non-professional text must surely be more humanizing, on this count at least?

Why insist on explicitness (or "elaborate codes") as a problematic feature of technical discourse? Why is it so much in evidence in our examples, and virtually anywhere else in technical domains? Part of the answer must surely refer back to the non-linear ways these texts are developed and used. All we want is the sentence or paragraph containing the answer to our question. And once we get to that little text segment, it must make sense in its own right, without discursive deictics to what came immediately before and what comes immediately afterwards (the only deictics now are the hyperlinks). Hence the need for those small units to be as explicit as possible; hence the eschewing of implicitness on all levels; hence the problem of pedagogical progression.

Explicitness is thus not particularly dehumanizing in itself. Technology makes our technical discourse relatively non-linear, non-narrative, and open to different reading positions. Explicitness is part of that bundle, potentially no worse than the rest, and perhaps ideologically preferable to extremes of implicitness. In many respects, explicitness is no more than an intralingual mode of internationalization, awaiting localization by individual readers. There is nothing wrong in that.

The particular interest of this analysis lies in yet another lesson to be learned from translation theory. Studies have consistently found (starting from Blum-Kulka 1986) that the discourse in translations tends to be more explicit than the corresponding

discourse in non-translations. Thus, in terms of our examples, a translation will tend to be more like the professional text than the non-professional text. This phenomenon finds explanations partly in psychology (the translator is working with smaller text units, with less knowledge of the referents and macrotextual structures), and partly in the specificities of cross-cultural communication itself (fewer shared referents means less occasion for implicitness). The tendency can, however, be broken. If we want to translate a text so that it functions like non-professional prose, that can certainly be done. It might only require slightly greater effort. Explicitness thus becomes a value that can be controlled and modulated in translation.

We have found that a vague concept of humanization can be associated with the use of personal pronouns to allow space for discursive participants, with allowance for pedagogical transitions, with a degree of linearity, and with relative explicitness. None of these values is necessarily contradicted by the use of electronic technology. Those associations have been based on two texts in English but can to some extent address the variables at stake in localization and translation, if only because all discourses can be modified quite radically in the moment of translation.

Our communication can thus become more or less humanizing, and reasoned intervention by translators can orient our relations accordingly. Unfortunately, localizers and translators frequently overlook that possibility. Much translating is still done, especially within localization projects, in terms of "default norms" based on reproduction of source-text features at all possible levels, with minimal regard for target-side constraints and with little thought about anything remotely like humanization. Unless there is an impelling reason to do otherwise, one should translate the source and nothing but the source, or so it would seem. Those default norms have been soundly challenged by translation theories since at least 1984; they have been reduced to strategic operative maxims in our theory here; they should have been dethroned by the pressures of globalization and the very tenets of localization long ago. That seems not to have happened, but there is no reason why it could not happen. Humanization can be achieved in cross-cultural communication.

Mediation and its vices

Is there a message here for localizers? Start praying, perhaps, in the wake of Buber? Or better, stop praying to the marketing experts ever ready to profile "what the customer wants". Start thinking about the social effects of our divisions.

The more immediate problem is that the people localizing technical discourses sometimes have little vision of any second person to be addressed, any degrees of pedagogical progression in reception, any modulation of explicitness, let alone any possible social effects of such variables. Large teams mean that individuals work on fragments, blind to the entirety of any project, indifferent to the addressee of their output. The result can be work that is not just boring but also dehumanizing, in virtually whatever sense you want to give the term.

To counter that tendency, localization projects could accord translators greater scope for decision-making than is currently the norm. If we are ever to communicate with human cultures rather than marketing locales, experienced translators are likely to bring in the subtlest awareness of the complex belonging that our distributions penetrate. They could be the ones who know most about how to humanize the

specificities. Their special competence should be drawn on. And it should be drawn beyond the strict field of translation when necessary.

True, the bulk of the localization workload comes later, with revision processes, product testing, updates and more updates, along with the manifold coordination problems of project management. That is usually professional in-house stuff. At those points we might hope to find a first person prepared to think about a second person; we might expect to discover communicators doing humanizing work. At the same time, however, the factors dominating such processes tend to be the deadline, the legal regulation, and the market, rarely the person.

Thus are we caught in a world of third-person things.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE: TRANSLATION DEPENDS ON TRANSFER

[1] Here we take position on a several theoretical fronts. If the semantics of communication could be divided into a "code" model versus an "inferential" model (cf. Sperber and Wilson 1988), we would clearly be on the inferential side. However, we take the liberty of dissenting with relevance theory on several other points. The code and inferential models do not appear to be different in kind ("codification" is merely inference compressed by frequency), and we find no urgent need to refer to any sender's "intention" beyond the basic supposition that a text is a human expression (i.e. it has meaningful materiality). We return to these points in chapters 7 and 8.

[2] In terms of Popper's *Objective Knowledge* (1972), here we are questioning the possibility of distinguishing World 1 (physical objects like books) from World 3 (ideas, theories, problems, arguments). We thereby question the basis for the theory of memes developed by Chesterman (1997: 14-17). We do not need to accept a notion of public space magically unstructured by the material interests that promote and direct distribution.

[3] A more exact formulation here would be that translations, as particular kinds of localizations, mark the changeover points between cultures. This is thanks to the strong binary nature of the translation form, which we will analyze later. It nevertheless seems valid to see all localizations as marking the limits of locales, if not always as specific points (as in the case of translation), at least as more diffuse frontier zones.

[4] The revised first edition defines *globalization* as "making all the necessary technical, managerial, financial, personnel, marketing, and other enterprise decisions necessary to facilitate localization" (11). *Localization* is then "the process of modifying products or services to account for differences in distinct markets" (11). *Internationalization* is briefly glossed once as "enabling a product for localization" (11), and then as "the process of ensuring at a technical/design level that a product can be easily localized" (34). One suspects that the apparently greater scope given to "globalization" in these definitions stemmed from the internal shakedown of LISA in 2000, when some argued that the main business opportunities were not actually in localization as such, but in the Internet-based globalization of business-to-business services. On the other hand, the second edition (Fry 2003) allocates a whole section to "internationalization" (14), which it describes as "enabling a product *at technical level* for localization" (14, italics ours), inserting the phrase "at technical level" in order to distinguish it from "globalization" as affecting an entire enterprise. One senses that "internationalization" has been reinstated in its key role.

[5] For statistics, see the *Index Translationum* since 1932 (under the auspices of UNESCO since 1948, computerized since 1979), publishers' data reported in Ganne and Minon (1992), snippets of the same in Venuti (1995, 1998), yearly reports from the European Commission's Translation Service, estimates made by the American Translators Association, regular LISA reports on the growth of the localization sector in recent years. None of those sources should be regarded as being particularly exact, but they all indicate a general growth in the global demand for translations.

[6] The period concerned was one of relative stability in political terms, perhaps free from the high volatility that marks the translations into languages with few books. For example, we find from another source (Vallverdú 1978) that translation percentages into Catalan were 55 in 1965, 8.3 in 1973, and 16.5 in 1977. Our test numbers should try to avoid such rapid shifts, which are due more to local developmental factors than to the general principles we are interested in.

[7] Much the same mixing can also apply to larger locales. Sheer size may bring with it a very high degree of inner differentiation, visible in a wide range of distinct yet more or less mutually comprehensible varieties. Further, many of those different language varieties gain access to printed communication, and do so in many different countries. Our data give some 24% of all books in English being published outside of the United States or the United Kingdom; the presence of writers born beyond those two main centers has become a regular feature of English-language literature. In fact, to complete our argument, the sheer size of English could mean that much of the variety and new blood that other language groups seek through translation, English-language cultures may be receiving through distribution without translation (for the

same argument in slightly different terms, see Constantin 1992: 126). The more facile critiques of English-language cultures (notably Venuti 1995) overlook these aspects.

[8] We will later argue that the prototype model is suited to the quantitative relation between a translation and its source, but not to the discursive first-person relation.

[9] This location is for the term "equivalence". We would freely admit that the concept, with its peculiar discursive consequences, has a much longer history, flourishing with the Renaissance and the rise of the printing press. Prior to that moment, the equivalence concept is as difficult to find as are stable functional source texts and assumptions of equal languages (as we shall later see, the medieval mind was ruled by a hierarchy of languages, some being closer to divine inspiration than others). Not by chance, the postmodern abandoning of equivalence coincides with technologies where source texts are similarly unstable, constantly in processes of rewriting and updating, and languages also stand in a hierarchy (some being closer to technical production centers than others). The roles played by equivalence are thus eminently historical: some locales make great use of its discursive forms, others do not.

[10] Our doubts here also concern the idea that the striving for invisibility "contributes to the cultural marginality and economic exploitation" of translators themselves" (Venuti 1995:17). This mode of causal reasoning runs counter to the old critical idea that the most invisible agents can be the most powerful ones (advertisers, for example, as "hidden persuaders") and are thus unlikely to suffer economic exploitation for that reason alone. The causal link is also countered by examples such as the standard practice of the European Commission's Translation Service, where the relative anonymity of collective responsibility (all translators are formally responsible for all translations) certainly achieves optimal invisibility for the individual but has been associated with high remuneration, excellent working conditions, and relatively strong official appreciation. Indeed, the professional anonymity associated with such invisibility becomes a reason why the translations are trusted (the collective profession effectively gives its stamp of approval), which is why some of the translations can become law, and why translation can assume a central role in the spheres concerned. The denouncing of simple invisibility as a cause of exploitation appears unable to explain such phenomena.

[11] The notion of maxims here draws on Grice (1975). As in Grice, the maxims are of interest not because they are immutable laws but because they are social conventions able to produce implicatures when not adhered to.

[12] We have also found a version in Andalusian Spanish (*Microsó Guindour 2000*): "Debería llama a tu primo Paco que etudia informsmatica y deharte de tocá botone a lo bobo" / "Borrico", which imitates accent as well as stereotyping strong family relations and low education levels.

[13] Our disagreement with Bigelow on the specificity of the translational operator also concerns Mossop's early article "The Translator as Rapporteur" (1983), where we find a relation between translation and reported speech based on reversible shifts between the first person and the third person. Mossop appears to see translation emerging from exchanges between direct and indirect discourse: "If the shift of 'my' to 'he' is reversed, the result will be a translation" (1983: 251). Although this view was recognized as simplistic and is partly corrected in a later paper (Mossop 1987: 20, n.6), it still leads to conclusions that are diametrically opposed to the operator described by Bigelow. Mossop originally tried to use the notion of reported speech in order to get rid of translational equivalence. And yet Bigelow shows that the same notion can adequately describe the way equivalence works.

[14] We should stress the major distinction being made here between the macrostructural level of discourse and the level of linguistic form. The above move from "Du musst wissen" (literally "*You* must know", with the morphological *second* person) to "I must tell you" (morphological *first* person) is certainly interesting as an indication of the way equivalence can respect local conventions. Yet the differences between those two forms have little to do with translation as a discursive act. It is enough that, on the level of discourse, both these tags call the attention of a macrostructural second person, quite independently of their morphological first-person or second-person status.

[15] Rimbaud: "Petit Poucet rêveur, j'égrenais dans ma course / Des rimes […]".

[16] "Nous avons vécu artificiellement, dit Carlos March, à l'abri d'un protectionnisme féroce. À cause de cela, nous sommes encore un pays arriéré. […] L'histoire de l'Espagne leur a fait sauter l'étape industrielle pour entrer de plain-pied dans la société postindustrielle. […] la 'Movida', aux dernières nouvelles vient de prendre un autre nom, en attendant le prochain : le postmodernisme."

[17]
        Dunc dist Merlin les prophecies
        Que vus avez, ço crei, oïes,
        Des reis ki a venir esteient,
        Ki la terre tenir deveient.
        Ne vuil sun livre translater
        Quant jo nel sai interpreter;
        Nule rien dire ne vuldreie
        Que si ne fust cum jo dirreie.

Durling translates the last line as "unless it were just as I should say", introducing a notion of external obligation and reducing the role of the first-person pronoun. Her final comments are nevertheless judicious: "For Wace, translation is a vision of truth which allows the author to add or delete material. It implies interpretation based on the author's own erudition, is suggestively linked to paternity, and is not discussed as a product of patronage." (1989: 30).

[18] Translational progress here is rather more general than the "retranslation hypothesis", which would posit that "retranslations tend to be closer to the original than [are] first translations" (formulated as such in Williams and Chesterman 2002: 72; cf. Gambier 1994). For us, "progress" simply means that the retranslation is seen as being somehow more equivalent than is the previous translation(s), whatever the reason (greater exactitude, attention to changes in the target locale, or appropriateness to a specific target group).

[19] Levy (1967) first introduced the basic "minimax" principle into translation theory, arguing that the translator must exert minimum effort for maximum effect. Unfortunately Levy did not define the general "effect" of translation, allowing his essay to wander between source-text determinism and reader-response relativism. Our transaction-cost model can give a general criterion for the weighting of such variants. Further, whereas Levy adopted a restrictive view of translation as a "game with complete information" (1967: 39), the transaction-cost model assumes no such closure, accepting probabilistic behavior in a world of uncertainties. In fact, our model suggests that the minimax principle would be contradicted by any insistence on complete information or absolute certainty. Some factors *should* remain relatively unknown precisely because the cost of reducing their uncertainty will exceed the potential mutual benefits. Interestingly enough, Christiane Nord's model of translation accepts Levy's determinist principle (1988: 40) and consequently recommends that translators invest quite extreme effort in source-text analysis. The principle of complete information might be a useful fiction in translator training, but it unthinkingly sanctions transaction costs that are often far higher than a professional ethics of cooperation can allow.

[20] There is considerable play in the numbers here. Wagner states that "In 1999 the total cost of interpreting and translation services for all the institutions combined was 685.9 million euros (Reply to Parliamentary Question E-2239/99 by MEP Christopher Huhne). This is equivalent to 1.8 euros for each member of Europe's population of 374 million" (2002: 9). For 2001, as noted above, we find that the figure is 220 million euros for just the Commission's Translation Service.

[21] On the relation between transaction costs and relevance theory, see Pym 2000d. The two approaches can reach virtually identical outcomes when analyzing the relations between the costs and the benefits of communication acts. For us, one slight advantage of thinking in terms of transaction costs is that it immediately applies to all participants in the communication (in production, mediation, and reception). Of course, there is no reason why relevance theory cannot be extended in this way. A major advantage of the transaction-cost model nevertheless lies in its relative lack of assumptions about what communication is supposed to achieve in the first place. Sperber and Wilson functionally replace (Gricean) cooperation with the aim "to have the communicator's informative intention recognized by the audience" (1988: 161). This is unhelpful because it relies on a speaker's "intention" that is not necessarily available to anyone or of immediate value to everyone. Further, it brings in a series of individualist presuppositions, proposing a psychologist's world peopled by a subject bent on accumulating information, increasing efficiency, and improving their personal knowledge (1988: 47-49). The transaction-cost model, on the other hand,

measures effect or success only in terms of cooperation. It thus does not require the essentialism of recoverable intentions, nor the individualism of subjects accumulating apparently stable information about the world.

[22] Note that the financial cost of the software is rarely a significant problem, given the availability of patches able to turn just about all demo versions into operative versions. The more significant barrier is formed by the technical skills needed to find those democratizing patches.

[23] The implications of these changes affect the work process in other ways as well. Esselink (2003) claims that the nature of constant updating means that language workers are no longer employed on "projects" (limited in time) but on "programs" (in the sense of an on-going service relation, as one might employ maintenance workers to grease machines on a regular basis). That change in terminology will certainly be justified in some sectors. There is a significant difference, however, between the kind of creative work that might be involved in a "project" (as when a new product is released or a new campaign is budgeted) and the more humdrum regularities of a work "program". Here, again, the discourses of localization would seem to be pushing translators out to the fringes, even when those same discourses have started to recognize (in 2003) the significant stakes involved in translation quality.

[24] The most practical solution to such problems would seem to be public exams open to anyone, no matter what their training, along the lines of the Institute of Linguists exams in the United Kingdom.

[25] In principle, intermediaries may draw authority from any socially contiguous profession, of which history provides quite a range. When not concerned directly with language, the "day jobs" quite often have to do with medicine (certainly among the Jews in Hispania and the *Oranda tsuji* in Japan), where clients tend to have a direct interest in obtaining trustworthy information.

[26] The prohibition of solitude has nevertheless rarely been operative in the literary domain, where concepts of strong authorship are still reflected in the individualist belief that a great translation can only come from an individual translator working alone.

[27] Chesterman would certainly accept that there are degrees of understanding, perhaps associated with degrees of semantic stability (cf. Chesterman and Arrojo 2000: 156). However, even that way of thinking implies an independent perfect understanding or semantic stability from which measurements can be made. The result is rather like our assumption of effability, albeit without the political economics.

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