

BENJAMINS

■  
TRANSLATION

De-/Re-  
Contextualizing  
Conference  
Interpreting

Ebru Diriker

■ LIBRARY

## De-/Re-Contextualizing Conference Interpreting

# Benjamins Translation Library

The Benjamins Translation Library aims to stimulate research and training in translation and interpreting studies. The Library provides a forum for a variety of approaches (which may sometimes be conflicting) in a socio-cultural, historical, theoretical, applied and pedagogical context. The Library includes scholarly works, reference works, post-graduate text books and readers in the English language.

## EST Subseries

The European Society for Translation Studies (EST) Subseries is a publication channel within the Library to optimize EST's function as a forum for the translation and interpreting research community. It promotes new trends in research, gives more visibility to young scholars' work, publicizes new research methods, makes available documents from EST, and reissues classical works in translation studies which do not exist in English or which are now out of print.

### General editor

Gideon Toury  
Tel Aviv University

### Associate editor

Miriam Shlesinger  
Bar Ilan University

### Advisory board

Marilyn Gaddis Rose  
Binghamton University

Yves Gambier  
Turku University

Daniel Gile  
Université Lumière Lyon 2 and  
ISIT Paris

Ulrich Heid  
University of Stuttgart

Eva Hung  
Chinese University of Hong Kong

W. John Hutchins  
University of East Anglia

Zuzana Jettmarová  
Charles University of Prague

Werner Koller  
Bergen University

Alet Kruger  
UNISA

José Lambert  
Catholic University of Leuven

Franz Pöchhacker  
University of Vienna

Rosa Rabadán  
University of León

Roda Roberts  
University of Ottawa

Juan C. Sager  
UMIST Manchester

Mary Snell-Hornby  
University of Vienna

Sonja Tirkkonen-Condit  
University of Joensuu

Lawrence Venuti  
Temple University

Wolfram Wilss  
University of Saarbrücken

Judith Woodsworth  
Mt. Saint Vincent University Halifax

Sue Ellen Wright  
Kent State University

## Volume 53

De-/Re-Contextualizing Conference Interpreting:  
Interpreters in the Ivory Tower?  
by Ebru Diriker

# De-/Re-Contextualizing Conference Interpreting

Interpreters in the Ivory Tower?

Ebru Diriker

Boğaziçi University

John Benjamins Publishing Company  
Amsterdam/Philadelphia



™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

#### Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Diriker, Ebru

De-/re-contextualizing conference interpreting : interpreters in the ivory tower? / Ebru Diriker.

p. cm. (Benjamins Translation Library, ISSN 0929-7316 ; v. 53)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Simultaneous interpreting. 2. Congresses and conventions--Translating services. I. Title. II. Series.

P306.95.D57 2004

418'02-dc22

2004049427

ISBN 90 272 1659 2 (Eur.) / 1 58811 522 4 (US) (Hb; alk. paper)

© 2004 – John Benjamins B.V.

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher.

John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 ME Amsterdam · The Netherlands  
John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia PA 19118-0519 · USA

# Contents

Acknowledgments	ix
Introduction	1
CHAPTER 1	
Previous literature, key concepts and grounding theories	7
1.1 Simultaneous Interpreting Research	7
1.2 Previous research on actual SI behavior in relation to socio-cultural and interactional contexts	8
1.3 “Context”	14
1.4 “Discourse”	18
1.5 Basic theoretical assumptions on “discourse”	19
CHAPTER 2	
Broader social context in SI	25
2.1 Meta-discourse as social context	25
2.2 Meta-discourse on SI	26
2.2.1 Discourse of general reference books	26
2.2.2 Discourse of codes of ethics	29
2.2.3 Discourse of professional organizations	32
2.2.4 Discourse of academia	35
2.2.5 Discourse of Turkish media	39
2.2.6 Discourse of interpreters in the media	42
2.2.7 Discourse of a popular book	45
2.3 Summary	48
CHAPTER 3	
Analyzing an actual conference context	51
3.1 Constructing the corpus: General reflections	51
3.2 Constructing the corpus in this study	54
3.2.1 Topic, date and venue of the conference	54
3.2.2 Conference languages	55

3.2.3	Interpreters, organizer and the recruitment process	55
3.2.4	Permission to record	56
3.2.5	Technical matters	56
3.2.6	Position of the booths	59
3.2.7	My position as the researcher	60
3.2.8	Participants	61
3.2.9	Speakers	61
3.2.10	Preparations, documents and the “assistant” in the booth	62
3.2.11	Turn-taking	63
3.3	Interviews	63
3.3.1	Interview with the organizer	63
3.3.2	Interviews with the speakers	64
3.3.3	Interviews with the interpreters	67
3.3.4	Interviews with the users of SI	74

CHAPTER 4

<b>Analyzing an actual SI performance</b>	<b>81</b>	
4.1	Constructing the transcripts in this study	81
4.2	Deciding on a unit of analysis	82
4.3	Exploring the “shifts in the speaking subject”	84
4.4	Presenting the analysis	85
4.5	Analyzing the conference transcripts	86
4.5.1	“Shifts in the speaking subject” in the present corpus	86
4.5.2	Last 25 minutes of the conference interaction	115

CHAPTER 5

<b>Juxta- and counterposing actual SI behavior with the meta-discourse</b>	<b>131</b>	
5.1	Juxtaposing actual SI behavior with the meta-discourse	131
5.1.1	Broader socio-cultural context: What the meta-discourse suggests	131
5.1.2	Presence of interpreters: What participant observations and interviews suggest	133
5.1.3	Performance of interpreters: What conference transcripts suggest	137
5.2	Counterposing actual SI behavior with the meta-discourse	141
5.2.1	Implications for SI research	144

<b>Appendix</b>	<b>149</b>
Transcription conventions	149
“Shifts in the speaking subject” in their order of occurrence during the conference	150
<b>Notes</b>	<b>201</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>207</b>
<b>Index</b>	<b>217</b>





# Acknowledgments

This book is the result of my growing interest in and fascination with the complex task of simultaneous conference interpreting, an activity that has come to occupy a central place in my professional life for over a decade.

I am indebted to many people for making it possible. First of all, I would like to extend my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Işın Bengi-Öner, for the trust and guidance she has always shown me, particularly while I was writing my Ph.D. dissertation, where the ideas in this book were first presented. I would also like to thank the faculty members of the Department of Translation and Interpreting at Boğaziçi University for providing a rich academic environment. In particular, I would like to thank Saliha Paker for her unfailing support and stimulating Ph.D. seminars on theory, and Şehnaz Tahir-Gürçaglar for always being a very inspiring friend.

I am particularly lucky to have met two colleagues in the field of Interpreting Studies at a relatively early stage of my research. The support and guidance I have received from them has been vital in the realization of this book. My most sincere thanks go to Miriam Shlesinger, who is also the Associate Editor of BTL, and Franz Pöchhacker!

I would like to thank Christina Schäffner and Cecilia Wadensjö for their constructive feedback at different stages of this book. My personal thanks also go to Isja Conen and Patricia Leplae at the Benjamins Translation Library for their friendly support during the publication process and Sondra Silverston, Jonathan Ross and Chris Rumford for proofreading the manuscript.

Without doubt, I owe a great debt of gratitude to the interpreters and the organizer of the conference on "Heidegger and Arendt: Metaphysics and Politics" for allowing me to record and analyze the event.

I would also like to thank my parents, my father-in-law and my grandmother for easing my life in numerous ways to create more time for me to work.

Finally, there are two men I cannot thank enough: My husband, Ahmet, and my son, Kaan. Without their support and the joy of their presence, this work would not have been possible. I dedicate this book to them.

Ebru Diriker  
Istanbul, April 2004



# Introduction

Interpreting Studies (IS) can still be considered a young academic discipline. The proliferation of literature is promising both in terms of the increase in the number of publications and the scope of the material. The more recent academic interest in accounting for the diversity of interpreting activities categorized under “community interpreting” is injecting a breath of fresh air into a field which, in its short history, has mostly focused on simultaneous conference interpreting.

Simultaneous Conference Interpreting, which in this book I shall refer to interchangeably as simultaneous interpreting (SI) or conference interpreting, has indeed been the most salient type of interpreting in the 20th century. The boom in the number of international meetings of all sizes has created significant demand for experts in interlingual and intercultural communication, leading to the emergence of SI as a technology-assisted solution to the growing demand for efficient cross-cultural contacts.

SI has always had an aura about it, possibly due to the charm of the large conference halls and highly specialised/institutionalised settings of simultaneous interpreter-mediated conferences. Furthermore, the near-simultaneity of the original speech and its interpretation into another language also seems to have added prestige and created “awe at an impossible task miraculously done” (Shlesinger 1989a: 8).

On the other hand, the scholarly interest in interpreting seems to have followed a hierarchy of its own, with most of the scholarly attention being devoted to the most salient types and features of interpreting (i.e., conference interpreting as the most salient *type* and cognitive aspects of the task as the most salient *feature*). The focus of SI research has varied from experiments on the role of memory and attention during SI to verbal-manual interference tasks, from the lateralization of the brain hemispheres of interpreters to pupillometry tests and the effect of ear asymmetries to information processing models for interlingual communication. Within a field dominated by cognitive, psycho- and neuro-linguistic paradigms, considerably less attention has been devoted to SI as “situated action”. That is to say, the position of conference interpreters as

individuals and professionals working and surviving in socio-cultural contexts, and the interdependency between socio-cultural contexts and the presence and performance of conference interpreters have not been among the major fields of research in Interpreting Studies.

This aspect of SI Research has differed markedly from the emphasis placed on the constitutive and constraining role of socio-cultural, interactional and ideological context(s) in Translation Studies. Starting with the emphasis placed on looking at actual translations in contexts in Descriptive Translation Studies, as well as the almost-parallel emphasis given by Skopos and Translatory Action theories to the situatedness of translation, scholars who have worked with and also critically reassessed the basic assumptions of these theoretical frameworks as well as numerous others who have approached translations from a variety of different perspectives, such as deconstruction, postcolonialism, critical social theory and gender studies, have converged on a view of translation as a cultural and contextual practice and acknowledged the shaping power of socio-cultural and ideological contexts with varying degrees of emphasis. They have also explored the “voice” of the translator and questioned the ideological reasons behind the translator’s seeming non-presence in translated texts. More recently, this interest in the situatedness of translation has expanded to cover the relatively less studied cognitive processing in translation, and attempts have been made to explore the links between “situated translation” and “situated cognition”.<sup>1</sup>

Interestingly, the meager interest shown in the relationship between the product and process of SI and socio-cultural and interactional contexts has also set SI Research apart from the literature on other modes of interpreting, especially on community interpreting, which has come to place an almost exclusive emphasis on exploring interpreting in relation to contexts. In Community Interpreting Research, the focus of many studies has been on how the mediation of an interpreter influences the interaction and the relations between the interlocutors, how it reveals, represents, reproduces and occasionally restores power differences between individuals, as well as between individuals and institutions or society at large. Scholars working on community interpreting have been very keen on analyzing and questioning the position of the interpreter, his/her job descriptions, the implications of an interpreter-mediated interaction in and on various settings such as police interrogations, doctor-patient encounters, psychiatric interviews, refugee hearings, etc.

In the research on community, court and sign language interpreting, the traditional notion of interpreters as “conduits” has been challenged (Roy 1990)

and assumptions of neutrality, completeness and accuracy as well as the impact of culture, power, context and language differences have been subjected to a critical (re)assessment (Inghilleri 2000, 2003, forthcoming; Bahadır 2001, forthcoming). Different studies have looked at the role of interpreters as active participants and organizers of the interaction (e.g., Roy 1989, 2000; Wadensjö 1993, 1998); the functions adopted by the interpreters in refugee hearings (e.g., Wurzel 1992; Barsky 1994, 1996); the impact of interpreters in the courtroom (e.g., Berk-Seligson 1990; Jansen 1995; Pym 1999); the moral dilemmas of court interpreting (e.g., Morris 1995, 1998); the position and strategies of the interpreters in political interviews (e.g., Baker 1997; Wadensjö 2000); police interrogations (e.g., Wadensjö 1997; Berk-Seligson 2000); healthcare settings (e.g., Knoll and Röder 1988; Röder 1995; Kaufert and Putsch 1997; Kadric and Pöchhacker 1999); peace operations, war and disaster situations (e.g., Thomas 1997; Bulut and Kurultay 2001; Monacelli 2002), and the active role of interpreters in sign language interpreting (e.g., Grbic 1997, forthcoming; Roy 1989, 2000; Tate and Turner 2002). Thus, the reciprocal impact between interpreters and interpreting and the socio-cultural, communicative, political and ideological contexts has been a major source of interest in the literature on non-conference interpreting.

The lack of major research activity on SI as a contextual activity is also somewhat paradoxical considering the rapid developments in technology that are constantly pushing for a transformation of the environment in which SI-mediated events take place. While the use of infrared systems which replaced wired ones in the 1930s has granted mobility to SI equipment and enabled many places, other than the conventional conference centers, to host SI-mediated events, advances in technology today are paving the way for yet another change in the work environment of simultaneous interpreters by promising them a virtual conference milieu far away from the actual conference venue by means of remote interpreting. Therefore, in contrast to its previous role in expanding the number and scope of places in which interpreters worked, technology seems to be currently working to limit the number and diversity of such environments by re-defining the conference site for conference interpreters as the technical room with remote conferencing equipment, rather than the conference venue where the primary interactants meet. Despite the objections of many professionals, cost concerns are forcing employers, professional organizations and researchers to explore the potential consequences of distance interpreting. From the viewpoint of IS, on the other hand, such developments are pushing the field of SI Research to explore the impact of *remote* SI settings before it has explored

the impact of *actual* conference settings (see, for instance, AIIC's Study on Remote Interpreting (no date)).

Against this background, this study aims to focus on the hitherto underexplored area of the nature of the relationship between the presence and the performance of simultaneous conference interpreters and the socio-cultural and interactional context(s). It intends to do so by approaching the socio-cultural contexts in SI at both the broader (i.e., macro) and the more immediate (i.e., micro) levels. While the study seeks to gain an insight into the nature of the relationship between the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters and the *broader* socio-cultural context(s) by looking at the representation of the profession(al) in the discourse of various actors/institutions, it also attempts to explore the nature of this relationship in the more *immediate* socio-cultural context(s) by analyzing the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters at a particular conference. The study attempts to cover this ground in the following way:

Chapter 1 presents an overview of the current literature, focusing on the extent to which Interpreting Research has approached SI as situated action. In doing so, it looks at the previous calls for, as well as actual research on, SI in relation to socio-cultural and interactional context(s). The first chapter also explores and expands on the key concepts of "context" and "discourse" that are used throughout this book and introduces the basic tenets of Critical Discourse Analysis that serves as the main theoretical framework grounding this study.

Following the introduction of the theoretical framework and the critical review of the status of research in this area, Chapter 2 focuses on the broader socio-cultural context(s) in SI by looking at the way simultaneous interpreters and interpreting are presented and represented in our language *on* interpreting, hence, in the "meta-discourse". In exploring the meta-discursive (re)presentation of the professional, this chapter presents a critical survey of the discourses of various actors and institutions in and around SI by scanning the codes of ethics, websites of the professional organizations, popular and general reference books, academic literature as well as printed and electronic media (including both the media's representation of SI as well as interpreters' self-representations in the media). The analysis of the meta-discourse in this chapter seeks answers to questions such as: Which aspects of conference interpreting and interpreters become foregrounded in the discourse of various parties? Who are the "various parties" talking *about* conference interpreting? What do they praise and criticize? How is a "successful" interpreter and interpreting performance defined? What are the general expectations from an interpreter and

interpreting performance? By investigating which aspects of SI are deemed more “desirable”, “correct”, “appropriate”, and “ethical”, the analysis in Chapter 2 seeks to gain an understanding of the larger social, interactional and ideological context in which conference interpreters function and survive.

Following the analysis of the (re)presentation of conference interpreters and interpreting at the broader discursive level, Chapter 3 focuses on the narrower context of a particular SI-mediated conference, a 2-day colloquium held on 29–30 May 2000 at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul on the topic of “Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt: Metaphysics and Politics”. Based on participant observations as well as interviews with the interpreters, speakers, organizers and users of SI, Chapter 3 explores the presence and performance of interpreters at this particular event and highlights the diversity of viewpoints with regard to the presence and performance of interpreters at a single SI assignment.

Chapter 4, on the other hand, complements the analysis in the previous chapter by focusing on the transcribed booth and the floor recordings. It attempts to explore actual SI behavior from the viewpoint of how interpreters use the first person singular (“I”) in the delivery at this particular conference. Based on the analysis of transcripts, this chapter seeks to investigate when and how interpreters shift from using the so-called “speaker’s I” in the delivery. In other words, it attempts to explore when and why interpreters “shift the speaking subject” in their interpretations. While pointing to the similarities, this chapter also explores the differences in the individual approaches of the interpreters. In doing so, Chapter 4 attempts to present an extensive (though inevitably inexhaustive) account of the dynamics of this particular conference and the complex network of relationship between an SI performance and the socio-cultural and interactional contexts.

Based on the analyses in Chapters 3 and 4, Chapter 5 provides an evaluation of how the meta-discourse on SI relates to the findings of the actual SI behavior at a particular conference. By juxtaposing and then counterposing the meta-discursive representation of SI with the tentative findings of actual interpreting behavior during the 2-day conference on philosophy and politics, this chapter develops certain hypotheses on the reasons behind the convergences and divergences between what is *said* and what is *done* in simultaneous conference interpreting.

Finally, the Appendix includes the Transcription Conventions used throughout the study and presents the excerpts and analyses of all of the 58 instances that point to a “shift in the speaking subject in the delivery” mentioned in the previous chapters.





## CHAPTER 1

# Previous literature, key concepts and grounding theories

### 1.1 Simultaneous Interpreting Research

As mentioned in the Introduction, the main focus of SI Research to date has been on cognitive, psycho- and neuro-linguistic factors. Research based on the analysis of both experimental data and real-life SI recordings has tended to explore these aspects of SI rather than the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters in relation to the socio-cultural, communicative and ideological contexts. As Franz Pöchhacker has stated:

Interpreting Studies tends to focus more narrowly on the cognitive “mechanics” of second-by-second processing rather than on *holistic conceptions of text, situation, culture, and the entire course of action in a professional interpreting assignment* (1995: 33, my emphasis).

However underexplored the social contexts of SI may be, this is not to say that their importance has never been acknowledged in Interpreting Studies. Throughout the years, researchers in IS have also directly or indirectly emphasized the importance of contexts and/or approaching SI from a sociological perspective. Nevertheless, only a few scholars have combined this emphasis with the analysis of actual SI behavior in relation to the immediate or larger socio-cultural and interactional contexts (for a general literature review, see Section 1.2), while the views of many others have remained too general to contribute much to a better understanding of SI as situated action. One such example is Christopher Thiéry’s (1990) article, “The Sense of Situation in Conference Interpreting”, in which the author has pointed very perceptively to the importance of looking at the “action” and “power structure” when analyzing the situation for simultaneous interpreters, stating:

Situation analysis inevitably encompasses not only the power structure but also the action [...] The point I’m trying to make is that the interpreter should not say, as he too often does, that all this “is none of his business”. It is very much his business to be fully alert to what is going on, and for two reasons: it will make a more intelligent listener, and also a more plausible speaker (1990: 43).

Unfortunately, despite the significance of his point, Thiéry's argument has left unexplored questions of critical importance such as *what* "plausibility" implies in actual contexts and *how* interpreters turn into more "plausible speakers" by analyzing the situation.

## 1.2 Previous research on actual SI behavior in relation to socio-cultural and interactional contexts

Taking a retrospective look at the existing literature on SI, Bruce Anderson was probably the first scholar to emphasize the importance of looking at the presence and performance of interpreters in relation to actual socio-cultural and interactional context(s). As early as 1976, Anderson argued that interpreting occurred "in social situations — situations amenable to sociological analysis" and contended that "in any such setting the role played by the interpreter is likely to exert considerable influence on the evolution of the group structure and on the outcome of the interaction" (1976: 209).

In 1978, Anderson published another article entitled "Interpreter Roles and Interpretation Situations" in which he interviewed 17 respondents (an interesting combination of AIC interpreters, students of Russian, a probation officer and a female social worker) and explored the way they assessed their "identification" with their customers. All of Anderson's respondents mentioned that they saw their duty as one of conveying the speaker's message faithfully. They also underscored that "taking sides" was unethical. Interestingly, however, later in the interview, when Anderson asked them to think of their actual interpreting experiences, many referred to instances where identifying with the customer had not been so easy. In that sense, they hinted at the fact that the meta-discourse on interpreting (i.e., what the interpreters say) and actual interpreting behavior (i.e., what they do) may not necessarily be the same.<sup>2</sup>

At around the same time, Hella Kirchhoff published two perceptive articles in which she approached interpreting as a communication system operating over a number of linguistic and extra-linguistic variables (1976a, 1976b). She saw all acts of communication, including SI, as embedded in both the (more local) situation as well as in the (larger) socio-cultural setting (1976b). Taking a dynamic view of "contexts", Kirchhoff underlined the fact that each utterance was actually valid only in the specific moment and situation in which it occurred (ibid.: 24). She saw the task of the conference interpreter within the complex environment as one of cooperation and optimization of communication

between the partners, but she also stressed that human communication and especially multi-language, multi-partner communication in interpreting was prone to “difficulties” (Kirchhoff called it “Störungen” which can mean disruption, interference, disturbance, trouble, etc.). Interestingly enough, her notion of “Störungen” was later referred to as “noise” in the English-speaking literature and approached as objectively remediable by the interpreter who would adjust the culturally determined peculiarities of the source text to the culturally determined expectations of the receiver (for some views in the direction, see Kondo and Tebble’s summary of the Panel on Intercultural Communication at the Turku Conference, Kondo et al. 1997), even though, according to my reading, Kirchhoff had underscored the *inherent* difficulty and proneness of all acts of communication and mediation.

Moving ahead in time, in 1983, Catherine Stenzl underlined the importance of developing a detailed overall model of SI that approached SI not as a sequence of mental operations performed by an interpreter, but as an interlingual communicative task involving the speaker, the interpreter and the target culture receiver in their situational context. In a highly perceptive manner, she also emphasized the need for observational and descriptive research on SI and underlined the need to work on models that could, among other things, explore “how the presence and work of interpreters alter the interaction between the primary partners in the communication process” (1983: 48).

In 1989, Miriam Shlesinger started the debate about the possibility of extending the concept of “norms”—a concept and tool that had come to occupy a central role in Translation Studies—to interpreting. She defined her aim as “an attempt to launch a discussion aimed at examining the possibility of *extending the notion of translational norms to (oral) interpretation*” (Shlesinger 1989b: 111, my emphasis). In fact, quite a few of the later calls for more sociologically-oriented approaches in IS followed Shlesinger in asking for a closer look at interpreting behavior so as to gain a better understanding of the “norms” (Schjoldager 1995a, 1995b; Gile 1998; Diriker 1999; Garzone 2002). Despite her pioneering call, Shlesinger (1989b) also raised doubts about whether there could be already established norms governing interpreting as a result of the limited cadre of interpreters and the relatively short history of interpretation.

Brian Harris, who responded supportively to Shlesinger’s initial call to integrate the concepts of “norms” to interpreting, actually referred to a number of general practices and expectations that he saw as the “norms” in SI. According to him, the norm in professional interpreting was to speak in the first person:

The norm in *professional* interpreting — we have to be careful to include the qualifier — [is] that the interpreter speaks in the first person as if s/he was the orator. That is, if the speaker starts off, “I’m happy to be here”, the interpreter too will paraphrase it as “I’m happy to be here” in the target language and not, “Mr. X says he’s happy to be here” [Harris 1990: 115].

Harris also added that interpreters were subject to the fundamental and universal norm of the “honest spokesperson”, which obliged them to “re-express the original speakers’ ideas and the manner of expressing them as accurately as possible and without significant omissions, and not mix them up with their own ideas and expressions” (ibid.: 118).

In 1995, Anna Schjoldager revitalized the importance of looking at the “norms” in SI and called for a descriptive study of interpreting behavior. In an article published in *Target*, Schjoldager (1995a) stressed the importance of norms in Translation Studies and tied the scholarly lack of interest in norms to the epistemological status of the research field that foregrounded the cognitive constraints in SI rather than the underlying norms. In one small study with students, Schjoldager also explored the regularities in interpreting behavior and concluded that “substitution proper” seemed to be a norm specific to SI, which suggested that interpreters tended to deploy target-text items with little or no resemblance to the source-text item as long as that target text item seemed contextually plausible (Schjoldager 1995b).

More recently, Daniel Gile also emphasized the need to finally start thinking about the norms in interpreting to “open up the researchers’ mind to sociological concepts and working methods which have been neglected in the field of conference interpreting” (1998: 102). In fact, in an article he wrote as early as in 1991 about quality assessment in “Translation” — a term he uses to cover both translation and interpreting — Gile argued that “since Professional Translation is *generated in and constrained by a social and economic context*, these factors in quality assessment are important and do have practical corollaries” (1991: 195, my emphasis).

Despite his emphasis on the constitutive and constraining role of the social and economic contexts, however, Gile also emphasized that, at a theoretical level, basic quality criteria in SI were “invariant” and more or less independent from social context:

a consensus exists concerning quality criteria that are more or less independent of the socio-economic context: clarity, linguistic acceptability, terminological accuracy and fidelity all contribute to high quality Translation, even though, (...) the weight given to them by individual raters may vary (ibid.).

Interestingly enough, Gile's own illuminating case study on the perception of fidelity among various types of assessors a year before had actually suggested the variance in and fuzziness of these "invariant" quality criteria by pointing to significant variations not only in the weight individual raters attached to "fidelity", but also in how they defined it in the first place (Gile 1990).

In the literature of conference interpreting, Franz Pöchhacker's works could be cited as those most focused on *contextualizing* SI. In his *Simultandolmetschen als komplexes Handeln*, published in 1994, Pöchhacker attempted to broaden the theoretical framework of Interpreting Studies by adopting (while simultaneously testing) the tenets of the functionalist theory of translation and interpreting developed by Hans Vermeer (1983; 1989) and Justa Holz-Mänttari (1984). For the first time in IS, Pöchhacker explored a real-life SI event by approaching the interpreters' output as "text-in-situation-and-culture". Based on transcribed conference recordings of the 3-day conference of the International Council for Small Business, Pöchhacker focused on SI as a complex act and, among many other aspects, also looked at how interpreters dealt with "forms of address" and "humor".

In an article published in 1996 and a monograph in 1998, Sylvia Kalina, who made use of discourse models developed by van Dijk and Kintsch, approached SI as strategic processing and referred to the importance of situation knowledge in SI (Kohn and Kalina 1996; Kalina 1998). Kalina also emphasized the need to make empirical investigation on SI to explore these strategies and transcribed the recordings of a three-language conference on legal cooperation against fraud. Even though she did not expand on how interpreter's strategies shaped and took shape in relation to the context of that particular conference which they recorded and transcribed, Kalina complemented the analysis of the strategies in a short excerpt from the conference recordings with the interpreter's introspective comments on these strategies, thereby expanding the scope of their investigation to include (one of) the most crucial parties to the interaction in SI (cf. also Monacelli 2000).

One other important contribution to the analysis of actual SI behavior came in 1999 with Robin Setton's *Simultaneous Interpretation: A Cognitive-Pragmatic Analysis*. Making use of authentic (as well as simulated) corpora, Setton drew on a variety of theoretical frameworks (relevance theory, cognitive semantics, mental models theory, and speech act theory), to develop a cognitive-pragmatic approach to analyze how meaning was cognitively processed in conference interpreting contexts. In doing so, Setton attempted to remedy the inadequacy of the two dominant paradigms in SI research

(Information-Processing Theory and Interpretive Theory) in “modeling context in relation to a corpus” (ibid.: 5). Emphasizing the importance of looking at SI in context, Setton’s theoretical framework predominantly foregrounded a mental model of context in which context took “the form of structured concepts in the hearer’s memory, which are evoked by the items of the text” (ibid.: 14). Possibly for this reason, he limited his analysis mostly to manifestations of context that were traceable in the interpreted utterance and rarely elaborated on the possible implications of the broader socio-cultural and ideological contexts on SI performance and vice versa. For exploring the mental representation of context as evidenced in utterances of the interpreters, however, Setton succeeded in developing a very competent model and, as Mona Baker emphasized (2000), his work is not only a very important piece of research for the field in general, but also promises to contribute greatly to the more sociologically oriented approaches to interpreting in particular.<sup>3</sup>

The strongest call for looking at SI in context(s) came with Michael Cronin’s appeal for a “cultural turn” in *Interpreting Studies* (2002). Pointing to the fact that *Interpreting Studies* had largely remained unaffected by the theoretical developments elsewhere in *Translation Studies*, Cronin forcefully underlined the need for material/cultural/manipulation perspectives that would examine all forms of interpreting “as they are grounded in the economic, political and cultural conditions of people’s lives” (ibid.: 391).

To some avail, recent and forthcoming publications in IS seem to be signaling a growing interest in exploring actual SI performances as situated action. For instance, in a recent volume edited by Garzone and Viezzi (2002), a number of papers have explored the various theoretical and methodological aspects of looking at actual SI corpora in contexts (see, for instance, Aston and Cencini, Garzone, Riccardi, Setton in the same volume). Similarly, interesting doctoral theses (for instance, Vuorikoski (2004), Beaton (forthcoming), Monacelli (forthcoming)) also point towards a more pronounced interest in exploring actual SI instances in relation to socio-cultural, interactional and ideological contexts, and they could well be the precursors of the “cultural turn” that Michael Cronin has so correctly called for in *SI Research*.

Other lines of research, such as those on conference typologies and user expectation surveys, have also contributed to our understanding of the social context(s) in SI, even if their direct focus was not on exploring actual SI behavior.

Conference typologies (Namy 1978; Niedzielski 1988; Gile 1989; Snelling 1989; Pöchhacker 1994), for instance, have attempted to classify the features that specific types of conferences would be likely to possess in terms of the

homogeneity of their participants, complexity of their structure, use of visual aids, etc. To cite an example, according to one of these typologies, Technical Conferences were generally characterized by a high degree of homogeneity of the participants, frequent use of visual support and a fairly high degree of structural complexity, whereas Press Conferences were characterized by a lesser degree of homogeneity, visual material and structural complexity (for a schematic representation, see Pöchhacker 1994: 54–57).

User-expectation surveys (Kurz 1989 and 1993; Gile 1989 and 1990; Vuorikoski 1993; Pöchhacker 1994; Kopczynski 1994; Mack and Cattaruzza 1995; Moser 1995), on the other hand, have explored the views of the users of SI as one of the most important parties to communication in an SI-mediated interaction.<sup>4</sup> They have looked at how users of SI rate various quality criteria such as sense consistency, fluency, intonation, etc.

To conclude, except for a handful of calls for and cases of research, whose numbers thankfully appear to be on the rise, exploring actual SI instances as situated action has not constituted a major focus of attention in Interpreting Studies. Thus, Pöchhacker's (1995) contention that Interpreting Studies has focused more on the cognitive mechanics of processing rather than on a holistic conception of text, situation and the entire course of action in a professional interpreting assignment largely remains true to this day, and the relationship between simultaneous interpreters, their delivery and the interactional, socio-cultural and ideological contexts still awaits a more thorough exploration.

It is against this background that this study sets out to explore the presence and performance of conference interpreters in actual contexts. Its point of departure is the assumption that conference interpreters are constrained by, but also constitutive of, a multitude of intertwined and mutually reflexive context(s) such as: the *most immediate discursive context(s)* during interpreting that are invoked by previous utterances and implied by potential utterances; the conditions and demands of the *particular conference context* where they work in a given instance; and the conditions and demands of the *larger socio-cultural context(s)* in which they operate and survive as professionals.

### 1.3 Context

As can be seen, exploring SI in context(s) is an important objective in this study. Setting such an objective, however, is easier said than done, since defining and analyzing contexts relevant to specific actions is not an easy task.



In the last 20 years, there has been a trend toward increasingly more interactive and dialogically conceived notions of context and especially contextually situated talk (Duranti and Goodwin 1992, cf. also Markova and Foppa 1991; Schiffrin 1994; Gumperz and Levinson 1996; Gunnarson et al. 1997; Linell 1998). Context is more and more conceived as a socially constituted, interactively sustained, time-bound phenomenon (Duranti and Goodwin 1992). According to this understanding, neither the physical setting nor the social setting one is interested in can be taken as fixed or “out there”. Instead, the social and physical settings and the constraints they bring are considered to be constituted by the activities of the participants, and are seen as standing in a mutually reflexive relationship.

Such a viewpoint stands in sharp distinction to the vast amount of research in formal linguistics on language structure that has long treated context as background information and preferred to keep its distance from this highly amorphous concept. As Duranti and Goodwin argue, research in formal linguistics has largely approached language as a self-contained, self-sufficient entity that can be cut off from its context and analyzed in isolation. Such research has not only studied language in isolation, but it has also approached the individual sentence or utterance as if it had no ties to the talk that surrounded it.

Despite the recent interest in context(s) as constitutive elements of talk and interaction, the initial writings highlighting the salience of context date back quite some time. As Duranti and Goodwin mention, a line of thinkers such as Malinowski (1923), Wittgenstein (1958), Austin (1962) and Voloshinov (1986) have all dwelt on the shaping power of context(s). To cite from Malinowski as early as 1923:

“Meaning [...] does not come from contemplation of things, or analysis of occurrences, but in practical and active acquaintance with relevant situations. The real knowledge of the word comes through the practice of appropriately using it within a certain situation” (Malinowski 1923: 325 cited in Duranti and Goodwin 1992: 15).

Years later, Voloshinov echoed a similar view in a sharp critique of the Sausurrean notion of language as an abstract system internalized in the minds of the speakers, saying that “verbal communication can never be understood and explained outside of this connection with a concrete situation” (Voloshinov 1986: 95). Underlining the importance of both the more immediate and larger contexts around utterances, Voloshinov forcefully argued for the shaping power

of these contexts by contending that “*the immediate social situation and the broader social milieu wholly determine — and determine from within, so to speak — the structure of an utterance*” (ibid.: 86, original emphasis).

Today, many writers acknowledge the importance of contexts in analyzing talk and human interaction. That is to say, language is seen not as a code with a structurally cohesive entity, but as part of a situation. In that sense, all discursive practices are seen as *situated* practices that are located in space and time (Gumperz 1992).

Even if one acknowledges their presence and importance, however, working with context(s) still constitutes a problem. As Duranti and Goodwin mention, not only the internal structure of context(s), but also the prior question of what is to count as context at a particular moment is a challenge, due to the dynamic and nature of contexts. Simply getting one’s hand on the shape of context becomes a major analytic problem. By way of contrast, the individual sentence provides a clear, highly structured, well-ordered world, one that lends itself well to systematic description and analysis (ibid.: 13).

Thus, while many researchers today agree that language and context stand in a mutually reflexive relation, not all converge on what constitutes the “relevant” context in analyzing a particular talk and interaction. In fact, according to Schiffrin (1994), the main differentiating element between the different approaches to discourse and context is the way they “situate” talk as action. For instance, some Conversation Analysts (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Schegloff 1991, 1992) argue that the relevance of a context should be based strictly on what participants to an event see as relevant in a particular context. Others from the more cognitive tradition focus on information processing structures in our heads (Sperber and Wilson 1986), while the more sociologically oriented support the view that the researcher can work on the implications of the larger and more institutional context(s) even if the relevance of these larger contexts are not directly traceable in the words or acts of the participants in the particular event under investigation (Cicourel 1992; Lindstrom 1992).

The differences in defining “relevant” context(s) also create significant differences in the methods adopted for analyzing particular instances of interaction. While some researchers place significant emphasis on methods such as participant observation, interviews and analysis of institutional structures, not all researchers on language concede, as Cicourel (1992) underlines, that ethnographic material, participant attributes, and patterns of social organization need to be included in the studies of the structure of discourse. Therefore,

while some discourse analysts define relevant contexts with only whatever is traceable in the discourse they analyze, others do not hesitate to explore the implications of the “larger” contexts where a particular local discourse occurs (for a detailed account of the various approaches to discourse-in-context, see Schiffrin 1994 and Linell 1998).

More in line with Voloshinov (1986), who underlines the constitutive power of both immediate and larger contexts, researchers such as Cicourel and Lindstrom defend the importance of looking at both the local and broader contexts when analyzing talk as interaction. For instance, Cicourel (1992), who refers to both “narrow” and “broad” context in situating particular discursive practices, emphasizes the importance of taking a holistic view of both for the analysis of conversational interaction.

As the “broad” context, Cicourel refers to an institutional framing of activities that embody the “group-derived prescriptive norms that pressure or channel people with designated titles, presumed competencies, duties or responsibilities into certain physical spaces at certain times in order to engage in a finite number of activities” (ibid.: 295). Within the “broader” context that acts as a framing of activities, locally organized and negotiated interaction that constitute the “narrower” context appear. According to Cicourel, both a broad and local sense of context need to be incorporated for the study of language use. In his own analysis of medical encounters, for instance, Cicourel does not limit himself to the transcripts of talk, but also explores the cultural and organizational constraints, and normative expectations, as well as immediate conditions that surround talk as it unfolds (ibid.).

In a similar vein, Lindstrom (1992), who borrows his approach to context from Foucault (1981), views the context(s) of talk as consisting of “orders of discourse” and approaches it as a set of cultural rules, conditions and practices that govern how people talk. He contends that already existing discourses and already existing conditions set limits on what can be said and how it can be said but, at the same time, he also recognizes that contexts are not static. In fact, Lindstrom approaches context(s) as fields of power relations that are transformed as people talk and take action. Accordingly, preexisting discourses and discursive conditions do set limits on what can be said and done, but they are never totally determinant. People occasionally can and do say the unsayable. They challenge the existing context(s) by resorting to alternative or competing discourses. Thus, Lindstrom underscores, orders of discourse are not monolithic and possibilities of counter-discourse always exist.

In order to help situate any particular social interaction in context, Cicourel

stresses the importance and desirability of doing ethnographic work that requires going beyond the boundaries of transcripts of talk. Challenging the claims to objectivity and neutrality of those who argue that researchers must limit their analysis of context to whatever participants take as context as evidenced in their talk and actions, Cicourel contends that complete objectivity is impossible to attain, regardless of the unit of analysis one investigates.

Within this framework, the present study aims to explore SI as both a context constrained and context constitutive action by adopting a dynamic view of contexts and the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters. Following in the footsteps of Bakhtin, Cicourel and Lindstrom, this study approaches SI in relation to both the broader (macro) and the narrower (micro) contexts and intends to place the focus on the intertwinedness of and the interplay between the presence and performance of simultaneous conference interpreters and these contexts.

In looking at the “broader” social context around SI, this study explores the kind of presence and performance asked of and expected from simultaneous interpreters by different actors and institutions in and around the profession. In that sense, the analysis here approaches the meta-discursive representation of the profession(al) as the broader context in SI. In line with Cicourel’s (1992) definition, it sees this meta-discursive representation as embodying the group-derived prescriptive norms that pressure or channel people with designated titles, presumed competencies, duties or responsibilities into certain physical spaces at certain times in order to engage in a finite number of activities.

In exploring the more immediate (i.e., micro) social and interactional context, on the other hand, this study focuses on the presence and performance of two conference interpreters at a specific SI-mediated event, which is a two-day colloquium on “Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt: Metaphysics and Politics” held on 29–30 May 2000 in Istanbul. Following Cicourel’s approach, the analysis of the more immediate context relies heavily on ethnographic material (field observations and interviews), as well as transcribed recordings of actual SI performance.

As a study that sets out to explore SI in context(s), it is clear that this study cannot avoid offering the researcher’s interpretation of the context(s). Given that contexts have no objective definitions and no clearly defined beginnings and ends, I do not claim to be in possession of *the* knowledge of the *real* and *objective* contexts in SI. As any researcher, however, I try to “objectify the subjective” by presenting an extensive and diversified account of the contexts I attempt to analyze. For that purpose, I include the discourse of a variety of

actors and institutions in exploring the broader social context around the profession(al), and rely on a variety of methods (field observation, interviews with the conference parties, transcripts of the booth and floor recordings) in analyzing the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters at a specific conference.

#### 1.4 Discourse

As the previous section indicates, analysis of discourse(s) is pivotal to this study. The basic tenets of the discourse analysis undertaken here rest on the eclectic theoretical and methodological stance embraced by Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992, 1995, 1997; van Dijk 1987, 1990, 1997; Wodak 1996, 1997) and my extrapolations of this analytical framework, along with certain other theoretical concepts and views on “discourse” and the “constitution of meaning” in language.

Among the different approaches to discourse analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) stands out for its concern to explore the role of discourse as a socio-cultural practice and as a site of socio-cultural (re)production and change. It differs from the more neutrally descriptive aims of other lines of discourse analysis, such as Conversation Analysis, because of the importance it attaches to “interpretation” of data as much as “description”. By allowing for “interpretation”, CDA challenges the orthodox and academic belief in objective and neutral description and places the emphasis not only on what happens, but also on why something happens the way it does, as well as why it does not happen in any other way. That is to say, if a speaker says X, CDA does not limit itself to describing what X is, but also explores why the speaker says X and not Y and Z, though Y and Z would also have been possibilities (Cameron 2001).

Among the different approaches within the field of CDA, Norman Fairclough’s more holistic approach seems to me to be particularly relevant for this study because he adopts a more critical stance towards his own field, criticizes some critical discourse analysts for overlooking the implications of power relations in and around discourse, and challenges the possibility of homogeneous discourses being (re)produced by homogeneous social groups.

In his *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (1995), and in *Discourse in Late Modernity* with Lilie Chouliaraki (1999), Fairclough incorporates critical concepts from the works of Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, Mikhail Bakhtin, Roland Barthes and Pierre Bourdieu, thereby expanding the

field of CDA to reflect on and work with notions such as “power”, “hegemony” and “heteroglossia”. His eclectic framework, together with my own investigation of the works of the abovementioned authors, guide the present study.

### 1.5 Basic theoretical assumptions on “discourse”

The basic assumptions on “discourse”, which ground this research, are as follows:

*Discourse is both a specific form of language use and a specific form of social interaction* – Discourse as language use primarily refers to spoken and written language use, but also includes other semiotic modalities such as non-verbal communication. Defining discourse as both a specific form of *language use* and a specific form of *social interaction* shifts the focus from language or language use *per se* to language use in relation to various contexts and implies “a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it (Wodak 1996: 62). The aim in critical analysis of discourse is, thus, a systematic exploration of the relationships of causality and determination between discursive practices, events and texts, and wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes (Fairclough 1995).

*Discourse is socially constitutive and socially conditioned.* Discourse is never an abstract or objective way of using language. All discourses are intimately intertwined with the way societies are organized and run. There is always a dialectical relationship between discourses and social practices and structures. Discourses are simultaneously constitutive of social identities, social relations and system of knowledge and belief. They provide frames of reference, ways of interpreting the world and giving it meaning (Burr 1995: 57). As Fairclough argues

Discourse is socially constituted, as well as socially conditioned — it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relations between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps sustain and reproduce the social status quo and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it (ibid.: 131).

*Discourse is ideological* – Discourse and ideology are very much intertwined. Drawing heavily from Foucault’s work on discourse and ideology and Gramsci’s work on hegemony, Fairclough (1995) argues that ideology and

hegemony are (at least partly) discursive in nature. “Ideology”, seen as particular representations and constructions of the world that are instrumental in reproducing domination and “hegemony”, seen as the winning of consent in the exercise of power, are thus produced and reproduced in discourse.

Language use is imbricated in social relations, and one aspect of this imbrication in the social which is inherent to the notion of discourse, is that language is invested with ideology. Discourses shape and are shaped by both discursive (such as vocabularies, turn-taking conventions, etc.) and extra-discursive structures (such as relationships in the market, political and economic structures, gender and market relations, relations with the state, and relations within social institutions, etc.). Social structures, particularly social institutions, are apparatuses of verbal interaction. In that sense, an institution may be regarded as a kind of “speech community”, with its own particular repertoire of speech events. Each institution has its own speech events, settings, participants, goals, etc. That is to say, every institutional frame includes particular ways of talking which are based on particular ways of seeing. In that sense, each institution both facilitates and constrains the social action of its members, i.e., it provides its members with a frame of action, without which they could not act, but it thereby constrains them to act within that frame (ibid.: 38). However, despite their influence, such frames of action do not always ensure full consent and compliance of the members, since rejection or deployment of alternative speech repertoires and frames of action always remain an option.

*Discourse generates “symbolic power”* – Discourses are never produced in a vacuum. Since they are always imbricated in social relations, discourses may be formulated to serve the interests of their producers. This aspect is very pronounced in the way discourses generate “symbolic power”. According to Bourdieu (1992), in addition to the classical idea of “economic capital”, there are other forms of capital such as “cultural capital” and “symbolic capital”. While “cultural capital” pertains to knowledge, skills and other cultural acquisitions, “symbolic capital” refers to the accumulated prestige or honor of persons, groups, institutions, etc. It is precisely in the constitution and enhancement of the latter (i.e., symbolic capital) where discourse plays a fundamental role, especially because in the field there is always room for one form of capital to be converted into another. For instance, “cultural capital” in the form of a skill or education in a certain specific field of knowledge can be used to enhance the “symbolic capital” of those with that education or skill by

increasing their prestige in the society, which can, in turn, augment their “economic capital” by justifying higher salaries and fees for these people.

According to Bourdieu, the production of linguistic utterances or expressions always occurs in particular contexts or “markets”.<sup>5</sup> The properties of these contexts or markets bestow a certain “value” on particular discourses. While producing linguistic expressions, speakers take into account — in varying ways and to different extents — the market conditions within which their products will be received and valued by others. They assess the market conditions, and anticipate the likely reception of their linguistic products with the ultimate objective of maximizing their access to various forms of capital which can be economic, cultural and social. Thus, speakers implicitly and routinely modify their expressions in anticipation of their likely reception, which implies that all discourses are to some extent “euphemized”, i.e., they are modified by a certain kind of *ensorship* which stems from the structure of the market but which is transformed into *self-censorship* through the process of anticipation (ibid.:19).

*Discourse naturalizes and creates “myths”* – The use of discourse in enhancing different forms of capital results in the constitution of, what Bourdieu (ibid.) calls, “legitimate language”. While “legitimate language” shapes and takes shape in relation to social, historical, ideological, cultural and market conditions, it develops a certain repertoire which involves and further reinforces aspects that grant language its “legitimacy” and “authority”. This repertoire is not static in nature, on the contrary, there is always a constant struggle between those who want to maintain it and those who want to change it. Thus, it is never complete and final. However, when analyzing in synoptic shots, one can see certain features which look so natural and authoritative that they appear to be the sole and most correct forms of language and language use possible.

The authoritativeness and naturalness with which any meta-discourse represents its object is linked with the process of “myth-making” in discourse. According to Barthes (1992), all meta-language (i.e., language *about* an object) tends to naturalize and rationalize the historicity and complexity of the object it represents. Everything can become a myth in language if there is an ideological need for it in human history. Thus, the naturalization and rationalization of the object in meta-language always serves a purpose or necessity.

Being features of meta-language, myths always operate by tearing the actual object from its situationality and historicity. Thus, myths always work on de-contextualized objects and give these objects a “blissful clarity”.



Meta-discourse forms myths by erasing the complexity of human acts and by presenting the “object” without contradictions. As Barthes puts it, “the world enters language as a dialectical relation between activities, between human actions; it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of essences” (ibid.: 142). Thus, while myths tend to give the historical object a natural and unproblematic appearance, they at the same time also mask the very process by which the historical object becomes a-historical. In that sense, myths imbue historical intentions with natural justifications.

*Discourse is “heteroglot” and the constitution of both discourse and meaning are “dialogical”* – Despite the tendency in all discursive representations towards naturalization and rationalization, and despite the tendency to give representations a static, final and coherent finish so as to serve a specific purpose or need, there is always room for contradictions and competing versions in discursive representations. This is as much a result of the constant struggle between those who want to maintain a particular representation and those who want to change it, as it is of the “heteroglot” and “dialogical” nature of language use and meaning, which inhibits the possibility of one *single* authorial representation.

According to the members of the Bakhtin Circle, language use is never marked by a single speaker. It is always “heteroglot” because all words and forms always come saturated with intentions and they always carry the baggage of their history, in addition to being marked by their potentiality. That is to say, every utterance contains within it traces of other utterances, which may contradict each other. This applies both to the micro- as well as the macro-linguistic scale in that, like the utterances of individual speakers, institutional discourses and even national languages may simultaneously carry elements of both “centrifugal” and “centripetal”, “official” and “unofficial” discourses (cf. Morris 1994).

According to Bakhtin, words and forms carry the baggage of their history because they are never “neutral” and never exist in a neutral and impersonal language waiting to be used by the individual speakers. Neither do they exist in a vacuum or a dictionary. Instead, they always exist “in other people’s mouths, in other people’s contexts, serving other people’s intentions: *it is from there that one must take the word, and make it one’s own*” (Bakhtin 1981: 294, my emphasis).

In addition to being saturated with their history, words and forms are also marked by their potentiality. As Voloshinov puts it:

*Word is a two-sided act. It is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant. As a word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee (Voloshinov 1986: 86, original emphasis).*<sup>6</sup>

It is this interaction between the speaker and all previous speakers of language, as well as the reciprocity between the speaker, all previous speakers and the potential addressee, that members of the Bakhtin Circle call the “dialogical” aspect of language use and meaning constitution. Accordingly, there is neither a first or last word nor fixed and finalized meanings in language because words and meanings always change and become renewed every time they are used. Thus, each instance of discourse production and discourse reception is interactive, and every utterance is “*the product of the interaction between speakers and the product of the broader context of the whole complex social situation in which the utterance emerges*” (Voloshinov 1994: 39, original emphasis).

As Cecilia Wadensjö, who grounds her pioneering analysis of dialogue interpreter-mediated interactions in Bakhtin’s view of language and meaning, succinctly comments, in the Bakhtinian dialogical model, “meanings conveyed by language use are conceptualized as co-constructed *between* speaker and hearer(s) *in interaction*” (1998: 41, original emphasis). “Sense” is considered to be made in and by a common activity, in contrast to the monological view of language where the meaning of words and utterances are seen as resulting from the *speaker’s intentions or strategies* alone. Thus, whereas in the monological view of language, language use is assumed to take place in a “vacuum”, in the dialogical view, social and interactional contexts that frame the language use are considered to play a determining role both in the way the speakers use the language as well as in the way meaning is constituted (cf. also Linell 1998).

The implications of Bakhtin’s conceptions of language are indeed immense because they challenge the notions of absolute “originality”, “intentionality” and “homogeneity” of discourses. If each instance of language use bears the imprints of its current user, as well as its previous users, then speakers cannot have an absolute authorial position from which they formulate messages that reflect their own intentions only. Furthermore, it also means that a single discourse cannot have absolute homogeneity to serve a specific purpose exclusively. Last but not least, it suggests that receivers cannot access authorial intentions completely because each instance of language use contains more meanings, intentions and accents than its formulator may have intended and any single receiver can purport to have accessed.

*About the Theoretical Framework* – Although facilitated by Fairclough’s approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, the eclectic, or to use the Bakhtinian term, “heteroglot” theoretical framework conjoined and explored above, basically reflects the way I see the interconnections between various theoretical concepts and stances regarding discourse and the constitution of meaning in language. With all its merits and shortcomings, it will be this theoretical framework that will guide my analysis of the broader social context(s) in SI in Chapter 2 and my analysis of the actual presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters in an actual conference context in Chapters 3 and 4. It will also inform my juxta- and counterpositioning of the meta-discursive representation with actual instances of SI behavior in Chapter 5.

## CHAPTER 2

# Broader social context in SI

### 2.1 Meta-discourse as social context

As professionals, conference interpreters are surrounded with both the immediate conference settings where they work day by day and the broader socio-cultural, ideological and interactional context(s) that position, honor and constrain them as professionals. It is this broader social context which grants simultaneous interpreters the status of experts in possession of certain skills for which they gain prestige, credibility and money.

In that larger socio-cultural context, conference interpreters, like all other professionals, operate with a “professional identity” which shapes and is shaped by the way a variety of actors and institutions inside and outside SI see and describe the profession(al). Like all “professional identities”, the professional identity of simultaneous interpreters is (meta-)discursive in nature. As such, the meta-discursive representation of simultaneous interpreters does not embody just a neutral description of intrinsic professional features, but presents a selected and hierarchised set of “norms”. In addition to presenting the values and ideas shared by a community, these norms convert those general values or ideas into performance instructions which specify what is prescribed and forbidden, as well as what is tolerated and permitted in a certain behavioral dimension (Toury 1995: 55).

At any given moment, certain norms are likely to be more prevalent than others in the general meta-discursive representation of a certain profession. This is a result of both the selection and hierarchisation of norms (van Dijk 1996) and the tendency in all meta-discourse towards “naturalization” of the object at hand (Barthes 1972). Despite the tendency towards rationalization and purification in meta-discourse, however, opposition and contradiction always remain possible, first of all, because the views and interests of the actors and institutions directly or indirectly involved in the (re)production of a meta-discursive representation tend to diverge from each other and, secondly, because the internal dynamics and dynamism of language tends to invoke multiple interpretations, thereby rendering a single monolithic and authoritative representation of an object impossible.

## 2.2 Meta-discourse on SI

Within this framework, this chapter explores the (re)presentation of SI in the (meta-)discourse of various actors inside and outside the profession. It does so because analyzing the meta-discursive representation of simultaneous interpreters and interpreting can provide an insight into the larger socio-cultural contexts in SI by highlighting the general values, expectations and demands regarding SI as a profession, the position of those who voice these demands and expectations, and the way in which these values and demands function as performance instructions for professional interpreters.

In exploring how the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters are seen and depicted in the broader social context, this chapter scans the discourse of professional organizations, codes of ethics, general reference books (such as dictionaries and encyclopedia), academic literature, printed and electronic media in Turkey (including both the media's own representation of SI, as well as interpreters' self-representations in the media), and a popular book by a practicing conference interpreter addressed to the general public in Turkey.

As the list suggests, the focus here is on already existing sources of discourse, and no attempt is made to generate new discourses on SI for the purposes of this book. Naturally, despite all attempts to cover as many sources of discourse as possible to make an extensive analysis, the sources of discourse explored here are far from being exhaustive. But then, the aim here is not to attempt the impossible task of including everything that has been said or written on SI, but to present a variety of institutional and individual positions so as to explore the points where they converge and diverge.

### 2.2.1 Discourse of general reference books

Dictionaries and encyclopedia are some of the more “general” sources that provide concise and conventional information about the subject matter they describe. I would like to scan some of these general sources to explore the (re)presentation of interpreting in general and simultaneous interpreting in particular.

To start with the dictionaries, here are two consecutive entries on “interpretation” and “interpreting” in *A Student's Dictionary of Language and Linguistics*:

Interpretation: assigning a meaning to something you hear or read.

Interpreting: the art of listening to a person speaking in one language and then

immediately after (or even simultaneously) producing a spoken equivalent in a different language (Trask 1997: 116).

According to the dictionary definition, there is a clear difference between these consecutive entries. While the definition of “interpretation” is marked by the *involvement* of the interpreters who *assign* a meaning to what they read or hear, the definition of “(interlingual) interpreting” refers to a more *objective* process where the person doing the interpretation produces *spoken equivalents* between languages.

Differentiating interlingual interpreting from other forms of “interpretation” is not an uncommon approach at all. Here is an entry on “(to) interpret” in *The Collins Cobuild Dictionary of English Language*:

- interpret: 1. if you **interpret** what someone says or does in a particular way, you decide that this is its meaning or significance.
2. if you **interpret** a novel, dream, result, etc., you give an explanation of what it means.
3. if you **interpret** a work of art such as a piece of music, a play, a dance, etc., you perform it in a particular way, especially a way that shows your feelings about it.
4. if you **interpret** what someone is saying, you translate it immediately into another language, so that speakers of that language can understand (Sinclair 1987: 763).

Similar to the first example, all forms of interpreting — except for interlingual interpreting referred to in item 4 — are defined as involving the active engagement of the person who is interpreting (i.e., interpreter) in shaping the objects of interpretation, whether they are dreams, results, meanings of utterances and actions, piece of music, play, dance, etc. The definition of interlingual interpreting is the only one where the interpreting process is conceived to be independent of the interpreter’s involvement and presented as an objective act of *making somebody else’s words understood*.

The difference in the definition of interlingual and other forms of interpreting becomes more obvious in the entry on the “interpreter” in the same dictionary:

- interpreter: 1. a person who repeats what someone else is saying by translating it immediately into another language so that other people can understand it.
2. a person who explains the meaning or significance of something.
3. a person who performs a work of art in a particular way, especially a way that shows the performer’s feelings about it (ibid.: 764).

As can be seen, the definition of the interlingual interpreter in item 1 is the only definition that does not foreground the active involvement of the “interpreter”. While all other “interpreters” bring in their own subjectivity to the interpretation process (by explaining the meaning or significance of something or performing a work of art in a way that shows their feelings), the interlingual interpreter is defined as one who *repeats* what a speaker says in another language.

The depiction of interlingual interpreting as an *objective* transfer between languages is also palpable in the discourse of the encyclopedia. One such example is the entry on “Simultaneous Interpreting” in *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, where SI is defined as involving the preservation of exact semantic correspondence between languages:

In no other context of human communication is anyone routinely required to listen and speak at the same time, *preserving an exact semantic correspondence* between the two modes (Crystal 1987: 349, my emphasis).

As can be seen, by placing the emphasis on an “exact transfer”, the depiction here echoes the previous emphases in the dictionaries on the objectivity of the transfer in SI and reinforces the view that simultaneous interpreters render the source speeches into other languages without becoming involved in shaping what gets transferred. At the same time, however, this entry also introduces the notion of “semantic correspondence”, and thereby shifts the focus on lexical equivalence in dictionaries to equivalence in meaning.

A similar emphasis on transferring “content” rather than “words” in SI is also evident in Roda Roberts’ entry in *The Encyclopedia of Language and Literature*:

The goal of conference interpretation, as well as of escort and community interpretation is a relatively *smooth presentation of the cognitive content of the message*, with the interpreter extracting the ideas from the oral discourse and reproducing them in an appropriate form and register in the target language (Roberts 1994: 1732, my emphasis).

Similar to the emphasis on “preserving exact *semantic* correspondence” in the previous example, this definition foregrounds the “smooth presentation of the *cognitive* content” as the goal of conference interpreting. In that sense, just as in the previous entry, it assumes a clear separability between the cognitive/semantic content and linguistic form of the original utterance and sees simultaneous conference interpreting as interested in the transfer of the semantic/cognitive content of the “original” message.

What this differentiation entails for the practice of conference interpreting becomes more obvious when the author contrasts the goals of court and conference interpreting:

The goal of legal interpretation, especially in a courtroom situation, includes transfer of features such as the speaker's hesitation, incomplete statements, redundancy, etc. because judges, lawyers and juries base their decision about a witness's credibility not only on what she/he says, but also on how she/he says it (ibid.).

Thus, while court interpreting necessitates the transfer of *how* people say what they say (including the flaws such as incomplete statements, etc.), conference interpreting involves the *smooth* transfer of *what* people say and does not entail the transfer of *how* people say it.

According to the same entry, (oral) interpretation also differs from (written) translation because, like court interpreting, translation requires "fidelity to the author's stated text" (i.e., the *how*), whereas oral interpretation necessitates above all "fidelity to the speaker's communicative intent" (i.e., the *what*).

As can be seen, in the general reference books, interlingual interpreting is viewed as different from other forms of interpreting. While definitions of all other kinds of interpreting (i.e., interpreting a piece of music, work of art, dreams, and even interpreting what others mean) foreground the active and subjective involvement of the person in shaping the end product of the interpretation process, the task of the *interlingual* interpreter is presented as one of "repeating what speakers say" or "producing spoken equivalents" in another language.

Simultaneous conference interpreting, on the other hand, is also seen as distinct from other types of interlingual interpreting. While SI is defined as exclusively involving the transfer of the *semantic* or *cognitive content* of the speaker's message, which pertains to *what* the speaker says, court interpreting, for instance, is presented as also necessitating the transfer of the lexical forms used by the speaker, such as hesitations, incomplete statements, etc., which pertain to *how* speakers say what they say.

### 2.2.2 Discourse of codes of ethics

Codes of Ethics are important sources of discourse because they delineate "ethical" behavior from "unethical" behavior and thereby define the kind of presence and performance interpreters should adhere to and attain.

Seen from this perspective, the "Code of Professional Ethics" adopted by the AIIC — the largest professional organization representing conference



interpreters — is a rather general one that refrains from defining the conduct of an interpreter. While the Code of the AIIC foregrounds secrecy, confidentiality, collegiality and integrity as some of the important constituents of “due professionalism” in conference interpreting, it does not specify what constitutes an ethical interpreting performance. In Article 3, it is stated simply that “acceptance of an assignment shall imply a moral undertaking on the member’s part to work with all due professionalism” (AIIC’s Code of Professional Ethics).

Even though the AIIC’s Code of Professional Ethics does not define specific types of behavior as “(un)ethical” and “(un)professional”, other sections of the AIIC’s website, such as “Quality Issues in Conference Interpreting” and “Advice to Students Wishing to Become Conference Interpreters”, provide ample and detailed descriptions of *what* “professional” conference interpreting entails and *how* “professionals” should interpret (see Section 2.2.3).

Other associations and institutions that represent interpreters (conference interpreters as well as others) and translators voice more explicit “ethical” performance attributes for professional interpreters. For instance, Article 4.3 of the ITI’s (Institute of Translation and Interpreting) Code of Ethics underscores the importance of the impartiality of interpreters, while also underlining their role as “gatekeepers” of communication by stating that “a member shall interpret *impartially* between the various parties and, with due regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time, *take all reasonable steps to ensure complete and effective communication between the parties*” (ITI’s Code of Ethics, my emphasis).

Accordingly, the Code does not see the steps that interpreters shall take to ensure complete and effective communication as a contradiction or potential threat to the requirement of “impartiality” in interpreting between various parties.

Similarly, Article 1 of the AUSIT (Australian Institute of Interpreters and Translators) Code of Ethics, which also represents conference interpreters, underscores the role of interpreters as “gatekeepers of communication” by emphasizing that:

It is the responsibility of the interpreters and translators to *ensure that the conditions under which they work facilitate rather than hinder communication* (AUSIT’s Code of Ethics, my emphasis).

Despite the flexible and empowering attitude towards the role of the interpreter in Article 1 that allows the interpreter to secure the conditions for

enhanced communication, Articles 1b, 4 and 5 of the same Code adopt a very strict understanding of “impartiality” and “objectivity”. For instance, Article 4b of the same Code stipulates that “a professional detachment is required for interpreting and translation assignments in *all situations*” (my emphasis) and asks interpreters to withdraw from tasks where objectivity and impartiality may be threatened or difficult to maintain. Article 5 on “Truth and Completeness”, on the other hand, gives a lengthy specification of what “impartiality” and “objectivity” in interpreting entails:

- i. In order to ensure the same access to all that is said by all parties involved in a meeting, interpreters shall relay accurately and completely everything that is said.
- ii. Interpreters shall convey the whole message, including derogatory or vulgar remarks as well as non-verbal clues.
- iii. If patent untruths are uttered or written, interpreters and translators shall convey these as accurately as presented.
- iv. Interpreters and translators shall not alter, make additions to, or omit anything from their assigned work (*ibid.*).

As can be seen, in striking contrast to Article 1, which allows room for the personal initiative of the interpreter to facilitate communication, Articles 4 and 5 of the AUSIT Code impose very strict controls over what interpreters can and cannot do. While Article 1 enables interpreters to take “reasonable steps to ensure effective communication”, Article 5 strictly limits their role to that of a linguistic intermediary, prohibiting all kinds of involvement of the interpreter in the interpreting process, even against patent untruths, derogatory and vulgar remarks.

In a similar vein, the Code of the STIBC (Society of Translators and Interpreters of British Columbia) bans its member from transgressing the limits of a language professional:

Members shall not use their professional role to perform functions that lie beyond the scope of a language professional, such as advocacy, counseling or improper disclosure of information (STIBC’s Code of Ethics).

Clearly, the Code views advocacy and counseling as transgressions of professional limits and treats them the same as with improper disclosure of information. It thereby limits the role of the interpreter with linguistic intermediation and rules out any other presence of the interpreter in the interpreting process.

As can be seen, while the Code of Ethics of the AIIC does not specify explicit performance attributes for “ethical” interpreting, the Codes of other

professional organizations, which also represent conference interpreters, foreground the “impartiality” and “objectivity” of the interpreter, the “accuracy” and “completeness” of the interlingual transfer, as well as the “confidentiality” of the information acquired during interpretation as constituents of professional ethics for interpreters. The Codes tend to place the most significant emphasis on the “objectivity” and “impartiality” of the interpreter and stipulate *absolute* loyalty to the original speaker, while underscoring the importance of conveying the whole message and ruling out the possibility of making any additions, omissions or abatements even when the original utterances contain patent untruths, derogatory or vulgar remarks.

However, while adopting the strictest rules on impartiality, objectivity, confidentiality, accuracy and completeness, the Codes also attach considerable importance to the provision of an effective communication through interpreting and consider as desirable the involvement of the interpreter in ensuring an easier, more effective and complete communication. While doing so, the Codes do not problematize how the requirement of complete detachment of the interpreter and strict fidelity to the original message fit with the concomitant demand of cultural mediation and gatekeeping of effective communication. In that sense, by imposing, or rather juxtaposing, the strictest rules on impartiality and objectivity together with demands for an interpreter-improved communication, the Codes draw fuzzy, if not paradoxical, borders between the “ethical” and “unethical” involvement of the interpreter in the interpreting process.

### 2.2.3 Discourse of professional organizations

In addition to the Codes of Ethics, the discourse of the professional organizations also act as important sites for the (re)production of the social identity of the profession(al) for both insiders and outsiders of the profession. Looking at the websites of two of the largest professional organizations which represent (AIIC) and also employ (SCIC) simultaneous interpreters, it is possible to see significant emphasis placed on conference interpreting as the transfer of the “content” of a message, rather than its words. For instance, according to the AIIC:

To interpret a speech is not to translate it word for word. To interpret a speech from its source language is to *transfer its semantic, connotative and aesthetic content* into another language, using the lexical, syntactic and stylistic resources of the second, or “target” language for that purpose (AIIC’s website, my emphasis).

While this description creates an association between conference interpreting and the transfer of the “[semantic, connotative and aesthetic] content”, it also implies an association between translation and word-for-word substitution.

Similarly, the SCIC also defines conference interpreting as the transfer of the “ideas” expressed by the speakers and presents this as a distinctive feature of conference interpreting:

It is the job of the interpreter to enable them [participants] to **communicate** with each other, **not by translating every word they utter, but by conveying the ideas which they express** (SCIC’s website, original emphasis).

According to both the AIIC and the SCIC, the transfer of the ideas in conference interpreting requires a “perfect” understanding of the meaning intended by the speaker in the “original” message. Once that meaning is understood, it can be detached and reattached to words of the target language:

To interpret is first and foremost to understand the intended message *perfectly*. It can then be detached from the words used to convey it in the original and reconstituted, *in all its subtlety*, in words of the target language (AIIC’s website, my emphasis).

Identification of the interpreter with the original speaker is also presented as a defining feature of professional interpreting. “Genuine” interpreters, the AIIC underscores, “identify closely with the speaker and while interpreting [...] adopt the speaker’s point of view”. Furthermore, according to the AIIC, the finest reward of “genuine” interpreters is to see the audience act “as though the speaker and the interpreter were one and the same person” (*ibid.*).

Similar to the AIIC, the SCIC also sees the identification of the interpreter with the speaker as a key aspect of SI and views “speaking in the first person of the speaker” as a manifestation of the identification between the interpreter and the speaker:

Conference interpreting deals exclusively with oral communication: rendering a message from one language into another, *naturally and fluently, adopting the delivery, tone and convictions of the speaker and speaking in the first person* (SCIC’s website, my emphasis).

According to the AIIC, grasping the intended message “perfectly” and carrying it to another language naturally and fluently is not an ordinary task that anyone can undertake, but a special skill which professionals possess:

Interpreters are employed to ensure perfect communication across language barriers. Knowing a language is not enough. It is a job for which properly qualified and experienced professional interpreters are essential (AIIC’s website).

Rendering the tone and convictions of the original speakers fluently and naturally is neither challenging nor problematic for the “professionals” because, according to the AIIC, professional interpreters are “capable of thinking and reacting instantaneously, delivering the speaker’s message with the right expressions, emphasis and accuracy — all in a matter of seconds” (ibid.).

Moreover, according to the SCIC, “a good interpreter doesn’t only know the language, he also knows the culture, grasps implications, captures allusions, doesn’t miss a nod or a wink” (SCIC’s website). Thus, “good” interpreters possess the ability to access both the explicit and implicit meanings intended by the speakers, as well as the meanings implied in their winks and nods.

While working with “good” interpreters guarantees a “perfect communication across language barriers”, working with “poor interpreters” is prone to imperfections:

A poor interpreter may leave gaps, leave sentences unfinished, have a very strong accent so that the listeners are obliged to put considerable effort into understanding what is being said. In the worst cases, communication may break down completely (ibid.).

Thus, working with a “good” interpreter guarantees “perfect” communication between languages where the listeners do not have to put an effort into understanding what is being said. A “good” conference interpreter ensures a smooth, lively and pleasant delivery of the speaker’s intended message, even when working under pressure:

An interpreter must be a clear and lively speaker and despite working under pressure, an interpreter’s delivery must remain smooth and the voice pleasant so as to prevent the listeners’ attention from slackening (ibid.).

Accordingly, regardless of the pressure and difficulties the interpreters might face, the end-product of the interpreting process (i.e., the “delivery”) by “professionals” always sounds smooth and pleasant. Furthermore, the delivery of “professional” simultaneous interpreters always comes in a format that is easy for the receiver to process, without ever ceasing to be the “exact” transfer of the message intended by the speaker.

As can be seen, in the discourse of the professional organizations, interpreting is differentiated from translating and while translating is associated with a word-for-word transfer, interpreting is associated with the transfer of the messages intended by the speakers. In the discourse of both the AIIC and the SCIC, professional conference interpreters are presented as professionals who can grasp the intended meanings in the “original”, detach that “transcendental”

sense from its word-carriers in the source utterance, and substitute them with the relevant semantic counterparts in the target utterance. Significant emphasis is placed on the fact that simultaneous interpreters never interfere with the “content” of what is meant by the speaker. In fact, according to these institutions, interpreters always “identify closely with the speakers”, “speak in the first person” and take pride in seeing the listeners act as though “the interpreter and the speaker were one and the same person”.

Furthermore, according to the meta-discursive representation of simultaneous interpreters by professional organizations, simultaneous interpreters also facilitate the flow of communication by improving the format or the “packaging” of the original message. That is to say, they transfer the message with a standard diction, native accent and pleasant voice, and ensure the immediate intelligibility of the speaker’s intended message.

According to the professional organizations, improving the “packaging” of a message is not contradictory with the demands of “fidelity” and “accuracy” in SI, because such improvements always take place at the lexical or prosodic level and never interfere with the essential semantic content of the original message. On the contrary, taking the necessary steps to ensure a smooth and transparent communication where the listeners do not have to put an effort into understanding what they are listening to, is a natural and desirable aspect of an interpreter’s task. Professional simultaneous interpreters are recruited to ensure “perfect” communication of messages as intended by the speakers across languages barriers, and only “poor” interpreters will cause a breakdown in the flow of communication.

#### 2.2.4 Discourse of academia

One other important source of discourse on SI is the academic discourse. According to Danica Seleskovitch, the pioneer of interpreting research and the foremost representative of the ESIT school, whose views still continue to exert direct and indirect influence on both academic and non-academic circles, interpreting entails a deverbalization process in which the interpreter converts the linguistic meaning in the original to a non-verbal “sense”:

Interpretation is not a direct conversion of the linguistic meaning of the source language to the target language, but a conversion from source language to sense, the intermediate link *being nonverbal thought, which, once consciously grasped, can then be expressed in any language regardless of the words used in the original language* (1977: 28, my emphasis).

In Seleskovitch's theoretical framework, interpreting is seen as a task of detaching the sense from the words that carry it. Once the interpreter consciously grasps it, the "sense" can be reconstituted in any human language. Therefore, the main skill of the interpreter is to grasp that "[transcendental] sense", detach it from the words of the source language and re-express it in another language.

A similar viewpoint is also adopted by Claude Namy who complements Seleskovitch's general theoretical framework based on the deverbalization of the sense of the original utterance with the definition of "good simultaneous interpreting":

What is good simultaneous interpreting? I venture to suggest the following definition: It is the art of re-expressing in a language a message delivered in another language at the same time as it is being delivered; the re-expression should be *clear, unambiguous and immediately comprehensible, that is to say perfectly idiomatic, so that the listener does not have to mentally re-interpret what reaches him through the earphones* (Namy 1978: 26, my emphasis).

According to Namy, the task of the simultaneous interpreter is to ensure a smooth and transparent communication where the listeners access the "sense" in the original via a "sense-wise exact", but "form-wise improved" delivery. Such an interpretation ensures a smooth and intelligible communication between the participants and saves them the effort of "mentally re-interpreting" what they hear.

Ensuring immediate intelligibility by improving the form of the original is necessary because, Sergio Viaggio argues, unintelligible interpreting is "useless" and "bad" and all interpreters are paid to be understood:

The interpreter must be made to understand that unintelligible interpreting, even if 'linguistically' unimpeachable, is useless; and that useless interpreting is, by definition, *bad*. He must be aware that he is not paid to understand, or to speak, but to be understood (Viaggio 1992: 311, original emphasis).

According to Daniel Gile, one way of ensuring intelligibility in interpreting is by discarding the "secondary information" when it threatens the efficiency of communication. For instance, "personal information", contained in the original message, constitutes "secondary information" which can be discarded by the interpreter when it threatens the clarity, strength and readability of the target product:

Personal Information [...] is by definition a pure reflection of the Sender's personality as manifested linguistically. It should therefore be followed if possible, but not if the costs in terms of communication efficiency (readability, clarity,

strength of the target product, etc.) is even moderately high. In particular, *Personal Information* indicating, through grammatical and other errors or regional expressions, that Senders are using a language other than their own, or that they come from a particular area in their country, should generally not be reconstructed in the target language, since they are *not relevant* and *may distract* the Receiver's attention from the Message. As for the case when Personal Information *generates a negative image* of the Senders, for instance by showing that they are not well educated, Sender loyalty would imply that *such information is not to be reconstructed* (Gile 1995: 62, my emphasis).

Such a strategy does not conflict with the principle of “fidelity” because, according to Gile, “the *absolute* fidelity rule is that *the Message or Primary Information should always be re-expressed in the target-language Text*” (ibid.: 59, original emphasis). Thus, what needs to be transferred is the “primary information” and “secondary information”, such as the “personal information” present in the original, can be eliminated without jeopardizing “absolute fidelity to the original” when interpreters think such information poses a threat to the “efficiency” of the communication or “interests” of the speakers.

In a somewhat similar vein, according to Roderick Jones, the interventions that conference interpreters undertake to “bridge the cultural and conceptual gaps separating the participants” (1998: 4) do not conflict with the principle of fidelity that requires “an *exact* and *faithful* reproduction of the original speech”:

The conference interpreter must be able to provide an *exact and faithful reproduction of the original speech*. Deviation from the letter of the original is permissible only if it enhances the audience's understanding of the speaker's meaning. Additional information should be provided only if it is indispensable to bridge cultural gaps referred above: *it should in no way involve the interpreter's adding their own point of view to that of the speaker* (ibid.: 5, my emphasis).

Accordingly, additional information which the interpreter provides to bridge cultural gaps does not imply the involvement of the interpreter's point of view. Similarly, deviations from the letter of the original that aim to enhance the audience's understanding of the original meaning do not contradict the principle of “exact and faithful reproduction”.

In the literature on SI in Turkish, demands for absolute objectivity and fidelity in SI also tend to come intermingled with the emphases on interpreters as providers of smooth and unproblematic interlingual/intercultural communication.

Atasoy, for instance, mentions that interpreters are basically known as people who “ensure a transmission from the source to the target language



*without making others realize the differences between languages, people and cultures*” (1997a: 123, my translation here and throughout this section).<sup>7</sup> According to Atasoy, interpreters, who have proven their professional success with their impeccable work, remain invisible and function as “anonymous entities within the service gear just like an important machine taken for granted and expected to work properly all the time” (1997b: 201).<sup>8</sup>

In order to establish communication without making others realize the differences between languages, cultures and peoples, simultaneous interpreters “filter” the meaning of the original utterance. Echoing the emphasis on the possibility of remaining absolutely loyal to the “primary meaning” after discarding “secondary information”, Atasoy states that conference interpreters eliminate the “redundant” from the “essential” to ensure an “impeccable work”:

To catch the meaning, to discover what s/he is perceiving and to carry that discovery to the target language, the interpreter has to filter it in his/her brain. In that filter, redundant words are eliminated and a summary is made, the essential is selected (1997a: 125).<sup>9</sup>

Once in possession of the “essential”, after having eliminated the “redundant”, interpreters render that essence with a smooth and intelligible delivery “using a proper expression in the target language and ensuring the transition with comprehensible and proper sentences” (ibid.).<sup>10</sup>

In a similar vein, Derkunt emphasizes that the aim in SI training is to ensure that students “pick out the ideas from within the whole meaning, catch the main idea and then transfer this to the target language in the most natural manner” (Derkunt 1994: 192).<sup>11</sup> However, “picking out” the ideas does not, by any means, imply a personal involvement of the interpreter, because the author contends that the meaning in interpreting does not rest on linguistic elements but on the “impartial and objective perception of a reality” (ibid.). Acknowledging that some people face difficulties while interpreting simultaneously, the author argues that these difficulties are usually results of not focusing on the comprehension of the meaning well enough and/or not having sufficient knowledge of the culture of the target language.

Finally, in the more recent emphasis on SI as inter-cultural communication, one still finds a rather objectivistic approach to inter-lingual and inter-cultural mediation in SI in those views that underline the possibility of substituting the culturally determined peculiarities of the source utterance with the culturally-determined expectations of the receivers. Views in that direction can be found in Kondo and Tebble’s (1997) summary of the Panel

on “Intercultural Communication” at the Turku Conference, where the question of whether interpreters should act as a mere mouthpiece is counterposed with whether they should act as cultural mediators. The latter view finds much more support, but constraints of on-line processing and the expectation of a faithful rendition come to the fore as the major challenges on the way to cultural mediation, rather than the inherent subjectivity and involvement implied in all acts of (intercultural) mediation.

In conclusion, the essentialist view of language, which sees the “meaning” in language as largely independent of the “words” that carry it and the “messages” of consisting of separate categories of information (such as “primary vs. secondary information”) also persists in the IS literature with varying degrees of emphasis.

This view of language facilitates the conceptualization of conference interpreters as professionals capable of accessing and re-expressing in another language the “sense”, “primary information”, and “essential content” contained in the original utterance. It also facilitates the depiction of conference interpreters as experts who can safely “filter out” the “irrelevant” or “redundant” aspects of the original message to enhance communication without becoming involved in shaping the message.

In line with this view of language, eliminating the hesitations, accents, grammatical errors, cultural differences, etc., are not perceived as implying an involvement on the part of the interpreter or an intervention in the “essence” of the speaker’s message. In fact, such “filtrations” are viewed as only modifying *how* speakers formulate their message and not *what* they intend to say. While “improving” the *how* (i.e., the way individual speakers formulate their intentions in language) is presented as a distinctive skill of professional simultaneous interpreters, these types of interventions are not seen, in any way, as contradicting even the strictest rule of “absolute fidelity to the original meaning” in SI.

### 2.2.5 Discourse of Turkish media

Another important source of discourse on SI is, without doubt, the discourse of the media. In contrast to the professional organizations and academia, which naturally develop discourses on SI due to their direct interest, the discourse of the media requires special attention not only with regard to *what* it says about SI, but also with regard to *when* it says something about the profession(al). Looking at the discourse on SI in the Turkish printed and

electronic media from 1988 until today at the archives of the Turkish Conference Interpreters Association, SI seems to hit the news in Turkey for three main reasons: big events, big money and big mistakes.

In the first category of “big events”, live broadcasts of major world events clearly play a significant role in creating a discourse on simultaneous interpreters and interpreting. Out of a total of 31 items of media coverage (press and TV) analyzed in this section, 8 make direct references to live SI performances on TV. The difference in the “fluency” of the professional and non-professional interpreters (who are usually the regular staff of television channels thrown into the task of interpreting live) seems to turn the eyes of the media to SI. For instance, in the following excerpt from a column, the columnist criticizes the deployment of anchor(wo)men as interpreters because they lack fluency:

This year, our TV channels were caught unprepared. They probably could not arrange for “professional interpreters”. Knowing English well and doing “simultaneous interpreting” are two separate things. Defne Samyeli and Elif Ilgaz know English well. They tried to do their best to decipher CNN. However, TRT and NTV did what they should by matching the voice of a professional who could interpret fluently with the scenes on the screen (Sina Koloğlu; *Milliyet* 18.12.1998, my translation here and throughout this section).<sup>12</sup>

In addition to the live broadcasts of major world events with SI, important summits and meetings (such as the organization of the big UN Habitat Conference with dozens of interpreters in Istanbul, the visit of the Italian Prosecutor Di Pietro to initiate a campaign against corruption, the use of SI in the Istanbul Film Festival) also turn the media’s attention to SI. The ability of conference interpreters to remain “loyal” to every *word* and even every *letter* they hear is also considered very striking by the media:

Imagine you are giving a speech in a conference where, by the time you utter the first syllable, your words are interpreted into eight languages all at the same time. Nice and virtuous ladies who smoke fags inside the booths *interpret every sentence you say letter for letter* into English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, and Greek (Hadi Uluengin, *Milliyet* 02.09.1995, my emphasis).<sup>13</sup>

In addition to the “big events”, Turkish media seems to turn its attention to SI on account of the “big money” that interpreters allegedly earn. To cite a few examples:

“In” Professions: 300 Dollars for Simultaneous Interpreting. Simultaneous Interpreters valued highly (*Ekonomist* 19.05.1996).<sup>14</sup>

A conference with interpreters starts from 8.5 million TL (*Hürriyet* 02.09.1992).<sup>15</sup>

Young girls no longer want to become models: The favorite profession of today is simultaneous interpreting. Simultaneous interpreting has as many challenging aspects as attractive ones (*Milliyet* 02.09.1989).<sup>16</sup>

Once again, the media seems particularly interested in the ability of simultaneous interpreters to remain loyal to the *words* of the speakers:

Interpreters carry a tremendous responsibility: Is it easy to bear the responsibility of interpreting the words a speaker utters simultaneously and without making any errors to another language during a very important meeting? (*ibid.*).<sup>17</sup>

Considering the emphasis placed on “fidelity to the *word* of the original”, it is probably only natural that the media also turns its attention to SI in case of “big mistakes”. One such big mistake in SI is said to have occurred during Helmut Kohl’s visit to Turkey:

Germany’s Foreign Minister Mr. Klaus Kinkel has referred to the comments of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz that were misunderstood due to an interpretation error as “unacceptably tactless”. In a meeting in Antalya with German and Turkish press members, Mesut Yılmaz, referring to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, had said “Old friends cannot become enemies”. However, these words were interpreted as “Our old friend Kohl is our new enemy” leading to new tension between the two countries (Ahmet Kùlahçı, *Hürriyet* 03.04.1998).<sup>18</sup>

Another “big mistake” is said to have occurred during the negotiations over a decision regarding human rights in Turkey at the European Parliament:

Some of the expressions in the decision taken by the European Parliament yesterday on the progress of human rights and democratic reforms in Turkey are still being debated. While the decision was said to omit the phrase “Turkish government, the PKK and the representatives of Kurdish organizations”, the official decision later contained the same statement. It was reported that this confusion of expression stemmed from the interpretation of the decision into 9 languages (*Türkiye* 14.01.1995).<sup>19</sup>

In short, three main reasons seem to kindle the interest of the media to SI in Turkey. These are the “big events” where conference interpreters work, the “big money” interpreters are thought to earn and the “big mistakes” they are thought to make. In that sense, the interest of the media seems to be triggered either by “scandalous” or “spectacular” news on conference interpreters and interpreting.

One aspect that seems to recur in the discourse of the media on SI is the emphasis on “fidelity”. Both the critical and the appreciative comments use “fidelity to the original *word*” (some even “fidelity to the original *letter*”) as

their benchmark in assessing and presenting SI. In addition to their loyalty to the original word, the media also distinguishes professional interpreters from non-professionals based on the fluency of their performance. Thus, while members of the media praise interpreters when (they think) conference interpreters remain “faithful to the original word” with a “fluent” delivery, they do not hesitate to criticize them when (they think) these criteria are for some reason not met.

### 2.2.6 Discourse of interpreters in the media

In contrast to the emphasis on fidelity to the *word* even *letter* of the original utterance in the media’s representation of SI, professional interpreters addressing the media seem very keen on emphasizing the transfer of *ideas* rather than *words* in SI. As one conference interpreter who was interviewed for a TV program underscores:

Conference interpreting is the *exact transfer of an idea* voiced in one language to another. I’m saying idea here because conference interpreting and *interpreters are not parrots*, if I may say so, *who only interpret whatever words they hear* (Interview with a conference interpreter in Stüdyo İstanbul Program, TRT 2, 25.09.1995, my translation here and throughout this section, my emphasis).<sup>20</sup>

In their depictions, professional interpreters underline that SI implies the maximum transfer of the ideas and opinions in the original in an *intelligible* manner and underscore the importance of *complete identification* between the interpreter and speaker:

Conference interpreting is the *maximum transfer of ideas and opinions* voiced in one language to another — this is never a 100 per cent transfer, it can be 99.9 or so. It is about *conveying ideas in an intelligible manner* in another language. While the interpreter does this, s/he takes over the task of the speaker, *replaces* him. It is no longer the speaker whom people hear and observe, it is the interpreter (Interview with a conference interpreter in *Cumhuriyet*, 04.09.1989, my emphasis).<sup>21</sup>

This description by an interpreter with the emphasis on the transfer of “ideas” rather than “words” in SI is clearly different from the depiction of the media which places the emphasis on absolute fidelity to the words. Echoing the notion of “identification” of the interpreter with the speaker that is quite pronounced in the discourse of professional organizations, the interpreter here presents the conference interpreter as the professional who takes over the task of the speaker and replaces him/her in the eyes of the target language audience.

In contrast to the representation of SI in all other sources of discourse analyzed until this point, professional interpreters who speak to the media refer to the “interpretation” involved in conference interpreting:

A very good translator is someone who knows the most crucial words. But as we said in the beginning, in oral translation there is *interpretation*, the difference is there in the name of the tasks (Interview with two conference interpreters in *Metis Çeviri* 1988: 127, emphasis voiced in English in the original Turkish text).<sup>22</sup>

Thus, professional interpreters consider the “interpretation” involved in interpreting as a distinguishing factor between interpreting and translating. While translation seems to be associated with the precise transfer of the words, interpreting seems to be associated with the interpreter’s personal involvement in accessing and transferring the original message. Interestingly, however, the same interpreters who declare “interpretation” as an inherent and distinctive aspect of SI also underline that this “interpretation” never means an intervention in or deviation from the original message:

The message has to be conveyed very precisely. You cannot allow even the smallest deviation or the smallest intervention. For instance you may not agree with the speaker. In fact, you may be people who advocate two totally different ideas. However, the only reason for your presence there is that you are an interpreter, you have a mission to fulfill. *You are making an ‘interpretation’ but the message must come across exactly.* Maybe you will not find the best word but you will not use a wrong one either. *You must give a correct rendition all the time.* Precision, the transfer of the message are a must (ibid.: 130–131, my emphasis).<sup>23</sup>

As can be seen, although professional interpreters emphasize the “interpretation” involved in conference interpreting, they also carefully underline that this “interpretation” by the interpreter always coincides with the meaning in the original message and never brings about a deviation or intervention.

Similar to the discourse of the professional organizations, professional interpreters emphasize that the challenging task of SI can only be performed by “people with a special talent” who have

[...] world knowledge, full mastery of the mother tongue, mental agility, the ability to think and come to correct conclusions on other’s behalf, talent to act, stamina, a smiling face, patience, physical and psychological fitness, knowledge of what goes on around the world and objectivity (Interview with two conference interpreters in *Cumhuriyet* 04. 09. 1989).<sup>24</sup>

Interestingly enough, despite the strong emphasis simultaneous interpreters addressing the media place on the “objectivity” of their interpretation, those interpreters who are asked to recount instances from their real-life experience

highlight a more “subjective” involvement of the interpreter in the interpretation process.

For instance, when the moderator of a TV program asks the two conference interpreters he is interviewing whether they ever rephrase the words of politicians, one of the interpreters quickly replies: “Well, of course! We have such parliamentarians that if we were to interpret the way they speak, our audience would think the interpretation was bad”. Her remark receives enthusiastic support from her colleague, who defends this strategy, saying: “Interpreting is not the transfer of words from one language to another, it is the transfer of contents” (Interview with two conference interpreters in *İçimizdeki Dünya* Program, TRT 2; 02.06.1997).<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, during the same program, the interpreters recount an assignment where, during the official dinner of a diplomatic conference, they take their seats behind a top representative of the Council of Europe and an Uzbek Minister only to realize that Turkish and Uzbek (known to be affiliated) have very little in common to an uninitiated ear. Realizing that it is too late to say so, the interpreters invent most of the conversation with whatever they can make out of the Uzbek language, although even their best efforts do not prevent the occasional puzzled looks on the faces of the delegates.

Thus, in their general and de-contextualized discourse, conference interpreters who speak to the media present their task as an “objective” transfer of the communicative intentions of the speakers. In contrast to the representation of SI by the media, they emphasize that their task is not about “translating the words”, but “transferring the content” of the original message. Furthermore, they underscore that conference interpreters always *identify* with the speakers and *replace* the speakers in the eyes of the audience.

In contrast to all other sources of discourse on SI, professional interpreters also stress that conference interpreting involves an “interpretation” of the original message by the interpreter and present this as a distinctive aspect of SI. Having said this, however, they also carefully underscore that their “interpretation” of the original message always overlaps with the meanings intended by the speakers.

Yet, despite the emphasis professional interpreters place on the objectivity of their interpretation and their identification with the speaker in their general and de-contextualized accounts of SI, the same interpreters also allude to the active role they play in shaping the message and the impact of the socio-cultural contexts on their performance when they recount actual instances from their real-life professional assignments.

### 2.2.7 Discourse of a popular book

Popular books are also important sources of discourse on SI that target a larger and non-professional clientele. Unfortunately, the number of such publications is rather limited and Turkish hosts only one such book by a professional interpreter. Published in 1991, Belkıs Çorakçı-Dişbudak's *Tane Tane Simültane* is full of anecdotes of events that the author and her colleagues experienced in their careers.

According to Çorakçı-Dişbudak, SI is best understood with the analogy of an “electronic device” drawn by Gloria Wagner who trained the first interpreters in Turkey:

“You are a device. An electronic device. Don't ever forget that,” our teacher Madam Gloria Wagner used to say, may her soul rest in peace. This actually reflects one's attitude towards the profession. While simultaneous interpreters transfer the utterances of the speakers at the rostrum to another language, *they cannot add even the shadow of their own existence, thoughts and beliefs*. They do not have the right to do that. Even if they think that what is being said is ridiculous or stupid, they cannot reflect that in their voice. They have to voice the views with a conviction that is parallel to the speaker's conviction even if they feel ashamed of them deep inside (1991: 29–30, my translation here and throughout this section, my emphasis).<sup>26</sup>

According to the depiction in the book, in addition to not adding even the shadow of their existence, simultaneous interpreters never skip anything pertaining to the “essence” of the original utterance. When speakers rush, what they can skip can only be the “details”:

I agree if the speaker is running, the interpreter cannot render what he says hundred percent. But what the interpreter will throw away will only be a detail; nothing pertaining to the essence can be thrown away or skipped (ibid.: 12).<sup>27</sup>

Moreover, as electronic devices programmed to transfer whatever original speakers say, interpreters never interfere with the content of the original. They refuse to do so even at the explicit requests of the employers:

Sometimes conference organizers come and say “Don't interpret these, we are losing face in front of our foreign guests, just manage the situation”. The interpreters will disappoint them because their task requires them to interpret. They are a device. An electronic device (ibid.: 31–32).<sup>28</sup>

However, in contrast to the presentation of simultaneous interpreters as non-involved electronic devices earlier, Budakçı-Dişbudak later underscores the importance of sustaining the communication in SI and considers certain interventions possible:



Ours is a civilized profession. We do not want to contribute to people standing up and confronting each other. However, we do not have the right to censor something already said either. Between two harsh words, we might opt for the one that is relatively milder. We can build the sentences in a more civilized, etiquette-complying format and make the assault look less rude. Yet, this is more or less all that can be done (ibid.: 30).<sup>29</sup>

In addition to “deliberate” interventions that help to sustain the communication by making an assault look less rude, the author also contends that simultaneous interpreters “automatically” adjust their delivery to the needs and expectations of their target audience:

And when we interpret into Turkish, we basically speak according to the average age of those in the room without even noticing that we do. It is not that when we enter a room, we take a look at the delegates and say “These are young” and “These are old”. But since our eyes keep roaming around the room, our language is automatically shaped according to those we are facing. Just like a chameleon (ibid.: 114).<sup>30</sup>

Similar to the way professional interpreters claim that their “interpretations” always coincide with the original speaker’s intentions (see Section 2.2.6), the author does not consider the “automatic” or the “deliberate” actions taken by the interpreters to sustain the communication as contradicting her notion of “interpreters as electronic devices”. By stressing that conference interpreters are bound, only by “messages” and not “words”, the author presents those interventions as taking place at the level of wording and not at the level of meaning in original messages. As she puts it:

Simultaneous translation cannot be a word-for-word translation. What is transferred is the message. It is not about translating the sentence but transferring the message (ibid.: 101).<sup>31</sup>

Almost identically to the discourse of the interpreters in Section 2.2.6, Çorakçı-Dişbudak distinguishes interpreting from translating because of the “interpretation” involved in interpreting. Just like the interpreters who mention the English word “interpretation” to emphasize that interpreting does not imply a word-for-word transfer, the author here refers to the English word “interpreter” to underscore that SI always involves a subjective assessment (“comment”) by the interpreter:

We name our profession “simultaneous translation” in Turkish but, in the western languages, there is a nuance there. They do not use the word “translator” for us. The word is “**Simultaneous Interpreter**”. All oral translators are called “interpreters”, that is, a commentator (ibid.: 101, emphasis in the original and in English).<sup>32</sup>

Like other sources of discourse on SI that juxtapose the strictest rules of fidelity with quests for interpreter-improved communication in the previous sections, the author does not problematize how this description of SI, which implies a personal involvement, and the previous depictions that foreground an active intervention by the interpreter (by softening words and assaults) fit with the analogy of “simultaneous interpreters as electronic devices”.

Interestingly enough, similar to the discourse of the professional interpreters addressing the media, the anecdotes from real-life events in the book suggest a very active involvement of the interpreter in the interpreting process. To take one example from among many, the author mentions a colleague of hers who goes to the French booth during a multilingual conference and proposes to interpret the next speaker directly from Turkish to French. As she finishes her interpretation, the interpreter in the French booth congratulates her for “giving a good speech”. To quote the whole event from the book:

Nuran goes to the French booth and suggests to the foreign interpreter there “If you want, I can take directly from Turkish into French. That might be healthier than you going via the English”. Sure, why do it in a roundabout way when there is a direct way of doing it. The lady likes the idea and says, “Oh please come in”. Nuran takes a seat and puts on the headset. The sound is not too good anyway, so Nuran fills in the gaps that she cannot hear and finishes interpreting the whole speech when the lady turns to her and says, “That was a great speech you gave”. “Oh! I just said what he said,” says Nuran in attempt to avoid the situation, but the lady knowingly shakes her finger and adds “Oh no, we listened to the other speech this same person gave last night. We know exactly how he speaks”. Some people (mistakenly) call our profession spontaneous interpretation. Maybe the type of interpretation Nuran made that day could indeed be labeled spontaneous interpretation (*ibid.*: 138).<sup>33</sup>

Similarly, the author mentions another interpreter who asks his audience to laugh at a joke, saying “The speaker has just started telling a joke which is impossible to interpret. But please do laugh, he will be very happy if you do” (*ibid.*: 197); and how a relative newcomer to the profession who misses a number in the original speech announces, “The speaker gave a number that I have missed but it wasn’t very much” (*ibid.*: 119).

Thus, while the author places significant emphasis on objectivity and detachment in her general and decontextualized discourse on SI, accounts of actual SI-mediated events in the book highlight the very active involvement of the interpreters in shaping the message they transfer. Similar to the anecdotal accounts of the interpreters addressing the media in Section 2.2.6, anecdotal accounts of real-life SI assignments in this book also challenge the analogy of

“interpreters as electronic devices” and foreground the individual, as well as the social factors, that influence the interpreting process.

### 2.3 Summary

The analysis of the meta-discourse in this chapter points to two levels of discourse in (re)presenting simultaneous interpreters and interpreting: The first are instances of general and de-contextualized discourse that treat SI as a “universal” and “abstract” phenomenon without referring to actual instances of interpreting in specific social and interactional contexts. Such general representations seem to appear frequently in the discourses analyzed in this chapter and become visible in the discourse of the professional associations, ethical codes, general reference books, media and academia.

The second level, on the other hand, pertains to instances of specific and contextualized discourse that refer to SI in real-life situations. Such representations of SI seem to appear less frequently in the written and recorded materials analyzed here and surface most visibly in the anecdotal accounts of the interpreters regarding their personal professional experiences. In the present corpus, they emerge in the popular book on SI and when interpreters are specifically asked to talk about their professional experiences in the media.

In the general and de-contextualized discourse, simultaneous interpreters are depicted as competent professionals who can identify with the speakers, replace them in the eyes of the audience, and unproblematically access and transfer the original meaning fluently, intelligibly and completely while erasing from the original “package” such impurities as distinct accents, grammatical mistakes, regionalisms, flawed formulations, etc. Improving the “package” of the original for the sake of ensuring a smooth and unproblematic flow of communication is seen as a natural and desirable part of the interpreter’s task and is not considered to contradict even the strictest notions of fidelity to original meaning, because such interventions are assumed to take place at the level of the “word” and not “meaning”.

On the other hand, in the more specific/contextualized representations where simultaneous interpreters recount real-life events, the involvement of interpreters in shaping the meaning to be transferred tends to become quite obvious. In such anecdotal accounts, simultaneous interpreters hint at their active engagement in the formulation of the “meaning” to be transferred and challenge the ease with which the general discourse claims they access and

reproduce the meanings intended by the speakers with a transparent, immediately intelligible and fluent delivery. Furthermore, in the accounts of real-life experience, the interpreter's complete identification with the speaker also appears more complicated than the general meta-discourse suggests, and the "I" (first person singular) in the delivery hardly appears to be a mirror image of the speaker.

In addition to being less frequent, anecdotal accounts tend to be surrounded by the features of the mainstream de-contextualized discourse on SI that relegate the instances where interpreters became involved in shaping the message to marginal moments ("interesting events") in the lives of professional interpreters. In that sense, the mainstream discourse tends to objectify the subjective involvement of the interpreter in shaping the message. This latter aspect becomes particularly obvious when interpreters emphasize that SI always implies an "interpretation" of the original message (sign of subjectivity and personal involvement), but almost simultaneously also emphasize that their interpretation always overlaps with meanings intended by the original speakers (confirmation of objectivity and non-involvement).

Both the interpreters and a considerable share of the other sources of discourse on SI refer to the importance of transferring the semantic content (*what* the speakers *say*) rather than the words (*how* the speakers say it) in SI, to justify and objectify the "interventions" interpreters make and are asked to make for different reasons such as to "facilitate the communication", "bridge cultural differences", "make an assault less harsh", etc. However, despite the objectification of the interpreter's position at the de-contextualized level, the active involvement of the interpreters in shaping the message becomes obvious as soon as the focus shifts back to recounting specific instances of SI.



## CHAPTER 3

# Analyzing an actual conference context

In the previous chapter, we looked at how the profession(al) was positioned in the broader socio-cultural context(s) by analyzing the meta-discursive representation of SI by various actors and institutions in and around SI. While generalized and de-contextualized accounts of SI underscored the importance of a complete identification with the speaker's message and ruled out any involvement of the interpreter in the interpreting process, specific and contextualized accounts of SI hinted at the active participation of the interpreter in shaping the message to be transferred. The analysis in the previous chapter, therefore, pointed to a tension between the quests for objectivity and accounts of subjectivity in (re)presenting SI — a tension that was at least discursively subdued with the argument that professional interpreters would always remain loyal to the original meaning since SI pertained to the transfer of meanings and semantic contexts rather than words.

Against the broader socio-cultural context(s), the present chapter focuses on simultaneous interpreters and interpreting in a particular SI-mediated event and seeks to understand how simultaneous interpreters are “positioned” in an actual conference context.

### 3.1 Constructing the corpus: General reflections

Before moving on to an analysis of actual SI behavior at a particular conference, it is important to emphasize that analyzing actual SI behavior is not a straightforward task. Accessing, storing and analyzing all kinds of “naturally occurring” data present major challenges for researchers. However, accessing “naturally occurring” data in SI is particularly difficult, because practicing interpreters are usually reluctant to be recorded, especially by their colleagues and for research purposes, and conference organizers may reject the idea for reasons of confidentiality or simply because they fear the recording process may create an additional hassle and jeopardize the flow of the interaction.

In addition to the difficulty of accessing data in SI, there are always concerns regarding the validity and reliability of “naturally occurring” data. In order to increase the “value” of their data, researchers in the social sciences usually try to combine and complement a variety of methods, such as ethnographic field notes, interviews, audio and video recordings, etc. For instance, audio and video recordings, which are thought to provide for more detailed and publicly accessible representations of social interaction, are generally used to complement the accepted and acknowledged subjectivity of the researcher in ethnographic methods (Hammersley 1992 cited in Peräklyä 1997). Here again, video recordings are seen as more advantageous than conventional audio recordings for diversifying and deepening the scope of the variables that can be subjected to analysis.<sup>34</sup>

Even though combining different methods in investigating “naturally occurring” data is advantageous in extending the scope of variables to be analyzed, the deployment and coordination of various methods usually pose serious challenges for researchers in practice. In SI Research, this usually means that, in addition to arranging for the audio or video recording, researchers must coordinate and monitor the recording on site, while simultaneously doing interviews and observing the multifaceted interaction at the conference, which is not limited to and should not be equated with the “official” interaction on the floor. In fact, brief interactions between the interpreters and organizers, speakers or the audience that take place outside the range of the audio or video recorder may at times be more crucial than the speeches of the official speakers at the rostrum.

Furthermore, no matter how much the researcher tries to enhance the *inclusiveness* and *objectivity* of data, it should not be forgotten that the data collected is always a partial representation of the original context. First of all, the very presence of the researcher and/or the knowledge that the event is being observed and recorded for further investigation very likely exerts some kind of an impact on the way “naturally occurring” data occurs. Additional elicitation procedures, such as interviewing the interlocutors or the audience, on the other hand, tend to enhance the visibility of the researcher and prompt participants to act differently than under “normal” conditions. In addition to prompting “unnatural” behavior, interviews are themselves (meta-)discourses that may serve a variety of (un)conscious purposes for both the interviewee and the interviewer, such as saving face, gaining prestige or justification, rather than being objective accounts of interviewee’s feelings, ideas and attitudes.

When working with “naturally occurring” (SI) data, one other aspect is the irrevocability of the context in which data is collected. Once the event is over, whatever is available on the cassettes and in the researcher’s notes or memory has to suffice. Naturally, cassettes can re-play only those aspects of the original context that are stored or storable on the tapes. They inevitably exclude other aspects that might have taken place outside the range of the lens or microphone. Field notes and human memory, on the other hand, can only retrieve what the researcher was able or inclined to see and note. Furthermore, material stored on tapes and notebooks can only be re-played and analyzed in a “new” context that is, by definition, different from the context in which the material was originally recorded. Thus, records of all kinds inevitably transform the spatial and temporal reality of the interaction they store and re-play.

In addition to the practical and theoretical difficulties inherent in accessing and storing “naturally occurring” SI data, audio and video recordings and interviews must be rendered amenable to further analysis. It is hard to predict if advances in technology will one day change the way we analyze oral interaction, but currently, many researchers working on spoken discourse seem bound to make some kind of a transcription, i.e., a written representation of speech events.<sup>35</sup>

Transcribing, on the other hand, basically means representing oral language in writing, a complex if not insurmountable task, because oral language includes many variables that normal written language does not possess, such as intonation, pauses, slips, repairs, false starts, blends, non-verbal behavior, and the like. Writing, on the other hand, makes use of punctuation marks and layout, which have no place in oral language. Furthermore, writing also exerts profound impact on the way we represent and perceive language. As Walter J. Ong argues forcefully in his book *Orality and Literacy*, writing moves the words from the sound world to a world of visual space and actually locks the words into position in this space, thereby transforming their perception completely (1982: 121). In fact, transcribing oral language can well be the topic of lengthy philosophical and ontological discussions in view of the approaches of de-constructionists and many other poststructuralists, who consider writing not as a mode of giving expression to speech, but as a specific “timing and spacing of signification” (Giddens and Turner 1987: 208, cf. also Olson 1995). In addition to the transformative impact of turning oral speech into writing, transcriptions will also always be incomplete and partial vis-à-vis what they purport to present, given that, “a transcription cannot represent everything



featured in the original spoken language and, thus, has to be an interpretation by the transcriber of what is being said” (Powney and Watts 1987: 147).

Last but not least, and perhaps needless to say, one also needs to acknowledge that not only the constitution, but also the analysis of all kinds of data, is “a reconstructive and not reproductive process” (Bliss, Monk and Ogborn 1983: 162). No matter how objective and data-driven (bottom up) the researcher aims or claims to be, the analysis of data always reflects the researcher’s explicit and implicit assumptions about the material at hand. In that sense, there is always a theoretical stance (top down) that informs the researcher’s constitution, understanding and interpretation of data.

### 3.2 Constructing the corpus in this study

Naturally, all of what has been said above also applies to the constitution and analysis of the data for this study. In what follows, I attempt to describe a conference where SI was used and where three interpreters worked for two days. My aim here is to explore the presence of simultaneous interpreters and gain an insight into how they “position” themselves and how other parties “position” the interpreters at a particular conference. In order to explore how interpreters are positioned within the complex grid of demands, expectations and attitudes, I rely on my observations of the conference and interviews with the speakers, organizers, users of SI, and the interpreters. Chapter 4 complements the analysis here with the analysis of the actual interpreting performance at the same conference. Naturally, both the depiction of the conference context and the interviews, not to mention the analysis of the actual SI performance reflect *my* interpretations of the presence and performance of the interpreters in this particular conference.

#### 3.2.1 Topic, date and venue of the conference

The conference analyzed in this and the next chapter is the “International Philosophy Colloquium — Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt: Metaphysics and Politics” — which took place on 29–30 May 2000 in the Kriton Curi Conference Room of Boğaziçi University in Istanbul. The main organizer was the Philosophy Department of Boğaziçi University, in collaboration with the Goethe Institute, Institut d’Etudes Françaises, Istituto Italiano di Cultura, and the Adam Publishing House.

### 3.2.2 Conference languages

All of the official presentations, except one (which was in French), were delivered in English. In the discussion sessions, both English and Turkish were used by the speakers and participants. SI was provided between English and Turkish throughout the conference and from French into Turkish for one single presentation in the first session of the second day.

### 3.2.3 Interpreters, organizer and the recruitment process

Three interpreters worked at the conference. All three were free-lancers who worked with an interpreting agency. Two interpreters worked between English and Turkish on both days and one interpreter came in the morning of the second day to interpret a single speaker from French into Turkish. The speech in French was interpreted only into Turkish and the Turkish-English interpreters did not take a relay from Turkish into English. They rested as their colleague in the French booth worked. The discussion session for the French speaker was held in English and not interpreted into French.

The interpreters were specially chosen by the interpreting agency for this particular SI assignment. Both Interpreter A and Interpreter B, who worked between Turkish and English, had academic backgrounds. In fact, Interpreter B still taught occasionally as a visiting lecturer in various universities. Interpreter A had been a professional interpreter since 1965 and Interpreter B had started working professionally in 1994, though he had been a translator for more than 20 years. In addition to English, Interpreter A had active German and Interpreter B had passive French. Both Interpreter A and B said they worked in conferences related to philosophy and social sciences quite often. Interpreter B said such conferences constituted around 25 per cent of his workload. Interpreter C, on the other hand, had active French and Turkish. He had been working as an interpreter for 20 years, but had also pursued publishing activity parallel to SI.<sup>36</sup>

The organizer of the conference was a professor from the philosophy department. He was also one of the speakers and chairpersons at the conference. There were no professional organizers to help him.

In recruiting the interpreters, the organizer had gone through the Public Relations Office of the university and had not become directly involved. However, he had asked the PR Office to contact interpreters who were familiar with the topic. Once the contact with the interpreting agency was established, he

had phoned the agency to learn the names of the interpreters assigned to the conference. He recognized the names he was given and was satisfied with the recruitment (see the interview with the organizer in Section 3.3.1).

#### 3.2.4 Permission to record

I contacted the organizer, told him I was doing my Ph.D. at the same university and asked him whether he would mind my recording the floor and the booth for research purposes. The organizer said he would not, but advised me to consult with the interpreting agency and the technicians as well. He also raised his concern about the possibility of distracting the speakers with the recording. He was partly relieved to hear that I would not be jumping around the rostrum with a hand-size recorder and that all of the recording would be done “off-sight” by the technicians.

In order not to overtax his tolerance at the outset, I waited until after the conference had begun to ask permission to interview the speakers and the participants. Possibly because my presence and the recording were not overtly disturbing anyone, he was again positive about my request.

Receiving permission from the interpreters was probably exceptionally easy at this conference because I knew all of them and had worked with them on numerous different occasions. In addition, they were a particularly friendly team and their backgrounds probably facilitated their granting me permission to record the conference.

#### 3.2.5 Technical matters

SI equipment was provided by a professional company. The organizers had not asked for the conference to be recorded so I contacted the equipment supplier personally and requested that they record the conference (both the floor and the booth) for a research project. They were very friendly and said they would send a multi-track recorder with their technician.

To my disappointment, however, I found out on the first day that they had sent a single-track cassette recorder and could record *either* the floor *or* the booth. Their multi-track recorders were being used somewhere else. Since the equipment supplier was asked to use the university’s sound system, the university technician was also present in the hall coordinating the technical matters with the SI technicians. It transpired that the university also had a single-track recorder that was located somewhere in the technician’s room. Seeing no

other opportunity, I asked the university's technician to record the floor and the SI technicians to record the booth. Naturally, this meant sacrificing the synchronicity of the recordings right from the outset because the cassettes could not be changed simultaneously. Furthermore, it meant sacrificing whatever control I had over the recording process. The university technician's room was one floor above the conference hall and had a small window opening on to the conference room, allowing no contact with him or his recorder during the sessions.

Moreover, possibly due to the conference "high season" in May, the SI technician who came on the first day was not one of the experienced and senior employees of the equipment supplier. To my dismay, however, even he was not available on the second day. Having set everything in place, he was replaced by an even less experienced colleague. This was coupled with the inexperience of the university's technician who knew very little about recording conferences. Disappointed, I asked all of the technicians to take the utmost care with the recording process and tried to convince them of the importance of the synchronicity of the recordings for my research.

However, the human element coupled with inexperience did take its toll on the recordings, and when I started transcribing, I realized the "damage" incurred. First of all, the tapes were not fully synchronized. Many times, the technicians had failed to start the recording on time after coffee and lunch breaks. They had also occasionally forgotten to change the cassettes when they came to the end and stopped. Furthermore, a power cut during the first day had possibly confused one of the recorders and new speeches were recorded over previously recorded material. The biggest disappointment, however, was in the recordings of the second day. For some unfathomable reason, one of the cassettes that was supposed to be recording the booth during the SI from French into Turkish had recorded the floor instead, so that I ended up with two recordings of the floor and none of the booth. This was certainly very unfortunate for me because, during my interviews with the users, the performance of the French-Turkish interpreter was rated significantly better than the English-Turkish interpreters. Most of the users thought this particular interpreter was great. In fact, in a coffee-break, two ladies had approached the interpreter as I was chatting with him and congratulated him for being "very much in control of both the topic and the languages".

My own impression of the Turkish-French interpreter's performance was that it was very fluent and the language use was very colloquial and natural. It made one feel that there was nothing inherently or conceptually difficult about the speech. My initial aim was to see if there was anything characteristic of that

performance and/or whether other factors, such as interpreting from a less known language, had created more appreciation for this interpreter among the audience.<sup>37</sup>

Interestingly, this interpreter also seemed to have more explicit strategies than the others. When I interviewed the French-Turkish interpreter on the same day, almost immediately after his only turn, he told me that there were certain strategies he always followed, such as remaining fluent and coherent even if that meant skipping parts of the original, never staying behind the speaker, using a very persuasive and confidence-giving voice, and using uncomplicated and everyday words. (see Interview with Interpreter C in Section 3.3.3.3). I was looking forward to analyzing his delivery, but, unfortunately, nothing of his performance was on the tapes.

Faced with an unrecoverable loss of data, I considered the option of making him re-interpret the text with the original recording of the French speaker in the laboratory, but later decided that the data from the laboratory with a “re-interpretation” of an already interpreted speech would hardly be comparable with the spontaneity of the performance the Turkish-English interpreters had to deliver. Even during his actual performance, the French-Turkish interpreter had been more advantaged compared to his colleagues because he was only responsible for a single speaker, whose text he had received earlier, and he was not asked to interpret the discussion session. Making him re-interpret the same text in a laboratory would only increase concerns regarding the validity and reliability of this performance. Therefore, I decided to omit a part that I had initially placed a lot of emphasis on, and included my interview with him without elaborating on it.

I also experienced some self-inflicted problems during my interviews with the speakers, organizer, interpreters and participants. For instance, I ran out of batteries in the middle of an interview and had to write down the responses of a couple of respondents. A few other times, I got confused about whether the side of the cassette I was about to insert was already full or not and, once, erased a part of an interview by recording over an already full cassette.

Nevertheless, I was still able to carry out the interviews and transcribe around 120 pages of conference recordings with matching and comparable data between the floor and the booth. Despite my regrets over the material lost, and although I would be much more cautious about the recording process if I were to conduct similar research again (such as asking an assistant to monitor continuously — what should be — a multi-track recording of the booth and floor, bringing many batteries, numbering cassettes, etc.), “accidents” seem

inevitable in *in vivo* research where one has little control over the numerous variables that might influence the process of data collection (such as the completely unexpected power cut during this conference). Unless one works in a laboratory environment with everything planned and under strict control (and sometimes even then), unpredictability becomes the rule of the game.

### 3.2.6 Position of the booths

There were two adjacent booths in the conference hall. They were located at the left hand side of the hall, to the front, very close to the rostrum, almost facing it from the side. The rostrum was elevated and the interpreters could see the speakers, and if not perfectly, at least well enough not to complain. Possibly because of the topic of the conference, none of the speakers made use of visual aids. Had there been visuals, the interpreters would probably have problems seeing them from where they sat. Such positioning of the booths was probably necessitated by the layout of the historical hall, which had not been conceived as a conference hall, but had been converted into one, to the extent that its original design as chapel for an American College allowed.

The position of the booths exposed the interpreters to both the speakers and the audience. This was quite unusual because the typical location of the booths either at the rear or sides of the conference rooms allows interpreters a direct view of the rostrum, but not of the faces of the listeners. Moreover, these more typical positions usually render the interpreters invisible by placing them largely out of sight of the audience during their work time. In this case, however, the interpreters were not only exceptionally close to the speakers and panelists, but they were also very visible to the audience.

The position of the booths seemed to exert a direct impact on the interaction between the interpreters and the participants. First of all, because of the proximity of the booths and the possibility of making direct eye contact with the interpreters, the participants managed to catch the attention of the interpreters with their gestures a few times when they did not receive the sound of the booth in their headsets. The interpreters also made use of this proximity and signaled the audience to use microphones when somebody from the floor attempted to speak without one. One of the interpreters also knocked on the booth's window once to warn the participants to speak into a microphone and even stuck his head out of the booth to interfere in a technical matter when English-speaking panelists needed headsets to follow his SI in the first discussion session.

The space around the booths was very cramped. The interpreters were not at all comfortable moving around the booths because they were forced to share what little space was available with the SI equipment and the technician. To make things worse, the wooden floors of the historical hall — recently restored — creaked every time somebody moved. Although the space inside the booths was standard, the interpreters were also cramped inside during the first day when they had an “assistant” from the Philosophy Department sitting at the entrance of the booth to assist them with the terminology (see Section 3.2.10). As the interpreters familiarized themselves with the topic and the terminology, the assistant gradually moved from inside to the side of the booth and finally left.

### 3.2.7 My position as the researcher

My position as the researcher was facilitated by the fact that I knew the interpreting agency, the equipment supplier, all three of the interpreters and the university. This certainly made obtaining permissions from all sides easier. Moreover, it allowed me to trace the whole process from the beginning to the end, including the recruitment, preparation and performance stages.

During the conference, I was mostly in the vacant booth (except for one single session on the second day when the French – Turkish interpreter worked in it) because it gave me a good view of the rostrum, the audience and the interpreters in the next booth, thanks to a small fiberglass window between the two adjacent booths.

The interpreters did not seem to be overtly disturbed by my presence, perhaps because they knew me and were used to seeing (and working with) me in conference settings. Their tolerance threshold was possibly higher also because both interpreters had academic backgrounds themselves.

Yet, despite all the “extenuating factors”, I was there watching, listening, interviewing and recording them, so that questions related to my impact on the unfolding of data remained as valid in this research as in any other research focused on exploring actual behavior in real-life settings.

### 3.2.8 Participants

Altogether there were about thirty-five participants, including nine speakers. Around one third of the participants on the floor listened to the SI into Turkish at any time. When Turkish was spoken, all of the non-Turkish participants (there were about 8 of them; 5 speakers and 3 listeners) followed the SI into English.

Interviews with the audience (see Section 3.3.4) indicated rather heterogeneous backgrounds and interests among those attending the conference. This was quite surprising, because the specificity of the topic, speakers from academic backgrounds, papers prepared and delivered in a typical academic fashion, and a university as the conference venue had given me the impression that the audience would basically consist of scholars and students. Conference typologies also suggested that this type of a conference would host a rather “homogeneous” group of participants (see, for instance, Pöchhacker 1994).

It turned out that, in addition to students and scholars, there were jurists, writers, a publisher, a political activist and even members of a spiritual society among the audience, and these different interests and backgrounds actually surfaced very strikingly during the last session of the conference (see “accusations of misinterpretation” in Section 4.5.1).

### 3.2.9 Speakers

According to the conference program, there were ten scheduled speakers who were all scholars from different universities. However, one of the speakers was canceled at the last minute. Of the remaining nine speakers, one was a native speaker of English, one of French, three of German and four of Turkish. Even though some of the non-native speakers spoke English well, most had very strong accents and experienced difficulties in expressing themselves and understanding the conceptually loaded questions in English. All of the foreign speakers listened to the SI into English whenever the floor turned to Turkish.

Interestingly enough, even though there was SI between English and Turkish, all of the Turkish speakers spoke in English. Perhaps they were asked to do so, although that was not stated anywhere in the program. Only during the discussions and only when there was a question in Turkish did they shift to Turkish. Moreover, none of the Turkish speakers ever listened to the SI into Turkish. This was striking because most of them experienced difficulties in understanding the questions addressed to them. This was certainly not a problem unique to the Turkish lecturers, because foreign speakers also faced serious difficulties in comprehending questions in English. However, the situation of the Turkish speakers was different because they never opted for the possibility to speak in Turkish or to listen to the SI into Turkish, even when they had the opportunity to do so.



### 3.2.10 Preparations, documents and the “assistant” in the booth

All of the speakers at the conference had prepared highly structured and conceptually loaded papers. However, not all the papers had reached the interpreters before the event. In fact, of a total of ten scheduled papers, five were made available to Interpreter A, three to Interpreter B and one to Interpreter C. One of the speeches that had reached both interpreters was canceled at the last minute due to the speaker’s absence. A copy of the French-speaker’s speech was only given to the French-Turkish interpreter (Interpreter C) and not to the English-Turkish interpreters (Interpreter A and B), possibly because they were told from the start not to interpret the French speaker into English. Thus, Interpreter A had four and Interpreter B had only two “valid” texts at the start of the conference.

All three interpreters had prepared for the conference: They had read the text(s), talked to other people about the terminology, taken notes on their texts and formed glossaries. Interpreter A had also made a rather unusual request and asked the organizer to arrange for an assistant or a Ph.D. student to help them out with the terminology, especially with unexpected terminology that could come up during the discussion sessions.

In line with her request, a young research assistant, either sat behind the interpreters or stood somewhere very close to them during the first day of the conference. Despite everyone’s best intentions, however, using an assistant in the booth was not too easy. In addition to cramping the little space around the booths, the assistant was not used to the silent, mostly semi-verbal and/or written communication between the interpreters in the booth. When the interpreters “signaled” a problem to him, the assistant either did not understand which term was problematic or gave loud or long answers so that the interpreters had to warn him to write things down and lower his voice. Since the interpreters were overtaxed with conceptually dense and highly structured speeches, they also had very little time to process and incorporate his answers. Thus, both sides seemed rather frustrated with the process and Interpreter A, in particular, occasionally made explicit gestures that reflected her frustration with the way the assistant was handling the task. As the interpreters “warmed up” to the highly conceptual language of Heidegger and Arendt, the assistant gradually moved from inside to the side of the booth, and then stopped waiting for an “emergency call”, until he finally took a seat in the hall.

### 3.2.11 Turn-taking

The interpreters took unusually long turns during the conference. Even though changing every 30 minutes or so is the general practice, during this conference, they took turns with every other speaker. Since most of the speakers were allocated around 50 minutes, the interpreters also took longer turns and finished the interpretation of one whole speech. They took fairly regular 30-minute turns during the discussion sessions.

During the interviews, the interpreters admitted the difficulty of taking longer turns, but emphasized that changing in the middle of a speech was almost impossible at this conference. They said it took unusually long to “warm up” to the speakers and, for the sake of coherence, it was important for one interpreter to interpret a single speaker from the beginning to the end (see Section 3.3.3).

## 3.3 Interviews

### 3.3.1 Interview with the organizer

I interviewed the organizer of the conference during one of the coffee breaks. As mentioned before, the organizer was at the same time a faculty member and one of the speakers and chairpersons of the conference. Typical of a university organization, there were no professional conference organizers and the organizer was very busy throughout the conference. In the interview, I asked him the following questions in a flexible format and sequence:

- Is this your first time organizing a conference with SI? (If not), what were your prior experiences with it?
- How did you contact the interpreters?
- Did you assist the interpreters in their preparations for the conference?
- What do you think is the role and task of simultaneous interpreters in general and at this conference in particular?
- What do you think about their performance at this conference?<sup>38</sup>

The organizer had organized conferences with SI before. He said his prior experiences with SI had been “unsuccessful”. This time, however, he was happy with the performance of the interpreters and there had been “no complaints from the listeners”. He tied the success of the interpreters to their interest in and knowledge of the topic and their adequate preparations before

the conference. He also underlined the importance of assisting the interpreters in preparing for a conference of this kind. He was convinced that he had done his best in getting the papers ready for them. He had sent six out of the ten papers originally scheduled for the program to the interpreting agency and was unaware that one of the interpreters had not received two of those papers.<sup>39</sup>

While recruiting the interpreters, the organizer said he went through the Public Relations Office of the university and did not exert any control on who they contacted for the job. He said he only told them to contact interpreters who were “familiar with the topic”. The PR Office had called the agency which they usually worked with. However, the organizer mentioned that he did call the agency later to check the names of the assigned interpreters. He said he knew the interpreters and how familiar they were with the topic and was happy to hear they were coming to the conference.

As for his expectations from the interpreters, he was convinced that a “mechanical translation” would not do. He said:

In philosophy, mechanical translation is never enough. The person has to be an insider to the subject. In fact, occasionally, the interpreters have to put aside a word-for-word translation and improvise so that they can convey the meaning.

He also underlined the fact that interpreters had to “focus on grasping the meaning”. Otherwise it was impossible to interpret philosophy, he contended. When I asked him to elaborate on what he meant when he said that interpreters should “convey the meaning”, he said he meant “the meaning in the speeches” and added that grasping that meaning was only possible through familiarity with the topic and adequate preparation before the conference.

### 3.3.2 Interviews with the speakers

During the breaks, I interviewed five English-speakers and asked them the following questions in a flexible format and sequence:

- Did you know there would be SI in the conference? (If yes), did you take this fact into account while preparing your speech and how?
- Did you change anything about your speech after seeing the interpreters this morning?
- Did the interpreters have any special requests from you?
- What do you think is the role and task of simultaneous interpreters in general and at this conference in particular? Can you elaborate on it?
- What do you think about their performance?

Four out of the five speakers I interviewed said they knew there would be SI at the conference because the organizer had asked them to send their papers for the interpreters. However, none of them had taken this factor into account during their preparations. For instance, none of them had thought of speaking *ad lib* instead of reading from a script or using less complex sentences to facilitate the task of the interpreters.

Speaker A, for instance, was possibly the one most aware of SI before the conference because she was allowed to speak in French only after a French-Turkish interpreter had been found. Interestingly enough, although she had insisted that her English was good enough to carry out the discussion session in English, she had asked to present her paper in French. She said this was because she had failed to find in France an English translation of one of Heidegger's books that was important for her paper. At her request, the organizer had contacted the agency for a French interpreter and confirmed to her that she could speak in French after an interpreter was found. However, even though this whole process was triggered by a translation problem and had given the speaker a clear indication that there would be simultaneous interpretation at the conference, she had not prepared her paper with the interpreters in mind either.

Among the speakers I interviewed, Speaker B was the only one completely unaware of the availability of SI at the conference. Yet, he too said that knowing about the SI would not have changed his preparations, since he "did not know anything about simultaneous translation".

Seeing the interpreters after the start of the conference was the first time the speakers became aware of the interpreter's presence. Speaker C, for instance, mentioned the proximity of the booths to the rostrum as a factor in making her notice the existence of interpreters. She said:

They really work very close to us. I sometimes follow their gestures. They use quite a lot of them.

Two of the speakers said they thought of reading their papers more slowly after seeing the interpreters at the conference. However, most had decided to undertake concrete changes in their presentations only after talking to the interpreters. All of the speakers said they were contacted by the interpreters before their turns. In these face-to-face encounters, the interpreters had asked them to clarify certain terms and/or made certain requests regarding their style of delivery, such as to "speak the texts", "explain the Heideggerian quotations", "not to rush" and to "take a breath between sentences".

All of the speakers said they took those requests into account “as much as possible”. For instance, Speaker D said he made a point of “reading the text more naturally” while Speaker C said she “explained some of the concepts and quotations”. Speaker E contended that because of her poor English she could not deviate from the text, but still tried to “read it slowly and carefully” and Speaker B (who was the only speaker to talk without a text except when he quoted the philosophers) said he “spoke slowly” and “explained the Heideggerian citations more clearly” than he normally would. If the interpreter had not talked to him, he said, he would have just read the paper. He also thought the interpreter’s suggestion to explain the citations had been “a good idea”.

Speaker B, on the other hand, was told by her French-Turkish interpreter not to deviate from the text without alerting him first. She said she remained faithful to the text and occasionally checked the interpreter with a glance:

I looked at the interpreter to see if he was suffering and also to understand if he could catch up with me. If I felt I was too fast, I slowed down.

Speaker E, too, said she tried to check how the interpreter was doing during her talk, but she could not really understand whether everything was all right:

I wish I could see the interpreter better. I could not really understand if everything was all right. It would be better if they were sitting closer to us.

Thus, although none of the speakers had taken account of SI during their preparations, seeing the interpreters that morning, and, most importantly, talking to them personally had changed their approach to the task of the interpreters.

Regarding their expectations from the simultaneous interpreters and interpreting, all speakers referred spontaneously to the difficulty of the topic. Some even admitted their own contributions to the challenge, such as Speaker E, who mentioned her English as a source of problem for the interpreters.

As for their expectations, the speakers said they expected the interpreters to “focus on the main points” (Speaker A), “interpret the main argument of the speaker” (Speaker C) and “concentrate on the speaker’s message as much as they can” (Speaker D). They seemed to view the focus they placed on “rendering the *meaning* in the speaker’s speech” as an alleviating factor in the face of the difficulty of the topic. They did not voice any other more specific demands.

All of the speakers also stressed that they were satisfied with the performance of the interpreters. For instance, Speaker D said:

I believe the interpreters are doing a good job. I can follow them. I have not had any problems understanding the interpretation.

His views were reiterated by the other speakers as well in the form of “the interpretation is going well” (Speaker A), “I have no problems understanding them” (Speaker E), and “they are quite good” (Speaker B).

### 3.3.3 Interviews with the interpreters

In addition to interviewing the organizer and speakers, I also decided to interview the interpreters during the conference. My aim in interviewing them during the conference was to avoid the “cooled down” atmosphere of post-conference interviews. Yet, I was also aware that asking them questions during their breaks could bring an additional visibility to my position as a researcher and lead them to become aware of issues or conditions they might not be too keen on under “normal” conditions. A less intrusive way might have been to interview them right after the end of the second day, but I still took the risk of approaching them during the conference, thinking that some of what they would say “on the spot” would not be available or as vivid after the event.<sup>40</sup> Considering the differences in the way simultaneous interpreters (re)presented SI in their contextualized vs. de-contextualized accounts of the profession(al) (see Chapter 2), this choice probably had as many merits as it had shortcomings.

As expected, however, interviewing interpreters “on the job” was not an easy task. The interpreters were overloaded during the conference, especially on the first day, and had very little time to spare. I tried to catch them during the breaks or when they were off-duty. Interpreter B did not seem to be too disturbed and responded to my questions at three separate times during coffee breaks. Interpreter A, on the other hand, either prepared for the next speaker or took small naps in the booth when not working and rarely left her seat. When I asked her whether I could ask her a few questions she said she would be willing to tell me a lot, not only about this conference, but also about interpreting in general, though not “just now”. She proposed for us to meet over coffee at the end of the first day and we did. The third interpreter only worked for 1.5 hours, did not interpret the discussion session and had very little time because he was going to work in another conference the same afternoon. In fact, I interviewed him in my car on his way to his next conference during the lunch break of the first day.

During the interviews, I asked the interpreters the following questions in a flexible format and sequence:

- How do you view your position as a simultaneous interpreter?
- What do you think are the general expectations of the presence and performance of interpreters?
- How do you view your position in this conference?
- Are there strategies that you are deliberately using today?
- Do you think your feelings and attitude towards the topic, speaker and/or the social context influence your delivery?<sup>41</sup>

### 3.3.3.1 *Interview with Interpreter A*

Interpreter A seemed very conscious about her position as an interpreter. She said that it was a mistake to call their task “tercüme” (“translation”) and believed a more appropriate term would be “communication”. She said the interpreter was a “party to the communication”, in fact, “the one ensuring the communication”.

For her, the way she was treated as a “communication partner” was very important. She made it very clear that the way she was treated shaped her performance: “The better and more appropriately I’m treated as a partner, the better service I deliver”. She had complaints about the way she had been treated that morning: “This morning I came in very early,” she contended:

I wanted to take my time to go through the texts and eventually to talk to the speakers but the doors were closed, there were no chairs in the booth, no water and none of the speakers showed up until the very last moment. If they treat me like this, then I will not tear myself apart to enhance the communication process.  
*The more bread, the more meatballs.*<sup>42</sup>

When she was younger, she said, she considered it a duty to separate her feelings from her performance:

I thought I had to give an impeccable performance *per se*. I thought no matter how I felt or how I was treated I had to be ‘good’. However, now, I do take such influences into account, I mean both physical and social, and interpret accordingly. After all, the headset and even the chair have an impact on my performance.

She also said her voice reflected it when, for some reason, she felt bad about what she was doing or the way the speaker spoke. She complained that the organizers thought working with interpreters meant “delegating the task of interpreting to some professional”:

But that is not it. Using an interpreter means making sure they get the texts and their chairs. One of the speakers apparently prepared a glossary for me but he only gave it to me this morning. That is just too late.

While preparing for the conference, she said, she personally called the organizer a few times to remind him of the texts. Once she had accessed the texts, she took them with her to another conference in Germany, where she met a well-known philosophy scholar who was her friend. “We sat down,” she contended “and worked for a long time to actually create the Turkish terms for some of the words in English or German”. Without the help of her friend, she said, this task would have been “impossible”.

Interpreter A also had complaints regarding the way the speakers spoke. “Actually there are no difficult topics, there are just difficult speakers,” she contended and went on to say that what mattered most was not the content of the speech but the speaker’s relation to that content. She complained that the speakers at this conference were not speaking but reading:

Take a look at the texts in this conference. The speakers think they are speeches but the pages are full of footnotes. What are footnotes doing in a speech?.

She believed the audience expected a “coherent” delivery from them. “The audience places a lot of importance on coherence, not only within a single speech but also between speeches,” she said and mentioned not being too happy with the coherence she had established with her colleague that day:

I worked on the terms with a philosopher. My colleague, on the other hand, is a social scientist. Therefore, at times, we did not achieve full harmony. For instance, with the term ‘other’, one of us used ‘öteki’ and the other ‘diğeri’. Neither is wrong, I know, but we have to use the one these listeners are most familiar with.

She mentioned using German — a language she actively worked with — to establish coherence in her delivery:

Sometimes, even if the speaker is using the English, I insert the German word or term. For instance, I say ‘Sorge’ instead of or in addition to ‘care’. Using the German word saves me time, increases the internal coherence, and helps me collect my mind. It allows me to utter something and to utter something right.

She thought “fluency” was important and explained her views with an analogy:

Interpreting is like wave-surfing. If you stop, you fall. Just like in surfing, you try to prolong your time on a wave. You prolong its breaking point. From former experience, you can feel and hear that the next wave is on its way; you can feel the sprinkles on your face. If you sense a chance of moving to the other wave, you



extend your time riding the current wave, you extend its breaking point until the next one arrives.

Interpreter A also mentioned making use of last-minute warnings to her speakers. She said she talked to the speakers before their turns to clarify some points and to remind them of her wishes as an interpreter. She also mentioned how, full of black humor, she made her position and task clear to one of the speakers that morning:

I talked to most of the speakers and warned them to ‘talk’ and not to ‘read’ the texts. For instance, this morning I went up to (Speaker B) and told him ‘How are you going to account for your deeds today when you meet Heidegger in the other world? What is he going to say when you tell him that you read his texts to a Turkish woman who heard of them for the first time and she had to interpret them simultaneously?’.

She thought the strategy had worked.

### 3.3.3.2 *Interview with Interpreter B*

Interpreter B believed that users of SI expected simultaneous interpreters to “grasp and transfer the main points” and deliver those “fluently and clearly”. At least, he said, that was what he would expect if he were in their shoes:

Not everything needs to be translated, but the main points must get across fluently and clearly without the interpreter stuttering or getting anxious. If I were sitting there and watching speakers rush through philosophical texts in a language I didn’t know, I would hope that the interpreter would try to summarize the main points on the page instead of reading them falteringly.

He believed that the audience would rather “make do with the main points than deal with meaningless sentences or details”. Since it was unlikely that an interpreter would have a background in Heideggerian philosophy, the best thing to do was to “focus on grasping and transferring the main points”. Throughout the conference, he said, he tried to summarize whatever he could understand, though he admitted:

It is difficult to summarize a subject one is not familiar with, but because the speakers read their texts and because the terminology is so difficult, I basically tried to summarize what I understood.

He also mentioned that summarizing meant omitting parts of the original speech or paper:

I omitted things. For instance, I omitted sentences that started with ‘that is to say’. I only interpreted those parts of the quotations that I thought were important. I

interpreted the speaker's comments about the quotations. Once, I omitted the quotation altogether and only interpreted the speaker's explanation of it.

Even though Interpreter B felt such omissions were needed, he also had doubts about the deontological acceptability of making omissions and said:

I am not sure if these omissions are acceptable professionally, I mean in terms of deontology. But the only other option is to finish the speaker's paper five minutes after the speaker, slowly deciphering the last three pages.

Interpreter B also mentioned feeling "great frustration" with his performance at the conference. He was convinced he could have performed much better had he been given all of the texts from the start:

If these texts had been given to me, I would have done much better. I am not a philosopher but I have done serious work on philosophy. Organizational defects create a lot of difficulty even for the most specialized interpreter, let alone for someone who is absolutely unfamiliar with the field.

Like Interpreter A, Interpreter B had complaints about the speakers at the conference. He said he was used to working in conferences on philosophy but this conference was particularly challenging because all of the speakers were "reading the texts". He also wanted me to note the term "having-begun-beginning-being" which he had struggled with in one of the speeches that morning. He added "If you leave your interpreter face to face with such a challenge, then you have to take all kinds of measures to make his life easier".

While preparing for the conference, Interpreter B had gone through all of the texts available to him, noted down the terms which he knew were critical in Heidegger, looked them up, talked to people and prepared a glossary. Despite all his care, however, his performance that morning had not satisfied him. He said he had not had the time to read one of the papers that had arrived at the very last minute and only grasped the meaning the speaker wanted to convey at the end, which, by then, was too late.

Interpreter B also thought that the conference was tiring, especially because of the long turns they took. He said:

We change every 40–50 minutes or so. This is unique to this conference. We have split the speakers. If we changed in the middle of a paper, it would be three times more difficult for the second interpreter. I have rarely felt so tired. In one of the papers, the speaker was talking about 'paralysis' and at certain moments during the interpretation that is exactly what I felt.

In complete contrast to Interpreter A, Interpreter B seemed frustrated with the frequent use of German at the conference. He had French but did not know

German. He said he felt lucky that one of the papers full of German quotations had landed in the hands of his colleague who knew German very well. Yet, despite his luck with the worst case, he had struggled with many other instances of German. He said he tried his best to pronounce the German words, even if he felt he was pronouncing them wrong. It was easier when he saw the terms in black and white but during the discussions it was very hard to repeat words like “Faktizität”, “Wiederholen” and “Tatsächlichkeit”. He said he tried to interpret the German words into Turkish whenever he could, but in some cases “the sentences just didn’t make sense because the whole discussion centered on the nuances between these words in German”:

I try to interpret those into Turkish when I can. I think I am a bit tense in this conference because actually I do understand that it is tough to translate the original terms and much easier to leave them in the original language. But, here, it becomes impossible to find your way through these terms. I mean what if my colleague did not speak German even better than English? All of the quotations one speaker made from Heidegger were in German.

Interpreter B thought that this was a problem related to the organization of the conference:

If this conference declares its working languages as English and Turkish and announces that there will be simultaneous interpretation between the two languages, then nobody should take the liberty to assume there will also be interpretation from German. I know the academic world a little and get the impression that this is showing off. There is an English translation of Heidegger’s masterpiece *Being and Time*. Of course, they could discuss a few terms and their translations into English or they could say ‘such and such a term in English does not have the same connotation as German’ but there is absolutely no need to leave the whole quotation in the original.

When he failed to repeat the German words, Interpreter B said he made an announcement to his audience to the effect of “You’re listening to the German” and stopped interpreting. He said he hoped that at least those who knew German would be able to follow from the original. He admitted feeling angry at the speakers during those times for not caring about the interpretation and the interpreter:

I am not responsible for interpreting German. I try to repeat the words as much as I can to help the listener, but if I cannot then I say ‘You’re listening to German’ and I guess I say this with slight anger. If these people know there is simultaneous interpretation, then they have to think a little about the interpretation even if they don’t care about the interpreter.

Interpreter B thought such an attitude on the part of the speakers was a sign of disregard for the listeners as well:

They should pay attention to the people listening to Turkish but I have a feeling these people are here to talk to each other. I mean basically they do not want an audience. They either do not think or do not care that a couple of Ph.D. students or a dozen postgraduate students could learn something from them.

He thought, under these circumstances, announcing that the speaker was speaking in German remained his only choice. Yet, being forced to make such an announcement, and to deliver less than his best, did not seem to come easy:

So I tell the listeners that, but I also realize I say it a little tensely. I feel like reacting when they leave everything in German in a meeting with interpreters.

Similar to Interpreter A, Interpreter B said he had also talked to some of the speakers before their turns to ask for their texts, clarify some of the terms and to tell them to “speak the texts”.

### 3.3.3.3 *Interview with Interpreter C*

Interpreter C believed that the task of an interpreter was to ensure “intelligibility”. He said his job was to make the speakers and their speeches “become intelligible” in another language. He said he had done the same thing with the speaker he interpreted that morning:

I made the speaker this morning intelligible. I wanted her to be as intelligible as possible for the listeners in the room. That is what everyone expects from me as an interpreter.

Interpreter C had a clear set of strategies in mind. He said he applied those strategies all of the time and they always worked. First of all, to make the originals intelligible, he said he always used terms that everyone would be familiar with. In fact, he admitted, he could not do it any other way. He did not know and, thus, could not use some of the “newly created terms that neither he nor anyone else understood”.

In addition to using familiar terminology, Interpreter C was careful not to lag behind the speaker. He thought following the speaker closely was crucial for the credibility of the interpreter, even if that meant skipping chunks of the original speech:

I always follow the speaker very closely. I never lag behind. Lagging behind shakes the confidence of the listener. I omit and cut things but I never work with a big lag. The listeners actually always excuse my hopping and skipping, but lagging behind

is catastrophic. If the speaker finishes and the interpreter finishes minutes later that is really bad.

Interpreter C said he also placed a lot of emphasis on his voice. He saw the voice of an interpreter as his “most important tool” because it shaped the “first impressions” of the audience:

I make sure my voice sounds convincing. The voice of an interpreter is the first impression the listeners get. They basically look at the voice to make a judgment about the interpreter’s performance.

In addition to using a convincing voice, Interpreter B said he always made sure that what came out of his mouth “sounded good”. He said:

I don’t care about what comes out of my mouth. I just care that it sounds good.

Interpreter C said he felt lucky he did not have to interpret the discussion session and, despite his brief presence at the conference, he thought this conference was one of the worst he had ever worked at.

Like Interpreters A and B, he mentioned talking to his speaker before her turn. In contrast to his colleagues who had asked the speakers to talk and not read their texts, however, Interpreter C had told the speaker not to deviate from the text:

I talked to the speaker this morning. I actually warned her not to omit sentences and skip pages without notifying me. I told her that even if she felt she had to skip some parts, she had to let me know which page she wanted to move to.

He thought it always helped to talk to the speakers before they took the floor.

### 3.3.4 Interviews with the users of SI

During the conference, I also interviewed thirteen users, which corresponds to around two-thirds of the SI users throughout the conference. I conducted the interviews during the breaks and asked them the following questions in a flexible format:

- What is your area of interest?
- Have you listened to SI before?
- How much did you rely on SI to follow the conference?
- What do you expect from the interpreters in this conference? Could you elaborate on your understanding of that expectation?
- As far as you have listened to it, what do you think about SI at this conference? What did you like and dislike about it? <sup>43</sup>

Out of thirteen respondents I interviewed, eleven had listened to SI before and only two were experiencing it for the first time. All of the respondents said they knew some English. Three of them said they knew English, but it was “insufficient”, so that they relied on SI to follow the conference. One respondent said he actually followed the floor and put on the headsets only “out of curiosity”. One other stated that she listened to the interpretation, but would have understood the last speaker much better had she listened to the original. All of the others said they listened to both the original and the interpretation, depending on the speaker. For instance, Respondent 3 said:

I listened to the interpretation half of the time today, depending on the English of the speakers. If I could follow their English, I did not use the interpretation.

Respondent 6 said she listened to SI because the speaker she had just listened to had a “very strong German accent”, while Respondent 9 mentioned following the original and the interpretation together with the text of the speaker when the text was available.<sup>44</sup>

The third question regarding the area of interest of the speakers pointed to the heterogeneity of the users. There was one writer, one publisher, one assistant professor from the Faculty of Law, six students from the departments of law, environment, philosophy, cinema and television of various universities. One respondent said he was a “political activist”, one said she was interested in philosophy and two said they were members of Mevlana Kardeşlik Cemiyeti — a spiritual society.

The answers respondents gave to the questions on their expectations from the interpreters were quite complicated to process. While some respondents referred to their general expectations, others could not refrain from basing their expectations on the SI performance in the previous session. This was probably quite natural, given that their impressions of SI were heightened by the most immediate session.

In their spontaneous replies, the users of SI foregrounded two main expectations of the interpreters for that conference: *Being familiar with the topic of the conference* and *conveying the meaning of the speakers’ speeches*.

Regarding their first expectation, eight of the respondents (R1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) mentioned that they expected the interpreters to be “familiar with the topic and concepts”. For instance, Respondent 3 said general knowledge on philosophy was not enough and emphasized that the interpreter had to be familiar with the works of Heidegger and Arendt. Respondent 7 thought it was the duty of the interpreter to become familiar with the subject matter and said,

“If they are not familiar with the area, they should take the initiative themselves to learn the area inside out”.

In addition to the expectation of general and specific knowledge on the topic and concepts, seven respondents (R4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13) mentioned that they expected the interpreters to “convey the meaning in the speakers’ speeches”.

However, when asked to elaborate on what they understood and expected from the interpreter to convey *as* the meaning in the speaker’s speech, the respondents seemed to share quite different views. For instance, when asked to elaborate on what he meant by “conveying the meaning in the original speech”, Respondent 4 said what mattered was not the “word order but the transfer of the idea” and stressed that he expected the interpreter to “give his/her interpretation of the meaning by paraphrasing the speeches on the floor”.

Similarly, Respondent 8 stated that he wanted the interpreter to “give a summary of the speeches in Turkish”. He was convinced that in conferences of this kind, the focus was always on a few ideas and it did not really matter if the interpreter skipped some parts as long the summary contained the “general meaning”. He said:

I prefer summaries in such conferences. These conferences analyze only a few ideas, not more. Those keep coming up over and over again, so that, if you understand them, missing one or two won’t matter, because they will surely be repeated again.

Respondent 10, on the other hand, expected the interpreter to convey the meaning, but for him “conveying the original meaning” meant not missing any terms. He said philosophy was always characterized by a plurality of meanings and options and believed it was the duty of the interpreter to “choose the correct correspondents for the terms in Turkish”.

Respondent 9 also said the correctness of the terms in Turkish was very critical in rendering the meaning and underlined his belief that the interpreters had to possess “a complete knowledge of the terms because the whole meaning changes with the way the terms are interpreted”.

Respondent 7 said he expected the interpreter to “convey the meaning correctly”, but his concern was not so much with the correctness of the concepts in Turkish, but with the “feeling behind the concepts”:

They are talking about such concepts there that you’ve got to live them and feel them. The interpreters have to feel the meanings of the concepts to pass those on to you.

Respondent 13, on the other hand, expected the interpreter to convey the meaning in a way that reflected “the spiritual world of the philosopher”:

What matters is conveying the meaning. The interpreters have to grasp the essence and transfer it. They have to be able to convey the spiritual world of the philosopher.

Thus, among those respondents who expected the interpreter to “convey the meaning in the speakers’ speeches”, there seemed to be significant differences in defining *what* constituted that meaning. For some, “the meaning in the original” was the emotions behind the concepts, for others it was the spiritual world of the philosopher. Some believed rendering the original meaning meant that the interpreter would give his “interpretation” of the speaker’s message in the form of a summary, while others contended that the meaning in the speaker’s speech was in the individual concepts and terms and they had to be rendered very exactly.

The different expectations regarding what constituted the meaning in the speakers’ speeches also surfaced in the respondents’ assessments of the actual interpreting performance. In response to the last question on what they thought about SI at the conference, some respondents criticized the interpreters for skipping sentences, terms or nuances.

For instance, in complete contrast to the expectations of Respondents 4 and 8, who wanted the interpreter to summarize and paraphrase the meaning of the original even if certain words and ideas were skipped (which they said would certainly be repeated during the conference anyhow), Respondent 10 was quite critical of one of the interpreters for “missing many sentences and not catching up”. Similarly, Respondent 2 thought the interpreters were “missing important nuances” and Respondent 3 believed the interpreters were skipping some terms and losing the meaning. He said:

The whole discussion in this session was on the philosophers’ terms and concepts. For instance, (Speaker C) used the word ‘a priori’ and you can say ‘önsel bilgi’ or ‘doğuştan varolan bilgi’ for it but the interpreter skipped it. Later, he interpreted some of the English definitions of that concept but the word ‘a priori’ never came out of his mouth. That term was very important in that paper. And when they miss the concepts, the meaning in the interpretation becomes disconnected. Moreover they don’t see what they miss. When they miss a concept they wait, say um. uh. but when the concepts are gone you lose the whole meaning. Especially in this conference, they should be careful about not skipping the concepts.

Therefore, while some of the respondents asked interpreters to summarize or paraphrase the original speech without focusing too much on the original



wording and structure, others, such as this respondent, insisted on hearing all of the concepts very precisely.

Regarding the *actual* interpreting performance at the conference, two respondents (R3, 12) said they were completely dissatisfied with the interpretation, while five (R5, 6, 8, 11, 13) said they were satisfied. The rest did not make an explicit judgment and made do with talking about aspects they liked and/or disliked.

For instance Respondent 13 said “I’m really pleased with the interpretation. We listened to the interpreters with pleasure. They are doing their job very well”. Respondents 6 and 8 also thought the interpretation was “good”, but believed this was so because the interpreters were reading from the texts. While Respondent 8 was convinced that the interpreters were “either reading from the texts or making use of them”, Respondent 6 said:

I think the interpretation was quite good because the sentences were meaningful and grammatical and the interpreter sounded relaxed when talking. But I think the interpreter was reading a given text. I don’t suppose this can be done simultaneously. They basically read the text and only if the speaker adds anything they interpret that. If they didn’t give the interpreters already translated texts, simultaneous [interpretation] would be a fiasco.

In complete contrast to these respondents, Respondent 2 thought the interpretation carried the flaws of a “spontaneous delivery”, which was inexcusable because he was sure the interpreters were given the texts to work on before the conference:

I don’t think the interpreters worked on the texts. As far as I know they were given the texts before the conference because the texts are all available outside on the desk. So, I would expect them not to interpret as if they were doing this spontaneously and simultaneously, but rather in a way that would reflect their prior knowledge and study of the texts.

He was most disturbed by the ungrammatical sentences uttered by the interpreters that did not fit into the Turkish syntax.

The pace and intonation of the interpreters also seemed to be important for the users, but once again the users varied greatly in their definitions of the “right” pace and intonation. For instance, Respondent 4 mentioned that the “tempo of the interpretation with all the ups and downs, prolonged sounds, abnormal slowness at times and occasional pauses was unbearable”. Respondent 7 believed that the interpreters had to be lively even if the speakers were boring. He thought the interpreters had been monotonous, especially

in the afternoon session when everyone relaxed and slowed down, whereas Respondent 5 thought the interpretation had been better than the original:

It might be better to listen to the interpretation if you don't want to get bored. Sometimes the voice and intonation of the speakers are unattractive and the interpretation makes it more bearable.

Respondent 4 believed the interpreters had to be a little more “entertaining” and, referring to the difficult position of the speakers who had to speak English again after 40 years, said, “If the interpreter played a bit with the speaker’s delivery, it could add some color. I cannot claim this is an ethical rule but I think they should help the speaker a little”. Thus, he expected the interpreters to *improve* the delivery of the original by making it more lively, entertaining and fluent.

Given the position of the booths (see Section 3.2.6), Respondents 3 and 9 were struck by the gestures of the interpreters (cf. also interviews with the speakers in 3.3.2). Respondent 9, for instance, noted that the interpreters spoke as if they were the original speakers saying, “I watched both of the interpreters, they look like they understood everything. It is as if they are the ones telling these things to us. Very nice”.

For Respondent 3, on the other hand, the gestures of the male interpreter were not so welcome:

The male interpreter uses his hands and arms so much I occasionally missed his interpretation. His gestures are extremely lively and colorful, but I guess sometimes he makes more gestures and says less. That is a bit risky.

He also thought that the listeners could at times miss the meaning in the delivery “because they were not following the gestures of the interpreters”, but rather those of the speakers.

There was also no consensus on whether old or new Turkish terms were better. While Respondent 10 said he really liked the new Turkish terms one of the interpreters used, Respondent 9 thought new Turkish terms like “özsel” (“essential”) used by the same interpreter did not mean anything and “hung in the air”. Respondent 5 also thought new Turkish coinages were difficult to understand and said he preferred everyday and familiar terms.

In their assessments of actual SI performance, respondents had also quite different views on how interpreters handled the German terms and quotations used by the speakers. For instance, Respondent 6 was disturbed by the Turkish term one of the interpreters used for ‘Ereignis’, and thought interpreting such

terms into Turkish made it worse. He said, “Not every term, but only the important ones such as ‘Ereignis’ should be kept in the original language”. He did not problematize how the interpreters were to distinguish which German terms voiced by the speakers were more important than the others. While Respondent 9 also shared the view that German words should be left in German, Respondent 10 mentioned that the speakers always referred to the Latin origins of the German words, and it would have been more appropriate for the interpreters to preserve the Latin words in Turkish. Respondent 11, on the other hand, believed the interpreters should have been more careful about interpreting the German terms into Turkish because doing so would “improve the thinking in Turkish”.

In all, although the respondents seemed to be referring to the “same” quality criteria that were also used by some user surveys (such as “fidelity to the original meaning”, “correct terminology”, “grammaticality”, “fluency”), there were significant differences not only in how users of SI *rated* various quality criteria, but also in how individual users *defined* the criteria. In that sense, rather than any objective expectation of the users, the interviews highlighted the “subjectivity” of the users in defining seemingly “generic” quality criteria and the “fuzziness” of the quality constructs with which simultaneous interpreters and interpreting were assessed.

## CHAPTER 4

# Analyzing an actual SI performance

Having focused on the broader socio-cultural context(s) in Chapter 2 and the more immediate context of a specific conference in the previous chapter, this chapter attempts to explore *actual* SI performance at the same conference analyzed in Chapter 3 on “Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt: Metaphysics and Politics” held at Boğaziçi University. The analysis here relies on the transcripts of the booth and floor recordings and complements them with my observations regarding specific moments of interaction during the conference.

### 4.1 Constructing the transcripts in this study

As covered in more detail in Chapter 3, working with “naturally occurring talk” generally necessitates some form of a transcription of the recordings. Yet, transcribing oral language is, by definition, a transformative process. It involves representing oral language and its features such as hesitations, intonation, false starts, blends, semi- and non-verbal behavior in a form of writing that makes use of punctuation marks, layout and symbols for representation. In that sense, transcribing — as writing — moves the words from the sound world to a world of visual space, actually locking the words into position in this space, thereby transforming their perception completely (Ong 1982). Furthermore, given that a transcription cannot represent everything featured in the spoken original, transcribing also always implies an interpretation by the transcriber of what is being said (Powney and Watts 1987).

As with any transcription, the transcriptions used in this study are the product of a number of deliberate decisions (and, without doubt, also a number of indeliberate ones). Perhaps the most deliberate strategy in transcribing the conference recordings has been the emphasis I have placed on the readability of the transcripts. To a large extent, this strategy itself has been a result of my motivation to explore the relationship between the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters and the socio-cultural and interactional factors rather than, for instance, the linguistic, cognitive or prosodic features of the SI

performance, which would have required more precision in transcribing various aspects of the same recordings.

In turning the recordings into writing for this study, I have opted for a simplified orthographic transcription, rather than a detailed phonetic transcription. I have preferred to present the transcripts of the booth and floor recordings separately, rather than using an interlinear gloss. I have deliberately omitted or simplified the representation of many features of oral language. For instance, I have not represented stress or intonation in the transcripts. I have represented slips and blends with ordinary orthography, rather than specialized symbols, which would have been more precise, but also more difficult to follow. I have transcribed the hesitations orthographically and represented filled pauses with the interjection “uh.” in English and “eh.” in Turkish, rather than special notations. I have marked pauses between 5–10 seconds with a single symbol (“+”) and longer ones with (“++”) without giving more precise timings. I have also made use of punctuation marks such as dots and commas to make the transcribed texts more reader-friendly. Naturally, my use of them has not been based on any physical reality, but on my intuition and on the intonation/pauses of the speakers. Similarly, in translating the Turkish parts in the recordings to English for an international audience, I have refrained from making an interlinear translation which could provide a more elaborate account of the grammatical structure of the recordings. Instead I have tried to reconstruct the Turkish sentences in English with all its methodological and ideological implications.

In contrast to such “simplifications”, I have tried to be quite meticulous about including the barely audible comments and semi-verbal communication in the transcripts. Furthermore, to provide a larger picture, I have tried to complement the recorded material with my observations during the conference.

In short, the transcripts presented and analyzed in this chapter are not *the* transcript but *a* transcript of the recordings that were produced for the purposes of this study. Needless to say, just like the transcripts themselves, their analyses in this chapter also reflect my implicit and explicit assumptions about the material at hand and are guided by my theoretical framework, which seeks to explore SI as an activity in context(s).

## 4.2 Deciding on a unit of analysis

While observing the conference on Heidegger and Arendt, I was intrigued by the fact that, in addition to using the “delivery” to render the utterances of the speakers to the target language, interpreters were also using it for a variety of other purposes such as warning the speakers to use a microphone, asking their listeners to warn the speakers to use microphones, commenting on the nature of the interaction on the floor, reporting or paraphrasing the speakers and responding to the accusations of misinterpretation from the floor.

My initial impressions about the delivery were reinforced as I started transcribing the recordings of the conference. While transcribing the recordings of the floor (i.e., the “original” speeches), I inserted a new conversation line for every new speaker.<sup>45</sup> Doing that with the recordings of the floor was relatively easy because every change of voice was an unmistakable signal of a change of speaker. However, doing the same thing when transcribing the recordings of the booth (i.e., the “delivery” of the interpreter) presented a major challenge. Although most of the turn-taking between the speakers was traceable in the delivery, either from the context or from explicit references to new speakers, some instances defied a clear differentiation. For instance, I did not know whether or where to insert conversation lines in the following section of the delivery:

Interpreter: I don't know if I've answered your second question ((inaudible remarks from the floor)) **But I mean that Merleau-Ponty has** *unfortunately we cannot interpret because the speaker speaking from the floor is not using a microphone.* But, says Mr. Ö\*, Merleau-Ponty has written on these topics and his early death has left his work inco unfinished. Uh. Many of Merleau-Ponty's expressions have been taken by Derrida but you know that better than I.

[\* name of the person removed]

In this short transcript from the recordings of the booth, standard letters represent the interpreter talking “as” the original speaker, underlined letters represent the interpreter reporting the speaker, italic letters represent parts where the interpreter talks to his audience directly “as” the interpreter, bold letters represent the voice of the speaker on the floor, which is automatically transmitted in the “delivery” channel when the interpreter switches off his microphone, and double parentheses represent inaudible speech in the background. Both during the conference and while transcribing the recordings of the booth, I was struck by this multiplicity of the “speaker-positions” in the delivery.

This multiplicity was striking because it actually ran counter to the widely held assumption and expectation that the person occupying the speaker-position (i.e., the “I”) on the floor would also occupy the speaker-position (i.e., the “I”) in the delivery. That is to say, it ran counter to the “norm” in SI that requires interpreters to adopt the first person singular of the speakers (Harris 1990) and challenged the widespread view that the delivery was reserved for the (re)presentation of the original speaker only (see the meta-discourse on SI in Chapter 2).

Intrigued by my initial impressions of the complexity of the speaker-positions, I decided to focus on instances where the interpreters seemed to shift from using the speaker’s “I” in the delivery and to call this unit of analysis “*shifts in the speaking subject*”. I suspected that by analyzing such deviations from what was considered the “norm” in SI, I could gain an insight into *when* and *why* simultaneous interpreters did not assume or remain in the “I” of the speakers in an actual SI context.

### 4.3 Exploring the “shifts in the speaking subject”

In exploring the “shifts in the speaking subject”, my analysis took its point of departure from the delivery only. That is to say, I did not undertake a one-to-one comparison between the floor and booth transcripts, but only explored those moments that looked like “shifts in the speaking subject” in the delivery. Since the main starting point was the delivery, my methodology was more inclined to detect the more explicit shifts from the speaker’s “I”, rather than the more subtle and implicit shifts.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, the corpus very likely contains more “shifts in the speaking subject” than the ones analyzed in this study, and these could be a topic of further research on the same corpus in the future.

Within this framework, my analysis of the transcripts suggested that, in contrast to the norm, which stipulates the presence of only one speaker-position in the delivery, there were four possible speaker-positions the interpreter could adopt:

1. The interpreter could place the speaker in the speaker-position in the delivery and assume his/her first person singular (“I”) (which is the only speaker-position that the interpreter could adopt according to the “norms” in SI).
2. The interpreter could assume the speaker-position in the delivery indirectly and interpret the speaker by reporting, paraphrasing and/or inserting brief

explanatory remarks about the speech on the floor.

3. The interpreter could assume the speaker-position implicitly and blend his/her remarks into what looked like the speaker's first person singular ("I") in the delivery.
4. The interpreter could take over the speaker-position explicitly and insert his/her personal remarks or comments in the delivery.

Within this framework, my analysis of the transcripts pointed to 58 shifts from the use of the speaker's first person in the delivery. Most of these shifts occurred during the discussion sessions rather than when speakers delivered (in this case, mostly *read*) their papers. Interestingly, these shifts did not seem to take place randomly, but became palpable in the cases of

- a. apologies of the speakers and/or interpreters
- b. mistakes of the speakers and/or interpreters
- c. overlapping/semi-verbal/inaudible interaction on the floor
- d. problems with the transmission of the interpreter's or speaker's voice
- e. ambiguous or contradictory input on the floor
- f. language/culture-specific discussions or difficult word-connotations in one conference language on the floor
- g. references in a non-conference language on the floor
- h. accusations of misinterpretation from the floor

#### 4.4 Presenting the analysis

In addition to 120 pages of transcribed recordings and 58 instances of "shifts in the speaking subject" that had to be analyzed, one other issue was the presentation of the analysis of transcripts in a way that would not abuse the patience of readers. Since the theoretical framework in this study approached talk and context as mutually reflexive and saw context(s) as constrained by but also constitutive of what was said and done, theoretically the most sound option would be to present the whole flow of the interaction by highlighting those instances which pointed to a "shift in the speaking subject". However, even though this option would give the readers the chance to follow the complete flow of communication and allow them to situate specific instances that pointed to shifts within the general flow, it would probably also tax the patience of an international audience that would have to scan 120 pages of transcripts, a large portion of which is in Turkish.



Another option was to analyze only those instances that suggested a “shift in the speaking subject” by presenting them as excerpts, without expanding on their position within the general flow of the interaction at the conference. This option could make the analysis more bearable from the reader’s point of view, but detached excerpts could also give a very fragmented view of what interpreters did, why they did it, and how that specific instance of interpreting behavior related to the social and interactional context(s).

As a middle way, and in what follows, I first give a categorical analysis of the “shifts in the speaking subject” in Section 4.5.1 and then, in Section 4.5.2, present the flow of communication in the final 25 minutes of the conference, which corresponds to 16 pages of transcripts and includes 8 shifts. In addition to these two sections, all of the “shifts from the speaker’s I” and their brief analyses can be found in the Appendix of the book in their order of occurrence during the conference.

I hope this format, especially the complete flow of the interaction in the last 25 minutes of the conference in 4.5.2, will allow the individual reader with Turkish and English a subjective reading and assessment of the same transcripts and help those uninitiated in Turkish to follow how the shifts in the speaking subject relate to and renew the flow of the interaction during the conference. Those interested in looking at the transcripts of the whole conference can refer to the complete transcripts of the floor and booth recordings in the Appendix of my dissertation (Diriker 2001).

## 4.5 Analyzing the conference transcripts

### 4.5.1 “Shifts in the speaking subject” in the present corpus

Let us now take a closer look into when and why “shifts in the speaking subject” took place in the present corpus.<sup>47</sup>

#### a. Apologies of the speakers and/or interpreters

Shifts in the speaking subject” became palpable with the apologies of the speakers and interpreters. In interpreting the apologies of the speakers, the interpreters either remained in the speaker’s “I” and rendered the apologies in the first person or assumed the speaker position in the delivery to report, paraphrase and/or insert remarks about the apology in the original speech. While Interpreter A tended to remain in the speaker’s “I” and render the speakers’ apologies in the first person (Excerpts 33, 35), Interpreter B mostly

assumed the speaker-position to either report and paraphrase the apology or insert brief explanatory remarks about the interaction on the floor (7, 9, 11, 13, 14).

Interestingly, in the present corpus, in eight instances when the interpreters themselves apologized for some reason, both of them always did so in the first person singular (10, 32, 34, 36, 50, 51, 55). Since the interpreters used the first person singular in the delivery to represent the speakers immediately before and after these brief apologies, the change of speaker-positions (from the interpreter speaking “as” the speaker to the interpreter speaking “as” the interpreter) were hardly noticeable in the delivery.

\* \* \*

Here is an example from the delivery of Interpreter A who remained in the first person singular both for her own apologies and those of the speakers (34/35/36):

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter A):...Eğer şunu hesaba katar isek, çağımızda kamuoyunun eh. iddiasını hesaba, kamu alanının pardon<sup>34</sup> iddiasını hesaba katar isek pardon şöyle diyim<sup>35</sup> kısmi aktör, bütün aktörler, eh. zaten pardon<sup>36</sup> taraflı aktör veyahut da tarafsız yargıç aslında bağımsız yargının iki eksenini oluştururlar...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter A):...If we take into account, in our age the public opinion's uh. claim, take the public realm's sorry<sup>34</sup> claim into account sorry let me put it this way<sup>35</sup> the partial<sup>1</sup> actor, all actors, uh. already sorry<sup>36</sup> the partial<sup>2</sup> actor or the impartial judge actually form the two axes of independent judgment...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker):...Uh. if we take into account, the decline of the public realm in our modern age. uh. I think we could say that the political actor sorry the partial actor which is always is always partial and impartial spectator or judge are two elements or two axes of independent judgement, maybe...*

[partial<sup>1</sup> and partial<sup>2</sup> refer to the two meanings of the homonym “partial” in Turkish used by the interpreter. Partial<sup>1</sup> stands for “kısmi” in Turkish, which means “of or relating to parts”, and partial<sup>2</sup> stands for “tarafı”, which means “biased or inclined to favor one party over the other”]

As the transcripts show, there are three apologies in the delivery (i.e., booth), but only one in the original speech (i.e., floor). The first apology (34) in the delivery does not seem to be speaker-induced and probably belongs to Interpreter A, who corrects her first choice of “public opinion” with “public realm”. The second

apology (35) is speaker-induced because the speaker on the floor corrects his initial choice of “political actor” with “partial actor”. From the point of view of the delivery, that apology is not really needed because, due to the time lag between the speaker and the interpreter, the interpreter never interprets the word “political actor” into Turkish, which the original speaker then corrects as “partial actor”. Yet, Interpreter A still opts to render the apology in the delivery (see also 33). Finally, the third apology (36) clearly belongs to the interpreter for her initial missuppression of the contextually inappropriate meaning of “partial” in Turkish. Thus, there are three apologies in the delivery that are all made in the first person singular and only one of them belongs to the speaker. Since the first person in the delivery is used by the interpreter to represent the speaker, the change of speaker-positions is hardly palpable in the delivery.

\* \* \*

Here is an example from the delivery of Interpreter B who tended to report, paraphrase or insert brief explanatory remarks for the apologies of the speakers, but always remained in the first person singular for his own apologies (9/10):

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B):...Heidegger eh. Da-Sein'in eh. temel bir özelliği olarak eh. dünyada olmanın vecde eh. vecd halinde bir açıklığını eh. tanımıştır. Bir başka şekilde söylesek, Da-Sein'in kendi varlığı özür diliyor konuşmacı ve tekrar başlıyor<sup>9</sup>. Öte te yani eh. Da-Sein'in varlığının esası eh. başkalarla, başkalarıyla birlikte olmaktır, Miteinander... (~1½ minutes of speech removed)... Bu varsayımların tam anlamı Heidegger'in daha sonraki düşüncesinde açıkça ortaya çıkar. Bu düşünce dolaylı bir şekilde baştan özür dilerim<sup>10</sup> bu düşünce eh. Varlık ve Düşünce üzerine verdiği Master dersleriyle hemen ara eh. ardından başlar...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B):...as a basic trait of Da-Sein Heidegger has acknowledged its ecstatic opening to being in the world. In other words, the own being of Da-Sein the speaker apologizes and starts again<sup>9</sup>. In other, that is, uh. the essence of Da-Sein's existence uh. is in its being with others, Miteinander... (~1½ minutes of speech removed)... The full meaning of these assumptions becomes clearly apparent in Heidegger's later thought. This thought directly from the start I'm sorry<sup>10</sup> this thought starts right after the Masters courses he gives on Being and Time...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker):...Heidegger has acknowledged as a fundamental trait of Da-Sein the ecstatic opening to its being in the world which necessarily involves the ecstatic opening to the other. In other words, the own being of Da-Sein implicates Being in the world which implicates,*

*excuse me*<sup>9</sup>, in other words, the own being of Da-Sein implicates in so far as it is being in the world, the being with others, Mitsein.... ((~1½ minutes of speech removed))... The full significance of these presuppositions become apparent in the later thought of Heidegger. This thought begins immediately with the Masters courses that he gave after Being and Time...

In this instance, the speaker apologizes and corrects a part of her speech and this forces Interpreter B, who is in the middle of rendering the same sentence, to undertake some kind of a correction as well. Instead of repeating the apology of the speaker in the first person singular, the interpreter opts to paraphrase the apology and explain the interaction on the floor (“the speaker apologizes and starts again”). Note that paraphrasing the speaker and explaining what the speaker does basically mean speaking *about* the speaker and are different from rendering what the speaker says in the first person, which implies speaking *as* the speaker. First of all, speaking about the speaker creates a distancing effect and *differentiates* the interpreter from the speaker. Furthermore, it also *exposes* the identity of the one who has made the mistake and accentuates the information that the speaker is apologizing on the floor (9).

As the same excerpt shows, soon after this first instance, the same interpreter apologizes for a mistake of his own when he makes a wrong anticipation in the section starting with “this thought begins immediately” (10). This time, the interpreter remains in the first person and does not attempt to create the same demarcation between himself and the speaker in the delivery by saying something like “the interpreter apologizes”.<sup>48</sup> Note that the interpreter uses the first person to represent the speaker right before and right after the apology so that the change in the speaking subject is hardly noticeable in the delivery. Challenging the assumption that the “I” in the delivery belongs to the speaker only, these consecutive instances point to the hybridity of the delivery as a site with multiple intertwined speaker-positions.

\* \* \*

There were three other instances where the delivery contained an apology. However, because the recordings of the floor (i.e., original speech) corresponding to the same instances were missing, it was not possible to understand whether the speaker or the interpreter was apologizing in the delivery (15, 24, 27). According to the norms and meta-discourse on SI, the delivery was considered to be reserved for the speaker’s “I” only, which meant that the apologies in the delivery had to belong to the speaker on the floor. However, given the complexity of the speaker-positions in the interpreted utterance

which was highlighted by some of the other instances, it was not possible to say who was apologizing in the delivery — instances which again pointed to the hybridity of the speaker-positions in the delivery.<sup>49</sup>

### **b. Mistakes of the speakers and/or interpreters**

In the present corpus, “shifts in the speaking subject” in the delivery also became palpable when interpreters made mistakes or were faced with the mistakes of the speakers. Similar to the differences in the way the interpreters handled the apologies of the speakers, there were also interpersonal differences in the way the two interpreters rendered the mistakes of the speakers. As with apologies, in rendering the mistakes of the speakers, Interpreter A was more inclined to remain in the speaker’s “I” and/or assume the speaker-position implicitly (51, 58), while Interpreter B was more inclined to assume the speaker-position more explicitly to either paraphrase, insert explanatory remarks or personal comments about the original speech in the delivery (6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 20, 43, 45).

In addition to interpersonal differences, there were also some intrapersonal variations in the response of the interpreters and, in one instance, Interpreter B, who usually took over the speaker position more explicitly, inserted a remark that carried features of a blend into the speaker’s “I” in the delivery (37).

Interestingly enough, there was significant similarity in the way both interpreters handled their own mistakes. Both Interpreter A and Interpreter B corrected and apologized for their mistakes in the first person singular without making explicit that they were shifting from using the speaker’s “I” in the delivery (10, 34, 36, 50, see also “apologies”).

To take a closer look at how the interpreters handled the mistakes of the speakers, in two instances in the present corpus, Interpreter A, who generally tended to remain in the speaker’s “I”, opted to correct the mistakes of the speakers in her delivery (51, 58). Since she made these corrections in the first person, users of SI, who listened to her delivery, did not “hear” the original mistake and did not receive any explicit verbal indication that the interpreter was undertaking a correction in the delivery.

However, one of the mistakes that was corrected by Interpreter A in the delivery led to repercussions on the floor when some participants in the audience reacted to the “original” mistake (58). As a result, users of SI, who listened to the “corrected” version of the speaker’s speech, ended up being excluded from the ensuing interaction on the floor. Possibly to compensate for the “gap” between an unproblematic delivery and the prolonged interaction on

the floor, Interpreter A inserted some compensatory remarks, but made it sound like the speaker's "I" in the delivery.

\* \* \*

Here is the instance which occurred at the very end of the conference while the chairman was making his closing remarks (58):

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter A:)...Profesör B\* doğrusu bana söyleyecek pek bir söz bırakmadı ama ben de özellikle katılımcılara teşekkür etmek isterim. Sabırları için. Dilim sürçtü, sabırsızlık dedim ama sabır demek istemiştım. Eh, çok sabırlı sabırlı bize zamanımızı aşmamız bakımından tahammül gösterdiniz...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter A:)...Professor B\* did not really leave me much to say but I too would like to thank the participants. For their patience. That was a slip of the tongue, I said impatience but I had meant patience. Very patiently patiently you tolerated us for exceeding our time...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...Well uh, Mister B\* didn't leave me uh, anything more to say uh, but I want uh, to express, to bring into expression, specifically my thanks to the participants uh, for their impatience, for their ((inaudible remarks on the floor)) uh, uh, impatience in general because it has taken so much time with with our work because we have overgone ((further remarks from the audience like "We have patience")) yes, you were patient ((laughter)) we have overgone the limits of our time...*

[\*name of the person is removed]

In this instance, the organizer of the conference thanks the audience for their "impatience" instead of "patience". Possibly because the interpreter thinks this is an obvious slip of the tongue, she renders the word into Turkish as "sabır", which is "patience". While the interpreter chooses to correct the mistake in her delivery, the original mistake stirs up many amicable comments and smiles among those listening to the speaker on the floor. Participants, who are sitting in the front rows shout, "Patience, we are patient". The speaker does not understand why they say this and first repeats his remark ("uh, uh, impatience in general") and, when similar remarks continue, smiles and adds, "yes, you have patience", still without noticing his initial mistake. While all this interaction takes place on the floor, the users of SI have heard an unproblematic delivery because the interpreter corrects "impatience" to "patience" right at the start. Thus, the interaction following the initial mistake does not correlate

with the delivery. Perhaps to compensate for the “gap” between the corrected delivery and the mistake-induced interaction on the floor, Interpreter A inserts the remark, “That was a slip of the tongue,” and then adds, “I said impatience but I had meant patience,” to her delivery. Note that, although they are added by the interpreter, both remarks sound as if they were voiced by the speaker. While these remarks possibly indicate to the users of SI that a slip of the tongue is the reason for the interaction on the floor, they also seem rather odd, in that they refer to a slip of the tongue which never occurs in the delivery. Furthermore, the second remark (“I said impatience but I had meant patience”) creates the impression that the original speaker understands and corrects his mistake on the floor, even though the speaker never realizes his mistake despite many remarks from the audience.

\* \* \*

In contrast to Interpreter A, who seemed to blend into the speaker’s “I” when inserting her remarks about the original interaction, Interpreter B was more inclined to insert his remarks or comments about the original speaker/speech more explicitly.

For instance, when speakers made mistakes, but then realized and corrected them, Interpreter B reported, paraphrased or inserted brief explanatory remarks about these corrections. Doing this meant speaking about the speaker and tended to make explicit the “shift in the speaking subject” from the interpreter speaking *as* the speaker to the interpreter speaking *as* the interpreter (7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 20, 25).<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, when speakers made mistakes that they either did not notice, or did not comment, or when there was a problem of communication on the floor, Interpreter B did not hesitate to shift from the speaker’s “I” in the delivery to insert personal comments that indicated the presence of a mistake or problem in the original interaction (6, 43, cf. also 45 in “ambiguous or contradictory input”).

\* \* \*

Here is an example of how Interpreter B took over the speaker-position in the delivery to insert an explanatory remark, rather than rendering the correction of the speaker in the first person singular. Compared to a rendition in the first person, speaking about the correction of the speaker made the presence of a mistake on the floor more explicit and ascribed that mistake to the speaker (11):

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Peki şimdi şair ne diyor dil hakkında? Bin bindokuzyüzde eh. eh. düzeltiliyor kendisini konuşmacı binsekizyüzde, eh. son biçimi verilmiş bir parçada, Hölderlin dilin insan için bir iyilik olduğunu, ein Gut für den Menschen olduğunu söylüyor ama ne anlamdadır ki dil insan için iyiliktir, iyidir?...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...So now what does the poet say about language? In nine nineteen uh. uh. the speaker corrects herself in eighteen hundred, uh. in a fragment finalised then, Hölderlin says that language is a good for man, ein Gut für den Menschen, but in what sense is it a good for the people, why is it good?...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...What then does the poet say about language? In a fragment edited in nineteen hundred, eighteen hundred, excuse me, Hölderlin says that language is a good for man, ist ein Gut für den Menschen. But in what sense is the language a good for man?...

In this instance, the interpreter repeats the mistake of the original speaker and, soon after, faces a correction that the speaker undertakes in the original. Having interpreted the same section, the interpreter possibly feels the need to accommodate the correction. Note that, rather than rendering the apology and correction of the original speaker in the first person, Interpreter B opts to insert a remark about what the speaker does (“the speaker corrects herself”). This remark conveys what the speaker does to the users of SI, but it also goes beyond that, and distances the interpreter from the speaker, while also creating a more concrete link between the correction (and, hence, the initial mistake) and the original speaker.

\* \* \*

Here is another instance from the delivery of Interpreter B in which he takes over the “I” in the delivery explicitly and comments on a series of pronunciation mistakes by the speaker (6):

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Eh. batı düşüncesini yöneten eh. yöneliş, anlam, kendini PreSokratik, Sokrat öncesi düşüncede göstermiştir ve ortadan gör ortadan kalkmıştır hemen hemen kalkmıştır ama eh. kelimeyi söylemeye çalışıyor onun için bekliyoruz. İngilizce telaffuzunu bulamadı ama hala kaybolduğu halde ortadan eh. Batı düşüncesini yönlendirmeye devam etmektedir...



*My translation of the booth:*

*(Interpreter B:)...Uh. the orientation orienting Western thinking, sense, has shown itself in pre-Socratic, before-Socrates thinking, and van vanished, nearly vanished but uh. (the speaker\*) is trying to say the word that is why we are waiting. She could not find the English pronunciation but despite the fact that it is still vanished, it uh. continues to orient Western thinking...*

[\* the interpreter uses the subject deleted form to refer to the speaker in Turkish]

*Floor:*

*(Speaker:)...the sense which all orient which has oriented uh. Occidental thinking this essence has shown itself in a certain manner in the Presocratic thinking and then it has vanished or nearly vanished but it subsists it uh. continues to orient to or or orient oder\*? To orient, orienté\*\*? To orient?*

*((inaudible comments from the floor))*

*(Speake:) Yes, thank you, to to orientate Occidental thinking...*

[\*pronounced in German, \*\*pronounced in French]

As was quite often the case at this conference, the interpreter is faced with a speaker who has serious difficulties in expressing herself and who admits to not having used English for more than forty years. In this particular instance, the speaker cannot find the correct pronunciation of the verb “to orient”. She actually mispronounces the same word before (see line 1 of the floor transcript), but the interpreter understands the word and interprets it into Turkish (see Line 1 of the booth transcript). When the speaker tries to use the same word again, the interpreter does the same thing and renders the word correctly into Turkish. However, in this second time, the speaker on the floor seeks help from panelists to find the correct pronunciation of the word. In the fairly long interval during which the speaker mispronounces the word, inserts words in French and even German, and tries to imitate the correct word pronunciation with the help of other participants on the floor, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position and inserts a “comment”, which highlights the content of the prolonged overlapping interaction on the floor and indicates the cause of the interruption in the delivery. Note that the remarks of the interpreter (“the speaker is trying to say the word, that is why we are waiting. She could not find the English pronunciation”) are more than neutral descriptions of the situation because they also disclose the attitude of the interpreter with regard to yet another breakdown in the interaction, which is something that happened quite often during this conference.

### c. Overlapping/semi-verbal/inaudible interaction on the floor

“Shifts in the speaking subject” also occurred when there was overlapping, inaudible and/or semi-verbal interaction on the floor (6, 8, 16, 19, 20, 37, 45, 54, 56, 57, see also the next section on “problems of sound transmission”). Most of the time, overlapping speech came together with inaudible speech and/or semi-verbal interaction (i.e., interjections such as “huh?”, “wha?”, etc.). Whether alone or in combination, overlapping, inaudible and semi-verbal interactions seemed to challenge the implicit equation governing the operation of SI, which rested on the presence of a single speaker’s voice on the floor (re)presented by a single interpreter’s voice in the delivery. While overlapping speech challenged this equation by presenting more than one voice on the floor to be simultaneously (re)presented by a single voice in the delivery, semi-verbal (occasionally also non-verbal) interaction and inaudible speech deprived the interpreter of a meaningful length of speech to (re)present in the delivery (for an account of inaudible speeches due to the failure to use a microphone on the floor, see the next section on “problems of sound transmission”). Under such circumstances, Interpreter B was more inclined to assume the “I” in the delivery and usually either reported the speaker’s speech or inserted explanatory remarks about the interaction on the floor, whereas Interpreter A did not shift from the speaker’s “I” explicitly.

\* \* \*

Here is one such example where Interpreter B opted to report the speakers who talked overlappingly (19):

#### *Booth:*

*(Interpreter B:)...Mek zaman içinde mekan yani burda bence ilginç. Bilmiyorum cevabı verdim mi? Eh. bence mekanla zaman arasındaki bu i bu özel ilişki gerçekten çok aydınlatıcı diyor eh. Profesör B\*. Evet. Bence de aydınlatıcı yani mekan zamansallıktan bağımsız olarak ele alınamaz...*

#### *My translation of the booth:*

*(Interpreter B:)...Sp its a space in time that I think is very interesting here. I don't know if I've given the answer? Uh. I think this rel this special relationship between space and time is really very illuminating says Professor B\*. Yes. I also find it illuminating, that is, space cannot be taken up independent of temporality...*

[\*name of the person is removed]

#### *Floor:*

*(Speaker:)...It is a space in time. I find it very important and very interesting.*

*///Uh. I don't know if I uh. give an answer*

*(Participant:)* ///I agree, I hadn't thought of that particular relation between space and time. It's very illuminating=

*(Speaker:)=Yes, I find it very illuminating also. That means the space uh. first of all can not be considered out of the temporal, temporality....*

In this instance, there is overlapping speech and rapid turn-taking on the floor, with more than one speaker occupying the speaker-position at the same time. Possibly because more than one speaker needs to be represented in the delivery simultaneously, the interpreter shifts from the first person and turns to reported speech by embedding the utterance of one of the speakers under the performative predicate “de-” (“say”). While speaking in the speaker’s “I” does not allow for a differentiated representation of more than one speaker occupying the floor at the same time, reported speech seems to enable the interpreter to signal a change of speakers in the delivery. The insertion of names or referents (such as “...says Professor B.” or “...says the speaker”) helps to indicate who is being represented in the delivery at a given moment. Thus, by shifting to reported speech from the speaker’s “I”, the interpreter seems to ensure a “discursive” order in the delivery.

\* \* \*

In a few other instances when overlapping remarks also contained ambiguous or contradictory remarks, Interpreter B did not limit himself to reporting or paraphrasing the original speeches, but also inserted personal remarks that disclosed his displeasure with the interruptions in the flow of the interaction on the floor (see, for instance, 43, 45 and 56).

**d. Problems with the transmission of the interpreter’s and/or speaker’s voice** “Shifts in the speaking subject” also became evident when there were problems with sound transmission from the floor or the booth (1, 2, 21, 22, 23, 29, 30, 38, 39, 40, 44, 47, 48, 49). Such problems were quite frequent during this conference because portable microphones were not always available for some reason and, when they were available, participants still tried to speak “out loud” from where they sat. In such instances, both interpreters tended to take over the speaker-position in the delivery to announce the source of the interruptions. Although both interpreters took action, there were differences in the actions they took. While Interpreter A usually resorted to brief interjections such as “Microphone please,” or “The microphone is off” (1, 2, 47, 48, 49) and waited until she could hear again, Interpreter B made longer and more explicit remarks

such as, “Unfortunately we cannot interpret because the speaker speaking from the floor is not using a microphone,” or, “Because the comment made from the floor is not made into a microphone, we cannot interpret” (21, 22, 23, 38, 40). In three instances, Interpreter B also called upon the listeners to warn the speakers to use a microphone (22, 39, 44).

\* \* \*

Here is one of those moments when, faced with repetitive interventions on the floor without a microphone, Interpreter B called on his listeners to warn the speakers to use a microphone (44):

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Eh. noktayı tam anlamadım. Size sonra veririm. Böyle giderse konferansın çoğu çevrilmeden kalacak. İsterseniz uyarım. Eh. düşüncesiz, düşüncenin eksikliği...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Uh. I didn't understand the point completely. I'll give it to you later. If this goes on like this, most of this conference will remain uninterpreted. Warn them if you want to. uh. thoughtless, lack of thought...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:) There is two concept of understanding. I can understand something and I can forgive //something but of*

*(Participant:) //I didn't get the point and Eichmann=*

*=((inaudible remarks on the floor))*

*(Speaker:) And the difference between Eichmann and Heidegger uh.*

*(Speaker:) =there is no thoughtless in uh. in uh. in in in Heidegger maybe thoughtless...*

In this instance, the interpreter is cut off from the flow of communication on the floor because of overlapping remarks that are made without a microphone for the seventh time in a row (see excerpts 37–44 in the Appendix). Chaotic turn-taking and inaudible interventions from the floor render his task almost impossible and the interpreter responds by assuming the speaker-position in the delivery to establish direct contact with his listeners and to call them to take action (see also 22 and 39). In fact, this is not the first time Interpreter B does that. He has called his audience to warn the speakers to use microphones before, but his former calls have mostly gone unnoticed. Probably because of that, there seems to be a tone of despair, if not slight anger, in his warning (“If this goes on

like this most of the conference will remain uninterpreted, warn them if you want to”).

\* \* \*

Although most of the problems of sound transmission during the conference stemmed from the failure to use the microphone on the floor, towards the end of the second day there were also problems related to sound transmission from the booth when English-speaking panelists did not have headsets to listen to SI, and then could not find the correct channel to listen to the interpretation. Interpreter B, who happened to be interpreting at that moment, intervened to solve both of these problems.

\* \* \*

Here is the instance when Interpreter B took direct action to remedy the problems of sound transmission (29, 30):

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Now I'm going to speak in Turkish but you need headphones. You need headphones<sup>29</sup> (++) ((a pause of approximately 20 seconds in which the interpreter leaves the booth, fetches the technician and ensures the distribution of headsets to participants)) **Okay? Eh. şimdi** now the topic is very complex. Therefore I don't think I'm going I'll be able to express myself with one or two sentences but nonetheless I will uh. ask certain questions. Of course uh. I wasn't educated in philosophy. I just read it on my own. I'm a self-made man in philosophy but this is sometimes an advantage because when I when I'm confronted with certain concepts when I'm confronted with certain concepts uh. then I can ((interpreter knocks on the window of the booth)) Channel two, channel two, channel two. Can you find it? İki. Okay? ((to the Turkish speaker from the side of the booth:)) ampirike geri dönün ampirike<sup>30</sup> ((laughs)) so I come from a more empirical viewpoint because I don't have references to who said what in philosophy...*

**Floor:**

*(Recordings of the floor for this excerpt are not available on the tapes)*

In this instance, one of the Turkish participants announces that she will speak in Turkish during a discussion session. Since all of the questions and contributions have been made in English until that moment, none of the English-speaking panelists have headsets. Seeing the panelists look quizzically, the interpreter calls out “You need headphones” to the panelists. The proximity of the booth to the rostrum probably facilitates this kind of direct communication. With this intervention, the participant who is about to speak in Turkish realizes there is a problem and stops talking. Seeing that the technician is not

around, the interpreter leaves the booth and fetches the SI technician, who is standing outside the door, to bring headsets for the English-speakers. Once everyone is set, the interpreter signals the participant to continue (29). Soon after he starts interpreting, the interpreter interrupts the participant on the floor again because he sees that some of the English-speakers, who have just put on their headsets, are not following the delivery, but playing around with the buttons of the receiver. Possibly concluding that they are on the wrong channel, the interpreter knocks on the window of the booth to attract their attention and shows “two” with his fingers (30). He also shouts “Channel two, channel two. Can you find it? İki (i.e., “two” in Turkish). Okay?” and thereby enters into direct contact with the primary interlocutors. Once he has all these “potential customers” on the correct channel and ready to listen to him, he leans out from the side of the booth and tells the Turkish participant to repeat her remark starting from a certain point, saying “ampirike geri dönün ampirike” (“empirical, go back to empirical”). Note that in both 29 and 30, the interpreter not only establishes direct contact with his (potential) users, but also regulates the flow of communication and turn-taking on the floor.

\* \* \*

While Interpreter B usually took over the speaker-position in the delivery to call attention to and sometimes complain about the speeches that were made without a microphone and even took an active part in remedying problems related to sound transmission from the floor, Interpreter A either waited without interpreting until she could hear again or inserted very brief remarks that hinted at the problem (1, 2, 47, 48, 49). She did not take an active part in solving sound problems and did not call upon her listeners to take explicit action.

\* \* \*

Here is one of those instances when the failure of the speakers to talk into a microphone caused interruptions in the delivery of Interpreter A (47/48/49):

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)... **When you ask how to reconcile oneself with what happen** dünyada olanlarla ve dünyada olanlardan sorumlu olanlarla nasıl barışılacak yani bu bence tabii anlamın anlamanın bize mikrofon<sup>47</sup> **by questioning like she does in The Origin of Totalitarianism, she questions like** anlama tabii burada yardımcı olacaktır (+) mikrofon lütfen<sup>48</sup> (+) Zannedersem eh. affetmekle barışmak farklı iki şeylerdir. Affetmek bir insana yönelir yani eğer bir insan sizden onu affetmenizi istiyorsa onu affedersiniz ama barışmak, rekonsiliasyon bambaşka bir şeydir. Burda pardon yani affetme sözkonusu değildir. Özel bir kişiye yönelmiyor. Barışma mikrofon lütfen<sup>49</sup> (+) Bu dediğinizden emin değilim...

*My translation of the booth:*

(Interpreter A:)... **When you ask how to reconcile oneself with what happen** how is one to reconcile oneself with what happens in the world and those who are responsible from what happens in the world, that is, I think of course meaning understanding microphone<sup>47</sup> **by questioning like she does in the Origin of Totalitarianism, she questions like** understanding will certainly help us here. (+) microphone please<sup>48</sup> (+) I think uh. forgiving and reconciliation are two different things. Forgiving pertains to a person that is if someone asks you to forgive him you forgive but reconciliation is something completely different. Here it is not about pardon, that is, forgiving. It does not pertain to a particular person. Reconciliation microphone please<sup>49</sup> (+) I am not too sure about that what you said...

*Floor:*

(Speaker:)... when you ask uh. how to reconcile oneself with what happened in that world and with those people who who were responsible what happened. It's precisely by trying to understand what happened. Understanding is the way to reconcile oneself I think with with the world=

=((inaudible remarks from the floor))=

(Speaker:)=No but by questioning like she does in The Origin of Totalitarianism she she questions like with a hammer like Nietzsche ((laughs)) in all her works. Finally the answers come uh. and I think uh. to reconcile one oneself is not quite the same thing as forgive. To forgive is to forgive to somebody, to forgive to somebody who asked you to forgive him. If somebody asks didn't ask you to forgive, there is nobody to forgive but to reconcile oneself is is not the same. You you reconcile yourself with the world and you forgive to some uh. uh. *sin avec quel'un particulier\** with uh. somebody particular=

=((inaudible remarks from the floor))=

(Speaker:)=I'm not sure=

=((inaudible remarks))=

(Speaker:)=I'm not sure=

=((inaudible remarks))

[\* words pronounced in French by the speaker]

In these instances, the speaker on the floor has a microphone, but the participant who speaks from the audience does not have one. The interpreter responds by saying “microphone” (47). Since the problem continues, she then pauses and switches off her microphone. When the interpreter switches off her microphone, the channel that is reserved for the delivery automatically switches to the floor, so that when the speaker with the microphone starts talking, his voice

occupies the “delivery”. Naturally, when the speaker speaks into a microphone, the interpreter can hear him too. Hearing the speaker, Interpreter A switches on her microphone again and this interrupts the transmission of the speaker’s voice through the SI channel. Although she has not heard all of the preceding talks on the floor, Interpreter A starts her interpretation as soon as she can hear the speaker. Only a few words later, however, the participant from the floor intervenes without a microphone again. Once again, Interpreter A says “microphone please” and stops her delivery (48). When the speaker with the microphone starts speaking again, the interpreter starts interpreting as well. A few sentences later, the participant intervenes a third time and the interpreter again says “microphone please”, stops the delivery for some time and continues when she hears the speaker again. Note that this short excerpt points to three speaker-positions in the delivery, with the interpreter speaking “as” the speaker, the interpreter speaking “as” the interpreter, and the speaker speaking directly in the delivery.

#### e. Ambiguous or contradictory input in the original speech

“Shifts in the speaking subject” also became palpable when there were highly ambiguous or contradictory remarks on the floor. In this corpus, there were three such instances (31, 43, 45). In two of these instances, when there was overlapping exchange of contradictory terms on the floor, Interpreter B took over the speaker-position explicitly and commented on the situation (43, 45). On the other hand, in a similar instance, when there was a highly ambiguous, almost incomprehensible question from the floor, Interpreter A took over the floor implicitly and inserted a remark in the first person singular that tended to blend into the speaker’s “I” in the delivery.

\* \* \*

Here is the instance when Interpreter A took the floor implicitly (31):

#### *Booth:*

*(Interpreter A:)... We know that peoples also, nations also do make mistakes and because so they should not be turned into myths and maybe it is not on my part to say so uh. but I would like to say we should also open such windows so that we also understand also this dimension better. Thank you. Biz size çok teşekkür ederiz efendim. Hemen mi cevap vereyim? Tam soruyu tam ne yani kadar anladığımı well, I don't know whether or not I could understand your question. I really did not understand it. Quite fra well I'm afraid but I think that of course it's a good thing that we make such meetings and talk about pluralism and difference and...*



*My translation of the floor:*

(Participant:)...*Explaining in such philosophical meetings that peoples can often make mistakes, that they can develop negative features, that is, that they should not be assessed as if myths uh. objects of worship, perhaps with my humble, if I have contributed even minutely with my speech he here, I will be happy or else my unhappiness might be possible but should it not be necessary to assess new such openings, such windows? Thank you.*

(Chairman:) *Okay, thank you you very much. Would you like to respond or should we?=-*

(Speaker:)=*I don't know how fully I have understood the question but I think uh. the fact that such meetings are held are themselves and that we speak of the issue of difference, plurality uh. that is the speaker who asked the question right before uh. can themselves be an answer to this...*

*Floor:*

(Participant:)...*halkların da çoğu zaman yanlış yapabildiklerini, halkların da olumsuz ögeler geliştirdiklerini yani onların hani bir mit eh. tapınç ögesi mit olarak değerlendirilmemesi gerektiğini bu tür felsefi toplantılarda anlatmak belki acizane bur burda konuşmamla ufacak bir şey kattıysam mutlu olurum yoksa mutsuzluğum söz konusu olabilir ama böyle açılımları, böyle pencereleri yeniden değerlendirmek anlamak gerekmez mi? Teşekkür ederim.*

(Chairman:) *Okay, thank you very much. Would you like to respond or should we?=-*

(Speaker:)=*Tam soruyu ne kadar anladığımı bilmiyorum ama eh. böyle toplantıların yapılması başlı başına ve burda işte farklılık konusunun, çoğulluk konusunun konuşulması eh. yani az önceki soruyu soranın eh. yani başlı başına buna bir yanıt oluşturabileceğini düşünüyorum...*

In this instance, one of the Turkish participants asks a Turkish speaker, who has just delivered her paper in English, a highly ambiguous, almost incomprehensible question in Turkish. The interpreter interprets the question into English. Compared to the speaker's utterance, the delivery sounds more grammatical and coherent and one can see that the interpreter has put an effort into making sense out of an ambiguous input. While Interpreter A struggles with the interpretation of the participant, the speaker on the floor does not seem to understand the original question in Turkish either and says, "I don't know how fully I have understood the question". She then starts giving a fairly general answer. The interpreter, on the other hand, interprets this remark ("I don't know whether or not I could understand your question"), but then adds a further one ("I really did not understand it"), which accentuates the point made by the speaker about the participant's question. Note that this remark is made in the first person in the delivery and sounds like it is made by

the speaker. Thus, those listening to the speaker through SI get to hear a stronger response by the speaker compared to those who listen to the same speaker directly.

\* \* \*

In contrast to Interpreter A, Interpreter B tended to take over the speaker-position more explicitly to comment on the original interaction when there were ambiguous and contradictory remarks on the floor (43, 45).

\*\*\*

Here is one of the instances when Interpreter B could not hear what was spoken on the floor due to overlapping remarks that were made without a microphone (44, see also Section d), and then heard contradictory concepts lined up one after the other (45):

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Eh, noktayı tam anlamadım. Size sonra veririm. Böyle giderse konferansın çoğu çevrilmeden kalacak, isterseniz uyarın<sup>44</sup> eh. düşüncesiz düşünceyin eksikliği Fransızca Fir excés de pensée yani eh. fazla düşünce bu sefer de dendi ama niye deniyor bunlar tam ben anlamadım<sup>45</sup>. Heidegger tarafından çok fazla düşünme eh. Eichmann tarafından da çok az düşünme ge eh. yokluk aynı hataya götürüyor...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Uh. I didn't understand the point completely. I'll give it to you later. If this goes on like this, most of this conference will remain uninterpreted, warn them if you want to<sup>44</sup> uh. thoughtless lack of thinking, in French, excés de pensée, that is this time they say excessive thinking but I don't really understand why they say these<sup>45</sup>. Too much thinking on the side of Heidegger uh. and lack of thinking, absence, on the side of Eichmann leads to the same error...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...I didn't get the point and Eichmann=*

*=///((inaudible remarks from the floor))*

*(Speaker:) //and the difference between Eichmann and Heidegger uh.*

*(Speaker:)=there is no thoughtless in uh. in uh. in in Heidegger but maybe thoughtless, absence de pensée=*

*=((inaudible remarks from the floor))=*

*(Speaker:)=excés de pensée, excés, oui, excéssif=*

*=((the floor turns to French and the remarks are inaudible))*

*(Speaker:) Too much thinking from one side, the side of Heidegger and absence you used absence or lack lack lack of thinking from the side of Eichmann leads to the same error...*

The transcripts show that the interpreter is cut off from the flow of communication on the floor because of overlapping remarks made without a microphone. Chaotic turn-taking, inaudible interventions and conceptually loaded utterances seem to make his task much more difficult and the interpreter responds by assuming the speaker-position in the delivery to call his listeners to action (44, cf. also 22 and 39). Since his former calls for help have mostly gone unnoticed, there seems to be a tone of despair in this comment (“If this goes on like this most of the conference will remain uninterpreted, warn them if you want to”). Right after this call for help, the interpreter is cut off from the discussion once again because of further remarks made without a microphone. As he tries to sustain the delivery amidst overlapping comments, he first hears “thoughtless” and then “absence de pensée” followed by “excès de pensée” in French. Faced with chaotic turn-taking, inaudible remarks and contradictory terms lined up in French and English, the interpreter suddenly takes over the “I” in the delivery and makes a “charged” comment (“lack of thinking [...] this time they say excessive thinking but I don’t really understand why they say these”), which no longer aims to call attention to overlapping and inaudible remarks only, but also reflects the displeasure of the interpreter with the interaction on the floor (cf. also 43). Note that with the sudden shift of the speaker-positions, the interpreter transforms the delivery from a site where he speaks “as” the speaker to a site where he speaks “about” the speaker and the interaction on the floor.

#### **f. Language/culture-specific discussions or difficult word connotations in one conference language on the floor**

In the present corpus, “shifts in the speaking subject” also occurred when there were references to or discussions on language or culture-specific concepts in one of the conference languages, or when the original utterance contained connotations difficult to render in the other language (28, 46, 56, 57). Interestingly enough, it was always Interpreter B who shifted from using the speaker’s “I” in the delivery under these circumstances. For instance, when the speaker referred to the American filmmaker Cassavetes, Interpreter B inserted an explanatory remark for his listeners about who Cassavetes was (28). In another instance, when the word “reconciliation” had connotations which were difficult to interpret into Turkish, Interpreter B inserted a remark about the difficulty of rendering the connotations of the word (46). Furthermore, to-

wards the very end of the conference, when two speakers on the floor became involved in lengthy discussions with many overlapping remarks on the etymological roots of a word and then on how a book title should have been translated into Turkish, Interpreter B took over the speaker-position in the delivery explicitly and inserted his comments on the nature of the interaction on the floor (56, cf. also 57).

\* \* \*

Here is the instance when a Turkish speaker and a Turkish participant who had just finished discussing the etymology of the word “emek” in Turkish with numerous overlapping remarks came immediately involved in another discussion on how Arendt’s book *The Human Condition* should have been translated into Turkish (56):

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...In the Uygur Turkish uh. it’s used exactly in the same manner as Arendt says uh. as a connotation of pain. I uh. accept this as a contribution because I had not been able to reach the etymology of the word labor emek uh. in Turkish. But you used the same thing on Arendt. Uh. you it was translated as İnsanlık Durumu uh. The Human Condition but I think it should be İnsanlık Koşulu. This is uh. a semantic or morphological well lexical uh. debate in Turkish so I don’t think this would interest our foreign guests. Koşul means condition while durum means uh. situation. Uh. so S\* Hanım says koşul is better for condition in Turkish. **It’s not true** this is not do eh. eh. bu doğru değil.*

[\*name of the person is removed. “Hanım” means Ms. in Turkish. Thus, the interpreter is referring to “Ms. S\*”]

**My translation of the floor:**

*(Participant 1:)... In Uygur Turkish its used in exactly the same meaning as Arendt says. I’m saying this so that it may be a contribution. Thank you.*

*(Speaker:) Thank you very much indeed. This is rea I take this as a contribution. Uh. frankly I could not access its etymology in Turkish=*

*(Participant 1:)=Uh. yes///I had the same difficulty and as a contribution*

*(Speaker:) //But, by the way, considering that there are guests interested in Arendt, you’ve used the same thing. Uh. it was translated as İnsanlık Durumu uh. uh. The Human Condition but I uh. propose that we accept it as uh. İnsanlık Koşulu. If this can be ac accepted because each situation uh. each condition refers to a condition but not each uh. situation constitutes a condition. So its more appropriate to accept it as condition. This is the difference between situation\* and condition\* in English.*

*(Participant 1:) //Yes, okay.*

(Speaker:) //According to me=

(Participant 1:)=Okay

(Participant 2:) It's not true...

[\* words pronounced in English by the speaker]

**Floor:**

(Participant 1:)... *Uygur Türkçesinden karşılaştırdığım zaman iki terimin aynı olduğunu ve Uygur Türkçesinde tam da Arendt'in söylediği manada kullanıldığını gördüm. Bu belki bir katkı olabilir diye zikrediyorum. Teşekkür ederim.*

(Speaker:) *Gerçekten çok teşekkürler. Bu ger bir katkı olarak kabul ediyorum. Eh. etimolojisine ben Türkçede doğrusu ulaşamamıştım çünkü=*

(Participant 1:)=E evet // yani o sıkıntıyı ben ya adım, bir katkı olsun diye.

(Speaker:) //Yalnız bu arada Arendt'le ilgilenen dinleyicilerimiz olduğunu da düşünerek, siz de aynı şeyi kullanıyorsunuz. *Eh. İnsanlık Durumu olarak çevrildi eh. eh. The Human Condition ancak bunun eh. İnsanlık Koşulu olarak eh. kabul edilmesini ben öneriyorum. Burada ka kabul edilebilirse çünkü durum, eh. her koşul eh. bir duruma işaret eder ancak her eh. durum bir koşul oluşturmaz. Dolayısıyla bunun koşul olarak eh. kabul edilmesi daha uygun. İngilizcedeki bu eh. situation, condition ayrıdır.*

(Participant 1:) //Evet. Okay

(Speaker:) //Bana göre=

(Participant 1:)=Okay.

(Participant 2:) It's not true...

When this discussion is taking place, the meeting is well beyond its scheduled finishing time. The speaker and a participant are discussing the etymological roots of different words and concepts in Turkish. They first discuss the roots of the word “emgek” by referring to its meanings in contemporary and Uygur Turkish, and the interpreter interprets the discussion into English, although it is highly language-specific. Right after that, the same interlocutors become involved in a discussion on how the title of Arendt's book *The Human Condition* should have been translated into Turkish. The participant criticizes the speaker for using the word “durum”, says “koşul” would have been more appropriate, and then tries to justify his point by focusing on the connotations of these words in Turkish. In response, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position explicitly and inserts a comment on the content of the discussion (“This is a semantic or morphological well lexical debate in Turkish”). He then

goes on to insert another remark (“...so I don’t think it would interest our foreign guests”), that discloses his (rather negative) views of the content of the discussion and perhaps also of the delay in the finishing time of the conference. After this comment, the interpreter briefly reports the remarks on the floor by embedding the words of one of the speakers under the performative predicate “de-”, which is “say” in English (“Uh. so S. Hanım *says* koşul is better for condition in Turkish”). Reported speech seems to enable the interpreter to indicate which speaker he is voicing amidst the overlapping remarks on the floor. Once this overlapping and language-specific discussion stops and another participant takes the floor, the interpreter resumes the “I” of the speaker and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery. Thus, in this excerpt, the position of the interpreter shifts from the one “voicing” the original speakers to the one “commenting” on the nature of the interaction on the floor and then to the one “reporting” the original speakers. Notice that right after this remark, the interpreter very briefly mixes up his languages and interprets an English question into English, which is perhaps a sign of fatigue after an intensive 2-day conference on philosophy. He quickly realizes his mistake and shifts back to Turkish.

#### **g. References in a non-conference language on the floor**

“Shifts in the speaking subject” in the delivery also became palpable when there were references in a non-conference language on the floor. The working languages of the conference were declared as English and Turkish (except for one speech in French on the second day). The interpreters for English-Turkish were recruited for their knowledge of English and Turkish only and at no point in the recruitment process were they notified that active or passive knowledge of German would be required or preferred. Despite this fact, many speakers made repeated references to German because of the topic of the conference.

For Interpreter A, who also had active German, the references in German did not create a problem. In fact, in the interview, Interpreter A mentioned that she actually inserted German terms on her own to make the delivery more coherent, even when speakers did not use them (see Section 3.3.3.1).

For Interpreter B, who had passive French, on the other hand, the quotations in German seemed to pose a considerable problem. Faced with numerous references to German, Interpreter B put an effort into remaining “on the air” by repeating many of these quotations even when this was clearly not an easy task (see, for instance, excerpt 3). However, some of the quotations in German were possibly too long or too complicated for him to repeat. In such instances,

Interpreter B took over the speaker-position to either report, paraphrase and insert explanatory remarks (4, 5, 12, 18, 26) or to comment on the original interaction (17).

\* \* \*

Here is an example of two consecutive instances when Interpreter B faced repetitive quotations in German (17/18):

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Burada sorum biraz kışkırtıcı hale gelecek. Eh. Heidegger'in eh. eh. Almanya ve Rhein dersinde, Hölderlin eh. den bir şiir daha var. Hölderlin diyor ki maalesef Almanca çeviremeyeceğim<sup>17</sup> yani diyor biz yorumlanması mümkün olmayan bir sembolüz diyor Hölderlin...((12 seconds of speech removed))...Bunu Heidegger konusunda kendi yorumunuz, özellikle, Mitsein, yani iletişim sorusuyla nasıl ilişkilendirirsiniz? Şimdi eh. Almanca olarak Hölderlin'i yeniden okudu<sup>18</sup>. Biz eh. imiz ama anlamı olmayan bir im. Çok zor bir soru...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...My question is going to become a little provocative here. Uh. there is another poem from Hölderlin in Heidegger's course on Germany and Rhein. Hölderlin says unfortunately it's in German, I cannot interpret it<sup>17</sup> so he says we are a symbol without the possibility of interpretation...((12 seconds of speech removed))...How do you associate this with your interpretation of Heidegger, especially Mitsein, that is, communication? Now uh. (the speaker\*) read Hölderlin again in German<sup>18</sup>. We are uh. a sign but a sign without meaning. That is a difficult question...

[\*the interpreter refers to the speaker with subject deletion]

**Floor:**

(Participant:)...here's where here is where my question becomes a little bit provocative. Uh. I think it's in Germanien Unser Heim in Heidegger's course on that in which he cites another verse from Hölderlin which is one of my very favorite of all of Hölderlin's verses where he says Ein Zeichen sind wir deutungslos<sup>17</sup> in other words we are a symbol without possibility of interpretation...((15 seconds of speech removed))...How would you uh. draw that particular verse into your own interpretation of Heidegger and the problem of communication, problem of Mitsein, would be my question. It's a difficult question but uh.=

(Speaker:)=Yes he says Ein Zeichen sind wir deutungslos und haben fast die Sprache verloren<sup>18</sup> he contin he says in another hymn, Hölderlin, we are a sign but without signification and we nearly lost the language...

In this instance, Interpreter B, who faces another long quotation in German, assumes the speaker-position in the delivery and explicates that there is a quotation in German which he cannot interpret (“Unfortunately it’s in German, I cannot interpret it”). While the speaker on the floor seems to have been the “speaking subject” in the delivery until that moment, this brief but striking interjection places the interpreter in the speaker-position. This interjection not only seems to fill in a potential gap in the delivery by enabling the interpreter to say something about the nature of the interaction on the floor, but it also explicates the cause of the interruption in the “normal” flow of the delivery (“...it’s in German...”). Furthermore, it highlights the interpreter’s personal position vis-à-vis the original remark (“Unfortunately...I cannot interpret it”). Once the floor returns to English, the interpreter resumes the speaker’s “I” and places the speaker back in the speaker-position in the delivery (17). Soon after, the speaker starts citing the full verse by Hölderlin in German (“Ein Zeichen sind wir deutungslos und haben fast die Sprache verloren”). This quotation is probably too long for the interpreter to repeat. By inserting another explanatory remark (“She read Hölderlin again in German”), the interpreter seems to give an account of the original speech, which he is probably unable to render or repeat while using the speaker’s “I” (18).

#### **h. Accusations of misinterpretation from the floor**

The most striking “shifts in the speaking subject” during this conference took place when two instances of miscommunication between one speaker and two different participants were attributed to misinterpretation (52, 53). In the present corpus, these two instances took place consecutively during the discussion on the same speech when the conference was already running late. In the first of these instances, one Turkish participant asked a Turkish speaker who had delivered her paper in English, whether she actually wanted to bring in the notion of “reincarnation” with the concept of “second life” in Hannah Arendt. This question came as a major surprise to the speaker, who responded by saying that she was talking about “second birth” in Arendt and had no intention of bringing in the concept of “reincarnation”. However, when the participant insisted that the speaker had used the word “second life” in her speech, the speaker and the participant agreed that the misunderstanding could be because of “mistranslation” (52). Right after this first accusation, another Turkish participant asked the same speaker — again in Turkish — whether she had implied that freedom of thought could be prohibited. This time, the speaker became completely perplexed and expressed her surprise at how the audience



could draw such conclusions from her speech. Once again, the two parties ended up blaming the SI as the cause of the misunderstanding (53). In both of these instances, Interpreter B took over the floor explicitly and inserted his comments about the accusation. Interestingly enough, these were also the only instances in the present corpus where the interpreters clearly distanced themselves from the speakers in the delivery by referring to themselves in the third person as the “the translators”.

\* \* \*

Here are the shortened transcripts of the floor and booth recordings for these consecutive instances (52/53):

### **Booth**

(52) (Interpreter B:)...Now a moment ago, uh, you talked about a second life. I think so. Perhaps you talked about reincarnation here. Yes please talk about, will you please talk about this? This is not the second life. I I said the second birth. You used the word second life. This is not true. The translators very clearly said second birth. This is misconception, misperception. A Arendts talks about two births. The first one is physiological birth. That's the first birth. The second birth, the second birth is uh, is our birth into uh, into human relationship...

((5 minutes of speech removed))

(53) (Interpreter B:)...I suppose I wasn't able to express myself very well. Because I don't understand how you can draw these conclusions from my presentation. But I did not say, let me correct something, I did not say politics and philosophy are the same thing. Uh, I said they are the sa two sides of the same coin. These, when you, well think of a coin that turns around its edge when you throw it on the floor and you see one side at a certain moment and then the other side at the other moment. Unfortunately this can't be translated. The translation may be wrong. Of course it is always the fault of the translator. Yes! I did use expressly the word madalyonun iki yüzü which means the two sides of the coin in Turkish. Oh my God! ((Laughter in the background. Some barely audible talk in English (see the transcript of the 'floor')). The conference interaction breaks for about one minute)).

### **My translation of the floor:**

(52) (Participant 1:)..Yes, in your speech, a moment ago, you mentioned about second life. I think. You probably wanted to bring in reincarnation. Yes, this please, I would like to request=

(Speaker:)=Uh, I did not say second life but second birth maybe there was a mis uh.=

(Participant 1:)=You used the expression second life that's what I'm referring to. You used the expression, you said second life=

=((barely audible remarks from the speaker who seems to tell the English-speaking chairman that she will answer in Turkish))

(Chairman:) Yes.

(Participant 1:) That's how the translation came probably.

(Speaker:) That is probably how the translation came. Uh. I wanted to say what ((English-speaking panelists suddenly start smiling and giggling)) Arendt calls second birth. Arendt separates birth into two. The first one is our physiological birth, maybe our birth from our mothers. The second birth, this is our first birth, the second birth is uh. ((to the English-speaking chairman who is still smiling:)) Am I saying wrong?\* ((headshakes from the smiling panelists)) Okay\*. Uh. uh. our second birth is uh. is our uh. birth among the humans....

((5 minutes of speech removed))

(53) (Speaker:)...I probably uh. did not express it well enough because I don't really understand how such conclusions can be drawn from my speech but uh. I did not say politics and philosophy are the same. First I want to correct that. I said politics and philosophy are uh. more like the uh. the two sides of a uh. of a coin. Uh. they are in constant, I am actually reminded of the image of a coin which continuously turns around itself when you throw it to the floor. You see the one side at a certain moment and the other side at another moment. Uh. and=

(Participant 2 – (barely audible:))=In the translation there is no such distinction. Just so that you know.

(Speaker:) The translation may be wrong uh. as the owner of that text I'm telling you the real translation. ((Long laughter among those listening to the English interpretation. One English speaker in the panel says "Poor translators". Some English-speaking panelists start talking to their Turkish colleagues and one of them tells the names of the interpreters and adds in Turkish: "Türkiye'de bulabileceğimiz en iyi çevirmenler" ("The best translators we can find in Turkey"). Another Turkish panelist replies, "Özellikle bu konuda" ("Especially on this topic"). The interaction on the floor breaks for about one minute)).

[\* "Am I saying wrong? Okay" is said in English by the speaker]

### Floor

(52) (Participant 1:)...Evet demin konuşmanızda bir ikinci yaşamdan bahsettiniz. Sanyorum. Bununla bir reenkarnasyonu herhalde devreye almak istediniz. Evet, bu lütfen rica edeceğim.

(Speaker:) Eh bu eh. ikinci ya am değil ikinci doğum dedim belki yanlış eh.=

(Participant 1:)= İkinci yaşam tabirini kullandınız da o bakımdan konuşuyorum. O tabiri kullandınız, ikinci yaşam dediniz=

=((barely audible remarks from the speaker who seems to tell the English-speaking chairman that she will answer in Turkish))

(Chairman:) Yes.

(Participant 1:) Çeviri öyle geldi herhalde.

(Speaker:) Çeviri herhalde öyle geldi. Eh. şunu söylemek ((English-speaking panelists suddenly start smiling and giggling)) ikinci doğum dediği Arendt'ın Arendt doğumu ikiye ayırır. Bunlardan iki bizim biyolojik doğumumuzdur, annemizden belki doğumumuzdur. İkinci doğumumuz ise, bir birinci doğumumuz budur, ikinci doğumumuz ise eh. ((to the English-speaking chairman who is still smiling:)) Am I saying wrong? ((headshakes from the smiling panelists)) Okay. Eh. eh. ikinci doğumumuz ise eh. bizim eh. insanlar arasındaki doğumumuzdur...

((5 minutes of speech removed))

(53) (Speaker:)...Herhalde eh. ben eh. yeterince iyi ifade edemedim çünkü ben benim konuşmalarından nasıl bu sonuç çıktığını tam olarak anıyamıyorum eh. ama eh. politika ve felsefe aynı demedim. İlkini, onu düzeltmek istiyorum. Felsefe ve politika eh. bir paranın, bir bozuk paranın iki yüzü gibi eh. dedim daha çok. Eh. bunlar sürekli, bunu daha çok ben eh. yere attığımızda sürekli etrafında dönen bir para imgesini hatırlatıyor bana daha çok. Kimi zaman bir tarafını kimi zaman diğer tarafını görüyorsunuz. Eh. ve=

(Participant 2–(barely audible:))=Tercümede bu ayrım yok. Bunu bilesiniz.

(Speaker:) Eh. çeviri yanlış olabilir çü eh. ben size o tekstin sahibi olarak esas çeviriyi söylüyorum. ((Long and lively laughter among those listening to the English interpretation. One English speaker in the panel says “Poor translators”. Some English-speaking panelists start talking to their Turkish colleagues. Then Turkish panelists start talking between themselves and one of them tells the names of the interpreters to her friend and adds in Turkish: “Türkiye’de bulabileceğimiz en iyi çevirmenler” (“The best translators we can find in Turkey”). Another Turkish panelist replies, “Özellikle bu konuda” (“Especially on this topic”). The interaction on the floor breaks for about one minute)).

In 52, one Turkish participant asks a Turkish speaker, who has just delivered her paper in English, whether she actually wanted to bring in the notion of “reincarnation” with the concept of “second life” in her speech. This question comes as a major surprise to the speaker who responds by saying that she was talking about “second birth” in Arendt and had no intention of bringing in the concept of “reincarnation”. However, when the participant insists that the speaker has used the word “second life” in her speech, the speaker and the participant agree that the misunderstanding could be because of SI (“that is probably how the translation came”). As soon as Interpreter B hears this accusation on the floor, he assumes the speaker-position in the delivery and, without interpreting the accusation, relegates the speakers on the floor from the position of the ones speaking to the ones spoken of. It is quite striking to note that, for the first time in this corpus, the interpreter refers to himself and his colleague as “the translators” rather than in the first person.<sup>51</sup> The fact that

the interpreter does this at this particular instance when he *reacts* to the speaker is probably telling. Perhaps he does this to avoid the risk of being confused with the original speaker in the delivery because using the third person clearly differentiates the interpreter from the speaker's "I".

As he takes over the speaker-position explicitly, the interpreter, who indeed never uses the word "second life" in his interpretation of the speaker, not only affirms that there was no mistake in the delivery to start with ("The translators very clearly said second birth"), but also re-directs the accusation to the primary interlocutors ("this is misconception, misperception"). These comments by the interpreter engender empathic smiles and comments among those listening to the English interpretation, including the chairperson and some other panelists. The speaker who is, in the meantime, dethroned from the speaker-position in the delivery, does not understand why the panelists suddenly start smiling and talking to each other. Thinking it might be because of something she has just said, she stops talking to the participant on the floor, turns to the English-speaking panelists, who are smiling, and asks in English, "Am I saying wrong?". When the chairperson smilingly shakes his head, she says, "Okay" and goes on with her speech in Turkish, though still puzzled by the situation (52).

Right after this first incident, another Turkish speaker takes the floor to ask the same Turkish speaker another question (53). His question is vague and poorly formulated grammatically, with many incomplete sentences and incoherent use of tenses. Though vague, the participant seems to be asking a rather provocative question on whether the speaker is arguing that freedom of thought can be prohibited according to Heidegger. Completely puzzled by what she probably sees as radical interpretations of her presentation, the speaker reacts defensively, saying that she does not understand how such conclusions can be drawn from her paper. As she tries to explain that she sees politics and philosophy as two sides of a coin, the participant intervenes and says, "In the translation, there was no such distinction". The speaker agrees with the possibility of a wrong interpretation and says, "The translation may be wrong. As the owner of the text, I'm telling you the real translation". Hearing yet another accusation, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position in the delivery and starts defending himself. His sarcastic remark ("Of course it's always the fault of the translator. Oh my God!") evokes long laughter and comments among the English speakers listening to him. This remark also transforms the whole flow of communication in the room because those who listen to the SI start talking among themselves. The English-speaking panelists

start relating the comments of the interpreter to the Turkish panelists who respond by saying that these interpreters are the best ones in the field. The speaker on the floor also stops talking because none of the English-speakers in the room and certainly none of the panelists on the rostrum are listening to her any longer.

Note that this intervention not only changes the flow of communication, but also transforms the position of the speakers and interpreters. All of a sudden, the interpreter who is supposed to be *interpreting* the floor, starts *regulating* the flow of the communication, and the delivery, which is supposed to be a site where the speaker should be the “speaking-subject”, becomes a site where the speaker is spoken of. By referring to himself and his colleague as “the translators” in his intervention, Interpreter B reveals that the interpreters are very aware of the multiplicity of speaker-positions represented in the delivery and deliberately distance themselves from the speakers when they feel the need for it.

Three final observations regarding these instances are that, first of all, the two participants who ask the questions of the speaker also happen to be my respondents in the user interviews. During the interviews, the lady who asks the question on “reincarnation” mentions being a member of a spiritual community, while the gentleman who asks the question on the “freedom of thought” calls himself a “political activist” (see Section 3.3.4). Looking at their backgrounds and current interests, the way they “interpret” the original speech does not look like a coincidence. Somehow, the member of the spiritual community does not ask the question on freedom of thought and the political activist does not enquire about reincarnation. Thus, the participants seem to understand the original speech in line with their backgrounds and interests. Yet, when the speaker rejects their interpretation, they all seek to save face by blaming the simultaneous interpretation.

Furthermore, the final remark of the speaker to the participant (“the translation may be wrong, as the owner of the text, I’m telling you the real translation”), clearly highlights that even at a conference on philosophy where the speaker herself explores how “agents disclose their identity through speech”, the same speaker does not hesitate to claim the sole ownership of her text and its “real” translation. Apparently, “disclosing one’s identity through speech” is seen as a prerogative of “original” speakers and not their interpreters.

Last but not least, it is worth noting that about five minutes later, as the conference comes to an end, the English-speaking chairman thanks the interpreters by underlining the fact that they had such a difficult job to do that

communication could have been impossible had it not been for the interpreters. Everyone applauds them. Thus, the visibility they attract in 52 and 53 does not seem to work against the interpreters in this conference. On the contrary, it looks like it might have fostered more appreciation for and acknowledgement of their task although, of course, it is not possible to really know what individual participants (especially the final speaker, who was completely excluded from the delivery) thought about SI at the conference.

#### 4.5.2 Last 25 minutes of the conference interaction

The categorical analysis of the “shifts in the speaking subject” in the previous section may have given an idea of the kind of context(s) that invoke and involve the “shifts in the speaking subject” in the present corpus. However, such a categorical presentation of the shifts from the use of the speaker’s “I” in the delivery also runs the risk of isolating the specific instances from the general flow of interaction and gives a rather fragmented view of SI behavior. To highlight how some of the shifts mentioned in the previous section are positioned within the general flow of interaction, this section presents the complete transcripts of the last 25 minutes of the conference. The transcripts start from the point where a Turkish participant asks a question on “reincarnation” to a speaker who has just talked about “second birth” in Hannah Arendt’s philosophical writings and include 8 shifts from the use of the speaker’s “I” in the delivery. The transcripts of the booth recordings are presented in the pages on the left and the transcripts of the floor recordings are presented in the pages on the right. The instances that point to a “shift in the speaking subject” are underlined and enumerated. The translation of the underlined part, which is in Turkish (either the floor or the booth), is presented as a footnote. Readers who are interested in reading my analyses of the underlined parts indicating a “shift in the speaking subject” can refer to the Appendix.

## Transcripts of the Last 25 Minutes of the Conference

### Booth

**Interpreter B:** ... I'm going to touch upon your presentation and I'll ask you certain questions. I uh. consider philosophy to be thinking of a certain kind. Thinking is a brainstorm and this brainstorm takes a person to truth. These are dimensions and stages you can not reach truth immediately. From the micro level to the macro level uh. a person uh. reaches different stages and opens their wing towards the unknown. Now when we come to the question of 'who' I never accept philosophers one by one by their names. I take them as a source to I I connect them to Descartes as a source. I think therefore I am, this is the whole truth. { Now a moment ago, uh. you talked about a second life. I think so. Perhaps you talked about reincarnation here. Yes please talk about, will you please talk about this? This is not the second life. I I said the second birth. You used the word second life. This is not true. The translators very clearly said second birth. This is misconception, misperception. A Arendts talks about two births. The first one is physiological birth. That's the first birth. The second birth }<sup>52</sup> the second birth is uh. is our birth into uh. into human relationship.

---

### *My translation of the floor:*

*(Participant 1:)...In your speech, a moment ago, you mentioned about second life, I think. You probably wanted to bring in reincarnation. Yes, this please, I would like to request=*

*(Speaker:)=Uh. I did not say second life but second birth maybe there was a mis uh.=*

*(Participant 1:)=You used the expression second life that's what I'm referring to. You used the expression, you said second life=*

*=((barely audible remarks from the speaker who seems to tell the English-speaking chairman that she will answer in Turkish))*

*(Chairman:)=Yes.*

*(Participant 1:)=That's how the translation came probably.*

*(Speaker:)=That is probably how the translation came. Uh. I wanted to say what ((English-speaking panelists suddenly start smiling and giggling)) Arendt calls second birth. Arendt separates birth into two. The first one is our physiological birth, maybe our birth from our mothers. The second birth, this is our first birth, the second birth is uh. ((to the English-speaking chairman who is still smiling:)) Am I saying wrong? ((headshakes from the smiling panelists)) Okay.*

*(Speaker:)=Uh. uh. our second birth is...*

## Floor

(Participant 1:)... Sizin konuşmanıza değineceğim, sizden bazı sorular rica edeceğim. Şöyle ki, ben felsefeyi bir düşünce olarak, tabii hepimiz, bunu alıyoruz ve düşünce bir beyin jimnastiğidir. Bir beyin fırtınası yaratır. Bu beyin fırtınası da insanı hakikate götürür. Bunlar boyutlardır, kademelerdir, birdenbire hakikate ulaşamaz. Mikrodan başlayarak makroya kadar insan kademe kademe bilinç aşamalarını yaparak bilinmeyen ufuklara kanatlarını açar. Böyle bir programın içindeyiz insan olarak. ‘Kim’ sorusuna gelince ben bütün filozofları isim olarak tek tek asla kabul etmiyorum, onları bir bütün olarak kabul ediyorum. Onları kaynak olarak ben Descartes’a bağlarım. Düşünüyorum o halde varım, bütün hakikat burda. { Evet demin konuşmanızda bir ikinci yaşamdan bahsettiniz. Sanıyorum. Bununla bir reenkarnasyonu herhalde devreye almak istediniz. Evet, bu lütfen rica edeceğim= (Speaker:)=Ee bu eh. ikinci yaşam değil ikinci doğum dedim belki yanlış eh.= (Participant 1:)= İkinci yaşam tabirini kullandınız da o bakımdan konuşuyorum. O tabiri kullandınız, ikinci yaşam dediniz==(barely audible remarks from the speaker who seems to tell the English-speaking chairman that she will answer in Turkish)) (Chairman:) Yes. (Participant 1:) Çeviri öyle geldi herhalde. (Speaker:) Çeviri herhalde öyle geldi. Eh. şunu söylemek ((English-speaking panelists suddenly start smiling and giggling)) ikinci doğum dediği Arendt’in Arendt doğumu ikiye ayırır. Bunlardan ilki bizim biyolojik doğumumuzdur, annemizden belki doğumumuzdur. İkinci doğumumuz ise, bir birinci doğumumuz budur, ikinci doğumumuz ise eh. ((to the English-speaking chairman who is still smiling:)) Am I saying wrong? ((headshakes from the still smiling panelists:)) Okay. (Speaker 1:) Eh. eh. ikinci doğumumuz ise }<sup>52</sup> eh. bizim eh. insanlar arasındaki doğumumuzdur belki bir anlamda eh. buradaki konuşmalarımızda karşı karşıya gelişimizdir=



## Booth

Perhaps the confrontation that uh. face to face we have here in talking. Perhaps this is matured in politics or rebirth in the public realm, there is no other explanation. One is not talking about reincarn reincarnation here. Of course philosophy brings us to this uh. frontier in our life world, to go beyond this is to go beyond frontiers. So you say let us remain here, then let us remain here. Thank you. (+) **Tekrar aynı konuya da ısrarlıyım** Yes, I insist on the same topic. I insist on the same topic. Now I'm quoting you. Between between philosophy and politics, I don't see a distinction. This is what I understood. Now here, uh. passionate ideologies can dive into politics. But philosophy is more cautious and its frontiers are thicker. Is this what you wanted to say? Political philosophy for instance there is uh. this philosophy of science but we consider politics to be science. Are you talking about political philosophy? And connected to this, I don't know how I can introduce here, this is very difficult but I'll be try to be courageous enough. Now let's see for instance uh. thought, action and speech. If I understand Heidegger, if I don't misunderstand him, Heidegger se sets up very converging relations. Then freedom of thought can be banned. There can be prohibitions with respect to the freedom of expression, tho thought. Because uh. in action, this is universal. In action there are uh. constraints, limits on the basis of laws. In this uh. situation then there is the information society, a rationale brought by the information society which means that we can this is a matter open for debate. { This is not very certain but but, according to these theses, thought can not, may not be free. Thank you. I suppose I wasn't able to express myself very well. Because I don't understand how you can draw these conclusions from my presentation. But I did not say, let me correct something, I did not say politics and philosophy are the same thing. Uh. I said they are the sa two sides of the same coin. These, when you, well think of a coin that turns around its edge

## Floor

(Participant 1:) E gayet tabii, anlıyorum=

(Speaker:)=ve bu tabii tam olarak belki, A Arendt bunu politik eylem içerisinde kişinin yeniden doğuşu ya da kamu alanında yeniden doğuşu olarak adlandırıyor. Bunun eh. başka bir eh. açıklaması yok herhangi bir başka reenkarnasyon ya da başka spiri spirtülistik bir şeyi bir açıklaması yok=

(Participant 1:)=///Anlıyorum, anlıyorum.

(Speaker:) ///Açıklaması yok.

(Participant 1:) Tabii felsefe zaten dünya yaşamımızda bizi bu sınıra kadar getirir bundan ötesini aşmak biraz sınırları aşmaktır. Onun için evet burda kalalım dersiniz çok teşekkür ederim. Sağolun.

(Participant 2:) Tekrar aynı konuda ısrarlıyım. Eh. tekrar aynı konuda ısrarlıyım. Eh. sizin sözünüzü aktarıyorum. Felsefe ile politika arasında, bilmiyorum tam, bir ayrım görmüyorum gibi birşey anladım. Yani burda eh. politik alana tutkulu ideolojiler dalış yapabiliyor çok kolay ama felsefe burada biraz daha temkinlidir. Sınırlı, sınırları daha kalınca. O açıdan siz şunu mu demek istediniz yani eh. politika felsefesi çünkü mesela bilim felsefesi var eh. biz politikayı da bilim sayarız. Hani politik felsefeden mi bahsetmek istediniz? Onunla bağlantılı olarak, Heidegger'den yani nasıl böyle bir giriş yapabilirim çok zor ama gene cesaretimi toplayacağım. Şimdi, mesela, örneğin, düşünce, eylem, söz arasında Heidegger anladığım kadarıyla, yanlış, çok iyi anlam anlam anlamıyorsam, eh. çok yakın yakınsak ilişkiler kurmuş gibi geliyor. O zaman düşünce özgürlüğü eh. yasaklanabilir bu durumda, yani yasaklı olabilir yani düşünce özgür olmayabiliyor bu durumda ((inaudible remarks)) çünkü eylemde özgürlük alanı kısıtladığına göre dün yani evrende yani şu yaşadığımız dünyada kısıtlı olduğuna göre yasalarla sınırlandırıldığına göre bu bu durumda eh. bilgi toplumunun getirdiği de bir süreç var. Getirdiği bir gerekeç var. Demek ki biz düşünceyi de yani aslında bu çok eh. eh. yani politik anlamda bir tartışma konusu. { Çok belirgin değil, belirlenmiş değil ama burda o sizin o bu tezlere göre düşünce eh. özgür olmayabilir de. Çok teşekkür ederim. (Speaker:) Herhalde eh. ben eh. yeterince if iyi ifade edeme edemedim çünkü ben benim konuşmalarımın nasıl bu sonuç çıktığını tam olarak anlıyamıyorum eh. ama eh. politika ve felsefe aynı dedim. İlk onu düzeltmek istiyorum. Felsefe ve politika eh. bir paranın, bir bozuk paranın iki yüzü gibi eh. dedim daha çok. Eh. bunlar sürekli, bunu daha çok ben eh.

## Booth

when you throw it on the floor and you see one side at a certain moment and then the other side at the other moment. Unfortunately this can't be translated. The translation may be wrong. Of course it's always the fault of the translator. Yes! I did use exp expressly the word madalyonun iki yüzü which means the two sides of the coin in Turkish. Oh my God! ((Laughter in the background. Some barely audible talk in English (see the transcription of the 'floor'). The conference interaction breaks for about a minute)) }<sup>53</sup>. I I think I like to say one one Ben küçük, eh. son eh. iki konuşmacıya küçücük birşey söylemek istiyorum. Heidegger'in ve Arendt'in ortak bir yanı her iki ikisinin de politik felsefeci olmaktan kaçınmasıdır, redetmesidir. Her ikisi de felsefe alanını ayırırlar. Burada felsefe eh. kavramların anlamının araştırılması mesela söz eh. kavramı eh. nin anlamının anlaşılmasını, farklı sorular sorulur. Bu alandan başka bir alana nasıl geçebiliriz? Ve ay bence bu iki alan aynı fikirdeyim ay aynı mad bir madalyonun iki yüzüdür. Ama mühim olan burda ne tür soru sorulduğudur. (+) Eh. Türkçe konuşuyorum I'm going to speak in Turkish. First I would like to address S. Hanım a question. Uh. the fact that action manifests itself through speech in the public realm the agen means that the agent puts forth his discloses his iden his or her identity through speech. But logos in your context is another aspect of reaching truth if I'm not mistaken. Let me put it the following way. In public realm, in the public realm uh. in the manifestation of action through speech then the the question with the question of who uh. there is disclosure. Then there is another context of reaching truth through thinking.

### My translation of the floor:

(Participant 2:)...It is not very clear, not very defined but, here, according to your thesis, thought uh. may just as well not be free. Thank you very much.

(Speaker:) I probably uh. did not express it well enough because I don't really understand how such conclusions can be drawn from my speech uh. but uh. I did not say politics and philosophy are the same. First I want to correct that. I said politics and philosophy are uh. more like the uh. the two sides of a uh. of a coin. Uh. they are in constant, I actually am uh. reminded of the image of a coin which continuously turns around itself when you throw it to the floor. You see the one side at a certain moment and the other side at another moment. Uh. and=

(Participant 2-(barely audible:))=In the translation there is no such distinction. Just so that you know.

(Speaker:) Uh. the translation may be wrong bec uh. as the owner of that text I'm telling you the real translation. ((Long laughs among those listening to the English interpretation. One English speaker in the panel says "Poor translators". Some panelists start talking to their Turkish colleagues and one Turkish panelist tells the names of the interpreters and then says in Turkish: "Türkiye'de bulabileceğimiz en iyi çevirmenler" ("The best translators we can find in Turkey"). Somebody else adds "Özellikle bu konuda" ("Especially on this topic"). The interaction on the floor breaks for about one minute)).

## Floor

yere attığınızda sürekli etrafında dönen bir para imgesini hatırlatıyor bana daha çok. Kimi zaman bir tarafını kimi zaman diğer tarafını görüyorsunuz. Eh. ve= (Participant 2-(barely audible:))=Tercümede bu ayrım yok. Bunu bilirsiniz. (Speaker:) Eh. çeviri yanlış olabilir çü eh. ben size o tekstin sahibi olarak esas çeviriyi söylüyorum. ((Long and lively laughter among those listening to the English interpretation. One English speaker in the panel says, “Poor translators”. Some English-speaking panelists start talking to their Turkish colleagues. Then Turkish panelists start talking and one of them tells the names of the interpreters to her friend and adds in Turkish: “Türkiye’de bulabileceğimiz en iyi çevirmenler” (“The best translators we can find in Turkey”). The other Turkish panelist replies “Özellikle bu konuda” (“Especially on this topic”). The interaction on the floor breaks for about one minute)) }<sup>53</sup>.

(Participant 3:) I I think I like to say one once more sentence to the last uh. two speakers. Uh. I guess the one thing uh. Heidegger and Arendt have in common that they both refuse to be political philosophers which means they both try to distinguish the spheres of philosophy and here philosophy is taken to be the search for meaning of concepts. Concepts like action, speech and so and so forth. So I think um. they are different questions posed and um. then we discussed of course uh. how we can go from one sphere to another. But uh. sides or spheres can be taken as sides of one coin and I must agree but uh. for each side one must change the attitude, the kind of questions.

(Chairman:) Please come forth.

(Participant 4:) Eh. Türkçe konuşuyorum. Öncelikle S. Hanıma eh. sorumu yönlendirmek istiyorum. Eh. kamusal alana veya kamu alanında eylemin konuşmayla belirmesinde aktörün veya sizin deyiminizle ajanın kimliğini veya yeniden doğumunu gerçekleştirmesi eh. durumu ortaya çıkıyor fakat yine sizin deyiminizle Arendt’te logos bağlamında düşünmeyi ayrıca bir düşünme eh. hakikate ulaşmada bir başka bölüm olarak söylediniz, yanılmıyorsam. Yani şunu veya şöyle söyleyeyim yani kamu alanında eylemin konuşmayla belirmesinde ‘kim’ sorusuna verilen cevap ortaya çıkıyor ((inaudible remark)) Doğru. Bir de düşünme ile hakikate ulaşmak diye ayrı bir bağlam sözkonusu=

## Booth

{ This is only uh, true for Heidegger. This is not Arendt. Perhaps this may be misunderstood but I did not say this. For Hannah Arendt uh, truth I I I interrupted you. I'm sorry I interrupted you. No no go ahead, says the person Uh, in uh, in the final analysis, Arendt's philosophy is meaning-centered, not truth-centered}<sup>54</sup>. Therefore Arendt has does not have a problem of reaching truth. {Then the uh, the fact of thinking is realized in the public realm too or reflection is a phenomenon that takes place in the public sphere. Meditation, contemplation sorry. Uh, no no. Hannah Arendt uh, distinguishes between the private realm and the public realm}<sup>55</sup>. Uh, the private realm is the sphere where we can talk to ourselves and at the same time between the public and private spheres, there is a connection which uh, which makes uh, which creates a situation where they both require each other. They can not exist without each other without each other. Arendt says this very clearly. In a situation uh, they can only disappear together or transformation into the social uh, in the same realm. Let me let me add something, Arendt, I read The Human Condition from the Turkish translation. Earlier, I had read Arendt partially in the eight the late eighties. I would like to contribute something on labor. If this is a contribution. In many of the Western languages or in Hebrew or in Sanskrit, uh, at the etymological root of the concept labor, there is pain, there is worry and that kind of uh, connotations. This is what she said. And I thought of the uh, etymological root of the word labor in Turkish emek but I could not find the etymological root but then I found an Uyğur a book uh, addressed to the

---

### Translation of the floor: (54)

(Speaker:)...This is only true in Heidegger but it is not a context for consideration in Arendt, that is to say, it might have been misunderstood but I did not point out to that that is Hannah Arendt's true truth I actually wanted to say that as a conclusion. I'm sorry I interrupted you but=

(Participant 4:)=///Please

(Speaker:)=///just so that it doesn't go wrong for later. Uh, uh, after all Arendt's philosophy is meaning-centered, not truth-centered....

### My translation of the floor: (55)

(Participant 4:)=So, its public, uh, the phenomenon of thinking still takes place in the public realm=

(Speaker:)=No, as far as I un understand=

(Participant 4:)=Well I'm just trying to say. To use the old word, is 'tefekür' a phenomenon that also takes place in the public realm?

(Speaker:)=No, in the private realm.

## Floor

(Speaker:)= { Bu tamamen Heidegger’de sözkonusu olan Arendt’te bu sözkonusu olmayan bir bağlam yani belki yanlış anlaşılabilir ((brief inaudible remark by the participant)) ancak buna işaret etmedim yani ha Hannah Arendt’in doğru doğruluk zaten sonuç olarak onu belirtmeye çalıştım. Afederseniz lafınızı kestim ama=

(Participant 4:)//Lütfen

(Speaker:): //daha sonraya yanlış gitmesin diye. Eh. eh. sonuç olarak zaten eh. Arendt’in felsefesi anlam merkezlidir, doğru merkezli değildir }<sup>54</sup>. Dolayısıyla Arendt’in eh. doğru eh. ya ulaşmak gibi bir kaygısından sözedemeyiz diye düşünüyorum.

(Participant 4:): {Yani kamu eh. düşünme eh. eh. olgusu da yine kamusal alanda gerçekleşen bir hadise=

(Speaker:)=Hayır benim anladığım=

(Participant 4:)=Yani veya şunu söylemek istiyorum. Eski deyimle te tefekkür de kamusal alanda gerçekleşen bir olgu mu?

(Speaker:): Hayır özel alanda gerçekleşen bir şeydir }<sup>55</sup>. Bana göre yani benim yaptığım ayrıma göre, özel yaşam diye ayırdığı Hannah Arendt’in bizim eh. o kendimizle olan konuşmayı yapabileceğimiz alan olarak eh. orada bulunmaktadır ve aynı zamanda eh. her iki alan arasında yani özel alan ve kamu alanı arasında birbirini gerektiren eh. bir bağlantı vardır yani birisi olmadan diğeri olamaz. Zaten Arendt de bunu çok açıkça eh. belirtiyor. Eh. her ikisinin de ortadan kalkması dediği durum eh. birlikte gerçekleşir yani biri kamu alanı gittiğinde özel yaşam da kalmaz diyor ya da tersi.

(Participant 4:): Veya toplumsal olana dönüşme aynı anda gerçekleşmiş oluyor=

(Speaker:)=Evet toplumsal alana dönüşme dediği her kesimin de ortadan kalkışına işaret ediyor=

(Participant 4:)=Ben bir ilavede bulunmak istiyorum. Eh. Arendt’in İnsanlık Durumu’nu Türkçesinden okudum ve daha önceden de Arendt’i seksenyedili yıllarda falan filan çok kısmi bir şekilde okumuştum. Eh. emek kavramı konusunda bir katkıda bulunmak istiyorum eğer katkılıysa. Eh. belli başlı Batı dillerinde, İbranicede olsun veya Sanskritçede olsun, yanlış hatırlamıyorsam, emek kavramının etimolojisinde, kökeninde acı eh. sıkıntı, endişe gibi çağrışımların bulunduğunu eh. söylüyordu. Ben bunu Türkçe’de emek kavramının etimolojisinde merak ettim fakat yeterince kaynağa ulaşamadım herhalde bu konuda fakat çok enteresan bir tesadüfle eh. bindokuzyüzkırkbir yılı baskısı eh. bir Uygur Türklerine yönelik bir kitapta emek kavramının kökenini rastladığımı zannediyorum. Eh. emgek olarak geçiyor. Emgek.

## Booth

Uygur Turks. I found the root of this word emgek. It was in Uygur. But but emgek is also the root and so is emek of course. But İsmet Zeki Eyüboğlu in his Etymological dic Dictionary, in Mongolian, uh. it comes uh. the word emek labor in Turkish comes from the Mongolian ‘em’ uh. then there was no no real real relation established so its debatable. Now with respect to the Van Le Cook uh. nineteenfortyone edition, emgek uh. is used in the same connotation mentioned by Arendt. That is to say it connotes pain also. When I went on looking into this I found a survey dictionary of uh. the agricultural terms of the Turkish Language Institutes Institute and I found there emgek is used as emek in certain regions. { Emgek the Uygur word is used as emek the Turkish word. Of course I said em but in when when I I compare Uygur Turkish and in the Uygur Turkish uh. its used exactly in the same manner as Arendt says that is uh. as a connotation of pain. I uh. accept this as a contribution because I had not been able to reach the etymology of the word labor emek uh. in Turkish. But you used the same thing on Arendt. Uh. you it was translated as İnsanlık Durumu uh. The Human Condition but I think it should be İnsanlık Koşulu. This is uh. a semantic or morphological well lexical uh. debate in Turkish so I don't think this would interest our foreign guests. Koşul means condition while durum means uh. situation. Uh. so S\* Hanım says koşul is better for condition in Turkish. Its not true This is not do uh. uh. bu bu doğru değil. }<sup>56</sup>

---

### My translation of the floor:

(Participant 4:)...the concept of emgek is referred to with the connotation of pain uh. suffering but when I compared it with Uygur Turkish I saw that the two terms were the same and in Uygur Turkish its used in exactly the same meaning as Arendt says. I'm saying this so that it may be a contribution. Thank you.

(Speaker:) Thank you very much indeed. This is rea I take this as a contribution. Uh. frankly I could not access its etymology in Turkish=

(Participant 4:)=Uh. yes ///I had the same difficulty and as a contribution

(Speaker:) ///But, by the way, considering that there are guests interested in Arendt, you've used the same thing. Uh. it was translated as İnsanlık Durumu uh. uh. The Human Condition but I uh. propose that we accept it as uh. İnsanlık Koşulu. If this can be ac accepted because each situation uh. each condition refers to a condition but not each uh. situation constitutes a condition. So its more appropriate to accept it as condition. This is the difference between situation\* and condition\* in English.

(Participant 4:)//Yes, okay.

(Speaker:) ///According to me

(Participant 4:) Okay.

(Participant 5:) It's not true....

[\* words pronounced in English by the speaker]

## Floor

(Speaker:) Emgek?

(Participant 4:) Evet, emek kavramı fakat eh. aynı zamanda kök emgek yani emek de öyledir mesela. Ama işte İsmet Zeki Eyüboğlu'nin eh. Türkçe Etimoloji Sözlüğüne göre Moğolca 'em' kökünden geldiğini söylüyor ama pek anlaşılır bir ifade değil çünkü em'le emek arasında bir bağlantı kuramadı ve tartışmalı ol olduğunu söylüyor. Fakat eh. Uygur Türkçesinde, Uygur Türklerine yönelik eh. Maneizm Propagandası Elkitabı, Van Le Cook bindokuzyüzkırk bir yılı baskısı. Burda emgek tam da Arendt'in bahsettiği anlamdaki bir çağrışımla kullanılıyor yani acı içeren bir çağrışımla kullanılıyor. Eh. daha sonra eh. devam ettiğimde, Türk Dil Kurumu'nun eh. Ziraat Terimleri Tarama Sözlüğünde, yanılmıyorsam yetmişbir yılı baskısı olsa gerek, orda eh. emgekin, bazı yörelerde emek olarak kullanıldığını gördüm. Tabii bu ikinci bahsettiğim Tarama Sözlüğünde, { emgek kavramı bir acı eh. sıkıntı anlamında bir çağrışım olarak kullanımı ama Uygur Türkçesinden karşılaştırdığım zaman iki terimin aynı olduğunu ve Uygur Türkçesinde tam da Arendt'in söylediği manada kullanıldığını gördüm. Bu belki bir katkı olabilir diye zikrediyorum. Teşekkür ederim. (Speaker:) Gerçekten çok teşekkürler. Bu ger bir katkı olarak kabul ediyorum. Eh. etimolojisine ben Türkçede doğrusu ulaşamamıştım çünkü=

(Participant 4:)=E evet /// yani o sıkıntıyı ben yaşadım, bir katkı olsun diye.

(Speaker:) ///Yalnız bu arada Arendt'le ilgilenen dinleyicilerimiz olduğunu da düşünerek, siz de aynı şeyi kullanıyorsunuz. Eh. İnsanlık Durumu olarak çevrildi eh. eh. The Human Condition ancak bunun eh. İnsanlık Koşulu olarak eh. kabul edilmesini ben öneriyorum. Burada ka kabul edilebilirse çünkü durum, eh. her koşul eh. bir duruma işaret eder ancak her eh. durum bir koşul oluşturmaz. Dolayısıyla bunun koşul olarak eh. kabul edilmesi daha uygun. İngilizcedeki bu eh. situation, condition ayrımıdır.

(Participant 4:)//Evet. Okay

(Speaker:) ///Bana göre=

(Participant 4:)=Okay.

(Participant 5:) It's not true uh. uh. that }<sup>56</sup> Heidegger identifies in the last instance language with truth. On the contrary=  
=((inaudible remarks from the speaker))=

(Participant 5:)=No. Its only the way of this construction is a first uh. is a first phases only and then he goes uh. in a in another direction. So he says first phases only and then he goes uh. in a in another direction. So he says for example in The Sophistes, in this big course I had this honor to edite, uh. he says the logos is so less the place of truth that in the contrary he is the place of



## Booth

Heidegger'in son tahlilde dille hakikati özdeşleştirdiği doğru değildir. Tam tersine, bu inşanın ilk aşamalarında geçerlidir. Daha sonra bir başka yönde eh. ha hareket eder Heidegger. Mesela Sofistlerde *is so less* edit ettiğim bu derlediğim bu sofistte eh. Heidegger şöyle der. Eh. dil hakikate değil yanlış a götürür. Logos hakikate değil yanlış a götürür der çünkü logos çünkü 'it' yani 'o' sentetiktir. Hakikat mı logos mu bilemiyoruz. Çünkü sentetiktir. Dolayısıyla logos zorunlu olarak hakikatin mekanı yeri değildir ve bu ilginçtir. Daha geniş bir anlamda logos, logos zemaynendir. Zemayneyn Aristoteles aletheyadan farklıdır. Bu aynı zamanda bir anlam taşır. Başka birşey değil. Bu sadece işaret eder, ifade etmez. Sadece işaret etmek için. Tanrı ve şeyin eh. gizi sırrı. Hakikat değil. { Bir bir ek yapmak istiyorum. Çok yaygın bir fikir Heidegger'in logosla hakikati özdeşleştirdiği fikri ama eh. şimdi S\* Hanım konuşuyor. Logosla legeyni birbirinden ayırıyor }<sup>57</sup>.

**Interpreter A: Okay. I would uh.** Ama bitmeden toplantımızı bitirmeden önce ben bu sempozyuma katılanlar adına özellikle yurt dışından gelenler adına şunu söylemek istiyorum. Burada bize gösterdiğiniz konukseverlik için özellikle size çok teşekkür ederiz Sayın Profesör S., herkese, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi yönetimine de teşekkür ederiz. Keza sizlere de çok teşekkür ederiz. Aynı şekilde. Bu toplantıyı mümkün kılan, bizim buraya gelmemizi mümkün kılan bütün kuruluşlara da cömertlikleri ve konukseverlikleri için ayrıca teşekkür ederiz. Çok istifade ettik. Kuruluşları saymak istiyorum. Goethe Enstitüsü, Fransız Araştırma Enstitüsü, İtalyan Kültür Enstitüsü ve Adam Publishing eh. Yayınevi. Bütün bu kuruluşlar bizim bu toplantıyı gelmemizi ve toplantının yapılmasını mümkün kıldılar. Eh. Hem onlara hem de bütün katılımcılara bir kere daha teşekkürler. Ayrıca tercümanlara da teşekkür etmek isterim. Gerçekten inanılmaz bir iş becerdiler ((Applause for interpreters)) Ve onlar da tabii bu sempozyumu mümkün kıldılar aksi halde birbirimizin ne dediğini anlamayacaktık. Gördüğünüz gibi dil çok önemlidir. Eh. ben de son olarak müsaadenizle bir kaç şey söylemek istiyorum. Umarım hoşunuza gitmiştir bu kolokyumumuz. Bunu yaparken amaçlarımızdan biri de şuydu. Kendimizi kamuya açmak ve galiba yaptık. Bazı problemler yok değildi fakat bunlar esas olarak teknolojik problemlerdi. Çünkü elektrik

### My translation of the booth:

(Interpreter B:)...I want to make an an addition. It's a very widespread idea that Heidegger identifies logos with truth but uh. *now Ms. S\* is talking. She is differentiating logos and legein.*

## Floor

falsity, of false, because logos is synthetetic, syn, synthetic, synthetic so he can combine terms which are not combined because he is, it is synthetic. So logos is not necessarily the the place of truth and uh. that that's very interesting. Yes, logos in wider sense is semainen with Aristotle. Semainen is not aletheuein. That's a difference. It's all, it also mean something and nothing more and this may be in a manner only which is indicating and not expressing really something, only to indicate it. Yes and God, the secret of the thing, yes, not truth.

{ (Speaker:) Uh. I want to uh. answer uh. I want to make a add addition=  
(Participant 5–barely audible:)=it is a very current ///opinion that Heidegger identifies logos with truth.

(Speaker:)

///No no he he himself

discriminates=

=(inaudible remarks from the participant))=

(Speaker:)=he himself distinguish uh. uh. logos and legein, legein also this well we can=

=(inaudible remarks))<sup>57</sup>

(Chairman:) I would before Ö\* I would like to say a word or two on behalf of the participants in this meeting, this symposium, uh. on behalf of especially those who've come from abroad and uh. who are extremely grateful for the um. for the kindness and the hospitality of Professor S. of uh. for the Administration of um. the Bogazici University. Uh. we would like to thank you uh. extend our thank, heartfelt thanks to you. Um. we would also like to thank all of those institutions that made it possible for us to come from abroad and to participate in this uh. symposium and whose generosity and hospitality uh. were of great benefit to us and uh. namely the Goethe Institute, the Institut d'Etudes Francaises, the Istituto d'Italia di Cultura and also the Adam Publishing House, to all of these who've made our participation possible and this uh. colloquium, symposium possible. I would like uh. to extend uh. our thanks on behalf of all of the participants. Uh. and uh. last but not least, I would like to thank the translators who did such a uh. wonderful job in translating and uh. its a terrible ((Applause for interpreters)) and uh. also made this colloq, this symposium possible because otherwise we wouldn't have been able to understand each other and that's an essential part of language so thank you all.

(Organizer:) Well, just the very last concluding remark by my side. I hope that you have you have enjoyed our colloquium. One of our aims was to open us to the public and I think that we have done that. Uh. there were some problems but these were first of all technological problems with electricity yesterday but I thin I think that we have overcome it finally ((laughs)) and to today there

**Booth**

kısıntıla ke kesilmelerini kastediyorum ama neticede üstesinden gelmeyi başardık. Bugün bu tür problem biraz daha az oldu. { Profesör B. doğrusu bana söyleyecek pek bir söz bırakmadı ama ben de özellikle katılımcılara teşekkür etmek isterim. *Sabırları için. ((barely audible laughs from the floor)) Dilim sürçtü, sabırsızlık dedim ama sabır demek istemiştım ((barely audible laugh from the floor)) Eh, çok sabırlı sabırlı bize zamanımızı aşmamız bakımından tahammül gösterdiniz. Tabii ayrıca Boğaziçi Üniversitesine de teşekkür etmek isterim. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi bu organizasyonu mümkün kılmış tır. Özellikle Organizasyon Komitesine yürekten teşekkürler efendim }<sup>58</sup>.*

---

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...Professor B\* did not really leave me much to say but I too would like to thank the participants. For their patience. ((barely audible laughter from the floor)) *That was a slip of the tongue. I said impatience but I had meant patience. ((barely audible laughter from the floor)) Uh, very patiently patiently you tolerated us for exceeding our time.* Of course I would also like to thank Boğaziçi University. Boğaziçi University has made this organization possible. I would like to thank the Organization Committee wholeheartedly.

## Floor

were less problems in that direction. { Well, uh, Mister B. didn't leave me uh. anything more to say uh. but I want uh. to express, to bring into expression, specifically my thanks to the participants uh. for their impatience, for their ((inaudible remarks from participants)) uh. uh impatience ((laughs)) in general because it has it has taken so much time. We have overgone ((inaudible remarks)) impatience with time with with with our work because we have have overgone ((further barely audible remarks like "we have patience")) yes, you were patient ((laughters)) we have overgone the limits of time but I think that that was not a problem. Well I want to thank you also in addition to the university, to the Boğazici University which has made possible this organization and specifically to the organization committee. Thank you very much }<sup>58</sup>.  
((Applause))



## CHAPTER 5

# Juxta- and counterposing actual SI behaviour with the meta-discourse

### 5.1 Juxtaposing actual SI behavior with the meta-discourse

As was noted in the Introduction, the current literature on SI has placed an overarching emphasis on the cognitive, psycho- and neurolinguistic aspects of SI, with considerable research being devoted to topics such as the role of memory and attention, lateralization of brain hemispheres and information processing models. Interestingly enough, a substantial amount of work has been done on analyzing the active involvement of the interpreter in shaping the delivery and interactional contexts in other modes of interpreting, but the same cannot be said for SI. For various reasons, such as the salience of the cognitive operations in SI, the difficulty of accessing and analyzing actual SI instances, the belief in a natural identification of the interpreter with the meaning intended by the speaker, and the assumption of homogeneous conference settings, SI has come to be seen as distinct from other modes of interpreting and has rarely been approached from a more critical sociological perspective.

Against this background, this study set out to analyze the presence and the performance of simultaneous interpreters in relation to the broader and more immediate socio-cultural and interactional contexts. Within this framework, Chapter 2 focused on the meta-discursive representation of simultaneous interpreters and interpreting to highlight the expectations and demands from the profession(al) in the broader socio-cultural context(s), while Chapters 3 and 4 focused on actual SI behavior at a particular conference to explore the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters in a more immediate socio-cultural and interactional context. In broad terms, the analyses suggested the following:

#### 5.1.1 Broader socio-cultural context: What the meta-discourse suggests

The analysis of the meta-discourse on SI pointed to two levels of discourse in (re)presenting simultaneous interpreters and interpreting: The first level was

the general/de-contextualized discourse, which treats SI as a “universal” phenomenon without referring to the particularities of specific interpreting contexts. Such general and de-contextualized accounts seem quite extensive in the written and recorded materials analyzed in this study, and appear in the discourse of the professional associations, ethical codes, general reference books, and to some extent in the academic literature.

The second level was the specific/contextualized discourse on SI, which refers to SI in real-life situations. Such accounts of SI have been seen to occur less frequently in the written and recorded materials and to surface most visibly in the anecdotal accounts of the interpreters regarding their personal professional experience. In the present corpus, they emerge in more popular literature and when interpreters are asked in the media to recount specific moments from their professional lives.

#### *General and de-contextualized discourse*

In the general and de-contextualized discourse, simultaneous interpreters are depicted as competent professionals who can unproblematically *identify* with the speaker and access and transfer the meaning in the speaker’s speech. According to such depictions, simultaneous interpreters will never interfere with the “content” of a speaker’s message though they may improve its “package” by removing impurities or redundancies such as distinct accents, grammatical mistakes, regionalisms, flawed formulations, etc. Improving the “package” of the original is seen as a natural and, in effect, essential part of the interpreter’s task and not considered to contradict the principle of absolute fidelity to the original meaning, since “meaning” in language is presented as independent of its word-carrier and simultaneous interpreters are asked to concentrate on transferring *what* the speakers say rather than *how* they say it.

#### *Specific and contextualized discourse*

On the other hand, in the more specific and contextualized discourse, the personal involvement of the interpreters in shaping the “meaning” to be transferred was quite apparent. In anecdotal accounts from their real-life professional assignments, simultaneous interpreters hint at the active role they play in formulating the “meaning” to be transferred. In doing this, they challenge the assumption in the general discourse concerning the ease with which they are supposed to access and reproduce meanings intended by the speakers with a transparent and fluent delivery.

In addition to being less frequent, anecdotal accounts are usually surrounded by features of the mainstream de-contextualized representation of SI, which relegate such instances to marginal moments (“interesting events”) in the lives of professional interpreters. In fact, the simultaneous interpreters who actually relate the anecdotes that hint at their active involvement in shaping the message to be transferred are also careful to stress that their “interpretation” of the original message ultimately always coincides with the message intended by the original speaker.

### 5.1.2 Presence of interpreters: What participant observations and interviews suggest

Although it is impossible to draw generalizations regarding the presence of simultaneous interpreters from a single conference, field observations and interviews with the users of SI, the speakers, organizer and interpreters at the 2-day conference on “Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt: Metaphysics and Politics” suggest the following:

*The conference hosted a heterogeneous group of participants with diverse backgrounds and interests.* In contrast to both the general belief that simultaneous interpreters work in more homogenous settings and to the description of this kind of a conference in the conference typologies, which suggests a homogenous group of participants, there was significant heterogeneity in the backgrounds and interests of the participants attending the event. In addition to scholars and students, there were also writers, publishers, members of a spiritual organization and political activists in the audience. The heterogeneity of the participants had a significant impact on the flow of communication and the expectations from and assessments of SI.

*The conference context was not predisposed to accommodate the needs of the interpreters and primary interlocutors had a rather simplistic understanding of the interpreters’ task.* Typical of a university colloquium, professional event organizers were not employed for the organization of the conference and one of the faculty members from the Philosophy Department, who was also a speaker and the moderator of certain sessions, handled the details of the organization. With so many things going on, simultaneous interpreters were hardly the focal point of the event. In many ways, the organizer tried to ensure high quality SI by recruiting interpreters who were familiar with philosophy, supplying them with the papers, and assisting them with the terminology



before the conference. However, all these efforts were geared to “acclimatize” the interpreters to the particularities of the conference. From the fact that speakers prepared very long and structured papers with numerous quotations in a non-conference language and effectively confessed that they had not thought of SI when drafting their presentations, it was clear that the potential presence of SI prompted hardly any adaptation to the particularities of an SI-mediated event on the part of the speakers and participants.

During the interviews, the speakers generally underscored that they expected the interpreters to “convey the meaning in the speakers’ speeches”. They seemed to view the focus on transferring “meanings” (as opposed to “words”) as an alleviating factor at this conference and were largely convinced that the interpreters could realize this fundamental objective with adequate preparation and previous experience. The scholars did not problematize how the interpreters could “grasp and transfer the meanings in their texts” in a conference where the main discussion between scholars was on what two philosophers had “meant” in a handful of writings.

*The interpreters were influenced by the conditions they worked in.* Both interpreters were bothered by the simplistic perception of their task and position. Both interpreters thought there had been numerous manifestations of this taken-for-grantedness. For instance, Interpreter A had expended a lot of effort in getting access to the conference papers. She had arrived early the first morning to talk to the speakers but had failed to talk to them because none of the speakers had arrived early enough. The door of the conference hall had been locked when she came in and she had to fetch someone to open it. The booths had no chairs and water and she had to arrange for it all. Interpreter B, on the other hand, was disappointed about some of the papers he had not been given. Hearing the way the speakers talked, he was also convinced that the speakers were actually interested in a dialogue among themselves and cared less about the audience.

Both interpreters had complaints about the way the speeches were delivered and both believed this was influencing the quality of their delivery. All of the speakers were reading from highly structured texts that were full of quotations and footnotes. Moreover, many were citing complex terms and even full quotations in German. While references in German made things easier for Interpreter A, who had active German and who said she used the German terms to enhance the coherence of her delivery, they were clearly a source of stress for Interpreter B, who believed they were impeding the quality of his interpretation.

In their own ways, both interpreters believed their presence and performance were taken for granted, especially by the speakers, who paid little attention to the requirements of SI-mediated communication. While Interpreter B said he felt “particularly tense” at the conference and thought his voice reflected this, Interpreter A commented that, in contrast to her youth, she knew that even the chair and headset had an impact on her delivery, and she would not “tear herself apart to give an impeccable performance” if she was not treated like a proper communication partner.

*The interpreters were not passive in the face of such constraints and took action to make their needs felt.* Despite the challenges involved, the interpreters were quite adept in imposing their presence onto a setting that was not really designed to accommodate their needs. For instance, all three interpreters talked to the speakers before they took the floor to clarify certain terminological ambiguities and to remind them of their needs as interpreters. Some of the reminders were as unforgettable as the following remark, full of black humor, made by Interpreter A to one of the speakers right before his turn:

How are you going to account for your deeds today when you meet Heidegger in the other world? What is he going to say when you tell him that you read his texts to a Turkish lady who heard of them for the first time and she had to interpret them simultaneously?

The strategy of talking to the speakers seemed to work since *all* of the speakers interviewed said they took the demands of interpreters into account as much as they could. Thus, the interpreters managed to influence the way original speeches were delivered, even though the end result was still far from perfect for the interpreters,

*The interpreters made use of general and context-specific strategies to cope with the constraints of the conference.* In addition to the face-to-face talks that contributed to the visibility of interpreters and allowed for some accommodation of their needs, the interpreters used additional strategies to cope with the particularities of the conference. They prepared exceptionally carefully for the conference, consulted with the organizer and other experts regarding terminology, and compiled glossaries. Moreover, they made a rather unusual demand and asked the organizer to appoint a research assistant to be around the booth to help them out with unexpected terminology during the conference. Despite a heavier workload, they took longer turns (45–50 minutes) in order to minimize problems of coherence in the interpretation of the same speech.

Interpreter B mentioned omitting parts of the original speeches that contained supplementary information to prevent a long *décalage*, although he admitted being concerned about the deontological implications of this strategy. Interpreter A, who knew German, mentioned inserting German words for certain terms to increase the coherence of her delivery, while Interpreter B, who did not know German, mentioned trying to repeat the words as best as he could or announcing to the audience that the quotation was in German, to alert those with German to follow the speech on the floor.

*The interpreters worked amidst complex and fuzzy expectations and assessments of SI.* The heterogeneity of the participants was a source of diverse and even contradictory expectations for the interpreters. Even though, in the interviews, many participants seemed to converge on two expectations of the interpreters, which were “fidelity to the meaning in the speaker’s speech” and “familiarity with the topic and terminology”, there were significant variations in what they believed constituted that “meaning” and “familiarity”. For instance, for one of the participants who defined himself as a “political activist”, the meaning in the speakers’ speeches was the “feeling behind the concepts”, whereas for two participants, who said they were members of a spiritual society, it was the “spiritual world of the philosophers”. Some of the respondents believed the meaning in the speaker’s speech was the interpreter’s *interpretation* of what the speaker meant in the form of a summary independent of original wording, while others contended that the meaning in the original was all about an exact transfer of the speaker’s words and terms. Some were convinced that only new Turkish coinages could convey the original meaning precisely while others wanted to hear everyday familiar terms and thought new coinages were incomprehensible.

In addition to diverse expectations, there were also great variations in the way the users of SI assessed the performance of the interpreters so that what seemed (al)right for one respondent bothered another.

Thus, what seemed like a fairly straightforward-looking “academic” conference on philosophy was host to a wide range of different expectations and assessments regarding the position and performance of simultaneous interpreters. The users of SI, the organizer and the speakers did not have a neutral attitude towards the simultaneous interpreters. They had a series of complex and fuzzy demands of the interpreters and adopted a rather unproblematic view of their task. On the other hand, the interpreters did not have a neutral attitude towards the primary interlocutors either. In fact, they were clearly

influenced by the constraints of the social and interactional context around them. The interpreters pointed to the frustration they felt at the way the speeches were delivered and openly declared their dissatisfaction with the external factors that jeopardized the quality of their performance. Despite all odds, however, they still found ways of imposing their presence onto a setting not planned to accommodate their needs and demands.

In short, the analysis of an *actual* SI event can be seen as challenging the general conviction that simultaneous interpreters work in homogeneous settings with participants from compatible backgrounds and interests. It highlights the fact that little is pre-determined about the “position” of simultaneous interpreters and indicates that this position had to be *negotiated* on site amidst a complex and rather fuzzy network of relations, expectations and assessments prevailing in an actual conference context.

### 5.1.3 Performance of interpreters: What conference transcripts suggest

Analysis of the transcripts of the booth and floor recordings from the same 2-day conference on “Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt: Metaphysics and Politics” suggests the following:

#### *Vulnerability of the position of simultaneous interpreters*

First of all, the analysis of conference transcripts points to the vulnerability of simultaneous interpreters. It reveals that the interlocutors could easily blame the interpreters when faced with misunderstandings among themselves (see 52, 53). Saving face by blaming the mediator, who was somewhat distant from the focal event and less prominently positioned than the “original” speaker, was possibly easier for the primary interlocutors than facing the disturbing reality of their own subjectivity in understanding each other. Especially in excerpt 53, it is quite striking to note that even the speaker who talked about “the disclosure of the agent’s identity and uniqueness in speech”, did not hesitate to claim being the “owner” of her text and its “correct” translation. Apparently, disclosing one’s identity in speech was meant to apply to “original speakers” and not their “interpreters”.

#### *Tension of co-existing with the speaker in the same “I” in the delivery*

The analysis of the conference transcripts also points to the tension inherent in co-existing with an alien “I” in the delivery. The two instances of accusation (see 52, 53) show that the seeming non-presence of the interpreters in the delivery — reinforced through their adoption of the speaker’s “I” in line with

the norm in SI — could easily be subverted, leaving all fingers pointing to the interpreters as the culprits in a failed communication. The interpreters could be held responsible for the mistakes, interruptions and “flaws” in the delivery — even if these stemmed from the primary interlocutors.

In a way, adopting the “I” of the speaker meant establishing a vaguely defined and highly unpredictable communion with the speaker in the same utterance. It meant temporarily sharing the same “I” and becoming a part of another’s “words” and “deeds”. It implied being represented in an “I” that no longer pointed only to the interpreter or the speaker alone. Adopting and remaining in the speaker’s “I” in the delivery seemed to be easier when the interaction at the conference looked unproblematic and transparent, but seemed less so when it became fraught and fragmented.

#### *Multiplicity of the speaker-positions in the delivery*

In contrast to the meta-discursive emphasis on the presence of a single speaker-position, the analysis of the conference transcripts points to the multiplicity of the speaker-position in the delivery. In addition to adopting the “I” of the speaker and positioning the original speaker to the speaker-position in the delivery, in line with the norm in SI, interpreters were able to follow other strategies such as: assuming the speaker-position implicitly by blending their remarks into the speaker’s “I”; taking over the speaker-position explicitly by speaking in their own “I”s; or assuming it indirectly by reporting, paraphrasing or explaining the interaction on the floor. The analysis has also indicated that the use of these options was not random but context-driven, pointing to a complex co-presence of the multiple speaker-positions in the delivery.

#### *Power in regulating the “speaking subject” in the delivery*

Despite the vulnerability and tension inherent in the interpreters’ sharing the same “I” with the speaker, the analysis points to the significant commanding power of the interpreters over their delivery. In the present corpus, the interpreters did not hesitate to assume the speaker-position, relegate the original speaker from the position of the “speaking subject” to the position of the subject spoken of in the delivery, and become the focus of attention of the social and communicative context when faced with unjust accusations of misinterpretation. They also took over the “I” in the delivery warning the speakers to use microphones, asking the listeners to warn the speakers to use microphones and commenting on the challenging aspects of the interaction on the floor. Similarly, the interpreters assumed the “I” in the delivery, but blended it into the speaker’s first person, when they compensated for the unanticipated

consequences of the corrections they undertook to remedy the speakers' mistakes, or when they made original speeches more coherent and complete. They also indirectly took over the speaker-position in the delivery to report, paraphrase and explain the interaction on the floor when faced with the mistakes, apologies and corrections of the speakers, as well as semi-verbal interaction and overlapping speeches. While the interpreters always apologized for and/or corrected their own mistakes in the first person, they chose to refer to themselves in the third person when they reacted to the speakers on the floor. Thus, the interpreters used a variety of discursive tools to distance or approximate themselves with the speaker's "I" in the delivery.

All of the excerpts analyzed in this study suggest that the interpreters were the main regulators of the speaker-positions in the delivery. Despite the numerous challenges of interpreting simultaneously, the strength of the interpreters was in their control over the "delivery" and in how they actively took part in shaping the representation of the speaker. Clearly, "identifying with the speakers" and "delivering the original meanings completely, fluently, intelligibly" were not "intrinsic performance standards" these simultaneous interpreters applied to different inputs. Rather they were "performance instructions" whose actual turnout was constantly *negotiated* by the interpreters in relation to the particularities and constraints of the actual situation. Amidst the constraints imposed by the nature of the work, the interpreters were not passive mediators with restricted control but active partners in communication.

#### *Delivery as a "heteroglot" construct*

In contrast to the general and de-contextualized discourse on SI, which tends to view the delivery as a site reserved for a single speaker (i.e., the "original" speaker) only, the analysis indicates that the delivery would best be characterized as a "heteroglot" construct containing multiple speakers all presented and represented by the interpreter. The final outcome of who came to be represented in the delivery, and how, was not determined unilaterally by who the speaker was or what s/he said, but was basically negotiated by the interpreter in relation to the source utterance, as well as in relation to various social, interactional, cognitive and psychological factors of the actual context(s).

#### *Inter- and intra-personal variations*

The present corpus also highlights the presence of interpersonal variations in the way the interpreters regulated the speaker-positions in their deliveries. One of the interpreters (Interpreter B) was considerably more inclined than the other (Interpreter A) to take over the speaker-position explicitly. Actually, at

various points during the conference, both of the interpreters inserted their personal or explanatory remarks regarding various aspects of the interaction on the floor. For various reasons, both of the interpreters took over the first person in the delivery they used to represent the speakers. The position of the booths, which made the interpreters fully visible to the audience and speakers, seemed to facilitate the fact that the interpreters voiced some of their remarks in the first rather than the third person. However, even though both took over the “I” in the delivery, there were significant differences in the way the interpreters did that.

The major difference was that when Interpreter B assumed the speaker-position in the first person, he usually did so in a way that highlighted the change in the speaking subject, that is, in a way that revealed it was he (“the interpreter”) and no longer the speaker who was speaking in the “delivery”. Interpreter B generally did this by speaking *about* the speakers, reporting, paraphrasing and inserting explanatory and/or personal remarks about the original interaction (see, for instance, 7, 8, 16, 43, 56). In general, Interpreter B also opted for more visible methods when solving the problems related to his task, such as by asking his listeners to warn the speakers to use a microphone (see, for instance, 44), making the primary interlocutors repeat their remarks (see 30), and even by leaving the booth to arrange the distribution of headsets (see 29). Overall, Interpreter B was more inclined to expose his presence (“I”) in the delivery and gain “visibility” during the moments he was interpreting the original interaction.

Interpreter A, on the other hand, was considerably less inclined to make her presence (“I”) explicit in the delivery. For instance, Interpreter A never reported, paraphrased or explained the speakers or the interaction on the floor. When there were problems of sound transmission, she briefly called attention to the problem or interrupted the delivery until she could hear again (“Microphone please”; see, for instance, 47 and 48). She also tended to insert her personal remarks more implicitly. In fact, the “shift in the speaking subject” became hardly noticeable when Interpreter A took over the speaker-position because her remarks tended to foster the impression that the speaker on the floor was still in the speaker-position in the delivery (see 31 and 58). Overall, Interpreter A tended not to become explicitly present in the delivery and seemed to opt for strategies that reinforced her “invisibility” when interpreting the original interaction.

Differences in the individual approaches of the interpreters, however, did not completely rule out the possibility of intra-personal variations. Interpreter B, for instance, who usually inserted his remarks in the first person, but in a way

that made explicit that he had taken over speaker-position in the delivery, also put in a few remarks that tended to blend into the speaker's "I" in the delivery (see 37, 41, 42, 46). Furthermore, he also twice distanced himself from the speaker in the delivery by referring to himself and his colleague in the third person (as "the translators") after the speakers on the floor accused the interpreters of misinterpreting (see 52 and 53). The fact that Interpreter B did not stay in the first person when responding to the accusations on the floor was probably because he wanted to distance himself very clearly from the speaker in the delivery.

Interestingly, despite the differences in the way they approached the representation of the interaction on the floor, there was a marked similarity in the way both Interpreter A and Interpreter B formulated their own apologies, corrections, and mistakes in the delivery. Both interpreters always remained in the first person which they also used to represent the speaker before and after those brief apologies and corrections (see, for instance, 10, 32, 34, 36, 50, 51, 55).

In any case, both interpreters seemed very much aware of the power of regulating the "speaking subject" in the delivery. It emerged that despite the various challenges to the interpreters and constraints imposed on them in actual situations, regulating who became represented, and how, in the delivery, was still predominantly the interpreters' prerogative, and this prerogative transformed the position of simultaneous interpreters from seemingly passive "subjects" to active and powerful "agents" of communication.

## 5.2 Counterposing actual SI behavior with the meta-discourse

### *The "mythical" nature of the meta-discourse on SI*

By highlighting the complexity of the actual interpreting performance and the role of the interpreter as the regulator of the multiple speaker-positions in the delivery, the analysis of the actual SI behavior at the particular conference examined in this study draws attention to the mythical nature of the meta-discourse on SI. The meta-discursive (re)presentation of simultaneous interpreters as professionals who can unproblematically access and transparently transfer the meaning, essential content, or primary information as intended by the original speakers is not fabricated or fake but reductionist and essentialist.

By naturalizing and rationalizing the complexity of the actual event, the general and de-contextualized meta-discourse on SI seems to build "myths" around its object. As is the case with myths in general (Barthes 1992), the



de-contextualized discourse on SI does not deny the relationship between the interpreter, speaker, and the socio-cultural contexts, but presents a more “purified” relationship with “blissful clarity”.

The general and de-contextualized meta-discourse on SI purifies the relationship between the interpreter, speaker, contexts by erasing its historicity (i.e., its boundedness with time and space) and subjectivity (i.e., its boundedness with the human agent). That is to say, it purifies the relationship by doing away with all the dialectics and downplaying the role of the human actor, and the socio-cultural and interactional factors in shaping the meaning and the flow of communication.

By fostering the image of the professional interpreter who can access and transfer original meanings as intended by the speakers, the general meta-discourse foregrounds an abstract and naturalized interpreter without a spatio-temporal and presence, rather than a flesh and blood interpreter working in particular conference contexts.

#### *The “purposeful” nature of the meta-discourse on SI*

In addition to pointing to its mythical nature, the analysis of the actual SI performance hints at the “purposeful” nature of the meta-discourse. The meta-discourse seems to depict SI in such unproblematic and essentialist terms to serve certain purposes. While one purpose seems to be that of sustaining the interests of the group, another seems to be that of organizing and monitoring the socially shared mental representations regarding the “object” at hand. Thus, on the one hand, this kind of a meta-discursive representation seems to aim at augmenting the “symbolic power” of the profession(al) while, on the other hand, it also seeks to deploy the “shaping power” of the discourse to bring actual SI behavior in line with norms that would increase the symbolic power of the professional most profoundly. To take a closer look:

#### *Augmenting the “symbolic power”*

The meta-discursive representation of simultaneous interpreters as competent professionals capable of accessing and transferring the meanings intended by the speakers transparently and fluently endows simultaneous interpreters with a “natural justification” which, in turn, reinforces their status as professionals with unique competencies that non-professionals do not possess. Furthermore, such a representation confirms and reinforces the value of SI as a “commodity”, to use Bourdieu’s vocabulary, since SI, as a profession functioning and surviving in a market-place, derives its “value” as much from its “utility” as from its “symbolic power” as a social and discursive construct.<sup>52</sup>

In that sense, the meta-discourse on SI — just like any other discourse on professions — rarefies itself in the language of truth, rationality, professionalism, authority and utilitarian value.<sup>53</sup> After all, would simultaneous conference interpreting and interpreters still generate the same symbolic, cultural and economic capital if interpreters were presented alternatively as professionals who took an active part in shaping the delivery and the (re)presentation of the original speaker in relation to the social, cognitive, psychological and communicative conditions and constraints of the contexts in which they functioned? Would not their services be more appealing and comforting if simultaneous interpreters were known to deliver the essential meaning in the original utterance as intended by the speakers completely, fluently, intelligibly and “untainted” by human, social and interactional factors?

*Augmenting the “shaping power”*

In addition to justifying the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters to the outside world, the general meta-discourse on SI also works to formulate and impose specific “performance instructions” on insiders, that is, for the practicing interpreters.<sup>54</sup> By depicting and foregrounding an “ahistorical” and “ideal” interpreter, the meta-discourse on SI seeks to bring “actual behavior” closer to the most effective, that is, “socio-culturally and commercially most viable” image of the profession(al). In other words, the general meta-discourse works to (re)produce and transmit uniform codes of conduct in line with the norms and values that are gradually selected and hierarchised as those socio-culturally and commercially most suitable for preservation and reinforcement of the professional interests of simultaneous interpreters.

*Meta-discourse as a “heteroglot” construct*

Despite the naturalization and rationalization of the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters, the meta-discourse is not a uniform construct with a monolithic (re)presentation of the profession(al). As with all discourse, the discourse on SI is host to multiple voices that foreground different, if not contradictory aspects of SI. This is very apparent in the differences between the de-contextualized versus contextualized accounts of SI in which claims about the objectivity of the interpreters in the general and de-contextualized discourses on SI clash with the accounts of their active involvement in the interpretation process in the specific and contextualized discourses — sometimes even in the discourse of the same person. In this sense, talking of a finalized and monolithic representation of SI in discourse is not possible, although

aspects foregrounded in the general/de-contextualized discourse look more pervasive and dominant than aspects foregrounded in the specific/contextualized discourse, thereby giving those features more prominence and visibility as the only possible and valid characteristics of the profession(al).

### 5.2.1 Implications for SI research

While pointing to the mythical and purposeful nature of the meta-discourse on SI and highlighting a complex and dialectical relationship between interpreters, speakers, and socio-cultural contexts, the present study also underscores the need to rethink some of the seemingly universal and unproblematic assumptions in Interpreting Studies.

First of all, the findings of this study challenge the widespread argument that conference interpreters work in homogeneous settings where participants share compatible social and technical backgrounds. It emerges that even at a philosophy conference on the fairly specialized topic of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt's works, organized by a university with academics as speakers, participants had very diverse backgrounds and interests that ultimately also shaped their expectations from and assessments of SI. Thus, the findings point out that the "homogeneity" of the users can not be taken for granted, even in conferences which at first glance foster that impression.

Secondly, the study also points to the fuzziness of the quality criteria used in a number of user surveys (such as "sense consistency with the original message", "fluency and completeness of interpretation", "use of correct terminology", etc.). Criteria that are presented as separate constructs in questionnaires seem to be perceived by the users as much more intertwined. Thus, what look like clearly defined and differentiated performance criteria in the user questionnaires seem to have much fuzzier borders for the users. In that sense, the study suggests that the results of those user surveys that ask respondents to rate certain pre-determined quality criteria risk rendering only a partial understanding of the complexity of the expectations and assessments under which simultaneous interpreters work. It suggests the possibility that we are very likely not "talking about the same thing" (Cattaruzza and Mack 1995) even when we seem to refer to the "same" generic criteria.

Furthermore, by suggesting that the interpreted utterance is not the reproduction of "the meaning intended by the original speaker" but the presentation of "the meaning negotiated by the simultaneous interpreter" — in a dialectical relationship with the source utterance, the interpreter's own subjectivity and a

variety of socio-cultural and interactional factors — the study seems to challenge the purist cognitive paradigm in SI research that seeks to explain isolated interpreted utterances with reference to mental processes only.

Last but not least, the study suggests that the explicitly or implicitly held assumption that simultaneous interpreters access and transfer the meanings intended by the speakers is too simplistic to account for the complexity of actual SI behavior. In addition to being simplistic, such an assumption seems to hinder a more profound interest in the actual performance of simultaneous interpreters by tacitly stipulating that a complete and transparent “semantic” transfer between languages is inherently possible and by fostering the view of actual SI instances as manifestations of “semantic equivalence” between languages, that do not necessitate a more critical and closer analysis. Moreover, by making divisions such as those between “meaning” and “form”, “redundant content” and “essential content”, “primary information” and “secondary information” seem unproblematic, such a view also allows for the formulation and stipulation of fuzzy, if not paradoxical, role descriptions for interpreters. On the one hand, these role descriptions ask interpreters to facilitate communication, bridge cultural gaps, and filter out redundancies while, on the other hand, they also demand full compliance with the strictest rules of fidelity that require interpreters to remain neutral and uninvolved in the interpreting process. In that sense, the findings of the study suggest the need to question the belief in “immanent meanings” and “transcendental signifieds” in SI research in order to enable a closer focus on how the meanings rendered by the interpreter are negotiated in relation to the social, psychological, physical and cognitive factors in actual contexts.



## Final remarks

It is quite typical and natural to conclude by saying that a single study can do no more than raise questions and propose certain hypotheses regarding its object of study. As a single study that has aimed to explore the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters in relation to the broader and more immediate socio-cultural context(s), this work cannot claim to have gone beyond these limits.

Nevertheless, taking into account their limitations and however tentative they might be, the findings of this study suggest that the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters in actual socio-cultural and interactional situations are more complex than we have come to think. The way interpreters perceive and assess the contexts they work in, the way primary interlocutors perceive and assess the presence and performance of interpreters, and the intricate network of views and constraints that mark an actual SI event all point in this direction. The complexity of actual instances of SI also becomes very palpable in the nature of the discursive relationship between the speaker and the interpreter who share the same site of signification, the delivery.

According to the tentative findings of this study, it seems simplistic to regard the delivery as a site reserved for the presentation of the speaker only. It also seems simplistic to assume that the interpreters access and transfer “original meanings”, “semantic” or “informational content”, “essential” or “primary information” transparently in a message. The possibility of an “identification” of the interpreter with the speaker — a view that is quite pervasive in the general and de-contextualized discourse on SI — seems to be equally reductionist.

Such assumptions, rooted in the belief that there are transcendental signifieds and immanent meanings in language, tend to — inevitably and, to some extent purposefully, — simplify a more complex and situational relationship between the interpreter and the speaker and play down the presence of the interpreter as the real “I” in the delivery. Furthermore, by stipulating an inherent, natural and pre-defined relationship between the speaker and the interpreter, they also conceal the constant *negotiation* and *re-negotiation* of this situational relationship.

In contrast to the belief in an unproblematic identification with the speaker's intended meaning and first person in SI, the analysis here points to the difficulty and vulnerability of the interpreter in co-existing with another's "I" in the delivery. It suggests that an identification with an alien "I" is hardly natural and unproblematic due to a variety of socio-cultural, cognitive, psychological and technical reasons.

At the same time, however, the analysis in this study suggests the presence of multiple speaker-positions that are available to the interpreter in the delivery. In contrast to the general assumption of a single speaker-position that is reserved for the (re)presentation of the speaker by the interpreter, the analysis points to the power of the interpreter in regulating the speaker-positions in the delivery. In that sense, it highlights the main negotiator position of the interpreter in working out a discursive representation of the speaker in the delivery amidst a highly complex network of relationships, expectations, and constraints imposed by the actual contexts.

This study is only an initial and limited attempt to take a closer look at the presence and performance of simultaneous interpreters in relation to the broader and more immediate socio-cultural and interactional contexts. Many other variables and viewpoints can and need to be taken into account in exploring what interpreters do and why, in particular contexts. Given the complexity of human acts, it is impossible to expect to see the full picture in SI or determine a systematic pattern of SI behavior. However, I truly hope that this study can prompt further interest in the exploration of actual SI behavior as a complex situational act. I also hope that more SI researchers will pick up certain threads that are slowly emerging in the field, to weave more holistic theories and research methods that can link together discourse, cognition, reception, psychology, ideology and socio-cultural contexts. Thus, if this study can help to trigger an interest in exploring SI as situated action and call for a more concerted effort to analyze the position of simultaneous interpreters as active partners in communication, it will have served its purpose.

# Appendix

## Transcription convention

(adapted from Have 1999, see also Section 3.2 regarding the approach to transcriptions in this study)

- /// Three slashes indicate the point of onset of overlapping speech.
- = Equal signs, one at the end of one line and one at the beginning of a next, indicate no “gap” between the two lines.
- (+) One plus sign in parentheses indicates pauses from 5-10 seconds.
- (++) Two plus signs in parentheses indicate longer pauses above 10 seconds.
- uh. The syllable uh. indicates filled pauses in English.
- eh. The syllable eh. indicates filled pauses in Turkish
- (( )) Double parentheses contain transcriber’s descriptions rather than, or in addition to, transcriptions.
- word** Word in bold letters indicate the voice of the speaker on the SI channel.
- word Word in italicized and underlined letters indicate parts that point to a “shift in the speaking subject” in the delivery.



## “Shifts in the speaking subject” in the delivery in their order of occurrence during the conference

1)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...*Bu aslında Aristoteles’den değil Romalılardan gelen onlara özgü birşeydir ve Arendt’in getirdiği yeni şey eh. son derece orijinaldir a very sh short one, yes eh. mikrofon efendim (+) Mikrofon ne yazık ki açık değil. I don’t see in Being and Time that that tech what what you say. What he argues about techno eh. teknolojiyle ilgili argümanlar daha geç bir döneme aittir...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...*This actually does not come from Aristoteles but from the Romans it’s unique to them and the new thing Arendt brings uh. is very original a very sh short one, yes. uh. microphone please (+) The microphone is unfortunately not on. I don’t see in Being and Time that that tech what what you say. What he argues about techno uh. the arguments on technology belong to a later period...*

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...*then this is not Aristotelian this is very Roman and in that sense um. she she brings in something new which is neith neither Aristotle nor Heided, Heideggerian but actually quite original.*

*((inaudible remarks from the floor))*

(Chairman:)*A very sh short one, yes=*

*≡((inaudible remarks))*

(Participant:)*Uh. I I don’t see in Being and Time that that tech what what you say. What he argues about technology is a much later argument....*

In this instance, the interpreter is cut off from the interaction on the floor because the participants who speak from the floor during the discussion session do not use a microphone. Faced with overlapping and inaudible speech, the interpreter shifts from the speaker’s “I”, that is, she stops using the “I” in the delivery to (re)present the speaker on the floor, assumes the speaker-position and indicates the cause of the interruption in the delivery. The interpreter also switches off her microphone for a while, and when she does that, the voice of the speaker occupies the delivery because the SI channel automatically turns to the floor. Once she can hear the floor again, the interpreter switches on her microphone and this blocks the transmission of the speaker’s voice on the

SI channel. The interpreter also resumes the “I” of the speaker and thereby re-allocates the delivery to the (re)presentation of the speaker on the floor. Note that, in this excerpt, the delivery is host to three speaker-positions with (a) the interpreter speaking in the speaker’s “I”, (b) the interpreter speaking on her behalf, and (c) the speaker on the floor speaking in the delivery while the microphone of the interpreter is switched off, all indicating the multiplicity of the speaker-positions intertwined in the delivery.

2)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter A):... Şimdi Arendt bu konuda ne eh. şekilde düşündü, bu bambaşka bir sorudur. Mikrofon açık değil efendim (+) Eh. kürsüdeki mikrofon ne yazık ki açık değil (+) Hala. Ben de sizin eh. dikkatinizi B\*'ın metnindeki bir pasaja takmak istiyorum....*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter A):...Now what Arendt thought uh. about this subject is another question. The microphone is not on (sir/madam) (+) Uh. the microphone at the rostrum is unfortunately not on (+) Still. And I would like to hook your attention to a passage in B\*'s text...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker):...Whether you agree with that or whether Arendt could agree with that is another question=*

*=((inaudible remarks from the participant))*

*(Chairman – (barely audible)) Mikrofonu biraz indirin. Kendinize doğru tamam ((translation: “Lower the microphone a little. Towards yourself, okay”))=*

*(Participant:)=and the other one to CS\*. Uh. I want to draw your attention uh. to a passage in the text of B\*...*

[\*names of the persons are removed]

Right after the first instance (Excerpt 1), the interpreter is faced with more inaudible and overlapping speech on the floor because participants do not speak into the microphones. Once again, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position and mentions that the microphones are not on. While this remark by the interpreter explicates the presence of a problem in continuing with the delivery, it also seems to act as an indirect call for help. In fact, a few users of SI in the audience, who listen to the interpreter, signal the participant to use the microphone. As the transcripts of the floor recordings show, the chairperson also realizes the problem and tells the speaker to hold the microphone closer to his mouth. Once the interpreter can hear again, she resumes the “I” of the speaker and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery.

3)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Tahsa\*, burda eh. sizin burda, sizin burda benim burda doğup doğmuş olmamızdır ama Faktisite\* burda tekil olmamız ve bir tekil kültüre ait olmamızdır. Eh. burda Heidegger'in çok önemli bir ayrımı bu. Eh. bu sanıyorum Iredung\* ile başka bir kavram arasındaki ayrımına eh. tekabül eder. Bu bu Tatsektung\* eh. a karşılık verir ((a tense chuckle)) Wiederholung ise eh. bizim belirli bir topluluğun eh. üyesi olmamıza referans verir...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Tahsa\* here is that you are born here and I'm born here but Faktisite\* here is that we are single and belong to a single culture. Uh. this is an important distinction by Heidegger here. Uh. I believe this corresponds to the difference between Iredung\* and another concept. This this is met with Tatsektung\* ((a tense chuckle)) Wiederholung refers to the fact that we are a member of a certain group...

[\* mispronounced words in German shown with Turkish orthography]

**Floor:**

(Recordings of the floor for this excerpt are not available on the tapes)

In this instance, Interpreter B is faced with numerous references in German. Even though the recordings for that precise moment are missing, the recordings of the previous instances indicate that the discussion centers around the connotations of German words like “Faktizität”, “Tatsächlichkeit” and “Wiederholung” in Heidegger and Arendt’s writings. Interpreter B initially tries to sustain his delivery by trying to repeat these words, but some of the German terms seem to create problems. While a few of the terms Interpreter B repeats are still comprehensible, even if they are not uttered with proper German pronunciation (such as “Faktisite”), others do not make sense although they sound like German (such as “Tatsektung” or “Iredung”). At one point, the interpreter does not catch one concept clearly (Iredung?) and seems to miss another one completely because he builds a rather ambiguous sentence like, “This corresponds to the difference between Iredung and another concept”. Right after that, the interpreter tries to repeat another German concept one of the speakers refers to on the floor, but the word does not mean anything in German (“Tatsektung”). Note that there is a tense chuckle by the interpreter there, which is probably a sign of stress in coping with many words in a non-conference language.

4/5)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Bir görüş belirtmek istiyorum eh. Sayın S\*'in söyledikleriyle. Wiederholung ve Iner eh. Errinerung konusunda. Eh. benim eh. Varlık ve Zaman konusunda söyleyeceğim

şeylerde bu ikisi aynıdır. Almanca olarak Wiede Wiederholungu açıklıyor<sup>4</sup> yani yani sadece bir tekrarlama çok öte birşeydir. Eh. bu sadece bir tekrarlama değildir, bir Erinnerungdur. Aynı zamanda eh. bunu etimolojik anlamıyla alıp birşeyin içine girmeye olarak görmemiz olarak anlamamız lazım. Eh. bu metafizik işte. Şimdi Almanca olarak anlatıyor çünkü yoktur diyor. Dolayısıyla bence diyor ikisi aynıdır<sup>5</sup> çünkü Heidegger tekrarlamaı eh. Varlık ve Zamanın ikinci kısmında Erinnerung gibi açıklıyor...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...I would like to express a view uh. what Mister S\*. said. On the issue of Wiederholung and Iner uh. Erinnerung. Uh. these two are the same in what I have to say with regard to uh. Being and Time. (The speaker\*\*) explains Wiede Wiederholung in German<sup>4</sup> that is that is it is more than just a repetition. Uh. this is not just a repetition, it is an Erinnerung. At the same time uh. we need to take this with its etymological meaning and see it understand it as like going inside something. Uh. this is metaphysics. Now (the speaker) explains in German because (the speaker) says it does not exist. So, according to me, the two are the same says (the speaker)<sup>5</sup> because Heidegger explains repetition like Erinnerung in the second part of Being and Time...

[\* name of the speaker is removed from the transcript, \*\* the interpreter uses the subject deleted form in Turkish]

**Floor:**

(Recordings of the floor for this excerpt are not available on the tapes)

Soon after excerpt 3, the interpreter is faced with further references to German on the floor. Even though the recordings of the floor are missing, the delivery of the interpreter indicates that, in addition to interjecting German words, some of the speakers base their arguments on a comparison of the (etymological) connotations of German terms (for instance, by referring to “Er-innerung” as “going inside something”). The interpreter responds to such a discussion on the difference between “Wiederholung” and “Erinnerung” by inserting an explanatory remark that indicates the content of the interaction on the floor (“(The speaker) explains Wiede Wiederholung in German”). Note that he uses the subject deleted form in this remark in Turkish, which attenuates the reference to the speaker. After this remark, the interpreter resumes the “I” of the speaker again and renders a part of the following discussion in the speaker’s “I” (4).

A few seconds later, the speakers on the floor probably go back to German because Interpreter B stops using the speaker’s “I”, assumes the speaker-position and inserts another explanatory remark about the interaction on the floor (“Now (the speaker) explains in German”). After this second remark, the interpreter goes on to report the floor for some time by embedding the sentence of the speaker under the performative predicate “de-“ (“say” in English).

Once the floor turns to English, he resumes the “I” of the speaker again and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery.

Note that, in this brief excerpt, the interpreter uses various speaker-positions to (re)present the speakers in his delivery. His position shifts between the one speaking “as” the original speaker, the one “reporting” the original speaker and the one speaking “about” the speaker.

6)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Eh. batı düşüncesini yöneten eh. yöneliş, anlam, kendini PreSokratik, Sokrat öncesi düşüncede göstermiştir ve ortadan gör ortadan kalkmıştır hemen hemen kalkmıştır ama eh. kelimeyi söylemeye çalışıyor onun için bekliyoruz. İngilizce telaffuzunu bulamadı ama hala kaybolduğu halde ortadan eh. Batı düşüncesini yönlendirmeye devam etmektedir...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Uh. the orientation orienting Western thinking, sense, has shown itself in pre-Socratic, before-Socrates' thinking, and van vanished, nearly vanished but uh. (the speaker\*) is trying to say the word that is why we are waiting. She could not find the English pronunciation but despite the fact that it is still vanished, it uh. continues to orient Western thinking.*

[\* the interpreter uses the subject deleted form to refer to the speaker in Turkish]

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...the sense which all orient which has oriented uh. Occidental thinking this essence has shown itself in a certain manner in the Presocratic thinking and then it has vanished or nearly vanished but it subsists it uh. continues to orient to or or orient oder\*\*? To orient, orientér\*\*? To orient?*

*((inaudible comments from the floor))*

*(Speaker:) Yes, thank you, to to orientate Occidental thinking...*

[\*pronounced in German, \*\*pronounced in French]

As is quite often the case at this conference, the interpreter here faces a speaker who has serious difficulties in expressing herself and who admits to not having used English for more than forty years. In this particular instance, the speaker fails to find the correct pronunciation of the verb “to orient”. She actually mispronounces the same word before, but the interpreter understands the word and interprets it into Turkish. When the speaker tries to use the same word again, the interpreter does the same thing and renders the word correctly into Turkish. However, in this second time, the speaker seeks help from the panelists to find the correct pronunciation of the word. This creates a fairly long and overlapping interaction on the floor, during which the speaker tries to imitate the correct pronunciation with the help of other participants. Since the

interpreter has already rendered the problematic part without a problem in Turkish, there is not any indication of a pronunciation problem in the delivery. Perhaps because he feels he needs to accommodate this long interaction, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position and inserts a “comment” about the interaction on the floor. Note that the comment of the interpreter is more than a neutral description of the situation because, not only does it explicitates the content of the discussion on the floor by highlighting that the speaker is trying to say the word, but it also discloses an attitude on the part of the interpreter (“The speaker is trying to say the word, *that is why we are waiting*”).

7)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)... Şimdi Lausanne Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Felsefe Bölümünde Çağdaş ve Modern Felsefe Batı Düşüncesinin Soykütüğü Kürsüsünde profesör olarak ders vermektedir Batı düşüncesi diye düzeltiyor kendini başkan. Çok eh. yayını var ama hepsini eh. size okuyamayacağım çünkü Almanca bilmiyorum ben...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)... Now she teaches as a professor at the Lausanne University Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophy, Chair of Contemporary and Modern Philosophy Genealogy of Western Thinking. The chairman corrects himself saying western thinking. She has many uh. publications but I cannot read all of them uh. to you because I do not know German...

**Floor:**

(Chairman:)... She's currently professor at the Chair of Philosophie Contemporaine et Moderne. Généalogie de la Pensée at Lausanne University=  
=((inaudible remarks by the speaker))

(Chairman:) Généalogie de la pensée occidentale sorry and she has published widely but unfortunately I cannot read them aloud to you as I don't know German...

In this instance, the chairman starts reading the CV of the next speaker and the interpreter, who has the same CV in front of him, starts interpreting. Interestingly enough, possibly due to the grammatical structure of Turkish, the interpreter ends up giving more information about the speaker's biography than the chairman because the chairman makes a mistake in the middle of the sentence and reads the name of the speaker's Chair as “généalogie de la pensée”. The speaker interrupts him right away and corrects the name as “généalogie de la pensée occidentale”. Since the interpreter does not make the same mistake and renders the name correctly upfront from the text in front of him, there turns out to be a mistake and a correction on the floor, but no mistake in the delivery.

Perhaps because the interpreter feels the need to account for this unexpected interaction on the floor, he shifts from the speaker's "I", and interjects the remark, "the chairman corrects himself saying western thinking". This remark by the interpreter explicitates the content of the interaction on the floor by alluding to the fact that the chairman has made a mistake and is undertaking its correction. Note, however, that these remarks of the interpreter refer to the correction of a mistake that never occurs in the delivery because, according to the delivery, the chairman reads the name of the Chair correctly. Thus, this interjection by the interpreter points to a mistake by the speaker which the speaker does not make in the delivery. Compared to a rendition in the speaker's "I", the fact that Interpreter B speaks *about* the speaker also tends to accentuate *who* has made the initial mistake by explicitly naming the speaker as the one who corrects himself.

8)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Habilitasyon tezimi bunun önemli bir bölümünü Aristo'ya ayırarak yazdım. Buyrun. Başlayabilir miyim diyor konuşmacı. Sözlerime başlarken Boğaziçi Üniversitesine teşekkür etmek istiyorum...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...I wrote my habilitation thesis by sparing a significant part of it to Aristotle. Please. May I start says the speaker. I would like to start by thanking the Boğaziçi University...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...I wrote a thesis about hermetation in grand in an important part about Aristo.*

*(Chairman:) Thank you. Please, the floor is yours ((chairman signals the speaker to walk to the rostrum))*

*(Speaker:) Oh yes I can be there. Thank you so much ((speaker seeks chairman's approval to start with non-verbal communication)) Uh. I want to begin my address my thanks uh. to the Bosphorus University...*

In this instance, the chairman of the session signals (non-verbally) to the next speaker (same speaker as in excerpt 7) to proceed to the rostrum where the microphone is located. The speaker, who is sitting at the panel, responds verbally to the non-verbal language of the chairman and says, "Oh yes. I can be there". When she comes to the rostrum, she turns to the chairman and, with a questioning look and hand movement, seeks approval from him to start. The chairman nods politely. While the interpreter does not do anything about the first part of the semi-/non-verbal interaction in which the chairman signals the

speaker to walk to the rostrum and the speaker agrees, he opts to account for the second part of the semi-/non-verbal interaction in which the speaker seeks approval to start by “voicing” the speaker’s non-verbal communication (“May I start says the speaker?”). He then assumes the “I” of the speaker and goes on interpreting her in the first person of the delivery.

9)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Da-Sein’in eh. temel bir özelliği olarak eh. dünyada olmanın vecde eh. vecde halinde bir açılışımı tanımıştır. Bir başka şekilde söylersek Da-Sein’in kendi varlığı özür diliyor konuşmacı tekrar başlıyor. Öte te yani eh. Da-Sein’in varlığının esası eh. başkalarla, başkalarıyla birlikte olmaktır, Mitsein...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...as uh. a basic trait of Da-Sein, uh. he has acknowledged its ecstatic uh. ecstatic opening to being-in-the-world. In other words, the own being of Da-Sein the speaker apologizes and starts again. In other, that is, uh. the essence of Da-Sein’s existence is in its being with others, Mitsein...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...a fundamental trait of Da-Sein the ecstatic opening to its being in the world which necessarily involves the ecstatic opening to the other. In other words, the own being of Da-Sein implicates being in the wo im im implicates, excuse me, in other words, the own being of Da-Sein implicates in so far as it is being in the world, the being with others, Mitsein...*

When the speaker apologizes and corrects a part of her speech, this correction has a direct impact on the delivery because the interpreter is already in the middle of rendering the same sentence. Note that, rather than repeating the apology of the speaker in the first person, the interpreter prefers to account for it by paraphrasing the apology and explaining the interaction on the floor (“the speaker apologizes and starts again”). Paraphrasing, reporting and explaining the floor bring about a difference compared to rendering the speaker in the first person. Whereas the former imply speaking *about* the speaker, the latter implies speaking *as* the speaker. In that sense, “reporting”, “paraphrasing” and “explaining” create a distance between the interpreter and the speaker in the delivery. Furthermore, by openly referring to the speaker as the one who apologizes and corrects herself, these forms also tend to accentuate what takes place on the floor (i.e., a mistake and correction) and establish a more concrete link between the mistake and the speaker.

The decision of the interpreter to shift from using the speaker’s “I” when the speaker makes a mistake might be an indication that remaining in the



speaker's "I" is more challenging for the interpreter in "problematic" instances compared to other instances where the communication looks unproblematic and smooth. The possibility of being taken as the cause of the mistake might be a reason why the interpreter distances himself from the speaker in the delivery rather than rendering what he says in the speaker's "I".

10)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Bu varsayımların tam anlamı Heidegger'in daha sonraki düşüncesinde açıkça ortaya çıkar. Bu düşünce dolaylı bir şekilde baştan özür dilerim bu düşünce eh. Varlık ve Düşünce üzerine verdiği master dersleriyle hemen ara eh. ardından başlar...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...The real meaning of these assumptions surfaces clearly in Heidegger's later thought. This thought in a direct way from the start I'm sorry this thought uh. starts right after the Masters courses he gives on Being and Time...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...The full significance of these presuppositions become apparent in the later thought of Heidegger. This thought begins immediately with the Masters courses that he gave after Being and Time...*

In this instance, the interpreter apologizes and corrects a mistake he makes in rendering the sentence "This thought begins immediately with the Masters courses[...]". Note that the interpreter apologizes in the first person singular which he has been using to (re)present the speaker on the floor until that very moment. After his brief apology, the interpreter continues to represent the speaker with the first person. Thus the shift in the speaking subject is hardly palpable and the apology of the interpreter tends to blend into the speaker's "I" in the delivery. In hosting two intertwined speaker-positions (i.e., the interpreter speaking as the speaker and the interpreter apologizing for his own mistake), the excerpt highlights the hybridity of the delivery as a construct with multiple intertwined speaker-positions.

11)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Peki şimdi şair ne diyor dil hakkında? Bin bindokuzyüzde eh. eh. düzeltiyor kendisini konuşmacı binsekizyüzde, eh. son biçimi verilmiş bir parçada, Hölderlin dilin insan için bir iyilik olduğunu, ein Gut für den Menschen olduğunu söylüyor ama ne anlamdadır ki dil insan için iyiliktir, iyidir?...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...So now what does the poet say about language? In nine nineteen uh. uh. the speaker corrects herself, in eighteen hundred, uh. in a fragment finalized then, Hölderlin says that language is a good for man, ein Gut für den Menschen, but in what sense is it a good for the people, why is it good?...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...What then does the poet say about language? In a fragment edited in nineteen hundred, eighteen hundred, excuse me, Hölderlin says that language is a good for man, ist ein Gut für den Menschen. But in what sense is the language a good for man?...

Similar to 9, the speaker first says “nineteen hundred” and then corrects it with “eighteen hundred”. The interpreter renders the initial reference to “nineteen hundred” into Turkish so that when the speaker on the floor realizes her mistake, he possibly needs to account for this correction as well. In doing that, however, the interpreter opts to insert a brief explanatory remark about what the speaker does (“the speaker corrects herself”), rather than interpreting what she says in the first person. Note that, compared to a rendition in the first person, this remark distances the interpreter from the speaker and also creates a more concrete link between the speaker and the initial mistake.

12)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Dil böylece insani Da-Sein’imizin en üst olayını oluşturur. Almancasını dinlediniz. Şimdi Heidegger’le birlikte diyalogu esas unsurlarına ayrıştıralım...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Language thus forms the supreme event of our human Da-Sein. You’ve listened to its German. Now let us with Heidegger differ differentiate dialogue into its essential features...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...This opening involving our relationship to the divine, according finally the essential word, language proves to be the supreme event of our human Da-Sein, das höchste, die Sprache ist das höchste Ereignis des menschlichen Da-Seins. Let us now with Heidegger analyze dialogue in its essential elements...

As is often the case at this conference, one of the speakers makes frequent and lengthy references to German. Interpreter B, who does not have German as a working language, is faced with the challenge of dealing with these quotations. In this instance, Interpreter B shifts the speaking subject in the delivery and inserts an explanatory remark (“You’ve listened to its German”). Note that the

interpreter makes this remark in *his* first person and, in it, speaks *about* the interaction on the floor. While this remark, which is made in the first person by the interpreter, tends to blur the speaking subject in the delivery, it also seems to enable the interpreter to hint at what is happening on the floor when his “normal” flow in the speaker’s “I” is interrupted due to references in a non-conference language. After this brief remark, where he speaks *about* the interaction on the floor, the interpreter resumes the speaker’s “I” in the delivery and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery.

13)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Eh. vecd içinde birşeye açık olmak, diyalog özür diliyor konuşmacı bu şeyin kendi birliğinde ve özdeşliğinde ortaya çıkışıdır. Burada eh. bu bu özel kelimenin yani diyalogun birliğini tem oluşturan bu özel kelimenin yeteneği sayesinde olur...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Uh. being open to the thing ecstatically, dialogue the speaker apologizes it is the revelation of this thing in its unity and identity. Here uh. this this unity of the essential word that is dialogue is realized thanks to the gift of the essential word...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...Being ecstatically open to the thing, dialogue is the it excuse me being ecstatically open to the thing, it is the revelation of this thing in its own unity and own identity, thanks to the gift of the essential word, which constitutes, strictly speaking, the unity of dialogue...*

In this instance, the interpreter is interpreting a speaker who is reading her paper. In the middle of a sentence, the speaker mixes up the word order, apologizes and starts from the beginning of the same sentence. Rather than remaining in the speaker’s “I” to render the apology, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position and indicates that the speaker is excusing herself (“the speaker excuses herself”). Note that, even though it is very brief, this remark distances the interpreter from the speaker in the delivery and exposes the origin of the mistake by establishing a more concrete link between the mistake and the speaker.

14)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Zaman Fohtriss'tir. Varlığın kendisinin de her zaman geri çekilmeye ve kendini yeniden saklamaya yeniden eğilim gösterdiği gibi. Bu özel bu son özellik yani kopması zamanın, zamana zamana tekrarlıyor konuşmacı kendini bu özellik zamana, boyutlarının sebat etme eğiliminin kökeninde olan ay aynı hareketi ile eh. döner...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)... Time is Fohtriss. Just like Being tends to move back and hide itself again. This trait this last trait that is the tearing of time, to time, to time the speaker repeats herself this trait returns to time with the same movement as that which is present at the origin of its dimensions...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)... Time is Fortriss, it's ravishment. Just as also Being itself always tends to retire and hide itself again. This last trait, that of tearing away belongs to it, to Being, to the time, excuse me, this last trait, that of tearing away belongs to it, to the time, by the same movement of its dimensions...

Soon after excerpt 13, the same speaker, who has many difficulties reading her conceptually and structurally loaded text, encounters another difficulty in expressing herself ("This last trait, that of tearing away, belongs to it, to it, to Being, to the time"). As the speaker excuses herself and repeats the sentence from the beginning, the interpreter shifts the speaking subject, assumes the speaker-position in the delivery and indicates that the speaker is repeating herself ("the speaker repeats herself"). Note that with this remark, the delivery exposes and affixes the presence of a problem in the original speech, while also creating a direct link between the initial mistake (and the subsequent repair) and the speaker on the floor (cf. also 11 and 13).

15)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)... O, kendisi bu öykünün antagonisti. onun iki antagonisti vardır. Eh. o pardon antagonist dedim, yanlış. O bu hikayenin kahramanıdır ve onun iki antagonisti vardır...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)... He is the antagonist of the story and has two antagonists. Uh. he sorry I said antagonist, wrong. He is the hero of the story and has two antagonists...

**Floor:**

(Recordings of the floor for this excerpt are not available on the tapes)

Since the recordings of the floor are missing, there is no way of knowing the speaking subject in this excerpt. Has the speaker made a mistake or the interpreter? Is the interpreter voicing the speaker's apology and correction or is she apologizing and correcting her own mistake? Discerning the source of the mistake from the delivery alone is not easy because, given its "hybridity", the delivery may be host to multiple speaker-positions.

Naturally, users of SI are not bound by the delivery-as-a-text only and can always make use of different contextual cues such as non-verbal communication, intonation, speaker's utterances, etc. However, it is also highly unlikely that all users of SI will be able to notice all of the shifts in the speaker-position, systematically even if they can understand (parts of) the original speech. As a "heteroglot" site representing multiple speaker-positions, identifying the occupant of the speaker-position in the delivery at any given instance is clearly not a straightforward task.

16)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Teşekkürler. Gerçekten de Profesör S\*'e bu çok ilginç ve çok düşündürücü sunuş için teşekkür ederiz. Sanıyorum onbeş dakikamız mı var tartışmak için? En a en az onbeş dakika diyor Sayın S\*. Dolayısıyla tartışmamıza devam ederiz ...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Thank you. We would indeed like to thank Professor S. for this very interesting and very thought-provoking presentation. I think do we have fifteen minutes to discuss? Min minimum fifteen minutes says Mister S\*. So we can go on with our discussion...*

**Floor:**

*(Chairman:)...Thank you very much. Well indeed thanks to Professor S\* for this very interesting and very suggestive exposé. I think uh. we have some fifteen minutes or so for discussion.*

*///Is that right?*

*(Organizer – (barely audible))*

*///Well let's see. At least fifteen minutes=*

*(Chairman:)=At least fifteen minutes. I think we'd better go on with our discussion...*

[\*name of the person is removed]

The chairman of the session turns to the organizer, who is also a professor and one of the speakers at the conference, to inquire how much time is left for discussion. In this instance, the chairman at the rostrum speaks into a microphone but the organizer, who is sitting in the hall, responds without one. This leads to overlapping and barely audible speech on the floor. Overlapping speeches seem to challenge SI by presenting more than one voice to understand and, perhaps more importantly, also to represent in the delivery. That is to say, overlapping interaction imposes more than one voice and more than one "I" to a single voice signifying a single "I" in the delivery. In this instance, the interpreter shifts the speaking subject and turns to reported speech by embedding the utterance of the speaker under the performative predicate "de-" ("say"). Doing this seems to enable the interpreter to impose a "discursive" order in the delivery to the chaotic turn-taking on the floor by making explicit which speaker is being represented in the delivery at a given moment.

17/18)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Burada sorum biraz kıskırtıcı hale gelecek. Eh. Heidegger'in Almanya ve Rhein dersinde, Hölderlin eh. den bir şiir daha var. Hölderlin diyor ki, maalesef Almanca çeviremeyeceğim<sup>17</sup>, yani diyor biz yorumlanması mümkün olmayan bir sembolüz diyor Hölderlin... ((12 seconds of speech removed))...Bunu Heidegger konusunda kendi yorumunuz, özellikle, Mitsein, yani iletişim sorusuyla nasıl ilişkilendirirsiniz? Şimdi eh. Almanca olarak Hölderlin'i yeniden okudu<sup>18</sup>. Biz eh. imiz ama anlamı olmayan bir im. Çok zor bir soru. Eh. sanıyorum ikinci alıntı sizin kuğ yaptığımız alıntı nihilizm çağında insanın özelliğine referans yapıyor...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...My question is going to become a little provocative here. Uh. there is another poem from Hölderlin in Heidegger's course on Germany and Rhein. Hölderlin says, unfortunately it's in German, I cannot interpret it<sup>17</sup>, so he says we are a symbol without the possibility of interpretation... ((12 seconds of speech removed))...How do you associate this with your interpretation of Heidegger, especially Mitsein, that is, communication? Now uh. (the speaker\*) read Hölderlin again in German<sup>18</sup>. We are uh. a sign but a sign without meaning. That is a difficult question uh. I think the second quotation, the quo quotation you made, refers to the characteristic of man in the age of nihilism...

[\*the interpreter refers to the speaker with subject deletion]

**Floor:**

(Participant:)...here's where here is where my question becomes a little bit provocative. Uh. I think it's in Germanien Unser Heim in Heidegger's course on that in which he cites another verse from Hölderlin which is one of my very favorite of all of Hölderlin's verses where he says Ein Zeichen sind wir deutungslos<sup>17</sup> in other words we are a symbol without possibility of interpretation... ((15 seconds of speech removed))...How would you uh. draw that particular verse into your own interpretation of Heidegger and the problem of communication, problem of Mitsein, would be my question. It's a difficult question but uh.=

(Speaker:)=Yes he says Ein Zeichen sind wir deutungslos und haben fast die Sprache verloren<sup>18</sup> he contin he says in another hymn, Hölderlin, we are a sign but without signification and we nearly lost the language.

(Participant:)=Precisely=

(Speaker:)=Yes, yes. You're uh. it's a very difficult question ((laughter)) but you're yes. How I do. Yes, I think the second quotation you are quoting now is the characteristic of man in the age of nihilism, of nihilism...

17.

As is frequently the case at this conference, the speakers on the floor start citing lengthy quotations in German. For Interpreter A, these references do not pose much of a problem. In fact, in the interview Interpreter A mentions that she actually inserts German terms, even when speakers do not use them, to make her delivery more coherent (see Section 3.3.3.1). For Interpreter B, however, these

quotations clearly create a problem. In this instance, Interpreter B, who faces another long quotation in German, assumes the speaker-position in the delivery and explicates that there is a quotation in German which he cannot interpret (“Unfortunately it’s German, I cannot interpret it”). While the speaker on the floor seems to be the “speaking subject” in the delivery until that moment, this brief but striking interjection places the interpreter in the speaker-position. This interjection not only seems to fill in a potential gap in the delivery by enabling the interpreter to say something about the nature of the interaction on the floor, but it also reveals the cause of the interruption in the “normal” flow of the delivery (“...it’s in German...”). Furthermore, it highlights the interpreter’s personal position vis-à-vis the original remark (“Unfortunately...I cannot interpret it”). Once the floor returns to English, the interpreter resumes the speaker’s “I” in the delivery and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery.

18.

Soon after 17, the speaker starts citing the full verse by Hölderlin in German (“Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos und haben fast die Sprache verloren”). This quotation is probably too long for the interpreter to repeat. By inserting another explanatory remark (“she read Hölderlin again in German”), the interpreter seems to give an account of the original speech, which he is probably unable to render or repeat while using the speaker’s “I”.

19)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B): ...Mek zaman içinde mekan yani burda bence ilginç. Bilmiyorum cevabı verdim mi? Eh. bence mekanla zaman arasındaki bu i bu özel ilişki gerçekten çok aydınlatıcı diyor eh. Profesör B\*. Evet. Bence de aydınlatıcı yani mekan zamansallıktan bağımsız olarak ele alınmaz...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B): ...Sp its a space in time that I think is very interesting here. I don’t know if I’ve given the answer? Uh. I think this rel this special relationship between space and time is really very illuminating says Professor B\*. Yes. I also find it illuminating, that is, space cannot be taken up independent of temporality...*

**Floor:**

*(Speaker): ...It is a space in time. I find it very important and very interesting.*

*///Uh. I don’t know if I uh. give an answer*

*(Participant): ///I agree, I hadn’t thought of that particular relation between space and time.*

*It's very illuminating=*

(Speaker:)=*Yes, I find it very illuminating also. That means the space uh. first of all can not be considered out of the temporal, temporality...*

[\*name of the person is removed]

Once again, there is overlapping speech and rapid turn-taking on the floor with more than one speaker occupying the speaker-position at the same time. In response, the interpreter shifts from the first person in the delivery and turns to reported speech by embedding one of the speaker's words under the performative predicate "de-" ("say"). Whereas speaking in the speaker's "I" does not allow for a clearly differentiated representation of more than one speaker at the same time, reported speech seems to enable the interpreter to voice the rapid or overlapping interaction on the floor. The insertion of names or referents to persons signals a change of speakers in the delivery (e.g. "...says Professor B"). In that sense, using reported speech in the delivery seems to bring in a "discursive" order to the overlapping and chaotic turn-taking on the floor.

20)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...*Diyalogu alırsak eh. bir ve grup içinde diyalog alırsanız bir çoğulluk içinde düşünmek zorundasınız. Çoğulluk duyamıyorlar eh. ötekini, bir başkası, bir öteki olarak bırakır bu diyalog...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...*If we take dialogue uh. a anf if you take dialogue in a group you have to think in terms of a plurality. Plurality (the speaker\*) cannot hear uh. this dialogue leaves the other as another, as the other...*

[\*the interpreter refers to the speaker with subject deletion]

**Floor:**

(Participant:)...*It seems to me that if we take dialogue and uh. in particular a dialogue within a group then we have to have, and then you have to think also in terms of a plurality=*

(Speaker:)=*In terms of?*=

(Participant:)=*Uh. plurality*

*///plurality*

((Some participants in the audience, in French:))

*///pluralité pluralité*=

(Participant:)=*which uh. leaves the other as an other and uh. which does not uh. which does not let the other into some kind of appropriation or revelation...*

In this instance, the interpreter has no difficulty following and interpreting a question addressed to a speaker. As soon as he hears the participant utter "plurality", he renders it into Turkish. However, the speaker on the floor, who



admits not having used English for forty years, faces difficulty in understanding the question addressed to her in English. Since she does not understand the word “plurality” in the question, other participants try to help her out by pronouncing it in English and in French. This leads to a rather long interaction between the speaker and the audience. Thus, while the delivery of the interpreter presents an unproblematic account of the original speech, the interaction on the floor indicates some kind of a problem. Possibly to account for the prolonged interaction on the floor, the interpreter shifts from the speaker’s “I” in the delivery and inserts a brief comment (“(the speaker) cannot hear”) that hints at the nature of the problem on the floor. After this brief remark, the interpreter resumes the “I” of the participant and goes on interpreting the rest of his question.

21/22)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Bilmem ikinci sorunuza cevap verdim mi? ((inaudible remarks from the floor))*  
**But I mean that Merleau-Ponty has maalesef salondan konuşan konuşmacı mikrofon kullanmadığı için çeviremiyoruz. (+) Ama bence, diyor Ö\* Bey, eh, bu konularda yazmıştır Merleau-Ponty<sup>21</sup> ve tabii erken ölümü de yapıtını yar, yapıtının tam tamamlanmadan kalmasına yol açmış tır. Eh, Merleau-Ponty'nin birçok deyimini eh, Derrida devralmıştır tabii siz bu meseleyi ga benden de iyi biliyorsunuz. Peki son bir soru. Ordan konuşurlarsa çeviremeyiz. Lütfen uyarın. Mikrofona gelmeleri gerekiyorsa aksi takdirde Türkçeye çeviremeyecek<sup>22</sup> (+) **If I** eğer yanlış anlamadıysam, Profesör Ö\* ayırımın ayırımının eh, eklenmediğini içine yerleştirildiğini söyledi...**

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...I don't know if I've answered your second question? ((inaudible remarks from the floor))*  
**But I mean that Merleau-Ponty has unfortunately we cannot interpret because the speaker speaking from the floor is not using a microphone (+) But, according to me says Mr. Ö\*, uh, Merleau-Ponty has written on these topics<sup>21</sup> and naturally his early death has left his work inco unfinished. Uh, Many of Merleau-Ponty's expressions have been taken by uh, Derrida but of course you know this issue even better than I. Okay one last question. If they talk from there, we cannot interpret. Please warn them. They have to come to the microphone otherwise they cannot be interpreted into Turkish<sup>22</sup> (+) **If I** if I did not misunderstand, Professor Ö\* said the difference of difference uh, is not added but inserted...**

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...What does that mean? Uh, evidently that must be searched, that must be understood then in the context of uh, Merleau-Ponty. I don't know did I give you an answer to your second question.*

*((inaudible remarks by the person who asked the question))*<sup>21</sup>

*(Speaker:)=But I mean that Merleau-Ponty has written uh, uh, on this subjects also and uh, his premature that as uh, let his work unfinished and then many concepts, many expression which*

*Merleau-Ponty uses are taken then by Derrida also. We see that, you know better perhaps uh. than me, yes.*

*(Chairman:) Okay, one last question. Yes please.*

*((inaudible remarks from a participant))<sup>22</sup>*

*(Chairman:) Can you, can you come here?*

*((barely audible remark from the participant who says "I can shout"))=*

*(Chairman:)=but they cannot interpret (+)*

*(Participant:) If I did not understand uh. wrong uh. Professor Ö. has said that uh. the difference of difference is not added but inserted...*

[\* name of the speaker is removed]

21.

As is often the case at this conference, a participant, who has a question from the floor, speaks without a microphone. His comments are barely audible for the interpreter. Furthermore, there are also overlapping remarks between the speaker and the participant that probably bring in an extra difficulty for the interpreter. In response to inaudible and overlapping remarks, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position and indicates the existence of a problem with the use of microphones. He also notifies the users of SI that the interpreters cannot interpret under these conditions ("unfortunately we cannot interpret because the speaker speaking from the floor is not using a microphone"). As the speaker with the microphone takes over the floor again, the interpreter starts with reported speech ("but, says Mr. Ö., Merleau-Ponty has written on these topics..."), possibly to indicate which speaker he is representing at that point in the delivery. When the same speaker goes on occupying the floor and overlapping remarks stop, the interpreter quickly resumes the "I" of the speaker and places the speaker in the speaker-position in the delivery.

22.

Right after 21, another participant wants to ask the same speaker a question and starts doing so without a microphone. Once again, the interpreter shifts the speaking subject, and assumes the speaker-position. In the speaker-position, he indicates the cause of the interruption in his delivery and also asks his audience to warn the speakers ("If they talk from there, we cannot interpret. Please warn them. They have to come to the microphone otherwise they cannot be interpreted into Turkish"). Note that when the interpreter takes over the floor, he actually refers to himself and his colleague in the first person plural ("we"), but because he explicitly talks *about* the speakers and interaction, the shift in the speaking subject seems quite visible. His call seems to work: The participants in

the front rows, who are listening to the SI, signal to the speaker the need for a microphone and the chairman, who also notices these signals, tells the speaker to come to the rostrum for the microphone. The participant first seems reluctant to do so and says, “I can shout”, but as the chairman takes a clear stance (“but they cannot interpret”), the participant agrees and walks to the rostrum. Once the interpreter can hear the speaker again, he resumes the speaker’s “I” in the delivery and starts interpreting the speaker in the first person.

Note that, by addressing his audience directly and asking them to take action, the interpreter regulates the flow of communication on the floor and also transforms the position of the users of SI from passive recipients of the interpreted utterance to active agents who can help to sustain the SI-mediated interaction.

23)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Ondan sonra eğer sorunuzu doğru anladıysam, Sa S. Hanım şunu soruyor. Eğer eh. bir hikaye anlatımı oluyorsa o zaman bu bu durum bu durum bu hik eh. bu hikayenin hakkında anl hikaye anlatılan kişinin kimliğiyle nasıl ilişkilidir? Bunu mu soruyorsunuz? Burdan sorulursa maalesef çeviremeyiz ((interpreter knocks on the booth's window)) **I mean that şunu demek istedim...***

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...And then if I have understood your question correctly, Miss S. is asking this. If uh. if there is a story-telling then how is this this situation this situation related with the sto with the story whom with the identity of the story of whom this story is told to? Is this what you are asking? If asked from here unfortunately we cannot interpret ((interpreter knocks on the booth's window)) **I mean that I wanted to say that...***

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...if I if I have understood your question if this is the situation which a story-telling uh. can occur then uh. how is it how is is this related, how is this situation can is how is it related to the identity of the person about whom this story is told. Is that the question?*

*((inaudible remarks by the person who asked the question))*

*(Speaker:) I mean that the first dialogue be, the first dialogue between me and myself, the second dialogue between me and you and the third one uh. is between story-teller, the other and the other...*

Faced with the third consecutive interruption to his delivery because of inaudible interaction on the floor, the interpreter takes over the “I”, assumes the speaker-position and announces that he and his colleague cannot interpret when the participants speak without microphones. Note that this remark is

made in the first person, which the interpreter uses to represent the speaker before and after this interjection. Possibly because of repetitive interruptions, the interpreter also knocks on the window of the booth. This interrupts the interaction on the floor and directs the attention to the interpreter. When a speaker with a microphone takes over the floor right after that, the interpreter resumes the speaker's "I" and positions the speaker on the floor back to the speaker-position in the delivery.

24)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Çok teşekkürler. Biraz daha zamanımız olsaydı son söylediğinizin we'll discuss it some other time. Yes, yes, sure, there is Derrida'yla bir ilişkisi var mı diye sormak isterdim. Çok büyük bir akrabalığı var elbette. ((cassette change)) Eh. ben ben bunu böyle görüyorum. Belki başkaları başka türlü görüyordur ama eh. ötekinin imlemesi eh. Levinas'da özür dilerim Derrida değilmiş Levinas Levinas'daki bu ötekinin imlenmesi eh. eh. var Heidegger'de varlığın öteki gibi düşünülmesinden kaynaklanır...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Thank you very much. If we had some more time on what you last said. We'll discuss it some other time. Yes, yes sure there is I would have liked to ask if it was related with Derrida. Of course, it is closely related ((cassette change)) Uh. this is how I see it. Maybe others see it differently but uh. the signification of the other in uh. in Levinas sorry it was not in Derrida but Levinas the signification of the other in Levinas uh. uh. stems from being taken as the other in Heidegger...*

**Floor:**

*(Participant:)...Well thank you very much. I mean if we had some more time I would have like to ask you if uh. what you said lastly uh. doesn't it have some affinity with Levinas for example uh. but perhaps we'll discuss it some other time=*

*(Speaker:)=Yes ((cassette change, parts of the floor recordings after the change are missing))*

One of the speakers on the floor refers to Levinas. The interpreter temporarily switches off his microphone. This is perhaps because he is not too sure about the name since, when the interpreter switches the microphone on again, he interprets the name as Derrida. Parts of the floor recordings after that are missing due to a cassette change but, from what is available, the interpreter then seems to apologize for saying Derrida instead of Levinas. Note that the interpreter apologizes in the first person, which he uses to represent the speaker before and after this brief apology and correction in the delivery. Thus, while the "I" in "uh. this is how I see it" represents the original speaker, the "I" in the next sentence, "sorry, it was not in Derrida but Levinas," belongs to the interpreter, once again

pointing up the “hybridity” of the interpreted utterance and the multiplicity of the speaker-positions co-existing under the “I” in the delivery.

25)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...*Eh. eylem eh. eh. Arendt için eh. dünyevi veya sıradan süreçleri otomatik süreçleri eh. beklenmedik ve düzensiz bir şekilde keser. Böylece eh. özgürlük alanı eh. emek ve özgürlüğün dedi konuşmacı eh. ait olduğu gereklilik alanından kesin olarak ayırır...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...*Uh. action uh. uh. for Arendt uh. cuts the profane or mundane processes automatic processes uh. unexpectedly and irregularly. Therefore uh. the area of freedom uh. labor and freedom said the speaker is definitely distinct from the area of necessity it belongs to...*

**Floor:**

(Recordings of the floor for this excerpt are not available on the tapes)

The recordings of the floor are missing. Therefore, it is not possible to know what takes place on the floor, but the recordings of the booth seem to indicate a correction in the original speech where the speaker first says “area of freedom” and then adds “labor” to it. In the delivery, the interpreter accounts for this correction by reporting the speaker (“labor and freedom said the speaker”), which implies speaking *about* the speaker, rather than remaining in the speaker’s “I”, which implies speaking *as* the speaker. Note that reporting the floor accentuates the fact that the correction stems from the speaker by creating a direct association with the speaker on the floor.

26)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...*Bir insanın düşüncesi bu kadar kesinlikli, açık ve dürüstse seninki gibi, o zaman eh. her zaman kontrol edilmemiş roman romantik köşeleri vardır bunun. Almanca söylüyor şimdi aynı şeyi konuşmacı. Eğer bu eğer farklı faaliyetlerin özgürlüğün ve gerekliliğin farklı alanları olarak görülürse...*

**My translation of the floor:**

(Interpreter B:)...*If a person’s thought is so precise, clear and honest as yours, then uh. there are always uncontrolled roman romantic corners of it. The speaker is saying the same thing in German now. If this if different activities are seen as different areas of freedom and necessity...*

**Floor:**

(Recordings of the floor for this excerpt are not available on the tapes)

In this instance, the speaker on the floor is reading her paper. The interpreter, who is interpreting her in the first person, suddenly assumes the speaker-position (“I”) and starts speaking *about* the speaker. The recordings of the floor are missing. However, according to the text of the speaker, which is distributed during the conference, the speaker probably shifts to German in this instance and reads the quotation “Wenn ein Mensch ein so präzises und klares und anständiges Denken wie Sie hat, gibt es stets unkontrollierte romantische Winkel”. Possibly because the quotation is quite long, the interpreter opts to account for it with an explanatory remark (“the speaker is saying the same thing in German now”). Note that while this remark gives an indirect account of the original speech by indicating that the speaker is saying the same thing in German, it also foregrounds a reference in a non-working language of the conference as the cause of the interruption to the “normal” flow of the delivery.

27)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter A:)...Ne tür bir yargıdır bu? Etik yargı mı? Estetik yargı mı? Pardon, yoksa teleolojik yargı mı? Hangisidir Hannah Arendt’in devraldığı...?*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter A:)...What kind of a judgment is this? Is it ethical judgment? Is it aesthetical judgment? Sorry, or is it teleological judgment? Which one is it that Hannah Arendt takes over...?*

**Floor:**

*(Recordings of the floor for this excerpt are not available on the tapes)*

There is an apology in the delivery but, since the floor recordings are missing, it is not possible to say whether it stems from the speaker or the interpreter, and for which reason. According to the norms in SI, this apology should belong to the speaker. However, as many instances in the present corpus indicate, the speaker-positions in the delivery are more complex than the norms seem to suggest.

Naturally, users of SI follow the floor and the delivery in its natural context during a conference. They can see the speaker, hear him/her, in some cases understand what s/he says, follow the non-verbal signs, etc. In that sense, natural contexts provide many communicative cues that transcripts cannot show. However, discerning the change of speaker-positions in the delivery, especially a change from the speaker to the interpreter in the first person, is still a challenge in many ways, due to the intertwinedness of the multiple-speaker positions in the delivery.

28)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...benim ilk sunuşumun ilk başlığı Etki eh. Altında Bir Kadındı. Bu Cassavetes'in eh. bir eh. bir övgüydü, saygı göstermiştim ama tabii sinema kongresi değil burası. Tabii bütün sorun, Cassavetes'i kastediyor konuşmacı eh. Amerikalı sinemacı. Biraz önce J. B.\*'la konuşuyorduk. Eh. eh. bir eh. kişinin kendi ustasına karşı yaz düşünmesi bir öğrenci olmasını ortadan kaldırırmı?...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...the first title of my first presentation was A Woman uh. Under Influence. This was a uh. a homage of Cassavetes, I paid tribute but of course this is not a cinema congress. Of course the whole problem is the speaker means Cassavetes uh. the American moviemaker. A little while ago we were talking with J.B\*.. Does the fact that someone write thinks in opposition to his master eliminate the fact that (s)he is a disciple?...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...my first uh. my first title of my communication uh. was entitled A Woman Under Influence. This was an homage to Cassavetes of course although its not a congress on cinema. Alas ((laughs)) It depends on what what we mean by disciple uh. the question I I I ask and we have we have talked about that a little before with J.B\*....

[\*name of the person is removed]

In this instance, one of the speakers mentions that she first gave her paper on Hannah Arendt the title of a movie by Cassavetes called “A Woman under the Influence”. Then she smilingly adds that she is aware this is not a conference on cinema. The interpreter interprets these remarks and starts interpreting the next sentence of the speaker when he suddenly shifts from the speaker’s “I” and inserts an explanatory remark (“the speaker means Cassavetes, the American movie maker”). Since knowing who Cassavetes is, is more a matter of general knowledge than linguistic knowledge, users of SI might have the same knowledge of who Cassavetes is as those who speak English. Nevertheless, with this explanatory remark, users of SI receive more information on a particular reference than those who do not follow the SI.

29/30)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Now I'm going to speak in Turkish but you need headphones. You need headphones<sup>29</sup> ((+)) ((a pause of approximately 20 seconds in which the interpreter leaves the booth, fetches the technician and ensures the distribution of headsets to participants)) **Okay? Eh.** **şimdi** now the topic is very complex. Therefore I don't think I'm going I'll be able to express myself with one or two sentences but nonetheless I will uh. ask certain questions. Of course uh. I

wasn't educated in philosophy. I just read it on my own. I'm a self-made man in philosophy but this is sometimes an advantage because when I when I'm confronted with certain concepts when I'm confronted with certain concepts uh. then I can ((knocks on the window)) *Channel two, channel two, channel two. Can you find it? İki. Okay?* ((to the Turkish speaker from the side of the booth:)) *ampirike geri dönün ampirike*<sup>30</sup> ((laughs)) so I come from a more empirical viewpoint because I don't have references to who said what in philosophy...

**Floor:**

*(Recordings of the floor for this excerpt are not available on the tapes)*

29.

During a discussion session, one of the Turkish participants announces that she will speak in Turkish. Since all of the questions and contributions until that moment have been made in English, none of the English-speaking panelists have headsets with which to listen to the SI. Seeing the panelists looking quizzically, the interpreter leans out of the booth and calls out “You need headphones” to the panelists. The proximity of the booth to the rostrum probably facilitates this kind of direct communication (see 3.2.6). With this intervention, the participant, who is about to speak in Turkish, realizes there is a problem and stops talking. In the meantime, the interpreter leaves the booth and tells the SI technician, who is outside the conference room, to bring headsets to the English-speakers. Once everyone is set, the interpreter signals the participant to continue. Note that, by doing so, the interpreter regulates the flow of communication and turn-taking on the floor.

30.

Soon after he starts interpreting, the interpreter interrupts the participant on the floor again because he sees that some of the English-speakers who have just put on their headsets are playing around with the buttons of the receiver. Possibly concluding that they are on the wrong channel, the interpreter knocks on the window of the booth and shows “two” with his fingers. He also shouts “Channel two, channel two. Can you find it?”, and thereby enters into direct contact with the primary interlocutors. Once he has all his “potential customers” on the correct channel and ready to listen to him, he leans out from the side of the booth and tells the Turkish participant to repeat her remark, starting from a certain point (“empirical, go back to empirical”). This is another striking example of how the interpreter takes explicit control over the flow of communication and turn-taking on the floor.



31)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)... We know that peoples also, nations also do make mistakes and because so they should not be turned into myths and maybe it is not on my part to say so uh. but I would like to say we should also open such windows so that we also understand also this dimension better. Thank you. Biz size çok teşekkür ederiz efendim. Hemen mi cevap vereyim? Tam soruyu tam ne yani kadar anladığımı well, I don't know whether or not I could understand your question. I really did not understand it. Quite fra well I'm afraid but I think that of course it's a good thing that we make such meetings and talk about pluralism and difference and...

**My translation of the floor:**

(Participant:)... To redefine peoples, societies, instead of glorificating masses, the mass, instead of glorifying the peoples, in the philosophical sense, that is, them, the peoples uh. how they continue that peoples can make mistakes, that peoples develop negative features that is, that they should not be assessed as if myths uh. objects of worship and explaining these in such philosophical meetings perhaps with my humble if I have contributed even minutely with my speech he here I will be happy or else my unhappiness might be possible but should it not be necessary to assess anew such openings, such windows? Thank you.

(Chairman:) Okay, thank you you very much. Would you like to respond or should we?=  
 (Speaker:)=I don't know whether I fully understood the question but I think uh. the fact that such meetings are held are themselves and that we speak of the issue of difference, plurality uh. that is the speaker who asked the question right before uh. can themselves be an answer to this...

**Floor:**

(Participant:)...Halkları, toplumları, kitleleri yeniden tanımlamak, kitleleri kitleyi yüceltirme yerine, halkları yüceleştirme yerine, felsefi anlamda yani onu halkları eh. eh. nasıl süregeldiğini, halkların da çoğu zaman yanlış yapabildiklerini, halkların da olumsuz öğeler geliştirdiklerini yani onların hani bir mit eh. tapınç ögesi mit olarak değerlendirilmemesi gerektiğini bu tür felsefi toplantılarda anlatmak belki acizane bur burda konuşmamla ufacak bir şey kattıysam mutlu olurum yoksa mutsuzluğum sözkonusu olabilir ama böyle açıklmaları, böyle pencereleri yeniden değerlendirmek anlamak gerekmez mi? Teşekkür ederim.

(Chairman:) Okay, thank you very much. Would you like to respond or should we?=  
 (Speaker:)=Tam soruyu ne kadar anladığımı bilmiyorum ama eh. böyle toplantıların yapılması başlı başına ve burada işte farklılık konusunun, çoğulluk konusunun konuşulması eh. yani az önceki soruyu soranın eh. yani başlı başına buna bir yanıt oluşturabileceğini düşünüyorum...

One of the Turkish participants asks a Turkish speaker, who has just delivered her paper in English, a long and ambiguous question in Turkish. The interpreter interprets the question into English. Her delivery sounds more coherent and grammatical than the participant's question and one can see that the interpreter has tried hard to make sense out of an ambiguous input. The speaker on the floor, who does not seem particularly successful in understanding the original question either, first says, "I don't know whether I fully

understood the question” and then starts giving a fairly general answer. The interpreter interprets this first remark (“I don’t know whether or not I could understand your question”), but then adds a further one (“I really did not understand it”), which accentuates the point made by the speaker about the ambiguity of the participant’s question. Note that this remark is made in the first person in the delivery and sounds like it is made by the speaker. Thus, participants listening to the delivery get to hear a stronger opinion of the speaker compared to those who listen to the speaker directly.

32)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...Evet şimdi sözü kendisine veriyorum. Buyrun efendim  pardon<sup>32</sup> *thought which seems eh. ben şimdi Arendt’in kendimce önemli gördüğüm birkaç düşüncesini sunacağım. Sistematik değil sadece aklıma geldiği şekilde bazı şeyleri sıralayacağım*<sup>a</sup>. Hepimiz şuna mutlak surette katılmaktayız<sup>b</sup> bizim toplantımızın amacı...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter A:)... Yes now I give the floor to him. Yes sir sorry<sup>32</sup> *thought which seems uh. I am now going to present a couple of Arendt’s ideas that seem important to me. Not systematically I shall just list certain things as they come to my mind*<sup>a</sup>. We all absolutely agree with the fact that<sup>b</sup> *the objective of our meeting is...*

**Floor:**

(Chairman:)...Uh. with that I uh. give the floor to Professor A.V.T\*.

(Speaker:) Thank you. Well I would like to make remarks and draw a attention some aspects of Arendt’s thought which seems to me important. This is not a systematic paper just just remarks<sup>a</sup>. Uh. we all agree I suppose<sup>b</sup> and this is uh. the object of our colloquium that...

[\* names of persons are removed]

There is an apology in the delivery, but none in the speaker’s speech. For some reason that it not too clear from the transcripts, the interpreter makes an apology in the delivery. Note that she makes this apology in the first person singular, which she uses to represent the speaker before and after that moment. Hence, the apology tends to blend into the speaker’s “I”, thereby pointing to the intertwinedness of the speaker-positions in the delivery.

Note that this excerpt also highlights two further aspects of the delivery. First of all, an incomplete utterance in the speaker’s speech (“just just remarks”) is rendered complete and is expressed more *elaborately* in the delivery (“I shall just list certain things as they come to my mind”) (see superscript a). Furthermore, a moderate emphasis in the speaker’s speech (“We all agree I suppose”) is rendered more *assertively* (“We all absolutely agree with the following”) (see

superscript b; cf. also 41 and 58). Since this study basically relies on a delivery-driven analysis of the “shifts in the speaking subject” rather than a full comparison of the booth and the floor recordings, such instances where speaker’s utterances are rendered more complete, grammatical, elaborate, etc., tend to become palpable only coincidentally. Thus, further analysis of the same corpus may highlight a variety of other ways by which the delivery of the interpreters shapes the transfer of the original speech to the target language.

33)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...*Bu tabii çok a şaşırtıcı bir değişim zira aktör ve seyirciyi birbirinden ayırıyor. Farklı noktalara getiriyor pardon pardon eh. Arendt’in aktör ve oyuncu ve seyirci arasında yaptığı bu yer değiştirme manevrası vita aktivanın dan vazgeçip eksklusiv ola bir biçimde vita kontemplativaya mı gittiğini insana düşündürüyor...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...*This is of course a very surprising change because it separates the actor from the spectator. Brings them to different points sorry sorry uh. this shift Arendt makes between actor and player and spectator, makes one think that it whether it leaves vita activa and goes exclusively to vita contemplativa...*

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...*This is a surprising shift uh. in emphasis uh. but well she makes between the actor and the spectator. Uh. this shift makes wonder uh. or uh. the, well sorry, the surprising shift in emphasis she makes between the actor and the spectator makes critics wonder whether judgment still participates in the vita activa or it is now confined exclusively on the vita contemplativa...*

In this instance, the speaker apologizes for a mistake in expressing herself and the interpreter renders this apology in the first person in the delivery. Interestingly enough, when the interpreter voices the apology of the speaker, she has not yet started interpreting the sentence in which the speaker makes a correction. Thus, there is nothing to apologize for in the delivery. Hence, the apology in the delivery does not refer to the same segment of speech to which the speaker’s apology refers. This is an instance that suggests that simultaneous interpreters might voice the apologies of the speakers even, if those apologies do not have direct relevance to a specific segment in the delivery (see also 35).

34/35/36)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...*Eğer şunu hesaba katar isek, çağımızda kamuoyunun eh. iddiasını hesaba, kamu alanının pardon<sup>34</sup> iddiasını hesaba katar isek pardon şöyle diyim<sup>35</sup> kısmi aktör, bütün*

aktörler, eh. zaten pardon<sup>36</sup> taraflı aktör veyahut da tarafsız yargıç aslında bağımsız yargının iki eksenini oluştururlar...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...If we take into account, in our age, of the public opinion's uh. claim, take the public realm's sorry<sup>34</sup> claim into account sorry let me put it this way<sup>35</sup> the partial<sup>1</sup> actor, all actors, uh. already sorry<sup>36</sup> the partial<sup>2</sup> actor or the impartial judge actually form the two axes of independent judgment...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...Uh. if we take into account, the decline of the public realm in our modern age. uh. I think we could say that the political actor sorry<sup>35</sup> the partial actor which is always is always partial and impartial spectator or judge are two elements or two axes of independent judgment, maybe...

[partial<sup>1</sup> and partial<sup>2</sup> refer to the two meanings of the homonym “partial” in Turkish used by the interpreter. Partial<sup>1</sup> stands for “kısmi” in Turkish which means “of or relating to parts” and partial<sup>2</sup> stands for “tarafli” which means “biased or inclined to favor one party over the other”]

In this instance, there are three apologies in the delivery, but only one in the speaker's speech. The first apology (34) in the delivery does not seem to be speaker-induced and probably belongs to the interpreter, who corrects her first choice of “public opinion” with “public realm”.

The second apology (35) seems to be speaker-induced because the speaker on the floor corrects “political actor” with “partial actor”. In fact, from the point of view of the delivery, that apology is not really needed because, due to the time lag between the speaker and the interpreter, the interpreter never utters the word “political actor” in Turkish, that is subsequently corrected as “partial actor” by the speaker. Yet, the interpreter still opts to include the apology to the delivery (see also 33).

Finally, the third apology (36) clearly belongs to the interpreter and relates to her initial missuppression of the contextually wrong meaning of “partial” in Turkish. Thus, there are three apologies in the delivery that are all made in the first person singular. Since the first person singular in the delivery is thought to belong to the speaker exclusively, and is also used by the interpreter to represent the speaker right before and after the apologies, the apologies of the interpreter and the apologies of the speaker as voiced by the interpreter tend to blend into each other, indicating the complexity of the speaker-positions in the delivery.

37)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Arendt eh. bunu bu yargı kavramını çok ciddi bir şekilde vurguluyor ama eğer Arendt'in yaklaşımında düşünme her zaman deneyimler alanıyla ilişkili olarak eh. ele alındığına göre, tekrarlıyorum konuşmacı duymuyor öteki çünkü, o zaman Eichmann eh. vakası bir eksik yargı eh. yargı vakası olarak görülmeli...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Arendt uh. strongly emphasizes this this concept of judgment but if in Arendt's approach thought is always taken up in its relation to the realm of experiences, I repeat because the speaker does not hear, the other one, then the case of uh. Eichmann should be seen as a case of lacking judgment case of judgment...

**Floor:**

(Participant:)...If you take seriously that uh. uh. in her uh. approach, thinking is always related to the realm of experiences uh.=

=///((inaudible remarks by the speaker))

(Participant:)=//that in her approach uh. thinking is essentially uh. uh. bound up with the realm of experiences=

=((inaudible remarks by the speaker))=

(Participant:)=realm. It its bound up with realm of experiences

///((inaudible remarks on the floor))

(Participant:)=//yes. uh. uh. then the Eichmann case itself uh. uh. well can be uh. must be seen as an uh. example of a missing judgment...

One of the participants asks a question of a speaker, but the speaker finds it very difficult to understand the part of the question that refers to the “realm of experiences”. The participant repeats the word a few times, but the speaker signals both verbally and non-verbally that she cannot understand it. While the primary interlocutors have a problem understanding each other in English, the interpreter has no problems interpreting the same part (“realm of experiences”) into Turkish. Thus, users of SI hear an unproblematic delivery, but see and hear a prolonged interaction in which one of the speakers clearly shows signs of incomprehension. Perhaps because the interpreter wants to compensate for this “gap” between the seemingly problematic interaction on the floor and the smooth delivery, he inserts the remark, “I repeat because the speaker does not hear, the other one”. While the real problem on the floor stems from the main speaker’s problem in understanding the concept “realm of experiences” rather than in hearing it, the speaker does make the participant and other members of the audience repeat the same words quite a few times. Despite all repetitions, however, she does not understand what the participant

says and the participant continues with the question. By inserting the remark, “I repeat because the speaker does not hear, the other one”, the interpreter seems to highlight the nature of the problem on the floor and indicate to his listeners, who have heard an unproblematic delivery, that there is a problem of communication on the floor.

Note, however, that this remark is also a rather peculiar construct. First of all, the remark is voiced in the first person singular, which has been used by the interpreter to represent the speaker until this remark. Thus, by its very construction in the first person, it gives the impression that it is said by the speaker and interpreted by the interpreter. However, the remark at the same time contradicts the idea that it is the speaker who has uttered it, because a speaker on the floor would hardly refer to the participant s/he is talking to as “the other speaker”. On the other hand, the remark also contradicts the idea that it belongs to the interpreter because the primary interlocutors on the floor are not listening to the interpreter, so he cannot be the one repeating himself for one of the speakers to hear. Thus, this brief insertion of the interpreter is a “hybrid” utterance itself that looks as if it can belong to the speaker and/or the interpreter but, at the same time, defies direct association to either through its own construction.

38)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...yargı ama çok önemli. Bütün eh. iş eserlerinde Hannah Arendt'in yargılamaya geliyor dönüp dolaşıp herşey yani bir yargıç var. Duyamıyorum ki çünkü mikrofon kapalı. Profesör S\*,'ün de dediği gibi duruma göre yargı meselesine dönersek belki çözüme yaklaşıyoruz...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...judgment however is very important. All works of Hannah Arendt dwell in one way or the other on judgment so there is always a judge. Well I can't hear that because the microphone is off. As Professor S\*. was saying if we go back to judgment according to situation, we may be getting closer to a solution...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...but judgment is very important. And all Arendt's works is on judgment I mean we have to. If we are human we have to judge=

=((inaudible remarks from the floor))=

(Speaker:)=Uh. no more values? Is this all value? Indispensable value.

(Participant:) Maybe we have to get back then to our concept of uh. what Professor S\*. was saying before a situation and judgment in situation which would then be Aristotelian...

[\* name of the person is removed]

As is quite often the case at this conference, speakers on the floor talk overlappingly and without microphones. The interpreter responds by shifting the speaking subject and assuming the speaker-position in the delivery. With that, the “I” in the delivery suddenly starts (re)presenting the interpreter rather than the speaker whom it represented until a second ago. The shift is indeed quite sudden and, the interpreter does not give the listeners any notice of the change of speakers in the delivery by, for example, referring to himself in the third person and saying something like “the interpreter cannot hear”. The change in the speaker-position becomes palpable only through the context. By overtaking the “I” in the delivery, the interpreter indicates the existence of a problem stemming from the failure of the speakers to use microphones. Once one of the participants on the floor occupies the floor as a single speaker and speaks into a microphone, the interpreter resumes the “I” of the speaker and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery.

39)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Agamben konusunu Ö\*.'a bırakacağım. Lütfen konuşmacıyı uyarır mısınız mikrofonu eline alsın. Agamben benim arkadaşım değil. Bunu Agamben'i Ö\*.'a bırakıyorum. Bu üçüncü soruyu ona bırakıyorum ben...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...I will leave the issue of Agamben to Ö\*. Would you please warn the speaker to take the microphone in his hand. Agamben is not my friend. I leave this Agamben to Ö\*. This third question I leave to him...

**Floor:**

(Participant:)...exactly where can we draw the line in somebody that we would isolate from the community or execute? Thank you.

(Speaker — (without a microphone and barely audible:)) Well for the third question Agamben I'll I'll leave Ö\*. to to to ((laughter)) Agamben is his great friend so=  
 =(the interpreters shout “mikrofon”)

(Speaker:) Oh sorry. II I'll leave Ö\*. to uh. to answer uh. the third question...

[\* name of the person is removed]

Soon after 38, the interpreter is cut off from the floor again because the speakers fail to use microphones. Once again, the interpreter responds to the situation by shifting the speaking subject and taking over the “I” in the delivery. By assuming the speaker-position, the interpreter not only indicates the nature of the problem on the floor, but also addresses his listeners directly and asks them to take action and warn the speakers to use a microphone (cf. also 22

and 44). The transcripts of the floor indicate that the interpreters also call out “Microphone” from the booth. Once the speaker on the floor starts using the microphone, the interpreter re-allocates the “I” to the speaker and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery.

40)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Eğer sizi anlayabildiysem, Arendt'in Eichhan'ı Eichmann'ı anlayıp anlamadığımı soruyorsunuz samıyorum (+) Konuşma, salondan yapılan konuşma mikrofonsuz olduğu için çeviremiyoruz (+) Well, *my English is not that good to understand benim İngilizcem sizi anlayacak kadar iyi değil...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...If I could understand you, you are asking if Arendt understood Eichan Eichmann or not I think (+) The talk because the talk made from the floor is not made into a microphone we cannot interpret (+) Well *my English is not good enough to understand my English is not good enough to understand you...*

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...If I if I understood you F\* uh. you you are asking whether uh. uh. Arendt understood Eichmann or uh. uh. //did I? wha? did? Uh? Well

////((Inaudible remarks))=

=////((The participant repeats her remarks but they are inaudible))

(Speaker:)//Yes yes yes yes Well my English is not that good to understand of it. I I'm sorry I couldn't get your point quite clearly I'm sorry...

[\* name of the person is removed]

As in 37, 38 and 39, the speaker and a participant become involved in a dialogue with many overlapping remarks. Furthermore, the participant speaks without a microphone. The interpreter responds to the situation by shifting the speaking subject and assuming the speaker-position in the delivery. In the speaker-position, the interpreter indicates the cause of the interruption to the delivery by mentioning that the comment from the floor has not been made into a microphone. He also emphasizes that they cannot interpret under these circumstances. Apparently, nobody takes action because a fairly long section following this comment remains uninterpreted. During this time, the interpreter stops interpreting and switches off his microphone. As he does this, the delivery channel automatically switches to the floor and the voice of the original speaker occupies the “delivery”. Once the speakers start using a microphone and the interpreter can hear again, the interpreter turns on his microphone, which blocks the transmission of the speaker's voice, resumes the



speaker's 'I' in the delivery and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery.

41/42/43)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Acaba Hannah Arendt Eichmann'ı anlıyor mu anlamıyor mu bilmiyorum. İki tür anlama vardır. Birinci tür o birincisine gelicem<sup>41</sup>. İkinci Ana Hannah Arendt bir yerde unutmadan veya Fransızca söylersek<sup>42</sup> afdan af etmekten af ne zaman gelir? Forgiveness yani affetme. Unutkanlık kelimesiyle affetme kelimesini karıştırdı bu konuşmacı<sup>43</sup>. Bu şimdi iki tür iki tür anlama var...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...I don't know if Hannah Arendt understands Eichmann or not. There are two kinds of understanding. The first kind, I'll come to that first one<sup>41</sup>. The second is Ana Hannah Arendt somewhere of forgetting or to say it in French<sup>42</sup> of forgiveness<sup>42</sup> forgiving when does forgiveness arrive? Forgiveness\* that is forgiveness. This speaker has mixed up the word forgetfulness with forgiveness<sup>43</sup>. This now there are two kinds of understanding...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...Uh. well I don't know if uh. Hannah Arendt understands Eichmann. There there is two two sort of understanding, uh? There is one sort of understanding<sup>41</sup> uh. and the second I'll try and the second is uh. uh. is the Hannah Arendt speaks of the somewhere of forgetfulness or pardon<sup>42</sup> I I I haven't read in in English uh. le pardon et quand est-ce que le pardon arrive? When the///wha? wha?

////((inaudible remarks))

(Speaker:) Pardon\*, forgiveness, when forgiveness arrives?<sup>43</sup>

=((inaudible remarks from the floor))

(Speaker:) When? I don't know...

[\*pronounced in French]

In 41, the speaker says there are two kinds of understanding, and then starts explaining the first kind, when he suddenly leaves that sentence incomplete and jumps to explaining the second kind of understanding. The interpreter, who has already said “the first kind (of understanding)”, inserts the remark, “I’ll come to that first one” in the first person, although the speaker on the floor does not complete that sentence. Thus the interpreted utterance becomes more complete and grammatically correct than the speaker’s utterance. In the present study, such instances that render the original speech more complete become palpable only coincidentally because the analysis here rests on a delivery-driven exploration of the “shifts in the speaking subject”, i.e., shifts that are basically detectable from the interpreted utterance. Therefore, the same corpus may be host to other

instances where the delivery presents a more complete speech than the speakers' speeches (cf. also 32a, 32b, 42).

In 42, the speaker utters a word in French (“pardon”) without giving any explanation. Before rendering the same part in his delivery, the interpreter inserts a brief remark (“to say it in French”), that indicates an upcoming reference in French. However, after this remark, the interpreter does not say the French word (“pardon”) in his delivery. Instead he uses the Turkish word “af” for “pardon”. Furthermore, the interpreter also renders the subsequent question that is voiced in French by the speaker (“quand est-ce que le pardon arrive?”) into Turkish. Thus, users of SI receive an indication that French will follow (“to say it in French”), but do not hear anything in French after this remark, whereas the listeners of the original speech do not hear any indication of upcoming French from the speaker, but hear two consecutive references in French.

In 43, primary interactants who have poor English pronunciation also speak overlappingly and without microphones. On top of this, the main speaker first says “forgetfulness” in English, which the interpreter renders into Turkish as “unutkanlık”, then says “pardon” in French and further confuses the interpreter by citing the quotation, “quand est-ce que le pardon arrive?” (cf. 42). While the participants in the conference room try to help the speaker with his English, the interpreter realizes that the initial reference of the speaker to “forgetfulness” was a mistake and that he was actually trying to refer to “forgiveness”. With that, he shifts the speaking subject in the delivery, assumes the speaker-position and inserts a comment (“this speaker has mixed up the word forgetfulness with forgiveness”). Note that this comment by the interpreter is not a neutral one. First of all, by declaring that the speaker has mixed up the words, this remark reveals the presence of a problem in the original speech. Secondly, by explicitly referring to the speaker as the one who mixes up the words, it creates a concrete link between the mistake and the speaker and thereby ascribes the “mistake” to the speaker on the floor. Last but not least, this comment also discloses the (rather negative) feelings of the interpreter with regard to the speaker and interaction on the floor (cf. also 45).

44)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Eh. noktayı tam anlamadım. Size sonra veririm. Böyle giderse konferansın çoğu çevrilmeden kalacak. İsterseniz uyarım eh. düşüncesiz...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Uh. I didn't understand the point completely. I'll give it to you later. If this goes on like this, most of this conference will remain uninterpreted. Warn them if you want to uh. thoughtless...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...I didn't get the point and Eichmann=

=////((inaudible remarks from the floor))

(Speaker:) ////and the difference between Eichmann and Heidegger uh.

(Speaker:)= there is no thoughtless in uh. in uh. in in in Heidegger but maybe thoughtless...

In this instance, the interpreter is cut off from the flow of communication on the floor again (in fact for the seventh time in a row), because of overlapping remarks that are made without a microphone. Chaotic turn-taking and inaudible interventions from the floor make his task extremely difficult and, once again, the interpreter responds by assuming the speaker-position in the delivery to call his listeners to action (see also 22 and 39). Since such interruptions are quite frequent, and his former calls and warnings do not bring about a lasting solution, there seems to be a tone of despair, if not slight anger, in this comment by the interpreter ("If this goes on like this most of the conference will remain uninterpreted, warn them if you want to").

45)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Düşüncesiz, düşüncenin eksikliği Fransızca Fir excés de pensée yani eh. fazla düşünce bu sefer de dendi ama niye deniyor bunlar tam ben anlamadım. Heidegger tarafından çok fazla düşünme eh. Eichmann tarafından da çok az düşünme ge eh. yokluk aynı hataya götürüyor...

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Thoughtless, lack of thinking, in French, excés de pensée, that is this time they say excessive thinking but I don't really understand why they say these. Too much thinking on the side of Heidegger uh. and lack of thinking, absence, on the side of Eichmann leads to the same error...

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)... there is no thoughtless in uh. in uh. in in in Heidegger but maybe thoughtless, absence de pensée=

=((inaudible remarks from the floor))=

(Speaker:)=excés de pensée, excés, oui, excésif

((the floor turns to French and the remarks are inaudible))

(Speaker:) Too much thinking from one side, the side of Heidegger and absence you used absence or lack lack lack of thinking from the side of Eichmann leads to the same error...

Soon after 44, the interpreter is cut off from the discussion once again because he cannot hear the remarks made without a microphone. As he tries to sustain the delivery amidst overlapping comments on the floor, he first hears “thoughtless” and then “absence de pensée” followed by “excés de pensée” in French. Faced with chaotic turn-taking, inaudible remarks and contradictory terms lined up in French and English, the interpreter suddenly takes over the “I” in the delivery and makes a “charged” comment (“This time they say excessive thinking but I don’t really understand why they say these”), which reflects the displeasure of the interpreter with the interaction on the floor. Note that, with the sudden shift of the speaker-positions, the interpreter transforms the delivery from a site where he speaks “as” the speaker to a site where he speaks “about” the speaker and the interaction on the floor.

46)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Dolayısıyla bu gerçekte nasıl uzlaşabilirsiniz? Bu bir eh. hem tarihsel bir gerçekliktir hem de ebediyen geçmişte kalmıştır. Bu işte bir aftır, bir bağışlamadır, Arendt’e göre. Şimdi eğer Agamben’i de bu bağlamda işin içine getirmek isterseniz homo saker me eh. Çıplak Hayat vesaire bütün bu sorunlar. Peki niye getirmeyelim derdim, niçin olmasın derdim. Uzlaşma orada da olması gereken bir şey. Her yerde olmalı barışma\* uzlaşma\*. Hayat hikayesinin umutsuz bir şekilde sona erdiği her yerde. Büyük bir tehlike, büyük bir tehdit var insan hayatına, insan düşüncesine, arada olma durumuna bu koşullar altında ama bir uzlaşma ya da barışma, reconciliation zor bir kelime İngilizce, uzlaşma veya barışma olmalı...*

**My translation of the booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...So how can we reconcile with this reality? This is a uh. both a historical reality and it also remains in the past forever. This then is a forgiving, pardoning, according to Arendt. Now if you want to bring Agamben into the matter within this context homo saker uh. Naked Life etcetera all these problems. Okay why should we not bring it I would say, why not I would say. Reconciliation is something that must also take place there. Everywhere where the life story comes to an end hopelessly. There is a great danger, a great threat to the human life, human thought and to the state of being in-between under these conditions but uzlaşma\* or barışma\* reconciliation\*\* is a difficult word in English, it should be uzlaşma\* or barışma\*...*

[\* “uzlaşma” and “barışma” are the two words with which the interpreter tries to render the connotations of “reconciliation” in Turkish.]

[\*\* pronounced in English in the delivery.]

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)...How can you then how are we going to reconcile yourself with this reality which is a timely and historical reality at the same time and which is passé forever. This then is forgiveness. The a way of reconciliation according to Arendt is forgiveness. Now if you want to bring also uh. Agamben into this context uh. homo saker naked life all these problems well uh. I would like to*

say, why not? Why not? Uh. the reconciliation must also happen everywhere properly speaking where the life story has come to an end. In a hopeless way evidently and there is a big danger, there is a big menace to human life, to human thinking, to being in between uh. under these circumstances but a reconciliation must come. In each case. That's my how I understand it. (Participant:) Yes, just to add when you ask uh. how to reconcile oneself with what happened in that world and with those people who who were responsible what happened...

In this instance, one of the speakers expands on how Arendt and Agamben have used and understood the word “reconciliation” in their writings. According to the speaker, reconciliation carries multiple meanings for the philosophers. To convey the connotations of “reconciliation”, the interpreter uses two words in Turkish (“uzlaşma” and “barışma”). Possibly because neither of the words convey the connotations fully, he also inserts a remark on the difficulty of expressing the word (“reconciliation is a difficult word in English, it should be uzlaşma or barışma”). Note that the interpreter makes this remark in the first person, which he uses to represent the speaker before and after this insertion. He also inserts this remark without giving any concrete indication about the change of speaker-positions from the interpreter speaking as the speaker to the interpreter speaking as the interpreter in the delivery. In that sense, this excerpt again points to the multiplicity of the speakers intertwined in the first person singular of the delivery and to the “hybridity” of the interpreted utterance.

47/48/49)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)... *When you ask how to reconcile oneself with what happen dünyada olanlarla ve dünyada olanlardan sorumlu olanlarla nasıl barışılacak yani bu bence tabii anlamın anlamının bize mikrofon<sup>47</sup> by questioning like she does in *The Origin of Totalitarianism*, she questions like *anlama tabii burada yardımcı olacaktır (+) mikrofon lütfen*<sup>48</sup> (+) *Zannedersen eh. affetmekle barışmak farklı iki şeylerdir. Affetmek bir insana yönelir yani eğer bir insan sizden onu affetmenizi istiyorsa onu affedersiniz ama barışmak, rekonsilyasyon bambaşka bir şeydir. Burda pardon yani affetme sözkonusu değildir. Özel bir kişiye yönelmiyor. Barışma mikrofon lütfen<sup>49</sup> (+) Bu dediğinizden emin değilim...**

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter A:)... *When you ask how to reconcile oneself with what happens in the world and those who are responsible from what happens in the world, that is, I think of course meaning understanding microphone<sup>47</sup> by questioning like she does in *The Origin of Totalitarianism*, she questions like understanding will certainly help us here. (+) microphone please<sup>48</sup> (+) I think uh. forgiving and reconciliation are two different things. Forgiving pertains to a person that is if someone asks you to forgive him you forgive but reconciliation is something completely different. Here it is not about pardon, that is, forgiving. It does not pertain to a particular person. Reconciliation microphone please<sup>49</sup> (+) I am not too sure about that what you said...*

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...when you ask uh. how to reconcile oneself with what happened in that world and with those people who who were responsible what happened. It's precisely by trying to understand what happened. Understanding is the way to reconcile oneself I think with the world=

=((inaudible remarks from the floor))=

(Speaker:)=No but by questioning like she does in *The Origin of Totalitarianism* she she questions like with a hammer like Nietzsche ((laughs)) in all her works. Finally the answers come uh. and I think uh. to reconcile one oneself is not quite the same thing as forgive. To forgive is to forgive to somebody, to forgive to somebody who asked you to forgive him. If somebody asks didn't doesn't ask you to forgive, there is nobody to forgive but to reconcile oneself is is not the same. You you reconcile yourself with the world and you forgive to some uh. uh. *sin avec quelq'un particulier\** with uh. somebody particular=

=((inaudible remarks from the floor))=

(Speaker:)=I'm not sure=

=((inaudible remarks))=

(Speaker:)=I'm not sure=

=((inaudible remarks))...

[\* words pronounced in French by the speaker]

In these instances, the speaker on the floor has a microphone but the participant, who speaks from the audience, does not have one. The interpreter responds by saying “microphone” in the delivery (47). Since the problem continues, she then stops the delivery and switches off her microphone. When the interpreter does that, the channel, that is reserved for the delivery, automatically switches to the floor, so that when the speaker with the microphone starts talking again, his voice occupies the “delivery”. Naturally, when the speaker speaks into a microphone, the interpreter hears him as well and switches on her microphone. This interrupts the transmission of the speaker’s voice on the SI channel. Although she seems to have lost most of the preceding comments, the interpreter starts her interpretation as soon as she can hear the speaker again, which indicates the interpreter’s willingness to start interpreting. Only a few words later, however, the participant from the floor intervenes without a microphone again. Once again, Interpreter A says, “microphone please” and stops her delivery (48). When the speaker with the microphone starts speaking again, the interpreter starts interpreting as well. A few sentences later, the participant intervenes a third time and the interpreter again says, “microphone please”, stops the delivery for some time and continues when she hears the speaker with the microphone again. Note that this short excerpt points to three speaker-positions in the delivery, with the interpreter speaking “as” the speaker, the interpreter speaking “as” the interpreter, and the speaker speaking in the delivery.

50)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...*Eh. Hayatın Aklında veya tin eh. pa özür dilerim Akın Hayatında veya Tinsel Hayatta Arendt bunu şöyle koyar...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...*Uh. in The Mind of the Life or mind uh. pa sorry The Life of the Mind\* or The Life of the Mind\* Arendt puts it in the following manner...*

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...*In The Life of Mind, as Arendt puts it, the criterion of logos coherent with speech is not truth or falsehood but meaning...*

[\*The interpreter renders the word “mind” twice in Turkish: first as “akıl” and then as “tin”]

The speaker on the floor refers to Hannah Arendt’s book *The Life of the Mind*. While rendering the name of that book, the interpreter mixes up the word order and says “Hayatın Aklında” (“The Mind of the Life”). He realizes his mistake right away, apologizes and corrects himself in the first person singular which he uses to represent the speaker until and after that correction. Interestingly, he actually corrects himself twice by rendering the name of the book, once, as “akıl”, and then as “tin”.

51)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...*Eylem, hem düşünmeyi hem de eylemi bir araya getirerek, logos, pardon, hem eylemle düşünmeyi bir araya getirerek işfa eder, açığa çıkarır...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter A:)...*Action, by bringing together both thought and action, logos, sorry, by bringing together action and thought reveals it, brings it to the open...*

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)...*action is something uh. with uh. which uh. which uh. gathers both thought and action and reveal it by speaking...*

One of the participants asks a speaker quite a lengthy question on the “destruction of logos”. Even though the speaker on the floor never undertakes a correction, the interpreter, who is naturally following the speech closely, possibly realizes a mistake in the sentence, which states “action [...] which gathers both action and thought”. The interpreter then apologizes in the first person and replaces the first reference to “action” with “logos” (“logos, sorry, by bringing together action and thought reveals...”). Note that the correction is

made in the first person singular, which is used by the interpreter to represent the speaker until and after this correction. Thus, the shift in the speaking subject in the apology and correction are hardly palpable in the delivery.

52)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)...Now a moment ago, uh, you talked about a second life. I think so. Perhaps you talked about reincarnation here. Yes please talk about, will you please talk about this? This is not the second life. I I said the second birth. You used the word second life. This is not true. The translators very clearly said second birth. This is misconception, misperception. A Arendt talks about two births. The first one is physiological birth. That's the first birth. The second birth, the second birth is uh. is our birth into uh. into human relationship...

**My translation of the floor:**

(Participant:)...Yes, in your speech, a moment ago, you mentioned about second life. I think. You probably wanted to bring in reincarnation. Yes, this please, I would like to request.=

(Speaker:)=Uh. I did not say second life but second birth maybe there was a mis uh.=

(Participant:)=You used the expression second life that's what I'm referring to. You used the expression, you said second life=

=((barely audible remarks from the speaker who seems to tell the English-speaking chairman that she will answer in Turkish))

(Chairman:)=Yes.

(Participant 1:)=That's how the translation came probably.

(Speaker:)=That is probably how the translation came. Uh. I wanted to say what ((English-speaking panelists suddenly start smiling and giggling)) Arendt calls second birth. Arendt separates birth into two. The first one is our physiological birth, maybe our birth from our mothers. The second birth, this is our first birth, the second birth is uh. ((to the English-speaking chairman who is still smiling:)) Am I saying wrong?\*(headshakes from the smiling panelists) Okay\*. Uh. uh. our second birth is uh. is our uh. birth among the humans...

[\*pronounced in English by the speaker]

**Floor:**

(Participant:)...Evet demin konuşmanızda bir ikinci yaşamdan bahsettiniz. Sanıyorum. Bununla bir reenkarnasyonu herhalde devreye almak istediniz. Evet, bu lütfen rica edeceğim=

(Speaker:)=Eh. bu eh. ikinci yaşam değil ikinci doğum dedim belki yanlış eh.=

(Participant:)= İkinci yaşam tabirini kullandımız da o bakımdan konuşuyorum. O tabiri kullandımız, ikinci yaşam dediniz=

=((barely audible remarks from the speaker who seems to tell the English-speaking chairman that she will answer in Turkish))

(Chairman:)=Yes.

(Participant:)=Çeviri öyle geldi herhalde.

(Speaker:)=Çeviri herhalde öyle geldi. Eh. şunu söylemek ((English-speaking panelists suddenly start smiling or giggling)) ikinci doğum dediği Arendt'in Arendt doğumu ikiye ayırır.



*Bunlardan ilki bizim biyolojik doğumumuzdur, annemizden belki doğumumuzdur. İkinci doğumumuz ise, bir birinci doğumumuz budur, ikinci doğumumuz ise eh. ((to the English-speaking chairman who is still smiling:)) Am I saying wrong? ((headshakes from the smiling panelists)) Okay. Eh. Eh. ikinci doğumumuz ise eh. Bizim eh. insanlar arasındaki doğumumuzdur...*

One of the Turkish participants asks a Turkish speaker, who has just finished presenting her paper in English, a question in Turkish. In her question, the participant inquires whether the speaker had “reincarnation” in mind when she referred to “second life” in her lecture. The speaker is very surprised to hear such a question and emphasizes that she was talking about “second birth” in Arendt and not “second life”. She tries to explain that Hannah Arendt uses this term to refer to the socialization process of the individual. However, the participant insists that she has heard her say “second life”. The tension between the speaker and the participant is resolved by putting the blame on the interpretation (“that is probably how the translation came”). As soon as the interpreter hears this accusation on the floor, he assumes the speaker-position and relegates the speakers on the floor from the position of those speaking to the ones spoken of in the delivery. In fact, the interpreter does not even interpret the accusation of the speakers, but directly reacts to it in the “delivery”. Interestingly enough, for the first time in this corpus, the interpreter here refers to himself and his colleague as “the translators”. This is perhaps because he wants to avoid even the slightest possibility of being confused with the speaker. By referring to himself and his colleagues as “the translators”, Interpreter B clearly distances himself from the speaker in the delivery. In the speaker-position, in addition to reaffirming that there was no mistake in the delivery to start with (“The translators very clearly said second birth”), he actually also re-directs the accusation to the primary interlocutors (“this is misconception, misperception”). The comments of the interpreter engender empathic smiles and comments among those listening to the English interpretation including the chairperson and some other panelists. The speaker, who is in the meanwhile still trying to clarify to the participant what Arendt means by “second birth”, does not understand why the panelists suddenly start talking to and smiling at each other. Suspecting herself of having said something wrong, she turns to the panelists and says, “Am I saying wrong?”. When the chairperson smilingly shakes his head, she says “Okay,” and goes on with her speech, though still puzzled by the situation.

Note that, while the speaker is the only speaker for the Turkish audience, she is only one of the speakers in the “interpreted utterance” for the users of SI.

When the speaker and the participant find fault with the interpretation, the interpreter reacts to them, excludes the speaker on the floor from the delivery and becomes the main speaker for the English-speaking audience. Furthermore, when the English-speaking audience reacts to the comment of the interpreter with empathic smiles and remarks, the remarks of the interpreter also affect the flow of the communication in the room. In fact, the speaker on the floor actually reacts to an interpreter-induced interaction between the English-speaking panelists when she turns to ask the chairman if she has said something wrong.

In this instance, the delivery and speech on the floor, which are assumed to be two parallel utterances of the same speaker in different languages, turn into two antagonistic discourses by two different speakers. The speaker, however, hardly becomes aware of this change.

There are two further points of interest that are not directly available from the excerpts. The first is that the interpreters are indeed not “guilty” of the miscommunication between the speaker and the participant. The transcripts of the booth clearly show that the interpreter systematically uses the word “second birth” when interpreting the speaker. He never refers to a “second life” in his delivery. The second point, and what is even more interesting, is that the participant, who asks this question on “reincarnation”, happens to be one of my respondents in the user interviews. During the interview, she mentions being a member of a spiritual organization and underlines that she expects the interpreters to convey the “spiritual world of the philosophers” (see Section 3.3.4). Thus, it is perhaps not coincidental that, among all the users of SI, she gets to hear “second life” as “second birth” and ends up linking it all to “reincarnation”.

53)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)... Then freedom of thought can be banned. There can be prohibitions with respect to the freedom of expression, thought, thought. Because uh. in action, this is universal. In action there are uh. constraints, limits on the basis of laws. In this situation uh. there is the information society. A rationale brought by the information society which means that we can this is a matter open for debate. This is not very certain but but, according to these theses, thought can not, may not be free. Thank you. I suppose I wasn't able to express myself very well. Because I don't understand how you can draw these conclusions from my presentation. But I did not say, let me correct something, I did not say politics and philosophy are the same thing. Uh. I said they are the sa two sides of the same coin. These, when you, well think of a coin that turns around its edge when you throw it on the floor and you see one side at a certain moment and then the other side at the other moment. Unfortunately this can't be translated. The translation may be wrong. Of course it's always the fault of the translator. Yes! I did use exp expressly the word madalyonun*

*iki yüzü which means the two sides of the coin in Turkish. Oh my God! ((Laughter in the background. Some barely audible talk in English (see the transcription of the 'floor'). The conference interaction breaks for about a minute)).*

**My translation of the floor:**

(Participant:)...Then freedom of thought can be uh. banned, it can be prohibited, that is thought may not be free. In this case because in action ((inaudible remarks)) the area of freedom is limited that is since its limited in the wo in the universe, that is, in the world that we live in, since its constrained with laws and then there is also the process brought about by the information society. There is a justification that this brings which means that we can actually this is this is uh. uh. this is a debate in the political sense. It is not very clear, not very defined but, here, according to your thesis, thought uh. may just as well not be free. Thank you very much.

(Speaker:) I probably uh. did not express it well enough because I don't really understand how such conclusions can be drawn from my speech uh. but uh. I did not say politics and philosophy are the same. First I want to correct that. I said politics and philosophy are uh. more like the uh. the two sides of a uh. of a coin. Uh. they are in constant, I actually am uh. reminded of the image of a coin which continuously turns around itself when you throw it to the floor. You see the one side at a certain moment and the other side at another moment. Uh. and=

(Participant -(barely audible:))=In the translation there is no such distinction. Just so that you know.

(Speaker:) Uh. the translation may be wrong bec uh. as the owner of that text I'm telling you the real translation. ((Long laughter among those listening to the English interpretation. One English speaker in the panel says, "Poor translators". Some panelists start talking to their Turkish colleagues and one Turkish panelist tells the names of the interpreters and then says in Turkish: "Türkiye'de bulabileceğimiz en iyi çevirmenler" ("The best translators we can find in Turkey"). Somebody else adds, "Özellikle bu konuda" ("Especially on this topic"). The interaction on the floor breaks for about one minute)).

**Floor:**

(Participant:)...O zaman düşünce özgürlüğü eh. yasaklanabilir bu durumda, yani yasaklı olabilir yani düşünce özgür olmayabiliyor. Bu durumda çünkü eylemde ((inaudible remarks)) özgürlük alanı kısıtladığına göre dün yani evrende yani şu yaşadığımız dünyada kısıtlı olduğuna göre yasalarla sınırlandırıldığına göre bu durumda eh. bilgi toplumunun getirdiği de bir süreç var. Getirdiği bir gerekçe var. Demek ki biz düşünceyi de yani aslında bu çok eh. eh. yani politik anlamda bir tartışma konusu. Çok belirgin değil, belirlenmiş değil ama burda o sizin o bu tezlere göre düşünce eh. özgür olmayabilir de. Çok teşekkür ederim.

(Speaker:) Herhalde eh. ben eh. yeterince if iyi ifade edeme edemedim çünkü ben benim konuşmalarından nasıl bu sonuç çıktığını tam olarak anlıyamıyorum eh. ama eh. politika ve felsefe aynı demedim. İlkini onu düzeltmek istiyorum. Felsefe ve politika eh. bir paranın, bir bozuk paranın iki yüzü gibi eh. dedim daha çok. Eh. bunlar sürekli, bunu daha çok ben eh. yere attığımızda sürekli etrafında dönen bir para imgesini hatırlatıyor bana daha çok. Kimi zaman bir tarafımı kimi zaman diğer tarafını görüyorsunuz. Eh. ve=

(Participant -(barely audible:))=Tercümede bu ayırım yok. Bunu bilesiniz.

(Speaker:) Eh. çeviri yanlış olabilir çü eh. ben size o tekstin sahibi olarak esas çeviriyi

*söylüyorum.* ((Long and lively laughter among those listening to the English interpretation. One English speaker in the panel says, “Poor translators”. Some English-speaking panelists start talking to their Turkish colleagues. Then Turkish panelists start talking between themselves and one of them tells the names of the interpreters to her friend and adds in Turkish: “Türkiye’de bulabileceğimiz en iyi çevirmenler” (“The best translators we can find in Turkey”). The other Turkish panelist replies, “Özellikle bu konuda” (“Especially in this topic”). The interaction on the floor breaks for about one minute))

Right after 52, another Turkish speaker takes the floor to ask the same Turkish speaker another question. His question is vague and poorly formulated grammatically, with many incomplete sentences and incoherent use of tenses. Though vague, the participant seems to challenge the speaker with a rather provocative question about whether she has argued for the possibility of prohibiting freedom of thought according to Heidegger. Completely puzzled by what she probably sees as two very radical interpretations of her speech, the speaker reacts defensively, saying that she does not understand how such conclusions can be drawn from her paper. As she tries to explain that she sees politics and philosophy as two sides of a coin, the participant intervenes and says, “In the translation, there was no such distinction”. The speaker agrees with the possibility of a wrong interpretation, and says, “The translation may be wrong. As the owner of the text I’m telling you the real translation”. Hearing another unfounded accusation, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position in the delivery and starts defending himself. His sarcastic remark, (“Of course it’s always the fault of the translator. Oh my God!”), evokes long laughter and comments among the English speakers who are listening to the interpretation. The flow of communication in the room changes completely because those participants, who have been listening to the interpreter, start talking among themselves and repeating the comments of the interpreter to their Turkish colleagues in the panel. The speaker on the floor, in the meanwhile, is forced to stop talking because none of the English-speakers in the room and none of the panelists on the rostrum are listening to her any longer.

Note that, with this intervention, the interpreter not only changes the flow of the interaction, but also transforms the position of the speakers and interpreters. All of a sudden, the interpreter, who is supposed to be “relaying” the speaker, starts “regulating” the flow of the communication on the floor, and the delivery, which is supposed to be a site where the speaker speaks, becomes a site where the speaker is spoken of.

Two further significant points here are, first, that the participant who asks this question happens to be one of my respondents in the user interviews

(see 3.3.4). During the interview, this participant refers to himself as a “political activist” and underscores that he expects the interpreters to “convey the feeling behind concepts”, which might say something about why he interprets the speaker’s speech rather strongly to suggest that freedom of thought can be banned.

Secondly, the last sentence in this excerpt, where the speaker says, “The translation may be wrong, as the owner of the text, I’m telling you the real translation”, strikingly reveals that, even the speaker who talks about how “agents disclose their identity through speech”, does not hesitate to claim the sole ownership of her text and its “real” translation. Apparently, “disclosing one’s identity through speech” is seen as a prerogative of “original” speakers, and not their interpreters.

54)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)... This is only uh. true for Heidegger. This is not Arendt. Perhaps this may be misunderstood but I did not say this. For Hannah Arendt uh. truth I I I interrupted you. I’m sorry I interrupted you. No no go ahead, says the person. Uh. in uh. in the final analysis, Arendt’s philosophy is meaning-centered, not truth-centered...*

**Translation of the floor:**

*(Speaker:)... This is only true in Heidegger but it is not a context for consideration in Arendt, that is to say, it might have been misunderstood but I did not point out to that that is Hannah Arendt’s true truth I actually wanted to say that as a conclusion. I’m sorry I interrupted you but=*

*(Participant:)* ===Please

*(Speaker:)* ///just so that it doesn’t go wrong for later. Uh. uh. after all Arendt’s philosophy is meaning-centered, not truth-centered...

**Floor:**

*(Speaker:)... Bu tamamen Heidegger’de sözkonusu olan Arendt’te bu sözkonusu olmayan bir bağlam yani belki yanlış anlaşılmuş olabilir ((brief inaudible remark by the participant)) ancak buna işaret etmedim yani ha Hannah Arendt’in doğru doğruluk zaten sonuç olarak onu belirtmeye çalıştım. Afederseniz lafınızı kestim ama=*

*(Participant:)* ===Lütfen

*(Speaker:)* ///daha sonraya yanlış gitmesin diye. Eh. eh. sonuç olarak zaten eh. Arendt’in felsefesi anlam merkezlidir, doğru merkezli değildir...

In this instance, there are overlapping remarks on the floor and the interpreter responds to this with reported speech whereby he embeds the utterance of one of the speakers under the performative predicate ‘de-’ (‘say’). Reporting (as well as paraphrasing and explaining) the floor seem to allow the interpreter to

talk *about* the speakers, thereby enabling the interpreter to explain which one of the speakers he is voicing in the delivery at a given moment (see also 4, 5, 7, 8, 16, 19, 21, 56). In that sense, reporting tends to impose a “discursive” order in the delivery to the chaotic turn-taking on the floor. In other excerpts (e.g., 16, 19, 56), the same interpreter mentions the names of the speakers when he uses reported speech, but, in this instance, he does not. Perhaps because he is exhausted after a difficult conference that is also running late, or he is weary from the numerous instances of overlapping and inaudible remarks throughout the conference, or perhaps because he is distracted by the two unfair accusations of misinterpretation a short while earlier (see 52 and 53), the interpreter here refers to the participant he reports as — somewhat bluntly — “the person” in the delivery.

55)

**Booth:**

*(Interpreter B:)...Then the uh. the fact of thinking is realized in the public realm too or reflection is a phenomenon that takes place in the public sphere. Meditation, contemplation sorry. Uh. no no. Hannah Arendt uh. distinguishes between the private realm and the public realm...*

**My translation of the floor:**

*(Participant:)...So, its public, uh. the phenomenon of thinking still takes place in the public realm=*

*(Speaker:)=No, as I un understand=*

*(Participant 4:)= That is or I'm just trying to say. To use the old word, is te 'tefekkiür' a phenomenon that also takes place in the public realm?*

*(Speaker:)= No, in the private realm...*

**Floor:**

*(Participant:)...Yani kamu eh. düşünme eh. eh. olgusu da yine kamusal alanda gerçekleşen bir hadise=*

*(Speaker:)=Hayır benim an anladığım=*

*(Participant:)=Yani veya şunu söylemek istiyorum. Eski deyimle, te tefekkiür de kamusal alanda gerçekleşen bir olgu mu?*

*(Speaker:)= Hayır, özel alanda gerçekleşen bir şeydir...*

In this instance, one of the participants refers to a word of Arabic-origin “tefekkiür” (“contemplation”), which the interpreter first renders as “reflection” in English. Then the interpreter adds “meditation”, possibly thinking that to be a better English for “tefekkiür”. However, realizing right away that the word he wanted to say is not “meditation” but “contemplation”, the interpreter apologizes and corrects himself in the delivery. Note that the interpreter does

that without explicitly indicating the change in the “speaking subject” in the delivery. That is, he makes the apology and the correction in the first person singular, which he actually uses to (re)present the speaker before and after this brief insertion.

The difference in the way the same interpreter handles his own correction and that of the speaker is noteworthy: While the interpreter opts to apologize and correct himself in the first person (cf. also 10, 15, 24, 50), he tends to render the correction by the speaker by referring to the speaker in the third person (cf. also 7, 9, 13, 14). Thus, while the interpreter tends to distance himself from the speaker when the speaker makes a mistake or correction on the floor, he does not do the same when he apologizes or corrects his mistake in the delivery.

56)

*Booth:*

(Interpreter B:)...*Of course I said uh. but in when when I I compare Uygur Turkish and in the Uygur Turkish uh. it's used exactly in the same manner as Arendt says that is uh. as a connotation of pain. I uh. accept this as a contribution because I had not been able to reach the etymology of the word labor emek uh. in Turkish. But you used the same thing on Arendt. Uh. you it was translated as İnsanlık Durumu uh. The Human Condition but I think it should be İnsanlık Koşulu. This is uh. a semantic or morphological well lexical uh. debate in Turkish so I don't think this would interest our foreign guests. Koşul means condition while durum means uh. situation. Uh. so S\* Hanım says koşul is better for condition in Turkish. Its not true this is not do uh. uh. bu bu doğru değil...*

[\*name of the person is removed. “Hanım” means “Ms.” in Turkish. Thus the interpreter is referring to Ms. S\*]

*My translation of the floor:*

(Participant 1:)...*Of course in this Second Tarama Dictionary that I I mentioned the concept of emgek is referred to with the connotation of pain uh. suffering but when I compared it with Uygur Turkish I saw that the two terms were the same and in Uygur Turkish its used in exactly the same meaning as Arendt says. I'm saying this so that it may be a contribution. Thank you.*

(Speaker:)*Thank you very much indeed. This is rea I take this as a contribution. Uh. frankly I could not access its etymology in Turkish=*

(Participant 1:)=*Uh. yes //I had the same difficulty and as a contribution*

(Speaker:)*//But, by the way, considering that there are guests interested in Arendt, you've used the same thing. Uh. it was translated as İnsanlık Durumu uh. uh. The Human Condition but I uh. propose that we accept it as uh. İnsanlık Koşulu. If this can be accepted because each situation uh. each condition refers to a condition but not each uh. situation constitutes a condition. So its more appropriate to accept it as condition. This is the difference between situation\* and condition\* in English.*

(Participant 1:)*//Yes, okay.*

(Speaker:) //According to me=

(Participant 1:= Okay

(Participant 2:) It's not true....

[\* words pronounced in English by the speaker]

### Floor:

(Participant 1:)...Tarama Sözlüğünde, emgek kavramı bir acı eh. sıkıntı anlamında bir çağrışım olarak kullanımı ama Uygur Türkçesinden karşılaştırdığım zaman iki terimin aynı olduğunu ve Uygur Türkçesinde tam da Arendt'in söylediği manada kullanıldığını gördüm. Bu belki bir katkı olabilir diye zikrediyorum. Teşekkür ederim.

(Speaker:) Gerçekten çok teşekkürler. Bu ger bir katkı olarak kabul ediyorum. Eh. etimolojisine ben Türkçede doğrusu ulaşmamıştım çünkü=

(Participant 1:)=E evet // yani o sıkıntıyı ben yaşadım, bir katkı olsun diye.

(Speaker:) //Yalnız bu arada Arendt'le ilgilenen dinleyicilerimiz olduğunu da düşünerek, siz de aynı şeyi kullanıyorsunuz. Eh. İnsanlık Durumu olarak çevrildi eh. eh. The Human Condition ancak bunun eh. İnsanlık Koşulu olarak eh. kabul edilmesini ben öneriyorum. Burada ka kabul edilebilirse çünkü durum, eh. her koşul eh. bir duruma işaret eder ancak her eh. durum bir koşul oluşturmaz. Dolayısıyla bunun koşul olarak eh. kabul edilmesi daha uygun. İngilizcedeki bu eh. situation, condition ayrımıdır.

(Participant:) //Evet. Okay

(Speaker:) //Bana göre=

(Participant 1:)=Okay.

(Participant 2:) It's not true...

When this discussion is taking place, the meeting is almost 45 minutes over its scheduled finishing time. The speaker and a participant are discussing the etymological roots of different words and concepts in Turkish. They first discuss the roots of the word “emgek” by referring to its meanings in contemporary and Uygur Turkish. The interpreter interprets this (partly overlapping) discussion into English although it is very language-specific. Right after that, the same interlocutors begin a discussion on how the title of Arendt’s book *The Human Condition* should have been translated into Turkish. The participant criticizes the speaker for using the word “durum” and says “koşul” would have been more appropriate. He also tries to justify his point by focusing on the connotations of these words in Turkish. In response, the interpreter assumes the speaker-position explicitly and inserts a comment on the content of the discussion (“This is a semantic or morphological well lexical debate in Turkish”). He then goes on and inserts another remark (“...so I don’t think it would interest our foreign guests”) that reveals his displeasure with the language-specificity of the discussion and perhaps indirectly also the (around 45 minutes) delay in concluding the conference. After this comment, the interpreter briefly reports the remarks



on the floor by embedding the words of one of the speakers under the performative predicate “de-”, which is “say” in English (“So S\* Hanım says koşul is better for condition in Turkish”). Reported speech seems to enable the interpreter to indicate whom he is voicing in the delivery amidst the overlapping remarks on the floor. Once the overlapping and language-specific discussion stops and another participant takes the floor, the interpreter resumes the “I” of the speaker and places the speaker on the floor back in the speaker-position in the delivery. Thus, in this excerpt, the position of the interpreter shifts from the one who is “voicing” the speakers to the one “commenting” on the content of the interaction on the floor and then to the one “reporting” the speakers. Notice that, right after this remark, the interpreter very briefly mixes up his delivery language and interprets an English question into English, which is perhaps also a sign of fatigue after an intensive 2-day conference on philosophy. He quickly realizes his mistake and shifts back into Turkish.

57)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter B:)... *Bir bir ek yapmak istiyorum. Çok yaygın bir fikir Heidegger'in logosla hakikati özdeşleştirdiği fikri ama eh. şimdi S\* Hanım konuşuyor. Logosla legeyni birbirinden ayırıyor. Okay, I would uh.*

(Interpreter A:) *Ama toplantımızı bitirmeden önce ben bu toplantıya katılanlar adına...*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter B:)... *I want to make an addition. It's a very widespread idea that Heidegger identifies logos with truth but uh. now Miss S\* is talking. She is differentiating logos and legein.*

**Okay, I would uh.**

(Interpreter A:) *But before we end our symposium, I, on behalf of the participants to this meeting...*

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)... *Uh. I want to uh. answer uh. I want to make an add addition=*

(Participant – barely audible:)= *it is a very current //opinion that Heidegger identifies logos with truth.*

(Speaker:) *//No no he he himself discriminates=*  
 = *((inaudible remarks from the participant))=*

(Speaker:)= *he himself distinguish uh. uh. logos and legein, legein also this well we can=*  
 = *((inaudible remarks))*

(Chairman:) *I would before Ö\* I would like to say a word or two on behalf of the participants...*  
 [\*name of the persons are removed]

Soon after 56, the speakers start discussing the meanings of the concepts “logos” and “legein” in Turkish, with overlapping and inaudible remarks. Similar to 56, they become very much absorbed in a conceptual discussion although the conference is almost an hour beyond its scheduled time. To account for the overlapping and barely audible remarks on the floor, and perhaps also because reporting the floor allows the interpreter to give a more general account of the original interaction, the interpreter shifts from the speaker’s “I” and inserts an explanatory remark about what the speaker is doing (“now Miss S\* is talking. She is differentiating logos and legein”). As he does that, the chairman finally intervenes to the discussion and starts the closing remarks.

58)

**Booth:**

(Interpreter A:)... *Profesör B\* doğrusu bana söyleyecek pek bir söz bırakmadı ama ben de özellikle katılımcılara teşekkür etmek isterim. Sabırları için. ((barely audible laughter on the floor)) Dilim sürçtü sabırsızlık dedim. Ama sabır demek istemiştim ((barely audible laughter on the floor)) Eh, çok sabırlı sabırlı bize zamanımızı aşmamız bakımından tahammül gösterdiniz. Tabii ayrıca Boğaziçi Üniversitesine de teşekkür etmek isterim. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi bu organizasyonu mümkün kılmıştır. Özellikle Organizasyon Komitesine yürekten teşekkürler efendim.*

**My translation of the booth:**

(Interpreter A:)... *Professor B\* did not really leave me much to say but I too would like to thank the participants. For their patience. ((barely audible laughter on the floor)) That was a slip of the tongue, I said impatience but I had meant patience. ((barely audible laughter on the floor)) Uh, very patiently patiently you tolerated us for exceeding our time. Of course I would also like to thank Boğaziçi University. Boğaziçi University has made this organization possible. I would like to thank the Organization Committee wholeheartedly.*

**Floor:**

(Speaker:)... *Well, uh, Mister B\* didn't leave me uh, anything more to say uh, but I want uh, to express, to bring into expression, specifically my thanks to the participants uh, for their impatience, for their ((inaudible remarks from participants)) uh, uh impatience ((laughter on the floor)) in general because it has it has taken so much time. We have overpassed ((inaudible remarks)) impatience with time with with with our work because we have have overgone ((further barely audible remarks like “we have patience”)) yes, you were patient ((laughter)) we have overgone the limits of time but I think that that was not a problem. Well I want to thank you also in addition to the university, to the Boğaziçi University which has made possible this organization and specifically to the organization committee. Thank you very much. ((Applause)).*

[\*name of the person is removed]

In this instance, which takes place during the closing session of the conference, the organizer of the conference thanks the audience for their “impatience” instead of “patience”. Possibly because the interpreter thinks this is an obvious slip of the tongue, she renders the word into Turkish as “sabır”, which is “patience”. While the interpreter chooses to correct the mistake in her delivery, the speaker’s mistake stirs up many amicable comments and smiles among those listening to the speaker on the floor. Participants sitting in the front rows shout, “Patience, we are patient”. The speaker does not really understand why they say this and first repeats his remark (“uh. uh. impatience in general”) and, when similar remarks continue, smiles and adds, “yes, you have patience”, still without noticing his initial mistake. While all this takes place on the floor, the users of SI have heard an unproblematic delivery because the interpreter corrects “impatience” to “patience” right at the start. Thus, the interaction following the initial mistake does not correlate with the delivery. Perhaps to compensate for the “gap” between the corrected delivery and the mistake-induced interaction on the floor, Interpreter A inserts the remark, “That was a slip of the tongue,” and then adds, “I said impatience but I had meant patience,” to the delivery. Note that, although they are added by the interpreter, both remarks look as if they were voiced by the speaker. While these remarks possibly indicate to the users of SI that a slip of the tongue is the reason for the interaction on the floor, they also seem rather odd in that they refer to a slip of the tongue which never occurs in the delivery. Furthermore, the second remark (“I said impatience but I had meant patience”) creates the impression that the speaker understands and corrects his mistake on the floor, even though the speaker on the floor never realizes his mistake despite many remarks from the audience.

## Notes

1. Hanna Risku (2002) has recently expanded on this topic and suggested that the field of Situated Cognition could learn much from the knowledge gained in Translation Studies on the situatedness of translation.

2. This discrepancy was later more thoroughly explored by Roy (1990) in an article on “Interpreters, their Role and Metaphorical Language Use” in which she analysed the metaphors in the meta-discourse traditionally used to refer to interpreters and the interpreting process. Roy mentioned that interpreters were traditionally referred to with the “conduit” metaphors because such metaphors allowed everyone to compress the complexity of the role of the interpreter into a singular analogy while foregrounding their non-personal involvement to both the insiders and outsiders. She argued that these metaphorical descriptors included unexamined underlying assumptions about the passive role of the interpreter in a communicative process and created “conflicting notions of reality” in the profession that emerged as a result of the discrepancies between what was said and what was done:

On the one hand, the field has come to expect relatively rigid standards of professional behaviour; while, on the other, many practicing interpreters comment on the differing realities of roles and functions in the smaller “real-life” situations (Roy 1990: 84).

The same discrepancy was also alluded to in an article by Şehnaz Tahir (1998) that relied on in-depth interviews with three interpreters.

3. Robin Setton is currently working on making a list of corpus-based research in interpreting. I would like to thank him for sharing this survey-in-progress with me.

4. The parties to the communication in an SI-mediated event include, but are not limited to, the interpreters. Users of SI, (other) participants and speakers who may not be users of SI, main organizers, (usually also) professional event organizers, among others, will have important roles to play in the unfolding of the interaction.

5. Bourdieu uses different terms such as “field” or “market” to refer to the social contexts or fields of action. A field or market may be seen as a structured space of positions in which the positions and their interrelations are determined by the distribution of different kinds of resources or “capital” (Bourdieu 1992: 14, Editor’s Introduction).

6. According to some authors, Bakhtin and Voloshinov are the same person and Bakhtin actually wrote under the name of Voloshinov.

7. “Konuşma süresince, dillerin, kişilerarası ve kültürlerarası farklılıklarını farketmeden, kaynaktan hedefe çeviri/ifade doğrultusunda aktarımını sağlayan kişilerdir”.

8. “Normal koşullarda gerçekten rolünü benimseyen, doğru ve uygun çeviri yapan bir konferans tercümanı çoğu zaman konferansa katılanlar tarafından farkedilmez bile. Mesleğinde profesyonelce başarılarını kanıtlayanlar, kusursuz çalışmalarıyla adeta mevcudiyeti zaten varsayılan önemli bir makinenin mutlaka muntazam çalışmasının kabul edilmesi gibi, hizmet çarkında tamamen anonim bir varlıktırlar”.
9. “Anlarken anlamı yakalayabilmesi, algıladığını keşfetmesi ve bu keşfini çeviriyi yapacağı erek dile taşıyabilmesi için beyinde bir sözgeçten geçirmesi gerekir. Bu sözgeçte gereksiz sözcükler ayıklanır ve bir tür özetleme; esas olanın seçimi yapılır”.
10. “Artık sıra en önemli, en hayati noktaya gelmiştir: Erekle dile aktarımda muntazam bir ifade kullanabilmek ve anlaşılabilir düzgün cümlelerle bu geçişi sağlayabilmek”.
11. “Amaç, fikirleri tüm anlamın içinde ayıklayabilmelerini, anafikri yakalayabilmelerini sonra da, bunu amaç dile, en doğal şekilde aktarabilmelerini sağlamaktır. Çünkü, çeviride anlam, her iki dilde dilbilimsel öğelerin karşılaştırılmasından değil, bir gerçeğin yansız, nesnel bakış açısıyla algılanmasından ortaya çıkar”
12. “Bu yıl TV’lerimiz hazırlıksız yakalandılar. ‘Profesyonel tercümanları’ herhalde ayarlayamadılar! İyi İngilizce bilmek ile ‘anında tercüme’ farklı şeyler. Nitekim Defne Samyeli, Elif Ilgaz iyi İngilizce bilen isimler. Ama dediğim gibi tercüme ayrı bir iş. Ellerinden geldiği kadar CNN’i çözmeye çalıştılar. TRT ve NTV gerekeni yaptı. Ekranaya getirdiği görüntünün altına akıcı bir şekilde tercüme yapan profesyonel ismin sesini koydular”.
13. “Öyle bir toplantıda konuştuğunuzu düşünün ki, siz daha ‘leb’ demeden ‘leblebi’ kelimesi aynı anda ve ayrı ayrı sekiz dile tercüme edilmiş olsun. Küçük kabinlerin içinde cigara içen hoş ve erdemli kadınlar, söylediğiniz cümleyi harfi harfine Fransızcaya, Almancaya, İtalyancaya, İspanyolcaya, Portekizceye, Felemenkçeye, Dancaya veya Rumcaya çevirsin”.
14. “Gözde meslekler: Anında Çeviriye 300 Dolar. Simültane çevirmenler el üstünde tutuluyor”.
15. “Tercümanlı konferans 8.5 milyondan başlıyor”.
16. “Genç kızların gözünde artık fotomodellik yok. Günün favori mesleği simültane çevirmenlik”.
17. “Cazip olduğu kadar zor yanları da var simültane çevirmenliğin... Bir kere çok büyük sorumluluk taşıyorsunuz; son derece önemli bir toplantıda, bir konuşmacının ağzından çıkacak sözlerini anında, hatasız, başka bir dile çevirmenin sorumluluğu az mı?”.
18. “Alman Dışişleri Bakanı Klaus Kinkel, Başbakan Mesut Yılmaz’ın çeviri hatası nedeniyle yanlış anlaşılan Almanya’yla ilgili son sözlerini ‘Kabul edilemez bir dersizlik’ olarak niteledi. Başbakan Yılmaz, geçen Salı günü Antalya’da Türk ve Alman gazetecilerle yaptığı toplantıda Türkçe konuşarak, Almanya Başbakanı Helmut Kohl için ‘eski dost düşman olmaz’ demişti. Ancak bu sözlerin Almanca’ya ‘eski dostumuz Kohl, şimdi düşmanımız’ diye çevrilmesi, yeni bir gerginlik çıkmasına neden oldu”.
19. The Turkish excerpt was no longer in the archives at the time I wanted to write the original.
20. “Konferans tercümanlığı bir dilde ifade edilen fikirlerin başka bir dile aynen aktarımıdır.

Burada fikir diyorum çünkü konferans tercümanlığı ve tercümanları duydukları kelimeleri tekrarlayan tabiri caizse papağan değildir”.

21. “Konferans tercümanlığı, bir dilde ifade edilen düşünce ve fikirlerin, mümkün meretebe yüzde 100 oranında — ki bu hiçbir zaman olamaz, yüzde 99.9 olur — başka dile anlaşılabilir fikirler olarak aktarılması işidir. Ve bunu yaparken çevirmen, konuşmacının görevini üstlenir, onun yerini alır. Dinlenen ve gözlenen artık orijinal konuşmacı değil, tercümandır”.

22. “Çok iyi bir yazılı tercüman en can alıcı kelimeleri bulan kişidir. Ama, sözümlüğün en başında söylemiştik, sözlü çeviride *interpretation* var, yani daha tanımından ortaya çıktı”.

23. “Mesajı kesinlikle doğru iletmeniz gerekir. Mesajda en ufak bir sapıtma yapamazsınız. Örneğin, konuşmacıyla aynı fikirde olmayabilirsiniz. Çok farklı fikirleri savunan kişiler olabilirsiniz, ancak sizin orada bulunmanızın yegane nedeni tercüman olmanızdır, sizden bir görev beklenmesidir. Bu nedenle gayet tarafsız olarak, mesaja sadık kalarak o mesajı iletmeniz gerekir. *Interpretation* yapıyorsunuz ama mesaj tam olarak iletmeli karşı tarafa”.

24. “Genel kültür, anadiline fevkalade hakim olmak, kıvrak bir zekaya sahip olmak, başkası adına düşünebilmek ve doğru sonuçlara varabilmek, oyunculuk yeteneğine sahip olmak, sinirlerine hakim olmak, güler yüzlü ve sabırlı olmak, çok güçlü bir fizik ve ruh konisyonuna sahip olmak, dünyada neler olup bittiğini her an bilmek ve tarafsız olmak”.

25. “Bir de şu var. Çeviri bir dilden diğerine kelimelerin değil içeriklerin aktarılmasıdır”.

26. “‘Siz bir aletsiniz. Elektronik bir alet. Bunu hiçbir zaman kafanızdan çıkarmayın’. Nur içinde yatsın, hocamız Madam Gloria Wagner bize habire bunu söyler dururdu. Bu gerçekten de kişinin yaptığı işe olan tutumunu çiziyor. Simültane çevirmen, kürsüde konuşmakta olan konuşucunun sözlerini öbür dile aktarırken gerçekten de işe kendi kişiliğini, düşüncelerini, inançlarını bir gölge olarak bile katamaz. Buna hakkı yoktur. Söylenen sözü gülünç buluyorsa, bunu sesini kullanarak yansıtamaz. Aptalca buluyorsa da öyle. Konuşucunun inancına paralel inanç içeren bir sesle söylemek zorundadır. İçin için utansa bile”.

27. “Evet kabul ediyorum, konuşucu motor gibi konuşuyorsa, çevirmen bunu yüzde yüz veremez. Ama attığı şey ancak bir ayrıntı olabilir, işin ruhuna ait bir şey atlamaz, atlanamaz. Bu delegeyi kandırmak olur”.

28. “Çevirmen onu düş kırıklığına uğratacaktır çünkü onun görevi bunu gerektirmektedir. Bir alettir o. Elektronik bir alet”.

29. “Bizimkisi uygar bir meslek. Salonda insanların ayağa kalkıp birbirinin üstüne yürütmesine katkıda bulunmak istemeyiz. Ama söylenmiş bir sözü sansür etmek gibi bir hakkımız da asla yoktur. Aşağı yukarı aynı anlama gelen iki tane sert kelimedenden nisbeten daha yumuşakça olanını seçebiliriz. Cümleyi çok uygar ve etikete uygun kurar, saldırıyı daha az kaba göstermeye çalışabiliriz. Yapılabilecek şey aşağı yukarı o kadardır”.

30. “Yabancı dilden Türkçe’ye çevirirken de [...] kendimiz farkına bile varmadan o salondaki yaş ortalamasına göre konuşuruz. Yo, bir salona girince delegelere şöyle bir bakıp, ‘Bunlar genç’ ya da ‘Bunlar yaşlı’ demeyiz. Ama salonda konuşurken gözümüz habire salonda gezinip durduğundan, otomatik olarak dilimiz karşıımızdaki insanlara göre bir havaya bürünür. Bukalemun gibi yani”.

31. “Sözlü çevirinin kelime kelime bir çeviri olamayacağı bilinir çünkü. Aktarılan şey anlamdır. Cümlelerin çevirisi değil, anlamın aktarılması sözkonusudur”.
32. “Mesleğimize Türkçe’de ‘Simültane çevirmen’ diyoruz ama batı dillerinde o noktada bir nüans var. ‘Translator’ sözü kullanılmaz bizim için ‘**Simultaneous Interpreter**’ denir. Sözlü çevirmenlere hep ‘interpreter’ denir zaten. Yani yorumcu”.
33. “Nuran kalkıyor, Fransızca kabinine gidiyor, oradaki yabancı çevirmene ‘İsterseniz ben buraya gelip doğrudan Türkçe’den alayım Fransızca’ya’ diye öneride bulunuyor. ‘Sizin İngilizce’yi dinleyip almanızdan daha sağlıklı olur’. Öyle ya...tavşanın suyunun suyuna ne gerek var, daha doğrudan yolu varken. Kadın sevinerek, ‘Aman gelin’ diyor. Nuran oraya oturup kulaklığı takıyor...ses zaten iyi değil, Nuran da duymadıklarını kendi sağduyusuna uygun gelen bir türde doldurarak konuşuyor, bitiriyor. Kadın ona dönüyor, ‘Ammma da güzel bir konuşma yaptınız’ diyor. Nuran tabii ‘O ne dediyse, ben de onu dedim’ diyerek işten sıyrılmaya çalışıyor, ama kadın bilgiç bilgiç gülümseyerek sağ elinin işaret parmağını sallıyor ona. ‘Yoo’ diyor. ‘Biz bu zatın yaptığı başka bir konuşmayı dün gece dinlemiştik. Nasıl konuştuğunu biliyoruz’. Bizim mesleğe bazen insanlar (yanlış olarak) spontane çeviri derler. İşte Nuran’ın o gün yaptığı tür çeviriye spontane denilebilir belki”.
34. Peräklyä (1999: 204) mentions that both video and audio recordings may entail a loss of some aspects of social interaction, including (a) medium- and long-span temporal processes, (b) ambulatory events, (c) impact of texts and other “non-conversational” modalities of action. For improving the accuracy and inclusiveness of the recordings, Peräklyä underlines the advantage of using multiple-cameras as a reasonable option. However, one should not forget that all types of recordings have inherent limitations and even multiple cameras can only foreground certain aspects of the social interaction.
35. In fact, technology is changing the way we present data by enabling a combination of the transcripts with the original recordings. In her dissertation, for instance, Vuorikoski (2004) presents her transcripts with a VCR that contains the recordings of the conferences that she analyzes. She also intends to put her study on the web and create special links that will enable the “reader” to listen to the recordings of the transcripts presented in the study (personal communication).
36. Due to technical problems in recording the performance of Interpreter C, which are elaborated in Section 3.2.5, I have only included my interview with him without elaborating further on any aspect of his performance.
37. The interviews with the users of SI highlighted the fact that most had some knowledge of English that might have given them ground to “judge” the English-Turkish SI. This was hardly the case for the French interpretation.
38. The interview with the organizer was carried out in Turkish. The parts between quotation marks are my translations.
39. One of the interpreters (Interpreter B) later told me that they had not notified the organiser of this problem, thinking that the interpreting agency could have been the faulty party as well.
40. Some researchers, such as Kohn and Kalina (1996), Monacelli (2000) and Wadensjö (2000), have also held retrospective interviews with interpreters to explore what the

interpreters think about their own decisions and performance by showing them the transcripts or re-playing the recordings. This has not been attempted here but could have been very interesting in exploring the post-SI discourse of the interpreters regarding their performances.

41. The interviews with the interpreters were carried out in Turkish. The parts between quotation marks are my translations.

42. “The more bread, the more meatballs” is a saying in Turkish to suggest “your portion of the ‘goodies’ will depend on what you have got to go with them”. In this context it seems to imply that “the quality of the service the customer will get depends on what they can provide for the interpreter”.

43. The interviews with the users of SI in the audience were all carried out in Turkish. The parts between quotations marks are my translations.

44. Although some of the users said they followed SI according to the comprehensibility of the speakers and their speeches, as far as I could see, those who used SI wore their headsets quite consistently regardless of who took the floor in English. It is of course hard to say, but users might have been inclined to exaggerate their level of English to save face and to show that they were actually not “too” dependent on SI.

45. Throughout this section, references to the *original* speech, speaker or utterance are made to indicate the speaker, speech and utterance on the floor and always imply “original” as inside inverted commas.

46. In fact, a few times during my analysis of the transcriptions, I came across more subtle “shifts in the speaking subject” that were not detectable unless the floor transcripts were compared with the booth transcripts (see, for instance, 32a, 32b, 41, 42).

47. In the following section, transcripts are indented and italicized. Furthermore, parts which point to a “shift” in the transcripts are underlined. All excerpts also contain my English translation of either the speaker’s speech or interpreter’s delivery, depending on whichever is originally in Turkish. (For Transcription Conventions used in this study, see Appendix).

48. In the present corpus, the interpreters refer to themselves as “the translators” in only two instances towards the end of the conference when conference interlocutors try to save face by blaming the SI (see section h on “accusations of misinterpretation”).

49. In a way, listening to these instances and looking at the delivery without a corresponding source speech resembles listening to the SI without understanding the “original” speech. At certain points, it is very difficult to determine whether the speaker or the interpreter is apologizing in the delivery. Naturally, unlike the researcher, users of SI at a conference are not bound by the delivery-as-a-text only and can always make use of different contextual or linguistic cues such as non-verbal communication, intonation, original speech, etc. However, it is also highly unlikely that all users of SI will be able to notice systematically all of the shifts between the speaker’s “I” and interpreter’s “I”. As a site hosting multiple speaker-positions, identifying the occupant of the speaker-position in the delivery at any given instance is clearly not a straightforward task.



50. Note that when the speakers noticed a mistake they usually apologized and then undertook a correction, which is why there are overlaps with the previous category on “apologies”.

51. In fact, the interpreters do refer to themselves as “the translators” once again at the very end of the conference when the chairman thanks them for doing a wonderful job (see the last page of the transcripts in 4.5.2). In that instance, however, the interpreter is actually in the speaker’s “I” voicing the original interaction and not talking “as” the interpreter as is the case here in excerpt 52.

52. See Chapter 1 on the concept of Pierre Bourdieu’s “symbolic power”. For Bourdieu’s own discussion, see Bourdieu 1992. For a discussion on “commodification” in social theory, see Lash (1990: 43–54).

53. Michel Foucault has argued that the will to exercise domination in society has clothed and rarefied itself in the language of truth, rationality, professionalism and authority. His views on discourse can be found in his article, “The Discourse on Language” in the appendix of his book *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972). For an illuminating discussion of Foucault’s views on discourse see Said (1994).

54. As Toury (1995) succinctly puts it, translating (here, I extend it to interpreting) is by its very nature interactional and involves *feedback*. The feedback that a translator (interpreter) receives is *normative* in essence and as such, the norms embodied in all kinds of feedback, whether direct or indirect, determine and stipulate the appropriateness/inappropriateness of the procedures utilized for deriving a translational output from a given input utterance, the nature of the relationship between the interpreted utterance and its sources and the compliance of the end product to what is expected of an interpreting product as a specific mode of text production (ibid: 249). In the initial stages of an interpreter’s development, the feedback directed to him/her is exclusively external. However, during the socialization process, parts of the normatively motivated feedback they receive are assimilated. They become capable of taking *potential* responses into account and thus develop an internal kind of monitoring mechanism that can act on the process and product of interpreting (ibid: 250).

## References

- AIIC Code of Professional Ethics. [http://www.aiic.net/en/asso/texts/code\\_of\\_ethics.htm](http://www.aiic.net/en/asso/texts/code_of_ethics.htm). Visited on 09.02.2000.
- AIIC (no date) *Report on Remote Interpreting: Assessment of Human Factors and Performance Parameters*. [http://www.aiic.net/community/print/default.cfm/page\\_1125](http://www.aiic.net/community/print/default.cfm/page_1125). Visited on 26.06.2003
- AIIC website. <http://www.aiic.net>. Visited on 09.02.2000.
- Anderson, Bruce W. 1976. "Perspectives on the Role of the Interpreter". In *Translation: Applications and Research*, Richard Brislin (ed.), 208–228. New York: Gardner Press.
- Anderson, Bruce W. 1978. "Interpreter Roles and Interpretation Studies: Cross-Cutting Typologies". In *Language Interpretation and Communication. Proceedings of the NATO Symposium on Language Interpretation and Communication, Venice, 26 September – 1 October 1977*, David Gerver & H.Wallace Sinaiko (eds), 217–231. New York: Plenum Press.
- Atasoy, Okşan. 1997a. "Sözlü Çeviri Eğitiminin Üniversite Sonrasına Aktarımı". In *Forum Türkiye'de Çeviri Eğitimi: Nereden Nereye?*, Turgay Kurultay and İlknur Birkandan (eds), 123–128. İstanbul: Sel Yayıncılık.
- Atasoy, Okşan. 1997b. "Sözlü Çeviride, Eğitim Öncesi/Eğitim Sonrası Hazırlıkla İlgili Beklenti ve Gereksinimler". In *Çeviri: Ekinler ve Zamanlar Kavşağı (Hasan Ali Yücel Anma Kitabı)*. Hasan Anamur (ed.), 197–202. İstanbul: Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi.
- AUSIT website. <http://www.ausit.org/code.html>. Visited on 13.12. 2000.
- Austin, John L. 1962. *How To Do Things With Words*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bahadır, Şebnem. 2001. "Perspektivität und Positionalität in der Community Interpreting-Forschung". In *Dolmetschen. Beiträge aus Forschung, Lehre und Praxis*. A. F. Kelletat (ed.), 39–49. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang.
- Bahadır, Şebnem. forthcoming. "Moving in-between: The [Community] Interpreter as Intercultural Negotiator". *Conference Proceedings of the "Interdisciplinary Conference on Globalisation", October 18–19 2002 at the University of Iceland, Reykjavik*.
- Baker, Mona. 1997. "Non-cognitive constraints and interpreter strategies in political interviews". In *Translating Sensitive Texts. Linguistic Aspects*. Karl Simms (ed.), 113–131. Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi.
- Baker, Mona. 2000. "Review of 'Simultaneous Interpretation: A cognitive pragmatic analysis' by Setton, Robin". *Interpreting: International journal of research and practice in interpreting*. 5(1): 69–75.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. 1981. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

- Barsky, Robert F. 1994. *Constructing the Productive Other: Discourse, Theory and the Convention Refugee Hearing*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Barsky, Robert F. 1996. "The Interpreter as Intercultural Agent in Convention Refugee Hearings". *The Translator: Studies in Intercultural Communication*. 2(1): 45–63.
- Barthes, Roland. 1972. *Mythologies*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Barthes, Roland. 1992. *Mythologies*. New York: The Noonday Press.
- Beaton, Morven. (forthcoming). "Competing Ideologies in the European Parliament: An investigation into the ideological force of recurring cohesive elements in simultaneously interpreted political debate". Unpublished PhD thesis. Edinburgh: Heriot-Watt University.
- Berk-Seligson, Susan. 1990. *The Bilingual Courtroom: Court Interpreters in the Judicial Process*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Berk-Seligson, Susan. 2000. "Interpreting for the Police: Issues in the Pre-Trial Phases of the Judicial Process". *Forensic Linguistics: The International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law*. 6(1): 30–56.
- Bliss, Joan, Monk, Martin and Ogborn, Jon. 1983. *Qualitative Data Analysis for Educational Research*. London: Croom Helm.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1992. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Polity Press.
- Bright, William. (ed.). 1992. *The International Encyclopedia of Linguistics*. Vol. 4. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bulut, Alev and Kurultay, Turgay. 2001. "Interpreters-in-Aid at Disasters: Community Interpreting in the Process of Disaster Management". *The Translator: Studies in Intercultural Communication*. 7(2): 249–263.
- Burr, Vivien. 1995. *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge.
- Cameron, Deborah. 2001. *Working with Spoken Discourse*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Cattaruzza, Lorella and Mack, Gabriele. 1995. "User Surveys in SI: a means of learning about quality and/or raising some reasonable doubt". In *Topics in Interpreting Research*. Jorma Tommola (ed.), 37–49. Turku: University of Turku.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie and Fairclough, Norman. 1999. *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Cicourel, Aaron V. 1992. "The interpretation of communicative contexts: examples from medical encounters". In *Rethinking context: Language as an interactive phenomenon*. Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin (eds), 291–311. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Çorakçı-Dışbudak, Belkıs. 1991. *Tane Tane Simültane: Simültane Çevirmenlik Üstüne Merak Ettiğiniz Her Şey Komiklikler de Cabası*. İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar.
- Cronin, Michael. 2002. "The Empire Talks Back: Orality, Heteronomy and the Cultural Turn in Interpreting Studies". In *The Interpreting Studies Reader*. Franz Pöchhacker and Miriam Shlesinger (eds), 387–397. London and New York: Routledge.
- Crystal, David. (ed.). 1987. *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Derkunt, Ümran. 1994. "Ardıl veya Simültane Çeviri Öğretiminde Başlıca Sorunlar". *Çeviribilim ve Uygulamaları*. Ankara: Bizim Büro Basımevi, 191–201.

- Diriker, Ebru. 1999. "Problematising the Discourse on Interpreting — A Quest for Norms in Simultaneous Interpreting". *TextconText*. 13: 73–90.
- Diriker, Ebru. 2001. "(De-)/(Re-)Contextualising Simultaneous Interpreting: Interpreters in the Ivory Tower?". Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Istanbul: Boğaziçi University.
- Duranti, Charles and Goodwin, Alessandro (eds). 1992. *Rethinking context: Language as an interactive phenomenon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fairclough, Norman. 1992. *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fairclough, Norman. 1995. *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. London and New York: Longman.
- Fairclough, Norman and Wodak, Ruth. 1997. "Critical Discourse Analysis". In *Discourse as Social Interaction, Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Teun van Dijk (ed.), 258–285. Volume 2. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Foucault, Michel. 1972. "The Discourse on Language". *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, 215–237. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, Michel. 1981. "The Order of Discourse". In *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*. R. Young (ed.), 48–78. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Garzone, Giuliana. 2002. "Quality and Norms in Interpretation". In *Interpreting in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities (Selected papers from the 1st Forli Conference on Interpreting Studies, 9–11 November 2000)*. Giuliana Garzone and Maurizio Viezzi (eds), 107–121. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Garzone, Giuliana and Viezzi, Maurizio. (eds). 2002. *Interpreting in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities (Selected papers from the 1st Forli Conference on Interpreting Studies, 9–11 November 2000)*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Giddens, Anthony and Turner, Jonathan. 1987. *Social Theory Today*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Gile, Daniel. 1989. "Les flux d'information dans les réunions interlinguistiques et l'interprétation de conférence: premières observations". *Meta* 34(4): 649–660.
- Gile, Daniel. 1990. "L'évaluation de la qualité de l'interprétation par les délégués: une étude de cas". *The Interpreter's Newsletter*. 3: 66–71.
- Gile, Daniel. 1991. "A Communication-Oriented Analysis of Quality in Nonliterary Translation and Interpretation". In *Translation: Theory and Practice Tension and Interdependence. ATA Scholarly Monograph Series V*, Mildred L. Larson (ed.), 188–200. New York: State University of New York.
- Gile, Daniel. 1995. *Basic Concepts and Models for Interpreter and Translator Training*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Gile, Daniel. 1998. "Norms in Research on Conference Interpreting: A Response to Theo Hermans and Gideon Toury". *Current Issues in Language and Society: Translation and Norms*. 5(1&2): 99–107.
- Grbic, Nadja. 1997. "Von Handlangern und Experten". In *Text – Kultur Kommunikation. Translation als Forschungsaufgabe*. Nadja Grbic and Michaela Wolf (eds), 293–305. Tübingen: Stauffenburg (Studien zur Translation 4).
- Grbic, Nadja. forthcoming. "From 10-minute wedding ceremonies to three week spa treatment programmes. Reconstructing the system of sign language interpreting in Styria" In *Translation Targets. Proceedings of the Prague Conference*. Zuzana Jettmarová (ed.)

- Gumperz, John. 1992. "Contextualisation Revisited". In *The Contextualisation of Language*. Peter Auer and Aldo di Luzio (eds), 39–55. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Gumperz, John and Levinson, Stephen. (eds). 1996. *Rethinking linguistic relativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gunnarson, Britt-Louise, Linell, Per and Nordberg, Bengt. (eds). 1997. *The Construction of Professional Discourse*. London and New York: Longman.
- Harris, Brian. 1990. "Norms in Interpretation". *Target: International Journal of Translation Studies*. 2(1): 115–119.
- Have, Paul Ten. 1999. *Doing Conversation Analysis: A Practical Guide*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Holz-Mänttari, Jutta. 1984. *Translatorisches Handeln. Theorie und Methode*. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia.
- Inghilleri, Moira. 2000. "Intersubjectivity: The holy grail of mutual understanding?". *Language and Communication*. 20. 133–148.
- Inghilleri, Moira. 2003. "Habitus, field and discourse: Interpreting as a socially situated activity". *Target: International Journal of Translation Studies*. 15(2). 243–268.
- Inghilleri, Moira. forthcoming. "Aligning Macro and Micro Approaches to Interpreting Research". In *Translation Research and Interpreting Research: Traditions, Gaps and Synergies*. Christina Schäffner (ed.), Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- ITI website. [www.iti.org.uk](http://www.iti.org.uk). Visited on 18.02.2000.
- Jansen, Peter. 1995. "The Role of the Interpreter in Dutch Courtroom Interaction: The Impact of the Situation on Translational Norms". In *Topics in Interpreting Research*. Jorma Tömmölä (ed.), 11–36. Turku: University of Turku, Center for Translation and Interpreting.
- Jones, Roderick. 1998. *Conference Interpreting Explained*. Manchester: St. Jerome.
- Kadric, Mira and Pöchhacker, Franz. 1999. "The Hospital Cleaner as Healthcare Interpreter: A Case Study". *The Translator: Studies in Intercultural Communication (Special Issue: Dialogue Interpreting)*. 5(2): 161–178.
- Kalina, Sylvia. 1998. *Strategische Prozesse beim Dolmetschen: Theoretische Grundlagen, empirische Fallstudien, didaktische Konsequenzen*. Tübingen: Günter Narr.
- Kaufert, Joseph M. and Putsch, Robert W. 1997. "Communication through Interpreters in Healthcare: Ethical Dilemmas Arising from Differences in Class, Culture, Language and Power". *The Journal of Clinical Ethics*. 8(1): 71–87.
- Kirchhoff, Hella. 1976a. "Das Simultandolmetschen: Interdependenz der Variablen im Dolmetschprozess, Dolmetschmodelle und Dolmetschstrategien". In *Theorie und Praxis des Übersetzens und Dolmetschens*. Horst W. Drescher and Signe Scheffzek (eds), 59–71. Bern and Frankfurt: Lang.
- Kirchhoff, Hella. 1976b. "Das dreigliedrige, zweisprachige Kommunikationssystem Dolmetschen". *La Langage et l'Homme*. 31: 21–27.
- Knoll, Michael and Röder, Friedhelm. 1988. "Der Dolmetscher als Übersetzer, Berater und Mittler in der psychiatrischen Praxis: Eine Analyse der Dolmetscherfunktion in der Gruppenarbeit mit türkischen Patienten". In *Von heimatlosen Seelenleben. Entwurzelung, Entfremdung, Identität – Der psychische Seilakt der Fremde*. A. Morten (ed.), 109–130. Bonn: Psychiatrie Verlag.

- Kohn, Kurt and Kalina, Sylvia. 1996. "The Strategic Dimension of Interpreting". *Meta*. 41(1): 118–138.
- Kondo, Masaomi and Tebble, Helen. (et al.). 1997. "Intercultural Communication, Negotiation, and Interpreting". In *Conference Interpreting: Current Trends in Research*. Yves Gambier, Daniel Gile and Christopher Taylor (eds), 149–166. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Kopczynski, Andrzej. 1994. "Quality in Conference Interpreting: Some pragmatic problems". In *Bridging the Gap. Empirical Research in Simultaneous Interpretation*. Sylvie Lambert and Barbara Moser Mercer (eds), 87–99. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Kurz, Ingrid. 1989. "Conference Interpreting: User Expectations". In *Coming of Age. Proceedings of the 30th Annual Conference of the American Translators Association*. Deanna L. Hammond (ed.), 143–148. Medford, New Jersey: Learned Information.
- Kurz, Ingrid. 1993. "Conference Interpretation: Expectations of Different User Groups". *The Interpreter's Newsletter*. 5: 13–21.
- Lash, Scott. 1990. *Sociology of Postmodernism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Lindstrom, Lamont. 1992. "Context contests: debatable truth statements on Tanna (Vanuatu)". In *Rethinking context: Language as an interactive phenomenon*. Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin (eds), 101–125. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Linell, Per. 1998. *Approaching Dialogue: Talk, interaction and contexts in dialogical settings*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Mack, Gabriele and Cattaruzza, Lorella. 1995. "User Surveys in SI: a means of learning about quality and/or raising some reasonable doubt". In *Topics in Interpreting Research*. Jorma Tommola (ed.), 37–49. Turku: University of Turku.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. 1923. "The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages". In *The Meaning of Meaning*. C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards (eds), 296–336. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc.
- Markova, Ivana and Foppa, Klaus. (eds). 1991. *Asymmetries in Dialogue*. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Monacelli, Claudia. 2000. "Mediating Castles in the Air: Epistemological Issues in Interpreting Studies". In *Intercultural Faultlines: Research Models in Translation Studies I, Textual and Cognitive Aspects*. Maeve Olohan (ed.), 193–214. Manchester: St. Jerome.
- Monacelli, Claudia. 2002. "Interpreters for Peace". In *Interpreting in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities (Selected papers from the 1st Forli Conference on Interpreting Studies, 9–11 November 2000)*. Giuliana Garzone and Maurizio Viezzi (eds), 181–195. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Monacelli, Claudia. (forthcoming). "Surviving the Role: a corpus-based study of participation framework and interactional politeness in simultaneous interpreting". Ph.D. dissertation. Heriot Watt University.
- Morris, Pam. (ed.). 1994. *The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev, Voloshinov*. London: Edward Arnold Publishers.
- Morris, Ruth. 1995. "The Moral Dilemmas of Court Interpreting". *The Translator: Studies in Intercultural Communication*. 1(1): 25–46.
- Morris, Ruth. 1998. "Justice in Jerusalem – Interpreting in Israeli Legal Proceedings". *Meta*. 1: 110–118.

- Moser, Peter. 1995. *Survey on Expectations of Users of Conference Interpretation: Final Report*. Commissioned by AIIC. Vienna: SRZ Stadt + Regional Forschung.
- Namy, Claude. 1978. "Reflections on the Training of Simultaneous Interpreters – A meta-linguistic approach". In *Language Interpretation and Communication*. David Gerver and Wallace Sinaiko (eds), 25–33. New York: Plenum Press.
- Niedzielski, Henry. 1988. "Prolégomènes à la typologie de textes en interprétation simultanée". *Meta*. 33(4): 491–497.
- Olson, David R. 1995. "Writing the Mind". In *Sociocultural Studies of the Mind*. James V. Wertsch, Pablo del Rio, Amelia Alvarez (eds), 95–124. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ong, Walter J. 1982. *Orality and Literacy: The Technologising of the Word*. London and New York: Methuen.
- Peräkylä, Anssi. 1997. "Reliability and Validity in Research Based on Tapes and Transcripts". In *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice*. David Silverman (ed.), 201–220. London: Sage.
- Pöhhacker, Franz. 1994. *Simultandolmetschen als komplexes Handeln*. Tübingen: Günter Narr Verlag.
- Pöhhacker, Franz. 1995. "Simultaneous Interpreting: A Functionalist Perspective". *Hermes*. 14: 31–53.
- Powney, Janet and Watts, Mike. 1987. *Interviewing in Educational Research*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Pym, Anthony. 1999. "'Nicole Slapped Michelle': Interpreters and Theories of Interpreting at the O. J. Simpson Trial". *The Translator: Studies in Intercultural Communication*. 5(2): 265–283.
- Risku, Hanna. (2002). "Situatedness in translation studies". *Cognitive Systems Research*. 3: 523–533.
- Roberts, Roda. 1994. "Interpretation". In *The Encyclopedia of Language and Literature*. R. E. Ashner (ed.), 1731–1738. Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press.
- Roberts, Roda. 1995. "Community Interpreting Today and Tomorrow". In *The Critical Link: Interpreters in the Community (Papers from the First International Conference on Interpreting in Legal, Health and Social Service Settings, Geneva Park, Canada, June 1–4, 1995)*. Silvana. E. Carr, Roda Roberts, Aideen Dufour, Dini Steyn (eds), 7–29. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Röder, F. 1995. "Gruppenpsychotherapie für Türken in Zusammenarbeit mit einem Dolmetscher – Kommentierte Schilderung der ersten, konstituierenden Sitzung". *Psychiatrische Praxis*. 22: 135–139.
- Roy, Cynthia. 1989. "A Sociolinguistic Analysis of the Interpreter's Role in the Turn of Exchanges of an Interpreted Event". Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Georgetown University. Washington D. C..
- Roy, Cynthia. 1990. "Interpreters, Their Role and Metaphorical Language Use". In *Looking Ahead: Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of American Translators' Association*. Leslie Wilson (ed.), 77–86. Medford, NJ: Learned Information.
- Roy, Cynthia. 2000. *Interpreting as a Discourse Process*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emanuel and Jefferson, Gail. 1974. "A Simplest Systematics for the Organisation of Turn-Taking for Conversation". *Language*. 50: 696–735.
- Said, Edward. 1994. "The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions". In *Michel Foucault: Critical Assessments*. Barry Smart (ed.), 88–123. London and New York: Routledge.
- Schiffrin, Deborah. 1994. *Approaches to Discourse*. Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Schjoldager, Anna. 1995a. "Interpreting and the 'Manipulation School' of Translation Studies". *Target: International Journal of Translation Studies*. 7(1): 29–45.
- Schjoldager, Anna. 1995b. "An Exploratory Study of Translational Norms in Simultaneous Interpreting: Methodological Reflections". *Hermes*. 14: 65–87.
- Schegloff, Emanuel. 1991. "Reflections on talk and social structure". In *Talk and Social Structure: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis*. Deirdre Boden and Don Zimmerman (eds), 44–70. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Schegloff, Emanuel. 1992. "In another context". In *Rethinking context: Language as an interactive phenomenon*. Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin (eds), 101–125. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SCIC website. <http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/scic/scic/interpreting>. Visited on 17.09.1998.
- Seleskovitch, Danica. 1977. "Why interpreting is not tantamount to translating languages". *The Incorporated Linguist*. 16(2): 22–23.
- Setton, Robin. 1999. *Simultaneous Interpretation: A Cognitive-Pragmatic Analysis*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Shlesinger, Miriam. 1989a. "Simultaneous Interpretation as a Factor in Effecting Shifts in the Position of Texts on the Oral-Literate Continuum". Unpublished M. A. Thesis. Tel Aviv University.
- Shlesinger, Miriam. 1989b. "Extending the Theory of Translation to Interpretation: Norms as a Case in Point". *Target: International Journal of Translation Studies*. 1(1): 111–116.
- Shlesinger, Miriam. 1995. "Quality in Simultaneous Interpreting". In *Conference Interpreting: Current Trends in Research*. Yves Gambier, Daniel Gile and Christopher Taylor (eds), 123–133. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Sinclair, John. (ed). 1987. *The Collins Cobuild Dictionary of English Language*. Birmingham: Collins Publishers.
- Snelling, David. 1989. "A Typology of Interpretation for Teaching Purposes". In *The Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Teaching Conference Interpretation*. Laura Gran and John M. Dodds (eds), 141–142. Udine: Campanotto Editore.
- Sperber, Dan and Wilson, Deirdre. 1986. *Relevance*. London: Blackwell.
- Stenzl, Catherine. 1983. "Simultaneous Interpretation: Groundwork Towards a Comprehensive Model". Unpublished M.A. Thesis. Birkbeck College: University of London.
- STIBC website. [www.vcn.bc.ca/stibc/stibsbabt.htm](http://www.vcn.bc.ca/stibc/stibsbabt.htm). Visited on 18.02.2000.
- Tahir, Şehnaz. 1998. "Sözlü Çevirinin Politikası". *Çeviribilim ve Uygulamaları (Çeviribilim ve Uygulamaları Semineri Bildirileri)*. December 1998: 177–184.
- Tate, Granville and Turner, Graham H. 2002. "The Code and the Culture: Sign language interpreting – in search of the new breed's ethics". In *The Interpreting Studies Reader*. Franz Pöchhacker and Miriam Shlesinger (eds), 373–383. London and New York: Routledge.



- Thomas, Roy. 1997. "United Nations Military Observer Interpreting in a Community Setting". In *The Critical Link: Interpreters in the Community (Papers from the First International Conference on Interpreting in Legal, Health, and Social Service Settings, Geneva Park Canada, June 1–4, 1995)*. Silvana E. Carr, Roda Roberts, Aideen Dufour, Dini Steyn (eds), 249–257. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Thiéry, Christopher. 1990. "The Sense of Situation in Conference Interpreting". In *Interpreting: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow*. (ATA Scholarly Monograph Series IV). David Bowen and Margareta Bowen (eds), 40–43. Binghamton, New York: SUNY.
- Toury, Gideon. 1995. *Descriptive Translation Studies and Beyond*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Trask, Robert L. (ed.). 1997. *A Student's Dictionary of Language and Linguistics*. London and New York: Arnold.
- van Dijk, Teun. A. 1987. *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. New York: Academic Press.
- van Dijk, Teun. A. 1990. "Discourse and Society: A New Journal for a New Research Focus". *Discourse and Society*. 1(1): 5–16.
- van Dijk, Teun. A. 1996. "Discourse, Opinions and Ideologies". In *Discourse and Ideologies*. Christina Schäffner and Helen Kelly Holmes (eds), 7–38. Clevedon and Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters Ltd.
- van Dijk, Teun. A. (ed). 1997. *Discourse as Social Interaction, Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, Volume 2. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Vermeer, Hans. J. 1983. *Aufsätze zur Translationstheorie*. Heidelberg.
- Vermeer, Hans. J. 1989. *Skopos und Translationsauftrag*. Heidelberg: Universität Heidelberg.
- Viaggio, Sergio. 1992. "Translators and Interpreters: Professionals or Shoemakers?". In *Teaching Translation and Interpreting: Training, Talent and Experience*. Cay Dollerup and Anna Loddegaard (eds), 307–314. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Voloshinov, Valentin N. 1986[1973]. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Voloshinov, Valentin N. 1994. "Freudianism: A Critical Sketch". 1927. In *The Bakhtin Reader: Selected Writings of Bakhtin, Medvedev, Voloshinov*. Pam Morris (ed.), 38–49. London: Edward Arnold Publishers.
- Vuorikoski, Anna-Riitta. 1993. "Simultaneous Interpretation – User Experience and Expectation". In *Translation – The Vital Link. Proceedings of the XIIIth World Congress of FIT, 6–13 August, Brighton*. Vol.1. Catriona Picken (ed.), 317–327. London: Institute of Translation and Interpreting.
- Vuorikoski, Anna-Riitta. 2004. *A voice of its citizens or a modern tower of Babel? The quality of interpreting as a function of political rhetoric in the European Parliament*. University of Tampere, Ph.D. dissertation. The School of Languages and Translation Studies. Acta Universitatis Tamperensis 985. Tampere: Tampere University Press.
- Wadensjö, Cecilia. 1993. "The Double Role of a Dialogue Interpreter". *Perspectives: Studies in Translatology*. 1: 105–121.
- Wadensjö, Cecilia. 1997. "Recycled Information as a Questioning Strategy: Pitfalls in Interpreter-Mediated Talks". In *The Critical Link: Interpreters in the Community (Papers from the First International Conference on Interpreting in Legal, Health and Social Service Settings, Geneva Park, Canada, June 1–4, 1995)*. Silvana. E. Carr, Roda Roberts, Aideen Dufour, Dini Steyn (eds), 33–54. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

- Wadensjö, Cecilia. 1998. *Interpreting as Interaction*. London and New York: Longman.
- Wadensjö, Cecilia. 2000. "Co-constructing Yeltsin – Explorations of an Interpreter-Mediated Political Interview". In *Intercultural Faultlines: Research Models in Translation Studies I*. 5(2). Maeve Olohan (ed.), 233–252. Manchester: St. Jerome.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wodak, Ruth. 1996. *Disorder of Discourse*. London and New York: Longman.
- Wodak, Ruth. 1997. *Gender and Discourse*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Wurzel, Petra. 1992. "Über die sprachlichen und kulturellen Ursachen von Missverständnissen und Widersprüchen in Asylverfahren aus der Sicht des Dolmetschers". *Zeitschrift für Kulturaustausch*. 1: 102–125.



# Index

## A

- accessing data 51–54, 58–59 (*see also* corpus-constitution)
- accuracy (of delivery) 3, 10, 32, 34, 35
- accusations (of misinterpretation) 83, 85, 109–114, 137, 138, 141, 190, 193–195
- actual instances (of SI) 24, 44, 48, 147
- agents of communication 114, 141, 168, 194 (*see also* partners)
- AIIC's Code of Ethics 29–31 (*see also* codes of ethics; AUSIT's Code; ITI's Code; STIB's Code)
- Anderson, Bruce 8
- anecdotal accounts (of SI) 47–49, 132, 133
- apologies 85, 86–90, 93, 139, 141, 157, 158, 160, 161, 169, 171, 176, 177, 189, 196, 206
- Atasoy, Okşan 37, 38
- audio recordings 52, 53, 204 (*see also* recording; video recording)
- AUSIT's Code of Ethics 30, 31 (*see also* codes of ethics; AIIC's Code; ITI's Code; STIB's Code)
- Austin, John 14

## B

- Bahadır, Şebnem 3
- Baker, Mona 3, 12
- Bakhtin Circle 22, 23
- Bakhtin, Mikhail 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 201
- Barsky, Robert 3
- Barthes, Roland 18, 21, 22, 25, 141
- Beaton, Morven 12
- Berk-Seligson, Susan 3
- Bliss, J. 54
- Bourdieu, Pierre 18, 20, 21, 142, 201, 206

- Bulut, Alev 3
- Burr, Vivien 19

## C

- Cameron, Deborah 18
- capital 201
  - cultural 20, 143
  - economic 20, 21, 143
  - symbolic 20, 143
- Catarruza, Lorella 13, 144
- Chouliaraki, Lilie 18
- Cicourel, Aaron 15–17
- codes of ethics 29–32, 48, 132
  - of conduct 143
  - (*see also* AIIC's Code; AUSIT's Code; ITI's Code; STIB's Code)
- cognitive (aspect) 1, 2, 7, 10, 11, 13, 15, 81, 131, 139, 143, 145, 148 (*see also* cognitive content)
- Community Interpreting Research 2–3
- complexity (of actual SI instances) 141, 145, 147
  - (of expectations) 53 (*see also* expectations from SI; fuzzy expectations)
  - (of human acts) 22, 148
  - (of speaker-positions) 84, 138, 141, 177
  - (of transcribing) 136, 137, 148
- conduit metaphor 2, 201
- conference typologies 12, 13, 61, 133
- constitutive power of contexts 2, 14, 16 (*see also* shaping power)
- content 32, 35, 39, 44, 45, 132, 141, 145
  - (cognitive) 28, 29 (*see also* cognitive aspects)
  - (semantic) 32, 33, 35, 49, 147
- context (socio-cultural) 2–5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 18, 23, 25–50, 85, 137, 138, 142, 144,

147, 148 (*see also* demands of contexts)  
 contextualized accounts/discourse 48, 51,  
 67, 132, 143, 144, 147 (*see also* de-  
 contextualized accounts/discourse)  
 contradictory (input) 85, 96, 101–104  
 Conversation Analysis 15, 18  
 Çorakçı-Dişbudak, Belkis 45, 46, 47  
 corpus-constitution 51–54 (*see also*  
 accessing data)  
 court interpreting 2, 3, 29  
 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 4, 18,  
 19, 24  
 Cronin, Michael 12  
 Crystal, David 28  
 cultural turn 12  
 culture-specific (input) 85, 104–107

## D

de-contextualized accounts/discourse 33,  
 44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 67, 132, 133, 139, 141,  
 142, 143, 144, 147 (*see also* contextual-  
 ized accounts/discourse)  
 demands (of context) 13 (*see also* context)  
 (from SI) 26, 32, 35, 37, 136, 145  
 Derkunt, Ümran 38  
 detachment 31, 32, 34, 36  
 (of interpreter) 31, 32, 47  
 (of sense) 33, 34, 36  
 (*see also* essential meaning/content;  
 transcendental sense)  
 deverbalization 35, 36  
 dialogical 22, 23  
 Diriker, Ebru 9  
 Duranti, Charles 14, 15

## E

electronic device (interpreters as) 45, 47  
 essential meaning/content 35, 38, 141, 143,  
 145, 147 (*see also* detachment of sense;  
 transcendental sense/signified)  
 essentialist (approach) 39, 141, 142  
 ethical (interpreting) 29–32, 48  
 expectations (from SI) 9, 26, 64, 74–80,  
 131, 133, 136, 137, 144, 148 (*see also*

complexity of expectations; fuzzy  
 expectations)  
 (of receivers/users) 9, 38, 46, 74–80

## F

Fairclough, Norman 18, 19, 24  
 fidelity 10, 11, 29, 32, 35, 37, 39, 41, 42, 47,  
 48, 80, 132, 136, 145 (*see also* loyalty)  
 first person (in the delivery) 5, 9, 10, 33,  
 35, 49, 84–90, 92, 96, 101, 102, 112, 138,  
 139, 140, 141, 148, 157, 158, 159, 160,  
 165, 167–169, 175, 176, 177, 179, 182,  
 186, 188, 189, 196  
 Foucault, Michel 16, 18, 19, 206  
 fuzzy borders 32  
 expectations 136, 137 (*see also* complexity  
 of expectations; expectations from SI)  
 relations 137  
 role-descriptions 145

## G

Garzone, Giuliana 9, 12  
 gatekeepers (interpreters as) 30, 32  
 Giddens, Anthony 53  
 Gile, Daniel 9, 10, 11–13, 36, 37  
 “good” interpreting 34, 36  
 Goodwin, Alessandro 14, 15  
 Grbic, Nadja 3  
 Gumperz, John 14, 15  
 Gunnarson, Britt-Louise 14

## H

Harris, Brian 9, 10, 84  
 Have, Paul Ten 149  
 heterogeneity (of users) 61, 75, 133, 136  
 heteroglot 19, 22, 24, 139, 143, 162  
 Holz-Manttäri, Jutta 11  
 homogeneity (of users) 13, 61, 144  
 (discourse) 18, 23  
 (setting) 131, 137, 144  
 hybridity (of delivery) 89, 158, 161, 170,  
 179, 186  
 (speaker-positions) 90

## I

- identifying (with the speaker) 33, 35, 44, 48, 132, 139  
 immanent meanings 145, 147  
 impartiality 30, 31, 32  
 inaudible (speech) 83, 85, 95, 97, 150, 167, 168, 184, 185, 195, 199  
 Inghilleri, Moira 3  
 intelligibility (of the delivery) 35, 36, 73  
 intended meanings 23, 29, 33, 34, 39, 44, 46, 131, 132, 142–145, 148 (*see also* “original” meanings)  
 interpersonal (differences in interpreting) 90, 139 (*see also* intrapersonal variations)  
 “interpretation” (in interpreting) 43, 46, 133 (of data) 18  
 Interpreting Studies 1, 2, 8–13, 144  
 interviews 15, 17, 18, 52–54, 56, 57, 58, 63–80, 133–137, 204  
 intrapersonal variations (in SI) 90 (*see also* interpersonal differences)  
 involvement (of interpreter) 27–29, 31, 32, 37–39, 43, 44, 47–49, 51, 131–133, 143, 201  
 ITP’s Code of Ethics 30 (*see also* codes of ethics; AIIC’s Code; AUSIT’s Code; STIB’s Code)

## J

- Jansen, Peter 3  
 Jones, Roderick 37

## K

- Kadric, Mira 3  
 Kalina, Sylvia 11, 204  
 Kaufert, Joseph 3  
 Kirchhoff, Hella 8, 9  
 Kohn, Kurt 11, 204  
 Kondo, Masaomi 9, 38  
 Kopczyński, Andrzej 13  
 Knoll, Michael 3  
 Kurz, Ingrid 13

## L

- language-specific discussions 104–107, 197, 198

- Lash, Scott 206  
 legitimate language 21  
 Levinson, Stephen 14  
 Lindstrom, Lamont 15–17  
 Linell, Per 14, 16, 23  
 loyalty 32, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 51, 217 (*see also* fidelity)

## M

- Mack, Gabriele 13, 144  
 Malinowski, Bronislaw 14  
 Markova, Ivana 14  
 meta-discourse 4, 5, 21, 22, 25–26, 48–49, 84, 89, 131–133, 141–144, 201  
 meta-discursive representation 4, 5, 17, 24–26, 35, 51, 131, 142  
 mistakes (interpreter’s) 40, 41, 48, 85, 89, 90–96, 107, 141, 158, 161, 183, 188, 198 (speaker’s) 89, 90–96, 139, 155, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 176, 183, 188, 196, 200, 206  
 Monacelli, Claudia 3, 11, 12, 204  
 monological 23  
 Morris, Pam 22  
 Morris, Ruth 3  
 Moser, Peter 13  
 myths 21–22, 141–142

## N

- Namy, Claude 12, 36  
 naturalization (in discourse) 21, 22, 25, 143 (*see also* rationalization)  
 negotiation (of interpreter’s position) 137 (of meaning) 139, 147  
 neutrality 3, 17, 18, 136, 145  
 Niedzielski, Henry 12  
 non-conference language 85, 107–109, 134, 152, 160  
 non-verbal (communication) 19, 31, 53, 81, 95, 156, 157, 162, 171, 205 (*see also* semi-verbal communication)  
 norms 9, 10, 16, 17, 25, 84, 89, 142, 143, 171, 206

## O

- objectivistic approach 38

- objectivity 17, 28, 31, 32, 37, 43, 44, 47, 49, 51, 52, 143
- observation 17, 54, 81, 82, 133 (*see also* participant observation)
- Olson, David 53
- Ong, Walter 53, 81
- orders of discourse 16
- original meaning/message 28, 33, 34, 37, 39, 43, 48, 51, 76, 77, 80, 83, 132, 136, 142, 205 (*see also* intended meanings)
- overlapping speech 85, 94, 95–97, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 139, 151, 154, 162, 165, 167, 181, 184, 185, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199
- P**
- “packaging” of original message 35
- paraphrasing 10, 76, 77, 83, 84, 86–90, 92, 95, 96, 108, 138, 139, 140, 157, 194
- participant observation 5, 15, 133 (*see also* observation)
- partners 9, 139, 148 (*see also* agents)
- Peräklyä, Anssi 52
- Pöhhacker, Franz 3, 7, 11, 12, 13, 61
- “poor” interpreters 34, 35
- Powney, Janet 54, 81
- professional (discourse) 143  
(identity) 25  
(interpreter as) 2, 13, 25, 26, 31, 3, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42–49, 50, 132, 133, 142–144  
(interpreting) 7, 9, 10, 13, 30, 31, 33;  
(organizations) 4, 26, 29, 32–35, 39, 42, 132
- Pym, Anthony 3
- Q**
- quality criteria 10, 11, 13, 80, 144
- R**
- rationalization (in discourse) 21, 22, 25, 143 (*see also* naturalization)
- recording (interpreting) 51–53, 56–58, 60, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 204, 205 (*see also* audio recordings; video recordings)
- redundant (content) 38, 39, 145
- regulating (the floor) 99, 114, 168, 173, 193  
(the speaking subject) 138–139, 141, 148  
(*see also* speaking subject; speaker positions)
- reliability 52, 58
- remote interpreting 3–4
- repertoire of speech events 20–21
- reported speech 96, 107, 162, 165, 167, 194, 195, 198
- reporting the speaker 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 95, 96, 107, 108, 138, 139, 140, 154, 157, 170, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199
- reproduction of original meaning/speech 37, 144
- Risku, Hanna 201
- Roberts, Roda 28
- Röder, F. 3
- Roy, Cynthia 2, 3, 201
- S**
- Sacks, Harvey 15
- Said, Edward 206
- Schegloff, Emanuel 15
- Schiffirin, Deborah 14, 15, 16
- Schjoldager, Anna 9, 10
- Seleskovitch, Danica. 35, 36  
“semantic equivalence” 145
- semi-verbal communication 62, 82, 85, 95–96, 139 (*see also* non-verbal communication)
- Setton, Robin 11, 12, 201
- shaping power (of contexts) 2, 14  
(of discourse) 142, 143 (*see also* constitutive power)
- shifts in the speaking subject 84–86, 90, 95, 96, 101, 104, 107, 109, 115, 150, 176, 182, 205 (*see also* speaking subject)
- Shlesinger, Miriam 1, 9
- SI Research 1–3, 7, 11, 12, 52, 144, 145
- sign language interpreting 2, 3
- Sinclair, John 27
- situated (action) 1, 4, 7, 12, 13, 148;  
(cognition) 2, 201  
(practices) 15

(talk) 14  
 (translation) 2, 201  
 situatedness 2, 201  
 Snelling, David 12  
 speaker's "I" 5, 84, 85, 86, 89–92, 95, 96,  
 101, 104, 109, 113, 115, 137–139, 141,  
 150, 151, 153, 156–158, 160, 164–166,  
 168–170, 172, 175, 199, 205  
 speaker-positions 84, 85, 87, 90, 92, 94, 96,  
 97, 99, 101, 103–109, 112, 113, 114, 138–  
 141, 148, 150, 151, 153–155, 160–162,  
 164, 165, 167–169, 171, 175, 177, 180–  
 184, 185–187, 190, 193, 197, 198, 205  
 speaking subject 5, 84–86, 89, 90, 92, 95,  
 96, 101, 104, 107, 109, 115, 138, 140,  
 141, 149, 150, 158–162, 164, 167, 176,  
 180–183, 189, 196, 205 (*see also* shifts in  
 the speaking subject)  
 Sperber, Dan 15  
 Stenzl, Catherine 9  
 STIBC's Code of Ethics 31 (*see also* code of  
 ethics, AIIC's Code; AUSIT's Code; ITI's  
 Code)  
 subjectivity (interpreter) 28, 39, 49, 51, 144  
 (researchers) 52  
 (users) 80, 137  
 (human agent) 142

**T**  
 Tahir, Şehnaz 201  
 Tate, Granville 3  
 Thomas, Roy 3  
 Tebble, Helen 9, 38  
 Thiéry, Christopher 7, 8  
 third person 110, 113, 139, 140, 141, 180,  
 196

transcendental sense/signified 34, 36, 145,  
 147 (*see also* detachment of sense;  
 essential meaning/content)  
 transcripts 16–18, 81–83, 84, 85, 86–114,  
 204, 205  
 transfer (interlingual) 28, 29, 32–35, 38,  
 42–48, 51, 70, 76, 77, 132, 134, 136, 141,  
 142, 145, 147, 176  
 Toury, Gideon 25, 206  
 Trask, Robert 27  
 Turner, Graham 3  
 Turner, Jonathan 53

**U**  
 unethical (behavior) 29, 30, 32  
 unit of analysis 17, 83, 84  
 user surveys 12, 13, 80, 144

**V**  
 validity 52, 58  
 van Dijk, Teun 11, 18, 25  
 Vermeer, Hans 11  
 Viaggio, Sergio 36  
 video recordings 52, 53, 204 (*see also* audio  
 recording; recording)  
 Viezzi, Maurizio 12  
 Voloshinov, Valentin 14, 16, 22, 23, 201  
 Vuorikoski, Anna-Riitta 12, 13, 204

**W**  
 Wadensjö, Cecilia 3, 23, 204  
 Wilson, Deirdre 15  
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 14  
 Wodak, Ruth 18, 19  
 writing 53, 81, 82  
 Wurzel, Petra 3



In the series *Benjamins Translation Library* the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication:

- 7 **BEAUGRANDE, Robert de, Abdullah SHUNNAQ and Mohamed Helmy HELIEL (eds.):** Language, Discourse and Translation in the West and Middle East. 1994. xii, 256 pp.
- 8 **GILE, Daniel:** Basic Concepts and Models for Interpreter and Translator Training. 1995. xvi, 278 pp.
- 9 **REY, Alain:** Essays on Terminology. Translated by Juan C. Sager. With an introduction by Bruno de Bessé. 1995. xiv, 223 pp.
- 10 **KUSSMAUL, Paul:** Training the Translator. 1995. x, 178 pp.
- 11 **VINAY, Jean-Paul and Jean DARBELNET:** Comparative Stylistics of French and English. A methodology for translation. Translated and edited by Juan C. Sager, M.-J. Hamel. 1995. xx, 359 pp.
- 12 **BERGENHOLTZ, Henning and Sven TARP (eds.):** Manual of Specialised Lexicography. The preparation of specialised dictionaries. 1995. 256 pp.
- 13 **DELISLE, Jean and Judith WOODSWORTH (eds.):** Translators through History. 1995. xvi, 346 pp.
- 14 **MELBY, Alan K. and Terry WARNER:** The Possibility of Language. A discussion of the nature of language, with implications for human and machine translation. 1995. xxvi, 276 pp.
- 15 **WILSS, Wolfram:** Knowledge and Skills in Translator Behavior. 1996. xiii, 259 pp.
- 16 **DOLLERUP, Cay and Vibeke APPEL (eds.):** Teaching Translation and Interpreting 3. New Horizons. Papers from the Third Language International Conference, Elsinore, Denmark, 1995. 1996. viii, 338 pp.
- 17 **POYATOS, Fernando (ed.):** Nonverbal Communication and Translation. New perspectives and challenges in literature, interpretation and the media. 1997. xii, 361 pp.
- 18 **SOMERS, Harold (ed.):** Terminology, LSP and Translation. Studies in language engineering in honour of Juan C. Sager. 1996. xii, 250 pp.
- 19 **CARR, Silvana E., Roda P. ROBERTS, Aideen DUFOUR and Dini STEYN (eds.):** The Critical Link: Interpreters in the Community. Papers from the 1st international conference on interpreting in legal, health and social service settings, Geneva Park, Canada, 1–4 June 1995. 1997. viii, 322 pp.
- 20 **SNELL-HORNBY, Mary, Zuzana JETTMAROVÁ and Klaus KAINDL (eds.):** Translation as Intercultural Communication. Selected papers from the EST Congress, Prague 1995. 1997. x, 354 pp.
- 21 **BUSH, Peter and Kirsten MALMKJÆR (eds.):** Rimbaud's Rainbow. Literary translation in higher education. 1998. x, 200 pp.
- 22 **CHESTERMAN, Andrew:** Memes of Translation. The spread of ideas in translation theory. 1997. vii, 219 pp.
- 23 **GAMBIER, Yves, Daniel GILE and Christopher J. TAYLOR (eds.):** Conference Interpreting: Current Trends in Research. Proceedings of the International Conference on Interpreting: What do we know and how? 1997. iv, 246 pp.
- 24 **ORERO, Pilar and Juan C. SAGER (eds.):** The Translator's Dialogue. Giovanni Pontiero. 1997. xiv, 252 pp.
- 25 **POLLARD, David E. (ed.):** Translation and Creation. Readings of Western Literature in Early Modern China, 1840–1918. 1998. vi, 336 pp.
- 26 **TROSBORG, Anna (ed.):** Text Typology and Translation. 1997. xvi, 342 pp.
- 27 **BEYLARD-OZEROFF, Ann, Jana KRÁLOVÁ and Barbara MOSER-MERCER (eds.):** Translators' Strategies and Creativity. Selected Papers from the 9th International Conference on Translation and Interpreting, Prague, September 1995. In honor of Jiří Levý and Anton Popovič. 1998. xiv, 230 pp.
- 28 **SETTON, Robin:** Simultaneous Interpretation. A cognitive-pragmatic analysis. 1999. xvi, 397 pp.
- 29 **WILSS, Wolfram:** Translation and Interpreting in the 20th Century. Focus on German. 1999. xiii, 256 pp.
- 30 **DOLLERUP, Cay:** Tales and Translation. The Grimm Tales from Pan-Germanic narratives to shared international fairytales. 1999. xiv, 384 pp.
- 31 **ROBERTS, Roda P., Silvana E. CARR, Diana ABRAHAM and Aideen DUFOUR (eds.):** The Critical Link 2: Interpreters in the Community. Selected papers from the Second International Conference on Interpreting in legal, health and social service settings, Vancouver, BC, Canada, 19–23 May 1998. 2000. vii, 316 pp.

- 32 **BEEBY, Allison, Doris ENSINGER and Marisa PRESAS (eds.):** Investigating Translation. Selected papers from the 4th International Congress on Translation, Barcelona, 1998. 2000. xiv, 296 pp.
- 33 **GILE, Daniel, Helle V. DAM, Friedel DUBSLAFF, Bodil Ringe MARTINSEN and Anne SCHJOLDAGER (eds.):** Getting Started in Interpreting Research. Methodological reflections, personal accounts and advice for beginners. 2001. xiv, 255 pp.
- 34 **GAMBIER, Yves and Henrik GOTTLIEB (eds.):** (Multi) Media Translation. Concepts, practices, and research. 2001. xx, 300 pp.
- 35 **SOMERS, Harold (ed.):** Computers and Translation. A translator's guide. 2003. xvi, 351 pp.
- 36 **SCHMID, Monika S.:** Translating the Elusive. Marked word order and subjectivity in English-German translation. 1999. xii, 174 pp.
- 37 **TIRKKONEN-CONDIT, Sonja and Riitta JÄÄSKELÄINEN (eds.):** Tapping and Mapping the Processes of Translation and Interpreting. Outlooks on empirical research. 2000. x, 176 pp.
- 38 **SCHÄFFNER, Christina and Beverly ADAB (eds.):** Developing Translation Competence. 2000. xvi, 244 pp.
- 39 **CHESTERMAN, Andrew, Natividad GALLARDO SAN SALVADOR and Yves GAMBIER (eds.):** Translation in Context. Selected papers from the EST Congress, Granada 1998. 2000. x, 393 pp.
- 40 **ENGLUND DIMITROVA, Birgitta and Kenneth HYLTENSTAM (eds.):** Language Processing and Simultaneous Interpreting. Interdisciplinary perspectives. 2000. xvi, 164 pp.
- 41 **NIDA, Eugene A.:** Contexts in Translating. 2002. x, 127 pp.
- 42 **HUNG, Eva (ed.):** Teaching Translation and Interpreting 4. Building bridges. 2002. xii, 243 pp.
- 43 **GARZONE, Giuliana and Maurizio VIEZZI (eds.):** Interpreting in the 21st Century. Challenges and opportunities. 2002. x, 337 pp.
- 44 **SINGERMAN, Robert:** Jewish Translation History. A bibliography of bibliographies and studies. With an introductory essay by Gideon Toury. 2002. xxxvi, 420 pp.
- 45 **ALVES, Fabio (ed.):** Triangulating Translation. Perspectives in process oriented research. 2003. x, 165 pp.
- 46 **BRUNETTE, Louise, Georges BASTIN, Isabelle HEMLIN and Heather CLARKE (eds.):** The Critical Link 3. Interpreters in the Community. Selected papers from the Third International Conference on Interpreting in Legal, Health and Social Service Settings, Montréal, Quebec, Canada 22–26 May 2001. 2003. xii, 359 pp.
- 47 **SAWYER, David B.:** Fundamental Aspects of Interpreter Education. Curriculum and Assessment. 2004. xviii, 312 pp.
- 48 **MAURANEN, Anna and Pekka KUJAMÄKI (eds.):** Translation Universals. Do they exist? 2004. vi, 224 pp.
- 49 **PYM, Anthony:** The Moving Text. Localization, translation, and distribution. 2004. xviii, 223 pp.
- 50 **HANSEN, Gyde, Kirsten MALMKJÆR and Daniel GILE (eds.):** Claims, Changes and Challenges in Translation Studies. Selected contributions from the EST Congress, Copenhagen 2001. 2004. xiv, 320 pp.
- 51 **CHAN, Leo Tak-hung:** Twentieth-Century Chinese Translation Theory. Modes, issues and debates. 2004. xvi, 277 pp.
- 52 **HALE, Sandra Beatriz:** The Discourse of Court Interpreting. Discourse practices of the law, the witness and the interpreter. 2004. xvi, 261 pp. + index.
- 53 **DIRIKER, Ebru:** De-/Re-Contextualizing Conference Interpreting. Interpreters in the Ivory Tower? 2004. vii, 209 pp. + index.
- 54 **GONZÁLEZ DAVIES, Maria:** Multiple Voices in the Translation Classroom. Activities, tasks and projects. 2004. xii, 259 pp + index.
- 55 **ANGELELLI, Claudia:** Revisiting the Interpreter's Role. A study of conference, court, and medical interpreters in Canada, Mexico and the United States. *Expected Fall 2004*
- 56 **ORERO, Pilar (ed.):** Topics in Audiovisual Translation. *Expected Fall 2004*
- 57 **CHERNOV, Ghelly V.:** Redundancy, Inference and Prediction in SI. A probability-prediction model of simultaneous interpretation based on the Russian school of Activity Theory. *Expected Fall 2004*
- 58 **BRANCHADELL, Albert and Lovell Margaret WEST (eds.):** Less Translated Languages. *Expected Fall 2004*