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Contemporary translation theory

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CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATION THEORY

By

Edwin Charles Gentzler

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To James Holmes

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Translation Theory" is and is not a new field; though it exists only since 1983 as a separate entry in the <u>Modern Language Association International Bibliography</u>, it is as old as the tower of Babel. Some scholars claim never to have heard of it as a subject in and of itself; others, who may themselves translate, claim to know all that they need to know. Anyone working "monoligually" may purport no need for translation theory; yet translation inheres in every language by its relationships other signifying systems both past and present. Ask the lexiographers who have been painstakingly working on the new <u>Oxford English Language Dictionary</u> how many foreign languages, dead and alive, they need to consult in order to present the current "meaning" of any given word. Although considered a marginal discipline in academia, translation theory should be central to anyone writing or interpreting literature; and in an historical period characterized by the proliferation of literary theories, translation theory is increasingly relevant to them all. This dissertation not only reports on the developments within several of the major branches investigating the subject of translation theory but also suggests that the continued segregation of the field of translation theory from other forms of literary investigation is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. In light of recent developments within translation theory and in view of current literary theories of texts, intertextuality, and signifying systems, clearly translation

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theory is of more than marginal interest; the question which I hope to raise is just how important is translation theory to contemporary literary studies.

What is "translation theory"? Although the field is defined differently by different scholars, one might begin a definition of "modern" translation theory by citing Roman Jacobson's definition, which breaks the field down into three areas: *intralingual* translation, a rewording of signs in one language with signs from the same language; *interlingual* translation, or the interpretation of signs in one language with signs from another language (translation "proper"); and *intersemiotic* translation, or the transfer ("transmutation") of the signs in one language to non-verbal sign systems (from language into art or music).[1] All of Jacobson's fields mutually reinforce each other, and accepting this definition, one can easily see how translation theory can quickly enmesh the student in the entire intersemiotic network of language and culture, one which touches on all disciplines and discourses. For the student of literature, to whom this particular text is directed, translation theory centrally affects the way in which we study texts. I will be concerned mostly with the second aspect of Jacobson's definition--*interlingual* translation--but I hope to demonstrate as well that such isolation is impossible, and that even translation "proper" entails multiple linguistic, literary and cultural aspects.

In recent years, translation theory has exploded with new developments. George Steiner characterizes the history of translation theory

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[1]Roman Jacobson, "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation," in On Translation, ed. Reuben A. Brower (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 232-9.

until Jacobson as a continual rehashing of the same formal-free theoretical distinction. "Modern" translation theory, like current literary theory, begins with structuralism and reflects the proliferation of the age: there may be as many theories as there are languages, which, in 1975, numbered over four thousand.[2] The text most widely translated in the world today is the Bible, available in far more than 800 languages, with over 3000 people actively involved in its translation.[3] Bible translators share certain presuppositions, discussed in Chapter Three, about the wide range of ways the "original message" can be communicated. In contrast to theories of Bible translation is that of Koran translation, not discussed in this dissertation. Muslims believe that any translation would distort the message of God as told to Muhammed, and therefore any rewriting of the text is considered an act of blasphemy. As the recent case of orthodox Islamic opposition to Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses graphically demonstrates, such misrepresentation is not taken lightly. If you want to read the Koran, you must first learn Arabic, which is in itself another kind of translation theory. Most translation theories locate themselves some place in between. Unable to report on the multitude of theories, I have selected a few, which are both representative of and influential in the new field of Translation Studies-- theories of interest to anyone who follows current developments in literary theory.

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[2]George Steiner, After Babel (London/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 51.

[3]Eugene Nida and Charles Taber, The Theory and Practice of Translation (Leiden: .E.J. Brill, 1969), 1.

The following study is introductory in nature. Given the marginal status of translation theory within literary studies, I have assumed that the reader has had little previous exposure to the theories presented here. All Western in origin, the investigations themselves differ greatly, a fact reflected in the terminology specific to each field as well as in the ideas themselves. Literary translators, for example, distance themselves from the "jargon" of linguistic approaches; deconstructionists subvert the very "scientific" terminology demanded by semioticians; and the aggressive rhetoric of the deconstructionsists alienates scholars from many of the other fields. Of necessity, each of the following chapters conforms in a gradual way to the preferred terminology within the particular branch of study, for certain ideas are dependent upon the terms used to describe them. In addition to terminological differences, other barriers have impeded the exchange of ideas among scholars of various approaches. Despite the fact that "new" approaches such as "Translation Studies" and "Polysystems Theory" have been developing their ideas and publishing their data for almost two decades, their ideas remain foreign to more traditionally based approaches. Anglo-American translators, for example, generally resist the suggestion that institutional manipulation influences translation. Translation Studies scholars do not relish the idea that their meticulously collected data may be interpreted by deconstructionists to reveal multiple gaps and literary repression rather than the systematic literary evolution they themselves have theorized. Interdisciplinary translation conferences have been held, but many incompatabilities remain; one of the purposes of

this study is to show how such problems in communication and exchange are grounded in the differing theoretical assumptions of each approach.

Although this dissertation is meant to serve as a critical introduction to the major theories of translation, I have not confined myself to mere accounts of the various movements, but have attempted to symptomatically read the theoretical implications of their work as well. Such a reading involves locating each theory within varying paradigms of twentieth-century theoretical developments. Chapter Two discusses contemporary Anglo-American literary translation in the context of New Criticism; against the background of translation theories of I.A. Richards and Ezra Pound, I examine the work of Fred Will for prevalent theoretical assumptions as well as suggest how a new theory emerges. In Chapter Three, I argue that Eugene Nida's "Science" of Translation, the theory underlying Bible translation, has roots in Protestant theology and merely uses generative linguistics to lend credence to its approach. I then examine the work of Wolfram Wilss in West Germany as a contemporary adaptation of this "science." Chapters Four and Five discuss two "new" approaches to the subject, both having their foundation in Russian formalism; the discussion in Chapter Four outlines the concepts borrowed from Czech semioticians by a group of scholars in The Netherlands and Belgium, including James Holmes and André Lefevere, and shows how the ideas are transformed into a new discipline called Translation Studies. Despite their claims to the contrary, I also show how the Dutch scholars judge the quality of translations based upon an ideal construct. Chapter Five traces further developments within this new discipline in its relationship to a more comprehensive approach, that of Polysystems Theory,

founded and articulated by the Israeli scholars Itamar Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury, who demonstrate how translation is interrelated to the functioning literary and extraliterary systems within a given culture. Comprehensive as Polysystems Theory purports to be, deconstructionists still consider it constrained by certain structural limitations. In Chapter Six, I look at Heidegger's thinking on the nature of language to contextualize deconstructionists' recent focus on non-identity, which is especially relevant to any theory of translation, and then look at work by Derrida not only as an alternative to systematic academic investigations in the field, but also as a way of rethinking the very definition of translation.

Despite the fact that these theories discussed here developed separately in different parts of the world, may seem mutually incompatible, and are often are written against each other, I also see certain connections. As a result, the order of presentation is not a random juxtaposition of disparate views, but rather a "narrative" that attempts to reveal a general "evolution" within contemporary translation theory. I hope this will become clear in the course of the dissertation, but to facilitate the reading process, I give the following very brief guidelines: Chapter Two considers primarily literary qualities; Chapter Three juxtaposes a linguistic alternative; Chapter Four combines linguistics and literary approaches; Chapter Five locates the combinination in an historical framework; and Chapter Six raises questions about the nature of the historical context framing the above theories. Since I began by looking for and expecting to find radical differences, the connections that have presented themselves seem all the more surprising.

The formulation of this project began in the early 1980's at the International Writing Program (IWP) at the University of Iowa, where I worked as an administrative assistant handling a whole range of logistical tasks, from the actual transportation (translation in a physical sense) of approximately thirty writers each year from all over the globe to Iowa, to the actual translation of specific texts into English. Elementary as it may sound, the most immediately apparent fact was that the international writers were different. When picking them up at the airport, I would not need a sign announcing my institution and hope that they would find me; one could immediately distinguish the writer from Greece, Indonesia, or Egypt from the local Cedar Rapids businessmen. Equally clear, their creative writing was different: one need not speak all the languages to understand that sounds and connotations gave away the presence of something else going on in the various languages. From the luxurious vowel sounds of Ga to the rich consonants of German, from the stoccado rhythms of Japanese to the lyric meditations of Hindi, something else was being transported into this country. During the last days of preparing a text for presentation, young American poets and international writers could be found discussing the sounds and connotations of words until the wee hours of the mornings, trying to manipulate single lines closer to intended "meanings."

Unfortunately, the general reception of performances was cool. Because the Program was housed at a university, those working on the presentations made certain that the translations were "adequate" for an academic audience. Yet, in general, the language department professors showed little interest in the international visitors. Responsible for publicity,

I took an interest in the reception and would privately query the language professors about their response. More often than not, they referred to the IWP members as "second class" artists. Certainly the plays of Albert Malikongwa about tribal chiefs in the bush country of Botswana do not conform to the kind of plays being performed at the West End in London; nor do the oral narratives of the Yoruba culture transcribed (in English) by Amos Tutuola of Nigeria conform to the new fiction being reviewed in the New York Times Review of Books. As a "promoter" of the Program trying to enhance international communication, this latter problem was perhaps the most difficult to overcome. A concern that the translations were inadequate to the standards of an erudite audience motivated my investigation of different theories of translation as a way to better understand the process. But I've concluded that another phenomenon was also in operation; a distinct standard prevalent in the institution existed which was clearly not being met. The problem was larger than the "quality" of any given translation, for often on the basis of one text in translation, out of context, evaluations were being made and writers dismissed. To call Ai Qing, one of the most distinguished writers from China, or Bert Schierbeck, one of the leading contemporary novelists from The Netherlands, second class, however, demonstrates not necessarily a lack of understanding or a poor translation, but a difference of standards. Not simply "flawed," our translations did not conform to certain "literary" expectations of our audience.

The result of such cultural hegemony operates subtly. My experience at the IWP revealed that the desire of writers from smaller countries to be

translated and valued in the major languages is enormous, and the standards by which they were judged here had an effect on the kinds of writing eventually produced. Thus our cultural dominance, although to a large degree unconscious, had definite repercussions. I have seen international writers arrive in the United States eager to read, to talk, to exchange ideas and texts, only to be crushed by the institutional disinterest and lack of avenues for expression. Some of the visiting writers recognized the problem and redirected their energies to conforming to thematics and styles that may meet a more favorable reception--but at certain costs. By rewriting texts to "appeal" to Western audiences, themes, styles, modes of reference and referents themselves are elided from the texts we receive. Other IWP participants returned to their home countries, where they were generally honored, wrote an essay about their stay in the USA, and continued with their own indigenous creative writing projects intended for their native audiences. In either scenario, much is lost and little gained. In many ways, all the translation theories discussed in this text reflect certain values and aesthetic assumptions about literature in general as understood by Western civilization. As the translation theories outlined in this dissertation become more and more complex, they seem to gain more and more support, and by their wider acceptance in academia in general, they also gain more power to exclude. Implicit in my critique is a skepticism regarding any theory that subsumes or represses other possibilities in its effort to generate consensus among other Western scholars.

I do not presume here to offer a solution to the problem or posit my own theory of translation. To better locate my position, however, a brief

outline of my agreements and disagreements with the theories that follow may help. All theories tend to conclude in some fashion that translation mediates. A translated text is not part of one sign system or another, but is enmeshed in a synchronic and diachronic intertextual web, out of which it emerges with a life and identity of its own. Although dependent upon the original (source) text for its reference and structure, the translated text also emerges as necessarily independent of it, aimed at communicating with a different audience in a different time and place and in the receiving (target) language. This originary reference can have a potency all of its own if transported to a new system of reference. Translation thus mediates between different languages, different cultures, different times, and, above all, between different people. Insofar as the translation theories which follow recognize this aspect of the process, I can support them. Rarely, however, are these theories content to identify and be governed by this mediatory aspect of translated texts and leaving it be. Rather, they tend to sublate it into an identity or "mode of presence" and subsume it into their own theoretical framework. A pattern of criticism thus emerges in this dissertation, always directed against the process of identifying "presence" and subsuming it into some structural framework. Briefly, such "modes of presence" might be characterized as follows: in Chapter Two: intuition; in Chapter Three: scientific (linguistic) knowledge; in Chapter Four: author's "original" intention; in Chapter Five: dialectical totality; in Chapter Six: the "Other." Usually, knowledge of these various modes of identity are subsequently declared as "good," "primary," "progressive," or "radical" and what remains is degraded, relegated to secondary status.

As far as I can see, "what remains" is precisely that which needs be "ferried across" by translation: the sounds, the referents, the connotations, the history, the writing (in a material sense), the ideas. Certainly real possibilities of alterity, of importing new ideas and expressions, are drastically repressed by the intellectual rigor of the theories I discuss. These "secondary" aspects of language, those very things which do not fit into any of the theories, may not only be as important as the respective theories' valued systems and abstract descriptions of underlying forms behind the text, but also may be the most useful and enjoyable aspect. Some people read literature for the way in which certain things are said; most of the theories discussed retain some sort of definition of literary related to the form of the saying. Yet the twin which accompanies how things are said is that elusive what is being said, not unimportant to a text's overall meaning. Despite a period in which theories multiply, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to tell what is literary, to isolate those features which lend the text its literary import, to identify that which evokes the appropriate "literary" response. Distancing myself from fixed intuited, scientific, functional and even pre-ontological definitions of that specific "presence" prioritized by the various theories as well as from the value systems which derive from such priorities, the following analysis is aimed primarily at exposing the historical backgrounds of the respective approaches in order to show the sources from which they derive their power. Examples at the end of each chapter will help illustrate the advantages as well as limitations of the respective approaches. Rather than suggest that any specific theory is about to move to the forefront and dominate other theories, closing off

avenues of investigation in favor of some unified presence, I suggest that translation theory is just beginning to recognize its own theoretical roots, thus setting the stage for more open-ended and interdisciplinary approaches through which the focus of the field may shift from the abstract to the specific, from the deep underlying hypothetical structures to the surface of texts with all their gaps, errors, ambiguities, multiple referents, and "foreign" disorder. Only at a time of renewed study of actual texts from a variety of angles might we begin to gain increased insight into the nature of translation, the nature of language, and (international) communication in general. Such a rereading of (translated) texts is beginning to take place, marking the beginnings of an exciting period for translation theory specifically and literary history in general, as perhaps for the first time in the history of literary theory, the translated text is moving toward central importance in the way literary scholars study texts and the process by which we "read" the world.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN LITERARY TRANSLATION

The Boom in Literary Translation

A myth in America today reads that translation is a secondary activity, mechanical rather than creative, therefore neither worthy of serious critical attention nor of general interest to the public.[1] Translators continually lament the fact that there is no market for their work and that what does get published is immediately relegated to the margins of academic investigation. However, a closer analysis of the developments over the last two decades reveals that there has been a veritable translation boom, with much public and academic interest. In the early 1960's, a time when there were no translation centers, Paul Engle, Director of the Writers Workshop at the University of Iowa, argued that creative writing knows no national boundaries, and subsequently expanded the Creative Writing Program to

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[1] Hilaire Belloc perhaps first articulated this impression as early as 1931, writing, "The art of translation is a subsidiary art and derivative. On this account it has never been granted the dignity of original work, and has suffered too much in the general judgement of letters." Hilaire Belloc, On Translation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931). At the first conference on literary translation in the United States, the director Robert Payne wrote, "Translators-the proletarians of literature with nothing to lose but their chains." Qtd. by Stefan Congrat-Butlar in the Preface to Translation and Translators (New York: R.R. Bowker, 1979). The lament is perpetuated today by practicioners and critics alike. Cf. Susan Bassnett-McGuire, Translation Studies (London: Methuen, 1980) p. 2, or Theo Hermans, The Manipulation of Literature (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), pp. 7-8. Also see Marcia Doran and Marilyn Gaddis Rose, "The Economics and Politics of Translation," Translation Spectrum (Albany: State University of New York Pres, 1981).

include international writers. By 1964 he had hired a full-time Director for what was the first Translation Workshop in the United States, and began conferring academic credit for translations. The following year the Ford Foundation conferred a $150,000 grant on the University of Texas at Austin toward the establishment of the National Translation Center. Also in 1965, the first issue of Modern Poetry in Translation, edited by Ted Hughes and Danny Weissbort, was published, providing literary translators a place for their creative work. In 1968, the National Translation Center published the first issue of Delos, a journal devoted to the history as well as the aesthetics of translation. Soon translation courses and workshops were being offered at universities all over the country; and today we find translation workshops well entrenched in the system at the most prestigious universities--Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Iowa, Texas, and SUNY Albany among them. No longer subsumed as an aspect of creative writing, advanced degrees are being conferred upon students for creative, historical and theoretical work in the field. This, in turn, has led to the establishment of the professional organization American Literary Translators Association (ALTA) in the late seventies as well as the founding of the journal Translation for that organization. By 1977, the United States Government lent its authority to this process of legitimization with the establishment of the National Endowment of the Humanities Grants specifically for literary translations. The next two decades will undoubtedly see translation workshops housed at as many institutions as currently offer programs in Creative Writing. Far from being

at the margins of society, translators are in the process of becoming mainstreamed.[2]

Why is this process occurring at this moment in American culture? In the early sixties, translation was a marginal activity at best and completely unrecognized by academia as a field worthy of study. In his essay "The State of Translation," Edmund Keeley, Director of Translation Workshops first at Iowa and later at Princeton, writes, "In 1963 there was no established continuing public forum for the purpose: no translation centers, no associations of literary translators, as far as I know, no publications devoted primarily to translation, translators, and their continuing problems."[3] That this belief continues to this day should surprise no one; ideological structures die slowly. The slow death of this particular myth suggests that perpetuating the idea of translation as a secondary activity (derivative instead of original) serves to reinforce the existing status quo, one which places primary emphasis not on the process but on the pursuit and consumption of original meaning. The activity of translation may represent a process antithetical to the reigning literary beliefs, hence its relegation to marginal status within educational and economic institutions, and its position in the society as part of a counter-cultural movement. In a decade of political turmoil, the practice of translation involved alternate

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[2]For a more detailed history of this process, see Translation and Translators: An International Directory and Guide, ed. Stefan Congrat Butlar (New York: R.R. Bowker Co., 1979), 1-5.

[3]Edmund Keeley, "The State of Translation," Modern Poetry in Translation 41-2 (1981). Qtd. by Danny Weissbort in Foreword to Modern Poetry in Translation: 1983 (New York: MPT/Persea, 1983), 7.

value systems and views of reality. Perhaps no one articulates the political urgency of the translation boom better than Ted Hughes:

> The boom in the popular sales of translated modern poetry
> was without precedent. Though it reflected only one aspect of the
> wave of mingled energies that galvanized those years with such
> extremes, it was fed by almost all of them. . . . There are diagnoses
> to be drawn from the mass epidemic of infatuation with hallucinogenic
> drugs, the sudden opening to all of the worlds of Eastern mystical
> practice and doctrine, particularly of various forms of Buddhism, the
> mass craze of Hippie ideology, the revolt of the young, the Pop music
> of the Beatles and their generation, the Walpurgisnacht of new
> psychotherapies. . . . The historical moment might well be seen, by
> a detached Spenglerian, as a development from the spiritual plan, an
> unfolding from inwards, a millennial change in the Industrial West's
> view of reality that had roots far back in time. . . . We were all taken
> unawares by a decade that became in many ways a poetic image
> simply for youth, which had behind it the magical power of sexual
> awakening, and the archaic biological imperative, to love and embrace
> everybody, especially those with foreign tongues, before it is too late.[4]

For Hughes, the translation boom of the sixties was simply one aspect of a generational movement that articulated itself in a variety of media. His view of translation as anti-establishment may not be true of all translation of this period, but certainly holds true for a large and influential group of contemporary American poets actively translating at the time: Robert Lowell, Robert Bly, W.S. Merwin, Gary Snyder, Denise Levertov, Galway Kinnell, Elizabeth Bishop, W.D. Snodgrass, and Lawrence Ferlinghetti, among the most important. These poets were not only rebelling against traditional literary institutions, but also against the national and international policies of their government and Western society in general. Paul Engle sums up the socially active, politically urgent cause of translation in the contemporary world:

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[4]Ted Hughes, Introduction to <u>Modern Poetry in Translation: 1983</u>, 9.

As this world shrinks together like an aging orange and all peoples in all cultures move closer together (however reluctantly and suspiciously) it may be that the crucial sentence for our remaining years on earth may be very simply:
TRANSLATE OR DIE.
The lives of every creature on the earth may one day depend on the instant and accurate translation of one word.[5]

The Translation Workshop Premise

Despite the surge of interest in translation and the raising of many questions regarding the theoretical nature of language during the past two decades, few have paused to consider the theoretical implications of the very practice they have fostered. The explicitly atheoretical premises of those practicing and teaching translation as revealed in the numerous prefaces and introductions to texts containing translations may serve as one explanation for this lack of critical attention. An essay by Jonas Zdanys, who teaches the translation workshop at Yale, amply illustrates the problem. In his essay "Teaching Translation: Some Notes Toward a Course Structure," he talks about his initial reluctance to teach translation because he views it as a creative process that could not be taught, but then his agreement to do so, hoping to attract literature students interested in "exploring the theoretical and the practical aspects of poetic translation."[6] He proceeds to review the course, the books taught, the structure of the seminar, and its successes, emphasizing especially the enjoyment of the original poems and the translations made by the students. The article concludes with Zdanys

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[5]Paul and Hualing Nieh Engle, Foreword to Writing from the World: II (Iowa City: International Books and the University of Iowa Press, 1985), 2.

[6]Jonas Zdanys, "Teaching Translation: Some Notes Toward a Course Structure, Translation Review. no. 23 (1987), 10.

changing his mind, resolving the contradiction involved in teaching something he believed could not be taught, and arguing that the art of translation can not only be taught, but also make the student aware of aspects of poetry, language, aesthetics and interpretation not part of his original agenda.

I argue, on the other hand, that the essay does not resolve itself quite so completely, and the humanistic conclusion reveals theoretical presuppositions which are characteristic of the workshop approach. For example, despite his wish that the course attract students interested in theoretical questions, he simultaneously argues that he opposes the restraints of "predetermined aesthetic theories." In addition, without telling us why, Zdanys says that "this essay unfortunately cannot consider" the contribution of deconstruction to the field, although Yale itself houses numerous such critics who in fact are part of the same department (a special interdepartmental program) in which the course was offered. Finally, perhaps most importantly, Zdanys implicitly reveals aesthetic predispositions which underlie his approach:

> Although I am not yet ready to surrender *my commitment to creative solitude*, I do believe that discussions of the various theoretical essays, the careful readings of original poems, first drafts, and finished translations, and the consideration of the various aspects of translation made workshop participants *more fully aware of the dynamic process that is literature.* By the end of the course, students certainly had a *richer understanding of literary complexity.* . . .[7]

Revealing terminology (italicized) in the above passage indicates that Zdanys (1) finds translation a subjective activity, (2) subsumes translation under the

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[7]Italics mine. Ibid., 11.

larger goal of understanding literature, (3) thinks the study of translation can lead to a qualitative "richer" understanding, and (4) has a hidden didactic agenda. The implicit goal is more overtly revealed in a section of the same essay in which he talks about the presence of a female linguistics student who despite Zdanys' "initial misgivings" about what she might contribute to the seminar, actually brought a "valuable and intriguing" perspective to the aesthetic process he was teaching. Zdanys contradicts his stated premise--a rejection of predetermined aesthetic theories--when he concludes that although her approach was a "refreshing" addition to the course, he "secretly hopes" that he "converted" her during the course. The lingering question is "converted her to what?"

That unarticulated "what" is the topic I wish to address in this chapter. Scholars associated with the American translation workshop boom tend to believe that their approach is not theoretically preconditioned; this essay attempts to formulate the *non-dit* present in their works, analyze those underlying assumptions, and show how they either reinforce the existing literary edifices or offer a counterclaim which deserves further consideration. Through this approach I hope to reveal that the translation workshop approach actually does both, i.e., simultaneously reinforces and subverts, and that this dual activity, necessarily operative *because* of the methodology, is in itself a contribution to an ongoing post-modern investigation of language.

Previous attempts to formulate the aesthetic theory underlying the American university "workshop" approach are few in number. This section will analyze some of the more influential formulations of a theory of literary

translation as practiced in America to see if they shed any light on that process which others argue defies coherent articulation. Since the prevailing critical approach to the study of literature in the country during the early sixties was that of New Criticism, I will first look at the work of I.A. Richards, the founder of New Criticism,[8] in order to establish the historical framework which ideologically constrains any theoretical formulation. Secondly, I will analyze the work of Frederic Will, the first director of a translation workshop in the United States, and whose theoretical writing is most influenced by his thinking on and about translation. I will next examine the work of Ezra Pound, who, from the early sixties on, remains the most influential critic on the theory of translation in America. Despite the critical attention devoted to his work, his "theory" remains perhaps the least understood. Finally, I will briefly focus on several texts by practicing translators which seem best to exemplify this approach as well as reveal the explicit and implicit theoretical agenda.

Theoretical Foundations: I.A. Richards

If there is one text which best exemplifies the theory of the practice-oriented workshop approach to translation, it is I.A. Richards' Practical Criticism. The precursor to both the creative writing workshop and the translation workshop, I.A. Richards' first reading workshop, took place at

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[8]cf. John Crowe Ransom, The New Criticism (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1941) who cited Richards with William Empson, T.S. Eliot and Yvor Winters as the leading "New Critics." Although Ransom is arguing to a certain degree *against* Richards, the argument is not disrespectful, and certain assumptions for achieving an adequate reading (and by extension, an adequate translation), such as the application of linguistic and semantic methods, are not questioned.

Harvard in the late 1920's. Richards' famous experiment was to give his best Harvard undergraduates 13 poems from authors ranging from Shakespeare to Ella Wheeler Wilcox. The students received poems with no further information (no title, author's name or biographical information), and had one week to respond, after which Richards collected the "protocols." We note how Richards isolates the text from all external considerations, especially its social context. Richards' aims were threefold: (1) to introduce a new kind of documentation on contemporary American culture; (2) to provide a new technique for individuals to discover for themselves what they think about poetry; and (3) to discover new educational methods. Via this ivory-tower approach--both the student and the text are cut off from society--Richards hoped to introduce new documentation supporting his aesthetic beliefs: that a unified "meaning" exists and can be discerned and that a unified evaluative system exists by which the reader can judge the value of that "meaning."

How does Richards' reading workshop of the twenties relate to today's translation workshop? First, both introduce new documentation into the culture: the responses of the not yet fully formed literary critic. As Zdanys' article above indicates, subsequent translation workshops followed this precedent, taking pride in the fact that their students did not yet have any predetermined methodology. Although this freedom from constraint was thought to allow a "truer" investigation of the process of translation, in practice, for Richards' and subsequent translation projects in secondary schools, the effect was simply that students tended to conform to the existing tastes and prejudices of those in control of the literary institutions. Secondly, although Richards' emphasis on the individuals' "discovering

themselves" appears magnanimous as well as democratic, it is not without a hidden humanist agenda. Richards' approach only *appears* to be one open to multiple interpretations, to readings which are liberating, individual and potentially anti-establishment as well as to those which reinforce traditional interpretation.[9] In fact, his project is exactly the opposite: to establish new educational techniques which will lead to "perfect understanding" of the text and will result in a unified and correct response.[10] In his workshop Richards does not seek variable responses, but unified solutions to communication problems and the generation of rules and principles by which singular interpretation can be attained and properly judged:

> The whole apparatus of critical rules and principles is a means to the attainment of finer, more precise, more discriminating communication. When we have solved, completely, the communication problem, when we have got, perfectly, the experience, the mental condition relevant to the poem, we still have to judge it, still to decide upon its worth.[11]

In Richards' communication model, reading a text is a problem which can be solved "completely," that which is discovered an "experience" which can be gotten "perfectly." Such a model presumes a primary poetic experience that

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[9]It is a misinterpretation which has been perpetuated by recent reader-response critics, including Jane Tompkins, who calls Richards' Practical Criticism "a touchstone for modern literary theory." Jane Tompkins, Reader Response Criticism (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), 258.

[10]This abstract reader is further idealized in reader-response criticism. Wolfgang Iser's "implied reader," Jonathan Culler's "competent reader," Michael Riffaterre's "superreader" and, to a lesser degree, Stanley Fish's "informed reader" presume similar unified responses to literature and a universal evaluative system.

[11]I.A. Richards, Practical Criticism (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1929), 11.

can be exactly and completely communicated to another person, if one is properly educated. The evaluation of the poem is similarly determined, again by the consensus of those whose trained abilities allow them to see the light and judge accordingly. Evaluative power here settles into the hands the elite few, revealing Richards' didactic goals only too clearly: Richards' students will no doubt learn to think and judge exactly the way he does. He writes, "The deficiencies so noticeable in the protocol writers . . . are not native unalterable defects in the average human mind. They are due, in large degree, to mistakes that can be avoided and bad training."[12]

Structurally, the translation workshop methodology has also adopted certain aspects of Richards' reading workshop. First, the same attempt to discover rules and principles which help attain that finer, "more discriminating" communication exists, the only difference being that translation workshop participants try to generate reading _and_ writing rules. Secondly, the same goal--that of achieving primary experience and rearticulating it--exists, the only difference being the media in which that experience is expressed. I am not sure, however, that all translators come to the same conclusion Richards reaches. For Richards, interpretation (read: translation) deficiencies are a mere product of mistakes that can be avoided with the proper training. Perfect rearticulation of the experience in a perfect "protocol"/interpretation is the goal: "A perfect understanding would involve not only an accurate direction of thought, a correct evocation of feeling, and exact apprehension of tone and precise recognition of

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[12]Ibid., 309.

intention, but further, it would get these contributory meanings in their right order."[13]

The contradiction in Richards' work is now clear: far from being anything new, i.e., something through which individuals, given their different backgrounds and ideological presuppositions, can discover different meanings in the same texts, a unified "meaning" is posited right where it was traditionally assumed to be, in a "precise recognition of [the author's] intention." Richards assumes *a fortiori* that we can understand precisely what the author said, privileges access to that meaning, and suggests that interpretation ought to recover that same meaning. It should come as no surprise that the text Practical Criticism goes on to advocate a very stringent educational regime--increasing homework, improving maturity, controlling stock responses, and safeguarding readers from their own preconceptions--through which reading problems can be solved and consensus attained. An argument which appeared initially to be very democratic--teaching students to think for themselves--actually turns into a condemnation of the American educational system. "Practical criticism" is idealism to the highest degree; in practice no such pure recovery is possible.[14] Richards believes that the reader of good poetry is more valuable

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[13]Ibid., p. 332.

[14]René Wellek, consulting different texts while trying to understand the "psychologism" of Richards aesthetic theory, comes to a similar conclusion: "The attempt to find the mode of existence of a work of art in the inaccessible psychic state of its author, whether during the act of creation or during the act of contemplating the finished composition, or even in the anarchic variety of any number of readers' responses, leads to potentially absurd conclusions. Richards' solution fails because it contains highly concealed dogmas." René Wellek, A History of Modern Criticism: 1750-1950, Vol. 5 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 229.

to the society than one who does not read, and his political values get confused with his literary theory, resulting in a theory that posits the possibility of creating a perfect reader who can recover the author's original meaning. Even more impossible would be the translation of that meaning into another text, be it a critical article, and interpretation or a translation. Far from offering anything new, Richards' approach actually reinforces conservative literary institutions and political structures.

In addition to his well known contribution to American criticism of this century, Richards has also made a foray into the field of translation theory. In "Toward a Theory of Translating," published in 1953, Richards refines his theory of meaning and how one goes about comparing translations to original texts. His initial project of attempting to resolve the problems inhibiting perfect understanding has been made increasingly more problematic in light of three decades of theoretical inquiry, most of which include relativist theses and perspective variables.[15] Richards is not untouched by evolving critical theory:

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[15]Relativist notions of how language shapes reality and how we experience the world (as opposed to some universal reality or common experience perceived the same way by all peoples) can be seen developing for quite some time in Germany. See the work of Johann Georg Hamann, Vermischte Anmerkungen (1761) and Philologische Einfälle und Zweifel (1772); continued first by Johann Gottfried Herder, Fragmente (1766-67); next by Wilhelm von Humbolt in "Einleitung" to Aeschylos' Agamemnon metrisch übersetzt von Wilhelm von Humboldt (1816) and Über das Entstehen der grammatischen Formen und ihrem Einfluss auf die Ideen Entwicklung (1822) and, especially, Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaus (1835). In terms of Richard's specific problems in the twentieth century, the principle opposing viewpoint is what has become known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which, very briefly stated, argues that each language constructs a distinct world limiting what individuals can understand. Thus no two languages can represent the same reality, and

How can one compare a sentence in English poetry with one (however like it) in English prose? Or indeed any two sentences, or the same sentence, in different settings? What is synonymy?* A proliferous literature of critical and interpretive theory witnesses to the difficulty. It seems to have been felt more and more in recent decades.[16]

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*Willard V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," _Philosophical Review_, Vol. LX (1951).

Richards notes Quine after "synonymy" because meaning and its translation within one language or across two languages has become increasingly problematic. For Quine and the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, the main problem has been that equating identity with semantic exactness (the problem of synonymy) extends beyond the laws of logic.[17] Richards, whose entire reading project had hoped to discover those laws which revealed literary meaning, finds late in life that the quantity of different interpretations in literary criticism has actually undermined his project.

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translation, accordingly, is impossible. See _Selected Writings in Language, Culture and Personality by Edward Sapir_, ed. D. Mandelbaum (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949) and _Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf_, ed. John B. Carroll (Cambridge, Ma.: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 252 ff.

[16]I.A. Richards, "Toward a Theory of Translating," _Studies in Chinese Thought_, ed. Arthur F. Wright (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 252-3.

[17]The problem of referentiality and translation is one which philosophy has addressed. See Willard Quine, "Meaning and Translation" in _On Translation_, ed. Reuben A. Brower (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1959); Willard Quine, _Word and Object_ (Cambridge, Ma., 1960); F. Guenthner and M. Guenthner-Reutter, eds., _Meaning and Translation_ (New York: New York University Press, 1978), especially S. Wheeler, "Indeterminacy of Radical Interpretation and the Causal Theory of Reference," and H. Putnam, "Meaning, Reference and Stereotypes"; also see John Wallace, "Translation Theories and the Decipherment of Linear B," in _Translation: Literary, Linguistic and Philosophical Perspectives_, ed. William Frawley (Newark: The University of Delaware Press, 1984).

Still, pleading his case until the end, Richards decides that the reason his initial project did not succeed was that the fields of comparison within the process of translation were too broad and permitted unlimited speculation. His solution now becomes one of narrowing the field and of choosing the right methodology for the relevant purpose. He believes that if we agree on our purpose (as practicing literary translators ought to), then the appropriate methodology is not difficult to determine:

> How are we to choose the respects (or dimensions) which will serve us best as headings under which to arrange those similarities and those differences of meanings which the translator must try to discern in one language to achieve in another? In the concrete, in the minute particulars of practice, these comparison-fields are familiar enough . . . All we have to do is to arrange, in a schema as parsimonious as adequacy will allow, a body of experience so common that if the purposing of our arrangement could be agreed on, there might be little we would then differ about.[18]

Richards' initial premises remain intact: he still believes that the field consists of texts which contain a primary "body of experience" which presumably (an elite few) readers can discern, and that with the proper training--"the comparison-fields are familiar enough"--consensus can be reached. He cannot rid himself of the urge to try to reduce all differences of interpretation to a single response: the model in place, he concludes that "there might be little we would then differ about."

Richards proceeds to sketch an encoder/decoder communication model similar to those used by communication theorists with the difference that Richards' diagram divides the original message into seven components, all of which carry meaning and require decoding. Richards argues that the

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[18]Richards, "Toward a Theory of Translating," 249.

translator is not only aware that a sign (1) indicates some thing, but that it also (2) characterizes (says the same thing or something new about things), (3) realizes (presents with varying degrees of vividness), (4) values, (5) influences (desires change), (6) connects, and (7) purposes (attempts to persuade).[19] Swearing, for example, places value on something in addition to indicating something. Thus "meaning" for Richards has grown to be something very complex, having both implicit and explicit aspects. For example, under "realizing" he allows that "what is highly realized may be distinct, explicitly structured, detailed, definite in most of the senses of this strategic word. But it may equally be indefinite." In addition, the converse may be true: "On the other hand, many devices--from headlines to the routines of the dispatch editor and commentator--reduce reality of what is presented."[20] Of further interest is Richards' awareness that signs in general are never devoid of attempts to persuade.

Despite his complex categories of meaning inherent in every message, I argue that the theoretical premises remain the same and the primary contradiction remains unresolved. Richards' new model is specifically tailored for the translator who aims to arrive at the "proper" translation. Richards is aware of the primary contradiction within the essay: how does one achieve a unified reading given the fact that relativity has been introduced into the theoretical framework of twentieth-century investigation. The question has gnawed at Richards for thirty years; that his

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[19]Ibid., 252-3.

[20]Ibid., 257.

previous attempts to deal with it have been inadequate motivates this particular essay on translation. On the one hand, Richards admits in the essay that the translation process "may very probably be the most complex type of event yet produced in the evolution of the cosmos."[21] On the other hand, he argues that translators, with proper education and practice, will come to know the proper methodology to achieve the correct understanding of that primary text. Despite allowing for complexity, the model is still one which suggests that the original message can be properly decoded and then recoded into another language. Premises of Richards' early work reflected in the essay include his developing rules as a means of solving a communication problem, arriving at perfect understanding, and correctly reformulating the particular message.

Richards' thought on translation has developed with time: he now allows for a shifting context within which a primary text may appear and multiple facets of primary meaning. Yet his argument offers little new, and actually reinforces the reigning school of criticism in the United States. Had he presented it in the thirties, it would have been a *tour de force* in the field; presented when it was, the essay reads as a desperate play to retain control in light of new theoretical developments, and indicates that the time was ripe for new insights. The closing argument is most revealing:

> We are guardians and subject therefore to the paradox of
> government: that we derive our powers, in one way or another,
> from the very forces which we have to do our best to control.
> Translation theory has not only to work for better mutual
> comprehension between users of diverse tongues; more central
> still in its purposing is a more complete viewing of itself and of

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[21]Ibid., 250.

Comprehending which it should serve."[22]

Richards is aware that he derives his power from controlling the criticism of literature; his Harvard project disseminated his students throughout the American university system. Language, however, has not yielded to their controlling forces, a fact especially apparent in the field of translation. Instead of establishing a set of rules which subjugate the text to a limited and unified interpretation and "complete viewing," translations tend to open up new ways of seeing, which tend to subvert any fixed way of seeing. Despite all the education and proper training in the right methodologies, give two translators the same text, and what evolves are two different translations. New texts emerge, which are not identical to the original or each other. Although Richards has derived his power from language, he seems not to understand very well that entity from which his power came. The translated text seems to have a life of its own, responding not to the interpreter's set of rules, but to a logic unto itself.

Frederic Will: Translation as Testing Ground for Theory

Although Richards speculated about translation theory, his work in translation might be characterized as an extension of his literary criticism. Frederic Will's involvement in translation has had the opposite effect, directly determining his theory of literary criticism. Will first taught Classics at the University of Texas, where he founded the journal _Arion_ with William Arrowsmith. He then moved to the forefront in translation by accepting the directorship of the Translation Workshop at the University of

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[22]Ibid., 261.

Iowa in 1964. His first theoretical text <u>Literature Inside Out</u>, published in 1966, raises questions about naming and meaning and indirectly suggests that translation can be viewed as a form of naming, fiction-making, and knowing.[23] His next book <u>The Knife in the Stone</u>, published in 1973, directly concerns the practice of translation; and parts of it rearticulate his workshop experience at Iowa. In this section I will first review some of the presuppositions Will brought to his new job as revealed in <u>Literature Inside Out</u>, in which he posits a central core of human experience which is universal and the ability of poets to communicate that experience. Next I will analyze how the theory changes in <u>The Knife in the Stone</u>, which begins as an attempt to substantiate his initial beliefs, but actually ends with a different thesis, one in which language takes on a life and energy of its own. Instead of concluding with translation revealing something identical to the original, Will's new hypothesis suggests the process reveals something about the relationship between two different texts and the mediatory capacity of translation.

Although Will's early text does not specifically address translation problems, certain relavent theoretical assumptions are visible. Will's project picks up where Richards' left off: trying to reconcile recent critical theories with New Critical beliefs. Will's initial essay "From Naming to Fiction Making" at first tends to agree with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which holds that different languages construct separate realities and that what any particular word refers to cannot precisely be determined. Translation

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[23]Frederic Will, <u>Literature Inside Out</u> (Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press, 1966), 15.

theories based on reference to a universal objective reality are thus called into question. Despite seeming acceptance of the above hypothesis, Will argues that knowledge of essence is possible: "The core of the self, the theme of its efforts, is love," which is a power unto itself and can bring the outer reality "into the focus of consciousness."[24]   As opposed to an objective outer reality which can be translated across cultures, Will posits a central common core of human experience and emotions which can overcome the indeterminate nature of language and bring that "outer reality" into focus. The power of this inner understanding and knowledge is further elaborated in the second essay "Literature and Knowledge," which I summarize briefly here: literature "embodies truth and knowledge"; a work of literature "is a deeply unified verbal event occurring in a self"; the words which compose a work of literature "are, in some sense, literally one"; literature "gives us the power to understand"; and finally, he rhetorically asks, "'The power to understand' something is 'knowledge' of something. What else can knowledge be, even about the natural world or about God, except the power to understand them?"[25]   The essay then follows with a thematic reading of Heidegger, in which Will concludes that truth is the unveiling of Being. The verity of the outer world is recognized through being in tune with one's inner self and knowledge of one's own being. The essay "Heidegger and the Gods of Poetry" continues in this argument, stating that poets can find what lasts, i.e., the truth, "which lies under each existing thing and needs only to

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[24]Ibid., 3-4 and 9-11.

[25]Ibid., 17, 18, 18, 23 and 23 respectively.

be revealed." Language in its traditional way of referring, of naming, tends to veil and obscure the common core of human experience, yet, according to Will, there is hope that language can be used to unveil that essence. Poets, he argues, know more about love and the human heart than anyone, and are cast in the role of saviors: "If our poets are again to make gods out of the truth of art, they will emerge from the inwardly constitution of our own experience of life." Modern theories have failed "because they have not arisen from intimately human preoccupations" and the answer can only be found "when we are able again to name the essence of things artistically, our naming will illuminate natural deities."[26]

Thus, despite the fact that Will has read "modern" theory and agrees with it to a certain degree, i.e., agrees that naming does not actually enable us to know the thing named, this is only half of an equation, and the lesser part. The second half of his theory is enhanced by a metaphysical power strong enough to override the obstacle and allow us to uncover the "essence" of things, the truth which "lies under each existing thing" and waits only to be revealed. Will acknowledges the contradiction, but by adding a new category--the power of love--which operates outside of the equation and in a realm of its own, he circumvents the problem in very traditional fashion.

Will reexamines his own theory after his experience in the translation workshop at the University of Iowa, and a significant shift in his thinking becomes apparent. Although his next theoretical text The Knife in the Stone still retains metaphysical concepts, romantic notions of love and humanistic

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[26]Ibid., 30 and 34.

beliefs in the power of the heart dissipate, and concepts of texts being interwoven in reality, subject to use, change, and variable interpretation arise. I suggest that his proximity to the process of translation at Iowa causes this shift in his thinking. In The Knife in the Stone Will uses translation as the "testing ground" for his theory, and clearly the goal is to substantiate the metaphysical beliefs he brings to the project:

> The inter-translatibility [sic] of languages is the firmest testing ground, and demonstration ground, for the existence of a single ideal body of literature. If there is any meaning, to the idea of such a body, it will show itself through as effort to equate literature in one language with literature in another.[27]

Again, the opposition includes the Sapir-Whorf advocates who are skeptical about the possibility of translation, but Will now adds to his opposition in this essay by naming Sartre and Mead, whose theories posit inner "selves" who are not aware of the universal core of human experience, but are, in Will's terminology, "groundless" and "socially constructed" respectively. Through the test of translation Will intends to disprove the "relativity" thesis, now encompassing Sapir-Whorf-Sartre-Mead, and show that one universal common ground--that of the single ideal body of literature--does, in fact enjoy "inter-translatibility." I would like to suggest that Will's argument, when put to the test, does not reconfirm his initial presuppositions, but causes him to alter his conception of translation in a manner that is of interest to post-structuralist theories of translation.

His first test, articulated in the essay "The Oneness of Literature," involves a personal experience which occurred during a trip to Hungary

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[27]Frederic Will, The Knife in the Stone, (The Hague: Mouton, 1973), 42.

where he worked with another poet on the translation of a group of poems by Gyula Illyes. Although Will admits that his knowledge of Hungarian literature is virtually non-existent, he already knows that the text in hand, translations of Gyula Illyes' poems by another writer, are "poor translations." How? Because there is little that "feels" like English poetry.[28] We see that Will's approach is very subjective and ultimately determined his transcendental view of the power of poetry. He is able to "feel behind" the translation and the original to some ideal form of the poem as part of that ideal body of literature. Because he belongs to that privileged class of poet and translator, because he enjoys the power of "love," he believes he can overcome his specific ignorance of the language in question as well as the its indeterminate normal use, and gain access to that "essence" behind the poem. Robert Frost has argued that poetry is what gets lost in translation.[29] Will believes exactly the opposite; in fact, given his lack of knowledge of the Hungarian language, the essence may be the only thing which he could possibly translate. Will believes the poetry can be made "intelligible," by which he means "a kind of 'transcendence' and a kind of becoming salient."[30] Will's methodology actually avoids all theory and returns to the practical "common sense" approach which trusts his intuition ("love" or "ecstasy") of the meaning of

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[28]Ibid., 42-3.

[29]"I'd like to say, guardedly, that I could define poetry this way: It is that which is lost out of both prose and verse in translation." Robert Frost, "Conversation on the Craft of Poetry," interview by Cleanth Brooks, Robert Penn Warren, and Kenney Withers, in Robert Frost on Writing, ed. Elaine Barry (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 159.

[30]Will, The Knife in the Stone, 50.

these poems. Far from offering new theoretical insights, Will's theory merely reflects traditional metaphysical theories of the power of poetry. He may think that his translation "success" reconfirms his theory, but for those not yet converted, it "proves" little.

Will's thesis is not only proven for him by this personal experience in Hungary, but also by his experience at the Translation Workshop in Iowa. In the essay "Faithful Traitors" he attempts to reconfirm his project, but, significantly, a change in the logic of the argument appears. Briefly, the article reviews his experience teaching at Iowa, and relates how the class worked, what the class problems were, and some of the solutions proposed. He is enamored with the kinds of learning that went on, the opening essay recounting how the class discovered how to "transcend" their cultural differences and create a "new, single, homogeneous fabric" out of varying cultural contexts. Will next relates his personal experience translating three different kinds of texts--that of a Polish prose writer, a Greek poet, and a German poet writing prose--and discusses the problems he encountered and how he chose to solve them. Finally, the essay moves toward a conclusion, and what we expect again is some sort of metaphysical claim about the oneness of poetry. Instead, what we get is a rethinking of the whole notion what literature is. Will writes, "as soon as we loosen up our sense of what a work of literature is, and what literary tradition is, as soon as we aerate it, we loosen up our sense of what translating works can mean."[31]

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[31]Ibid., 148.

In the course of the activity of actual translation, it became clear to Will that what he was translating had less to do with the meaning of the text and more to do with the energy of the expression, how that meaning was expressed in language. He found himself using the Sapir-Whorf (Sartre-Mead) thesis that once was so problematical by turning it back in on itself, not to oppose his practice, but to *contribute as an equally always present part.* Since language is indeterminate, since we never have access to that meaning behind specific language, all the more reason to be free and trust not what language says, but what our intuition feels that it says. The traditional notion of translation as "carrying over" is too restrictive, and has caused translation to fall into categories of "faulty equivalences" and of "versions" of the original. What Will is advocating is an approach which translates not what a work means, but the energy or "thrust" of a work, for which there is no "correct" way to translate or represent. He writes:

> Translation is *par excellence* the process by which the thrust behind the verbal works of man . . . can be directly transferred, carried on, allowed to continue . . . works of literature are highly organized instances of such thrust . . . these blocks force themselves on, through time, from culture to culture.[32]

This "thrust" is a new concept in the argument, and is not something represented by language *per se.* Translation is less seen as a "carrying over" of content, but as a "carrying on" of the content in language. The paradox present in the title of the essay, itself an adaptation of the Italian *tradutore, traditore,* is resolved in the idea that the translator can be most faithful to the

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[32]Ibid., 155.

true meaning of the text by being unfaithful to the specific meaning ("indicative" meaning in Richards' theory) of the language of the text.

Will enters dangerous ground here by allowing the translator a "poetic" license to make the necessary changes in order to retain something arrived at intuitively. Such a methodology offends most translation theorists, especially scholars and linguists, because it is antithetical to their very definition of translation as a transfer or carrying over of a message from one code to another. Whatever else may be said about Will, I should like to note the complexity of this particular thought and consider this redefinition of the process. Meaning is redefined by Will not as something behind the words or text, not as an "essence" in a traditional metaphysical sense, but as something different, as thrust or energy, as centers of something dynamic and creative, something which is at the same time indeterminate and groundless (as in Sartre) and universal and originary (as in Descartes). Translation is possible both because dynamic universals constantly and continually thrust and because language is impenetrable. In translation Will seems to find a possible/impossible paradox of language which not only defines the translation process, but defines how we come to know ourselves through language.

The contradiction in Will's later position is thus a different one from that in Richards' argument. Whereas Richards found himself fighting against contradiction and trying to solve the problem by narrowing the focus of that being investigated and by clarifying the rules of the investigation, Will expands the parameters to include the contradiction and turn it in on itself. The difficulty in understanding Will's text is due to the fact that he is

trying to say something which is obscured by his own metaphysical conceptions. Thus, for example, the end of the essay on the Iowa Translation Workshop, which concludes with a very positive evaluation of the workshop approach toward investigating language, is determined by Will's need for closure and his almost romantic notions about poetry as well as by his new hypothesis about language. He says that at the workshop there was "a communal working toward the single language which lies between, or among--spatial metaphors collapse here--all the national languages. It was in that sense an especially potent coming together, and one centering on a pure and artificial horizon."[33] But then he continues in the different vein:

> Of course we were not, literally, considering a middle or pure or perfect language, but always languages x and y, from one of which we were trying to translate into another. However the theoretical horizon, which made possible this notion of crossing linguistic areas, was the conviction of a single repository of meaning, a *tertium quid*, from which both x and y drew, from which they both equally nourished, which somehow guaranteed them both in their relationship to each other.[34]

The activity of translation, according to Will, somehow reveals to the translator that language is simultaneously unstable and stable, that texts are interwoven in reality and in a tradition of fiction, and that man is both subjected by language and capable of creating language. Language always refers to something (other), be that reality or some metaphysical concept. At the same time, human language is necessarily always innovative, additive, continually being relocated in different contexts, with different referents. That which makes translation possible for Will (universals) also makes it

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[33]Ibid., 158.

[34]Ibid.

impossible (the specific moment). Language thus always refers backward and forward, trapped in an intertextual network. Will's multiple conservative ideological preconceptions merely serve to obscure a provocative (and progressive) hypothesis on the subject of translation theory.

Ezra Pound's Theory of the Energy of Language

If a more explicit theory of "thrust" exists, one which carries with it all the patriarchal overtones reflected in Will's work as well as the seed for a new theory, it may be Ezra Pound's theory of the energy of language. Certainly Pound is the most influential and least understood translator and critic read by the current generation of translators in America. Pound's theoretical writings can be divided into periods: first, an early Imagist theory, which despite its departure from traditional forms of logic and grammatical structures, was still a mimetic theory; and secondly, a later theory of the energy of language, in which representation as primary recedes and the energy and form of language become most important.[35] For

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[35]The distinction between the two periods of Pound's theory is one created by the critical reception of Pound's work rather than by Pound, who saw no division. Pound's early writings appeared Romantic and his initial work on an Imagist theory seemed metaphysical. However, as Pound saw how Amy Lowell and others were appropriating his ideas, he felt the need to distance himself from the Imagist movement. Thus his move to "vorticism" and more radical articulations, many of which remain uncollected, still located in unanthologized articles in New Age, BLAST, and other now defunct magazines. His essays on painting and sculpture, no less revealing of Pound's literary theory, were deliberately excluded from Eliot's anthology of Pound's Literary Essays. The wealth of criticism generated on Pound's literary theory is invariably based upon the early and easily accessible work. Recent scholarship, however, is just beginning to recognize the post-structuralist importance of Pound's theory as based upon the breadth of his work. See Marianne Korn, Ezra Pound, purpose, form, meaning (London: Middlesex Polytechnic Press, 1983); and Jean-Michel Rabate, Language, sexuality and ideology in Ezra Pound's Cantos (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).

Pound, the precision and accuracy of the reference to material reality in art remain fundamental in both periods, but in the later theory, the object being presented is substantially different. I suggest that Pound's writing on translation and the translations themselves, often self-reflexive, best reveal his later theory on the energy of language. During the writing of the <u>Cantos</u>, Pound's languages ceased to be clearly distinguishable; English for him was merely part of an evolving Greek-Roman-Latin-Italian-French-Spanish-English language in which all meanings were interrelated. What was stable, in Pound's mind, was the form in which language and object combined. That which Pound was trying desperately to fix was not an "idea" or "image," but the very material existence of the energy of the object in language, the "form."[36] By looking at his translations and his letters on translation to W.H.D. Rouse in addition to his essays on literary theory, we can better understand this aspect of his thought.

In the section titled "language" of his essay "HOW TO READ," Pound lays out the various manners in which "language is charged or energized." These are MELAPOEIA, or the musical property, PHANOPOEIA, or the visual property, and LOGOPOEIA, which is by far the most complex property, one which includes both the "direct meaning" and the "play" of the word in its context. Pound writes:

> LOGOPOEIA, 'the dance of the intellect among words', that is to say, it employs words not only for their direct meaning, but it takes count in a special way of habits of usage, of the context we <u>expect</u>

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[36]The first to suggest that Pound's theory of art is materialist and not idealist was Donald Davie. See Donald Davie, "Ideas in *The Cantos*," <u>Ezra Pound</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

to find with the work, its usual concomitants, of its known
acceptances, and of ironical play. It holds the aesthetic content
which is peculiarly the domain of verbal manifestation, and
cannot possibly be contained in plastic or in music. It is the latest
come, and perhaps most tricky and undependable mode.[37]

This remarkable post-structuralist statement--foregrounding ironical play
and the domain of verbal manifestation--not only gives rise to associations
with Nietzsche's dancing star[38] but also distinctly refers not to what a word
means, but what a word calls into play by its intertextual associations with a
paradigm of meanings, habitual and otherwise. Pound goes on to further
explicate the difficult concept by talking about translation: *melopoeia* is
difficult to translate except a "half a line at a time"; *phanopoeia* can be
translated " almost, or wholly, intact"; and *logopoeia* "does not translate."
Pound elaborates:

> *Logopoeia* does not translate; though the attitude of mind it
> expresses may pass through a paraphrase. Or one might say, you can
> not translate it 'locally', but having determined the original author's
> state of mind, you may or may not be able to find a derivative of
> an equivalent.[39]

The trouble in interpreting Pound's aesthetic begins here: is he talking
about intuition, guessing the author's original intention, or something else?
I suggest what Pound is trying to determine and translate is an attitude of
mind in a given historical situation. He does not say intuit, but "determine"
by studying the language, the time, the biography of the author, other texts

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[37]Ezra Pound, Polite Essays (London: Faber, 1937), 170.

[38]"One must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a
dancing star," Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Viking, 1954), 129.

[39]Ibid., 170-1.

by the same author and others during the period, the logic of categories thought in another time and context, and giving yourself over to that state of "mind." Then, one needs to return to the present and try to create new relations, derived from the old, which reveal the logic of the other.

Thus Pound's theory of translation involves being both inside a tradition and outside any institutionalized logic. In order to understand the *logopoeia* of a text, the translator must understand the time, place and ideological restrictions of the text being translated. Translators must allow themselves to be subjected by the mood, atmosphere, and thought processes of the text in time. Simultaneously, the mood and sensibility in time and place must be transported to the present culture for the translation to become a contemporary text. The only way for this to happen without falling into "translatorese" is to create new relations in the present, to draw attention to the translator as a living and creating subject.

An example of a translation that creates new relations in contemporary culture is Pound's "Homage to Sextus Propertius," which has provoked strong emotional responses among Western scholars. Its reception has been dominated by those who favor "faithful" translation, who argue that Pound is incompetent and who document their position by the number of errors in the translation, and by those who advocate "free" translation, arguing that Pound plants "howlers" on purpose and that he is translating something other than the literal sense.[40] In the case of "Homage to Sextus

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[40]Robert Graves and Richard Lattimore are among those who advocate a "faithful" approach. See Robert Graves, "These be your Gods," The Crowning Privilege (London, Cassell, 1955); Frederic Peachy and Richard Lattimore in The Pound Newsletter, 5, and The New Age, November 27 (1919). J.P. Sullivan has written the most influential text defending the "free" approach. See J.P.

Propertius," however, what becomes clear is that neither position is remotely close to what Pound himself tries to articulate. Pound's text is actually parodying the very kind of flat, boring, awkward English which has become characteristic of the scholar's literal translation; one of the meanings of the poem is how not to translate.[41] At the same time, Pound is not arguing for poetic license or freedom of interpretation; in fact, he vehemently opposes freedom from the form and meter of the source text. Pound uses the classical text for his own purposes, i.e., to create new relations in the present. Certainly "Homage" has done that, ridiculing reigning translation theories of the educational and literary establishment and opening new avenues for appropriation of the classics.

While Pound's personal voice is interjected into not just "Homage," but into other translations such as "The River Merchant's Wife," "The Seafarer," or "The Odyssey" as it appears in Canto I, he is not necessarily being "unfaithful" to the original. Wai-lim Yip, for example, argues that Pound paradoxically comes closer to the "central consciousness" of the poems of Li Po than other translators despite the fact that he using the poems to expand his own beliefs.[42] George Steiner pronounces the superiority of Pound's translations over Arthur Waley's, whose translations of Li Po were primarily intended to correct Pound's errors. Steiner writes, "on sinological grounds

Sullivan, Ezra Pound and Sextus Propertius: A Study in Creative Translation (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964). Qtd. by Donald Davie, Ezra Pound, 56-7.

[41]Davie, Ezra Pound, 58.

[42]Wai-lim Yip, Ezra Pound's Cathay (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), 88.

alone, 'The River Merchant's Wife: A Letter' is closer to Li Po than is Waley's 'Ch'ang-kan.'"[43] Both wonder how Pound was able to achieve such accuracy: Yip suggests that the method was by "clairvoyance" and Steiner calls the method one of "divine accident." Steiner further suggests that it was precisely because Pound was ignorant of Chinese and because Fenellosa's transcription was defective that a leap of the imagination--"hermeneutic trust" in Steiner's words--was possible. Wai-lim Yip and George Steiner's translation theory more closely resembles I.A. Richards' and that of the early Frederic Will.

I suggest neither accident nor divine intervention. Pound worked hard at his languages, and although Chinese did not fit into the Romance language paradigm which Pound knew better, he was not ignorant of the language and culture. Chinese paintings hung in his parents' home. The Fenellosa manuscripts consumed him and changed his entire aesthetic. He worked hard on his Noh plays and discussed Eastern thought, art, drama, calligraphy and culture for years with Yeats. He was extremely well versed in Chinese history, as he demonstrates in Cantos LII-LXII. He read the works of many Chinese emperors and continually referred to model rulers from the Chou dynasty. He intimately knew Li Ki, the Chinese almanac or book of seasons and translated Chinese peasant songs as well. He also subscribed to the Japan Times and corresponded with Japanese poets. If Pound had a religion, it was that of Ta Hio. He spent years meditating on and translating Confucius, and it was this ability to transport himself to the time and place of

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[43]George Steiner, After Babel (London and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 358.

Confucius which enabled him to survive the post World War II prison conditions that would break most human beings--locked like an animal in an open cage, sleeping on the ground under open sky, knowing the whole time he would probably be convicted and punished for treason. One could argue that Pound spent his whole life translating Chinese ideograms.

The Chinese Cantos are the least read and understood, but represent the fruition of his aesthetic before the lyrical shift of the Pisan Cantos. The Rock-Drill Cantos (Rock-Drill meaning bursts of energies) again try to recapture his aesthetic, and are heavily influenced by Chinese sensibility. In these Cantos Pound attempts to escape the limitations of Western ways of thinking--the limitations of abstraction, of symbolic thought, of generalizing and finding deeper hidden meanings. Instead, he advocates using the senses and stating as precisely as possible what he has seen, heard, and tasted without generalizing or abstracting. Precisely because Pound worked so hard to escape the limitations of Western thought, because he studied the history, the language, and the thought of the culture, he was able to give himself over to the other and capture the "central consciousness" of the original texts in certain translations. His method has nothing to do with clairvoyance, divine accidents, or hermeneutic trust, although Pound's words are frequently appropriated to substantiate such claims. Unlike Richards, early Will, Yip and Steiner, Pound does not attempt to discover universal standards. In fact, it is precisely because Western intellectuals yearn for such an ideal that Pound finds their thinking cloudy.

Pound's indignation with Western scholars' cloudy conceptual notions, and his emphasis on concrete historical particulars within his theory of

translation, can best be illustrated by his letters to W.H.D. Rouse, who was translating The Odyssey at the time of the correspondence. The letters reveal Pound's belief that not intuition, but knowledge of the language, history and economics enables one to understand the classics: "Along with direct teaching of the language, is there any attempt to teach real history? 'Roman mortgages 6%, in Bithinya 12%.'"[44] He continues, "Until Latin teaching faces the economic fact in Latin history, it may as well leave out history." Pound believes that the real history has been covered up by the Western scholar. The "parrotting" by the teachers, the "tushery" provided by "adorned" translations, obscures the classics and makes them inaccessible by creating an elite class which has access to the ideas and whose job it becomes to pass on that knowledge. Pound is very aware of the socio-economic motives of the creation of this class of interpreters: "Granted the bulk of the sabotage and obstruction is economic and nothing else."[45] Rouse tells the story that when he read his translations to small boys they understood every word, but when he adorned them, the children were bored. The adventure, the narration of Homer, has been sacrificed at the expense of higher truths and beautified language. Rouse, with Pound's support, is aiming at plain language, personal modesty, and narrative drive. Pound realizes the difficulty Rouse had holding to his principles, given the mythical status of Homer's story and the political implications for literary institutions if the classics were accessible to the entire population.

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[44]Ezra Pound, Letters 1907-1941, ed. D.D. Paige (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), 262.

[45]Ibid., 263.

When Rouse deviates from his stated aims, Pound continually advises him to return to basics:

> Let's list the aims:
> 1. Real speech *in* the English version.
> 2. Fidelity to the original
>   a.   meaning
>   b.   atmosphere.[46]

Although Pound uses "fidelity" in a humanist/idealistic fashion, he broadens the concept to include "atmosphere" as well as original meaning. His term "atmosphere" refers to both contextual and intertextual associations. Pound clarifies the importance of contextual relations in his vehement criticism of Rouse when he ceases to locate the words in history: "This first page of book two is _bad_. I mean it is just translation of words, without your imagining the scene and event enough."[47] Because words never exist out of context, the translator must at all times keep present in the imagination the context ("scene") and the expression in that context ("event"). According to Pound's translation theory, meaning is not something abstract and part of a universal language, but something that is always already located in historical flux--the atmosphere in which that meaning occurs. To unpack that meaning, one has to know the history and reconstruct the atmosphere/milieu in which that meaning occurred.

In the same letter, Pound underscores the importance he gives to intertextual relations, the *logopoeia*, the play of the word in time: "Tain't what a man sez, but wot he _means_ that the traducer has got to bring over.

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[46]Ibid., 263.

[47]Ibid., 271.

The implication of the word."[48]   The implication of the word entangles the
translator in the web of intertextual relations and interrelated meanings.
Pound's theory of translation requires the translator to keep the historical
atmosphere in which the words occur in view at all times so that the
translation process reveals not just what the words mean but the various
intertextual implications of the word in its "verbal manifestation."   All words
invoke both a paradigm of expected and habitual associations and play
against that very paradigm.   Pound's theory suggests that the free play of the
word and its distancing itself from what it means may be just as important as
its one-to-one correspondence.   *Logopoeia* provides a theoretical construct
which is more interested in preserving the irony, the implicit meaning over
literal meaning.   For the energy of language--the object in the medium,
always changing and newly creating--can be seen only within the irony and
play of the word in historical context.   Unless one knows the history, no
adequate translation is possible, but merely one which obscures through
pretty adornments and universal abstractions.

Applications of a Practice-Oriented Theory

The question I wish to address in this section is not a further
elaboration of the theoretical basis upon which the workshop approach is
founded, but how that theory is practiced.   Although workshop practitioners
invoke Pound as someone who has freed translation from the restraints of
literalism, they rarely confront Pound's or, for that matter, any other

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[48]Ibid.

aesthetic theory directly.[49] The naive, anti-intellectual position allows them to appropriate Pound's theory--freeing them from methodologies that privilege literal correspondence--and grants them license to promote whatever aspect of the original text they please. For example, the interpretation of Pound's theory by poet and translator Ronnie Apter, author of a book called Digging for the Treasure: Translation After Pound, clearly illustrates my point. Apter still thinks in terms of "faithful," which she calls "Victorian," and "free," which she terms "modern," and uses Pound to support her defense of the free approach. She concludes:

> Pound's innovations have freed modern translators from slavish adherence to sense for sense, rhyme for rhyme, and meter for meter. Instead, they turn to a battery of *ad hoc* strategies (often strategies suggested by Pound) on the original poem in an attempt to give critical insight into why the original poem has importance.[50]

Certainly Pound's strategies were not *ad hoc*; whenever Rouse strayed from the initial aims, Pound harshly admonished him. True, he was not advocating sense for sense, but this does not necessarily mean opening up the field for any intuited or divinely inspired "insight" either. The problem with Apter's and others' interpretation of Pound's theory of translation is that it derived from Pound's early Provençal translations, his early literary essays, and on his imagist writings, which, although they directed attention to the energy of language, were based on aesthetic intuition and leaps of poetic imagination. Apter, however, does not seem to have consulted his essays on

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[49]See workshop premises outlined by Zdanys, pp 5-7 above.

[50]Ronnie Apter, Digging for the Treasure: Translation After Pound (New York: Peter Lang, 1984), 75.

vorticism, any of his criticism on painting and the plastic arts, nor does she seem to have read the <u>Cantos</u>, referring to them a mere three times and then only in footnotes. Thus, her conclusion tends to be more characteristic of vague and *ad hoc* strategies supported by contemporary taste in poetry and translation as opposed to the specific and well defined strategy demanded by Pound.

If Pound's translation theory is not taken seriously by creative writers and translators today, what are the theoretical premises of the workshop methodology? First, what has been adopted from Pound's theory primarily is his taste--lack of adornments, plain speech, and poetry which is as well written as prose. While I too may prefer this tendency, I find no theoretical basis for such a preference and the prevailing taste could just as well be something different. Although the "plain speech" phenomenon seems intrinsically American and more overtly "democratic"--a reaction against a differing European tradition, the danger of elevating a nationalistic position is that it reinforces literary institutions that historically have been elitist and tends to make literature inaccessible to a large portion of the population. In terms of taste, what was revolutionary and innovative in Pound's era has now become mainstream. Translators can intuit good poems from another language without knowledge of the original or the culture, and as long as they have good taste, now governed by plain speech and lack of adornment, their translations are judged accordingly.

Secondly, what has been adopted from Pound's theory tends to distort his material foundations. The assumption that a universal language exists to which poets have immediate access still prevails. Because of the breadth of

Pound's language skills, it appears perhaps that he was intuiting some universal language, but in fact he had learned the languages of the Greco-Roman Western tradition. In addition to Chinese as revealed above, he knew some Greek, better Latin, was fluent in Provençal and Italian, his French and Spanish were excellent, and his English/American legendary. His mind could in fact range freely over the centuries, and he could think in different languages and thought systems. Much of his life was spent trying to demythologize that tradition as elevated by Western scholars, and to rewrite the literary history to make it more widely accessible. Unfortunately, many translators seem to feel that they can intuit a particular language and tradition and have access to the mythology without knowledge of the language, let alone the historical/cultural context that Pound had. In a recent article in the New York Times Book Review, Milan Kundera writes about this phenomenon in the West:

> In 1968 and 1969, "The Joke" was translated into all the Western languages. · But what surprises! In France, the translator rewrote the novel by ornamenting my style. In England, the publisher cut out all the the reflective passages, eliminated the musicological chapters, changed the order of the parts, recomposed the novel. Another country: I meet my translator, a man who knows not a word of Czech. "Then how did you translate it?" "With my heart." And he pulls a photo of me from his wallet.[51]

The theoretical premise that such translation is possible is clearly Platonic and not Poundian; it allows translators to translate from languages they know nothing about, to use literal versions as cribs and intuit the "essence"

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[51]Milan Kundera, "Key Words, Problem Words, Words I Love," The New York Times Book Review, March 6 (1988), 1.

behind the crib, all the while using Pound's name as a masque to lend their approach a modernist authority.

It is difficult to give examples in the scope of this chapter because translators have such varying degrees of knowledge of the culture and language from which they are translating as well as such multiple and various strategies, which may or may not be defensible. I suggest, however, that certainly Zukovsky's translations of Catallus hint at universal phonetics, Merwin's French translations seem divinely inspired, Kinnell seems to have an immediate understanding of Villon and "good taste" in his translations, Arrowsmith has access to eternal metaphysical ideas in his Greek translations, some of Bly's translations imply a "superlogical" (his term) awareness, and Snyder's translations from Japanese reveal an inner harmony and beauty that transcends any historical moment. There is a tremendous interest in East European poetry during the past decade, and there are many translations by people who do not speak the language from which they translate, as the Kundera quote above illustrates. I suggest that the interest is governed by both contemporary taste--a stripped down, bare, plain spoken language dominates the taste of both cultures (but for very different reasons)--and by the assumption that the poetry reflects some sort of universal suffering or existential Angst common to all humanity. Few translators have a strong idea of the context in which the poems occur. Although all of the writers mentioned above deserve individual scrutiny, I can better illustrate my argument by examining one translation in more detail.

Robert Bly has documented his strategies involved in the translation of one sonnet from Rilke's Sonnets to Orpheus in the essay "The Eight Stages of Translation." Once one is aware of Bly's theoretical approach and views the various stages, one can see how his approach both reinforces strategic assumptions and at the same time creates new insights into the nature of language. Bly is more theoretical than many of the workshop practitioners and is very articulate in outlining his own strategies; his essay is one of the few which document the process of translation and its various stages between original and final product. Bly's essay illustrates certain implicit theoretical assumptions about translation which are characteristic of literary translation in this country; at the same time it demonstrates how the focus on process rather than product serves to expand and open up new avenues of thinking rather than close with the intended resolutions.

Bly begins with the expected disclaimer that he is dealing with practice. not theory: "In this essay I will not deal with the theory of translation but will try to answer the question: What is it like to translate a poem?"[52] His process involves eight stages: an initial literal version, two stages consulting native speakers for semantic and thematic meanings, two stages getting the translation into spoken English, two stages working on tone and sound, and a final stage comparing the final version with other translations.[53] Bly's translation strategy foregrounds (1) semantic and

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[52]Robert Bly, "The Eight Stages of Translation," in Translation: Literary, Linguistic, and Philosophical Perspectives, ed. William Frawley (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984), 67.

[53]Ibid., 67-89.

thematic accuracy, (2) musical and rhythmical equivalences, and (3) a translation which sounds right in the receiving language. Four of Bly's stages emphasize sound--two are concerned with hearing the sound and rhythm in the original and two are concerned with how the completed translation sounds in the new language. Recalling Pound's terminology, all of Bly's strategies may be included under *melopoeia* (musical properties), which is difficult to translate, and *phanopoeia*, which can be translated almost wholly intact. Bly tackles the difficult problem of the musical properties of the original and the translation, and almost all of his later stages are concerned with it. There is no specific reference to anything resembling *logopoeia*, the ironical play of language in context. Unless the consulted native speaker very early in the process is able to educate Bly on the context, the intertextual relations, the history of the usage, the implicit meanings, the irony, the play, and the energy of the words, much of what Pound values in translation will fall through the cracks. However, in the course of the following analysis, I suggest that a certain play of language does enter Bly's translation process, especially in the later stages.

Bly's emphasis on the singing aspect of poetry, for example, reveals certain aesthetic assumptions about the nature of literary translation. Bly says that he chooses "virtually at random" this particular sonnet, but I suggest that the selection is less at random and more one well suited to illustrate Bly's translation priorities. Rilke's sonnet thematically and musically serves to reconfirm certain presuppositions Bly brings to his project. Bly's translation aesthetic unfolds as follows:[54]

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[54]Italics mine. Ibid., 67, 68, 74, 85, 89.

Rilke:

Frühling ist wiedergekommen, Die Erde
ist wie ein Kind, das Gedichte weiss;
viele, o viele . . . Für die Beschwerde
langen Lernens bekommt sie den Preis.

Streng war ihr Lehrer.   Wir mochten das Weisse
an dem Barte des alten Manns.
Nun, wie das Grüne, das Blaue heisse,
dürfen wir fragen: sie kanns, sie kanns!

Erde, die frei hat, du glückliche, spiele
nun mit den Kindern.   Wir wollen dich fangen,
fröhliche Erde.   Dem Frohsten gelingts.

O, was der Lehrer sie lehrte, das Viele,
und was gedruckt steht in Wurzeln und langen
schwierigen Stämmen: sie singts, sie singts!

Bly's translation in process (Stage 1: literal version):

Spring has returned again.   The earth
is like a child that knows many poems;
many, o many.   *For the burdens*
of her long study, she receives the prize.

Her teacher was hard.   We liked the white
in the old man's beard.
Now, how the green (things) and the blue are called,
we dare to ask: she knows it, she knows it!

Earth, on vacation, you lucky one, play
with the children now.   We'd like to catch you,
happy earth.   Success goes to the happiest.

Oh what the teacher taught her, so many things,
and what is imprinted (or pressed) into roots and the long
difficult stems: She sings it, she sings it!

Bly's translation in process (Stage 3:   English version):

Spring has returned once more. The earth
is like a child who has memorized her poems,
many, many poems. *She receives the prize*
for her long and strenuous learning.

Her teacher was strict. We were fond of the whiteness
in the old man's beard.
As for blue things and green things, we dare
to ask their names, and she knows them!

Earth, now out of class, lucky being, play
now with the children. We want to catch you,
happy earth. Only the happiest succeeds.

How many things the teacher taught her,
and what has been pressed into the roots
and long wiry trunks: she sings it, she sings it!

Bly's translation in process (Stage 6: German sound version):

Spring is here, has come! The earth
resembles a child who has learned her poéms.
So many poems! *Her study long,*
strenuous, earns it . . . The prize comes to her.

Her teacher was stern. We loved the white
that showed in the old man's beard.
What names to give to the green patch and the blue
come to us, and we ask: earth knows it by heart!

Earth, free from school now, joyful, come
play with the children. We want to catch you,
wholly glad earth. The most whole gets you.

Earth's teacher taught her things, so many!
And the sounds that lie printed inside roots
and long entangled stalks: she carries and sings them!

Bly's final version:

Spring is here, has come! The earth
is like a child who has learned her poems--
so many poems! . . . Her study, long,
strenuous, earns it . . . the prize comes to her.

Her teacher was stern. We loved the white
showing in the beard of the old man.
What is blue and what is green have distinct names--

What are they? Earth knows all that by heart!

Earth, free now of school, lucky one, come,
play with the children. We want to touch you,
wholly glad earth. The most whole catches you.

Earth's teacher, how much he taught her!
So much! and what lies printed inside roots,
inside long involved stalks: earth carries that and sings it!

To illustrate Bly's considerations through the various stages, I would like to draw attention to the highlighted passages above, the first stanza of the third and sixth stages, as well as the sixth stage change of "happy "to "wholly glad" in stanza three. Bly's third stage attempts to get the literal meaning into an English which sounds like a natively spoken English, drawing from both the German text, the literal version (stage 1), and consultations with a German native speaker (stage 2). The other source is the English language itself, which has its own power. Of this stage Bly writes, "We think of the genius of the English language," and "we use all we know about the structure of the English language."[55] Talking of the energy in language and verbal structure, Bly notes:

> German gains energy at times by delaying the verb, and even the main noun, so it appears late in the sentence. English gains energy the opposite way, by embarking the main noun immediately, and the verb soon after. Most sentences in English that begin with prepositions, with "into" or "upon the" or "for the" tend to be weak in practice.[56]

His solution, then, as dictated by the nature of the English language, is to move the subject and verb to the beginning of the sentence, and change "burden" into the adjective "strenuous." About the temporary solution "She

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[55]Ibid., 72.

[56]Ibid., 73.

receives the prize/for her long and strenuous study," Bly writes: "It sounds more like English now, and "strenuous" has added considerable energy to the line."[57]

To pick up the process again at stage 6, Bly is now concerned that in the process of smoothing out the English version, the sound of the German is lost. What does Bly mean by sound? He is talking about neither meter nor rhyme nor any phonetic or linguistic aspect, but again about an energy in language, a rhythm of stresses and pauses distinct from meter. Bly elaborates:

> Robert Hass is right in saying that rhythm is a separate energy from meter. And Donald Hall is right in saying that rhythm amounts to the goat's foot coming down. If a line is flat, in meter or free verse, there may be a human foot in it, but no goat's foot.[58]

Bly suggests that the opening German line has a rocking motion, and that his English version does not. His proposed solution--adding a redundant verbal phrase and imposing a breath stop with a comma--accomplishes the desired rocking sound. Bly doesn't elaborate much further, other than suggesting that if the reader were to memorize the German and say it many times, understanding of this aspect of sound would come. But the technique can be seen in the first stanza of stage 6 above: repetition, elision, added punctuation, exclamation are all used to capture the sound. It is a difficult stage, and precedents for evaluation do not seem to exist. Bly seems to imply that this stage belongs to the poet, for they understand what Hass and Hall are talking about. At a certain point in the process, formal rules of

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[57]Ibid.

[58]Ibid., 83.

correspondence break down, and more subjective standards are invoked. In Bly's poetics, his privileging sound gives rise to a network of associations within the English language which may not have been initially apparent. To illustrate his use of a reservoir of resonance, I've also highlighted "wholly" above, for Bly does explain his rationale for that seemingly unlikely change:

> One can never be sure when helped by sound to a solution if the solution is reasonable, justifiable, within Rilke's area of meaning. After brooding about it, I decide the emphasis on "whole" as opposed to "happy," "glad," or "perfect" is all right. Some of our associations around the root *froh* are carried by the sound of "whole." And other cultural associations around "whole," for example, becoming whole, whole earth, whole wheat bread, resonate with certain associations around the earth mother. I have to trust my sense of it.[59]

The above quote reveals Bly's justification for a change on which he relies more on intuition and a network of associations than any specific methodology or correspondence with the German text. At a certain point theoretical presuppositions break down and the play of language takes over, Bly relying on sensibility rather than technique. At this point similarities between Bly's translation methodology and his beliefs about the nature of poetry begin to unite.

Bly's sensibility at work can best be seen when one examines Bly's understanding of the poem as a whole. Here it becomes clear that Bly did not choose this text at random, but selected it to reinforce something he wants to communicate about poetry in general. His interpretation of Rilke's "meaning" of the poem is that the text reflects universal joy at the return of spring, and that the earth mother is the source of all joy. To justify the accuracy of this understanding, Bly is pleased to quote a note by the French

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[59]Ibid., 84.

translator J.F. Anngelloz, who interprets the (universal) meaning of the poem as follows:

> The earth, freed from winter, the children, who have learned their poems by heart, and the poet himself, who takes part in the awakening of nature, play tag with the earth, source of all joys; the victory goes to the most joyful of them. The sonnet closes in a magnificent harmony: the universal impulse of Dionysius expresses itself in singing.[60]

Bly's implicit theoretical premise suggests a belief in the regenerative power of the earth, of universal beauties of nature, and the existence of some sort of primal rhythm which transcends particular languages. This "superlanguage," accessible to both poets and children through leaps of the imagination, also transcends history; thus Bly need not solely focus on language in context, nor does he need to ground his text in history. Reminiscent of the theories of Richards and the early Will, who also felt that poets enjoyed a special power to transcend normal use of language and tune in to the essence of life, Bly's methodology, by privileging sound and the rhythmic aspects of language, invariably proves his thesis, thus reinforcing certain metaphysical claims about the nature of language.

Yet while his translation tends to conform to early theories of Richards and Will, Bly also documents something which Will referred to as translation drawing upon a _tertium quid_ or a crossing of linguistic areas wherein traditional notions of metaphor collapse. Pound referred to something similar as the verbal manifestation of the dance of words or play upon expected usages that extends beyond local translation strategies. Within the process of translation, an extension or exploration of semantic

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[60] J. F. Angelloz, quoted and translated by Robert Bly, Ibid., 89.

fields in which words manifest themselves occurs in spite of attempted reinscription in existing traditions. The conflation of the associations of semantic fields around the word German word *"froh"* and the English "whole" is just one example of this process at work in every translation of every word. Translation imports associations and connotations that may or may not be inherent in the language system of the receiving culture, a process which clearly appeals to many American poets. Many translate as well as write their own poems precisely because exact equivalents do not exist, and thus the words found to approximate sense equivalence tend to be charged with energy and etymological resonance. Translation by its nature tends to subvert existing ways of perceiving the world and opens up new avenues of thought.

As the translated words enter into play with each other, the translation tends to take on a life of its own, generating new relationships and meanings. W.S. Merwin writes about this phenomenon:

> But if we take a single word of any language and try to find an exact equivalent . . . we have to admit it cannot be done. . . . A single primary denotation may be shared but the constellation of secondary meanings, the movement of rings of associations, the etymological echoes, the sound and its own levels association, do not have an equivalent because they cannot. . . . Yet if we continue, we reach a point where some sequence of the first language conveys a dynamic unit, a rudiment of form. Some energy of the first language begins to be manifest, not only in single words but in the charge of their relationship.[61]

In the process of translating, the translator becomes aware not only of the correspondences and equivalences, but also the differences which defy

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[61]W.S. Merwin, Selected Translations, 1968-1978 (New York: Atheneum, 1979), viii. Quoted by Rainer Schulte, "Poet as Translator: Correspondences and Renewal," Translation Review 26 (1988), 15.

translation, nuances which escape and are lost, connotations which refuse transfer and remain left behind. Yet at the same time, something happens to the text being transferred across language boundaries: it acquires a resonance of its own and forms relationships anew. Language is charged with energy and has a life of its own; it is almost as if language writes itself.

What Merwin implies, and Will, Pound and Bly above allude to, is a whole new set of questions less about translation in terms of identities and more about language associations, resources, wells of reserve and resonance that would not normally be seen (heard) if it were not for the process of translation. The translator, because of the presence of the original text and certain reproductive goals, is constantly constrained from innovation, creating new metaphors, adding new information. The process demands giving in to an other logic as it begins to form, one over which he has little control. Yet in that gray area--in the logic of the one language, but in the words of another--old, marginalized, dead, forgotten associations resurface. Language finds itself used in a different way with different referents-- sometimes primary, invariably secondary; the limiting demands of the practice has actually made possible the creation of new verbal constructions, stable in their instability, possible because of their impossibility. Perhaps what Merwin is talking about here has less to do with translation theory and is more revelatory of the nature of single languages. Translation seems to subvert itself, disappearing in the process as the translated text emerges from these obscure reserves of meaning within the receiving language. Questions emerge, such as what are the referents at this point? To what is the translator bound, the original text or something else? What is the logic

here?   Has it anything to do with identity?   What are the rules governing the
generation of the translated text?   Are they unique to translation?

American literary translation seems to raise more questions about the
theory of translation than present us with definitive statements about its
nature.   It seems as if in the process of translation, differences in the
intertextual web are equally as manifest as the correspondences.
Translations appear overtly self-referential, drawing attention to
themselves, not because of their accuracy and cohesion, but because of the
errors and deviations.   Yet culpability cannot be assigned within this
framework, because at certain point translations tend to write themselves,
their energies extending beyond subjective control.   Translation, thus, finds
itself in a position as both part of a literary tradition and methodologically
may be constrained by a specific approach--like Bly's eight stages--which
attempts to govern its development, and simultaneously, because of its
nature, never fulfilling that predetermined role, combining in a different
way with that very same tradition and aesthetic than intended.   Isolated,
acquiring at a certain point relative autonomy, it allows silences and voids to
resonate and new and/or repressed powers of language to appear.   All
traditional forms of genre and representation are subverted in some fashion
or other, collapsing, as Will points out, spatial metaphors, and giving rise to a
new theoretical horizon of crossing linguistic areas from which the
translated words do not necessarily refer directly, but from which they draw.
Any theory of translation must address this double movement--one which
perpetuates given aesthetic beliefs and simultaneously subverts those very
conceptions.   The American translation workshop, ironically, because of its

naivete, its avoidance of theory, and its focus on the process of translation, may find itself in an advantageous position to better inform the development of a translation theory interwoven in reality and fiction, subject to its own laws.

CHAPTER III

THE 'SCIENCE' OF TRANSLATION

The Need for a More Objective Approach

The general approach as practiced by American literary translators, although opening up new perspectives, might be characterized by a theoretical naiveté and subjective methodologies which tend to reinforce whatever theoretical values the individual translator privileges. Joseph Graham summarizes the theoretical contributions of the workshop approach as follows, "Much that has been written on the subject of translation yields very little when sifted for theoretical substance because it has always been written as if spoken in the workshop. The personal anecdotes and pieces of advice may well provide some help, but certainly not the coherent and consistent theory required for translation."[1] The problem is not just a contemporary phenomenon in America, but one that has troubled translation theory historically. People *practiced* translation, but they were never quite sure what they were practicing. The final result of their work did not depend so much upon theoretical considerations, but upon literary taste at the time. George Steiner provocatively divides the history of translation theory into four time periods, the first period of which is very long--ranging from Cicero (46 B.C.) to Hölderlin (1804)--and is characterized by subjective pronouncements by translators on their own enterprise. The

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[1]Joseph Graham, "Theory for Translation," in Translation Spectrum, ed. Marilyn Gaddis Rose (Albany: State University of New York Press), 23.

second period, which lasts until Larbard's Sous l'invocation de Saint Jérome of 1946, is slightly more theoretical--characterized by translators reaching a phenomenological understanding of the original text and transporting that original meaning. Steiner quotes Richard Knox on the theoretical considerations governing the first two time periods, reducing the entire history of translation to two questions, the first concerning whether the translator should favor the literary or literal version and the second regarding whether the translator is free to express the sense of the original in any style or idiom.[2] Contemporary American literary translation seems to perpetuate the same practice. It seemed clear that a more systematic approach to translation was needed, and the discipline with the theoretical and language tools necessary to address the problem was first provided by linguistics.

Up until the early sixties linguistics had been characterized by largely descriptive research in which individual grammars were detailed but not compared, and thus of little theoretical value to translators. The simultaneous development of two theories significantly altered the course of translation theory and remain today the most influential in their fields. The culmination of the evolving theories may be represented by Chomsky's Syntactic Structures (1957), Eugene Nida's Message and Mission (1960), Nida's Toward a Science of Translating (1964), and Noam Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). While Nida argues that the theories evolved in parallel fashion, which might explain some of the differences between the

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[2]George Steiner, After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation (London and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 239.

two to be talked about later in this chapter, the addition of generative transformational grammar, along with its legitimacy within the field of linguistics, lent credence and influence to Nida's "science" of translation. Nida's theory took shape from his experience translating the Bible, with early theoretical assumptions being visible in articles written in the fifties and in 1960 with Message and Mission. Chomsky published a tentative version of his theory called Syntactic Structures in 1957 in The Netherlands. Nida claims that his theory of translation was already well developed before Chomsky's formulation. Writing about himself in an article called "A Framework for the Analysis and Evaluation of Theories of Translation," Nida argues:

> Before the formulation of generative-transformation grammar by Chomsky, Nida had already adopted an essentially deep-structure approach to certain problems of exegesis. In an article entitled "A New Methodology in Biblical Exegesis" (1952) he advocated the back transformation of complex surface structures onto an underlying level, in which the fundamental elements are objects, events, abstracts and relations.[3]

Despite claims to the contrary, Nida's theory crystallizes with the addition of Chomsky's transformational component--Nida read Chomsky's Syntactic Structures in mimeograph form two years before it was published. With the adoption of Chomsky's theoretical premise, his transformational rules and his terminology, Nida's theory crystallizes, and the result--Toward a Science of Translating--has become the "Bible" for not just Bible translation, but translation theory in general.

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[3]Eugene Nida, "A Framework for the Analysis and Evaluation of Theories of Translation," Translation: Application and Research, ed. Richard W. Brislin (New York: Gardner Press, 1976), 71.

Chomsky's theory, which grew from a dissertation written at the University of Pennsylvania and discussions he was having while a research fellow at Harvard, was revolutionary within the field of linguistics, and may explain why he had trouble getting it published in America. At the time linguistics was dominated by behavioral and empirical theorists who were using a "data-processing" approach to analyzing language. Languages were detailed by cataloging parts of speech, observing habits and patterns, and using induction and analogy to broaden inventories; based on the collection of data, then, grammars were described. Chomsky reacted against followers of the Sapir-Whorf school, Bloomfield descendents, behaviorists such as Skinner, and even Prague structuralists such as Jakobson.[4] Chomsky saw a "methodological limitation" based on procedures which classify and describe, but cannot generate new sentences, unless via a process of substitution within a general category. Something was missing, and Chomsky's theory supplied that missing link. By abandoning inductive reasoning and reversing the direction of inquiry, Chomsky took an imaginative leap right to the center of thought. There he posited a "base component" made up of

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[4]Chomsky's writing reflects ambiguous feelings about Jakobson. He had read him as a graduate student and was influenced by him, but still rejected his approach. Chomsky writes, "Distinctive feature theory, in the sense of the Prague circle, might be regarded as such a system [traditional empiricism]. Jakobson, in particular, has developed in numerous works the view that such features are perceived as phenomenal properties, and that acquisition of phonological system develops in a systematic and fairly uniform way by refinement and elaboration of a feature system." At the same time, Chomsky writes "insofar as distinctive feature theory postulates certain universal conditions that a grammar must satisfy, it must be considered as a "rationalist" rather than as "empiricist" model. See footnote 19 to introduction to The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (New York: Plenum Press, 1975), 47.

phrase structure rules that "generate" deep structures to sentence, which then in turn are "transformed" via transformational rules to form all surface manifestations. It is important today to understand the theoretical basis of Chomsky's theory, for it has often been misunderstood and related to structural linguistics, mathematical theories of communication, computer investigation of language, and machine translation. Many literary critics and translation theorists have been skeptical of Chomsky's claim regarding the nature of the human mind that enables us to know language, arguing instead that no twentieth-century method reaches that "initial" structure upon which Chomsky's theory is based. There is no test, empirical or neurophysical, which can reach the language center of the brain to discover such structures. Chomsky himself admits this, but argues in his defense that given the complex and complicated nature of language (as opposed to other forms of knowledge), unless such a structure existed, no child could ever learn a language. Chomsky's theory is founded on Cartesian philosophy and is Platonic in a very humanistic, idealistic sense. His own text Cartesian Linguistics (1966) traces the development of his theory from the rationalist philosophers from the seventeenth century. Such a theoretical base proved to be new and revolutionizing within the field of linguistics, confronting and changing the paradigm, and creating a new discipline. However, in terms of literary theory, his assumptions about the nature of the human mind perpetuate rather than revolutionize dominant beliefs which govern the intellectual and literary establishment.

Nida's work in the field of Bible translating was initially practice-oriented rather than theoretical. The historical paradigm on which he draws

for his strategies was fairly narrow, dominated by translations of the Bible. Nida privileges "sense for sense" translations, and historically he tends to compare how Bible translations fared against the prevailing taste of the period. For example, in the Greco-Roman period when Greek plays were being translated into Latin, a period when Cicero, Horace and Catullus were studying translation problems, Bible translating did not fare so well: "Unfortunately, Bible translating did not in some respects fare as well as the classics, for there was a tendency to regard the 'letter rather than the spirit,' with results that were sometimes lamentable."[5] During the sixteenth century, Bible translating fared better. Nida clearly favors Martin Luther's translation strategies, which involve, among others, shifts of word order, suppression of Greek or Hebrew terms which have no acceptable equivalent, use of phrases to translate single words, shifts of metaphors to nonmetaphors and vice versa, and, especially, careful attention to exegetical accuracy.[6]

Nida's development of a translation science was motivated by a personal dislike for what he sees as a classical revival in the nineteenth century, an emphasis on technical accuracy, adherence to form, and literal rendering of the meaning. The principal exponent in English of this movement, according to Nida, was Matthew Arnold, whose approach was clearly too scholarly and pedantic for Nida's taste, placing too many demands

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[5]Eugene A. Nida, Toward a Science of Translating: With Special Reference to Principles and Procedures Involved in Bible Translating (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964), 12.

[6]Ibid., 14-15. Nida also footnotes Edward H. Lauer, "Luther's translation of the Psalms in 1523-1524," Journal of English and Germanic Philology 14 (1915) , 1-34, and Heinz Bluhm, "The Evolution of Luther's Translation of the Twenty-third Psalm," Germanic Review 26 (1951), 251-258.

upon the reader to become informed about the original culture. Arnold's literalism, according to Nida, negatively affected Bible translation in the early twentieth century; he cites as one example the American Standard Version, which, although popular with theology students, never caught on with the general public. Nida writes that, "the words [of the American Standard Version of the Bible] may be English, but the grammar is not; and the sense is quite lacking."[7]   I argue that Nida's arguments against Arnold's approach are governed by his taste, general public opinion, and the economics of his project (converting people to Christianity).   Implicit in his approach is a populist evangelical Christian belief (and anti-intellectual stance) that the word should be accessible to all. His "science" of translating does not demonstrate that the American Standard version is anymore lacking in grammar and sense than contemporary versions.

Despite being relegated to a "practical handbook" status within the branch of the field of theology called the "theology of missions" and more recently "missiology," because of its vast number of examples, Toward a Science of Translating has enjoyed a particularly influential status in another field, that of translation. Bible translating has generated more data in more languages than any other translation practice: it enjoys a longer history, has reached more people in more diverse cultures, and has involved more translators from different backgrounds than any other translation practice. In generic terms as well, Bible translating has touched all fields, for within the text one finds passages of poetry and prose, narrative and

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[7]Ibid., 20-21.

dialogue, parables and laws. The sheer quantity of examples and breadth of scope have made Bible translation a necessary part of any study on the theory of translation. However, in terms of its theoretical contribution, it too can be viewed in terms similar to the practical, anecdotal approach characteristic of American literary translation theory.

Nida, aware of the unsystematic nature of a practice-oriented approach, attempted to scientifically validate his methodology and apply it to translation as a whole. Nevertheless, his religious beliefs and missionary goals--attempts to unite people around a common belief in the inviolable word of God--although not explicitly stated, remain embedded within the scientific framework. Because of the magnitude of theoretical importance the original message receives in any translation of the Bible, the fundamental governing principle of Nida's theory was correspondingly predetermined: the communication across cultures of the spirit of the original message is primary throughout. The particular form in which that message appears is superficial as long as the meaning of that message is clear. Chomsky was literally a godsend for Nida, for with the incorporation of Chomsky's theoretical framework, Nida's project ceased to be directed at merely fellow missionaries, and attempted to lay the groundwork for a larger audience; his work became the basis upon which a new field of investigation in the twentieth century--the "science" of translation--was founded.

Why a "science" of translation emerged at this time and why it incorporated aspects of Noam Chomsky's theory of linguistics are two of the questions addressed in this chapter. Noam Chomsky's theory of syntax and generative grammar was not, nor was it intended to be, a theory of

translation. In fact, Chomsky cautioned against its appropriation in such a fashion. The universal forms that fascinated Chomsky have more to do with the rules that structure or even construct grammars, rules that precede any concept of specific deep structure to any given sentence of any specific language. Chomsky's theory involves three levels of conceptualization: (1) a base component made up of "phrase structure rules" that generate (2) a deep structure, which in turn is changed, via transformational rules into (3) a surface structure. Nida simplifies Chomsky's model and adopts only part of the model in order to validate his science. At the same time, I will argue that Chomsky's model lends itself to such a misappropriation by translation theorists; had Nida not formalized it, someone else would have. Transformational grammarians work in various languages and continually point out structural similarities across languages. Such similarities fascinated Chomsky, too, although again he has cautioned against drawing conclusions, knowing that the number of languages is vast compared to the similarities found, and that deep structures need not be like any existing surface structure.

Although the two theories evolved for different reasons, they both assume that there exists a deep, coherent and unified entity behind whatever manifestation language takes: the "core," the "kernel," the "deep structure," the "essence," the "spirit" are all terms used by Nida, many of which derive from Chomsky. While Chomsky later distanced himself from terms such as "kernel" (it is still present in Aspects, but plays an increasingly diminishing role), he still used concepts such as "base component" and "formal universals" which are "innate" in humans and cut across cultures. Both

Chomsky and Nida make metaphysical claims about the object of investigation for their respective theories. Bequeathed an identity, it comes as no surprise that a science grows to investigate it. Chomsky's linguistics probed structures of the mind and changed focus of linguistics in the modern age; Nida's translation theory probed deep structures common to all languages and found ways to transform those entities in differing languages. The two approaches attempt to demonstrate different kinds of objects at the center--one arguing the existence of universal rules of grammar and universal lexical forms; the other making metaphysical claims about an original divine message. Both linguistics and translation theory are revitalized by their respective theories. Chomsky's deep-structure/surface-structure model, his transformational rules, although monolinguistically derived, lend themselves to justifying a theory of translation. Whether one accepts Chomsky's beliefs on how the human mind is structured or not, his deep structures, postulated to contain all the necessary syntactic as well as semantic information for a correct transformation into surface structure and interpretation, indeed lend themselves well to the translation practitioner trying to represent an "underlying" message in a second language.

What I wish to call into question in the course of this chapter is the very object which translation science claims to be investigating. Has it been identified? Nida make theoretical claims, but is there a *non-dit* operative which affects his theory? What are the underlying assumptions? Can there be a "science" of translation? In terms of its importance in the field, Nida's science cannot be underestimated, for his approach is being disseminated in the classrooms of both West Germany and the United States. In Germany, the

science of translation (*Übersetzungswissenschaft*) has become the approach which governs the teaching of translation, both conceptually and in practice. In the United States, the emergence of his science has engendered textbooks, linguistic institutes, and journals which now dominate the academy. The wealth of linguistic data, numerous examples, machines, computers, and mathematic formulas employed seems deliberately to obscure something very fragile about the science, i.e., its theoretical premise. I hope to show how the science of translation is itself a dual activity: in the process of discovering new information and solving translation problems, it simultaneously covers up other aspects inherent in the nature of the subject being studied. If translation necessarily subverts its own institutionalization, then attempts to make a science of the field actually reinforce a different theoretical agenda than originally intended.

In this chapter I first look at aspects of Noam Chomsky's work, showing how it lent itself, however inappropriately, for adaptation by Nida. Next, I analyze Nida's theory, disclosing explicit and implicit theoretical premises. I then examine the work of Wolfram Wilss, who is the leading proponent of the science of translation, and whose text The Science of Translation (*Überstezungswissenschaft*) best articulates its methodology. I close with a brief analysis of the kinds of writing for which this approach seems most appropriate, as well as brief discussion of texts which for theoretical reasons the science tends to avoid.

Noam Chomsky: "Underlying" Structures

As noted earlier, when Chomsky first introduced his theory of syntax, linguistics in general had stagnated, and descriptive linguistics, even structural linguistics, was proving inadequate. Methods that had worked with phonemes and morphemes, of which each language has a finite number, did not work very well when applied to sentences. Revealing the structures of the mind that enables us to generate an infinite number of sentences fascinated Chomsky. At the bottom of his hierarchy are "phrase structure rules" thought to be "innate"--part of our "unconscious" knowledge or our "competence"--that govern our ability to know grammar, to know or learn a language. Chomsky is so absolute in his fundamental notion of the syntactical nature of such rules that according to John Searle, he has become a "minority" within his own field.[8] Yet even those who disagree with him concede that he brought forth examples which the existing paradigm could not adequately analyze or classify, thereby altering the scope of the field. The revolution in linguistics has been likened by some to the pattern of scientific change outlined in Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolution.[9]

I can best demonstrate Chomsky's advance in the field by citing a simple example. Consider the pair of sentences:[10]

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[8]John Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," in On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays, 2nd Ed., ed. Gilbert Harman (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 18.

[9]Ibid., 2.

[10]Ibid., 4-5. See also Noam Chomsky, Language and Mind, enlarged edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1972), 36-7.

(1) (i) John is easy to please.

(ii) John is eager to please.

A descriptive analysis of the two sentences would reveal that their structures are the same. American structuralism (Bloomfield), empiricism (Sapir-Whorf), behaviorism (Skinner), and Prague semiotics (Jakobson) can merely describe and categorize the above sentences, but cannot explain them. Chomsky distinguishes between what he calls peripheral processing--smell, feel, hearing processed via "elementary" principles of generalizing association and induction--and rational processing--thinking which probes behind the periphery. He argues that traditional grammars do not go far enough, that the surface structure is often misleading, and that there is "no trace" of a different structure underlying the pair on the surface. Consider the pair when their surface structure has been transformed:

(2) (i) It is easy to please John.

(ii) * It is eager to please John.

Chomsky argues that although the two sentences in (1) appear to have a parallel surface structure, their deep structure clearly differs, as shown by (2). Much information can be obtained about the grammar of a given language by observing its surface manifestations and categorizing the various parts of speech, but such "data-processing" fails to detect certain complexities and ambiguities that his system is prepared to offer. His theory elucidates the "innate" knowledge of language's "abstract nature" which is not reflected in the surface structure. In Aspects of Syntax Theory, Chomsky gives the example:

(3) (i) I persuaded John to leave.

(ii) I expected John to leave.

He then says, "So far as I have been able to discover, no English grammar has pointed out the fundamental distinction between these two sentences."[11] He then illustrates their difference by considering the following pairs of sentences:

(4) (i) I persuaded a specialist to examine John.

(ii) I persuaded John to be examined by a specialist.

(5) (i) I expected a specialist to examine John.

(ii) I expected John to be examined by a specialist.

The sentences in (5) are "cognitively synonymous": one is true only if the other is true; but the sentences in (4) are not synonymous at all and can vary in their truth or falsity independently of each other.[12] Chomsky's syntax theory is explanatory, not merely descriptive. By analyzing differences such as the above by looking at the internal structure underlying such sentences, he demonstrates how misleading the surface structure may be and shows how the underlying grammar actually determines their semantic interpretations.

Yet Chomsky's grammar is more complex than a two-level deep structure/surface structure argument. His model has several levels, the bottom of which is a very vague "initial element" (abandoned after his 1957 book Syntactic Structures, but conspicuous by its very absence), followed by the "base component," which is composed of two kinds of rewriting rules-- the above mentioned "phrase structure rules," which are common to all

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[11]Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1965), 22.

[12]Ibid.

languages, and "lexical rules," which also derive from universal categories. The phrase structure rules generate the deep structure of a sentence, which, according to Chomsky at the time of the writing of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, contained all the syntactic and semantic information that determine its meaning. Finally, transformational rules modify the deep structure, resulting in the surface structures--all the sentences in a given language. Thus there is a double movement embedded in Chomsky's theory--from the base to the deep structure via phrase structure rules, and then from the deep structure to the surface via transformational rules. According to Chomsky, the phrase structure rules represent the internalized and unconscious workings of the human mind, deep structure determines meaning underlying sentences, and surface structure determines sound.[13]

Chomsky assumes much when he assumes that such rules represent innate structures of humans, and questions have been raised about such assumptions. John Searle, for example, writes:

> He [Chomsky] is not, of course claiming that a speaker actually goes consciously or unconsciously through any such process of applying [phrase structure] rules of the form "rewrite X as Y" to construct sentences. To construe the grammarians description this way would be to confuse an account of competence with a theory of performance.
> But Chomsky does claim that in some form or other the speaker has "internalized" rules of sentence construction, that he has "tacit" or "unconscious" knowledge of grammatical rules, and that the phrase structure rules constructed by the grammarian "represent" his competence. One of the chief difficulties of Chomsky's theory is that no clear and precise answer has ever been given to the question of exactly how the grammarian's account is supposed to represent the speaker's ability to speak and understand sentences, and in precisely what sense of "know" the speaker is supposed to know the rules of the grammar.[14]

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[13]Ibid., 143.

[14]Searle, "Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics," 10-11.

The problem that Searle had with Chomsky's theory is representative of philosophical objections many have had with Chomsky's assumptions about the human mind, and how it "knows" language. In addition to questioning such concepts as "innateness," "intuition," "tacit" knowledge, some critics did not find Chomsky's evidence all that convincing. Ironically, Chomsky's "empirical" evidence of language structure is not based upon living language--how humans actually use language in a social situation--but sentences "used" in an ideal state, cut off from all the everyday problems such as distractions, shifts of attentions and errors. Chomsky calls such data "grammatically irrelevant":

> Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-
> listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community, who
> knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such
> grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations,
> distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors . . . This
> seems to me to have been the position of the founders of modern
> general linguistics, and no cogent reason for modifying it has been
> offered.[15]

To those reading such a statement now, the terminology is loaded with suppositions--"ideal speaker-listener," "homogeneous speech-community," "know language perfectly," "grammatically irrelevant conditions"--that have all been called into question during the past decade. Michel Foucault suggests that not only are their philosophical differences regarding assumptions about "human nature" involved, but a generation gap regarding how the "subject," specifically, the "creative speaking subject" is perceived as well.[16] Chomsky has idealized the speaking subject and has

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[15]Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 3-4.

[16]Chomsky and Foucault, "Human Nature: Justice versus Power," 164.

empowered it with unique abilities with regard to its creative ability to use language. Through the process of idealization, however, certain usages involving accidents, errors, and slips of the tongue are not incorporated into Chomsky's model, instances which are just as important as "correct" formulations to Foucault's understanding speaking subject and its underlying "nature."

Even at the time of Chomsky's writing, those who disagreed with his assumptions were many. Notwithstanding Bloomfield's structuralism and Skinner's behaviorism, against which Chomsky specifically directed his arguments, within the generative-transformational camp, followers such as Katz and Lakoff questioned his divorcing semantics from syntax, and revised his theory to greater emphasize semantics role in the deep structure.[17] Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophers such as Searle and Austin opposed cutting language off from its social function, and argued that it is the surface structures, not the deep structures, that carry meaning and that meaning can only be understood as the result of a social exchange, with different people playing different roles.[18] Sociolinguistics such as Dell

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[17]Jerrold Katz, Semantic Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); George Lakoff, Irregularity in Syntax (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); James D. McCawley, Grammar and Meaning: Papers on Syntactic and Semantic Topics (New York: Academic Press, 1976).

[18]J. L. Austin, How to do things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); John R. Searle, Speech Acts, An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Robin Lakoff, "Language in Context," Language, Vol. 48:4 (1972), 907-927; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Ansconbe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968).

Hymes tended to be more sympathetic to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which

posits a very different conclusion from observations of language, suggesting

that different patterns of syntax and lexical items in different languages

revealed not universals common to all languages, but universals laid down

along the lines of each separate language.[19]   Similarly, Quine's empirical

line of inquiry suggested a pluralism rather than a universalism of logical

structures and proponents argue against the "absolutism" of systems such as

Chomsky's.[20] Prague structuralism, chapter five illustrates, did more than

simply categorize linguistic features, but also demonstrated that languages

evolve systematically, continually reinventing themselves as social

conditions change.   Chapter six shows how Heidegger and subsequent post-

structuralist literary theorists radically oppose the positing of an innate

system of rules in the interior of the mind, suggesting that such structures

and generalities actually cover up irregularities also inherent in the nature

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[19]Edward Sapir, Selected Writings of Edward Sapir, ed. Mandelbaum
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1949). Benjamin
Lee Whorf, Language Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin L.
Whorf, ed. J. Carroll (New York: John Wiley, 1940). John Gumperz and Dell
Hymes, eds., Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of
Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Dell Hymes,
Foundations in Sociolinguistics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1974. John Gumperz, Discourse Strategies (Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press, 1982. See also George Steiner, After Babel
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 87-94 and in "Whorf, Chomsky and
the Student of Literature," in On Difficulty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1978).

[20]Willard V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA, 1960) and
"Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory" in On Noam
Chomsky: Critical Essays, 2nd ed., ed. Gilbert Harman (Amherst: The
University of Massachusetts Press, 1974).   See also Noam Chomsky, "Quine's
Empirical Assumptions," Synthese 19 (1968), 53-68 and Willard V. Quine,
"Replies," Synthese 19 (1968), 264-280.

of language, and that "meaning" cannot be fixed by a lexical universal or a mathematical structure, syntactical or otherwise.[21]

In terms of translation theory in general, those who disagree with Chomsky's essentialist approach are also numerous. I do not wish to enter into the debate as to whether or not Chomsky's model should have been appropriated for translation theory. Chomsky himself has argued against its appropriation in such a fashion, never intending his linguistics to be used as a basis for literary criticism or translation analysis. Nevertheless, translation theory has "used" Chomsky to substantiate specific claims about the nature of language, one cannot ignore this body of material. George Steiner, whose comprehensive 1975 book on translation theory After Babel serves as one example, felt it important enough to deal extensively with Chomsky's theory and its relevance to understanding translation. As I will discuss later in this chapter, two major translation theorists have adopted a Chomskian model for their theories. Eugene Nida, who argues that his science of translation is based upon Chomsky's deep structure/surface structure model, has perhaps simplified Chomsky's work and misappropriated it for his purposes. Wolfram Wilss, who argues that his model is not based upon Chomsky's work, has perhaps unwittingly adopted more from Chomsky than he is willing to admit.

According to many literary critics and translation theorists, problem with the Chomskian model has less to with its tendency to attempt to locate

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[21]Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, "Human Nature: Justice Versus Power," in Reflexive Water, ed. Fons Elders (London: Souvenir Press, 1974), 133-198.

assumed deep structures and more with regard to theoretical assumptions he
makes about "structures" in the mind.   In After Babel, George Steiner sums
up the objections to what Chomsky supposes to be "tacit" structures as follows:

> The elementary or tree-structures arrived at by the application
> of transformational rules to an English sentence are not an X-ray.
> There has been no empirically verifiable probe from surface to
> depth. . . . A transformational analysis however abstract, however
> suggestive of the formal moves of pure logic, is itself a language-act,
> a procedure which interpenetrates at every stage with the object of
> its analysis. The linguist no more steps out of the mobile fabric of
> actual language--his own language, the very few languages he
> knows--than does a man out of the reach of his shadow.[22]

Chomsky's generative transformational model, because of its focusing on an
ideal speaker-hearer situation, because of its assumptions about the nature of
the mind, has been able to isolate aspects of language such as its syntax, and
create powerful generative formulas which have enabled the linguist to
better comprehend certain linguistic phenomena--semantics, morphology,
phonology, and, especially, grammar in general.   In addition, in terms of his
theoretical advance, Chomsky restored the power of the speaking subject to
create new sentences, phrases never before heard or experienced, to
linguistic analysis.   This data is clearly of interest to the translation theorist,
and   much underused.   Troubling to Steiner and the translation theorists in
general, however, is the move from an attempt to describe a grammar to one
which argues that innate structures determine the form of knowledge.   For
example, when Chomsky argues that "there are innate ideas and principles of
various kinds that determine the forms of acquired knowledge,"[23]   Steiner

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[22]Steiner, After Babel, 111.

[23]Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax , 48.

points out that no "empirically verifiable probe from surface to depth" has

ever occurred.   In order to gain access to deep structure--or in Chomsky's

case the base component--a cognitive leap is necessary.

To justify this move, Chomsky invokes traditional Cartesian dualism

and leaves the realm of the real for the ideal.   He quotes Descartes to

substantiate his transcendental move:

> . . . nothing reaches our mind from external objects through the
> organs of sense beyond certain corporeal movements . . . but even
> these movements, and the figures which arise from them, are not
> conceived by us in the shape they assume in the organs of sense. . . .
> Hence it follows that the ideas of the movements and figures are
> themselves innate in us.[24]

Chomsky does not trust the senses, does not believe the "shape" figures

appear in as revealed by our senses: these are mere "corporeal movements"

and are dismissed in favor of that transcendental idea behind the appearance

of things.   Chomsky clearly is not talking about just language here, but about

the philosophy of ideas.   He continues in Aspects of Syntax Theory to invoke

a paradigm of theorists to defend his move.   First he cites Lord Herbert, who

in the seventeenth century argued that ideas "remain latent when their

corresponding objects are not present."[25]   During this same period, Chomsky

also quotes Arnauld who claimed, "no idea which we have in our minds has

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[24]René Descartes, "Notes directed against a certain programme," in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. I , trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), 443. Quoted by Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 48. See also Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

[25]Herbert of Cherbury, De Verité, trans. M.H. Carre (Bristol: University of Bristol Studies, 1937), 132. Quoted by Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 49.

taken its rise from sense."[26]   Next, a little less equivocally, Chomsky cites the

eighteenth-century German philosopher Leibniz, who posits, "Necessary

truths . . . must have principles whose proof does not depend on examples."[27]

Finally, concluding this line of thinkers with the nineteenth-century

German philosopher Humboldt, whom Chomsky paraphrases as arguing

learning is largely a matter of *Wiedererzeugung* or a "drawing out what is

innate in the mind."[28]   It is in fact a translation of Humboldt's use of the

concept *Erzeugen* which yields Chomsky's term "generative."

The derivation of the form of ideas in the mind from what began as a

better description of language may seem to many a remote extrapolation, but

for Chomsky the two problems are not distinct from one another. His larger

agenda is philosophical, not linguistic, and he hopes that his theories about

language will substantiate larger philosophical issues.   In   The Logical

Structure of Linguistic Theory (LSLT) Chomsky writes:

> . . . the linguistic theory developed in LSLT presents certain
> empirical hypotheses concerning the structure of language that can
> likewise be regarded as hypotheses concerning the properties of the
> mind . . . These matters are not discussed in LSLT, but the issues lie
> in the immediate background of this work . . . in my personal view,
> the general intellectual interest of the work in generative grammar
> lies primarily in its contribution to the understanding of these

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[26]A. Arnauld and P. Nicole, La Logique, ou l'art de penser (1622).
Quoted by Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax, 49.trans. James Dickoff and
Patrick James (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964).   See Antoine Arnauld The
Art of thinking: Port-Royal Logic, trans. James Dickoff and Patricia James
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964).

[27]Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human
Understanding, trans. Alfred Gideon Langley (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court,
1949), 44.   Quoted by Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax, 50.

[28]Ibid., 51.

issues.[29]

--Chomsky thus hopes that his linguistic project will actually be used to substantiate the metaphysical claims of Cartesian dualism, tautologically lending credence to the presupposition that our ideas are patterned after certain universal, transcendental forms, which in turn constitute the basis for Chomsky's linguistic theory. His claims point to a direction of research in neuro-physiology as well as linguistics, and certainly transcend the boundaries of any one given language structure.

The distinction Chomsky makes between "substantive" and "formal" universals will illustrate how Chomsky's theory transcends the boundaries of linguistics.[30] "Substantive" universals are a "fixed class" of phonetic and syntactic items, generally independent from any specific language, from which a language draws in order to function. As an example of this kind of universal, Chomsky cites Jakobson's theory of distinctive phonetic features, fifteen or twenty in number, each having a "substantive acoustic-articulatory characterization independent of any particular language."[31] In addition to such fixed classes, Chomsky also hypothesizes the concept that "the grammar of every language meets certain specified formal conditions."[32] His transformational rules, he suggests, are just such a kind of

[29]Noam Chomsky, The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory, 13. See also Noam Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics (New York: Harper and Row, 1966) and Chomsky, Language and Mind, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972).

[30]Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax, 28-29.

[31]Ibid., 28.

[32]Ibid., 29.

universal, rules which operate on syntactical and phonological structures, not merely rules enabling one to draw from a fixed set of features, but the abstract rules which govern that very selection process and severely limit the choices possible. He gives the example that the color words of every language must not only draw from the color spectrum, but must subdivide it in a certain way, i.e., in continuous segments. "Formal universals" extend beyond the mere hypothesis that semantic features may provide a universal framework for all semantic description, to the point where the rules governing all languages are interconnected.

While arguing in favor of formal universals common to all languages, Chomsky holds that these formal properties go much deeper than the particular deep structure of a sentence in any given language:

> To say that formal properties of the base will provide the framework for the characterization of universal categories is to assume that much of the structure of the base is common to all languages. This is a way of stating a traditional view, whose origins can again be traced back at least to the *Grammaire général raisonnée* (Lancelot, *et al.*, 1660). To the extent that relevant evidence is available today, it seems not unlikely that it is true. Insofar as aspects of the base structure are not specific to a particular language, they need not be stated in the grammar of this language. Instead, they are to be stated only in general linguistic theory, as part of the definition of the notion "human language" itself. In traditional terms, they pertain to the form of language in general rather than to the form of particular languages. . . .[33]

Though Nida perhaps thought that the same deep structure could underlie a sentence in two particular languages, Chomsky does not claim that deep structures are universal. The form of a particular language, according to Chomsky, does not necessarily equal the form of another:Chomsky realized

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[33]Ibid., 117.

the implications of his thesis for translation theory and advised caution: just because these formal universals exist, it does not mean that they should be applied as a procedure for translating:

> The existence of deep-seated formal universals, in the sense suggested by such examples as these, implies that all languages are cut to the same pattern, but does not imply that there is any point by point correspondence between particular languages. It does not, for example, imply that there must be some reasonable procedure for translating between languages.[34]

While Chomsky assumed generative rules lie at the heart of man's language facility, and postulated that a formal device may exist behind all languages, he cautioned against jumping to conclusions based upon one to one correlations between just two languages, and assuming a grammar particular to one language will work systematically for another. Surface structures need not be like their underlying deep structures. Nida ignored this caution and derived a translation procedure based upon a very simplified notion of Chomsky's theory, one which focuses primarily upon the deep structure, transformational rules, and surface structures similar across languages rather than the deeper phrase structure rules that actually allow for real structural diversity as well as surface differences in human languages.

From the perspective of translation practitioners, the problem with the generative transformational model is that it is overly idealistic, divorced from all the problems of translation--from verb tenses, to archaisms, to dialects, to ironies, to proper nouns, to metaphors, to mistakes, and all those knotty problems that make translation both impossible and fascinating. Quine's calling into question the very notion of synonymity strikes a

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[34]Ibid., 30.

resonant chord and is perhaps more relevant to practitioners than a theory of language which posits universal structures. The linguistic methodology which isolates its model from spoken language is both overly idealistic and perhaps too "theoretical" for many a translator's taste. For example, mathematically, it may be possible to develop a system in which a finite number of rules can generate an infinite number of manifestations, yet language, they would argue, operates differently from mathematics, and no matter how precisely a generative transformational linguist describes the generative rules which produce surface structures, other aspects of language will fall through cracks between generative lines of production. Chomsky's system, which works well for linguistics, is not well suited for translation purposes. Again, Steiner articulates the translator's main objections:

> To assert that any given pattern is uniquely concordant with
> "underlying reality" and therefore normative and predictive,
> is to take a very large, philosophically dubious step. It is just at
> this point that the implied analogy with mathematics is decisive
> and spurious. . . . the difficulty as well as the explanations offered
> are based on the arbitrary, internally consistent, possibly tautological
> quality of the mathematical fact. It is this quality that makes the
> mathematical model *verifiable*. The facts of language are otherwise.
> No momentary cut, no amount of tissue excised from the entirety of
> the linguistic process can represent or guarantee a determination
> of all future forms and inherent possibilities. A language model is
> no more than a model. It is an idealized mapping, not a living whole.[35]

The fact that spoken language contains errors, shifts, ellipses, and gaps begs to tell us something about meaning and something about the structural nature of language. One could hypothetically argue that no sentence is ever divorced entirely from error, that this itself is a condition of language, and

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[35]Steiner, *After Babel*, 112.

that language derives its very energy from this inherent instability.   Again,
Steiner argues:

> It is the *langage donné* in which we conduct our lives, whether
> as ordinary human beings or as linguists. We have no other.
> And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely
> argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical
> cinches, may block perception. The marginalia, the anarchic
> singularities and inefficiencies which generative transformational
> grammars leave to one side or attempt to cover with *ad hoc* rules,
> may in fact be among the nerve-centres of linguistic change . . .[36]

The tendency of generative transformational grammar to ignore all errors
or to term them grammatically irrelevant probably obscures as much as it
reveals about the structure of language.

Creative writers are just one group to seize upon this inherent nature
of language, deliberately breaking the structural rules of the language yet
still making sense. Literary critic Ian Robinson's The New Grammarians'
Funeral directly challenges Chomsky's linguistics, pointing out numerous
weaknesses and limits of generative transformational grammar as well as
problems with its philosophic assumptions. Robinson points out, for
example, that there is no past imperative in English, and certain
philosophers would argue that it cannot exist because no one would order
someone to do something in the past. Yet Gerald Manley Hopkins does
precisely that:

> Have fair fallen, O fair, fair have fallen, so dear
> To me, so arch-especial a spirit as heaves in Henry Purcell[37]

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[36]Ibid., 113.

[37]Quoted by Robinson, The New Grammarians Funeral, 41.

Robinson argues that the only thing Chomsky's theory can do with the above sentence is to say that it is "ill-formed," and that no competent native speaker would construct such a sentence. Robinson suggests that for every structural rule--phrase structural or transformational--a linguist could posit, Hopkins, among others, could find a way to break it or subvert it. One aspect of language that transformational grammar has particular trouble dealing with, according to Robinson, is tone, especially irony. He cites another example from Joseph Heller's Catch-22 to show that what we say is not always what we mean:

> "I want someone to tell me," Lieutenant Scheisskopf beseeched them all prayerfully.
> "If any of it is my fault, I want to be told."
> "He wants someone to tell him," Clevinger said.
> "He wants everyone to keep still, idiot," Yossarian answered.
> "Didn't you hear him?" Clevinger argued.
> "I heard him," Yossarian replied. "I heard him say very loudly and very distinctly that he wants every one of us to keep our mouths shut if we know what's good for us."[38]

Robinson writes that "TG grammar has no way of showing (although it is implied by common parlance) that saying something ironically is less basic to language than saying something straight."[39] Creative writers have actually found Chomsky's examples a source of inspiration just to disprove his data. For example, when the rules generates a sentence such as "colorless green ideas sleep furiously," Chomsky argued that such a string could be interpreted only "by direct analogy to well-formed sentences" and that "a descriptively adequate grammar should make all these distinctions on some

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[38]Quoted by Robinson, Ibid., 49.

[39]Ibid.

formal grounds."[40]   Yet American poet John Hollander responded by writing

a perfectly grammatically well-formed sentence that needed no structural

analogy for interpretation.   His poem "Coiled Alizarine," dedicated to

Chomsky, reads:

> Curiously deep, the slumber of crimson thoughts:
> > While breathless, in stodgy viridian,
>
> Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.[41]

Although Chomsky's theory revolutionized the field of linguistics, and

many consider his theoretical work one of the major contributions to

twentieth century thought, many creative writers, literary theorists and

translation practicioners have remained strangely aloof.   They quibble with

his examples, doubt his assumptions, question his claim of being a science,

are troubled by his empirical procedures, and especially, question whether

generative transformational model is useful to the study of literature.   A

whole series of questions raised by Barbara Herrnstein Smith in a discussion

of Jonathan Cullar's work is indicative that Chomsky's arguments have not

persuaded all of the correctness of its assumptions, of its singular importance

to linguistic inquiry, or its suitability for literary theory:

> *Is* literature a system of signs? Is *language* a system of signs?
> If so, and they are in that respect alike, does the inference still
> follow?   Specifically, are the differences between literature-
> as-a-whole and a language of no significance for the nature
> of the discipline that studies each?   Is linguistics a monolithic
> discipline?   Specifically, is it equivalent to transformational-
> generative grammar?   If not, is Chomsky's theory of language
> and the transformational-generative grammarians' pursuit of

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[40]Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax, 149-150.

[41]John Hollander, The Night Mirror (New York: Atheneum, 1971).
Reprinted in On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays, 2nd ed., ed. Gilbert Harman
(Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), 1.

> its study the only and/or the most suitable model for the theory
> of literature and the pursuit of its study? And, in any case, are
> the assumptions, procedures, concepts, and conclusions of linguistics
> themselves so well established, so free from internal problems or
> external criticism that the literary theorists are well advised to
> adopt and apply them unreflectingly?[42]

Despite reservations from creative writers, literary theorists and literary

translators, and despite caution from Chomsky himself, one translation

specialist found Chomsky's assumptions and methods very attractive and

proceeded to construct a translation science around the model provided by

Chomsky. As it turned out, the theory became the most influential approach

in the field for subsequent decades.

Eugene Nida: Applying Generative Grammar to Translation

If Chomsky's theoretical base is Platonic, Nida's is Protestant. The

religious presuppositions on which Nida's work rests can be amply

demonstrated by a look at his 1960 text Message and Mission, a pre-Chomsky

version of Toward a Science of Translation. At that time Nida is still writing

for missionaries, not translators; thus, while Nida is moving in the direction

of a scientific analysis, "breaking new ground with new tools"[43] in the

communication the Christian faith, the discussion of theological motivations

remains overt. The book's general thesis is that Biblical translators should

not take communication for granted, but should work at it, employing all the

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[42]Barbara Herrnstein Smith, On the Margins of Discourse: The Relation of Literature to Language (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 178.

[43]Eugene A. Nida, Preface to Message and Mission: The Communication of the Christian Faith (New York: Harper, 1960), xvii.

resources of linguistics and communication theory to aid their task. Nida

draws on extensive field work which shows that the religious message often

fails to be communicated because of different cultural contexts and world

views. Nida understands that meaning cannot be divorced from the personal

experience and the conceptual framework of the person receiving the

message. He writes:

> Whatever concepts are communicated are reinterpreted in terms of
> the total conceptual framework of the different context. People do
> not leave such conceptions floating about in their minds, unrelated to
> their total conceptual map of experience. People simply have to fit
> their ideas together into a whole or suffer the corrosive effects of
> neurotic tensions.   Therefore, any new idea must be accommodated to
> the old, or the old must be modified to fit the new.[44]

The first difference between Nida's and Chomsky's philosophy is thus very

apparent: Nida's practical experience in introducing new ideas to a culture

remote from his own has underscored the importance. of including with his

theoretical framework the cultural context in which the communication

occurs, an aspect totally lacking in Chomsky's model. Although Nida supports

his arguments for such a model by referring to communication theory and

cybernetics, the inclusion of this particular component is more than

pragmatically motivated, but is also rooted in Nida's religious

presuppositions. Nida summarizes the essential aspects of a specifically

Protestant understanding of language in Message and Mission as follows:

> 1. *Verbal symbols are only "labels" and are of human origin* . The
> meaning of the account of Adam giving names to all the cattle, to the
> fowls of the air, and to every beast of the field (Gen. 2:20) is
> primarily that language is a human convention and that the words
> used are essentially labels.
> 2. *Verbal symbols, as labels for concepts, have priority over*

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[44]Nida, Message and Mission, 87.

> *visual symbols in the communication of truth* . While the pagans
> saw mystic objects, the Jews listened to the voice of God.
> Throughout Scripture there is the constant admonition against
> idolatrous visual images, but insistence on "Thus saith the Lord!"
>   3. *Language symbols reflect a meaningful relationship between
> symbol and behavior* . . . . The Bible is not concerned with the
> problem of Greek philosophy, which argued the relation of the word
> to the reality behind it, or with the difficulty of modern
> epistemology, which tries to relate the concept with the reality
> toward which it points. The focus of the Biblical revelation is
> the event. . . .
>   4. *Communication is power* . . . . On the divine level God speaks
> and it is done, and on the human plane, the king commands and his
> servants perform. . . .
>   5. *Divine revelation takes place in the form of a "dialogue."* The
> entire concept of the covenant of God with men is predicated upon a
> two-way communication . . . the divine-human conversation is
> eternal, for the end of man is for fellowship and communion with
> God . . .[45]

For both pragmatic and theological reasons Nida shows a strong interest in

the response of the person receiving the communication. According to Nida,

the Christian faith has behavioral rather than epistemological objectives,

and thus Nida's goal is to effect the appropriate response, one which will

start a dialogue not between the receiver and a text or symbols, but between

the receiver and God. Theoretically, then, he does not privilege the sign as

does Chomsky and many structural linguists, but the response to the sign. If

his translation can solicit the response God intends, then the translation is

successful. Words and symbols are mere labels, and the form of the message

is thus relegated to secondary status.

Theological considerations are edited out of Nida's next publication

Toward a Science of Translation, but I argue that they are implicit

throughout. As illustrated in the introduction to this chapter, in his history

of Bible translation, Nida favored "sense for sense" translations as opposed to

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[45]Ibid., 224-225.

strict adherence to the form, which, given his Protestant beliefs, should come as no surprise. According to Nida, technical accuracy and literal renderings of meaning may actually impede immediate understanding and solicit inappropriate action. In a chapter on the nature of meaning, we note again his emphasis on pragmatic and contextual aspects in addition to the syntactic and semantic. He writes:

> Pragmatics, in contrast to both semantics and syntactics, deals with the relation of symbols to behavior. This element of meaning is increasingly recognized as important, for in communication the effective meaning of any message is what gets through to the receptor. Hence, the reactions of people to symbols are fundamental to any analysis of meaning.[46]

Whereas Chomsky discounted the Sapir-Whorf approach to linguistics, which he felt was too culture-specific, Nida incorporates it within a larger model. Chomsky investigates the meaning inherent in the sign cut off from cultural context; Nida's primary concern is not with the meaning any sign carries with it, but with how the sign functions in any given society. Nida quotes Zellig Harris as saying, "The meaning of a linguistic form may best be defined as the range of situations in which that form occurs,"[47] to which Nida adds, "This type of functional definition of meaning not only provides a more useful tool with which to analyze meaning; but it also suggests the very process by which terms acquire meaning."[48] Nida claims that this

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[46]Nida, Toward a Science of Translating (Leiden: Brill, 1964), 35.

[47]Zellig Harris, Review of Louis H. Gray, Foundations of Language (New York: Macmillan, 1939), Language 16 (1940), 227. Qtd. by Nida, Toward a Science of Translating, 37.

[48]Ibid.

"functional definition of meaning" marks an advance over traditional mentalistic and imagistic definitions of meaning which have been characteristic of traditional philosophic investigations. If one accepts Chomsky's own characterization of his science as mentalistic, by extension, Nida's pragmatic interests appears to be at least a deviation from more traditional notions of deep structure.

Although it may appear that Nida's concept of meaning is substantially different from Chomsky's, Nida's pragmatics are not differentiated from Chomsky's concept of deep structure, but merely added to it. The pragmatic aspect of meaning is factored into the structure not at the surface level, but at the base, with the result that Nida's base has a dual nature--a core of syntactic structures and of universal human experience. In order to accomplish this difficult maneuver, Nida must necessarily expand the nature of the core of his theory in order to include a "universal" experience of receiving the message. To include a reception component in the base component, Nida redefines the original message now as the "function of the message." Nida argues that the deep structure of the language--composed of the sign in context--can be inferred via study of the language and culture and the exegesis of these signs over the years. Only then can the appropriate response to that structure be determined and universalized. Nida builds his theory on the premise that not only can the message of the original text be determined, but also that the message can be so translated that the reception of that message will be the *same as that perceived by the original receptors.* In addition, since the source is clearly unitary--being God--the intention of the communication can also be counted upon as being stable. Nida's theory

emphasizes not formal correspondence, but functional equivalence; not literal meaning but dynamic equivalence; not "what" language communicates, but "how" it communicates. His definition of dynamic equivalence reveals his tendency to universalize the original message as well as the original response. Nida writes:

> **dynamic equivalence:** quality of a translation in which the message of the original text has been so transported into the receptor language that the response of the receptor is essentially like that of the original receptors. Frequently, the form of the original text is changed; but as long as the change follows the rules of back transformation in the source language, of contextual consistency in the transfer, and of transformation in the receptor language, the message is preserved and the translation is faithful.[49]

Nida's theory has been perceived as being progressive because it factors in the context of the message, but we see here it is no less abstract than Chomsky's. "The message in context" or the "message and its reception" is pulled out of history, understood as unified and an essence of itself, and made into timeless concept. The translated text, according to Nida, should produce the same effect on the reader in today's culture as did the original text; if it does not, he suggests making changes in the text in order to solicit that initial response. Such a theory is less derived from scientific principles and is more an outgrowth of the nature of his religious inclinations. The implicit assumption present but elided from his science is strikingly similar to the Protestant credence that communication is power, and translation thus, for Nida, becomes the rearticulation of the power of the work (over people). Contemporary translations are always compared to a timeless *a*

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[49]Eugene A. Nida and Charles Taber, _The Theory and Practice of Translation_ (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1969), 202.

priori model in which meaning and response have been completely
identified by the translator, or to be more precise, by the theologian. They
are then pulled out of history, translated to a new context, and made to work
in the <u>same manner</u>. The surface manifestation does not really matter to
Nida; changes in the text, the words, the metaphors are allowed as long as the
second language text functions in the same manner.

Once Nida has redefined meaning in terms of its function and has
abstracted the concept to the point it can assume universal structural status,
the appropriation of Chomsky's model with its concept of innate structures of
the mind, its "generative" rules of transformation, and its reduction of
surface signs to superficial status, follow quite naturally. With the added
authority Chomsky's linguistic model lends to his project, Nida can now
suggest that his missionary work has yielded to an objective "scientific"
analysis of the problem of translation. He goes on to list some of the
universals he has been able to determine by back-transforming, including:
"all languages appear to have something equivalent to subject-predicate
constructions"; "all languages appear to distinguish in some formal ways
between nouns and verbs"; "objects tend to be expressed primarily by nouns
and events by verb"; "all languages also have ways of indicating the
abstractions of objects and events."[50]   After cataloguing these similarities,
Nida concludes:

> It may be said, therefore, that in comparison with the
> theoretical possibilities for diversities of structures languages show
> certain amazing similarities, including especially (1) remarkably
> similar kernel structures from which all other structures are

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[50]Ibid., 67-68.

> developed by permutations, replacements, additions, and deletions, and (2) on their simplest structural levels a high degree of parallelism between formal classes of words (e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc.) and the basic function classes in transforms: objects, events, abstracts, and relationals.[51]

Thus, although Nida's interest and goals differ widely from Chomsky, the two reach the same conclusion about the nature of language, positing the existence of a deep structure which underlies "all other structures." The terminology is much the same with the use of "kernels" and "transforms." Although Nida is not quite ready to make Chomsky's claim that these kernel structures are universal, given the terminology he uses at their discovery, i.e., "remarkable" and "amazing," Nida seems to accord them supernatural status within his "scientific" approach.

There are significant differences between Chomsky's and Nida's theories, however, which tend to illustrate that Nida's model is a simplified version of Chomsky's, to a large degree misappropriated in order to apply it to translation. At the heart of Nida's theory is a system of "kernel constructions" from which everything else is derived. He argues:

> The kernel constructions in any language are the minimal number of structures from which the rest can be most efficiently and relevantly derived. . . .there appear to be many more parallelisms between kernel structures than between the more elaborated transforms. In fact, the remarkable similarities between the basic structures of different languages are increasingly becoming the object of study by linguists.[52]

The concept of kernel sentences is one advocated by Harris and adopted by Chomsky in early models of his generative transformational grammar, but a concept which is rapidly disappearing by the time Aspects appeared, a

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[51]Ibid., 68.

[52]Ibid., 66.

concept that Chomsky feels is misleading at best and does not play an important role in his theory. He writes:

> Among the sentences with a single base Phrase-marker as basis, we can delimit a proper subset called "kernel sentences." These are sentences of a particularly simple sort that involve a minimum of transformational apparatus in their generation. The notion"kernel sentence" has, I think, an important intuitive significance, but since kernel sentences play no distinctive role in generation or interpretation of sentences, I shall say nothing more about them here.[53]

Nida seems to conflate the concept of kernel sentences with the base component composed of phrase structures, and one is never clear exactly what he means by such references. Chomsky's base component allowed for an infinite diversity of surface manifestations, a concept he held fundamental to the creativity revealed by the speaking subject.

Methodologically, differences between the two theories are also apparent. Nida prefers to work backwards from the surface of the original text to its deep structure, transfer that deep structure to the deep structure of the new language, and then generate a surface structure in the second language. In other words, he posits a decoding and recoding process in which the original message never changes. Nida summarizes his translation methodology as follows:

> It is both scientifically and practically more efficient (1) to reduce the source text to its structurally simplest and most semantically evident kernels, (2) to transfer the meaning from source language to receptor language on a structurally simple level, and (3) to generate the stylistically and semantically equivalent expression in the receptor language.[54]

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[53]Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, 17-18.

[54]Ibid.

Working backwards and reducing texts to simple structural sentences most evident kernels are not Chomskian procedures, and again suggest a misappropriation of Chomsky's model. Chomsky's structures are hardly simple or evident. Using such a concept "back-transforming" reveal universals of syntax and semantics also raises questions about Nida's concept of transformational rules in general. Although Chomsky does suggest that transformational rules are non-linear, to extrapolate a decoding-recoding process does misrepresent his theory. Nida, like other practicing translators, decodes and recodes, and often proves his work by translating into a second language and then back into the first language,[55] but to argue that such a methodology derives from Chomsky, or rephrasing such a practice with Chomskian terminology, distorts a theory of transformational grammar.

Indeed, that which Chomsky had cautioned against, i.e., deriving a procedure based upon the existence of deep structure universal grammar from which one generates in different language corresponding texts, has been realized.[56] Chomsky's base component and Phrase-Structure rules composed his generative grammar; deep structure did not. Nida's theory

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[55]Nida, Toward a Science of Translating, 66-69. See also Wolfram Wilss, The Science of Translation (Tübingen: Günter Narr, 1982), 140-144. In contrast to using back translation as means of defining correctness, James Holmes documents the impossibility of obtaining consensus, structural or otherwise via back-translation in "On Matching and Making Maps: From a Translator's Notebook," Delta 16, No. 4 (1974), 68.

[56]Chomsky's universal forms are clearly at a much deeper, more abstract (and less understood) level than Nida's kernels; also, certainly at the time Chomsky was writing, the rules of transformation were so tentative that no real translation procedure other than point by point comparison of limited fields existed. Yet the "logic" of the two models are so similar that Nida's invoking Chomsky to substantiate his science seems only natural.

moves simplistically back and forth from a deep to surface structure with seemingly little awareness of what Chomsky meant by generative grammar. Nida's "scientific" theory clearly assumes some sort of original meaning and reduces the formal aspects of any text to almost irrelevant status. It presumes that the meaning of a text can be deduced, that it can be "transferred," and that it can be recoded more or less in tact.

How, according to Nida, then is meaning to be determined, if not by accepted linguistic methods? In a section called "Basic Requirements of the Translator" Nida writes:

> The translator must understand not only the obvious content of the message, but also the subtleties of meaning, the significant emotive values of words and the stylistic features which determine the 'flavor and feel' of the message. . . . In other words, in addition to a knowledge of the two or more languages involved in the translational process, the translator must have a thorough acquaintance with the subject matter concerned."[57]

Nida argues that one may know a language fluently, but still may not know enough about a particular subject in order to translate. For example, he says that one may not know enough about nuclear physics or organic chemistry to understand the message. Again, Nida's religious beliefs tend to be very instrumental in the formulation of his scientific approach. Indeed, he seems to be conflating the translator's role with that of the missionary. In one example in which he draws on his experience in Bible translation, Nida writes:

> In many instances of Bible translating, for example, the missionary restricts himself primarily to the tasks of: (1) explaining carefully what the text means; (2) indicating something of the type of communication involved . . . (3) writing down what his helpers

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[57]Nida, Toward a Science of Translating, 150.

suggest as appropriate ways of rendering such passages; and (4) bringing to the attention of his helpers certain obvious semantic and grammatical problems. In this process, the translator is a kind of resource person who, though he may suggest possible ways of rendering the message in the receptor language, relies upon his informants for the actual form of the translation.[58]

The translator is identified as the missionary, one who able to decode the text to arrive at the original word and then is able to reformulate that message, explaining the idea to the uninitiated. In fact, the difference between exegesis and translation is beginning to disappear in Nida's theory, as how that message is rendered and what remains of the original formulation seem to be less important than the explanation itself.

In addition to enjoying complete knowledge of the source, Nida requires that the translator have the same "empathetic" spirit of the author. He writes, "the translator must have the gift of mimicry, the capacity to act the author's part, impersonating his demeanor, speech, and ways, with the utmost verisimilitude."[59] Nida goes on to argue that the translator should admire the author, have the same cultural background, the same talent (not more or less) and present the same joy to the reader that is given by the original. Nida's "empathetic spirit" approaches total devotion to and dependence upon the original author's intent. For Nida, unless these requirements are fulfilled, the translator will miss the original message as well as how that message functions. The problem with such a requirement is one literary critics refer to as the intentional fallacy: what a work says and what the author intended it to say are two different things. Such empathy as

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[58]Ibid., 153.

[59]Ibid., 151.

Nida seems to favor in fact may serve to obscure that which is being translated. Nida's theory of translation seems less scientific motivated and more a positive reaffirmation of the work, continually evaluating as it goes. Translation is equated with revelation, making visible that original message which now takes on archetypal status.

I suggest that the relationship between an author and the work is complex and potentially deceptive, the reduction of a work to "simple structures" invariably distorting, and the transfer of those simple structures from one deep structure to another--across languages and across time-- probably impossible. Even in Nida's simplified theory, he does not tell us how the deep structure transfer occurs. Given the emphasis "empathy of spirit" receives in the model, intuition must somewhere enter the equation. Certainly faith, devotion, absolute trust become the major theoretical vehicles. In fact, Nida does not give us a general theory of translation; instead he suggests that we trust the theologian and pray that God will provide the answer. I suggest that the center, the deep structure, the text's meaning, may always be absent. The text, as dense as it may be, and the exegesis, as lucid as it may be, are never complete. There will always be gaps, room for differing interpretation, and variable reception. Therein lies the energy of the text. Nida would deny this as a matter of faith, positing instead the opposite viewpoint, i.e., that the original message can be determined and does not change. However, because he is working with words, even in this case the Word of God, and because of the very fact that he is working with language, there will always be present metaphoric indeterminacy and historical change. No text ever explicates its own reception. Nida's

translation theory wants to decipher the text and prepare it for consumption. He wants to explain it rather than describe it, just as Chomsky's theory wants to explain linguistic structures in addition to describing them. Nida does not trust readers to decode texts for themselves, thus he posits an omnipotent reader, preferably the ideal missionary/translator, who will do the work for the reader. His goal, even with the Bible, is to dispel the mystery, solve the ambiguities, and reduce the complexities for simple consumption. Nowhere is Nida's goal more apparent than when he discusses his principles of correspondence, which he calls formal equivalence (F-E) and dynamic equivalence (D-E). Nida's definition of formal equivalence:

> Formal equivalence focuses attention on the message itself, in both form and content. In such a translation one is concerned with such correspondences as poetry to poetry, sentence to sentence, and concept to concept. Viewed from this formal orientation, one is concerned that the message in the receptor language should match as closely as possible the different elements in the source language.[60]

Juxtaposed to formal equivalence, Nida posits at the heart of his translation methodology the concept of "dynamic equivalence," which is based, as I stated earlier, upon the principle of "equivalent effect." Of dynamic translation Nida writes:

> In such a translation one is not so concerned with matching the receptor-language message with the source-language message, but with the dynamic relationship, that the relationship between receptor and message should be substantially the same as that which existed between the original receptors and the message.[61]

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[60]Ibid., 159.

[61]Ibid.

In order to prove his claim, Nida offers a couple of examples aimed at demonstrating the superiority of dynamic over formal, one of which compares several translations of II Corinthians 3:10-11. The texts cited include the Greek, the American Standard Version (1901), the Revised Standard Version (1946), the New English Bible (1961) and Phillips Modern English (1958). The analysis claims to be merely statistical, and I reproduce some of the code below. Adjustments made by the translators are indicated by asterisks (word deleted), *italics* (word added), CAPITALS (word changed grammatically), and parentheses (word split or made dependent). The texts:

Greek:

> Kai gar ou dedoxastai to dedoxasmenon en touto to merei
> eineken eineken tes huperballouses doxes. ei gar to
> katargounemon dia doxes, pollo mallon to nemon en doxe.

American Standard Version:

> For verily that which hath been made glorious ( ) hath not been made glorious in this respect, by reason of the glory THAT SURPASSETH. For if that which passeth away *was* with glory, much more that which remaineth *is* in glory.

Revised Standard Version:

> Indeed in this case, WHAT *once* HAD SPLENDOR ( ) HAS COME TO HAVE NO SPLENDOR *at all* . BECAUSE OF the splendor THAT SURPASSES *it* . For if WHAT faded away CAME with splendor, WHAT IS PERMANENT *must* HAVE much more splendor.

New English Bible:

> Indeed, * THE SPLENDOR THAT *once* ( ) WAS IS *now* NO SPLENDOR *at all*. * * *; * *it* IS OUTSHONE BY A splendour ( ) GREATER STILL. For if that which ( ) WAS *soon* TO fade ( ) HAD ----- *its moment* OF splendour, *how* much GREATER *is* THE SPLENDOUR OF that which ENDURES.

Phillips Modern English:

> AND *while it is* TRUE *that* THE ( ) ( ) FORMER *temporary* GLORY

HAS BEEN *completely* ECLIPSED BY THE LATTER, * * * *, * * *we do
well to remember that* IT IS ECLIPSED *simply because* THE
PRESENT PERMANENT PLAN IS *such a very* much more GLORIOUS
THING *than the old* .[62]

We note that the American Standard Version made only three changes from

the Greek, whereas the Phillips Modern English text made over 50 changes.

Yet Nida clearly prefers the J.B. Phillips' rendering despite the fact that little

or nothing remains from the Greek version.   Nida's theory supports those

translations which aim at creating the same response as the original, and the

Phillips translation clearly aims at that: "One of the modern English

translations which, more than any other, seeks for equivalent effect is J.B.

Phillips' rendering of the New Testament."[63]   Yet questions remain.   Was

clarity the intention of the original author?   Did the Greek readers come to as

immediate an understanding as the Phillips readers?   Does the Phillips relate

the complexity and ambiguity of the Greek?   Such a statistical analysis

refrains from being evaluative, but despite Nida's attempts to remain

objective he is aware of how he himself has evaluated the evidence: "In this

preceding analysis of F-E and D-E translations we have been measuring only

the degree of formal differences and have not attempted any evaluation,

even though it may have appeared from the description that the greater the

number of D-E characteristics the better the translation."[64]   What Nida

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[62]Ibid., 189-190.   Nida's quotations also number each word consecutively
in order to better follow changes in word order.

[63]Ibid., 160.

[64]Ibid., 191.

wants to argue is that dynamic translations are _more_ faithful than formal translations.

One of the goals in _Toward a Science of Translating_ is to redefine the principles which have been used to govern and judge the accuracy of translation. Traditionally, "faithful" has been reserved for literal versions, ones which tend to privilege form, and "free" has been used to designate those translations which privileged content. Nida prefers the the latter, and has ironically reversed the historical use of the term "faithful," which he has now applies to his dynamic approach. He argues that formal translators are more apt to make mistakes misinterpreting the "intent of the author," more likely to select a "less than appropriate interpretation out of several possible renderings," and more apt to "distort the message."[65]   In the course of the argument outlining his preference for dynamic equivalence, a reversal in terminology has taken place.   His chapter on principles of correspondence concludes as follows:

> In practice F-E translations tend to distort the message more than D-E translations, since those persons who produce D-E translations are in general more adept in translating, and in order to produce D-E renderings they must perceive more fully and satisfactorily the meaning of the original text. For the most part a translator who produces D-E renderings is quite aware of the degree of distortion, and because of greater conscious control of his work is able to judge more satisfactorily whether or not the results seem to be legitimate. On the other hand, a translator who produces strictly F-E renderings is usually not conscious of the extent to which his seemingly "faithful" translations actually involve serious distortions.[66]

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[65]Ibid., 191-192.

[66]Ibid., 192.

Other than the appropriation of the term "faithful" for his own use, I do not see a large difference between his definitions of "formal" and "dynamic" and the terms that have traditionally governed the field.[67] Nida feels that the dynamic translator is able to do more than the literal translator by somehow leaving meaning intact while surreptitiously importing explanation through additions, elisions and transformations. Above we saw how Frederic Will at least saw the paradox involved in translation and confronted the "faithful traitor" problem with new insight; Nida does not see the paradox, and wishes to claim one methodology is better than the other, perpetuating the same old faithful/free problem which Steiner feels is characteristic of all pre-structuralist translation theory. Nida's prescriptive translation theory, while intended to elucidate the original message and response, invariably results in a distortion of the very sense he claims to wish to preserve, as his translation as exegesis obscures the original text to such a degree that it becomes unavailable to the contemporary reader.

The above passage not only reveals Nida's attempt to redefine the terminology and his prescription for proper translation, it also reveals his theoretical priorities. We see that he presumes some underlying "meaning of the original text" which is accessible. Because of the importance of retaining this meaning, the form the message takes becomes expendable, reducing the surface manifestation of the message to secondary status. Chomsky's theory, because it stresses the revelation of the deep underlying

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[67]See also Maria Tymoczko, "How Distinct are Formal and Dynamic Equivalence?" The Manipulation of Literature: Studies in Literary Translation, ed. Theo Hermans (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), 63-86.

structure of the surface structure, is similarly constructed. Both Nida's and Chomsky's theories are self-reflective. Chomsky's deep structure is derived from the surface, thus it has to reflect that which he hypothetically says it has to reflect. If the surface structure cannot be explained with reference to the deep structure and phrase structure rules, the fault lies in the inadequacy of the linguist to explain the grammar, not with the generative component. Nida's theory presumes an inviolable concept of original meaning and depends upon Biblical exegesis; thus, the surface structure of the translation will always be shaped to reflect that message. If the translation does not explain the primal word, the fault lies not with the theory but with the translator, for the message never changes. Nida's test for evaluating the translation is how well it communicates and whether it evokes the same response in today's culture as in the original culture. Presumably an expert exists who is able to pass that judgement, yet the question remains as to who that individual might be. For a science to be scientific, there must be some sort of objective criteria for judgement. In fact, none of the criteria outlined by Nida are testable or reproducible in any sense associated with scientific experimentation in the natural sciences.

In fact, Nida's evaluation standards are derived less by translators and more by successful missionaries. One strategy Protestant missionaries tend to find successful is finding a common ground to serve as a conceptual basis in order to effect communication. As we saw above in his summary of Protestant beliefs in Message and Mission, Nida believes that words are essentially labels; if they need to be changed or replaced in order to effect communication, then they should be adjusted accordingly. Verbal symbols

are only labels of human origin, and the "message" is from a higher source. Texts are equally pliable, adapting themselves to multiple forms without altering the original intention. Nida would translate "lamb" into "orangutan" if he felt the latter would evoke the same response as the original. I am not being facetious; "lamb" has been translated into "seal" and "pig" and many other "forms" or "labels" in order to spread the word of God. Missionary work depends upon establishing a point of contact, any point of contact, and building from there. The assumption that this higher, originary message not only exists, but that it is eternal and precedes language is always already presupposed by Nida, and it affects his science. He "knows" the message from this higher source, and knows how people are supposed to respond. He doesn't trust the people to make up their own minds when they read; in order to achieve the intended response, he has licence to change, streamline, and simplify. All potential differences--ambiguities, mysteries, Freudian slips--are elided to affect a unified response that transcends history. This methodology may be very useful for those translating propaganda or advertising, and it seems to work well with religion, but its limitations within the framework of a science of translating are obvious. Nida provides an excellent model for translation which involves a manipulation of text to serve the interests of a religious belief, but fails to answer the question with which we began: "Is the translator free to express the sense of the original in any style and idiom he chooses?"

The Science of Translation in West Germany

Although most influential in terms of Bible translating, Nida's work in

translation also enjoys surprising academic influence in the fields of linguistics and translation outside a Biblical context. Nida's authority rests on definitive articles on the science of translation in Current Trends in Linguistics, Language, as well as The Bible Translator.[68] His procedures and principles dominate the methods governing the Summer Institute of Linguistics, which publishes two journals, Notes on Translation and Notes on Linguistics. At least two textbooks exist which almost exclusively reflect his science--Nida's own The Theory and Practice of Translation, co-authored with Charles R. Taber, and Meaning-Based Translation by Mildred L. Larson-- both intended for use in translation courses at the university level. With Nida's leadership, Bible translating, which already enjoyed much influence on the practice of translation, has reached a level of theoretical importance at the highest level perhaps in its history.

Yet the most detailed application of Nida's theory has not occurred in England or America, but in West Germany, where the science of translation [Überstezungswissenschaft] predominates in the teaching of translation in the translation branch of the Applied Linguistics Department at the

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[68]See Eugene A. Nida, "Science of Translation," Language 47 (1969), 483-498; "Formal Correspondence in Translation," The Bible Translator 21 (1970), 105-113; "Translation" in Current Trends in Linguistics 12, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), 1045-1068; "Semantic Structure Translating," The Bible Translator 26 (1) (1975), "A Framework for the Analysis and Evaluation of Translation," Translation: Applications and Research, ed. Richard W. Brislin (New York: Gardner, 1976), 120-132; "Translation Principles and Procedures," The Bible Translator 33 (1982), 208-213; and "Translating Means Translating Meaning," Proceedings from the X. Weltkongress der FIT: Der Übersetzer und seine Stellung in der Öffentlichkeit, ed. Hildegund Bühler (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1985), 119-125.

University of Saarland, Saarbrücken, where Germany trains its future translators and interpreters. I can best illustrate Nida's influence by analyzing the work Wolfram Wilss, who teaches at Saarland, and whose text, The Science of Translation, perhaps best articulates its theory and practice.[69] Wilss' science is still in very tentative form--documenting its research with very few examples, with examples being drawn from only two languages (English-German), containing many unresolved contradictions, and lacking evaluative standards. Yet enough work has been accomplished in terms of linguistic analysis of specific pair-bound examples--both sentence and text oriented--for Wilss to make fairly large generalizations about appropriate methodological and philosophic approaches for a science of translation. I will focus on his theoretical presuppositions, both explicit and implicit, and show how these largely reflect premises similar to those of Chomsky and Nida, and then examine his understanding of translation equivalence, which despite claims of being descriptive, also reflects a tendency to universalize.

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[69]See Wolfram Wilss, The Science of Translation: Problems and Methods (Tübingen: Günter Narr, 1982), which is a translation, primarily by Wilss himself, and updated version of his Übersetzungswissenschaft. Probleme und Methoden (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1977). See also Wolfgang U. Dressler, "Der Beitrag der Textlinguistic zur Übersetzungswissenschaft" in Übersetzer und Dolmetscher, ed. Volker Knapp (Heidelberg: Quelle und Mayer, 1974), 61-71; Wolfgang U. Dressler, ed., Current Trends in Textlinguistics (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1978); Wolfram Wilss, "Textanalyse und Übersetzen," Imago Linguae. Beiträge zu Sprache. Deutung und Übersetzen, ed. Karl-Heinz Bender, Klaus Berger, Mario Wandruszka (München: Fink, 1977), 625-651; Werner Koller, Einführung in die Übersetzungwissenschaft (Heidelberg: Quelle und Mayer, 1979); Wolfram Wilss and Gisela Thome, ed., Aspekte der theoretischen, sprachenpaarbezogenen und angewandten Sprachwissenschaft, Proceedings from the Saarbrücken Conferences on Translation in 1972 and 1973, two volumes (Heidelberg: Groos, 1974, 1975); Lillebill Grähs, Gustav Korlen and Bertil Malmberg, eds., Theory and Practice of Translation, (Bern: Lang, 1978).

Before assessing the theoretical assumptions of his approach to translation, a brief description of the scope of the project as a whole is in order. Wilss' science of translation is divided into three related but separate branches of research: (1) a description of a "general science" of translation which involves translation theory; (2) "descriptive studies" of translation relating empirical phenomena of translation equivalence; and (3) "applied research" in translation pointing out particular translation difficulties and ways of solving specific problems. "General science" (1) is heavily weighted toward text-linguistic premises which categorize texts both thematically and functionally. Translators must have what Wilss terms text-analytical competence; texts types themselves are classified as "more translation oriented" or "less translation oriented." "Descriptive studies" (2) tend to focus on "text-pragmatic equivalence" or examples which evoke the same set of ideas and concepts. Wilss' method involves both intralingual translation--paraphrasing the meaning of original--and interlingual translation--transferring that meaning to second language--and places a great deal of emphasis on the psychological response. "Applied research" (3) offers practical insights on particular translation difficulties and attempts to resolve them by a sort of means-to-an-end approach. In addition, this branch of the program tries to develop a frame of reference for analyzing errors, and attempts to provide an explanative and evaluative structure for assessing quality, or at least acceptable variants. Of the three branches of Wilss' project, applied research is the least defined and raises the most questions; he admits that his "science" has yet to recognize many translation difficulties, and it also has problems in terms of finding an objective

evaluative framework.   More developed are the theoretical and

methodological branches, which I will now proceed to examine more closely.

Wilss begins his text by announcing not the stagnation of empiricism

and behaviorism as the beginning of modern linguistics, but the breaking of

the chains of Chomsky's generative grammar.   The Science of Translation

opens with:

> Modern linguistics is regarded as a primarily communicative
> discipline; this development can be traced to the time it began to
> break the stranglehold of the generativists.[70]

Wilss' project thus reacts against two dominating linguistic theories, that of

descriptive linguistics and that of generative grammar, despite the fact that

the two have very different theoretical foundations.   How does this occur?

The rejection of linguistic approaches that merely describe specific

languages and show little interest in translation is easy to understand.   He

writes:

> Taxonomic structuralism, for example, aims at completely grasping
> the surface structure system of an individual language . . . and in
> this way arriving at a scientifically precise, empirically verifiable
> formal approach to language. . . . there is hardly any place for the
> examination of the problems relevant for the science of
> translation.[71]

His reasons for opposing generative grammar, however, are slightly less

clear.   Wilss argues that the same problem is true for generative

transformational grammar as for structural linguistics:

> The foregoing remarks also apply, in principle, to GTG [generative
> transformational grammar] . . . using the methodological tools
> available to a scientistic science, this discipline seeks to produce

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[70]Wilss, The Science of Translation: Problems and Methods, 11.

[71]Ibid., 67.

a mathematically explicit depiction of the mental processes which allows for empirical verification and confirmation.[72]

In a fairly extended critique of generative transformational grammar, Wilss outlines his objections: that it is syntax dominated, that it does not include psycholinguistics, that it studies only individual language systems, that it provides no interlingual language model, that it ignores reception problems and that it ignores the function of the message in its original context.[73] Wilss sees Chomsky in the same camp as the structuralists and empiricists because he does not see the very idealist, Platonic roots of Chomsky's theory. Wilss at one point argues that Chomsky's linguistic theory is governed by "quasi-cybernetic automatic control system" and that "the generative component in Noam Chomsky's linguistic theory . . . is ultimately mechanistic, not mentalistic."[74] Chomsky has been attacked by so many linguists in terms of his lack of semantic and pragmatic components in the theory, that Wilss, because he analyzes textual units in addition to sentence structures, does not seem to realize that he is adopting a similar deep-structure/surface-structure framework with an equally similar theoretical rationale.

Wilss chooses, ironically, to invoke the "mentalistic" paradigm for his own "science." He writes that the science of translation is not a sealed, "nomological" science, but a "cognitive/hermeneutic/associative" one. Thus it need satisfy only "to a limited degree" the demands for objectivity and

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[72]Ibid.

[73]Ibid., 68-70.

[74]Ibid., 15.

"value-free procedural methods" that characterize the research methodology of the natural sciences. This frees Wilss to find historical precedence for his approach in those pre-structuralist language theories that are based upon a humanistic/idealist concept of understanding, to adopt the competence/performance distinctions as outlined by Chomsky, and to accept Nida's modification of competence to include a contextual component. Translation for Wilss is guaranteed by the deep-structure existence of universals--syntactic and semantic universal forms as well as a core of common experience--and his science becomes a simple matter of creating syntactic, semantic and reception equivalents. Wilss' "science" is much closer to Chomsky's than even he might care to admit:

> The translatability of a text is thus guaranteed by the existence of universal categories in syntax, semantics, and the (natural) logic of experience. Should a translation nevertheless fail to measure up to the original in terms of quality, the reason will (normally) be not an insufficiency of syntactic and lexical inventories in that particular TL [target language], but rather the limited ability of the translator.[75]

Thus, with the proper training at his institute, students can learn to expand their inventories of proper equivalents, sharpen their hermeneutic intuition, and produce quality translations. Wilss' didactic position reminds us of I.A. Richards' workshop project since both involve teaching students the proper interpretation of texts.

An examination of Wilss' history of translation theory provides a framework in which to understand his presuppositions better. Wilss moves very quickly through the Romans and Greeks, Cicereo, Jerome, and Luther,

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[75]Ibid., 49.

summarizing each theory in less than a paragraph. He then provides a detailed analysis of two German theorists: Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humbolt. In his analysis of Schleiermacher's "On the Various Methods of Translating" ["*Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersezens*"] which Schleiermacher presented to the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin in 1813, Wilss gleans the following:

1. Schleiermacher was the "first" to distinguish between translating (art and science) and interpreting (business), and in doing so was the first to use the term 'the science of translation.'
2. Schleiermacher set qualitative standards, distinguishing between "true" translation (again, art and science) and "mechanical" translation (pragmatic texts).
3. Schliermacher saw man in a dual relationship between linguistic freedom (independent thinking) and linguistic dependence (thinking limited by boundaries of language).
4. Schleiermacher posits the hermeneutic possibility of transporting the author into the world of the receiving culture and "changes him into one of their own."[76]

Schleiermacher becomes important for Wilss' science because he makes a qualitative distinction between "true" and "mechanical" translation, legitimating the need for a science which can translate art, and necessitating a translator who is capable of the hermeneutic leap to the primary message and the "proper" (Schleiermacher's term) translation of the meaning. Wilss' didactic project reinforces the linguistic distinction in German which English does not make: the difference between translation [*Übersetzen*] and interpretation [*Dolmetschen*]. Only recently, at the instigation of the East Germans, has the term "translation" been introduced to cover both the act of translating and of interpreting.

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[76]Ibid., 31-33.

Having dismissed Voss, Tieck, August Wilhelm Schlegel, Wieland and Goethe as mere practical translators, Wilss next emphasizes Humboldt's contribution to translation theory. Unlike Chomsky's reading, Wilss is aware of contradictions in Humboldt's arguments regarding translation. Humboldt did not believe in the *a priori* existence of universal conceptual systems that transgress the boundaries of individual languages. For example, Wilss quotes Humboldt as saying, "A language is the outward manifestation of the spirit of people so to speak; their language is their spirit, and their spirit is their language, you cannot go too far in thinking of the two as identical."[77] Wilss also is aware that such thinking would deny the possibility of ever finding a functional equivalent, the cornerstone of both Nida's and his own science. He quotes a letter from Humboldt to A.W. Schlegel in which the finding of any common ground is ruled out:

> All translation seems to me to be simply an attempt to solve an impossible task. Every translator . . . will either stay too close to the original . . . or adhere too closely to characteristics peculiar to his nation. The medium (i.e. a middle course; Wilss' note) between the two is not only difficult, but downright impossible.[78]

Yet despite Humboldt's view that languages are essentially dissimilar and translation impossible, Wilss twice finds him positing universals:

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[77]Wilhelm von Humboldt, Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts, ed. H. Nette (Darmstadt, 1949), 60 ff. Quoted by Wilss, The Science of Translation, 34-35. See also Wilhelm von Humboldt, On Language: The Diversity of Human-language Structure and its Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind, trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[78]Letter written to A.W. Schlegel, July 23, 1796. Quoted by Wilss, The Science of Translation, 35.

> It is not being too bold to assert that in any [language], even the
> languages of very primitive peoples insufficiently known to us,
> everything--what is highest and what is lowest, what is strongest
> and what is most tender--can be expressed.[79]

> The natural predisposition to language is a universal one and that
> *all* [languages] must hold within them *the key* to understanding
> all languages.[80]

Wilss excitedly concludes that translation is possible because the

hermeneutic process gives us access to these universals and the generative

potential of the universals enables language to transcend specific social and

cultural boundaries.   His conclusion reads:

> What von Humboldt is trying to say here, in an almost rhapsodic
> way, can only be that translation, in spite of all structural differences
> among individual languages, is, after all, ultimately possible.   This
> is because it is a hermeneutic process and because, in the last
> analysis, all languages, even the so-called primitive ones, possess a
> comparable potential for expression capable of multidimensional
> development; the "generative" reserves of this potential are so great
> as to enable a speech community to adequately cover any and all
> extralinguistic states of affairs, including those beyond the scope of
> their own sociocultural experience.[81]

Thus Wilss sees a simultaneous, dual argument rather than a contradiction,

concluding that   both positions are true, i.e., that universals exist at a deeper

level, while surface structures are mutually exclusive.   He argues that a

relationship exists--core structures have the capacity to generate surface

structures--between the two.   Instead of breaking the chains of Chomsky's

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[79]Wilhelm von Humboldt, "Einleitung zu Agamemnon," quoted by Hans Joachim Störig, *Das Problem des Übersetzens* (Stuttgart: H. Goverts, 1963), 82. Quoted by Wilss, *The Science of Translation*, 36.

[80]Quoted by Rolf Klöpfer, *Die Theorie der literarischen Übersetzung, Romanisch-deutscher Sprachbereich* (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1967), 55. Quoted by Wilss, *The Science of Translation*, 36.

[81]Ibid., 36.

generative grammar, Wilss actually adopts Chomsky's distinction between competence and performance and of deep structure and surface structure, as substantiated by nineteenth-century German philosophy.

Wilss' translation theory is thus rooted in German idealism and is based upon the following: (1) the concept of a universal language, consisting of universal forms and a core of shared experience; (2) a belief that deep structure transfer is possible via a hermeneutic process; (3) a generative component, which translates intralingually from the base to the surface of a given language; and (4) a qualitative ranking of texts, from a high level incorporating art and science texts to a low level including business and pragmatic texts. Wilss' research methodology is based upon reducing the original text to its thematic content and its text type via an "intralingual" back transformation. By paraphrasing meanings, Wilss eliminates differences, specific word plays, and implications of texts as they occur in history; rather, texts are classified archetypically and ahistorically. The research branch of his science clearly reveals such a methodology:

> Translation research must develop a frame of reference which views
> a text as a communicatively-oriented configuration with a thematic,
> a functional, a text-pragmatic dimension; these three text
> dimensions can be derived from the respective surface structure.[82]

Texts are thus categorized according to idealized types and complex relations reduced to "empirically" derived formulas classifying texts according to universal genres and themes.[83] These themes are then repackaged in a

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[82]Ibid., 116.

[83] For the distinction between "text-linguistics" which is what Wilss is practicing, and "text theory" which classifies texts according to their cognitive function, not originary genre or theme, see Dieter Stein,

different language and context, but are designed to produce the same effect as the original. Wilss' theory falls prey to what literary critics refer to as the empirical fallacy: the "empirically" derived categories are never seen: they exist only as some ideal construct in someone's imagination, just as Chomsky's competence is never revealed, only derived. The system is designed to identify and describe finished products, and prepare that product for consumption in a different time and place. Such universalizing approaches tend to omit the things that do not fit into categories, to omit contradictions, and to erase ironies and distancing devices, which are also always part of every text. In addition, not surprisingly, Wilss ends his history with the optimistic pronouncement that "everything can be expressed in every language" and that this view is "widespread in modern linguistics."[84] Unfortunately, that which has been reduced and repressed in order to accomplish this total success may inform the text as much as its thematized content.

An examination of some of those "modern" linguists whom Wilss argues hold the above widespread view reveals that they are not post-Chomsky at all, but very much pre-structuralist theorists. Wilss reacts against the Sapir-Whorf school of thought which denies the *a priori* existence of universal categories of thought and thus has a skeptical view of the possibility that two languages would share a common core of experience. To dismiss this line of reasoning, Wilss first invokes Chomsky and then F. H.

Theoretische Grundlagen der Übersetzungswissenschaft (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1980).

[84]Ibid., 48.

Lenneberg, whose 1967 work posited biological universals in language. Wilss

suggests that Chomsky/Lenneberg view of language universals "proceeds

from the hypothesis, *undisputed to date,* that there are semantic and

syntactic universals, including universal pragmatics; this holds true in

many if not all natural languages."[85] Wilss next cites E. Koschmieder, who

argued in 1965 that what is signified does not necessarily equal the meaning

of a text.[86] Wilss finally concludes that the Sapir-Whorf relativity thesis

today is now largely "overdrawn and unsupported (if not unsupportable)."[87]

As his crowning modern linguist, Wilss calls on the French translation

theorist George Mounin, who in 1963 wrote:

> Tel est le vaste ensemble de raisons pour lequelles on peut parler
> d'universaux de langage: cosmologie, biologie, physiologie,
> psychologie, sociologie, anthropologie culturelle et linguistique
> elle-même contribuent à dresser ce vaste inventaire de traits
> communs . . . il faut conclure aussi que la traduction de toute langue
> en toute langue est *au moins* possible dans le domaine des
> universaux.[88]

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[85]Emphasis mine. Wilss is drawing on Chomsky's Syntactic Structures (The Hague: Mouton, 1957) and Eric H. Lenneberg's The Biological Foundations of Language (New York: Wiley, 1967). See Wilss, The Science of Translation, 39.

[86]Erwin Koschmieder, Beiträge zur allgemeinen Syntax (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1965). See Wilss, The Science of Translation, 43.

[87]Joshua A. Fishman, "Review of D.D. Laitin, Politics, language and thought: the Somali experience," in Language 55 (1979), 491. Quoted by Wilss, 43.

[88]Georges Mounin, Les problèmes théoriques de la traduction (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), 222 ff. Quoted by Wilss, The Science of Translation, 44.

Wilss at one point in his argument even implies that the Sapir-Whorf thesis is implicitly "racist" by quoting Kade from 1964 to support this politically provocative argument:

> If I assert that a complete translation is not possible, I am asserting that one language (namely, the language that I am translating into) cannot express what was already expressed in another language . . . this implies attaching a rating to those who speak it, and we find ourselves on the surest road to a reactionary racist ideology.[89]

This move from theoretical foundations to unprovoked political mud-slinging merely indicates Wilss' own emotional investment in his "science" as well as his fear that the Sapir-Whorf view may be more widespread than he is willing to admit. Wilss concludes his section on a review of modern linguistics with a quote from Nida which summarizes his theoretical premises:

> Anyone who is involved in the realities of translation in a broad range of languages is impressed that effective interlingual communication is always possible, despite seemingly enormous differences in linguistic structures and cultural features. These impressions . . . are based on two fundamental factors: (1) semantic similarities between languages, due no doubt in large measure to the common core of human experience; and (2) fundamental similarities in the syntactic structures of languages, especially at the so-called kernel, or core, level.[90]

On such foundations Wilss builds his theory; and he asserts that anyone who has dealt with the "realities of translations" will intuitively grasp the veracity of his claims. Wilss argues that the deep structure of language (in which he includes the sign in context) can be determined (via hermeneutic

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[89]Otto Kade, "Ist alles übersetzbar? " Fremdsprachen (1964), 88. Quoted by Wilss, 48.

[90]Eugene A. Nida, "Science of Translation," Language 47 (1969), 483.

trust) and transformed into "all" languages in any contemporary context. Wilss' deep structure is thus no less abstract than Chomsky's or Nida's. Wilss adopts Platonic universals of form from Chomsky's theory, adds the humanistic, religious premises found in Nida, and builds his "science" from there.

Applications in the Science of Translation

We have seen above how Nida's "science" prepares the Bible for consumption, especially for people with little previous knowledge of the text or the religion. Subtleties, nuances, and mysteries are interpreted and often simplified for easier identification and understanding. Nida's approach deliberately avoids overloading the communication circuit for fear that the text will not be received at all. Bible translators using his system often work with fairly obscure languages in remote areas of the world. Characteristic of the kinds of texts they are translating into Western languages are folktales, short stories (usually narratives), visions, and religious texts. Invariably, the cultural context is so foreign to Western readers that a translation is not enough; the translators feel they must explain the meaning of the text, add cultural highlights, provide background information, and otherwise orientate the text for the receiver's adequate comprehension. The following are two versions of a story written in Ibaloi, a language spoken in the Philippines:

Literal version:

> . . . One of those who found (some of the buried money) was Juan Bejar. . . . They arrived with it at night to his house, and he did-*kapi*-for-it that night at his house at Salakoban. Yes, it was at his house where he did-*kapi*-for-it.

The next morning, as they eating the head, the new jaw bone fell-down. And it was not tilted when it fell but rather it was upright and it was pointing east. When the old women saw it, they said, "Do-it-a-second-time. Perhaps they have regarded-it-as-insufficient." And yes, Juan did-*kapi*-for-it a second time.

Version with additional cultural information (*in italics*):

. . . One of those who found (some of the buried money) was Juan Bejar. . . . They arrived with it at night to his house, and he celebrated the *feast of kapi* with a pig as payment to the ancestral spirits that night at his house at Salakoban. Yes, it was at his house where he celebrated the *feast of kapi* for it.

The next morning, as they were *having the traditional community breakfast following feasts*, the jaw bone *of the pig which had been sacrificed the previous evening* fell down *from the eaves of the house where it is traditionally hung*. And it was not tilted when it fell but rather it was upright, and it was pointing east *where the ancestral spirits are said to live*. When the old women saw it, *they regarded it as a bad omen and* said, "*Celebrate kapi* a second time. Perhaps *the ancestral spirits have regarded *the pig you sacrificed* as insufficient *payment*." And yes, Juan celebrated *kapi* for a second time.[91]

So much information has been added and the prose is so smooth that if it were not for the literal version and the change in typeface, one would lose the energy of the original. Such a translation clearly emphasizes explanation and interpretation; the original text is refracted beyond recognition. Yet without the additional information, the literal version may carry little meaning in the receiving culture (presumably America). Nida's translation theory tends to be most successful with translation of texts from cultures of which the reader his absolutely no knowledge, and thus expects the translator to provide all appropriate contextual information with the choices of appropriate form, content, style, and tone. In the absence of an objective evaluative standard, the translator becomes the authority.

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[91]cf. Mildred Larson, <u>Meaning-based Translation</u> (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 459-460.

Despite similarities in theoretical assumptions, the kind of texts Wilss' project focuses on are different than those Bible translators prefer. Centered in West Germany, Wilss' aims are to teach translators to enter the business world of Europe and the United States where the projected receptors are well informed of the culture and language of the original texts. Any translation "error" will be quickly discovered and undermine the trust the translator establishes with the audience. The kinds of texts usually translated are those in which the facts and meaning can be precisely determined-- newspaper articles, scientific texts, political statements, memoirs, instruction manuals for machines and computers--and for which a homogeneous group of competent, well-informed readers can be identified. Despite the metaphysical foundations of the theory, the research branch of the "science" has developed a technical and sophisticated vocabulary for reflexive discussion, and its goal--to identify and resolve all translation difficulties--is ambitious. Yet their explanations do not consider subjective factors and are, in their own way, just as authoritarian as Nida's. To illustrate the "science" in operation, I choose an example which is slightly less technical than a scientific text and for which an extended commentary on the translated text exists.

I quote first a passage from Shirley MacLaine's autobiography Don't Fall off the Mountain, then from the published translation by Eva Schönfeld Raupe mit Schmetterlingsflügeln, and finally from a "scientifically" derived translation. In addition, I include a commentary by Wilss. The sentence for which I quote Wilss' explanation for his translation decisions is italicized in the passage:

MacLaine:

I was born into a cliché-loving middle-class Virginia family. To be consistent with my background I should have married an upstanding member of the community and had two or three strong-bodied children who ate Wonder Bread eight ways. *I should have settled down on a clean, tree-lined street in a suburb of Richmond, Virginia, had a maid once a week, a bridge game every Wednesday, and every three years or so a temptation - I would feel guilty about it - to have an affair.*

Schönfeld:

Ich wurde in eine traditionsbewußte Kleinbürgerfamilie Virginias hineingeboren. Um den Klischeevorstellungen meiner Umwelt zu genügen, hätte ich ein aufstrebendes Gemeindemitglied ehelichen und ihm zwei bis drei wohlgeratene Kinder gebären müssen, die Gesundheitsbrot auf acht verschiedene Arten aßen. *Ich hätte mich in einer sauberen, baumbestandenen Straße in einem Vorort Richmond, Virginia, einrichten und einmal wöchentlich die Hilfe einer Putzfrau in Anspruch nehmen sollen, nicht zu vergessen das Bridge-Kränzchen jeden Mittwochabend und alle drei Jahre mal eine amouroese Anfechtung, natürlich nicht ohne eine gehörige Portion Gewissensskrupel.*

Wilss:

Ich kam in Virginia als Kind einer klischeeliebenden Mittelstandsfamilie zur Welt. Hätte ich ihren gesellschaftlichen Wertvorstellungen treu bleiben wollen, hätte ich ein stattliches Mitglied unserer Gemeinde heiraten und zwei oder drei kräftige Kinder bekommen (kriegen) müssen, die Golden Toast auf achterlei Art aßen (essen würden). *Ich hätte in einer sauberen, baumbestandenen Straße in einem Vorort von Richmond, Virginia, wohnen müssen; einmal pro Woche wäre die Zugehfrau gekommen; jeden Mittwoch wäre Bridgeabend gewesen, und etwa alle drei Jahre waere ich in Versuchung geraten, natürlich nicht ohne Gewissensbisse, ein Verhältnis mit einem anderen Mann anzufangen.*

Wilss' error analysis:

The rendering of the verbal construction "I should have . . ." is difficult, because it is decisive for the understanding of the whole sentence and because the modal component of "should" in German must be placed in sentence-final position ("Ich hätte . . . müssen"). Despite the excessive syntactic sentence-architectural span between "ich hätte . . ." and "müssen", which, in going from English to German, changes the whole syntactic sentence

> perspective, this structure could, at least theoretically, have been accomplished, had not the SL [source language] authoress added another syntactic level of complexity by interpolating a parenthesis of clause rank and by finishing off the whole sentence with the sentence-final idiom "to have an affair." In view of these complications, the translator, in order to facilitate the perception of the semantic sentence perspective, had hardly any other way out than to cut off the the range of the SL verbal construction "I should have . . ." after "maid" (a German syntactic equivalent would have been rather clumsy anyway) and attempt to hook up the rest in a stylistically acceptable way. This leads to the insertion of . . . as well as to the reorganization of . . . with the qualification that . . .[92]

Despite the complexity of Wilss' explanation, the actual problem faced by the translator is a fairly simple one confronted regularly by those who translate from English to German. We recall Bly's handling of similar verbal construction differences when translating Rilke. Wilss' work is helpful and his findings may be valuable to some translators of certain kinds of texts, but whether one can systematically inventory all the difficulties as he tries to do is questionable. His emphasis on syntactic and functional equivalence may in fact obscure other aspects of the text which are equally important to translate. The structural girding of the analysis seems little informed by any universals of form and theme, and certainly finds problematic the correlation of syntactic structures--deep or surface.

Investigations of the project such as the example cited above not only call into question the existence of deep structure syntactic universals and demonstrate lack of surface structure equivalents, but also reveal the struggle to create functional equivalents: the tempo and tone of MacLaine's text is important to the meaning, and it complicates the translation, for the timing appears to be incompatible with the structure of the German

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[92]Wilss, The Science of Translation, 173-174.

language. Wilss' syntactic manipulation to force the German to achieve functional equivalence regarding the "affair" only moderately succeeds; he achieves the end position, but then cannot suppress the urge to explain and one word becomes seven, "ein Verhältness mit einem anderen Mann anzufangen," and the quick light surprise twist of the MacLaine noun is lost. Many aspects of the MacLaine text are culturally bound--the Wonder Bread reference the most glaring example--but more important is MacLaine's attitude toward her environment, for her self-identity is constituted by such frivolous factors. Her quick, light touch and ironic play--with all its multiple meanings as well as overall thematic importance (this is her autobiography after all)--indicates her inscription in and distance to the culture. The play of the language along the surface, which constitutes meaning especially in this particular genre, is precisely that aspect of translation which Wilss' science has devalued at the expense of achieving equivalences of form and text types.

Interestingly, neither Nida's nor Wilss' "science" works very successfully with literary texts. Certain creative writers recognize the limitations of the above approach because of the multiple aspects of language that are obscured by it. In an article contributed to the Times Literary Supplement, Octavio Paz best summarizes the creative writers' position:

> In recent years, due no doubt to the imperialism of linguistics, there has been a tendency to minimize the pre-eminently literary nature of translation. There has not been nor can there ever be a science of translation, even though it can and should be studied scientifically. Just as literature is a special function of language, so translation is a special function of literature. What about translating

machines?[93]

The evolving "science" of translation as described by Chomsky, Nida, and Wilss increasingly reacts against claims made by the descriptive linguists and relativist theorists of the Sapir-Whorf school. The same was true, as we saw in the first chapter, of I. A. Richards and Frederic Will. Wilss goes so far as to argue that the Sapir-Whorf thesis has been satisfactorily dismissed by modern linguistic theory. Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to disappear quietly, and in terms of literary translation, it may be the most dominant theoretical approach. In addition to Paz, one could add Mallarmé, Valery, Borges, Frost, Nabakov, Lowell just to name a few. Indeed, George Steiner argues that the student of literature tends to be "ultra-Whorfian":

> The student of literature sees language diachronically. He knows that the pressures of time are incessant and intricate. A speech act is embedded in the conventions, social and philosophic inferences, contingent emphases of the moment . . . Indeed it is inside literature that linguistic change, the development of new tonalities, the transformations of the semantic field, are most salient.[94]

By seeing how language, and ideas expressed *in* language, develop and change over history, and how complex, paradoxical, arbitrary and illogical those changes seem to be, the literature student becomes naturally skeptical of theories which tend to generalize and idealize. Steiner goes so far as to argue that there are not only no language universals, but that each literary text generates its own spheres of meaning which alter the associative fabric

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[93]Octovio Paz, "The Literal and the Literary," Times Literary Supplement, September 18 (1970), p. 10.

[94]George Steiner, "Whorf, Chomsky and the Student of Literature," On Difficulty and Other Essays (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 154.

that connects all languages. The study of literature reveals not universals, but "ontological particulars" which run counter to normative conceptual categories. Steiner continues:

> Where Whorf finds that every language and the culture which that language articulates organizes (makes organic) its particular "thought-world," the reader of literature will say the same about every writer and, where penetrative response is pressed home, of every major poem, play or novel.[95]

To summarize, thus, the "sciences" of translation described in this chapter tend to be theoretically founded on an assumption about the nature of language that cannot empirically be verified. Methodologically, they tend to proceed by universalizing and generalizing to such a degree that that which is unique, different and new about ideas as expressed in language becomes obliterated. In terms of positing standards for evaluation, they necessitate that the translator be the authority, and cease to trust the readers to interpret the text on their own. Finally, by investing heavily in the notion of deep structure, they tend to trivialize their own products, the works in translation, and the contributions acts of translation may make to the development and evolution of the original text.

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[95]Ibid., 156.

CHAPTER IV

TRANSLATION STUDIES

The Call for a New Discipline

The two dominant modes of research in the field of translation through the seventies were those focused on primarily literary concerns, rejecting theoretical presuppositions, normative rules, and linguistic jargon, and those focused on linguistic matters, claiming a "scientific" approach and rejecting alogical solutions and subjective speculation. Both sides limited the kinds of texts they addressed to show their methodologies to best advantage, viewing each other's work and accomplishments with skepticism: literary translators dismissed any scientific linguistic analysis; linguists dismissed non-scientific literary analysis. Intervening in this confrontational situation were a handful of mostly younger scholars from The Netherlands and Belgium, including André Lefevere, who coined the term "Translation Studies" for a new approach. In an article entitled "Translation: The Focus of the Growth of Literary Knowledge," he outlines the opposing factions--which he calls the hermeneutic and the neopositivistic-- and argues that "their mutual antagonism is based on mutual (willful) misunderstanding."[1] Lefevere argues that the hermeneutic approach to translation, used primarily by individual thinkers who try to arrive single-

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[1]André Lefevere, "Translation: The Focus of Growth of Literary Knowledge," in Literature and Translation, ed. James S. Holmes, José Lambert and Raymond Van den Broeck (Leuven, Belgium: Acco, 1978), 8.

handedly at universally valid ideas, truths, and grammatical forms, tends to be non-scientific, bases its system of ideas on epistemological assumptions which are three hundred years out of date, and is contradicted at every turn by findings of other disciplines.[2] Logical positivism, the dominant strategy employed by translation structuralists, text grammarians and semioticians, reduces the study of literature to a language intended for physical science, bases truths on hard data and correspondence rules, and posits ideals of science which are monistic, reductionistic and physicalistic.[3] Lefevere argues that translation theories based on such approaches do not further the growth of literary knowledge, but tend to have vested interests--ideological as well as corporate--which have impeded the description of an adequate theory of translation. He displays sentiments characteristic of the Dutch intervention in the field:

> Here lies the great scandal of literature in general and metaliterature [translation and commentary] in particular. Instead of exposing and demolishing ideologies that stultify and enslave, those who claim to be professionally interested in literary knowledge are busy constructing their private ideologies within a safely conventional framework and calculating their profits.[4]

The scholars in the Low Countries were interested in both linguistics (scientific) and literary translation (non-scientific) and did not see why the two need be mutually exclusive. In order to escape the idealistic and static

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[2]Lefevere cites Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding, I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 34. Lefevere, "Translation: The Focus of the Growth of Literary Knowledge," 9.

[3]Lefevere cites Gerard Radnitzky, (Goeteborg: Universitetsforlaget, 1970). Lefevere, "Translation: The focus of the Growth of Literary Knowledge," 12-13.

[4]Ibid., 22.

concepts characteristic of previous approaches to all translation, Lefevere suggests that Translation Studies shift the theoretical focus of their investigation, basing their research "on an evolutionary concept of metascience, not on the logical positivist concept, not on the hermeneutic concept."[5] The Dutch interventionists persuaded the Department of Literary Studies at the University of Leuven (Louvain) to hold a colloquium in April, 1976, on the subject of "Literature and Translation" in order to present their ideas.

The historical and sociological reasons for holding such a conference at this particular time and place are difficult to assess, but Marcel Janssens, Dean of the University of Leuven Faculty of Philosophy and Letters, who gave the introductory lecture, speculated as follows:

> Why are we organizing this colloquium, here and now? It may seem that neither the University of Leuven not its Department of Literature has exhibited any special merit in the field of theory and praxis of translation . . . As members of a fairly small linguistic community, we are in fact translating all the day long, whether we stay inside our own field, in most cases the field of one national literature, or trespass the borderline of disciplines and languages to talk to a colleague across the hall. Moreover, the Dutch-language area forms a privileged meeting-place and thoroughfare . . . the river basins of the Low Countries have served for ages as a reflector of the most varied radiation of thought--and all too often also as the battlefield for both political and intellectual conflicts.[6]

Smaller nations with fewer people speaking "minor" languages have come to depend upon translation for their commercial, political and cultural livelihood; thus it comes as no surprise that scholars from such countries

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[5]Lefevere, "Translation: The Focus of Growth of Literary Knowledge," 7.

[6]Marcel Janssens, "The Medial Mode: By Way of Introduction," in Literature and Translation, 1-2.

would not only know more about translation but might adapt themselves more readily to situations of conflict. Given the countries' geographical location at the crossroads of European intellectual life, it is also not surprising that a new idea or at least a new perspective on the problems facing a theory of translation might find nourishment among the young and grow. Translation may have been a marginal field of investigation in countries which have large monolingual populations, but in Belgium and The Netherlands the field of translation may unite, or at least mediate, diverse literary theories. Detached from the ideological investment that characterizes the history of translation theory elsewhere, a fresh approach emerged from the Lowlands, one which tends to be neither positivistic nor hermeneutic.

Translation Studies began with a call to suspend temporarily the attempts to define a theory of translation, trying first to learn more about translation procedures. The major topics of the conference involved theoretical criteria characterizing literary translation and methods for describing it. Instead of trying to solve the philosophic problem of the nature of meaning, the theoretical focus at the conference concerned how meaning travels. Most characteristic about the new field was its insistence on openness to interdisciplinary approaches: having literary scholars work together with logicians, linguists together with philosophers. Limiting distinctions such as right and wrong, formal and dynamic, literal and free, art and science, theory and practice, receded in importance. Translation as a field was no longer viewed as either literary or non-literary, but as both. New questions were posited regarding the subject of investigation, the

nature of the translation process, how mediation occurs, and how the process affects both the original (redefined as source text) and received (redefined as target text) works. Even the distinction between original writer and translator was called into question. The object of study was neither an absent core of "meaning" or deep "linguistic structure," but rather the translated text itself.

Such an approach is not devoid of theory, and one of the goals of Translation Studies is to formulate a theory of translation. Initially, however, this new field was characterized by its hesitancy to impose theoretical presuppositions and its careful testing of all hypotheses against descriptions of actual translations and historical case-studies. André Lefevere writes about the theoretical goals of the field:

> The goal of the discipline is to produce a comprehensive theory which can be used as a guideline for the production of translations. The theory would gain by being developed along lines of argument which are neither neopositivistic nor hermeneutic in inspiration. The theory would gain by being elaborated against a background of, and constantly tested by case-histories. The theory would then not be static; it would evolve according to the dynamic consensus of qualified scholars, who constitute a forum of competition. . . . It is not inconceivable that a theory elaborated in this way might be of help in the formulation of literary and linguistic theory; just as it is not inconceivable that translations made according to the guidelines tentatively laid down in the theory might influence the development of the receiving culture.[7]

Instead of taking preexisting theories about literature and linguistics and applying them to translation, Lefevere reverses the order of thought, suggesting that the field first look at what is specific about translation and then apply that knowledge to literary and linguistic theory. As a result,

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[7]André Lefevere, "Translation Studies: The Goal of the Discipline," Appendix to Literature and Translation, 234.

Translation Studies attempts to avoid preordained, fixed and immutable prescriptives and opens itself to constant self-evaluation and evolution. The variable approach acknowledges that the object being investigated is not something fixed in the real world to be scientifically investigated, nor is it the object of higher, transcendental truth to be revealed in a mystical way. Rather, the objects of study are the translations themselves, which are by definition mediations subject to theoretical manipulation and prevailing artistic norms; at the same time, as Lefevere speculates, translations may reciprocally have influence upon those very same norms which determine them. One goal of this chapter is to show how Translation Studies displaces the epistemological problem of representation by viewing the text as both produced and producing. Its mediatory role is more than a synchronic transfer of meaning across cultures; it mediates diachronically as well, in multiple historical traditions.

Initially tentative about making large theoretical generalizations, those attending the conference on "Literature and Translation" also tended to be aware that something theoretically powerful was coalescing. Ironically, the process of ignoring existing literary theory and focussing the study on the status of historically marginalized texts actually revealed something not merely tangentially related but of central relevance to literary theory. Janssens writes:

> A paradoxical effect of this colloquium may be that a mode of text which traditionally has been considered to be marginal will turn out to be a touchstone for problems which we hold to belong to the very core of literary theory.[8]

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[8]Janssens, "The Medial Mode," 5.

With their new questions and shift in focus, the intervention by the Dutch scholars raises multiple problems for literary theory, including the importance of praxis within theory, the cultural interdependence of literary systems, and the intertextual nature not just of translation, but of all texts. The activity of translation may be marginal, but the theoretical problems raised by the practitioners are crucial to any integrated literary theory.

The establishment of a new field within the domain of literary analysis did not occur overnight. As I argue below, the roots of early Translation Studies can be found in Russian formalism, and the precursors to the present generation of Dutch scholars include a group of Czech scholars well schooled in Russian poetics. I hope to show how Translation Studies, despite claims to avoid prescription and refrain from judging, implicitly reflects certain modernistic prejudices. At the same time, however, the epistemological assumptions of Translation Studies depend on viewing texts as dynamic and productive rather than static and fixed, and thus contribute to the ongoing post-modern reevaluation of the nature of language. In the next two chapters I will trace the evolution of Translation Studies from the early tentative work by Dutch scholars through the positing of a comprehensive system--called Polysystems Theory--by an Israeli circle. My examination is based on texts by three Czech scholars--Jiří Levý, František Miko, and Anton Popovič--whose work is not only crucial to gaining an understanding of the work by the group of Dutch language scholars, but also effects a transition from Russian formalism to the present day paradigm of translation investigation. Next, I will analyze the work of James Holmes, Raymond Van den Broeck, and André Lefevere, whose contributions are the

most theoretical of their generation and perhaps best articulate the theoretical and pragmatic goals of the discipline. I will conclude this chapter by focusing on several examples which I find to be characteristic of the kind of interpretation and scholarship during early phase of Translation Studies. The following chapter focuses on the movement to formulate a comprehensive theory of translation based generally upon the results obtained by Translation Studies and more specifically on the work of Russian formalist Jurij Tynjanov, whose concept of literary system provides the foundation for Polysystems Theory. I will then examine the work of the Israeli scholars Itamar Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury, whose work best articulates the breath and depth of the project. Finally, I conclude with a brief analysis of the kind of interpretation the polysystems model promotes, showing how it contributes to contemporary literary theory and informs the ongoing investigation of the nature of language.

Jiří Levý and the Czechoslovakian Connection

In 1966, the Czech delegation to the conference of the International Federation of Translators (FIT) held in Lahti, Finland, wanting to draw attention to the increasing amount of study by East European scholars regarding problems of literary translation, proposed an international colloquium on the theory of literary translation. This conference convened under the title "Translation as an Art" in Bratislava in May of 1968, but could hardly be called a success. Many of the people whom the Czechs tried to attract could not or did not come, and several who did come spoke but did not submit papers for publication, including Fred Will, who talked about

research methods at the Iowa Translation Workshop. Although the proceedings were published, they hardly created an international focus on East European research on translation. However, a couple of the young scholars from The Netherlands attended, including James Holmes and Frans de Haan, and helped edit the proceedings, making the publication a joint Amsterdam and Bratislava effort. The seeds for a fresh approach to the subject of translation found a bed in the Low Countries and began to grow.

The work of three Czechoslovakians form the theoretical foundation for Translation Studies. The first, Jiří Levý, was not present at the conference--he died one year earlier, but his book Umění překladu [Literary Translation], published in 1963 (translated into German as Die literarische Übersetzung in 1969) had already established the theoretical framework not just of this particular conference but for Translation Studies in general. The second, František Miko, attended the conference and delivered "La théorie de l'expression et la traduction," one of the plenary papers, reporting on his ongoing work cataloguing the formalist features which the field studies. His results were later published in 1969 as Estetika výrazu. Teória výrazu a štýl [The Aesthetic of Expression: the Theory of Expression and Style]. The third, Anton Popovič, also attended the conference and presented the paper "The Concept 'Shift of Expression' in Translation Analysis," a report on the methodology and terminology to carry out the kind of analysis characteristic of translation studies. The final version of his proposals for a consensus on terminology was later summarized in Dictionary for the Analysis of Literary Translation, published in 1976. In addition, Popovič eventually traveled to The Netherlands to help edit the proceedings of the conference, further

helping to communicate and clarify the work of his colleagues in Czechoslovakia.

To set the parameters of the following discussion, I will first briefly summarize some of the main tenets of Russian formalism, basing my analysis primarily on the summary "The Theory of the Formal Method" by Boris M. Ejxenbaum in Readings in Russian Poetics,[9] and discuss their relevance for Translation Studies. First, Russian formalism attempts to isolate and define what it terms "literariness" by focusing solely upon what it views to be literary facts, separating literary artifacts from other disciplines such as psychology, sociology, and cultural history. The discipline as well as the texts being studied take on an autonomy of their own. This becomes important for the current generation of translators interested in what literary translation can contribute to translation theory in general, enabling them to focus their investigation on specific determining features of literary texts rather than on metaphysical notions about the nature of literature and meaning. Russian formalism avoids deep-structure arguments, looking instead at actual texts and specific features of texts. The move to define literariness led the formalists to try to determine what makes

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[9]Boris M. Ejxenbaum, "The Theory of the Formal Method," in Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist Views, ed. Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978), 3-38. See also Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History--Doctrine, 3rd. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). For translations of Russian formalist texts plus articles documenting their response in France and Italy see Russian Formalism: A Collection of Articles and Texts in Translation, ed. Stephen Bann and John Bowlt (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1973). For a retrospective view by participants as well as contemporary scholars. see Russian Formalism: A Retrospective Glance, ed. Robert Louis Jackson and Stephen Rudy (New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies, 1985).

literary texts different from other texts, what makes them new, creative, innovative. Translation Studies also distances itself from theories like those of Chomsky and Nida which are more focused on deep-structure generative components than on actual surface structure characteristics. Formalism and Translation Studies privilege specific surface structural features and analyze them to learn what determines literary merit. Indeed, Russian formalism, although it uses thematic concepts, relegates them to secondary status, being more concerned with compositional concepts. It argues that abstract ideas often look much the same over history; what is important is how these thematic concepts are expressed. Translation Studies uses thematic concepts in a similar fashion, shifting them from primary and determining position to a concept dependent upon the culture and language in which they are embedded.

Perhaps the most important and least understood aspect of Russian formalism is its historical dimension. Attacks of the school tend to be focused on its "decadent" art-for-art's-sake beliefs and criticize its lack of historical parameters. Russian formalism, however, does not just analyze texts synchronically, but also dichronically, trying to understand how texts relate to a determining literary tradition. The formal analysis thus incorporates intrinsic and extrinsic factors in order to determine a specific text's contribution to and distance from any evolving literary tradition. Translation Studies actually shows the diachronic effect of translated texts to two traditions: that of the source culture and that of the target culture. Borrowing another aspect of Russian formalism, perhaps its best known and most easily embraced principle--the defamiliarization [ostranenie] device--

Translation Studies attempts to measure the text's relation to its tradition. Because it doesn't inflate the value of the content, meaning or original idea of a work, Russian formalism can focus on aspects that do not conform, but make the text special, different, and especially strange. Translation Studies similarly refuses the tendency toward focusing on meaning, on determining the original content (seen earlier in theories like Nida's), and on preparing the text for easy consumption by readers in the receiving culture. If anything, Translation Studies prescribes that a work in translation retain defamiliarization devices, and if existing devices cannot be transposed in the second language, the translator needs to invent new ones. Proper nouns, for example, have always been troublesome for translators, for they always tend to have a special, specific meaning--such as place names that have a special resonance, location, history in the source culture--that invariably get lost in translation. Finally, Russian formalism remains open to new problems; its methodology can be applied to itself; and it insists that the discipline of literary scholarship need be an evolving one. Exjenbaum concludes:

> We possess no theory of such a kind as could be deployed as a rigid, ready-made system. Theory and history have merged for us, not only in what we preach, but also in what we practice. We are too well trained by history itself to imagine that we could do without history.[10]

Such an incorporation of history into their theoretical model has helped Translation Studies apply theory inwardly as well as externally, enabling them to address problems as raised by their own and other fields of investigation. The spirit of discovery, of evolution, and of multiple

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[10]Ibid., 35.

applications characterizes Translation Studies, as well as the retention of a focus which limits the field of investigation to specific translated texts. Perhaps this can explain Janssens' hesitancy to make the claim that Translation Studies may have wider relevance for literary theory in general. Its scholars tend to be caught in the bind, on the one hand, of trying to define and limit a field of investigation and, on the other, of secretly aware that valuable insights and discoveries very relevant to contemporary literary theory are happening as one studies actual translated texts.

The Czech group of translation scholars, including Jiří Levý, Anton Popovič, and František Miko, have evolved from Russian formalism, simultaneously reflecting and distancing themselves from some of the tenets above. Certainly they have distanced themselves from the concept of literature as autonomous literary works isolated from the rest of the world. One of the reasons Levý's text <u>Die literarische Übersetzung</u> is so instrumental for translation studies is precisely because it takes the tenets of Russian formalism, applies them to the subject of translation, and shows how formalist structural laws are located in history and interact with at least two literary traditions simultaneously, that of the source culture and that of the receiving culture.

Levý's formalist roots are revealed by the specific linguistic methodology which characterizes his project. Levý begins with the linguistic distinctions of translation that his colleague Roman Jacobson, who left Moscow to help found the Prague school of linguistics, has laid out in "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation." Jacobson divides translation into three branches: (1) intralingual--transferring something by rewording it within

signs from the same language; (2) interlingual--transferring something by rewording it with signs from a different language; and (3) intersemiotic-- transferring something from one symbolic order to another, i.e., transferring words to music.[11] The Prague structuralists thus view texts as incorporated within semiotic networks and view language as a code or complex of language elements that combine according to certain rules. Every word stands in relation to other segments of the same text (synchronic) and other words in texts in the literary tradition (diachronic). Jacobson has laid out three signifying systems which come into play in the course of translation. Levý also incorporates the interpretative aspect into his translation theory, basing such deduction upon Willard Quine's hypothesis that translation meaning can be logically interpreted. Quine's theory does not involve a metaphysical leap to the deep and unified central meaning of a text, but builds slowly and carefully, not necessarily via a word-to-word or sentence-to-sentence correlation--synonyms and analogy always tend to retain a certain indefiniteness--but by the capacity of learning meaning via structural groupings. Beginning with guess and intuition, moving through comparison, deciphering, matching groups of positive and negative stimulus meaning, Quine argues that the translator can arrive at

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[11]Roman Jacobson, "On Linguistic Aspects of Translation," in On Translation, ed. Ruben A. Brower (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 233. Cited by Levý, Die literarische Übersetzung, 20.

"analytic hypotheses," which are finally tested against a network of standing sentences as well as against agreed upon synonyms.[12]

With the establishment of the semiotic horizons which come into play in the course of translation and with the positing of the interpretive component which enables the translator to grasp the meaning of the text in question, Levý is now in position to present his translation methodology. Of primary importance in Levý's model is that the literary quality of the work of art not be lost. To ensure transfer of "literariness," Levý foregrounds the particular communicative aspect of specific formal features [*Mitteilungsffunktion die einzelnen sprachlichen Elementen*] of the original author's style that give the work of art its specific literary character. Levý bases this aspect of his translation theory on another of the founding members of the Prague linguistic circle, Vilém Mathesius, who as early as 1913 wrote:

> Das eigentliche Fundament des Umdichtens ist das Bestreben, sei es auch mit anderen Mitteln als im Original, einen künstlerischen Effect zu erzielen . . . oft erzielen die gleichen--oder annähernd die gleichen--Mittel unterschiedliche Wirkungen. Der Grundsatz, daß die Gleichheit der künstlerischen Effekte wichtiger ist als die Gleichheit der Kunst-mittel, erweist sich vor allem beim Übersetzen von Poesis als bedeutungsvoll.[13]

Levy, as other formalists, first views language as a semiotic system with synchronic and diachronic aspects. He also elevates the art object to the most

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[12]See Willard Q. Quine, "Meaning and Translation," in On Translation, ed. Ruben A. Brower (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959). Cited by Juří Levý, Die literarische Übersetzung (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1969), 20.

[13]Vilém Mathesius, "O problémch ceského prakladatelstvi" ["Über die Probleme des tschechischen Übersetzerwesens"], Prehled 11 (1913), 808. Quoted by Levy, Ibid., 21.

privileged position, believing that the "literariness" can be logically deduced and defined. His translation theory thus emphasizes less the "meaning" or the "object being represented" in the second language, but instead focuses upon the style, the specific literary features of the text that make it literary. In his essay "What is Poetry?" Roman Jacobson spells out the value placed by formalists upon the specific "poetic" quality of a work:

> The poetic function, *poeticity*, is, as the "formalists" stressed, an element sui generis, one that cannot be mechanically reduced to other elements . . . It can be separated out and made independent, like the various devices in, say a cubist painting . . . poeticity is only part of a complex structure, but it is a part that necessarily transforms the other elements and determines with them the nature of the whole.[14]

The formalist belief that poeticity is a formal quality, something that can be separated out of a work, is crucial to understanding Levý's translation theory. Levý believes that he can logically determine those aspects which make a text art, divorce them from the content, the world, the language system, replace them with stylistic elements from a different language, equally divorced from everything else, and arrive at an equally artistic work. He draws the conclusion, based on Mathesius' and Jacobson's comments above, that the theory of substitution of elements of style ["Theorie von der Substitution der Stilmittel"] has been constructed upon an objective foundation ["auf eine objektive Basis gestellt"].[15]

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[14]Roman Jakobson, "What is poetry?" in <u>Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions</u>, ed. Ladislav Matejka and Irwin R. Titunik (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1976), 174.

[15]Levý, <u>Die literarische Übersetzung</u>, 21.

Levý's theory is thus another structuralism; whereas Chomsky's theory analyzed the deep structure, especially its syntactic elements, Levý's examines surface structure and stylistic elements. Each theory uses linguistics and "scientific" methods of interpretation to help isolate that aspect of language which they feel is primary. In Levý's process of isolating the "poetic" features, an interesting sub-theory simultaneously develops. What happens to "content" in Levý's system? If one privileges structural and stylistic features, content in Levý's system, is demoted, for it is not stable, but temporarily conditioned by the signifying system in which it is expressed. If one is working in a single sign system, however, the formal features and the content can be made to appear to mutually reinforce each other, producing that "unified work" pregnant with "literariness." But by placing a work in multiple signifying systems, at least two in the case of interlingual translation, the instability and ephemeral nature of that thing expressed becomes visible. The translation is not a unified work, but one which is full of tension and contradictions, because the content is intertextually constructed, represented as it were by two perspectives simultaneously: from the view of the originally signifying system and from the angle of the second language system. Levý recognizes the tension inherent in the new "structure":

> Das übersetzte Werk ist ein gemischtes, hybrides Gebilde. Die Übersetzung ist kein einheitliches Werk, sondern die Verschmelzung, das Konglomerat zweier Strukturen: auf der einen Seite steht der Bedeutungsgehalt und die formale Kontur des Originals, auf der anderen Seite das ganze System der an die Sprache gebundenen Züge, die der Übersetzer dem Werk beigegeben hat. Beide Schichten--oder besser Qualitäten, die sich im Ganzen des Werks durchdringen--stehen in einem Spannungsverhältnis zueinander,

und dies kann zu Konflikten führen.[16]

Yet despite the above recognition, Levý argues that the better the translation, the better it overcomes the conflicts and contradictions outlined above. Evaded by the formalists and smoothed over by Levý, the subtext that has been developing throughout the argument, i.e., what happens to the content, becomes the determining contradiction within his theory. Levý wants to argue that the translated text must be consistent and unified--contradictions can be resolved and the objective substitution of equivalences is possible. He writes, for example, "Die Übersetzung als Ganzes ist umso vollkommener, je besser es ihr gelingt, ihre notwendige Widersprüchlichkeit zu überwinden," and, "Deshalb erfordert das Übersetzen . . ., daß der Übersetzer die Wiedersprüche, die sich im übersetzeten Werk notwendig aus seinem ambivalenten Character ergeben, auszugleichen versteht."[17] This leads to a conclusion that is very much like the ones reached by American literary translators, favoring the recreation of the "aesthetic beauty" and "truth" of the original in the second language:

> Als die "treue" (oder besser wortgetreue) Übersetzungsmethode bezeichnen wir das Arbeitsverfahren jener Übersetzer, die als Hauptziel die genaue Reproduktion der Vorlage betratrachten, als "freie" (oder besser adaptierende) Methode diejenige, welcher es vor allem um die Schönheit, d.h. um die ästhetische und gedankliche Nähe zum Leser geht, darum, daß mit der Übersetzung ein deutsches Originalkustwerk entsteht.[18]

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[16]Ibid., 72.

[17]Ibid., 73.

[18]Ibid., 68.

Ironically, however, instead of just constructing a theory of translation which smooths over the inherent problem of how this is to be done, given that the translated text is invariably shot full with contradictions, Levý's theory also reinforces a by-product of formalism: in addition to the awareness of the correspondence of sign to object, there is the necessary opposite function simultaneously in process, namely that the relationship between sign and object is always already inadequate. Content is always unstable, always changing, constructed by discourse, in constant flux, merely "appearing" stable temporarily in its fictional aesthetic construction. As translation always has at least two referents, meaning never appears stable. That which is made manifest in the process and product of translation is the very mobility of concepts, the mutability of signs, and the evolution of the relationship between the two.

It would seem that Levý's translation theory is asking the impossible, i.e., to develop objective criteria for isolating and cataloguing in multiple languages the particular poetic formal features which transform a normal expression into an artistic one, and then to establish paradigms enabling the substitution of those elements appropriate to translation. Yet work in precisely that seemingly impossible field has begun, and I turn to the work of František Miko to illustrate the process. In "La théorie de l'expression et la traduction" he reports on his progress, defining what he calls the "expressive categories" (expressive features or qualities) of language which

lend it its artistic quality.[19]   Miko first makes a distinction between

expression as a whole, the expressive character, and the expressive features:

> Je me servirai, plus loin, des notion suivantes: l'expression,
> la propriété expressive, la catégorie de l'expression. Par la première
> notion, j'entends l'expression au sens le plus large du mot, englobant
> chaque maniere de s'exprimer, c'est-à-dire tous les styles. La propriété
> de l'expression, c'est une composante élémentaire de celle-ci,
> la composante élémentaire du style. Le style lui-même, ainsi conçu,
> est une configuartion dynamique de certaines propriétés de
> l'expression dans une manifestation verbale.[20]

The distinction is important for Miko, not just to clarify potential

misinterpretation of his work, but for theoretical reasons.   He shares the

formalist distinction between form and content, or between form and theme,

and posits the primary importance of the linguistic elements.   The subject

matter is contingent upon and constituted by the linguistic structure of the

language ["Le sujet dépend de la langue et se constitue par elle"].[21]   In order

to determine what an expression as a whole means, what determines its

poeticity, one has to look at the smallest details which when structurally built

together determine the work of art's style.   The expressive features form

together hierarchically, constructing the work's meaning and value.   Given

the fundamental belief that language thus determines content, Miko– asks the

question what happens when one changes the language system?   Is all lost?

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[19]See František Miko, _Estetika výrazu.   Teória výrazu a štýl_ [The
Aesthetic of Expression. The Theory of Expresison and Style] (Bratizlava,
1969); "Teória výrazu a prekladu" ["The Theory of Style and Translation"]
Dialog 1 (1968), 39-66 (English summary, 242); "La théorie de l'expression et
la traduction" in _The Nature of Translation_.

[20]Miko, "La théorie de l'expression et la traduction," 62.

[21]Ibid., 63.

Miko argues against such a conclusion, believing that he can determine and catalogue a system of expressive features independent of any one specific style, features that can be interchanged as necessary in the act of translation. Miko does point out the difficulty and complexity of the problem, especially regarding the translation of literary texts, but argues the necessity of its resolution because the alternative--the substitution of synonyms, of syntactical structures, of similar themes--has historically proved inadequate.

Expressive features of the text, according to Miko, can best be determined by relating those features of style of a specific text to similar characteristics used within the literary tradition. In that place between the text and its tradition, subjective qualities of style--emotional, irrational, expressive--as well as idiosyncrasies of style--irony, abstraction, brevity, joviality--can be determined. Only through such a historical analysis can the function of the original text be understood, and enable eventual adequate translation. For Miko the problem of translation is either purely linguistic or purely stylistic ["en soumettant à l'analyse des points critiques du texte traduit, on démontrerait facilement que les difficultés recontrées étaient soit purement linguistic, soit purement stylistic"].[22] The problem of achieving correspondence of style is a delicate one because the nuances are fine, but of primary importance: if such elements are omitted from the translation, it loses its "literariness," the very quality which Russian formalism values most. The addition of an historical horizon, albeit a purely literary one, is an

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[22]Ibid., 64.

important one for the development of Translation Studies, for it provides not only a basis of comparison but also implies a diachronic evolution of language.

How far did Miko progress with his inventory? He progressed far enough to establish certain hierarchies within a system of cataloguing qualities of expression. He also has identified certain categories which he claims do not permit further distinction. He admits the impossibility of the task, yet enough research has been completed to enable him to draw certain conclusions.[23] He has been able to equate certain expressive characteristics with certain types of speech found in journals, in popular literature, in speeches, and in literary texts. For example, categories of expression characteristic of literary texts include not just aesthetic/emotional ones, but variablity, ambiguity, disequilibrium (unrealized resolutions) as well as conventional resolution, and in certain instances even irrationality (e.g., stream of consciousness texts). Miko suggests these elements can be isolated, analyzed and translated using a methodology that finds functional rather than literal equivalents. All the while, Miko's categories are subject to the flux of history. He is well aware of stylistic features tend to have a very subjective nature and that social conditions change, thus changing the appropriateness of certain expressive characteristics. Detailed research of the specific characteristic in history is necessary, making translation dependant upon the interpretive as well as linguistic and creative ability of the translator. Miko's summary reads:

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[23]Ibid., 67-70.

La conception du style telle que nous venons de l'esquisser, est rigoureusement structuraliste, c'est-à-dire linguistique, respectant pleinement le rapport signifié-signifiant: elle est fonctionnelle, utilisant des catégories et non des moyens linguistique particuliers: elle est basée sur la définition corrélative des catégories expressives, ne perdant pas de vue l'importance de l'aspect paradigmatique et syntagmatique pour l'analyse du matériel linguistique (le système expressif--le style). Elle prend en considération également l'aspect évolutif et social de l'objet.[24]

Miko's diligent work provides a structuralist framework which defines those very subtle elements which lend a work its overall artistic merit and establishes an objective basis for comparison of the literary quality of the original and the literary quality of the translation.

Anton Popovic's project begins where the work of Levy and Miko leaves off: he begins the comparative work of locating the conformities and the differences that occur when a work is translated and explains the relationship of the translated work to the original. Instead of prescribing a technique which eliminates losses and smooths over changes, Popovic accepts the fact that losses, gains and changes are a necessary part of the process because of inherent differences of intellectual and aesthetic values in the two cultures. In his essay "The Concept 'Shift of Expression' in Translation Analysis," he introduces a new term to characterize this process:

Each individual method of translation is determined by the presence or absence of shifts in the various layers of the translation. All that appears as new with respect to the original, or fails to appear where it might have been expected, may be interpreted as a shift.[25]

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[24]Ibid., 73.

[25]Anton Popovic, "The Concept 'Shift of Expression' in Translation Analysis," in The Nature of Translation, 78. See also Anton Popovic, Dictionary for the Analysis of Literary Translation (University of Alberta, Edmonton: Department of Comparative Literature), no date, 16-17; Anton

Shifts have been noticed before in terms of translation analysis, but have invariably been attributed to deliberate distortions, incompetence on the part of the translator, or linguistic incompatibility between the two languages. Popovič extends the theoretical horizon by analyzing shifts in terms of the differing cultural values and literary norms. Instead of accusing translators of ignorance or unfaithfulness, Popovič argues that they resort to shifts precisely because they are attempting to render faithfully the content of the original despite the differences between the languages. Thus shifts reveal not the inadequacy of the translation, but something about the primary aesthetic quality of the original. Levý's project left off with the prescription that if an expressive feature does not work in the receiving culture, then the translator must replace it or even invent a new feature so that the overall literary quality is not lost. Popovič extrapolates:

> Every conception of translation of any real significance and consistency finds its principal manifestation in the shifts of expression, the choice of aesthetic means, and the semantic aspects of the work. Thus in a translation we can as a rule expect certain changes because the question of identity and difference in relation to the original can never be solved without some residue. Identity cannot be the only feature characterizing the relation. This conclusion is inevitable if we consider the force of historical factors and the impossibility of repeating the act of translation as a creative process.[26]

Accepting the fact that certain elements will fall through the cracks as one moves from one system of discourse to another, Popovic looks not for what

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Popovič, Teória Umeleckého Prekladu [Theory of Literary Translation] (Bratislave: Tatran, 1975).

[26]Popovič, "The Concept 'Shift of Expression' in Translation Analysis," 81.

fits, but what doesn't, and picks up the "residue" to examine it more closely. The last sentence quoted above reveals Popovič's rejection of the idealistic notion that literal or functional equivalences can be found, yet he retains formal features as part of his system in order to demonstrate translation differences and the force of history.

As Miko believes that the minute and subtle nuances of expression were the key to determining a work's overall artistic quality, so too Popovič believes that the key to understanding a translation's chief aesthetic means lies in the analysis of the shifts of those very nuances. In Popovič's theory, in which differences are just as important as equivalences, the faithful-free theoretical concerns collapse into the same horizon; the two are always relative depending upon the aesthetic assumptions of the translator. Popovič explains:

> It is not the translator's only business to "identify" himself with the original; that would merely result in a transparent translation. The translator also has the right to differ organically, to be independent . . . Between the basic semantic substance of the original and its shift in another linguistic structure a kind of dialectic tension develops along the axis of faithfulness-freedom.[27]

There are various methods of translating, and while Popovic's own preferences mirror Levý's, his theoretical model lends itself to determining the aesthetic presuppositions of the translator that motivate shifts of expression. His theory reads the shifts symptomatically in order to determine the prevailing literary assumptions governing the translation. With Popovič's theory, the critic can trace the tracks left by the shifts in the translated work to the cultural norms of the receiving culture which govern

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[27]Ibid., 80.

that text. Instead of proposing stylistic unity with the original as a goal of translation, Popovič accepts the impossibility of achieving an equivalent text and posits a theory to explain rather than criticize its non-identity. Through an analysis of shifts of expression and an analysis of the relationship of the language of the original work to that of the translated work, something about the mediatory, heterogeneous nature of the process of translation is revealed.

At this point, several observations with regard to the Czech contribution to Translation Studies can be made. First, an aesthetic prejudice is revealed by the kind of translation preferred, i.e., one which functions as an art object in the receiving culture. The Czech demand to preserve literariness determines the preferred methodology. However comprehensive Miko's catalogue of "objective" stylistic features becomes, it will always remain inadequate and to a large degree subjectively organized. The hypothesis that a work's overall artistic merit is determined strictly by structural characteristics may be appropriate for examining modernistic or futuristic texts characteristic of the period during which the theory developed, but what about texts written during other historical epoches? How well does the theory work with symbolic or allegorical texts, with narratives, poetic or prose, with agit-prop theatre or folktales which require common understanding of the referent? In addition, such a preference may in fact determine which third world texts get translated into Western languages. Russian formalism defines what is to be valued in a text--aspects such as form, self-referentiality, and technical juxtaposition--and evaluates translations on the capacity of the target text to transfer those formal

characteristics. Yet different aesthetic approaches as well as different historical moments and cultures may value other aspects of a text. In many ways the translation theory deriving from Russian formalism reflects precisely those devices--"defamiliarization" devices for example--which are characteristic of the prevailing artistic norms and interpretive theories of a particular time and place, i.e., modern European society.

Secondly, although Popovič expands the parameters of a theory of modernism to point Translation Studies in a new direction, Translation Studies scholars avoid theorizing about the relation of form to content, failing to read symptomatically the implications of their theory for their own methodology. Despite claims to the contrary, the literary text quickly gets divorced from other socio-political factors. Words cease to refer to real life, but to other words used in the same literary tradition, thus creating a system built upon its own self-referentiality and thus reinforcing its own values. Art does become autonomous, as perception of a work's literariness is tied directly to an awareness of form. It is this quality of calling attention to itself that the theory values and asks to be translated; the methodology demands that the receiver perceive those specific formal features that sets a work apart from a tradition, again necessitating the incorporation of a "competent" reader into their translation model (I.A. Richards' theory, too, prescribed such an ideal reader). There is an hermetic, self-referential quality in "literary" texts which formalists perceive, value, and recommend be perpetuated. Because Levý and others tend toward the prescriptive, questions remain regarding the evaluative horizon. Who judges the adequacy of the stylistic substitutions? The demands on the translator are

enormous; they include competence as literary critic, historical scholar, linguistic technician, and creative artist. It is no wonder that the evaluative horizon presents problems, for the requirements extend beyond the capacity of any single human's ability.

Despite these reservations about the work by the Czech school, the beginnings of a descriptive methodology can be seen. Although the theory might work better with modern and contemporary texts, it is by no means limited to them. The methodology of systematically analyzing shifts can be applied to symbolic, realistic, metrical, literal, and phonetic theories of translation as well, precisely because it begins to include historical and ideological horizons as well as literary ones. Indeed, in order to explain shifts adequately, the methodology cannot restrict itself to the changes of artistic traditions, but must consider evolving social norms and subjective psychological motivations as well. For these reasons the Dutch became very interested in the work by their colleagues in Eastern Europe.

Early Translation Studies: James Holmes, Raymond Van den Broeck and André Lefevere

Despite its relatively short history, "Translation Studies" already can be divided into early and current periods, the early period the subject of the remainder of this chapter, and the later to be analyzed in chapter four. I will proceed to examine texts by three founding members of the discipline: James Holmes, who attended the conference in Bratislava and first introduced a new way of discussing translation to Western Europe; Raymond Van den Broeck, who addressed the problem of equivalence in translation from the perspective of Translation Studies; and André Lefevere, whose work is the

most theoretical, and whose assessment might be characterized as the most definitive of the field. I intend to show a double movement of the paradigm: while attempting to avoid prescription and focus on pure description, Translation Studies favors a translation methodology much determined by its roots in Russian formalism. In addition, while limiting the field of investigation to concrete, existing translations, Translation Studies includes the seeds for a comprehensive theory, addressing out of necessity data not only outside of one text, beyond one tradition, but phenomena which as yet have no specific textual realization and have escaped traditional analysis.

James Holmes was a poet/translator who taught Translation Studies at the University of Amsterdam until his recent death. His work describing the translation process, while dismissing traditional notions of equivalence, is perhaps most responsible for the formation of the new field. In "Forms of Verse Translation and the Translation of Verse Form," his contribution to the 1968 conference in Bratislava, we can see the introduction of new terminology and methodology with which to approach the subject. The most visible change in Holmes' approach is his alteration of the nature of the referent: Holmes argues that the translation does not refer to the same object in the real world to which the source text refers, but rather to a linguistic formulation. The language of translation is different from the language of primary literature, and to designate this distinction, Holmes introduces the term "meta-language," borrowed from Roland Barthes, who divides literature into two classes: the class of poetry, fiction and drama that "speak about objects and phenomena which, whether imaginary or not, are external and anterior to language," and the class of literature that "deals not with 'the

world,' but with the linguistic formulations made by others; it is a comment on a comment."[28]   Holmes broadens the definition of Barthes' term, originally limited to merely critical commentary about literature, to include a variety of metaliterary forms, verse translation being merely one.

In addition, Holmes argues that verse translation is different from other forms of commentary or metalanguage, because it uses the medium of verse, and aspires to be a poem in its own right.   While metaliterature in itself, verse translation also generates a new corpus of metaliterature about it.   Thus, the thing to which translation refers not only is different from other kinds of creative writing, but the kind of literature written about translation differs from other kinds of critical writing, placing it in a unique position in terms of the realm of literary criticism.   Referring and producing simultaneously, verse translation is critical commentary on a source text, and yet yields critical interpretation as if it were a primary text. About translation's dual nature Holmes writes:

> All translation is an act of critical interpretation, but there are
> some translations of poetry which differ from all other interpretive
> forms in that they also have the aim of being acts of poetry . . .
> it might be helpful if for this specific literary form, with its double

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[28]Roland Barthes, "Criticism as Language," in The Critical Moment: Essays on the Nature of Literature (London, 1964), 126. Quoted by James Holmes, "Forms of Verse Translation and the Translation of Verse Form," in The Nature of Translation, 91. The concept of translation as metalanguage has been extensively elaborated by Anton Popovič in Teória Umeleckého Prekladu [Theory of Literary Translation] ; Problemy Literárnej Metakomunikácie-Teória Metatextu [Problems of Literary Metacommunication-Theory of Metatext] (Nitra, Klkem, 1975), an English summary for which is given in "Aspects of Metatext" Canada Review of Comparative Literature, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1976), 225-235. See also André Lefevere, Literary Knowledge (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1977), 52-58. The idea seems to be Holmes'.

purpose as meta-literature and as primary literature, we introduced the designation "metapoem."[29]

Given this redefinition of verse translation, the theory about translation must be similarly redefined. Thus, Translation Studies becomes less concerned with identity and the old problem of reference, and more concerned with analyzing (a) the relationship of the translated text (as a secondary text) to the source text within a framework of the signifying practices inherent in that particular literary tradition and (b) the relationship of the translated text (as a primary text) to the signifying practices within the framework of the tradition of the target culture.

Because Holmes is less interested in identity and is more concerned with the relationship of the translation to other signifying systems, another shift in Holmes' approach becomes visible: he begins a description of translated texts not by making universal claims about the validity (or invalidity) of specific proposed translation solutions, but by describing various translation methodologies and how they historically have been used. The goal is not to perpetuate some metaphysical claim about the nature of language or conceptual knowledge, but to understand better the various kinds of translation, of "metapoems," as a unique kind of signifying practice. Holmes defines four types of translations each relating differently to the original text and belonging to different theoretical traditions. The first type retains the form of the original; Holmes suggests that identical form is impossible, but patterns can be made to closely resemble each other, and fundamental formal verse structures can be matched, such as Richmond

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[29]Holmes, "Verse Translation and Verse Form," 93.

Latimore's mimetic hexameters of Homer's Greek. The second type attempts to discern the function of the text in the receiving culture and seeks a parallel function within the target language tradition, creating analagous forms which will create similar effects, such as Robert Fitzgerald's blank verse translation of Homer. The third type is content-derivative, taking the original meaning of the primary text and allowing it to develop into its own unique shape in the target language, such as Pound's organic free verse translation of Homer in the first Canto. The fourth type includes what Holmes calls "deviant forms" not deriving from the original poem at all, but deliberately retaining minimal similarity for other purposes, for which Holmes gives no example, but Robert Lowell's "The Killing of Lykaon" of books one and twenty-one of the Iliad may serve as an example. Holmes refrains from favoring any one of the four types of translation, saying that each approach, "by its nature opens up certain possibilities for the translator who chooses it, and at the same time closes others."[30] Since initial theoretical choices determine what a translator can hope to achieve, Holmes suggests Translation Studies can better analyze what is opened up and what is limited by such methodological choices. Recognizing the type of translation and grasping its corresponding theory, whether conscious or unconscious on the part of the translator, allows us to understand what the translated text comes to mean in the receiving culture. Holmes concludes:

> There is an extremely close relationship between the kind of verse form a translator chooses and the kind of total effect his translation achieves. It is, in fact, a relationship so central to the entire problems of verse translation that its study deserves our utmost attention--

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[30]Ibid., 97.

study, not in order to arrive at normative dicta . . . but to come to understand the nature of various kinds of metapoem, each of which can never be more that a single interpretation out of many of the original whose image it darkly mirrors. [31]

André Lefevere, in his text Translating Poetry: Seven Strategies and a Blueprint (1975), reveals a similar approach. Lefevere, attempting a more empirical, objective approach, takes one source text--that of Catallus' sixty-fourth poem--and describes seven different types of translation based on correspondingly distinct methodologies which tend to govern the translation process. Each opens up certain possibilities and closes others: (1) phonemic translation works well in recovering etymologically related words and reproducing onomapoeia, but shatters meaning; (2) literal translation may transfer a sense of the semantic content, but often by smuggling in explanation and sacrificing "literary" value; (3) metrical translation may preserve the meter but distorts sense and syntax; (4) prose versions avoid sense distortions, but the very form robs the text of poetic resonance; (5) rhyming translations are governed by so many restraints that words end up meaning what they do not mean, and the end result often is boring, prudish and pedantic; (6) blank verse achieves greater accuracy and a high degree of literalness, but imposed meter forces contortions, expansion and contractions, often making translated versions verbose and clumsy; and (7) interpretation, including versions and imitations, which interpret the theme to make the text easier for reception may do so at the expense of the structure and texture.

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[31]Ibid., 102-103.

While Lefevere is attempting greater objectivity and historical accuracy in his description of Catallus translations, he does not refrain from revealing his preferences.   Finding all linguistic versions--categories one through six--similarly distorting, he prefers the last category as one that covers up the least in translating a text's content.   Presenting his own bias in a short section of the book titled "Prescription," Lefevere explains why most of the above approaches fail:

> The reason why most translations, versions and imitations are unsatisfactory renderings of the source text is simply this: they all concentrate exclusively on one aspect of that source text only, rather than on its totality.   This exclusive concentration can be traced back to either idiosyncratic or traditional motivations.   The motivation is obviously idiosyncratic in the case of the phonemic translator, the writer of versions, and the imitator.   It results from an excessive respect for tradition in the case of the metrical, the rhyming, the blank-verse, and the prose translator.   Once this unfortunate starting point has been established, the process through which the actual translations come into being is much the same in all cases.[32]

Lefevere himself prefers Holmes' second version, one that privileges the function of the text on the original readers.   The terminology of Lefevere's "new" prescription, however, recalls the earlier work of Nida and Wilss:

> The translator's task is precisely to render the source text, the original author's interpretation of a given theme expressed in a number of variations, accessible to readers not familiar with these variations, by replacing the original author's variation with their equivalents in a different language, time, place and tradition.   Particular emphasis must be given to the fact that the translator has to replace *all* the variations contained in the source text by their equivalents.[33]

Lefevere continues to prescribe, compiling a set of rules to which competent literary translators should minimally conform.   A translator must

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[32]André Lefevere, _Translating Poetry: Seven Strategies and A Blueprint_ (Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1975), 99.

[33]Ibid.

(1) comprehend the source text as a whole--literally, socially, culturally and linguistically; (2) measure the communicative value and replace it without smoothing or distorting the original; (3) distinguish between culture-bound and structure-bound time and place elements and topicalize the former and retain the latter; and (4) select, within the literary tradition of the target language, a form to match the position of the source.[34]   Like Nida, Lefevere wants to themetize the text, but like Levi, do so without smoothing over its "literariness."   He talks of "preserving distortions," but what he means here is preserving the *ostranenie* devices which seem strange in the original and set it off from the existing tradition of a particular time and place.   His recommendation of a particular historical method (his own), undermines a project that is otherwise historically sensitive.

The determining contradiction in the early period of Translation Studies is that it attempts to be both objectively descriptive and subjectively prescriptive.   If we contrast Holmes' concept of translation equivalence as revealed in his essay "On Matching and Making Maps: From a Translator's Notebook" and that of Raymond Van den Broeck in his essay "The Concept of Equivalence in Translation Theory: Some Critical Reflections," the problem is most apparent.   Traditional translation theory was based upon premises of original meaning, training translators to   interpret that meaning correctly in order to reproduce it properly, and resulted in rules and laws about the procedure whereby products could "objectively" be compared and evaluated. Holmes begins from the opposite viewpoint.   He writes:

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[34]Ibid., 101-102.

> No translation of a poem is ever "the same as" the poem itself.
> It can't be, since everything about it is different: another language,
> another tradition, another author, another audience.
> Nor is a translation of a poem really "equivalent" to its original,
> at least in any strict sense, however fashionable that term has
> become among the theorists of translation.[35]

Whereas Richards, Nida and Wilss are intent upon educating translators to produce unified, coherent, single reproductions of the original, or at least to reach a consensus regarding what the ideal single reproduction should be, Holmes argues that to begin with such a premise misses something essential about the nature of translation. Holmes suggests that asking for equivalence extends beyond the pragmatic limitations encompassing the situation; he recommends the experiment:

> Put five translators onto rendering even a syntactically straight-
> forward, metrically unbound, imagically simple poem like Carl
> Sandberg's "Fog" into, say Dutch. The chances that any two of the
> five translations will be identical are very slight indeed. Then set
> twenty-five other translators into turning the five Dutch versions
> back into English, five translators to a version. Again, the result
> will almost certainly be as many renderings as there are translators.
> To call this equivalence is perverse.[36]

Holmes insists that the focus of Translation Studies should be the process of translation, analyzing the choices from a myriad of possibilities that a translator makes. Once initial choices are made, the translation begins to generate rules of its own, determining further choices. Holmes introduces two elements that translation theory has historically avoided: subjective decisions and accident. Of the latter Holmes writes:

Two languages can chance to "interlock" at specific points, quite

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[35]James Holmes, "On Matching and Making Maps: From a Translator's Notebook," _Delta_ Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter, 1973-74), 67.

[36]Ibid., 68.

accidentally, in such a fashion that the translation appears to come through more or less all of a piece. This happens all too rarely, but when it does, the translation seems almost to write itself. One case in my experience was Lucebert's "School der poezie," where English presented matching rhymes almost for the taking . . . This, of course, is a fluke of fate: a translator trying to render the same poem into, say, French, might throw up his hands in despair.[37]

Holmes notes that more often than not, the translation process involves initial decisions that determine later decisions. No choice is made without certain costs; changes will have to be made over the course of the translation which will be deliberate departures from the original. Translation establishes a hierarchy of correspondences, emphasizing, for example, expressive qualities over original message, rhyme and meter over free verse, appellative function over semantic content; any of these choices will ultimately restrict and determine the kind of correspondences available during the course of the translation process. Such decisions are neither right nor wrong, but both, always limiting and opening up, closing off certain avenues and possibilities, but simultaneously creating new relations and possible alternatives.

Van den Broeck begins his essay "The Concept of Equivalence in Translation Theory" in agreement with Holmes; he avoids much of the same theoretical terminology that characterized translation traditionally. He quotes Holmes' experiment yielding twenty-five renderings of the same text, concluding that "we must by all means reject the idea that the equivalence relation applies to translation."[38] He realizes that all the speculation on

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[37]Ibid., 78.

[38]Raymond Van den Broeck, "The Concept of Equivalence in Translation Theory: Some Critical Reflections," in Literature and Translation, 33.

defining equivalence by linguists, translation theorists, scholars, philosophers, and philologists contain many different and contradictory equations, especially when applied to phenomena as complex as poetry in translation. Van den Broeck spells out his opposition to the terminology and its theoretical implications which characterizes traditional translation theory:

> Many different labels have been put forward so far, each of them representing a specific characterization of what an acceptable translation is to be. To mention only a few: *similarity, analogy, adequacy, invariance, congruence*--all these are key terms by which the standard relationship between original and translation has been referred to.
>
> For reasons I hope to make more obvious, most contemporary theoretical discussions use the term *equivalence*. This paper aims at being a critical approach to this terminological usage and its theoretical implications. In it special attention will be paid to some basic assumptions that are necessary for a true understanding of how literary translations may be regarded as "equivalent" to their originals.[39]

Despite Van den Broeck's criticism of the terms implying similarity, analogy, equivalence, the last sentence of his thesis statement above shows that he intends to recuperate "equivalence" for his own concept of "true understanding." How does his argument unfold?

Van den Broeck's redefinition of equivalence is based upon the semiotics of Peirce as applied by Robert Abernathy, the philosophical abstraction of Charles Stevenson, and the applied linguistics of J. C. Catford. Briefly Van den Broeck begins with a reevaluation of the conception of "correspondence," drawing on Peirce's distinction between "types" and "tokens" whereby multiple tokens can refer to one type, as in several

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[39]Ibid., 29.

versions ("additional instances") of the original poem ("prime instance"),

shifting the focus of translation studies from a "one-to-one" to a "many-to-

one" notion of correspondence.[40]   Van den Broeck expands upon Peirce's

notion of "type" by borrowing the concept of a universal "megatype" from

philosophy, reaching the conclusion that two translations, if they have

"approximately the same" meaning, can be identified as representing the

"same megatype."   To substantiate this claim, he quotes Charles Stevenson:

> Two tokens will belong to the same megatype if and only if they have
> approximately the same meaning; so it is not necessary that the tokens
> belong to the same language or that they have that similarity in shape
> and sound that makes them belong to the same type.   Thus any token
> of "table" and any token of "mensa," though not of the same type, will
> nevertheless be of the same megatype.[41]

Like Holmes, Van den Broeck locates translation in a network of various

instances of one "megatype" or "prime instance"; meaning is reduced to

approximations of something somehow identifiable yet always textualized in

"tokens" or "additional instances."   Yet he retains a formal concept of

meaning, as do the Russian formalists, in which meaning is seen as a

property of language and not as something extrinsic.   Megatype thus is

determined by a network of tokens and yet also transcends those types,

thereby also transcending language.   Quoting J. C. Catford, Van den Broeck

arrives at a definition of meaning as "the total network of relations entered

into by any linguistic form" and adopts Catford's definition of translation

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[40]See Robert Abernathy, "The Problem of Linguistic Equivalence," Proceedings of the 12th Symposium in Applied Mathematics, ed. Roman Jacobson (Providence, R.I., 1961), 95-98. Quoted by Van den Broeck, "The Concept of Equivalence in Translation Theory," 34.

[41]Charles Stevenson, "On 'What's a Poem?'," Philosophical Review, 66 (1957), 337. Quoted by Van den Broeck, Ibid., 34-35.

equivalence: "translation equivalence occurs when an SL [Source Language] and a TL [Target Language] text or item are relatable to (at least some of) the same relevant features of situation substance."[42] For Van den Broeck those relevant features have nothing to do with semantic reference, and everything to do with textual reference. He again refers to Catford, arguing that "both texts must be relatable only to the *functionally relevant* features of the communicative situation."[43] In contrast to Van den Broeck, however, Catford regards the functionally relevant features as relatively indeterminate and largely a matter of opinion, as can be seen by the full context of his argument:

> We can distinguish, then, between situational features which are *linguistically relevant*, and those which are *functionally relevant* in that they are relevant to the communicative function of the text in that situation. For translation equivalence to occur, then, both SL and TL text must be relatable to the *functionally relevant* features of the situation. A decision, in any particular case, as to what is functionally relevant in this sense must in our present state of knowledge remain to some extent a matter of opinion.[44]

Van den Broeck, on the other hand, feels that those functionally relevant features can be precisely determined, standardized and evaluated. Van den Broeck concludes in agreement with Lefevere that the original author's intent and the original text's function can be determined and translated via a

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[42]J.[ohn] C.[unnison] Catford, A Linguistic Theory of Translation: An Essay in Applied Linguistics (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 35. Quoted by Van den Broeck, "The Concept of Equivalence in Translation Theory," 38.

[43]Van den Broeck, "The Concept of Equivalence in Translation Theory," 38.

[44]Catford, A Linguistic Theory of Translation, 94.

method of typologizing and topicalizing so that it will "possess a literary value" equivalent to the source text and function accordingly. Van den Broeck writes:

> If the textual element of a literary translation is to possess a literary value equivalent to that of the original, a decisive part will be played by the functional equivalence of such categories as, for instance, the thematic means, the means to build up characters, contextual procedures, the prosodic elements in lyric poetry . . . It is therefore right to say with Lefevere, "if and when both the communicative value and the time-place-tradition elements of the source text have been replaced by their nearest possible equivalents in the target text."[45]

In conclusion, we see how the demand to preserve literariness at all costs influences not only methodology, but also evaluative standards. The problem with the early Translation Studies approach of Holmes, Lefevere and Van den Broeck is that they have foregrounded the internal organization of the text and its inherent framework to such a degree that the referent totally vanishes. Much of the problem centers around the use of the term "function." When Miko, for example, refers to the word "function" he is talking about a very subtle linguistic feature of the text that gives it its "literariness." He isolates distinct structural elements in language and describes them, hoping to determine a paradigm of universal elements true for all languages. He has in mind specific ahistorical universals of form which are independent from any specific cultures. Translation Studies uses the term "function" to refer both the way Nida uses the word--in terms of communication theory and reducing the information load so that the message "functions" similarly in the receiving culture--and the way Miko

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[45]Ibid., 39, with reference to Lefevere, <u>Translating Poetry</u>, 102.

uses the term--very subtle linguistic features that only the most informed linguistic scholars and literary critics may discern.[46] Nida uses the term "function" to talk about the response of real readers who have linguistic limitations; his model presumes a message channel full of impediments. Miko's reference to "function" presumes an absolutely pristine message channel with an ideal reader who knows an author's original intent, is fluent in numerous languages, can distinguish minute and complex linguistic features, and has creative poetic ability. Few such readers exist; Miko's model presumes not merely a competent reader, but an ideal one. The Translation Studies model is thus based upon a non-existent receptor as well as a non-existent referent. Not fully tied to thought or communication, it resembles the modernistic/futuristic texts of the twenties which referred to nothing but themselves, and were totally autonomous and "meaningless."

The reason why Van den Broeck wants to reclaim the terminology of traditional metaphysical philosophy for Translation Studies is that this so-called new approach retains the same form vs. content dichotomy that characterizes traditional philosophical dualism. According to Lefevere and Van den Broeck, the problem with translations that privilege formal aspects-

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[46]When Juri Tynjanov talks about "function," he distinguishes between at least three kinds: "constructional function," "literary function," and "verbal function." "Constructional function" refers to the interrelationship of formal elements within a text, and is further subdivided into "auto-functional" elements (similar elements in other works) and "syn-functional" elements (different elements in the same work). "Literary function" refers to how the text relates to the specific literary tradition, and "verbal function" refers to the texts interaction within society. See Juri Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," trans. C.A. Luplow, Readings in Russian Poetics, ed. Ladislav Matejka and Krystina Pomorska (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Studies, 1978), 66-88.

-rhyme, meter, phonetics, syntax--is not that they cannot transfer the content, but that they do not adequately translate even the formal properties of the original text.   They do not focus _enough_ on the "total" form, the proper theme in relation to literary tradition, and the specific "literary" features.   This emphasis upon the purely formal characteristics presumes the same form/content dualism without theorizing about the relation of the two. If the _effectiveness_ of the formal representation of the object gets translated, then presumably the object itself will be translated as well.   Translation Studies claims a position that is theoretically new and mediatory as opposed to hermeneutic, yet it finds itself embedded in and perpetuating that very same metaphysical tradition.

Ostranenie as the Evaluative Standard

In order to demonstrate the practice of Translation Studies, I turn to the text _Translation Studies_ written by Susan Bassnett-McGuire, whose book grew out of work with post-graduate students at the University of Warwick in England in close consultation with the Leuven/Amsterdam group.   The text is one of the first publications abroad about the Dutch project, and is intended to serve as an introduction to the field, appealing to a broader audience; Bassnett-McGuire is thus deliberately didactic and provocative in order to stimulate interest, promote discussion and clarify differences.   She subscribes to the two fundamental yet contradictory tenets of early Translation Studies: that there is no right way to translate a literary text, and that the interpretation of the translation be based on the comparison of the text's "function" as original and as translation.   After reviewing a series of translations, she writes:

> All the translations reflect the individual translators' readings,
> interpretations and selection of criteria   determined by the concept
> of *function* both of the translation and of the original text . . . in some
> cases *modernization* of language and tone has received priority
> treatment, whilst in other cases archaization has been the dominant
> determining feature.   The success or failure of these attempts must
> be left to the discretion of the reader, but the variations in method
> do serve to emphasize the point that there is no single *right* way of
> translating a poem.[47]

Despite the attempt to avoid judgement, her preferences can be seen in her

analysis of the following two translations of a poem by Guiseppe Ungaretti:[48]

Ungaretti:

Un'altra notte
In quest'oscuro
colle mani
gelate
distinguo
il mio viso

Mi vedo
abandonato   nell'infinito

Patrick Creagh:

In this dark
with frozen hands
I make out
my face

I see myself
adrift in infinite space.

Charles Tomlinson:

In this dark
with hands
frozen
I make out
my face
I see myself
abandoned in the infinite.

With such a short poem, the reader would have liked to have had the title line

reproduced as well, but let's assume that the omission was a typist's.   Bassnett-

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[47]Susan Bassnett-Mcguire, <u>Translation Studies</u> (London: Methuen,
1980), 101.

[48]Bassnett-McGuire acknowledges Arnold Mondadori for Ungaretti's
poem, <u>Stand</u> for Charles Tomlinson's translation, and Penguin Books for
Patrick Creagh's version. See , Ibid., 101-102.

McGuire goes through a brief comparison, noting that Tomlinson's version has seven lines to Creagh's six, Tomlinson distorts English syntax to preserve line order, both versions stress the "I" pronoun, both translate "distinguo" as "make out" and Tomlinson's last line retains the single word "infinite" whereas Creagh added explanation in order to preserve a rhyme. The description appears to be neutral, describing advantages and disadvantages for the translators' choices, each of which seem justifiable.

Bassnett-McGuire then begins evaluation according to Russian formalist principles. She writes:

> The apparent simplicity of the Italian poem, with its clear images and simple structure conceals a deliberate recourse to that process defined by the Russian Formalists as *ostranenie*, i.e., making strange, or consciously thickening language within the system of the individual work to heighten perception . . . Seen in this light, version A [Creagh], whilst pursuing the "normalcy" of Ungaretti's linguistic structures, loses much of the power of what Ungaretti described as "word-image." Version B [Tomlinson], on the other hand, opts for a higher tone or register, with rhetorical devices of inverted sentence structure and the long Latinate final line in an attempt to arrive at a "thickened" language by another route.[49]

Instead of historicizing the two translations, discussing how they function in a specific context, Bassnett-McGuire invokes ahistorical measuring standards. She knows the original intent of Ungaretti: to present a "word-image." Thus Creagh's version "loses much of the power" that Tomlinson's does not, and Bassnett-McGuire judges the latter better because its "thickened" language affects the target language audience much the same as the original image. Whatever the Italian may be, however, it certainly isn't thick, and the Italian does not need to invent syntax to create

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[49]Ibid., 103.

defamiliarization; it is exactly the simple image and regular order of things which is estranging.

Bassnett-McGuire's prejudices manifest themselves more vividly when she looks at three versions of Catallus' thirteenth poem. I reproduce the first several lines of each version of her citations:[50]

Catullus:

> Cenabis bene, mi Fabulle, apud me
> paucis, si tibi di favent, diebus,
> si tecum attuleris bonam atque magnam
> cenam, non sine candida puella
> et vino et sale et omnibus cachinnis.
> haec, si, inquam, attuleris, venuste noster,
> cenabis bene; nam tui Catulli
> plenus sacculus est aranearum.
> sed contra accipies meros amores . . .

Sir William Marris, 1924:

> Now, please the gods, Fabullus, you
> Shall dine here well in a day or two;
> But bring a good big dinner, mind,
> Likewise a pretty girl, and wine
> And wit and jokes of every kind.
> Bring these, I say, good man, and dine
> Right well: for your Catullus' purse
> Is full--but only cobwebs bears.
> But you with love itself I'll dose . . .

Frank O. Copely, 1957:

> say Fabullus
> you'll get a swell dinner at my house
> a couple three days from now (if your luck holds out)
> all you gotta do is bring the dinner

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            and make it good and be sure there's plenty
Oh  yes  don't  forget  a  girl  (I  like  blondes)
and  a  bottle  of  wine  maybe
            and any good jokes and stories you've heard
just  do  that  like  I  tell  you  ol'  pal
you'll  get  a  swell  dinner
       ?
     what,
         about,
             ME?
well;
         well here take a look in my wallet,
             yeah those're cobwebs
but   here,
         I'll give you something too
             I CAN'T GIVE YOU ANYTHING BUT
                 LOVE BABY . . .
```

Ben   Johnson:

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To  night,  grave  sir,  both  my  poore  house,  and  I
Doe  equally  desire  your  companie:
Not  that  we  thinke  us  worthy  such  a  ghest,
But  that  your  worth  will  dignifie  our  feast
With  those  that  come;  whose  grace  may  make  that  seeme
Something  which,  else  could  hope  for  no  esteeme.
It  is  the  faire  acceptance,  Sir,  creates
the  entertaynment  perfect:  not  the  cates
Yet  shall  you  have,  to  rectifie  your  palate,
An  olive,  capers,  or  some  better  sallade
Ushring  the  mutton;  with  a  short-leg'd  hen,
If  we  can  get  her,  full  of  egs,  and  then,
Limons,  and  wine  for  sauce:  to  these,  a  coney
Is  not  to  be  despair'd  of,  for  our  money;
And,  though  fowle,  now,  be  scarce,  yet  there  are  clarkes,
The  skie  not  falling,  thinke  we  may  have  larkes. . . .
```

In her analysis, McGuire points out the obvious differences: Marris attempts

to preserve rhyme and meter and as much syntax as possible; Copley focuses

on the relaxed and friendly tone as well as on the close relationship between

the author and his guest; Johnson, who translated the sonnet into a forty-one

line poem, makes no attempt to "translate," but uses Catullus' poem and works

outwards from it to create a new poem. Her conclusions, however, cease to be objective. She dislikes Marris' adherence to the form of the original:

> One is left wondering exactly what Marris' criteria for choosing to
> translate this poem must have been. Had he merely wanted to
> transmit the content of the original to English readers he would
> have been content with paraphrase, so clearly he was concerned
> to create an English poem. He seems to have fallen into the
> pitfalls awaiting the translator who decides to tie himself to a
> very formal rhyme scheme in the TL version, at the expense,
> in this case, of giving the English poem any force and substance. . . .

She provocatively suggests that Copley's version is actually closer to the "meaning" of the poem than Marris' translation:

> . . . The Copley version, then, far from being an aberration of the
> original, in some respects comes closer to the Latin poem than
> the more literal version by Marris. As Popovic has pointed out,
> the fact that the process of translation may involve shifts in the
> semantic properties of the text does not mean that the translator
> wanted to underemphasize the semantic appeal of the original. . . .

Then she argues that the Johnson version, which is not a translation at all, is the closet of all to the "language" of Catullus and possesses an element of "beauty":

> . . . The third version is very obviously not a close translation of
> Catullus' Poem 13 and yet at the same time it comes nearer in
> mood, tone and language to Catullus than either of the other
> versions . . . The plea of poverty, the affection between the two
> friends, the contrast between what is projected as the ideal dinner
> 'and what is the possible dinner, all these elements are beautifully
> expressed by Johnson. . . .

Finally, in her conclusion, she invokes the ambiguous term "function" to measure the different versions, suggesting that adherence to structural elements in fact has been negatively productive:

> . . . With the three versions of the Catullus poem above, it was
> possible to see how the closer the translation came to trying to
> recreate the *linguistic* and *formal* structures of the original, the
> further removed it became in terms function. Meanwhile, huge
> deviations of form and language managed to come closer to the

original intention.[51]

Bassnett-McGuire's dismissal of Marris' translation is less than convincing; preserving rhyme and meter complicates the translation process, yet Marris does it with a certain amount of skill and without as much sacrifice of content as Bassnett-McGuire indicates. Secondly, the use of Popovic to defend the Copley version seems to be an abuse of his concept of shift, which was originally tied to structural differences between two languages and two literary situations; Copley's version is so idiosyncratic and the shifts are so subjective that they extend beyond structural necessity. Thirdly, Johnson's text is so removed, so quantitatively different from Catullus' text, that one has no idea where Catullus' text ends and where Johnson's begin. The primary problem with Bassnett-McGuire's analysis concerns her emphasis on the "function" of the text as a measuring criterion; she does not merely confuse the concept of "function," she distorts it to conform to her own poetics: she seems to favor adding *ostranenie* effects when none were there before, adding parenthetical remarks if the translator feels so motivated, and even adding entire passages to make the text relevant to the contemporary reader. Any deviation, addition, deletion could be labelled "functional equivalent." Just what are the rules here? What is the difference between shifting an adjective from a normal position to an inverted one and adding pop lyrics to make a text relevant? What is the functional equivalence of Joyce's Ulysses in today's time and place? Should the translator make it so obscure and so pornographic that no publisher would touch it? Bassnett-McGuire provocatively presents a case for creative translation, but does not

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[51]Ibid., 88-91.

investigate the implications. Her theory presumes knowledge of the author's intention and the original function (which Marris lacks), but she does not indicate who determines what the intent was and how the text originally functioned? Her approach recalls adaptation strategies for the stage; yet, ironically, instead of preserving the defamiliarization features of the original, the text is so manipulated that many historically relevant details get lost in the contemporary setting.[52]

A second problem with Bassnett-McGuire's approach concerns the relation of the translated sign to the source sign and subsequently to the referent. Texts which draw attention to themselves through formal techniques and are primarily self-referential rather than denotative are well served by her methodology. In many cases, however, the initial text does _not_ privilege defamiliarization devices. We have seen how her method may work well with modernism/futurism, but what about an oral narrative which requires redundancy, clarity, simplicity, and a common referent. What about social realism? How would she suggest we translated Balzac? Translation theory needs to address the problem of not just the relationship of signs to the receiver, but also of the signs to the referent. In Johnson's text, for example, the girl of the fourth line entirely disappears, sacrificed for some concept of functional equivalence. Clearly, Bassnett-McGuire has framed her discussion with such extreme examples for didactic purposes in

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[52]It should come as no surprise that Bassnett-McGuire's recent work concerns the theory of translating theatre texts, specifically translating performance texts as opposed to the written text. See Susan Bassnett-McGuire," Ways Through the Labyrinth: Strategies and Methods for Translating Theatre Texts" in The Manipulation of Literature, ed. Theo Hermans (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), 87-102.

order to challenge traditional notions of fidelity; her analyses do raise provocative questions about the difference between translation and adaptation, translation and interpretation, translation and explanation. Yet despite the radical appearance of her methodology, her poetics do not represent any theoretical advance in the field. She presents the theoretical issues raised by the Dutch scholars as part of "translation problems" which have characterized translation theory throughout its history, yet again as part of the continuing faithful/free saga. Still, Bassnett-McGuire cannot be blamed for her application of Translation Studies to her own theatrical approach to translation; certainly theoretical support for her priorities can be found in the work of Levy, Popovic, Lefevere, and Van den Broeck. Her "use" of Translation Studies is partially determined by terminological confusion within the field, its inscription in traditional philosophical dualism, and its privileging an aesthetic that lends itself to appropriation by referenceless and subjective stratagems.

Whereas Bassnett-McGuire uses Translation Studies to support her own translation strategy, one which contains evaluative standards based upon the prevailing norms characteristic of modernism, James Holmes proceeds more cautiously before making evaluative judgements. He wants to reveal first the process of translation in order to understand why certain decisions were made, before judging whether the result is good/bad, true/untrue, understood/misunderstood. He presents his translation of Paul Snoek's "Rustiek Lanschapje" and then talks about how his initial decisions

subsequently determined the remaining translation choices. The source and target text follow:[53]

Paul Snoek (1959):

rustiek   landschapje

De *ganzen* zijn net onze*tantes*:
zij waggelen en wandelen
en worden waterandend
in de modder oud

Maar plots doet een geweldig
knalletje hun landelijke,
liefelijke vliezen bijna scheuren.

Dat was een hereoer natuurlijk:
hij schit met loden spek,
de gek. Hij sneed een appel
in de bek en riep spierrood
van ontspanning: 'Ik mest,
jawel, ik mest een gulden peer'.

Of die *kwakende tantes* moesten lachen.
1. Zij snoeien hun rozen
met een kromgekweekt mes;
2. Hoe oud zijn de *ganzen*?

James Holmes (1965):

rustic   landscape

The *ducks* are like our *cousins*;
they waggle and walk
and slavering at the mouth
in the mud grow old.

But all at once a terrific
bang almost breaks
their pleasant peasant membranes.

That was the farmer himself of course:
he's trying the shotgun out.

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[53]Italics mine. Holmes, "On Matching and Making Maps," 76-77.

the lout.   He cut an apple
in the snout and cried, stark red
with relief: 'I'm dressing,
yes, a golden pear.'

And did those *quacking cousins* have a laugh.
(1) They prune their roses
with crooked knife;
(2) How old are the *ducks*?

The shifts (italicized) of the first line are dictated by an incompatibility of

language differences--both phonetic and semantic as well as denotative and

connotative--between Dutch and English.   How that initial problem is solved

determines the rest of the poem.   Holmes reveals how he approached the

problem and his attempt at resolution:

> A fundamental theme of the Dutch poem is the juxtaposition of
> *ganzen* [geese] and *tantes* [our aunts], with such descriptive terms
> as *waggelen, wandelen, worden . . . oud* and *kwakende* applying to
> both.   These juxtaposed and coalescing images (suddenly separated
> again in the two "clues" which close the poem, turning it into a picture
> puzzle) are reinforced acoustically by a complex system of alliteration
> and internal rhyme.
>
> A low-rank translation of the opening line would yield "The
> geese are like our aunts" or a similar rendering.   But that lacks the
> acoustic complexity of the Dutch.   Moreover it leads the translator
> to the further problem that in English geese do not quack (see line
> fourteen) but honk . . . Retention of the geese leads to honking
> relatives . . . Retention of the quacking, on the other hand, leads from
> geese to ducks.   A choice for ducks and quacking instead of honking
> and geese opens up the possibility of turning the aunts into cousins . . .
> In other words, the major cluster of choices facing the translator of
> this poem is that of either reconstructing the acoustic qualities of the
> Dutch at the cost of shifting the nature of two of the poem's major
> images (though preserving the nature of their juxtaposition) or
> retaining the images at the cost of introducing alien implications with
> the "honking" and failing to parallel the acoustic qualities of the
> poem.[54]

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[54]James Holmes, "Poem and Metapoem," quoted by Holmes, "On Matching
and Making Maps," 79-80.

Holmes argues that translation involves decision making, and one decision effects each other decision. Yet at a certain point, the translation begins to generate its own set of rules, precluding certain choices and opening up insights that perhaps were not visible before. However the translation turns out, other translations are always possible, not better or worse, but different, depending upon the poetics of the translator, the initial choices and the points when the languages interlock and begin to develop not in the source or target language, but in that grey area in between. The difference in Holmes and Bassnett-McGuire's approach is that Holmes tries to preserve the sound, the sense, the rhythm, the textual "material" of the thing in language and recreate those specific sensations--sound, sense and association--despite inherent limitations in the target language whereas Bassnett-McGuire leaps to the central theme and meaning, intuits the "original function," and replaces the entire text with all its particular resonance and associations with something new and completely different, but which theoretically effects the reader the same way. Holmes prefers instead to try to transmit those beautiful Dutch consonants and vowels, to recreate the smell the of the mud and the sound of the gaggling precisely in order to reveal a sense the time and place perhaps foreign to and yet of interest to the receiving culture. With the translations Bassnett-McGuire's privileges, we learn a lot more about the cultures of Renaissance England or American sixties than about Latin culture, the sound of the Latin language, or the Latin semantic fields of association.

Translation Studies as Literary History

Whereas Holmes is trying very hard to avoid making theoretical generalizations about what the object (the translated text) should look like before the source text has been confronted, the language incompatibilities analyzed, and options weighed which will dictate methodology, Van den Broeck, André Lefevere and Susan Bassnett-McGuire confront the descriptive problem with evaluative standards already in place. The theoretical differences between them, however, may not preclude their cooperation in terms of translation scholarship. For example, Translation Studies has come to an agreement that the translation scholar must analyze the system of both the correspondences and deviations constructed by the translator. In his essay "Describing Literary Translations and Methods," Holmes elaborates:

> The task of the scholar who wishes to describe the relationship
> between the translated text and its original would seem to be
> obvious. He must attempt to determine the features of the
> translator's two maps and to discover his system of rules, those
> of deviation, projection, and above all, correspondence--in other
> words, the translator's poetic.[55]

However obvious the relationship may appear, such a description is not easy, for two reasons. First, invariably, no material for analysis exists except the two texts, the original and the translation, and the scholar has no access to what went on in the translator's mind in terms of the decision making process. Secondly, even if the translator explicitly elaborates in an introduction or preface the main criteria and poetic system governing the translated text, the result may not correspond to the original intention. Thus, the scholar must trace the relationship between the translation and original

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[55]James Holmes, "Describing Literary Translations: Model and Methods," in Literature and Translation, 77.

along an imaginary path, for texts documenting the path (such as Robert Bly's above) are virtually non-existent. To date, none of the disciplines of literary criticism has presented a methodology sufficient to explain objectively the translation process; previous attempts have made comparisons on an arbitrary basis, characterized by intuition and the method of influence studies, and have been glaringly incomplete. Translation Studies proposes a more rigorous approach by trying to reach an agreement on a repertory of specific features to be compared (such as the one Miko outlined above), then establishing where the determining shifts occur (as defined by Popovič above), and finally analyzing those shifts systematically, incorporating both synchronic, structural textual analysis as well as diachronic literary intertextual and socio-cultural analysis, in order to determine the meaning and function of any specific translated text. Van den Broeck concurs, suggesting that limited invariance (approximate meaning) goes hand in hand with translation shifts (functional equivalents). He writes:

> The invariant element of a translation may be understood as the relation between all the existing translations of the same original, in other words what they have in common. Variant, on the other hand, is that part of a translation which is subject to substitution. This is the domain of transformations or "*shifts* of expression" (a key term in Popovič's theory), the domain of *metacreation*.[56]

In order to relate the original and the translation in terms of their stable core and their determining shifts, Van den Broeck also points to Miko and his

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[56]Van den Broeck, "The Concept of Equivalence in Translation Theory," 41.

system of expressive properties.[57]   Lefevere, using slightly different

terminology, makes the same point:

> Literature evolves both cladogenetically (new independent units arise
> from a basic unit) and anagenetically (progressive changes take place
> in the course of time). It is both polytypic (composed of a cluster of
> types) and polymorphic (consisting of individual shapes). The task
> of metaliterature is to codify the cladogenetic and anagenetic evolution
> of literary procedures, as well as the reasons for that evolution, and
> the institutions through which that evolution takes place . . . It is also
> the task of metaliterature to relate the polymorphic to the polytypic
> (texts to procedures) for in that way only can the meaning of a work
> be established.[58]

Holmes, aware of the magnitude of such a task, argues that working out such

a system of codification and undertaking the process of describing literature

in the above fashion is the next necessary step for the field. He concludes

his essay "Describing Literary Translations" as follows:

> The task of working out such a repertory would be enormous. But
> if scholars were to arrive at a consensus regarding it, in the way, for
> instance, that botanists since Linnaeus have arrived at a consensus
> regarding systematic methods for the description of plants, it would
> then become possible, for the first time, to provide descriptions of
> original and translated texts, of their respective maps, and of
> correspondence networks, rules, and hierarchies that would be
> mutually comparable. And only on the basis of mutually comparable
> descriptions can we go on to produce well-founded studies of a larger
> scope: comparative studies of the translations of one author or one
> translator, or--a greater leap--period, genre, one-language (or one-
> culture), or general translation histories.[59]

Translation Studies, which began with a fairly modest proposal, that of

focusing on the translations themselves and better describing the process of

translation, has discovered that the task will be much more complex than

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[57]Ibid., 44-45.

[58]Lefevere, "Translation: the Focus of the Growth of Literary
Knowledge," 25.

[59]Holmes, "Describing Literary Translations," 81.

initially conceived. The job is certainly beyond the scope of any particular scholar, no matter how knowledgeable of linguistic, literary, and socio-cultural theory--hence the proposal that literary scholars from a variety of fields agree upon a working methodology and unite the efforts around this enormous goal. An analysis of their progress toward that search for a complete system describing translation within literary history is the subject of chapter five.

CHAPTER V

POLYSYSTEMS THEORY

Transcending the Borders of Translation Studies

The papers presented at two Translation Studies conferences following the 1976 colloquium in Louvain--the first in 1978 in Tel Aviv, whose proceedings appeared as a special issue of Poetics Today (Summer-Autumn, 1981) and the second in 1980 in Antwerp, whose proceedings were published in a special translation issue of Dispositio (1982)[1]--illustrate the advance toward a more comprehensive theory. The most important development within the field came from the incorporation of theoretical work by Itamar Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury, both of whom contributed papers to the 1976 conference, but whose work until that date was relatively new to the scholars in The Netherlands.[2] In a series of papers written from 1970-1977 and collected in 1978 as Papers in Historical Poetics, Even-Zohar first introduced the term "polysystem" for the aggregate of literary systems,

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[1]Itamar Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury, eds., Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations, special issue of Poetics Today 2:4 (Summer Autumn, 1981); André Lefevere and Kenneth David Jackson, eds., The Art and Science of Translation, special issue of Dispositio, Vol. VII, No. 19-20-21 (1982).

[2]In the bibliographies of Lefevere's Translating Poetry (1975), Holmes "A Basic Bibliography of Books on Translation Studies 1956-1976" in Literature and Translation (1978) and Bassnett-McGuire's Translation Studies (1980), no mention of work by either Israeli scholar appears. The first reference to Even-Zohar's notion of "polysystem" occurs in André Lefevere, Literary Knowledge (Van Gorcum/Assen, 1977), 53.

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including everything from "high" or "canonized" forms (e.g., innovative verse) such as poetry to "low" or "non-canonized" forms (e.g., children's literature and popular fiction) in a given culture. Even-Zohar recognized both the "primary" (creating new items and models) as well as "secondary" (reinforcing existing items and models) importance of translated literature in literary history.[3] Gideon Toury, a younger colleague, adopted the polysystems concept, isolated and defined certain translation "norms" that influence translation decisions, and incorporated these factors in the larger framework of a comprehensive theory of translation.[4] These ideas were not new ones, but were based upon work done by late Russian formalists and evolved from a decade of work by scholars at Tel Aviv University who had undertaken the very ambitious project of describing the entire "History of Literary Translation into Hebrew." Early in the 1970's, Even-Zohar developed polysystems hypotheses while working on a model for Israeli Hebrew literature; he had published his findings in French as "Aperçu de la litérature israélienne" as early as 1972, though the English version of Even-Zohar's theory did not appear until his Papers in Historical Poetics. Gideon Toury was one of several scholars at Tel Aviv University who participated in various field studies "testing" Even-Zohar's hypotheses during the seventies and had extensive data upon which to base his theoretical conclusions.[5]

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[3]Itamar Even-Zohar, Papers in Historical Poetics (Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, 1978), 7-8.

[4]Gideon Toury, In Search of a Theory of Translation (Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, 1980).

[5]See Itamar Even-Zohar, "Aperçu de la littérature israélienne," Liberté 14 (1972), 104-120; Even-Zohar, "Israeli Hebrew Literature: A Historical

Why did this union of work going on by scholars in the Low Countries and in Israel occur at this moment in time? One reason certainly has to do with the parallel developments in their social and historical situations: the Dutch scholars enjoyed close intellectual contacts with the German and Czech literary and linguistic circles, while the Israelis interacted with German, Russian, and later Anglo-American scholars. A similar perspective on translation also exists in both regions: their countries might be characterized as having few people speaking in "minor" languages, both "national" literatures are very much influenced by "major" literatures around them, the Dutch by German, French, and Anglo-American, and the Israelis by German, Russian, and Anglo-American. The situation in Israel was more extreme than the Dutch, which had its own indigenous tradition, for Hebrew lacked a canon of literary works and was totally dependent upon foreign language texts to provide both diversity and depth. More importantly, however, was the dependence of the culture as a whole upon translation for commercial and political purposes. In the case of the Dutch/Belgian situation, certainly economic, intellectual and social opportunities are enhanced by mulitilingual interaction; in the case of

Model," in Papers in Historical Poetics (Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, 1978), 75-92. Reports on case studies include Shelly Yahalom, "Le Sytème littéraire en état de crise" in Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations, 143-160; Zohar Shavit, "Translation of Children's Literature as a Function of Its Position in the Literary Polysystem," in Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations, 171-180; Gideon Toury, "Norms of Literary Translation into Hebrew 1930-1945, " and "German Children's Literature in Hebrew Translation: The Case of Max und Moritz," in In Search of a Theory of Translation, 122-151.

Israel, the survival of the nation becomes dependent on translation.[6] If the the Dutch and Belgian scholars find themselves at an intellectual crossroads of Europe, the Israeli scholars find themselves at a crossroads not only between Russia and the West, but between Western and "Third World" cultures. In chapter one I noted that Paul Engle has asserted that the future of the world may depend upon the accurate translation of one word; nowhere is this assertion more apparent than in the fragile diplomatic and political situation in the Middle East. There Russian culture does meet Anglo-American; Moslem meets Jewish; social and historical forces from the past influence the present; multilingualism is more prevalent than monolingualism; exiles are as common as "local" nationals. To understand one's past, one's identity, an understanding of translation in and of itself is crucial; translation ceases to be an elite intellectual "game," a footnote to literary scholarship, but becomes fundamental to the <u>lives</u> and livelihood of everyone in the entire region (and maybe the world). For these reasons and others the Bernstein Chair in Translation Theory was created at Tel Aviv University, and the scholars persuaded the school to host the second Translation Studies Symposium, this time entitled "Translation Theory and International Relations," which was held March 28-31, 1978.

Another reason for combining a consideration of Polysystems Theory with Translation Studies, and one which I will focus on in this chapter, is their similarity: a logical connection exists between what was being suggested in the Netherlands and what was being postulated in Israel. The

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[6]Translation as "survival" (*sur-vie/überleben*) will become an important consideration in chapter 5.

Israeli scholars do not contradict the early Translation Studies work, but expand upon it, incorporating earlier theoretical notions of translation equivalence and literary function into a larger structure which enables them to historicize actual translated texts and see the temporal nature of certain aesthetic presuppositions which influence the process of translation. The important theoretical difference between their work and early Translation Studies is that the direction of thought about translation becomes reversed. Translation Studies, like several translation theories before it, tended to look at one-to-one relationships and functional notions of equivalence; it is based on belief of the subjective ability of the translator to derive an equivalent text that in turn influences the literature and cultural conventions in a particular society. Polysystems Theory presumes the opposite: that the social norms and literary conventions in the receiving culture ("target" system) govern the aesthetic presuppositions of the translator and thus influence ensuing translation decisions. In many ways Polysystems Theory is a logical extension of the demands by early Translation Studies theorists; the Israeli scholars have expanded the parameters of what Lefevere, Holmes, and Van den Broeck intended, to the point where translation theory seems to transcend "legitimate" linguistic and literary borders. In the introduction to <u>Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations</u>, the proceedings from the 1978 Tel Aviv conference, the editors Even-Zohar and Toury write:

> Having once adopted a functional(istic) approach, whereby the object is theory dependent, modern translation theory cannot escape transcending "borders." Just as the linguistic "borders" have been transcended, so must the literary ones be transcended. For there are occurrences of a translational nature which call for a

semiotics of culture.[7]

With the incorporation of the historical horizon, Polysystems Theory changes the perspective which has governed traditional translation theory and begins to address a whole new series of questions. Not only are translations being more adequately described and interliterary connections between cultures being better described, but intraliterary relations within the structure of a given cultural system and actual literary and linguistic evolution are also visible by studying translated texts.

The problem with early Translation Studies, according to Polysystem Theorists, was that it attempted both to theorize about the process of translation and to evaluate the success of individual texts synchronically (texts in terms of their pure "literariness"). It purported to have a diachronic component, for it did consider the historical context as well as the target culture (in terms of the text's function in the receiving culture), yet this component tended toward the ahistorical: the theory hypothesized the possibility of a direct importation of an isolated function (the author's original intended function) across centuries. A synchronic evaluation, like Van den Broeck's attempt to recuperate the concept of "translation equivalence" for Translation Studies, was in direct contradiction to a comprehensive diachronic description, which would relativize rather than universalize any concept of equivalence. Any attempt to prescribe one aesthetic over another in terms of approaches to translation was doomed to be undermined by the necessary extension of the parameters of the

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[7]Even-Zohar and Toury, Introduction to _Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations_, x.

historical analysis. Because early translation theory was very much bound up with metaphysical distinctions separating form from content and dualistic theories of representation, it failed to adequately describe the historical situation conditioning specific systems of representation. The Israeli contribution abandons attempts at prescription, incorporates descriptions of multiple translation processes, and analyzes the various historical products. Instead of basing their theory on deep-structured grammatic/thematic types or linguistic features which have similar functions, "modern" translation theory incorporates the idea of systemic change which undermines such static, mechanistic concepts. The process translation theory now wishes to describe is not the process of the transfer of a single text, but the process of translation production and change within the entire literary system. To do so, Even-Zohar and Toury borrow heavily from the ideas of some of the later Russian formalists, especially those of Jurij Tynjanov, whose project in many ways parallels the development of Translation Studies. Locating his concept of Polysystems Theory in the tradition of Russian formalism, Even-Zohar writes:

> The importance for literary history of the correlations between central and peripheral literature as well as between "high" and "low" types was raised by Russian Formalists as soon as they abandoned their partially a-historical attitude, early in their history. The nature of these correlations became one of their major hypotheses in explaining the mechanisms of change in literary history . . . A fascinating pre-theoretical work on the function of popular forms for high literature was Vinogradov's article on Gogol's "The Nose," published as early as 1919. There he collected much evidence for the use of popular elements in the Gogol text. He failed, however, to interpret the results of his inquiry in terms of literary history; those implications were drawn only later by Tynjanov, Ejxenbaum and their students.[8]

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[8] Itamar Even-Zohar, "The Function of the Literary Polysystem in the History of Literature," in Papers in Historical Poetics, 11.

In this chapter I will first summarize the work of Jurij Tynjanov on the evolution of literary systems and review Even-Zohar's Polysystems Model, upon which Toury's "search" for a theory of translation is based. I will next examine in some detail the data from Toury's field study on translations of English, Russian, German, French and Yiddish novels into Hebrew, which informs his theoretical work. I will then analyze Toury's Translation Theory itself, pointing out the necessity of its orientation toward a "Target-Text" model for "material" reasons, as well as discussing its theoretical weaknesses because of its roots in formalism. Finally, I will illustrate his theory with his work in children's literature, specifically the translation history of Wilhelm Busch's Max und Moritz, and show how Toury has influenced the field of Translation Studies.

Jurij Tynjanov on Literary Evolution

The Russian formalists did not form a totally homogeneous group, and the disagreement within the group over the concept of "form," i.e., whether language is primarily directed toward the sign itself or the external world, is perhaps responsible for the internal division. One of the Russian formalists who argued for the branching out from autonomous literary works and into history was Boris `Ejxenbaum, who in "Theory of the Formal Method" describes the moment of the break:

> The fact of the matter is that the Formalists' original endeavor to pin down some particular constructional device and trace its unity through voluminous material had given way to an endeavor to qualify further the generalized idea, to grasp the concrete function of the device in each given instance. This concept of functional value gradually moved out to the forefront and overshadowed our original concept of the

device.[9]

The split in Russian formalism was not merely directed against early formalist tendencies, but also against the reigning literary history and symbolist scholarship in Russia. Such a change in conceptual thinking forced the later formalists to consider historical factors, and again they came into conflict with the traditions of literary historicism, then dominated by biological accounts and influence studies of canonical authors. According to `Ejxenbaum, literary historians relied on "vague generalities" such as concepts of "romanticism" or "realism" when talking historically, and progress was measured on an individual basis--similar, for example, to the way a father passing something on to his son. Literature was seen as playing no role in social evolution. The symbolist literary theorists, against whom Russian formalism initially reacted, removed literary scholarship even further from cultural conditions, developing a whole series of "impressionistic sketches" and "silhouettes" that modernized writers by turning them into "eternal companions." Because of their own few numbers and the size of the opposition, `Ejxenbaum (and later Tynjanov and Jacobson) tended to resort to a "manifesto" style of writing:

> We had to demolish those academic traditions and liquidate those
> tendencies in journalistic criticism. We had to pit against those
> forces a new concept of literary evolution and of literature itself--
> a concept divorced from ideas of progress and decorous succession,
> from the concepts of realism and romanticism, from any material
> extrinsic to literature as a specific order of things. As for the critics,
> we had to proceed by pointing out concrete historical facts, the
> mobility and mutability of form, the need to take into account the
> concrete functions of particular devices, in short by pointing out the

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[9]Boris `Ejxenbaum, "The Theory of the Formal Method," trans. by I. R. Titunik, in Readings in Russian Poetics, ed. Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1978) 29.

difference between a literary work as a definite historical fact and the free interpretation of it from the standpoint of present-day literary needs, tastes, or interests.[10]

This branching out of Russian formalism was a natural consequence of the formalist approach: in the analysis of a particular literary issue, the critic would soon find the literary problem enmeshed in history and itself having a history. `Ejxenbaum gives the example of Tynjanov's Dostoevskij and Gogol, which began with a simple analysis of parody as a determining literary feature within one text, and expands to the entire history of parody, opening up the complex problem of literary evolution:

> When people talk about "literary tradition" or "succession" . . . they usually imagine a kind of straight line joining a younger representative of a given literary branch with an older one. As it happens, things are much more complex than that. It is not a matter of continuing on a straight line, but rather one of setting out and pushing off from a given point--a struggle. . . . Each instance of literary succession is first and foremost a struggle involving a destruction of the old unity and a new construction out of the old elements.[11]

According to Tynjanov, any new literary work must necessarily deconstruct existing unities, or by definition it ceases to be literary. In terms of the development of Russian formalism and its relevance to Translation Studies, this insight by Tynjanov marks the critical break. In his 1927 article "On Literary Evolution" and then a year later, together with Roman Jacobson, in "Problems in the Study of Literature and Language," Tynjanov officially

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[10]Ibid., 31.

[11]Jurij Tynjanov, Dostoevskij i Gogol, (Opajaz, 1921). Quoted by `Exjenbaum, "The Theory of the Formal Method," 31.

repudiates his formalist colleagues and posits a new systematic approach for the study of literary evolution.[12]

In "On Literary Evolution" Tynjanov first characterizes the existing Russian literary scholarship as either eclectically individual or based on simple causal approaches. He begins his essay, "Within the cultural disciplines literary history still retains the status of a colonial territory. . ."[13] and continues with a rejection of literary histories that replace the analysis of literature with the analysis of the psychology of the author, shut off literary texts from broader social orders, and evaluate texts based on "simplified" and "incomplete" approaches. In "Problems in the Study of Literature and Language" Tynjanov and Jacobson first specifically include "formalism" as part of the problem:

> Furthermore, academic eclecticism, scholastic "formalism"--which replaces analysis by terminology and the classification of phenomena-- and the repeated attempts to shift literary and linguistic studies from a systematic science to episodic and anecdotal genres should be

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[12]Jurij Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," trans. C.A. Luplow, in Readings in Russian Poetics, ed. Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1978); Jurij Tynjanov and Roman Jacobson, "Problems in the Study of Literature and Language," trans. Herbert Eagle, Readings in Russian Poetics. Another critique, one from a Marxist perspective, of early Russian formalism appeared in 1928, i.e., that of Pavel Medvedev, which some have argued became the model for a "science" of ideology ["Ideologiewissenschaft"]. See Pavel Medvedev, Die formale Methode in der Literaturwissenschaft, ed. and trans. Helmut Glück (Stuttgart, J. B. Metzler, 1976). One year later, the "Theses" of the Prague Linguistic Circle were presented at the First International Congress of Slavists in Prague, which bore the marks of Jacobson's and Tynjanov's theses in "Problems." For an account of the development from late Russian formalism to early Prague structuralism, see Ladislav Matejka, "Postscript: Prague School Semiotics" in Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions, ed. Ladislav Matejka and Irwin Titunik (Cambridge, Ma.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1976), 267-270.

[13]Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," 66.

rejected.[14]

Rejecting traditional literary history with its categories, abstractions and anecdotes, Tynjanov calls for a scientific approach to investigate literary evolution through the analysis of the relationship of literary phenomena to other orders, including (but not exclusively) literary tradition. By introducing his concept of literary system, Tynjanov theoretically distances himself from purely synchronic analysis:

> Tradition, the basic concept of the established history of literature, has proved to be an unjustifiable abstraction of one or more of the literary elements of a given system within which they occupy the same plane and play the same role. They are equated with the like elements of another system in which they are on a different plane, thus they are brought into a seemingly unified, fictitiously integrated system.[15]

> Pure synchronism now proves to be an illusion: every synchronic system has its past and its future as inseparable structural elements.[16]

Tynjanov's move away from the synchronic formalist study--now viewed as superficial and mechanical, its results as illusory and abstract--sets the stage for a new conceptual approach to the problem of literary evolution.

The theoretical dependence of the synchronic features upon past and future structures causes Tynjanov to reformulate the formalist concept of diachrony and the function of literature in history. Formal elements take on value not when they can be abstracted and correlated to some concept of the similar or identical form, but when they are different, distancing

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[14]Tynjanov and Jacobson, "Problems in the Study of Literature and Language," 79.

[15]Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," 67.

[16]Tynjanov and Jacobson, "Problems in the Study of Literature and Language," 79.

themselves from a standard form. "Literariness" is equated with difference, and phrases such as "innovation" within works and "mutation" of systems are used to illustrate his argument: "The main concept for literary evolution is the mutation of systems, and thus the problem of 'traditions' is transferred onto another plane."[17] Always in a dialectical relationship with other systems, works can no longer be studied in isolation, for that which is innovative is dependent upon that which is normal:

> Even in contemporary literature, however, isolated study is impossible. The very existence of a fact as literary depends on its differential quality, that is, on its interrelationship with both literary and extraliterary orders . . . What in one epoch would be a literary fact would be a common matter of social communication, and vice versa, depending on the whole literary system in which the given fact appears.[18]

Two changes in Tynjanov's thinking become apparent: first, "literariness" cannot be defined outside of history--its existence depends upon its interrelatedness; and, second, formal unities recede in importance as the systemic laws which govern literary relations are elevated. Tynjanov might now be characterized as a structuralist rather than a formalist, for the goal of his project is to discover the "specific structural laws" which govern all systems, including literary texts. He proposes a study of the relationship of the function of formal literary elements to other intratextual literary elements, to intertextual literary elements, and to extraliterary orders. The formal abstraction of separate elements of a work--such as composition, rhythm, style, syntax, or parody--has been useful but limited, for at a certain

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[17]Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," 67.

[18]Ibid., 69.

point such work is bound to reveal that the role of a given element varies in different systems. The revelation that formal elements are capable of taking on different functions in different cultures (as in translation, for example) suggests to Tynjanov that parameters governing literary scholarship need be expanded to include the extraliterary. He rejects the nonsystemic "origin" of new elements, ideas, and/or genres, whether generated from literary texts ("literary influences") or extraliterary institutions, and posits the thesis that structural evolution determines every specific change:

> The history of literature (art), being simultaneous with other historical series, is characterized, as is each of these series, by an involved complex of specific structural laws.[19]

> A disclosure of the immanent laws of the history of literature (language) allows us to determine the character of each specific change in literary (linguistic) systems.[20]

To better understand the relationship of the innovative formal element to the specific text and to the existing literary order, Tynjanov introduces the concept of "system." Elements do not exist in isolation, but always in an interrelationship with other elements of other systems. For Tynjanov, the entire literary and extraliterary world can be divided into multiple structural systems. Literary traditions compose different systems, literary genres form systems, a literary work itself is also a unique system, and the entire social order comprises another system, all of which are interrelated and "dialectically" interact with each other and condition how any specific formal element can function. Without a concept of sameness, of

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[19]Tynjanov and Jacobson, "Problems in the Study of Literature and Language," 79.

[20]Ibid., 80.

system, of norms, of conforming, it would be impossible to determine that which is new, different, "mutant." Formalism posited the thesis that it can distinguish "literariness" through a concept of defamiliarization. Yet that thesis is dependent upon the assumption that it can also define that which is familiar, for the formal element's function can be viewed as defamiliarizing only in that specific intertextual moment when the norm and the new come in contact. Thus Tynjanov's major contribution to literary theory is to extend, in a logical fashion, the parameters of formalism to include literary and social norms.

Despite their interrelatedness, the function of formal elements with other orders, according to Tynjanov, is not of equal relevance, and the question arises as to how the material world fits into his system. Part of Tynjanov's concept of evolution is based upon establishing a hierarchy of formal elements and their "value," i.e., their difference from normal perception. In order to arrive at a better understanding of literary evolution--and by extension of historical change--one must analyze the relation of literary elements to other orders. Sometimes elements which began as literary are "effaced," and here is where the extraliterary enters Tynjanov's system--at the bottom of the hierarchy. The social order in Tynjanov's model is everything that has become normalized, automatized, regularized--ordinary, everyday, banal life:

> When the referential meaning of a word is effaced, that word becomes
> the expression of a relationship, a connection, and thus it becomes an
> auxiliary word. In other words, its function changes. The same is
> true of the "automatization" of a literary element. It does not
> disappear. Its function simply changes, and it becomes auxiliary . . .
>   Thus the short feuilleton verse of the newspaper uses mainly
> effaced, banal meters which have long been rejected by poetry . . .
>   This also applies to parody in the verse feuilleton. Parody is viable

only in so far as what is being parodied is still alive. What literary significance can the thousandth parody of Lermontov's "When the golden cornfield sways . . ." or Pushkin's "The Prophet" have today? Here again we have the same phenomenon: the function of parody has become auxiliary, as it serves to apply extraliterary facts to literature.[21]

Thus, the extraliterary in Tynjanov's model is not something which influences literary works; the literary work influences the extraliterary. Literary texts introduce change in the way we perceive things in the real world. To illuminate this set of relations, Tynjanov introduces the concept "complex of norms":

> The principles involved in relating these two categories (i.e., the existing norm and the individual utterances) as applied to literature must now be elaborated. In the latter case, the individual utterance cannot be considered without reference to the existing complex of norms. (The investigator, in isolating the former from the latter, inescapably deforms the system of artistic values under consideration, thus losing the possibility of establishing its immanent laws.)[22]

Thus the individual utterance is first related to the preexisting literary norm to measure its "value" and thus determine the immanent laws of its production. At a third level exists the real, material world, the world of "social convention," i.e, that which exists when literary texts are literally "worn out," and transferred onto other forms of "real life." Talking about the evolution of a particular kind of ode--the "Lomonosov" ode, Tynjanov writes:

> By the time of Karamzin, the ode is literally "worn out." The "orientation" had died out or narrowed down in significance and had been transferred onto other forms related to life. Congratulatory odes, as well as others, became "uniform verses," i.e., what are purely real-life phenomena. Ready-made literary genres did not exist.

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[21]Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," 69-70.

[22]Tynjanov and Jacobson, "Problems in the Study of Literature and Language," 80.

> Everyday verbal communication took their place . . . These speech phenomena were found in the salon of Karamzin's epoch. And the salon, a fact of everyday life, at this time acquired a literary function.[23]

The social norms, thus, are viewed to a large degree as stagnant, static, dead; literary innovation is what moves society. Real life's function in Tynjanov's model is merely to be the receptor for the tired, worn out phrases which have lost their life.

The hierarchy of Tynjanov's models thus proceeds from (1) the analysis of the relation of structural elements within a literary text ("constructional function") to (2) the analysis of the relation of the literary text to literary order ("literary function") and finally (3) to the analysis of the relation of literary system to social conventions ("verbal function"). The hierarchy is compartmentalized so that a single literary work cannot relate to the social order; only a literary order relates to extraliterary orders and vice versa.:"A separate work must be related to a literary order before one can talk about its orientation."[24] According to Tynjanov, evolution moves from one order to the nearest correlated system. Big jumps, say from an author's life (or class) to his literary work, are "fruitless" and deform our understanding of the nature of the literary system. Literature evolves in relation to but simultaneously separated from the social order. Tynjanov quotes the poet Polonskij, who separates the influence of the natural world upon the poet from the intraliterary development:

> It is very possible that the severity of nature, the forests, the fields . . . influenced the impressionable soul of the child and

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[23]Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," 74.

[24]Ibid., 75.

future poet [Benediktov], but how did they influence it? This is
a difficult question, and no one will resolve it without straining the
point. It is not nature, which is the same for everyone, that plays
the major role here.[25]

The distinction between form and content, always vague in Tynjanov's model,

receives some clarification above: the natural world is conceived as a

constant and affects artists in the same way it affects everyone else. What is

significant, however, is how impressions from the natural world are put into

form: literature affects the real conditions differently. Form of course is

related to function, "the relationship between form and function is not

accidental,"[26] yet the relationship between structure and meaning is not

defined in this essay. `Ejxenbaum addresses the question on how to

understand the "material" in Tynjanov's work by referring to the 1924 text

The Problem of Verse Language:

> Among the general issues of poetics posed and illuminated afresh
> by this study, the question, how to understand "material" had
> crucial significance. The accepted practice had been to oppose
> this concept to the concept of "form," with the result that both concepts
> suffered a loss of meaning . . . The concept of form in the Formalist
> usage, having accrued a sense of complete sufficiency, had merged
> with the idea of the work of art in its entirety. Thus it did not
> require any opposition other than with another category of forms
> of the nonartistic variety. Tynjanov points out that the material
> of verbal art is not uniform either in kind or in value, that "one factor
> may be put forward at the expense of the others, as a result of which
> these others are deformed and sometimes are reduced to the level of
> neutral prop." The conclusion is that "the concept of material does not
> extend beyond form--it too is formal; its confusion with
> extraconstructional factors is a mistake."[27]

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[25]Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," 76.

[26]Tynjanov, "On Literary Evolution," 72.

[27]Boris `Ejxenbaum, "The Theory of the Formal Method," 27-28; See Jurij
Tynjanov, The Problem of Verse Language, ed. and trans. by Michael Sosa and
Brent Harvey (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1981).

While Tynjanov is very much committed to a theory of systems over formalism, his formalist roots remain visible, for the formal structure of a text is still privileged and the content reduced to marginal importance. Tynjanov's concept of how literature evolves is based upon the very same defamiliarization device so highly valued by the early formalists. Despite apparent claims to the contrary, even in late formalism, literature is still cut off from the rest of the boring, banal, automatized world; literature is viewed as developing autonomously, adjacent to the real world. What causes evolution is anything that changes the interrelationships of multiple systems, and that which causes most change in Tynjanov's hierarchy of structures is the formal literary element. These very same *ostranenie* devices change the literary order, which then again distance themselves from the extraliterary social order.

As advanced as his model is, the purported diachronic, evolutionary model still is primarily determined by his synchronic conceptual predispositions. The contradiction within Tynjanov's work most characteristic of his project is his attempt to broaden the perspective of Russian formalism by introducing historical perspective and social realities into his model, yet at the same time retaining synchronic conceptual categories which traditionally govern formalism. What has value is that which defamiliarizes (poetic verse); and what has no value is that which conforms (journalism, popular literature). His call for a value-proof "science" of literary evolution privileges signs referring to other signs--the innovation of form is the determining factor--and not to the material world. Literature thus evolves autonomously according to literary laws of evolution,

independent of external factors. In fact, Exjenbaum, who, along with Tynjanov and Jacobson, is considered the most progressive of the late Russian formalists, concludes his chronology of "The Theory of the Formal Method" with the following:

> We study literary evolution to the extent that it bears a specific character, and within such limits as allow us to call it autonomous, not directly dependent on other orders of culture.[28]

Literature remains above the normal, humdrum world, evolving on its own. Literature does not mediate, it only influences, via some sort of "trickle down" effect. The concept that different cultural milieux, economic conditions, or literary institutions (like the press) might have an effect upon the evolution of a literary system is inconceivable within Tynjanov's framework of analysis. In Tynjanov's model, the material world, the content of the work of art, its historical referent, and its meaning are all relegated to a subsidiary status.

Itamar Even-Zohar: Exploring Intrasystemic Literary Relations

Itamar Evan-Zohar is not specifically a translation theorist, but a cultural theorist: he adopts Tynjanov's concept of a hierarchical literary system and then "uses" the data collected from his observations on how translation functions in various societies to describe the hierarchical cultural system as a whole. He coins the term "polysystem" to refer to the entire network of correlated systems--literary and extra-literary--within society, and Polysystems Theory attempts to explain the function of *all* kinds

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[28] Ejxenbaum, "The Theory of the Formal Method," 33.

of writing within a given culture--from the central canonical texts to the most marginal non-canonical texts. Concepts borrowed from Tynjanov-- such as "system," literary "norms," and the notion of "evolution" as an ongoing struggle between various literary systems are used to frame his research: the analysis of the intrasystemic relations between conflicting literary structures. Although the analysis of translated literature is just one aspect of his investigation, it proves more than marginal, for his data show that translated literature functions differently depending upon the age, strength, and stability of the particular literary "polysystem." In fact, his thinking about translation, es ecially in relation to the unique situation of Hebrew literature, with its general lack of texts in general and the unique role translated Russian and Yiddish literature play in its literary system, leads Even-Zohar to some of his most provocative hypotheses about literary systems. I will first examine Even-Zohar's concept of polysystem and the relations among internally conflicting sub-systems; second, the particular function(s) of translation within various polysystems; and, finally, his conclusion: his definition of universals of literary contacts.

Even-Zohar adopts Tynjanov's concept of system, his hierarchical structure of differing literary systems, his concept of defamiliarization as the measuring device for historical literary significance, and finally his concept of literary mutation and evolution. Even-Zohar's definition of polysystem is the same as Tynjanov's concept of system, including the literary, semi-literary and extra-literary structures; the only difference is one of terminology:

> It would be, therefore, rewarding--I believe--to come back to
> Tynjanov's conception of literature as a system. I would, however, like

to introduce a slight terminological modification and call it a
polysystem, thus making it possible to speak of literary systems
as members of this polysystem. Most scholars have come to agree
that the most rewarding typology of this polysystem is that which
dichotomizes it into canonized vs. non-canonized systems, each
consisting of subsystems. By "canonized" literature we mean roughly
what is usually considered "major" literature: those kinds of literary
works accepted by the "literary milieu" and usually preserved by
the community as part of its cultural heritage. On the other hand,
"non-canonized" literature means those kinds of literary works more
often than not rejected by the literary milieu as lacking "aesthetic
value" and relatively quickly forgotten, e.g., detective-fiction,
sentimental novels, westerns, pornographic literature, etc.[29]

The term "polysystem" is thus a global term covering all of the literary

systems, both major and minor, existing in a given culture. The substance of

Even-Zohar's research involves his exploration of the complex interrelations

between the various systems, especially those between the major systems and

the minor sub-systems. In a more controversial move, aware of the

ideological implications of Tynjanov's hierarchically structured system,

Even-Zohar nevertheless adopts the same set of structural relations with

their correspondingly varying "value" within the structure as a whole:

According to what is presumed about the nature of systems in
general and the nature of literary phenomena in particular, there
can obviously be no equality between the various literary systems
and types. These systems maintain hierarchical relations, which
means some maintain a more central position than others, or that
some are primary while others are secondary . . .
Can we accept this as valid classification? If one wants to argue
on social grounds that every group should have its cultural needs
legitimized, equalized (and even financed) by government, it would
only be natural to consider the hierarchy suggested above as
reactionary and unjustified. But it does not seem necessary to deal
here with a democratic cultural policy, in which no group in an ideal
welfare state would be discriminated against because of its peculiar
taste. What we are dealing with here is the analysis of literature
functioning as a polysystem on factual cultural grounds. Consequently,
it seems to me rewarding even here to accept the above classification

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[29]Itamar Even-Zohar, "The Relations between Primary and Secondary
Systems in the Literary Polysystem," in Papers in Historical Poetics, 15.

as a starting point for further analysis, while attempting to give it a more solid basis.[30]

The third concept borrowed from Tynjanov is that of "defamiliarization" or in the late formalist terminology, "deautomatization." As the above passage indicates, Even-Zohar's model again presumes the privileged status of the "high" literary elements of "primary" importance to the polysystem, and of "low" automatized elements at the bottom of the cultural hierarchy, of "secondary" importance. At the lower levels, the elements, although "materially" unchanged, lose their "original function" and become "petrified."[31] Even-Zohar reverses our notion of canon as an unvarying and generally accepted body of literature which operates as a standard norm in a given culture, and now uses it to help define that which is innovative, new and different:

> While canonized literature tries to create new models of reality and attempts to illuminate the information it bears in a way which at least brings about deautomatization, as the Prague Structuralists put it, non-canonized literature has to keep within the conventionalized models which are highly automatized. Hence the impression of stereotype one gets from the non-canonized works.[32]

The historical horizon is introduced along the lines of Russian futurism as well: the shock caused by the appearance of new and innovative elements in the existing codified system is what causes a literary system to evolve. Even-Zohar supports his thesis with examples of writing by Flaubert and Baudelaire in France in the late nineteenth century:

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[30]Ibid., 16.

[31]Ibid.

[32]Ibid.

>We have there two famous cases of writers, who, while operating within the framework of canonized literature, eventually introduced elements from the non-canonized sub-system of erotic and pornographic literature. As a result they had to defend themselves in court against the charge of having committed a crime of "outrage à la morale publique." Nobody could possibly consider the "indecent" descriptions in Madam Bovary as anything more than innocent études as compared with the rich and flourishing non-canonized pornographic literature of the day. Baudelaire, on the other hand, was much more audacious in his Fleurs du mal, though, again, hardly comparable with la flore pornographique of the time . . . It was rather their introduction into the canonized literature, and the consequent disorder caused to the established stratification within the polysystem, that met with so much objection. In a polysystem where highly codified stratification prevails, any minor move from one stratum to another may be taken as a major offence.[33]

According to Even-Zohar, the disorder caused by introducing pornographic elements into the canon necessarily caused its modification; thus the relationships between the sub-system and main system, always in a state of tension, were altered, forcing the evolution--now seen as a reordering of the relationships between differing systems--of the entire literary "polysystem." Throughout history, competing literary sub-systems are thus constantly challenging and infiltrating higher orders, and then resolving, so the entire system evolves in a systematically "unsystematic" fashion: a sort of boiling caldron, manifest within a text as an interplay of intersecting and competing paradigms of formal elements, indicative of the conflicting heterogeneous systems struggling within the "polysystem" as a whole.

Such a theory re-articulates the system theory proposed by the late formalists; Even-Zohar resurrected them after a period of silence partially imposed by political conditions in the Soviet Union. His work incorporating

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[33]Even-Zohar, "The Function of the Literary Polysystem in the History of Literature," in Papers in Historical Poetics, 12.

translation into his model, however, marks a further development within the field of historical poetics:

> It is necessary to include translated literature in the polysystem. This is rarely done, but no observer of the history of any literature can avoid recognizing as an important fact the impact of translations and their role in the synchrony and diachrony of a certain literature.[34]

Not all polysystems are the same, and through the analysis of the relationship of translated to original literary works, Even-Zohar arrives at a better understanding of the nature of polysystems. In all previous systems models, translations were invariably classified as secondary systems; Even-Zohar's data show that such classification may be inaccurate. The polysystems of larger, older cultures, such as Anglo-American or French, for example, differ from the polysystems of younger or smaller nations, such as Israel or The Netherlands. The former, because of the length and self-sufficiency of their traditions, according to Even-Zohar, tend to relegate translated literature to the margins of society (except in periods of crisis), whereas within the latter systems, for opposite reasons, translations play a more central role. In his essay "The Position of Translated Literature Within the Literary Polysystem," Even-Zohar suggests that the relationship between translated works and the literary polysystem cannot be categorized as either primary or secondary, but as variable, depending upon the specific circumstance operating within the literary system.

Even-Zohar outlines three social circumstances enabling a situation in which translation would maintain a primary position: when a literature is

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[34]Even-Zohar, "The Relations between Primary and Secondary Systems in the Literary Polysystem," 15.

"young," or in the process of being established; when a literature is "peripheral" or "weak" or both; and when a literature is experiencing a "crisis" or turning point.[35]   In the first case, as is characteristic of the Israeli situation, translation fulfills the need of a young literature to use its new language for as many different kinds of writing as possible; since it cannot create all forms and genres, translated texts may serve as the most important for a certain amount of time (though not limited to just this role in the hierarchy).   The same principle holds true, according to Even-Zohar, in the second situation, when a weak literature, often of a smaller nation, like The Netherlands, cannot produce all the kinds of writing a stronger, larger system can--thus its inability to produce innovations and subsequent dependency upon translation to play more than a secondary role--in such situations translations also introduce precedent setting texts.   In such circumstances, translated texts serve not only as a medium through which new ideas can be imported, but also as the form of writing most frequently imitated by "creative" writers in the native language.   In the third situation, perhaps analogous to the cultural situation in America in the sixties, established literary models no longer stimulate the new generation of writers, who turn elsewhere for ideas and forms.   Under such historical circumstances, or combination of circumstances, both established and avant-garde writers produce translations, and through the translated text, new elements are introduced into a literary system that would otherwise fail to appear.

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[35]Even-Zohar, "The Position of Translated Literature Within the Literary Polysystem," 24.

The opposite social conditions, according to Even-Zohar, govern the situations in which translation is of secondary importance to the polysystem. In strong systems such as the French or Anglo-American, with well-developed literary traditions and many different kinds of writing, original writing produces innovations in ideas and forms independent of translation, leading to translation's marginal importance to the overall functioning of the dynamic system. In this historical situation, translation often (but not necessarily always) assumes forms already established as a dominant type within a particular genre, and the translated literature tends to remain fairly conservative, adhering to norms which the "higher" forms have already rejected. Despite playing a secondary role, translations produced under these circumstances may paradoxically introduce new ideas into a culture while at the same time preserving traditional forms.

Having observed the position of translation within varying cultural systems, Even-Zohar next explores the relationship between the translated texts and the literary polysystem along two lines: (1) how texts to be translated are selected by the receiving culture and (2) how translated texts adopt certain norms and functions as a result of their relation to other target language systems.[36] In his early work on polysystems theory, Even-Zohar's debt to the Tynjanov and the Russian formalists is very clear, and the conspicuous absence of extra-literary factors can be noted. Selection, according to Even-Zohar's research, appears to be governed by conditions within the receiving polysystem. Texts to be translated are chosen because

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[36]Ibid., 22.

of their compatibility with the new forms needed by a polysystem to achieve a complete, dynamic, homogeneous identity. Thus, the socio-literary conditions of the receiving culture in part determine those texts which get translated in the first place. If features such as techniques, intonation, or even genres are missing--Even-Zohar talks in terms of "vacuums" within a literary culture--in all likelihood texts providing such functional elements will be imported in order for the system to achieve full dynamic diversity. If not, the receiving polysystem remains "defective." If indeed a system begins to stagnate, again translation will tend toward the innovative, move to the canonic center and provide the system with the impetus to move on.

With regard to the way translated literature influences the translation norms of a given culture, Even-Zohar suggests that when translated literature assumes a primary position, the borders between translated texts and original texts "diffuse" and definitions of translation become liberalized, expanding to include versions, imitations, and adaptations as well. Governed by a situation where their function is to introduce new work into the receiving culture and change existing relations, translated texts necessarily tend to more closely reproduce the original text's forms and textual relations (adequate to the source language). If the form of the foreign text is too radical, too estranging, the translated text runs the risk of not being incorporated into the literary system of the receiving culture; however, if the new text is "victorious," it tends to function as primary literature, and the codes of both the receiving culture's original literature and the translated literature becomes "enriched." If translation tends to be a secondary activity within a given polysystem, the situation is reversed: the translator attempts

to find ready-made models for translation, resulting in translations that conform to pre-established aesthetic norms in the target culture at the expense of text's "original" form. For example, according to Polysystems Theory, nineteenth-century Anglo-American translations (those by Rosetti, Longfellow, FitzGerald) based on approaches (such as that by Mathew Arnold) that emphasize "faithfulness" to the original form and textual relations, functioned as primary. Certain modern translations (contemporary Bible translation or theatre adaptations) using approaches (such as those by Bassnett-McGuire or Nida) that prefer finding existing forms which function as equivalents in the target literature, would be secondary systems, reinforcing the current dominant aesthetic (modernism) rather than importing new ideas and techniques.

Initially focused primarily upon literary systems, Even Zohar revises the Polysystem hypothesis in 1977 to better allow for how a literary system interrelates with socio- and economic forces within a society. In an essay called "Polysystem Hypothesis Revisited" he writes:

> One only need assume the center-and-periphery relation in order
> to be able to reconciliate heterogeneity with functionality. Thus, the
> notion of hierarchy, of strate, is not only unavoidable but useful
> as well. To augment this with the notion of a system of systems, a
> multiple system, i.e., a system whose intersections are more complex,
> is but a logical step necessitated by the need to elaborate a model
> "closer" to "the real world."[37]

The advantage of Polysystems Theory is that it allows for its own augmentation, and integrating the study of literature with the study of social and economic forces of history. Even-Zohar uses the term "poly" just to allow

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[37]Itamar Even-Zohar, "The Polysystem Hypothesis Revisited," in **Papers in Historical Poetics**, 29.

for such elaboration and complexity without having to limit the number of relations and interconnections. The principles which he uses to describe relations within the literary system are also applicable to its relations with the extra-literary. He writes:

> These principles, valid for the *intra*-relations of the system, seem to hold true for its *inter*-relations, too. Here we are faced with yet another augmentation of the model, i.e., with the assumption that the literary PS is just a component of a larger PS--that of "culture" to which it is, semiotically speaking, both subjugated and iso-morphic, and thus correlated both with this greater whole and its other components. The complicated questions of how one literature correlates with another, how literature correlates with society, language, economy, etc., may here merit less simplistic and reductionist hypotheses than otherwise.[38]

Even-Zohar's early work is important to translation theory because of the attention and though given to the role of translation within a literary system, a role traditionally ignored by literary theorists in general. Yet, by his own admission, the hierarchy described, the means by which translations were chosen, and the way they functioned within the literary system were too simplistic, and the theory needed revision. With such a revision, Polysystems Theory is entering a new phase in which extra-literary factors such as patronage, social conditions, economics, institutional manipulation are being correlated to the way translations and chosen and function in a pure literary system. Despite the fact that his theory allows for expansion, Even-Zohar's own work and hypothesizing tends to focus primarily upon the literary, as demonstrated by his more recent work formulating "universals" based upon his findings.

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[38]Ibid., 29-30.

Since the goal of structural theories is to establish the rules and laws which govern any given system, to find the "deep structure" of the surface manifestation being investigated, Even-Zohar's approach, despite its apparent focus upon heterogeneity and difference, still, because of certain theoretical presuppositions, posits such universals. In Even-Zohar's case, he is reading the text of the cultural fabric, trying to discover those rules which regulate the system of cultural heterogeneity, the "polysystem." In doing so, he raises the formalist approach to a higher degree: his theory becomes a formalism of forms. Although he assumes that literary systems are composed of multiple differing systems constantly undergoing change, at the core of his theory is a concept of a totally integrated and meaningful "whole." Though the competing sub-systems are in a constant state of flux, they also variously (cor)relate with other elements and systems forming a complex but unified structure. Even-Zohar does not analyze single texts and classify them; instead, he analyzes multiple texts and their complex intra- and interrelations they enter into as they form a highly stratified but unified whole. Even-Zohar is a structuralist, and for him culture is the highest organized human structure.

Such conclusions, according to Even-Zohar, are not readily apparent. Upon first observing the data, translation in particular, it seemed to him that certain polysystems were unstratified or lacked certain elements or sub-systems. But further analysis revealed that this was not the case, that indeed stratification was "always" present, and that no literature ever functions as a non-stratified whole. This lead to the first "universal" of cultural history:

"all literary systems strive to become polysystemic."[39] In fact, without this striving to become whole, a stagnation would take place causing the system to petrify:

> As soon as I started working with this [the polysystem] hypothesis, it appeared that there were cases of literatures which were otherwise structured: they were unstratified and lacked items, or even whole strata, already established in some of the highly developed literatures. But this also turned out to be a fallacy, caused by our traditional prejudices concerning the borders of literature. Thus, both in full-fledged, highly developed polysystems and in defective ones (those which lacked items), a strong and marked cline of stratification was always present. True, different means were used to achieve this and the degrees of detailed stratification differed largely in the various cases in the course of history. But it became clear that no literature really ever functions as a non-stratified whole, and, if the correlation between the strata within it disintegrates for some reason or other, a sort of stagnation takes over. As a result the system collapses.[40]

The tendency to over generalize and establish universal laws is the most controversial part of Even-Zohar's theory. In addition, such conclusions veer perilously close to traditional theoretical terminology-- which is based on sameness, eternal verities, and homologous systems. Traditional universals of language are characterized by the same structures applying to all languages, Even-Zohar's universals are based on inherent differences of forms always already in conflict within a given culture as well as on the existence of new and unfamiliar forms which can be imported from foreign cultures. Even-Zohar's theory of the role of translation within the polysystem is determined by the heterogeneous nature of differing systems and ultimately depends upon shifting cultural conditions. For example,

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[39]Even-Zohar, "On Systemic Universals in Cultural History," in Papers in Historical Poetics, 43.

[40]Ibid.

Even-Zohar argues that dominant ideologies tend to suppress the articulation

of minor voices and alternate structures of conception:

> There is no un-stratified language, even if the dominant ideology
> governing the norms of the system do not allow for an explicit
> consideration of other than the high, or canonized, strata. The same
> holds true for the structure of society and everything involved in that
> complex phenomenon. Moreover, all anti-stratification ideologies and
> experiments on the social level have turned out to be unsuccessful.[41]

Despite attempts by governing cultural paradigms to eliminate diversity and

alternatives, such attempts at anti-stratification tend always to engender new

forms of opposition. Even-Zohar cites one example illustrating his first

universal:

> Between 1969 and 1970 through propaganda and wide consensus, the
> Swedish people decided to eliminate from their language the polite
> pronoun "ni," equivalent to the French "vous" and the German "Sie."
> This should have increased egalitarian feelings among large sections of
> Swedish society, but soon new stratification means appeared to
> distinguish between more and less intimate speech. Only that
> particular opposition was neutralized.[42]

Even-Zohar's universals thus are of the "oppositional" variety, universals

which always operate against universals of the traditional kind, especially

those imposed by those institutions governing the literary centers in a given

society.

In his essay "Universals of Literary Contacts" Even-Zohar lists

thirteen such universals derived from his new data. Fully cognizant of the

tentative nature of his own list, with more data and time to analyze it, new

formulations will inevitably be drawn. But in the course of the challenges,

he also hopes a better understanding of relations between and within

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[41]Ibid.

[42]Ibid., 43-44.

cultures can be reached.   Briefly, some of Even-Zohar's "universals" of the

connections ("contacts") among literary systems, especially intercultural

relations, include:

1. Literatures are never in non-contact. . . .
2. Literary contacts are not necessarily linked with other contacts between two communities. . . .
3. Contacts are mostly unilateral. . . .
4. A SLt [Source Literature type or model] is selected by prestige and dominance. . . .
5. Contacts are also favored/non-favored by a general attitude of a potential TLt [Target Language type or model]. . . .
6. Interference occurs when a TLt cannot resist it or has a need for it. . . .[43]

Even-Zohar's work is perhaps the most important to date in the field of

translation theory;   he uses notions of translation equivalence and literary

function, yet does not pull them out of history and prescribe a translation

model that transcends time.   His work is highly innovative,   making manifest

the temporal nature of aesthetic presuppositions by looking at actual

translations within the larger sociological context.   His work makes a real

contribution not only to the field of translation theory, but I suggest may be

of relevance to literary theory in general.   Certainly his work demonstrates

the importance of translation within the larger context of literary studies

specifically and in the evolution of culture in general.

Yet despite the advances Even-Zohar is making, several minor

problems with Polysystems Theory can be noted.   Time and space limitations

preclude a detailed analysis, but I would like to briefly suggest four such

areas of concern.   The first problem, which he recognizes, is his tendency to

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[43]Even-Zohar, "Universals of Literary Contacts," in Papers in Historical Poetics, 45-53.

propose universals based on very little evidence. A more extensive analysis

of textual and cultural relations must take place before "universals" can be

persuasively posited. The contradictions in his own data demonstrate the

ephemeral nature of many of his hypotheses and tend to distort the

theoretical importance of what he is trying to articulate. For example, Even-

Zohar says in his characteristically definitive fashion that "no literary

structures on any level were ever adopted by the non-canonized system

before they had become common stock of the canonized one."[44] Yet, for

example, in his analysis of late nineteenth-century French literature, the

data seems to indicate otherwise: pornographic literature was widespread in

the non-canonized literature before being adopted by the canon. Even-

Zohar perhaps too uncritically adopts the late Russian formalist model,

positing a hierarchy of relations in which the innovative ideas trickle-down

to reside eventually in the stagnant forms of popular literature. His own

evidence suggests that at least a more dialectical relationship of mutual

interaction is often the case, or that in some instances the opposite

movement--i.e., that the popular influences the canonical--is to a large

degree true.

This leads to the related problem of Even-Zohar's uncritical adoption of

the entire formalist framework, perpetuating concepts such as "literariness"

which underlie, yet seem inappropriate to, Even-Zohar's complex model of

cultural systems. Despite his historically based model, Even-Zohar retains a

concept of "literary facts," based on a formalist value system of

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[44]Even-Zohar, "The Relations between Primary and Secondary Systems
in the Literary Polysystem," 17.

defamiliarization, perhaps in contradiction to his own thesis of literary texts being culturally dependent. This presupposition influences his concept of hierarchical relations within a society, his definitions of "primary" and "secondary," which still retain ideological residues of an ahistorical system of judging literature, despite defensive claims to the contrary. If translated literature seems to function as both primary and secondary, might not the same be true for children's literature, detective novels, folktales? Within the theoretical framework of Even-Zohar's model, folktales will always be relegated to secondary status, for they do not develop the form or genre. Although the plots and characters may change, the tales do not change structurally, and thus can never occupy a primary position within the hierarchy. Yet it is easy to imagine a literary system in which oral tales might be highly valued.

In addition, the problem of locating the referent applies to Even-Zohar's Polysystems Theory as it does to formalism. Despite allowing for such a possibility, Even-Zohar seldom relates texts to the "real conditions" of their production, only to hypothetical structural models and abstract generalizations. The extra-literary continues to be significantly absent from his analysis. What about the signified? The *thing* signified--the content, the meaning--shared by the author and the reader is absent in Even-Zohar's model; he analyzes only the signifier and how it formally interacts with other literary/cultural systems of signification. A theory that addresses only form and formal function misses something. In terms of translation theory, the problem of how one translates the signs without concealing the thing to which the signs refer still remains. In a system with different signs having

different cultural associations, how can one minimilize the losses of

reference?   Where do ideas fit into Even-Zohar's system?   Do they develop

independently of the literature?   Despite his allowing for augmentation of

his theory, in his theory Even-Zohar also holds that the literary system to a

large degree autonomous.   He writes:

> Literature is assumed to be a self-regulating system. Thus,
> stratification is carried out by the interrelations within the system.[45]

Even-Zohar shares `Ejxenbaum's and Tynjanov's belief that literature

develops autonomously according to rules of its own.   Even-Zohar reads

multiple texts of the cultural life of a society with the same formalist

presuppositions that the Russian formalists brought to individual texts.

Finally, Even-Zohar's own methodology and discourse limit the scope of

his investigation.   He purports to observe "objectively" the interplay of

systems, eliminating all bias, and "rationally" describe and order literary

phenomena:

> A non-elitist and non-evaluative historiography will attempt to
> eliminate all sorts of biases. The PS [Polysystems] hypothesis,
> therefore, should not be allowed to become a pseudo-rational
> justification for "democratic" ideas (often expressed by the denigration
> of "high-brow" culture) propagated by literary agents. Such trends,
> legitimate as they may be within the context of "literary struggle,"
> have nothing to do with a discipline whose task it is to observe it.[46]

Such total objectivity is of course impossible, especially given the nature of

the subject matter.   His methodology of making rules, developing hypotheses,

testing them, arriving at a consensus of the "qualified" literary historical

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[45]Even-Zohar, "The Polysystem Hypothesis Revisited," in Papers in Historical Poetics, 30.

[46]Ibid., 28.

scholars (those who agree upon the same scientific method) will eventually close down avenues of investigation. While the content of Even-Zohar's theory is "dialectical" and challenging to theories which universalize and homogenize, his methodology also leads him to generally agreed upon and thus "proven" theses which serve as literary "facts." Although his argument is convincing and well-supported, Even-Zohar's formulation of principles occasionally contradicts that which he is trying to prove. He has accumulated new data which tend to disprove old theories and require new interpretation, yet he retains a conceptual framework and scientific approach which forces him to make such universal statements. Such a tendency to generalize, especially with so few data on which to base conclusions, most of which drawn from a very unique culture in the history of mankind, runs the risk that elements for analysis will only enter into his model when they find a place in the structural whole of the polysystem. With unity postulated from the beginning, and a scientific method aimed at eliminating contradictions, the methodology necessarily limits and obscures that which it purports to be opening up. What does not conform to the rules and laws of the structural system is thus viewed as "defective." Non-conforming models have "vacuums" which need be filled to achieve completeness. The whole system is based on order and regularity, and the ability of the investigator to satisfactorily explain all the phenomena. The implicit subtext to his theory calls to mind Platonic forms and classical aesthetics, by smoothing out contradictions and eliminating that which does not fit. Just what is that complete, dynamic, homogeneous system against which all other systems are compared? Contradictions in reality and

problems of literary creation are "solved" by his methodology; variations are regulated; and texts are viewed as "more" or "less" innovative, and classified accordingly.

Despite these reservations, Even-Zohar's Polysystems Theory demonstrates an advance in the development of Translation Studies specifically and translation theory in general. Unlike earlier models, Even-Zohar's system is not text-specific and does not analyze individual texts isolated from their cultural context. According to Even-Zohar, a text does not reach the highest hierarchical level within a given culture because of some inherent eternal beauty or verity, but (1) because of the nature of the polysystem of the receiving culture and its social/literary historical circumstances and (2) because of the difference between certain elements of the text and cultural norms. A text is never totally autonomous (although the entire literary system is postulated to be); the text is always already involved in a multitude of relationships with other elements of other systems at both the center and margins of a cultural whole. The theoretical advance of Polysystem Theory for Translation Studies should be readily apparent: instead of having a static conception of what a translation should be, Even-Zohar varies his definition of "equivalence" and "adequacy" according to the historical situation, freeing the discipline from the constraint that has traditionally limited its previous theories:

> The question of what is a translated work cannot be answered a priori
> in terms of an a-historical out-of-context idealized state; it must be
> determined on the grounds of the operations governing the
> polysystem. Seen from this point of view, translation is no longer a
> phenomenon whose nature and borders are given once and for all, but
> an activity dependent upon the relations within a certain cultural
> system. Consequently, such key concepts as adequacy and
> equivalence cannot be dealt with fairly unless the implications of

polysystematic positions are taken into account. I would go so far
as to say that this negligence is one of the major mistakes of
contemporary translation theories, which lean too heavily on static
linguistic models or undeveloped theories of literature.[47]

By expanding the theoretical boundaries of translation theory, embedding

translated literature into a larger cultural context and then locating that

complex in history, Even-Zohar has opened the way for translation theory to

finally advance beyond prescriptive aesthetics. This opening is seized upon

by Even-Zohar's colleague Gideon Toury, who focuses specifically upon the

translation component of Even-Zohar's model, and begins the search for a

new theory of translation.

<u>Gideon Toury: Toward a Reception-Oriented
Theory of Translation</u>

Gideon Toury's work may be divided into two periods: the first from

1972-1976 and reported in 1977 in <u>Normot sel tirgum ve-ha tirgum ha sifruti</u>

<u>le-ivrit ba sanim 1930-1945 [Translation Norms and Literary Translation into</u>

<u>Hebrew]</u>, involved a comprehensive sociological study of the cultural

conditions affecting the translation of foreign language novels into Hebrew

during the period 1930-1945 (later expanded to include children's literature);

the second, from 1975-1980 and summarized in a series of papers collected in

1980 as <u>In Search of a Theory of Translation</u>, involved an attempt to develop a

more comprehensive theory of translation based on findings from his field

study.[48] The first project was begun with Itamar Even-Zohar and used the

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[47]Even-Zohar, "The Position of Translated Literature Within the
Literary Polysystem," 27.

[48]Gideon Toury, <u>Normot šel tirgum ve-ha-tirgum ha-sifruti le-ivrit ba-</u>
<u>šanim 1930-1945 [Translation Norms and Literary Translation into Hebrew,</u>
<u>1930-1945]</u> (Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, 1977);

Polysystems Theory framework; the second study, although still based on Polysystems Theory, posits theoretical hypotheses which distinguish Toury's model from his predecessor. Before discussing the theoretical work, his sociological research should briefly be summarized.

The initial field study was set up within the scope of a larger project called "The History of Literary Translation into Hebrew" being undertaken at the University of Tel Aviv at the time.[49] Toury's study catalogued the prose fiction translations from English, Russian, German, French, and Yiddish into Hebrew during a fifteen-year span and generated quantitative data on, for example, the number of writers translated, number of books by each writer translated, and the number of translators and publishers involved in the process. The statistical data yielded certain translation tendencies: a few translators did a large proportion of the work, and a few publishers did a large proportion of the publishing. The effect of a publisher going out of business (or three of them, as was the case in 1939) had corresponding effects on not only the number of translators, but the number of translations published, and the general translation policies as well. One prominent developmental line, despite the changes in institutional framework, showed the increase in the percentage of English translations during the period, which grew from 24% in 1928/9 to 42% in 1946/8.

Gideon Toury, In Search of a Theory of Translation (Tel Aviv: The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, 1980).

[49]Toury, "Norms of Literary Translation Into Hebrew," in In Search of a Theory of Translation, 123.

The qualitative interpretation of these data served as a background against which Toury developed his later attempts to distinguish a unified theoretical field governing translation. One of the goals of the field study was to discover the "operational norms," the actual decisions made during the translation process, through which he hoped to discover a system of rules governing translation in this particular polysystem. As Popovič postulated, the aesthetically-determined rationale for certain translation decisions were most visible in the "shifts" between the source and target texts. Toury's analysis focused on two paradigms of shifts: (1) "matricial" changes (affecting the matrix of the text) were discovered by a linguistic mapping of the two texts in order to measure additions, deletions, and changes in the location (especially larger units) of the text; and (2) "textual" changes (affecting verbal and stylistic choices) were discovered using a functional equation that measured stylistic equivalences and changes in a very traditional "translation problems" fashion. The analysis of the shifts showed that there were very few "matricial" norms in operation during the period; the dominant characteristic was that translations tended to be complete, with relatively few omissions and even fewer additions, and those additions or omissions tended to be irrelevant to the identity of the text as a whole. In addition, in terms of the location or sequence of events, the texts also showed few changes, although paragraph structure did change slightly, with longer paragraphs being divided up into several shorter ones. More changes were noted with regard to word choices and style, resulting in the following "textual" norms Toury posits as characteristic of the period. For example, texts translated into Hebrew tended to be "elevated" and words selected tended

to reflect the "highest" style of the possible alternatives. Toury discovered a stylistic factor called "richness" in language. His data showed that the model determining the translation choices in the receiving Hebrew system was generally characterized by its employment of as many "rare" elements as possible, e.g., never using simple forms when compounds would do and never repeating words when a synonym could be found. Colloquial language was almost always omitted at the beginning of the period, and as a result, ·stylistic differentiation within the receiving culture almost entirely disappeared. By the end of the period a new attitude emerged: differentiation was created, not through colloquial Hebrew, but *ad hoc* and by artificial means. The "high" style of the Hebrew continued to be untouched. Other textual norms included shifts toward the increased use of collocations and of binomials, causing information redundance and loss of information, which Toury attributed to inherent linguistic rules of Hebrew. On the other hand, he also noted stylistic shifts that had no apparent linguistic foundation: foreign language elements (a Spanish substratum in Hemingway, for example) were mainstreamed and normalized, thus eliminating certain textual functions in the source text. In addition, successive repetitions were often omitted for no apparent reason; and direct speech was clearly preferred, resulting in more paragraphs and multiple changes from indirect to direct speech.

From the point of view of traditional models of translation, all these changes would make the translations inadequate. In an ideal pair-bound linguistic model, closer equivalents--textual, sentence or even lexical units--invariably could be found, especially with regard to the changes that were made for non-linguistic reasons. From a literary-functional standpoint,

there was even less correlation. The translators in Toury's study seldom considered units larger than a single sentence; since functional-equivalent models are based upon text types defined in advance and their replacement by alternate types that function "equally" in the target system, no such equivalence was found. According to Toury's field study, aesthetics played a very small role in the translation process; in fact, Toury found that most texts were selected for ideological reasons. Preferences for social and even "socialist" works, for certain subjects and topics, and of course for Jewish writers and subjects were demonstrated, but few choices based on aesthetic criteria were identified. Toury, in accordance with Even-Zohar, did find that the texts which were selected for literary reasons and for which equivalent literary formal models were found did tend to occupy and shape the center of the system of translation within the Hebrew Polysystem. Yet, in addition to the formal innovativeness of the central texts, other elements in common with all central texts were also noted: for example, their "didactic" attitude and their general agreement with (and almost rigid application of) the translation norms. Accidents also played a large role in terms of texts selected and texts published as well as in terms of linguistic equivalents found and not found. Yet despite the changes in the texts and lack of conformity with predetermined linguistic and literary theories of translation, the translated texts, according to Toury, still functioned as translations in the Hebrew polysystem. The texts entering the Hebrew system as translations tended to be only *partially* linguistically and functionally equivalent to the source text; nevertheless, they were accepted

in the target culture as translations and occupied all positions from the center to the periphery. Toury concludes:

> For all their inadequacy, it would be sheer absurdity to conclude that the translations comprising our corpus are "not equivalent" to the texts serving as their originals. The only direct conclusion to be drawn is that the concepts of translation and of translation equivalence expressed by them are not congruent with the hypothetical construct of adequate translation.[50]

Despite this general lack of conformity with hypothetical models of translation equivalence, examples of "mistranslations," translations considered "inadequate" in the target culture were generally rare. On the other hand, examples of complete linguistic equivalence to the source text were even rarer, and the instances of near-adequacy to the source text, when they did occur, were usually "accidental."[51] The reason for this general lack of concern for "faithfulness" to the source text, Toury concluded, was not that the translators were indifferent to the textual relations within the source text, but that their main goal was to achieve acceptable translations in the target culture. The operational decisions were thus a natural outcome of a preference for the translators' initial teleological goal, the changes were dictated by the cultural conditions of the receiving system.

It thus should come as no surprise that when Toury turns his attention to developing a theory of translation he finds fault with existing source text-oriented theoretical models of translation. Following Even-Zohar's "use" of translation to discover rules about the literary system in general, Toury attempts to better detect and describe all those laws--linguistic, literary and

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[50]Toury, "Norms of Translation into Hebrew," 136.

[51]Ibid., 137.

sociological--which govern translation. His field study results caused him to be skeptical of abstract theories involving ideal author-original text/translated text-reader models. By avoiding a predefinition of what a translation "should" be, and looking at actual translations in a real cultural context, it becomes clear that aesthetic theories of literary transfer and even pair-bound "objective" descriptions of linguistic possibilities do not account for various factors which clearly influence the translation product.

The theoretical context against which Toury locates his project is one dominated by translation models which posit a definition of equivalence as functional-dynamic (see chapter two above). Toury suggests that despite their advance over linguistic definitions of translation equivalence, such theories are still source-oriented and inadequate:

> Any theory of translation accepting the reconstruction of ST's [Source Text's] relevant features (including its textual relationships) in TT [Target Text] as a necessary (and/or sufficient) condition for translation and postulating the "functional" relationship (or category of relationships) as translation equivalence is an ST-oriented theory. Such a theory will inevitably be directive, normative in nature, because it will recognize only "correct" instances (and types) of performance as belonging to the domain it covers; in other words, it will identify "translation" with (or reduce it to) "correct" translation, according to its a priori, ST-based conditions.[52]

The correctness of translation, the adequacy of the equivalent second language text, is, according to these theories, always measured against the degree of correspondence with the source text, by trying to reconstruct all

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[52]Gideon Toury, "Translated Literature: System, Norm, Performance; Toward a TT-Oriented Approach to Literary Translation," Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations, ed. Itamar Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury, Poetics Today 2:4 (Summer/Autumn 1981), 14; also in In Search of a Theory of Translation, 39-40.

the "relevant" functional features--be they linguistic or literary elements--
of the source text.   Requirements for translation traditionally have been
conceived as being determined by the source text, and as a result, have
necessarily been idealized.   Toury's theory opposes theories that are based
upon a single unified and abstract identity or "correct" instances of "equal"
performance.   His model is based on difference and assumes structural
differences between languages: "every linguistic system and/or textual
tradition differs from any other in terms of structure, repertory, norms of
usage, etc."[53]   Positing hypothetical poles of total acceptability in the target
culture at the one extreme and total adequacy to the source text at the other,
Toury locates translation as always in the middle: no translation is ever
entirely "acceptable" to the target culture because it will always introduce
new information and forms defamiliarizing to that system, nor entirely
"adequate" to the original version, because the cultural norms cause shifts
from the source text structures.   Historically, translation criticism has been
characterized by its tendency to find fault with the translator because the
actual text can never meet the ideal standards of the two abstract poles: from
a linguistic point of view, errors can always be pointed out and better
solutions proposed; from a literary point of view, the functional elements can
invariably be judged as less dynamic or innovative than the source text's
features.

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[53]Toury, "Translation Solutions and Translational Relationships: Toward
the Description of Translated Texts," in In Search of a Theory of Translation,
94.

By considering translation from the point of view of the target culture, however, Toury argues that translation equivalence is not a hypothetical ideal, but becomes an empirical matter. The actual relationship between a source text and a target text may or may not reflect the postulated abstract relationship; nevertheless, the translated text exists as a cultural artifact for the replacement of a source text by an acceptable version in the receiving culture. Content to identify the causes for deviation from the standard, Toury's theoretical project is unified by the acceptance of translated texts without a judgment of their solutions as correct or incorrect. Only by analyzing translated texts from within their cultural-linguistic context can one understand the translation process. Toury argues that translations themselves have no "fixed" identity; because they are always subject to different socio-literary contextual factors, they thus must be viewed as having multiple identities, dependent upon the forces that govern the decision process at a particular time. Distancing himself from models which posit single conceptions of translation equivalence, Toury suggests a different theoretical framework in which to conceptualize phenomena regarded as translation. Borrowing from Ludwig Wittgenstein the concept of families of resemblance ["Familienähnlichkeiten"], Toury now views "original" texts as containing clusters of properties, meanings, possibilities. All translations privilege certain properties/meanings at the expense of others, and the concept of a "correct" translation ceases to be a real possibility. To illustrate his concept, Toury refers to passages from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations:

> Nunetwa, weil es eine--direkte--Verwandschaft mit manchem hat, was man. bisher [Übersetzung] genannt hat; und dadurch, kann man sagen,

> erhält es eine indirekte Verwandschaft zu anderem, was wir auch so nennen. Und wir dehnen unseren Begriff der [Übersetzung] aus, wie wir beim Spinnen eines Fadens, Faser an Faser drehen.[54]

Citing the similarity of translation to language games, Toury continues with another example:

> es ist diesen Erscheinungen garnicht Eines gemeinsam, weswegen wir fuer alle das gleiche Wort verwenden,--sondern sie sind mit einander in vielen Weisen verwandt. Und dieser Verwandschaft, oder dieser Verwandschaften wegen nennen wir sie all [Übersetzungen].[55]

Toury successfully pushes the concept of a theory of translation beyond the margins of a model restricted to faithfulness to the original, or of single, unified relationships between the source and target texts. Translation becomes a relative term, dependent upon the forces of history and the semiotic web called culture. The role of translation theory is correspondingly altered, ceasing its search for a system from which to judge the product and now focusing on the development of a model to help explain the process which determines the final version.

Early Translation Studies (see chapter three), which attempted to be objective and to study actual translated texts in the target culture, is no less implicated in the paradigm of static, source-oriented translation theories which Toury rejects. Behind early Translation Studies' definition of translation, argues Toury, is James Holmes' concept of "metatext," and although it has been elaborated by Anton Popovič (and others) and revised

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[54]Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), section 67. Quoted by Toury, In Search of a Theory of Translation, 18.

[55]Ibid., section 65. Quoted by Toury, In Search of a Theory of Translation, 18.

by Van den Broeck (and others), translated texts are still viewed by Translation Studies theorists as one kind of metatext, measured and evaluated in comparison with the source text or some idealized interpretation of that initial version:

> Though Popovic's theory devotes much attention not only to TT as a text, but also to the constraints imposed on its formulation and structuring by the target literary system, nevertheless, (a) it is still oriented basically toward the "proto-text," i.e., ST; (b) it is not devised to consider instances of translation in their immediate environment, but the general category of "translation" and its members as one of the possible realizations of a more general concept of "metatext"; that is, different sorts of texts linked in various ways to other, preexisting texts; (c) it lists certain properties, the possession of which is a necessary condition for the classification of a text previously recognized as a metatext, as a translation.[56]

Toury wants to expand the boundaries of even that which early Translation Studies has already augmented, getting further away from hypothetical constructs that tend to study translated texts in isolation and including real environmental factors. As opposed to another Source Text [ST] determined theory, Toury posits a Target Text [TT] theory for translation:

> In comparison, when considered from TT's point of view, equivalence is not a postulated requirement, but an empirical fact, like TT itself: the actual relationships obtaining between TT and ST. It is clear that the reconstruction of ST's relevant features in their order of relevance in ST is not the only option that a translator, operating within the target literary system and the TL, has at his disposal; hence not only functional relationships obtain between actual TTs and their respective STs. It is also clear that TL's systematic constraints ("linguistic rules") are not the only restrictions within which the translator operates. Thus, the actual relationships between TT and ST may or may not reflect the postulated (near-) interchangeability; on the other hand, they always stand for a factual replacement of ST by TT.[57]

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[56]Toury, _Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations_, 16; _In Search of a Theory of Translation_, 42.

[57]Toury, _Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations_, 13; _In Search of a Theory of Translation_, 39.

Toury does not reject the work of contrastive linguistics or semiotic-functional approaches; linguistic/literary limitations of course operate and condition the nature of the translation product. Toury argues, however, that such rules and laws are merely one set of factors operating on the translation process; his project introduces a new set of factors which may be more powerful than other factors. The eventual goal of Toury's theory is to establish a hierarchy of interrelated factors (constraints) which determine (govern) the translation product. In short, Toury demands that translation theory include cultural-historical "facts," a set of laws which he calls "translation norms."

Occupying the center of Toury's theory and operative at every stage of the translation process, these translation norms mediate between systems of potential equivalence:

> Sociologists and social psychologists regard norms as the translation of general values or ideas shared by a certain community--as to what is right and wrong, adequate and inadequate--into specific performance-instruction appropriate for and applicable to specific situations, providing they are not [yet] formulated as laws. These instructions, the norms, are acquired--even internalized--by individual members of the community during the socialization process.[58]

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[58]Toury's sociology is drawn from Paul N. Wexler, *Purism and Language. A Study in Modern Ukrainian and Belorussian Nationalism (1840-1967)* [Language Science Monographs, 11] (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974); Jay Jackson, "Structural Characteristics of Norms," in *The Dynamics of Instructional Groups: Sociopsychological Aspects of Teaching and Learning [Fifty-Ninth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education,* II], ed. Nelson B. Henry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 136-163; Jay Jackson, "Structural Characteristics of Norms," in *Current Studies in Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 301-309. See Gideon Toury, "The Nature and Role of Norms in Literary Translation," in *Literature and Translation,* ed. James S. Holmes et al., 83-100; also in *In Search of a Theory of Translation,* 49-62.

In his paper "The Nature and Role of Norms in Literary Translation," Toury outlines his definition of translation norms and describes his methodology. A given society always has multiple and conflicting norms, all interconnected with other functioning systems, but if situations reoccur regularly, certain behavioral patterns can be established. Thus, in terms of translation, in order to distinguish regular tendencies, it is necessary to study not just single texts, but rather multiple translations of the same original text as they occur in one receiving culture at different times in history. Toury distinguishes between three kinds of translation norms: preliminary, initial and operational norms. "Preliminary norms" involve factors such as those which govern the choice of the work and the overall translation strategy within a polysystem. Because the definition of translation varies historically, certain preliminary questions need to be answered in order to establish the cultural context which frames the translation process. What is the translation "policy" of the target culture? What is the difference between translation, imitation and adaptation for the specific period? What authors, periods, genres, schools are preferred by the target culture? Is intermediate or second-hand translation permitted? What are the permitted mediating languages? The "initial norms" categorize the individual translator's choice to subject oneself either to the original text with its textual relations and norms, or the target culture's linguistic and literary norms, or some combination thereof. The initial norms are placed at the top of the hierarchy of operational norms, for if consistent, they subsequently influences all other translation decisions. "Operational norms"

are the actual decisions made during the translation process, some of which we saw above in Toury's field study of translated prose fiction in Hebrew: "matricial" norms determining location, additions and deletions, and "textual" norms revealing linguistic and stylistic preferences. Polysystems Theory informs Toury's model: in terms of initial norms, the translator's attitude toward the source text is affected by its position in the source culture literary polysystem; in terms of operational norms, all decisions are influenced by the position--central or peripheral--held by translated literature in the target culture polysystem.

In the course of discussing translation norms and the methodology for determining them, Toury also posits a new set of theoretical premises which seem to contradict his original intent. Similar to Lefevere's methodology in Translating Poetry: Seven Strategies and a Blueprint, Toury arrives at the translation norms by comparatively examining several translations of one original text carried out in different periods by various translators. The comparison reveals the different definitions of translation, the priorities of the translators, and the often subconscious rules influencing the decision process. Ironically, Toury's comparison technique does not involve actual texts, but a hypothetical intermediating text:

> In the comparison of a translation and its original we proceed from two main theoretically founded premises meant to bring forth the founding of the partial comparison on as large and essential a part as possible and the formulation of an invariant appropriate for the task:
> (1) the equivalence postulate mentioned earlier, from which it follows that the comparison does not set out to determine whether an equivalence obtains between translation and original, but what type (and/or what degree) of equivalence actually obtains between them;
> (2) the "literariness" of both texts, which leads us to take special interest in phenomena which are particular to the literary text

> (in type as well as in degree).
> From these assumptions it follows that the "intermediary concept" in this kind of comparison should be based on an equivalence notion which is literary-specific, the adequate translation . . . A comparison of an actual translation to this "invariant" (which is, of course, a hypothetical construct only) will reveal shifts caused by factors other than rules, and a series of comparisons carried out along the lines of such a method will lead the student to generalizations and will enable him to form hypotheses as to the norms.[59]

In order to measure the shifts revealing the norms which determine them, Toury posits the existence of an ideal invariant third text which is the "adequate translation," not based on a comparison to the original and various historically-bound texts, but on abstract linguistic and literary theory. Toury has already posited the hypothesis that no translation is ever entirely acceptable to the target culture because of its estranging structural and verbal elements, nor can it be adequate to the source text because of the new cultural context in which it finds itself. Yet in order to determine the position of the translated text between the poles of source and target text extremes, Toury also posits the necessity of an ideal "invariant of comparison" which underlies the text in question and his entire theory in general:

> The determining of TT's position between adequacy and acceptability can be achieved by a combined operation of TT-ST comparison on the one hand and the establishment of TT's position in the relevant target literary and/or linguistic systems in terms of its acceptability in them on the other.
> Thus, the transformed concept of adequacy finds its main use in the methodology of TT-ST comparison. In the methodological framework it is conceived of as a hypothetical entity constructible on the basis of a systemic (textemic) analysis of ST, and it is used as the

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[59]Toury, "The Nature and Role of Norms in Literary Translation," Literature and Translation, 93; In Search of a Theory of Translation, 58.

invariant of the comparison (i.e, as a tertium comparationis).[60]

Contradicting everything his theory seemed previously to explicate, this hypothetical invariant is not conceived of as something which is subjectively determined or historically conditioned, but as something which exists in another realm, as a universal literary/linguistic form, which all (bilingual) humans have the ability to intuit.   Not surprisingly, perhaps, Toury appeals to Chomsky's concept of competency and of formal universals:

> Translation in favorable conditions, between two languages that the translator is a competent speaker of, or even translation into his own mother tongue, also abounds in manifestations of interlanguage.   Thus, although lack of mastery of TL is doubtless a supporting factor for the occurrence of such forms, and may not only contribute to their frequency but also affect their form and condition for the production of interlanguage, it can by no means be regarded as either a principal or necessary condition for the production of interlanguage.   Actually, the claim should be even stronger.   I would claim that the occurrence of interlanguage forms in translation follows from the very definition of this type of activity/product, thus being a formal "translation universal."   (For the difference between the substantive and formal types of universals, cf. Chomsky, [Aspect of the Theory of Syntax], 1965: 28-29.)   Moreover, there are situations where interlanguage as a whole, or at least certain types/degrees of it, is not simply present in translation as living evidence of the universal, but even preferred to "pure" TL forms.[61]

The appeal to formal universals in an otherwise performance-oriented and material theory is an unexpected move.   Toury's entire project has been to deconstruct source-oriented, static theoretical models of translation.   Yet this hypothetical construct is based on that very same source-text oriented theory, completely static and unconditioned by literary evolution, exactly

[60]Gideon Toury, "Translated Literature: System, Norm, Performance: Toward a TT-Oriented Approach to Literary Translation," Translation Theory and Intercultural Relations, 23; In Search of a Theory of Translation, 49.

[61]Toury, "Interlanguage and its Manifestations in Translation," Meta, 24, No. 2 (June 1979), 224; also in In Search of a Theory of Translation, 72.

that which his evolutionary theory opposes. On the one hand, Toury posits the premise that every literary system is different from every other in terms of its structure and norms of usage; on the other hand, he suggests that the same structural universal form underlies two different language system. This is the crux of the theoretical debate within current translation theory, and Toury adopts both positions. How is this possible?

Toury's work is based on Polysystems Theory, which in turn is based on Russian formalist conceptual thinking. His use of formal universals, of invariants of comparisons, although surprising, has an implicit foundation in the theory. Despite efforts to include differing socio-historical conditions, there is the underlying tendency throughout this "historically determined" theory toward "pure" formalism. Toury's theory evolves from his formalist and structuralist predecessors, and as such carries certain absolute notions which limit the conceptual framework. Toury's historical model includes numerous other static concepts as well: translated texts are viewed as empirical facts, cultural norms are defined as static, non-contradictory rules influencing the generation of actual texts, and multiple tendencies within historical epoches are reduced to unified behavioral laws. One has the sense, for example, from reading his conclusions of the study of translated prose fiction into Hebrew that his five or six "norms" apply to all the texts included in the study. His analysis documents the conformity, not the exceptions; perhaps of more interest, and more revealing about the nature of translation, would be a list of all the exceptions to the rules. In addition, both Even-Zohar and Toury still confine their analyses to entities called "literary," and divorce the evolving literary polysystem from other signifying systems

in a culture. Toury, as Even-Zohar before him, tends toward structuralism; and although on the surface he accepts the "fact" that all languages are different, he suggests that underlying that difference is a unified and universal structural form. Because of our linguistic differences and cultural norms, we cannot articulate this form, but as "competent" bilingual speakers, we can still "know" it.

Fortunately, Toury's theory does not depend upon the existence of the "tertium comparationis" to function. By positing a fairly neutral linguistic version (sometimes called a crib or dogtrot), and subjectively contemplating aesthetic criteria (based not necessarily on Russian formalism, but whatever aesthetic the translator/critic privileges), then comparing it with other historical versions, a grid can be established from which to measure shifts of whatever text is being analyzed. Although such a model is necessarily imperfect--certainly less perfect than that which Toury posits--it does provide a basis for comparison, and cultural biases can be determined. Recent Translation Studies has found itself effectively using Toury's model in spite of his theoretical contradictions. In a review of Toury's book In Search of a Theory of Translation, Ria Vanderauwera, finds that Toury himself ignores his own formalist tendencies when applying his theory:

> Information about these norms can also be derived from extra-textual material (statements of translators, editors, publishers, critics) but first and foremost through a comparative study of source and target texts. Toury insists that this should happen via a tertium comparationis, a hypothetical third text and invariant of the comparison. I consider this an unnecessary complication and a relic of the formalization urge that swept through linguistics and semiotics. Ironically enough, in his own two valuable case studies which conclude the book, Toury makes

no use of this _tertium comparationis._[62]

Translation Studies has adopted that part of Toury's translation theory focusing on the socio-literary norms that govern the target culture and directly influence the process of translation. Several aspects of Toury's theory have contributed to development within the field: (1) the abandonment of one-to-one notions of correspondence as well as the possibility of literary/linguistic equivalence (unless by accident); (2) the involvement of literary tendencies within the target cultural system in the production of any translated text; (3) the destabilization of the notion of an original message with a fixed identity; (4) the integration of both the original text and the translated text in the semiotic web of intersecting cultural systems. Theoretically, Translation Studies adopts the performance aspect of Toury's theory, viewing translation as a process by which subjects of a given culture communicate in translated messages primarily determined by local cultural constraints. Inescapable infidelity is presumed as a condition of the process; translators do not work in ideal and abstract situations nor desire to be innocent, but have vested literary and cultural interests of their own, and _want_ their work to be accepted within another culture. Thus they manipulate the source text to inform as well as conform with the existing cultural constraints.[63] The translated text simultaneously draws from a family of resemblances as well as writes itself into other

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[62]Ria Vanderauwera, "Translation Studies: Changing the Focus" _Modern Poetry in Translation_, no. 43 (Autumn 1981), 52.

[63]See _The Manipulation of Literature_, ed. Theo Hermans (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985) for examples of literary manipulation through translation.

families of resemblances. Toury's theory inscribes the translated text into the shifting web of intertextuality, and thus prepares us for post-structuralist analysis, to be considered in the following chapter.

Max and Moritz in Hebrew

To illustrate how his theory works, Gideon Toury's offers an analysis of the translation of Wilhelm Busch's Max und Moritz (1965) into Hebrew, reported primarily in "German Children's Literature in Hebrew Translation: The Case of Max and Moritz," published in In Search of a Theory of Translation, and again (with additional examples in English) in "A Rationale for Descriptive Translation Studies," a paper given at the Third International Colloquium on Translated Literature and Interliterary Communication at the University of Antwerp in 1980, later published in the Symposium's collected papers in Dispositio (1982) and revised for The Manipulation of Literature (1985).[64] Children's literature lends itself particularly well to Polysystems Theory because it is (1) generally considered to be a secondary literary activity in Western countries, upholding Even-Zohar's distinction between primary and secondary, and (2) invariably subject to social constraints, i.e., a didactic social attitude always effects what gets written. Whereas Toury's prose fiction case study was limited to only a fifteen-year period and could give little sense of the historical nature of translation norms, his children's literature study covers the entire translation history of one text. The

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[64]Gideon Toury, "German Children's Literature in Hebrew Translation: The Case of Max and Moritz," in In Search of a Theory of Translation, 141-151; Gideon Toury, "A Rationale for Descriptive Translation Studies," Dispositio, Vol VII, No. 19-20-21 (1982), 23-39; Gideon Toury, "A Rationale for Descriptive Translation Studies," in , ed. Theo Hermans, 16-42.

analysis of all the translations into Hebrew over two centuries of Wilhelm

Busch's Max and Moritz, originally published in Germany in 1865, illustrates

the evolutionary nature of translation norms.   My summary of Toury's

translation history follows:[65]

1.) In 1898 Aaron Luboshitsky published the first translation in a
series of booklets for children called "For My Little Brothers."
Although little known, and although it appears "epigonic" and
secondary by today's standards, Toury argues that it was both
adequate to the original and very innovative, making it of central
importance to the Hebrew children's literature polysystem.

2.) In 1939 Chava Carmi published a translation in a two color album,
with illustrations, and although it was reprinted again in 1944, it
exerted little influence on subsequent generations.   Toury argues that
Carmi's translation was too close to the original for Hebrew taste,
which by that time had been "Russified" (connotations carried by
proper nouns, word order, intonational patterns influenced by Russian
literature).   Toury suggests Carmi's text did not conform to cultural
norms, and thus was marginalized.

3.) Also in 1939, Anda Amir-Pinkerfeld published a more popular
version, often reprinted, becoming the text read to
Toury's own generation.   Toury argues that its popularity was due to
its minimal reconstruction of the German, and maximum conformity to
the target models, now dominated by Russian patterns and developing
a translation tradition of its own.   She is the only translator to delete
an entire chapter--Max and Moritz' trick causing their teacher's pipe to
blow up in his face.

4.) In 1965 Uri Sela published another popular version, which is even
less adequate to the source text than Amir's and is partly "Anglicized,"
by now English being the dominant foreign language influencing
translation.   Toury suggests that it again attempts to conform with
current norms of the Hebrew system, the Amir text now being
outdated, and that Sela's continues a translation tradition fairly
well established.

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[65]Aaron Luboshitsky, Šim'on ve-Levi (Warsaw-St.Petersburg, 1989);
Wilhelm Busch, Max u-Moritz zomeme ha-mezimot, trans. Chava Carmi (Tel
Aviv, 1939); Anda Amir-Pinkerfeld, Gad ve-Dan (Tel Aviv, 1939); Wilhelm
Busch, Max u-Moritz, trans. Uri Sela (Tel Aviv, 1965).

To review the framework underlying Toury's research, Polysystems hypothesis suggests that translated literature, including translated children's literature can occupy any position—central or marginal—in the receiving culture. Its normal position tends to be secondary, generally conforming to rather than changing literary norms, and having little influence on the major evolutionary process of the polysystem as a whole. Yet because the Hebrew system is so weak, and was especially so at the turn of the century, certain translations, such as Luboshitsky's, can fill "vacuums" and move straight to the center, and set precedents for subsequent versions. In the case of the translation history of Max und Moritz, Toury argues that translation norms operate not only synchronically, but diachronically as well. By tracing the history of Max und Moritz in Hebrew, Toury demonstrates that there is a progression of conformity, beginning with Luboshitsky's innovations, which moved to the center of the literary system at the time because of his loyalty to the German and the lack of any Hebrew translation norms, to the more popular recent versions, which aim at readability in the target culture, now enjoying a stronger translation tradition and demanding more conformity. In addition, especially with regard to children's literature, the target culture norms influencing translation choices are very much social, dictated in the case of Max und Moritz by ethical and didactic attitudes dominating Jewish education.

As James Holmes demonstrated above (see chapter two, final section), his initial decision to translate *ganzen* as "ducks" when translating Paul Snoek's poem "rustiek lanschapje," subsequently effected all other choices of the translation process. Toury extends the theoretical boundaries of Translation

Studies by demonstrating that initial choices also operate diachronically: one initial choice also restricts subsequent textual choices for future translators of the same source text. In "A Rationale for Descriptive Translation Studies" in Dispositio (1982) he traces the evolution of "solutions" to one translation "problem"--in this case how to translate German cooking methods into a Jewish cooking system--and shows how the first solution became a translation norm that ultimately operated as a constraint upon future translations:[66]

Wilhelm Busch (1865):

> Durch den Schornstein mit Vergnügen
> Sehen sie die Hühner liegen
> Die schon ohne Kopf und Gurgeln
> Lieblich in der Pfanne schmurgeln.

Aaron Luboshitsky (English by Gideon Toury) (1898):

> Through the chimney they see
> the stove, and on it pots full of
> cooking chicken
> which have been finely roasted;
> in fat soup the legs,
> the wings, the upper legs,
> swim slowly, and from sheer delight
> they almost melt there like wax.

Chava Carmi (English by Gideon Toury) (1939):

> They smell the meal,
> they peep through the chimney,
> without heads, without throats
> the cock and each one of the hens
> are already in the pan.

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[66]Toury, "A Rational for Descriptive Translation Studies," Dispositio, Vol. VII, No. 19-21 (1982), 33-34.

Anda Amir-Pinkerfeld (1939):

> The only thing given by the fourth Hebrew version is the Hebrew word for "roast meat," tsli.

Uri Sela (English by Gideon Toury) (1965):

> Max and Moritz, in the meantime,
> have already seen the stove,
> and the smell of tasty roast meat
> went into the noses of the naughty children.

Toury wants to illustrate that the pattern of transforming German into Jewish cooking habits develops historically, and once one person has "solved" a translation problem, that particular solution operates in the target culture as a translation norm which influences (and constrains) subsequent translators. Because Jewish cooks do not put whole chickens in frying pans, let alone four simultaneously, the source text had to be changed; thus, Luboshitsky, who according to Toury, seldom deviated from the source text, set a precedent by cutting up the chickens and putting them into pots. The movement continued from the pots until the birds disappeared into the oven, and this change effected other textual matters, for the birds now could not be seen, but only smelled, and thus subsequent texts needed to be _further_ altered, until the graphic image of the young kids peering through the chimney at headless chickens bubbling on the stove is reduced to "the smell of tasty roast meat" in the Sela version. Yet Israeli culture seems clearly to prefer the Sela version over, for example, the Carmi version, which preserves the original imagery.

The size of the pan is not the only translation problem in the above example. Toury argues that ethical and didactic norms are the primary force

determining the center of the Hebrew polysystem, and the fact that the chickens have had their heads cut off, made graphic in the original by a picture accompanying the text, is another translation problem. Good Jewish parents want to protect their children from the violence of Busch's text and force the translators to adjust it accordingly. Carmi's version is the only one which reproduces the headless chickens, the only one which reproduces Busch's illustration, and the only one which disappears from the tradition. Explaining the difference between the reception of the two texts which appeared in 1939, Toury argues that Carmi's version is an "irregular phenomenon" of its time, an option which "found no real continuation and had no effect on the Hebrew language and literature."[67] Carmi's text violated not just cooking norms but didactic norms governing children's literature at the time (and apparently throughout the last two centuries); it ran the risk of being too innovative and, thus, was marginalized by the polysystem.

Toury illustrates this point by giving two examples of translated versions of the poem's ending, in which, according to Busch's original, Max and Moritz, after playing a trick on the farmer, are caught and punished. The children are put into the grain sack, taken to the mill, ground up into bits and pieces, scattered in the barnyard, and eventually eaten by the miller's fowl. The ending completes a cycle beginning with the kids' killing and eating Witwe Bolte's chickens and ending with their death and consumption by similar domestic birds. A coda to the text reveals that the villagers not only do not mourn the children, but because the kids have

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[67]Toury, "Max und Moritz in Hebrew," 149.

played tricks on everyone, are happy to be rid of the menace. The didactic message of the source text is simple but clear: their punishment suited the crime. Certainly food for thought, especially in the minds of the children, but too much for good Jewish adults, who demand moderation and at least the possibility of forgiveness and a happy ending. Presumably Luboshitsky's and Carmi's text reproduce the Busch's ending, for Toury tells us that they made no didactic concessions to the target culture norms. He does reproduce the endings from the two popular versions, which more than reveal the conflict of interests experienced by the translators:[68]

Busch (1865):

    "Her damit!" Und in der Trichter
    Schüttelt er die Bösewichter.--
    Rickeracke! Rickeracke!
    Geht die Mühle mit Geknacke.
    Hier kann man sie noch erblicken
    Fein geschroten und in Stücken.
    Doch sogleich verzehret sie
    Meister Müllers Federvieh.

Anda Amir-Pinkerfeld (English by Toury) (1939):

    ha-saq l-ma'la he'la
    al ha-masmer oto tala
    vadai odam tluyim me'az
    l-hazilam is lo nehpaz.
    ve-ulai b-kol zot mi-saq jaz'u
    mi-zaratam b-nes nahlzu,
    ak lo noda od mi-ze ha-zman
    kol ma'ase b-Gad v-Dan.

    [he lifted the sack (with the children in it)/and hung it on the nail.
    They probably still hang there;/(because) nobody hastened to
    their rescue/maybe they came out of the sack, after all/and were

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[68]Wilhelm Busch, Gesamt Werke, Bd. I (Olten/Stuttgart/Salzburg: Fackelverlag, 1966), 279-80; Toury, "Max und Moritz in Hebrew," 146-7.

miraculously rescued from their misfortune;/at any rate, since
then/nothing has been heard about them]

Uri Sela (English by Gideon Toury) (1965):

b-od rega -- pi ha-saq
kbar qasur u-mhudaq
ve-ha-zug ha-msukan
lo jukal la-zet mi-kan,
lo jukal od l-qalel
ba-aherim l-hit'alel,
et misehu la-sim lizhoq
ve-la abor kol gbul vahoq

[in a minute, the opening of the sack/is already tied and
fastened/and the dangerous couple/will not be able to leave
it,/will no longer be able to curse,/to treat other people cruelly,/
to make a laughing-stock of anybody/and transgress all limits
and laws]

Despite their ambiguity, omissions and distortions, Amir-Pinkerfeld's and

Sela's versions have been accepted in the Hebrew culture as the definitive

translations of Max und Moritz, and they are the editions that two

generations of children have been raised on. Any analysis of the above

example by means of a theory which posits linguistic or functional rules of

translation equivalents will be unable to explain not just certain translation

decisions, but the social phenomenon governing acceptability as well.

Toury's theory, by providing a culture component, enables the translation

theorist not only to better understand the process effecting the translation

choices, but also to incorporate and explain factors governing the production

of translated texts.

There are still problems with Toury's argument, especially concerning

which texts move to the center of the polysystem and which ones are

marginalized, all confused by a unified definition of "literariness," which he

uses inconsistently, obscuring where the center of the system is at any given

moment. For example, Anda Amir-Pinkerfeld is regarded as a "poetess," whereas Chava Carmi is "a [sic] obscure figure"; Amir-Pinkerfeld's text is central, and Carmi's is peripheral; yet Carmi's version seems to challenge the norms and Amir's to conform. The most important question that a historically-determined theory of translation needs to address is the emergence within the same culture of two diametrically opposed texts in the same year. Because Polysystems Theory argues that cultural norms determine translation, Toury is forced to conclude that Carmi's text is an "irregular" phenomenon, which is less than an adequate explanation. More work needs to be done regarding the violent content of the original, with its grotesque and ironic elements, and its acceptability, or lack thereof, in the Hebrew literary system (or in Western culture in general). The phenomenon of texts such as Carmi's being elided from the society because of their content may be more systematic and less "irregular" than Toury suggests; clearly more is involved than the linguistic fidelity to the German and the retaining of Germanicized proper nouns. Nevertheless, the study documents two important aspect of Toury's theory: that translation decisions have a historical nature, operating on a diachronic as well as synchronic axis, and that certain decisions made by translators are made without any consideration of the source text, but solely in light of what the target system will accept. His examples document his argument that translation theory needs to expand the boundaries of its models and shift the focus to a reception-oriented theory. In addition, his application of his theory to Max und Moritz provides a practical model for subsequent research.

Nineteenth-century French Translations

The best example of Toury's theoretical and methodological influence on Translation Studies can be seen in the work of a group of scholars at the University of Leuven studying "Littérature et Traduction en France 1800-1850," whose initial reports were presented in 1980 at the Antwerp "Third International Symposium on Translated Literature and Interliterary Communication." Three papers reveal different but interrelated avenues of research: Lieven D'hulst reports on translation approaches as revealed in various prefaces and introductions; José Lambert reports on one author's trials getting a translation of a play by Shakespeare produced; and Katrin Van Bragt traces the translation process through a number of translation of one source text. D'hulst's and Lambert's data seem to reconfirm certain Polysystems hypotheses, whereas Van Bragt's seems to confirm them while simultaneously raising a new set of questions about Polysystems Theory and the nature of translation.

In his article "The Conflict of Translation Models in France (End of 18th - Beginning of 19th Century)" Lieven D'hulst puts early nineteenth-century translations in context by describing the translation models which influenced translation decisions.[69] By reviewing various prefaces and introductions to translated texts in order to determine the aesthetic preferences of the individual translators, he is able to describe which models were dominant and non-dominant, isolate norms in specific periods, and describe the evolution of the translation norms in the literary system. His

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[69]Lieven D'hulst, "The Conflict of Translational Models in France (End of 18th - Beginning 19th Century)," Dispositio, Vol. VII, No. 19-21 (1982), 41-52.

conclusion, when discussing the emergence of a "new" model of verse translation in 1830, reconfirms the Polysystems hypothesis that innovative translation (verse) can move to the center of a given literary system:

> Since, for more complex cultural reasons--in which the political system probably played a determining role--, the French literary system limited direct contacts with exogenous systems, the exogenous textual elements manipulated in (especially) the prose translation model occupy a peripheral place in the new poetic model of the literary centre. How then should one understand the renewal of the translation model? The particular congruence of the original text with the poetic norms of the centre favours the experimental function of translations, which in this way support the formation of the endogenous poetic code. The partial contact between the dominant translation model and the "new" model (in verse)--in which the norm of exactitude and various other textual features are transferred--is dictated by the strategy of the new literary center.[70]

In "How Emile Deschamps Translated Shakespeare's Macbeth, or Theatre System and Translational System in French Literature (1800-1850)," José Lambert, also at the University of Leuven and part of the same research team, reports on his study of a single author and the attempt to translate and publish a single text within a certain period of time.[71] The case is particularly illuminating because Deschamps split with a group of other young Romanticists, tried to subvert theatre conventions at the time by translating the "real" Shakespeare, in this case meaning Shakespeare in "verse," and saw his translation refused in 1829, only to have it successfully staged in 1849 after conventions had changed. Lambert concludes that despite his avowed interest in translating the "real" Shakespeare, Deschamps

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[70]Ibid., 49.

[71]José Lambert, "How Emile Deschamps Translated Shakespeare's Macbeth, or Theatre System and Translational System in French Literature (1800-1850)," Dispositio, Vol. VII, No. 19-21 (1982), 53-61.

contradicted his intentions of being true to the   source text and actually

demonstrated more interest in the acceptability of his translation by the

receiving culture, reconfirming the Polysystems hypothesis that translation

theory need be more target-text oriented:

> Deschamps behaves as much in a contradictory way as his
> predecessors, he merely seems to solve the problems of stage
> constraints in a more Shakespearean manner. He admits that he has
> been looking for a "traduction libre mais aussie fidèle que l'autre--la
> traduction littérale." In fact, the more Deschamps explains how he
> wants to be true to Shakespeare's theatre, the more he seems to be
> arguing both against it and against the French (adapted) formula.
> Every time he justifies a more traditional method (e.g. the use of verse,
> instead of the mixture of prose, blank verse and verse), he argues
> from the point of view of a producer (or a spectator) rather than as a
> Shakespeare reader/spectator: the source text is less important than
> the rules of the stage.[72]

The most interesting study, and by far the most meticulous, is "The

Tradition of a Translation and its Implications: 'The Vicar of Wakefield' in

French Translation," a report by Katrin Van Bragt on work she is doing

together with José Lambert at the University of Leuven.[73] By comparing

synchronically and diachronically a series of translations, she is able to

determine how certain norms effect the translation process and thus gain an

understanding of the relationship between the translation system and the

literature as a whole. With her colleague Lambert she has examined twenty-

five different translations and seventy-five re-issues within a hundred-year

period (1767-1860). Because of her documentation and the fact that the

reader has recourse to look at actual texts rather than statements of

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[72]Ibid., 56.

[73]Katrin Van Bragt, "The Tradition of a Translation and its Implications:
'The Vicar of Wakefield' in French Translation," Dispositio Vol. VII, No. 19-21
(1982), 63-75.

intentions and thus to view translation decisions as they unfold, her conclusions become much more persuasive. In addition to the common tendencies governing a particular period, her study also show its diversity. To look at just one brief example, I quote the last four lines of a poem--called merely "song" in the Goldsmith's original-- and a half dozen translations:[74]

Goldsmith (1766):

    The only art her guilt to cover,
        To hide her shame from every eye,
    To give repentance to her lover,
        And wring his bossom - is to die.

1.)   Mme De Montesson (1767):

    Sa seule ressource pour réparer son erreur, pour cacher
    sa honte, pour faire repentir l'amant de son infidélité, &
    pour lui déchirer le couer, est de mourir.

2.)   Anon. in "Bibliothèque universelle des Romans" (1788-89):

    Le seul art qui puisse couvrir
    Et son opprobre & sa foiblesse,
    Le seul art qui puisse guérir
    Le remord cuisant qui la blesse,
    Et réveiller le repentir
    Dans l'art trompeur qui la délaisse,
    C'est de se taire & et [sic] mourir.

4.)   Gin (1794?):

    La seule voie qui lui reste pour voiler son crime, dérober sa
    honte à tous les yeux, faire repentir son amant, lancer dans
    son sein le remords rongeur, --C'est de mourir.

6.)   Ymbert (1802):

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[74]Ibid., 69-70.

> Quel art, quel charme alors peut chasser le tourment,
> La honte, les soucis qui vous rongent sans cesse,
> Et déchirer le sein d'un infidèle amant?
> C'est de mourir, hélas! en proie à la tristesse.

15.) Nodier (1836):

> Le seul moyen de cacher sa faute, de voiler sa honte à tous
> les yeux, d'éveiller le remords au coeur de son amant et de
> le déchirer, c'est . . . de mourir.

18.) Mme Swanton Belloc (1839):

> Pour retrouver la paix ravie à sa jeunesse,
> Arracher un remords à qui l'a pu trahir
> Pour laver cette tâche et guérir sa tristesse,
> Il ne lui reste qu'à mourir!

The above selection is representative of both the different kinds of translators as well as different kinds of translations. Nodier was a well-known literary figure as well as a translator; Ymbert an occasional translator; Gin a specialist in classics; others were unknown or remained anonymous. The translations themselves seem to be characterized by their diversity rather than their conformity. Despite the song's simplicity, it presented a complex problem to the translators, for the phenomenon of a song in a narrative text was not that frequent, and in prose fiction in France during this period almost no precedents existed. Although a strong translation tradition existed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries for translating poetry into prose, Van Bragt tells us the Vicar of Wakefield translators often rendered poems in prose, sometimes translated one (of the three) Goldsmith's poems into prose, or, borrowing heavily from fellow-poets, wrote poetic translations of their own. Thus the "initial" choices varied greatly, despite the existence of a very strong literary system in

general. In addition, the data show that even among both the prose (De Montesson, Gin, Nodier) and verse (Anon., Ymbert, Belloc) paradigms, more formal divergences than similarities exist. For example, Van Bragt points out, the anonymous version doubles the number of lines and draws from a traditional stock of French poetic clichés; the Ymbert version has a "higher" noble style; and the Belloc text paraphrases and tends towards preciosity. In the prose versions, the differences continue: the De Montesson version is very flat and not very different from the prose context; the Gin version has a higher "poetic" level and preserves the punctuation and syntax of the original; and the Nodier version, which is very brief and terse, eliminated all repetition from the original. Thus the "operational" decisions seem to reveal less conformity and more diversity than a culturally determined theory might anticipate.

Despite all the diversity and apparent lack of conformity with any cultural norm, Van Bragt is able to point out some "stability" within the diversity:

> All translators dramatically enhance the anticipation of the final point "is to die," by means of redundant explicitations, by repetitions, and above all by the use of a moral, rather than stereotyped vocabulary.[75]

She cites examples such as De Montesson adding "de son infidélité," the anonymous version doubling the length of the poem, full of repetitions and explications, Gin writing "remords rongeur," and Ymbert adding "hélas!" and suggests that all the poems are somewhat reminiscent of a kind of poetical

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[75]Ibid., 71.

writing to which genres like "romance" and "idylle" belonged.[76] The study

of actual texts in translation has led Van Bragt to conclude as follows:

> It would be possible indeed to set the respective versions of any textual segment of our text, or even of any Vicar's translations as a whole, on an hypothetical axis that links, at one pole "stability," tradition of equivalence, a normative and exclusive model. . . , with, at the other pole "instability," caprice and individual, new norms. The analysis of both the prose extract and the poem have showed stability. But a take-over from earlier versions never occurred mechanically. The tradition of the Vicaire provided the translator with virtual equivalences from which he selected his individual equivalence, according to principles more converging in the case of prose, and more diverging--at least on the formal and functional levels--in the case of poetry.[77]

Van Bragt seems less willing to draw definitive conclusions than some of her

colleagues practicing Polysystems Theory. Although she knows how the

data should conform according to the theory, especially in a intact

("nondefective") literary system as existed in nineteenth-century France,

the texts are so different, so various, so inconclusive, that many tendencies

can be seen as existing simultaneously. Certainly translation traditions exist

and exert intertextual influence, and certainly ahistorical source-text

oriented systems are inadequate to explain the above translations.

Reaffirming the need for a target-text oriented system, Van Bragt writes, "It

would be absurd indeed to compare only the source-text with each translation

respectively, as if we were faced with many single, exclusive or non-

interfering relationships."[78] But there seems to be a force at work that even

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[76]Ibid.

[77]Ibid., 72.

[78]Ibid., 74.

Polysystems Theory is not broad enough to encompass, a sort of shifting play of words and multiple systems and strategies in operation at any given moment. All of the translators reviewed seem to be inside an epoch governed by a system of decipherable translation strategies, but also capable of breaking out at any moment, behaving inconsistently and contradicting themselves repeatedly. Wittgenstein posited fields of resemblance, from which Toury choose the option of selecting a less than "adequate" version in favor of one which is more "acceptable" to the receiving culture. In his system, how a text functions has more importance than linguistic or literary equivalence. Yet whatever aspect chosen, the model is still based on equivalence, albeit a culturally acceptable equivalent. Van Bragt's study implicitly suggests that linguistic, literary, and target culture norms may not provide a theory of translation with the means to explain all the deviations. Something else is involved in translation, something which may be larger than the material forces of the evolution of history, something which may have more to do with diverse and contradictory differences of the translated text to the source text rather than its resemblance.

Toury's theorizing has propelled Translation Studies to a new level; he has established a methodology of looking at actual translations in an historical context. How many people, literary scholars included, French literary scholars included, had any idea that within a hundred year period, twenty-five different translations of Oliver Goldsmith's Vicar of Wakefield, in seventy-five editions (Van Bragt's study includes no version published after 1860), would occur in any given country? Could any system theorist predict or explain such a phenomenon? At a certain point, literary scholarship,

definitions of primary and secondary, center and periphery no longer suffice. Processes of dissemination, idiosyncrasy, subjective creativity, free play and unconscious random association are involved that extend beyond rational analysis, and certainly beyond the capabilities of academic reconstruction. The University of Leuven project, as comprehensive as it is, involving several scholars from different disciplines, has just scratched the surface. The Vicar of Wakefield, despite its unusual integration of three poems within a narrative, is not that complex a literary work, yet yields a large number of different solutions. Just what are the translation rules here? Where's the center? And where's the history? Despite the fact that the French literary system is "intact," i.e, non-defective, according to Polysystems Theory, the social system is in a state of turmoil: there are multiple revolutions during this period. How does the social norm of mass revolt affect translation?

Polysystems Theory tends to prefer stable social situations--be they "weak" or "strong" systems--so that it can focus solely on textual features and how they affect society. Even Van Bragt's study, with all its openness, has concentrated on matricial and textual (stylistic) norms. A translation theory cannot just focus on conventions, be they linguistic, literary, or even social. At a certain point one needs get away from formal analysis and get to what the text says. For example, what does Goldsmith poem say about the women? What does he mean? Are the two the same? What do the translators say about the women? What is the difference? More than just a literary system is evolving during this period, and by reading the translations symptomatically for content as well as for convention, one can gain new insight into history.

At a certain point the inadequacy of Tynjanov's trickle down effect becomes visible, and the systematic evolution of his literary system becomes disjointed. Using Toury's "comprehensive" model, his broad parameters, and his scientific methodology, Van Bragt's study reconfirms his theory and reveals that other factors are involved in translation. Toury's has broadened the perspective of translation studies, broken down certain conceptual barriers, and offered a method for better describing translations, but his theory still retains parameters which limit the nature of what can and cannot be investigated. Even-Zohar and Toury, despite their contribution furthering our understanding of the translation process, seem committed to Polysystems Theory, which, as another kind of structuralism, limits that which it can conceptualize. Despite the usefulness of its method for studying translated texts, Van Bragt seems to be open to other theoretical interpretations of the data and other theoretical possibilities regarding the nature of translation.[79] The next chapter will deal with one such possibility, that of deconstruction, whose practitioners tend to transgress boundaries wherever they appear.

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[79]A division within Translation Studies is brewing; the marriage between Translation Studies and Polysystems Theory may be short-lived. Already certain scholars are distancing themselves from Polysystems Theory. See Maria Tymoczcko, "How Distinct are Formal and Dynamic Equivalence" in The Manipulation of Liturature, 63-87, and "Translation in Oral Tradition as a Touchstone for Translation Theory and Practice" (to appear this spring); André Lefevere, "The structure in the dialect of men interpreted," Comparative Criticism 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 87-101. Both of them agree that pre-Toury models are inadequate and use Polysystem Theory in their work, but at the same time suggest further considerations need be included.

CHAPTER VI

DECONSTRUCTION

Turmoil and *Tel Quel*

The translation theories examined thus far all depend upon some notion of equivalence: the same aesthetic experience (chapter two), linguistic structural/dynamic equivalence (chapter three), corresponding literary function (chapter four), or similar formal correlation governed by social acceptability and the kind literary system in the receiving culture (chapter four). Despite differing approaches, each theory is unified by a conceptual framework which assumes original presence and a re-presentation of it in the receiving culture. Even-Zohar and Toury tried to escape the epistemological straight-jacket that the power of the original text retains over the translation by reviewing the problem of translation in terms of the actual product rather than the ideal of a "faithful" version, but in the end they found it difficult to escape limitations imposed by their formalist roots and scientific approach. The question remains whether it is possible to think about translation in other than traditional terms. To date, all translation theories have made rigid distinctions between original texts and their translations, distinctions which determine subsequent claims about the nature of translation. Yet a radical redrawing of the questions upon which translation theory is founded is being undertaken by

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deconstructionists.[1] Questions being posed include the following: What if one theoretically reversed the direction of thought and posited the hypothesis that the original text is dependent upon the translation? What if one suggested that without translation, the original text ceased to exist, that the very survival of the original depends not on any particular quality it contains, but upon those qualities that its translation contains? What if the very definition of a text's meaning was determined not by the original, but by the translation? What if the "original" has no fixed identity that can be aesthetically or scientifically determined but rather changes each time it passes into translation? What exists <u>before</u> the original? An idea? A form? A thing? Nothing? Can we think in terms of pre-original, pre-ontological conditions? Deconstructionists not only raise questions challenging fundamental notions prevalent in all the theories discussed above but also question the very nature of the act of raising such questions. Foucault, as we shall see later, calls into question the questioner, suggesting that this particular age is characterized less as one in which man poses the questions and more as one in which questions arise from something inherent in language itself. Deconstructionists go so far as to suggest that perhaps the <u>translated text writes us</u> and not we the translated text.

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[1]Certain practicioners distance themselves from the term "deconstruction" in favor of "affirmative productivity." See Eugene Vance, "Translation of the Past Perfect," in <u>The Ear of the Other: Texts and Discussions with Jacques Derrida</u>, trans. Peggy Kamuf, ed. Christie McDonald (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 135-136. For the sake of clarity and because of its widespread acceptance, I will use the term "deconstruction" to refer to this particular approach to translation.

Because of the nature of the very different "subject matter" of deconstruction, this chapter will differ slightly from the preceding chapters; while the other theories offer or recommend a method of translation, one that can be tested and evaluated (against "original meaning," for example), deconstruction discusses limits of language, writing, reading which by definition delineate limits of the specific theories they describe. While not offering a specific "translation theory" of its own, deconstruction, however, does "use" translation often both to raise questions regarding the nature of language and "being-in-language" as well as suggesting that in the process of translation texts, one can come as close as is possible to that elusive notion or experience of *différance*, which "underlies" their approach. Such thinking about the nature of translation and the nature of language, thus, becomes important to the translation theories, not because it necessarily defines another approach, but because it deepens and broadens the conceptual framework by which we define the very field itself. I suggest that the shift to a more philosophic stance from which the entire problematic of translation can be better viewed may not only be beneficial for translation theory, but that after such a confrontation, the discourse which has limited the development of translation theory will invariably undergo a transformation, allowing new insights and fresh interdisciplinary approaches, breaking, if you will, a logjam of stagnated terms and notions.

In Anglo-American circles, deconstruction is not an approach normally associated with translation theory, and none of the theorists examined above mention its existence, let alone deem it appropriate their

discussions.[2]   I would like to suggest, however, that the deconstructionists'
entire project is intricately relevant to questions of translation theory, and
that their thinking is seminal to any understanding of the theoretical
problems of the translation process.   Jacques Derrida, for example, suggests
that deconstruction and translation are inexorably interconnected,
intimating that in the process of translation, that elusive impossible
presence he refers to as *différance* may, to the highest degree possible, be
visible: "In the limits to which it is possible or at least appears possible,
translation practices the difference between signified and signifier."[3]   All of
Derrida's writing, regardless of the "subject matter" or text in question,
continually revolves around problems pertaining to the possibility or
impossibility of translation.   According to Derrida, all of philosophy is
centrally concerned with the notion of translation: "the origin of
philosophy is translation or the thesis of translatability."[4]   He challenges the
reader (and especially the translator) to think and rethink every moment a
translation solution is posed, an item named, an identity fixed, or a sentence
inscribed.   With each naming gesture, Derrida suggests a footnote, a note in

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[2] One exception is James Holmes, who suggests that "translators are also
human beings, despite all their efforts to function as clear-glass windows
which the bright sun of the author's text can shine through undistorted.
And that fact gives rise to a second question: To what extent are the texts that
they have translated committing records of their own motives, desires and
frustrations?   The questions are important, and the deconstructionists are
providing us with tools to answer them."   James Holmes, "The State of Two
Arts: Literary Translation and Translation Studies in the West Today,"
Proceedings from X. Weltkongress der FIT, ed. Hildegund Bühler (Vienna:
Wilhelm Braumüller, 1985), 150.

[3] Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1981), 21.

[4] Derrida, The Ear of the Other, 120.

the margin, or a preface also is in order to retrieve those subtle differing supplementary meanings and tangential notions lost in the process of transcription. With the focus of philosophical investigation redirected from identity to difference, from presence to supplement, from text to preface, translation assumes a central rather than secondary place; for it is here that Derrida creates tension, casts doubts, and offers alternatives. The process of translation offers, as near as may be approached, a mode of differing/deferring that subverts modes of traditional metaphysical thinking that have historically dominated assumptions about translation specifically as well as philosophy in general.

In contrast to all the theories discussed in this study, at the foundation of Derrida's thought is the assumption that there is no kernel or deep structure, nothing that we may ever discern--let alone represent, translate or found a theory on. Rather, Derrida "bases" his "theory" of deconstruction on non-identity, on non-presence, on unrepresentability. What does exist, according to Derrida, are different chains of signification--including the "original" and its translations in a symbiotic relationship--mutually supplementing each other, defining and redefining a phantasm of sameness, which never has existed nor will exist as something fixed, graspable, known, or understood. This phantasm, produced by a desire for some essence or unity, represses the possibility that whatever may be there is always in motion, in flux, "at play," escaping in the very process of trying to define it, talk about it, or make it present. The subject of translation theory has traditionally involved some concept of determinable meaning that can be transferred to another system of signification. Deconstruction questions

such a definition of translation and uses the practice of translation to demonstrate the instability of its own theoretical framework. Deconstruction resists systems of categorization which separate "source" text from "target" text or "language" from "meaning," denies the existence of underlying forms independent of language, and questions theoretical assumptions which presume originary beings, in whatever shape or form. In translation, what is visible is language referring not to things, but to language itself. Thus the chain of signification is one of infinite regress--the translated text becomes a translation of another earlier translation and translated words, although viewed by deconstructionists as "material" signifiers, represent nothing but other words representing nothing but still other words representing.

The deconstructionist alternative arose primarily in France in the late 60's during a time of social and political upheaval. At the same time the events of May 1968 were threatening to topple de Gaulle's regime, a group of formalists joined a group of leftists and began collectively publishing their work in the Parisian journal _Tel Quel_, the name which became associated with the group.[5] _Tel Quel_ in the late sixties was composed of publications by central members Philippe Sollers, Julia Kristeva, Marcelin Pleynet, Jean Pierre Faye, Jacqueline Risset, and Jean Ricardou as well as by more temporary members such as Roland Barthes, Tzvetan Todorov, Pierre Boulez,

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[5]For a history of the group _Tel Quel_, see Philippe Sollers and David Hayman, _Vision à New York_ (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1981); Marcelin Pleynet, _Spirito Peregrino: Chroniques du journal ordinaire_ (Paris, 1981); Julia Kristeva, "Mémoire," _L'Infini_ (Winter 1983), 39-54; Stephan Bann, "The Career of _Tel Quel_: _Tel Quel_ becomes _L'Infini_," in _Comparative Criticism_ 6, ed. E.S. Schaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 327-339.

Jean-Louis Houdebine, Guy Scarpetta, and Derrida. Barthes and Todorov were decidedly formalist, and Kristeva, who had joined the group from Bulgaria, was well versed in the study of Russian formalism. From another direction, Louis Althusser, although not considered a member of the group, practiced a form of deconstruction while retaining a Marxist dialectic and a scientific methodology, and exerted enormous influence. In addition to working with fellow Marxists--Sollers, Houdebine, and Scarpetta (and Merleau-Ponty at an earlier date)--Althusser's influence also filters down through his student Foucault (whose subsequent students included Derrida),[6] who remained politically active for multiple anti-establishment causes until his death. All were deeply influenced by formalist and structuralist thinking and were continually accused of reducing literature to formalist concepts and the kind of "scientific" thinking that accompanies it, whether that scientific thinking was formal/structural or dialectical/dynamic. However, the members viewed themselves at the time as an avant-garde, as revolutionaries and disruptors; they generally were interested less in describing underlying forms and in explanation of texts than in changing society--transforming ways Western intellectuals think--and in dismantling both conceptual and material institutions governing society. Literature and concepts of literariness were

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[6]Derrida remains fairly silent in terms of his position toward Marxism and his Marxist colleagues. When pressed in an interview with Guy Scarpetta and Jean-Louis Houdebine, he says that he is "convinced" of Marxism, but he just has not read any exegesis which satisfies him. See Derrida, Positions, 62-4. See also Michael Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1982), especially Chapter 2; Michael Ryan, "The Marxism-Deconstruction Debate in Literary Theory," New Orleans Review (Spring 1984), 29-35; and Marx after Derrida, ed. S.P. Mohanty, Diacritics (Winter 1985).

primary targets, for they tended to be defined and perpetuated by "bourgeois" thinking, and were thus appropriate objects to be dismantled and opened up for other uses. Contrary to orthodox leftist notions at the time, the deconstructionists did not want to abandon literature, yet neither did they want to conform to existing paradigms of investigation. Instead, they suggested that literature, because of its awareness of its own forms and self-reflexivity, can be analyzed in a way that subverts the notions of unified presence, meaningful intentions, and philosophical truths. Thus literary texts became the focus of deconstructive investigation as much as did traditional philosophical texts. As activists, they wished to alter the static, sanctified definitions of literature and appropriate the literary text for their own use. In other words, they subscribed neither to the politically leftist nor to the bourgeois notion of literature, but embarked upon a different approach.

The political practice motivating the work of the members of Tel Quel, thus, became one which suggested numerous alternatives. The chaotic events in France mutually reflected and motivated this non-philosophic, practice-oriented movement. While leftists wished conformity and solidarity with their leadership, the deconstructionist group, as indeed the general protest movement, enjoyed a life of its own. In his article "The Career of Tel Quel: Tel Quel becomes L'Infini," Stephan Bann clarifies the difference between the progressive *engagement* of deconstructionists and the political position of the more traditional leftists by citing Philippe Sollers' rebuttal of an attack from a Sartrian position by Bernard Pingaud. At issue is the subject of "writing." Whereas traditional leftists have dismissed certain forms of

writing as reinforcing bourgeois institutions, the members of Tel Quel viewed writing as a force that both reinforces and simultaneously deconstructs formal, sacrosanct conceptions of the "literary," thus changing the issue from a clear-cut "either/or" choice to one theoretically and politically more complex. Sollers writes:

> In effect, we can find in Pingaud's conclusions the restatement of an old alternative, which is moreover typically Sartrian. . . . Either one must be "revolutionary" without "literature," or, since literature is "bourgeois," any activity in this direction is, by definition, outside the revolution. There we have a problem of "bad faith" which is not our concern. Having to choose between a uniquely "militant" activity and a defence which is non-revolutionary of what Pingaud--because he misinterprets its historical force--refers to as "sacrosanct writing," that is yet another reductive simplification that we reject. For us, writing, textual activity, is precisely what repudiates any form of sanctification or sacralisation and first of all, need we point out, that of "writing" in the aesthetic sense of the term . . . We say in effect that the line of thought which commands our attention, apart from the element of "play" which it presupposes, is inevitably linked to the processes of scientific knowledge and social transformation. . . . An avant-garde is in the last resort effective less as a result of its declarations or its "formal" innovations than through its work: it is this work, and its reflective aspects, which should impel Pingaud, as indeed many others, to reread Tel Quel.[7]

The above passage illustrates how Sollers rejects either/or dichotomies, not letting others typecast the Tel Quel project by their own dualistic categorical thinking. Neither leftist nor rightist, Sollers argues the group rejects both its imprisonment by the metaphors of dialectical categories and its sublation by holist, unified, "bourgeois" verities. The members of Tel Quel read both Jacobson and Marx at the same time, neither rejecting nor identifying with either, deliberately refusing to resolve the contradiction of such a stance in order to open up new avenues of thought. That its evolution reflects the

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[7]Philippe Sollers, "Le réflexe de réduction," in Théorie d'ensemble (Paris: Seuil, 1968), 398. Quoted by Bann, "The Career of Tel Quel," 332.

political and social turmoil in France during the late sixties is more than

coincidence. In his book Readings and Writings: Semiotic Counter-Strategies,

Peter Wollen suggests that the events in May 1968 "brought Tel Quel in its

wake,"[8] but clearly the alternative mode of thinking by the young radicals

served to bring about the events of May as well. Wollen clearly states the

deconstructionist opposition both to theories that posit unified essences and

theories that posit dialectical structures at their centers:

> The aspects of the Tel Quel approach that captivated me were, in
> general terms, the attempt to bring semiotics, Marxism and
> psychoanalysis into one field of discourse, and more specifically, the
> introduction of "heterogeneity" and "inter-textuality" as key concepts,
> derived from Bataille and Bakhtin respectively and deployed by Julia
> Kristeva. The Tel Quel view focussed on the split in the sign, the class
> contradictions and split in society and the subject split between body
> and representation and between unconscious and conscious. It was
> opposed to holistic theories that contained contradictions as oppositions
> or antinomies that could be mediated, rather than mobilized them as
> dialectical generators of an uncontainable excess.[9]

To say that deconstructionists reject formalism, however, is not

necessarily accurate; the progressive (Marxist) politics as well as

structuralist backgrounds of the group, however, did help them contextualize

the movement. In 1965 Tzvetan Todorov published Théorie de la littérature,

the first translation of a selection of Russian formalist essays to appear in

France, and it had enormous impact on the group. Julia Kristeva, who joined

the Tel Quel editorial board in 1970, was well-versed in both Chomskian and

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[8]Peter Wollen, Readings and Writings: Semiotic Counter-Strategies
(London: Verso Ed. and NLB, 1982), 210. Quoted by Bann, "The Career of Tel
Quel," 334.

[9]Wollen, Readings and Writings: Semiotic Counter-Strategies, 210-11.
Quoted by Bann, "The Career of Tel Quel," 334.

Czechoslovakian linguistics. She greatly admired the work of Bakhtin, for example, but suggested in her essay "The Ruin of a Poetics" that although his work was substantially correct, it did not go far enough, especially when it began to introduce sociological and ideological aspects into the structuralist framework.[10]   Derrida, too, admits the necessary stage of structuralism for the activity of deconstruction.   In Of Grammatology he suggests that Saussure did not see his project through to its ultimate conclusions and that while Saussure's linguistics limits the system of language by a "bad" abstraction, thus preventing him from determining fully that object of investigation, his work also opens the field for new insight:

> It is when he is not expressly dealing with writing, when he feels he has closed the parentheses on that subject, that Saussure opens the field of a general grammatology.   Which would not only no longer be excluded from general linguistics, but would dominate it and contain it within itself.   Then one realizes that what was chased off limits, the wandering outcast of linguistics, has indeed never ceased to haunt language as its primary and most intimate possibility.   The something which was never spoken and which is nothing other than writing itself as the origin of language writes itself within Saussure's discourse.[11]

As noted earlier, translation theories have used formalist concepts to provide a focus on the similarities and differences constituting the structures of various languages.   Indeed, it is within such a notion of comparison that social and subjective factors can be seen to operate as constraints. Deconstruction likewise analyzes the differences, slips, changes, and elisions that are part of every text.   Just as formalist roots have helped Translation

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[10]Julia Kristeva, "The Ruin of a Poetics," trans. Vivienne Mylne, in Russian Formalism, ed. Stephen Bann and John Bowlt (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1973).

[11]Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 43-44.

Studies focus on actual texts rather than on hypothetical ones, so is deconstruction tied to the text which it reads. If indeed, both "fields" are moving toward a position that avoids independent, preconceived concepts from which to categorize, interpret, and evaluate texts, the value of deconstruction for a post-structuralist theory of translation may now be apparent. Yet Russian formalism, as Saussurian linguistics, is based upon form/content distinctions, on the signified/signifier distinctions that ground traditional metaphysical philosophy. This dichotomized thinking and the hierarchies generated by such distinctions (privileging literary over non-literary, the metaphysical over the referential, or pure thought over surface structure) are the same distinctions that deconstruction finds limiting and against which it operates. In terms of translation theory, which invariably posits some determinable meaning as that which must be reconstituted in another language, the very separation of language from an identifiable meaning or deep structure becomes the target of deconstruction's questions and thus a fruitful place to begin reexamination of translation theory in general.

In the passage quoted above, Derrida refers to "something which is never spoken"--something unthought or, as I will argue, language itself speaking, a notion traditionally viewed as beyond the scope of translation theory. In this chapter I suggest that translation theory can no longer avoid such questions. I will briefly use Foucault to introduce this chapter's elusive "subject matter," which is necessarily obscure and, by Derrida's definition, escapes meaningful discussion. To better understand "what" this chapter is about, I will first turn to work by Foucault, who as an archaeologist of "The

Other," best articulates the "concept" of how language can speak itself, thereby returning to language "something" that has been silenced for millennia. Next, I will argue that the roots of deconstructionist thinking can be found in the work of Martin Heidegger, who began to focus not merely on what language says, but what language denies as well. Heidegger's own translations of early Greek texts play a crucial role in revealing language's simultaneous presencing and covering-up capability. I will then move on to discuss questions raised by Derrida regarding the subject of writing, translations included, as writing itself--of translation as a carrying forth, extension of, and survival of earlier writing. Derrida suggests that in translation, structural and conceptual limits might be transgressed; indeed, one could argue that all of his work is in some sense an elaboration of a theory of translation. Finally, I will examine an article by Jacqueline Risset, who in an essay about James Joyce translating his own novel Finnegans Wake into Italian, best demonstrates the kind of translation that deconstructionists argue is always already in process.

Foucault and De-structuring the Concept of Original

In the epigraph to Language, Counter-memory, Practice, Michel Foucault cites Jorge Luis Borges as saying, "The fact is that every writer creates his own precursors. His work modifies our conception of the past, as it will modify the future."[12] The notion that the translator creates the original is one which is introduced by deconstructionists and serves to

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[12]Quoted by Michel Foucault, Language Counter-memory, Practice, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 5.

undermine the notion of authorship and with it the authority on which to base a comparison of subsequent translated versions of a text. Borges' story "Pierre Menard," for example, is about a Frenchman who writes not a translation of, but the actual text Don Quixote itself, not in order to produce mechanical transcription of the original text, nor to identify with and become the author himself, but to continue to be Pierre Menard and yet to arrive at the "same" text through his own experiences. Because of the change in authorship, time, and place, the second Quixote resonates with all sorts of differences. Although verbally identical, Borges suggests that Menard's Don Quixote is more subtle and much richer than that of Cervantes by citing the following example:[13]

Cervantes (seventeenth century):

> . . . la verdad, cuya madre es la historia, émula del tiempo,
> depósito de las acciones, textigo de lo pasado, ejemplo y aviso de
> lo presente, advertencia de lo por venir.

Menard (early twentieth century):

> . . . la verdad, cuya madre es la historia, émula del tiempo,
> depósito de las acciones, testigo de lo posado, ejemplo y aviso de
> lo presente, advertencia de lo por venir.

> [. . . truth, whose mother is history, who is the rival of time,
> depository of deeds, witness of the past, example and lesson to the
> present, and warning to the future.]

Borges argues first that the styles differ radically: whereas Cervantes uses an easy, ordinary style popular during his time, Menard, as a foreigner writing at a different time, has constructed an archaic style that, because he

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[13]Jorge Luis Borges, "Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote," trans. Anthony Bonner, in Ficciones, ed. Anthony Kerrigan (New York: Grove Press, 1962), 52-3.

is French, also suffers a certain affectation. In addition, of more importance than mere stylistic differences, Borges suggests that very content of the passage radically differs. Whereas Cervantes was simply positing a "rhetorical eulogy of history" common during the period, Menard's ideas regarding history are viewed as much more complex:

> History, *mother* of truth; the idea is astounding. Menard, a contemporary of William James, does not define history as an investigation of reality, but as its origin. Historical truth, for him, is not what took place; it is what we think took place. The final clauses-- *example and lesson to the present, and warning to the future*--are shamelessly pragmatic.[14]

While keeping in mind that the story is fictional, the reader needs to take the point Borges is making about translation seriously. Ironically, Derrida, who teaches the story in a seminar on translation, tells of the case of a Hispanic student in his class who went so far as to argue that the French translation of Borges' story was "better than the original" because the Spanish is marked with a certain Frenchness.[15] Although Derrida himself would not think in such evaluative terms, the anecdote does serve to undermine notions of original and source text as the place to begin a discussion of translation theory. Instead, Derrida might suggest that the Spanish of Borges always already enjoyed a foreign language referential quality which the translation underscores, and during the course of the story's transformation into French, the "original" also gets rewritten in this new light.

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[14]Ibid., 53.

[15]Derrida, The Ear of the Other, 99-100.

Deconstructionists argue that such a process is always taking place: original texts are constantly being rewritten in the present and each reading/translation reconstructs the source text. In his essay "What is an Author?" in Language, Counter-memory, Practice, Foucault addresses these problems, noting that traditional notions of original authorship, of original acts of creation, of the unity of an original text, of translation equivalence or similitude, and systems of valorization are at the foundation of our understanding of literature and translation.[16] He suggests that by granting primordial status to writing, we reinscribe in transcendental terms an affirmation of the text's sacred origin. Traditional translation theory holds dear such notions of both the author and the primordial status of an original text. Any translation of an original into a second language involves a violation of the original, thus the impossibility of ever creating "pure" equivalents. Foucault attempts to break down the traditional notion of the author, and instead suggests we think in terms of "author-function." Instead of a fixed originary identity, Foucault recommends focusing on the relationships of texts with other texts and viewing the specific discourse of a particular text within its historical situation. According to Foucault, the author's work is not the result of spontaneous inspiration, but is tied to the institutional systems of the time and place over which the individual author has little control or awareness. Thus the "act of creation" is in reality a series of complex processes which the designation "author" serves to simplify. Foucault prefers not to think of the author as an actual individual, but as a

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[16]Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?," Language, Counter-memory, Practice, 113-138.

series of subjective positions, determined not by any single harmony of effects, but by gaps, discontinuities, and breakages. Foucault summarizes the main characteristics of the aspects of a personality which comprise an "author-function" as follows:

> The "author-function" is tied to the legal and institutional systems that circumscribe, determine and articulate the realm of discourses, at all times, and in any given culture; it is not defined by the spontaneous attribution of a text to its creator, but through a series of precise and complex procedures; it does not refer, purely and simply to any actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives a variety of egos and to a series of subjective positions that individuals of any class may come to occupy.[17]

The discourse of the text will show how these discontinuities destructure the notion of a unified, ahistorical, transcendental original text. With such an historical approach, Foucault argues, critics will learn to laugh at the "solemnities" of truth and instead focus on the interplay of forces, of subjectivities, of positions and possibilities. Gaps, reversals, differences, contradictions, and silences are just as important in determining "meaning" as that which is coherent, unified, and explicitly articulated.

A definition and conception of what Foucault calls the Modern versus the Classical Age is central to his argument in "What is an Author?." Traditional translation theory, based on conceptions of harmony, unified texts, an original idea which can be captured by an analogous text, can be thought of as grounded in what Foucault calls a "classical" conception of representation. During the eighteenth century, according to Foucault, language established relations to identity--language was a form of knowing

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[17]Ibid., 130-1.

and knowing was already discourse. Following the manner scientific

research documents the natural sciences--Foucault includes Linneaus as well

as Locke and Hume as representative of the period--the theory of the world

can be seen as interwoven in a theory of words. Natural history, for

example, always attempted to reveal the true order, the true foundations

behind the scene of everyday life, by using names to give things their true

denomination. In The Order of Things he writes of this period:

> Between language and the theory of nature there exists therefore a relation that is of a critical type: to know nature is, in fact, to build upon the basis of language a true language, one that will reveal the conditions in which all language is possible and the limits within which it can have a domain of validity. The critical question did exist in the eighteenth century, but linked to the form of a determinate knowledge. For this reason it could not acquire either autonomy or the value of radical questioning; it prowled endlessly through a region where what mattered was resemblance, the strength of the imagination, nature and human nature, and the value of general and abstract ideas--in short, the relations between the perception of similitude and the validity of the concept.[18]

During the eighteenth century patterns of reality were discovered,

taxonomies begun, abstract characteristics defined, and essences described;

orders and genres were established that continue into today's age. For this

enterprise, language required the similarity of impressions, and thus the

presupposition of an arrangement of reality to conform to the discourse of

the period--one which posited universals of being, the primacy of the

knowing subject, and a language capable of describing those universals.

This harmonious view of the world was shattered at the end of the

eighteenth century. In the chapter entitled "Labor, Life and Language" of

The Order of Things, Foucault elaborates, suggesting that in the nineteenth

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[18]Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, trans. by anonymous (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), 161-2.

century, discourse becomes the subject of discourse. The author no longer uses language and then stands outside of it, but the language is conceived as also "inside" the creating subject and as having its own producing effect. Humbolt, Bopp, Grimm, and others begin their investigations and comparisons of languages; philology makes its appearance; and grammatical structures are described. Foucault suggests a double break occurs during this period: languages broke with their ties to the represented thing and broke with their link with the general continuity of the natural order, thus gaining a life of their own:

> For an evolution--other than one that is solely the traversal of ontological continuities--to be conceived, the smooth unbroken plan of natural history had to be broken, the discontinuity of the sub-kingdom had to reveal the plans of organic structure in all their diversity and without any intermediary, organisms had to be ordered in accordance with the functional arrangements they were to perform, and thus establish the relations of the living being with what enables it to exist. In the same way, for the history of languages to be conceived, they had to be detached from the broad chronological continuity that had linked them without interruption as far back as their origin; they also had to be freed from the common expanse of representations in which they were caught; by means of a double break, the heterogeneity of the various grammatical systems emerged with its peculiar patterings.[19]

According to Foucault, while language becomes divorced from the thing represented, it also paradoxically remains the only medium through which the thing can be known. Language thus becomes simultaneously elevated and demoted during this period, and grammatic structures are seen as *a priori* of what can expressed. Philosophical truths are thus trapped in the web of

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[19]Ibid., 292-3.

discourse, and analysis must work backwards from the opinions, truths, and even sciences to the words that make them possible. For example, Foucault suggests that Marx' Das Kapital is merely an exegesis of the term "value," Freud's work an exegesis of those "unspoken phrases that support and at the same time undermine apparent discourse," and Nietzsche's writing "an exegesis of a few Greek words."[20] Production of anything--from commodities to literary texts--is no longer conceived as structured around individual consciousness, but rather around the age, or, according to Foucault, the discourse of the age, which actually creates the individual. Language, especially "literary" language, therefore, takes on a whole new mode of existence; it ceases to play the role of the metaphysical revealer/mediator of philosophical truths and becomes more and more self-referential, merely a manifestation of its own "precipitous" existence:

> Literature becomes progressively more differentiated from the discourse of ideas, and encloses itself within a radical intransitivity; it becomes detached from all the values that were able to keep it in general circulation during the Classical age (taste, pleasure, naturalness, truth), and creates within its own space everything that will ensure a ludic denial of them (the scandalous, the ugly, the impossible); it breaks with the whole definition of genres as forms adapted to an order of representations, and becomes merely a manifestation of a language which has no other law than that of affirming--in opposition to all other forms of discourse--its own precipitous existence; and so there is nothing for it to do but to curve back in a perpetual return upon itself, as if discourse could have no other content than the expression of its own form; it addresses itself to itself . . .[21]

Forms of authority cease to impose laws; genres and forms cease to be viewed as eternal; and the structure of any notion of originality breaks down. In the

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[20]Ibid., 298.

[21]Ibid., 300.

"Modern Age," language has become an authority unto itself. Even the author becomes a "function" of discourse, dissolving into the text writing itself. In "What is an Author?", Foucault quotes Samuel Beckett as posing the Nietzschean question "What matter who's speaking?" Man as well as God has disappeared into the evolution of language writing itself. The fundamental question of the Modern Age, according to Foucault, is no longer how one accumulates knowledge to become an authority and pass judgment on the world, but one of how we can think that which we cannot think. That which is unthought, that which escapes as language writes itself, but nevertheless forms us, our speech, and thought patterns, becomes the object of the deconstructionist inquiry:

> The question is no longer: How can experience of nature give rise to necessary judgments? But rather: How can man think what he does not think, inhabit as though by a mute occupation something that eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement that figure of himself that takes the form of a stubborn exteriority? How can man be that life whose web, pulsations, and buried energy constantly exceed the experience that he is immediately given of them? How can he be that labour whose laws and demands are imposed upon him like some alien system? How can he be the subject of a language that for thousands of years has formed without him, a language whose organization escapes him, whose meaning sleeps an almost invincible sleep in the words he momentarily activates . . .[22]

Although Foucault makes no predictions as to what the answer to his own questions are, he does point us in a direction: toward a reflection on that which is silent, an illumination of that which is dark, and a restoration to language of that which has been mute. He writes, "Modern thought is advancing towards that region where man's Other must become the Same

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[22]Ibid., 323.

itself."[23] The "Other" has not been, nor can be, illuminated in the sense of a positive knowledge, but rather as a blind spot or dark region which accompanies conscious thought. Foucault describes the "Other" as follows:

> The unthought (whatever name we give it) is not lodged in man like a shrivelled-up nature or a stratified history; it is, in relation to man, the Other: the Other that is not only a brother but a twin, born, not of man nor in man, but beside him and at the same time, in an identical newness, in the unavoidable duality. This obscure space so readily interpreted as an abyssal region in man's nature, or as a uniquely impregnable fortress in his history, is linked to him in an entirely different way; it is both exterior to him and indispensable to him: in one sense, the shadow cast by man as he emerged in the field of knowledge; in another, the blind stain by which it is possible to know him. In any case, the unthought has accompanied man, mutely and uninterruptedly, since the nineteenth century.[24]

Deconstruction thus shifts the nature of the questions being asked about a literary work and its meaning from the audible to the mute. The author's creative role is reduced and new questions are raised about where the discourse of any particular text comes from, if not the author. The originality of the initial text is thus also called into question, and other determining factors emerge with regard to what can and cannot be thought within a particular discourse. Most importantly, the meaning of a text is reconsidered, and silent elements are returned to the language of a text, visible in contradictions, gaps, and omissions. In addition (im)possible meanings are returned to words, meanings which always already accompanied them, but were covered up by the nature of the evolution of the discourse in Western culture in general, and in the eighteenth century in

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[23]Ibid., 328.

[24]Ibid., 326-7.

particular. Thus, in practice, deconstructionists tend to exhibit a great indifference to authors and explicit meanings, and instead tune into the language speaking itself, listening for the unheard, the ungraspable--that which is there and yet is not there, lost in that space between signified and the signifier.

Deconstructionists are attracted to translated texts, in which they claim the affirmative play of words in and of themselves can be seen and repressed meanings can and do return, often implicitly, to the present. By means of their practice of writing--even their most "philosophical" texts, with all their footnotes, prefaces, supplements, double entendres, and notes in the margins, can be viewed as a kind of translation--deconstructionists are challenging traditional translation theory to expand its borders, encouraging it to consider its own limitations, psychology, unconscious restraints, and the implications of its rhetoric. In translation, the possibility that <u>nothing</u> exists behind language except its own pattern of infinite regression can be confronted, and the mere play of language in and of itself can be revealed. This openness to absolute nothingness, to death, to finitude is characteristic of the thought that Martin Heidegger, whose thinking on the nature of language has destructured metaphysical theories of translation and opened the way to thinking about that which language denies.

Heidegger and the Limits of Naming

One of the first attempts to break the strangle-hold of metaphysical conceptual approaches to translation was Heidegger's writing <u>Being and Time</u>, wherein one can locate the beginnings of the practice of

deconstruction.[25] Ironically, it was not in allusion to any philosophical truths which enabled Heidegger to escape the metaphysical limitations, but writing about questions of language, about poetry and translation, which disclosed new avenues of thought. In a return to the most basic and most concrete question upon which all Western philosophy is based, Heidegger refrained from a discussion of the meaning of Being and instead asked about the very conditions for the possibility of ontological thought. Being and Time, thus, is less a philosophical description and more of a pre-ontological inquiry. The language framing such questions, however, is itself paradoxical in that the (thing) being investigated is defined by those very terms which are being cast into doubt. Yet, because of the provisional nature of Heidegger's text--he was not trying to answer the question, but to "stir" it, to provide a place and context for that question to occur--Heidegger avoids traditional conceptual notions and thus is able temporarily to circumvent the paradox. The text does not offer a proof, outline an argument, or reach a

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[25]See David Farrell Krell, Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), who posits the thesis that Heidegger's career from Being and Time onward may be regarded as an expansion and elaboration of the deconstruction or dismantling of traditional philosophy; Robert Bernasconi, The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1985), who suggests that Heidegger thinks about the question of Being in terms of the question of language, or the way language conceals itself by directing us away from that which is spoken about; Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), who in "Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time" suggests that the language of Heidegger from Being and Time through "The Anaximander Fragment" calls into question the entire "system of translation" that imbues his very terminology with the associations and essences he attempts to disassociate and disjoin.

conclusion, but rather elaborates a process of de-centering, of beginning over and over again, of asking the questions of the being [Seiende] who is asking the question of Being [Sein]. The process of really thinking about the question, experiencing the question existentially, and not escaping into preconceived notions or historical definitions of Being outside of oneself, destructures the history of ontology and of how Being has traditionally been interpreted. The beginnings of deconstruction [Destruktion][26] might be located in part six, chapter two, of <u>Being and Time</u> where Heidegger works out his method of investigation, one which might be characterized as a kind of double writing: first, raising of the question of Being; and second, exposing an "horizon" for its interpretation:

> If the question of Being is to achieve clarity regarding its own history, a loosening of the sclerotic tradition and a dissolving of the concealments produced by it are necessary. We understand this task as the <u>de-struction</u> of the traditional content of ancient ontology which is to be carried out along the <u>guidelines of the question of Being</u>. The de-struction is based upon the original experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding determinations of Being were gained.
> . . . The de-struction has just as little the <u>negative</u> sense of disburdening ourselves of the ontological tradition. On the contrary, it should stake out the positive possibilities of the tradition . . .
> The de-struction of the history of ontology essentially belongs to the formulation of the question of Being and is possible solely within

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[26]Joan Stambaugh and David Krell suggest that "deconstruction" as we understand it today evolves from the translation of Heidegger's German term *Destruktion*, which they note does not mean "destruction" in the usual sense, for which Germans use the word *Zerstörung*. Rather, they suggest the term has a neutral and ultimately con-structive sense in the German, a kind of positive dismantling, a clearing of "congested arteries," of destructuring of traditional philosophical concepts, and which the current generation of deconstructionists tend to reaffirm. See David Farrell Krell, "General Introduction" in Martin Heidegger, <u>Basic Writings</u>, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977) 20-3, and Joan Stambaugh, translator's footnote, Martin Heidegger, <u>Being and Time</u>, trans. Joan Stambaugh in collaboration with J. Glenn Gray and David Krell, in Heidegger, <u>Basic Writings</u>, 64.

such a formulation.[27]

Rethought from the horizon of time in his essay "Time and Being," Heidegger similarly writes:

> The history of Being means destiny of Being in whose sendings both the sending and the It which sends forth hold back with their self-manifestation. To hold back is, in Greek, *epoche*. Hence we speak of the epochs of the destiny of Being . . . The epochs overlap each other in their sequence so that the original sending of Being as presence is more and more obscured in different ways.
> Only the gradual removal of these obscuring covers--that is what is meant by "dismantling" [*Destruktion*]--procures for thinking a preliminary insight into what then reveals itself as the destiny of Being.[28]

Heidegger suggests that Being does not exist outside anything, certainly not outside of the place where the question occurs. The question happens only in the question, only happens as relations in language, poetry, and thought are formed. Being is not an answer to anything, for it is not an entity, a thing, a concept, an idea which is graspable, but more of a doubt, a lack of presence, an anxiety which signals absolute nothingness, always beyond the grasp. Heidegger avoids philosophic truths that serve merely to obscure this pre-ontological experience and tries to think in the absence of preconceptions, in the absence of timeless verities. His thought thus turns more and more to language as the essay unfolds, and he continually raises the question of Being, only to see any resemblance of an answer simultaneously disappear as he comes closer to coherently structuring the question. The two become intricately linked and intricately exclusive as Heidegger attempts to think

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[27]Heidegger, "Being and Time: Introduction," trans. Joan Stambaugh, in Basic Writings, 67-8.

[28]Martin Heidegger, "Time and Being," trans. Joan Stambaugh, in On Time and Being (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 9.

through the discourse in which his own question is framed, and the question without an answer becomes the one which primarily guides his subsequent thinking.

Through the attempts to structure a question from where one might begin to locate an answer, Heidegger was able to see that language/thought restraints limited his thinking, and he began to destructure or deconstruct those limits. His method involved more and more play with the language, allowing it to speak for itself through its own variations and windings. In a process very similar to that of translation, and one which has become the governing methodology of deconstruction, Heidegger--by letting language speak itself, letting it take on its own energy and etymological resonance-- was able to point to one way metaphysical thinking might be overcome. There is a sense in Heidegger's writing that once the philosophical debris is dismantled, a return to a pre-original moment is possible and that pre-ontological thought can be experienced. In the double movement of deconstruction--[*Destruktion* as *zersetzen/übersetzen*] as a clearing-away of structures that congest and as an entering made possible by leaping over generations of traditional thought--translation enters theory.[29] Translation becomes understood in terms of returning to the pre-originary, of allowing the virginal experience of language to occur. In order to speak original speech, to think the "Other" in Foucauldian terms--i.e., pre-metaphysical thought--one must do a translation. Translation is viewed as action, an operation of thought, a translation of our selves into the thought of the other

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[29]See Krell, Intimations of Mortality, 80-94; Bernasconi, The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being, 15-17.

language, and not a linguistic, scientific transfer from something into the present.

Heidegger saw that the language of metaphysical thought, the naming of phenomena by a knowing subject, deferred thinking on the question of Being by making it a specific kind of being; thus his text itself becomes one of the earliest deconstructionist texts. In the process of writing Being and Time, Heidegger became aware of a different kind of thinking--a thinking not of naming, possessing, defining, relating to an original thing, but a thinking with no origin, without naming. The very grammar in which Heidegger was writing, with its subject/object dichotomy, served to stop the raising of the question of Being. Yet despite the language, despite the metaphysical foundations of thought, the question somehow survived, implicitly letting itself be felt in the very language that tended to suppress it. This different kind of thinking does not provide answers, is not definitive in any way, nor does it uncover any deep or underlying meanings or structures. Instead, it questions, opens up spaces for questions, moves along the surface of life without ordering or creating hierarchies, always ready to encounter that which does not fit into the existing cultural order. Traditional theories of translation, based on premises of syntactic and lexical equivalents, functional identities and acceptable equivalents based on social norms, are not open to such radical difference. In some fashion, the theories discussed in this text all retain the premise that there are knowing subjects who can create cultural artifacts which reveal the same idea that has been named by another language. This separation of object from language creates a limiting structure that will always serve to eliminate certain nuances, subtleties,

anomalies, contradictions--anything which does not fit the economy of the predefined system.

Yet it is the movement of Heidegger's thought after Being and Time which becomes most important for translation theory. In Being and Time Heidegger was discussing questions cardinal to Western metaphysics, dealing with the idea of man as the being which raised the question of Being. Distancing himself from his own idea of the importance of the subject as a knowing being, Heidegger's thought soon turned to the importance of language as the force that destructures the subject, and, thus, in Foucauldian terminology, man becomes the subject of language. Being, as Heidegger first began thinking about it, now disappears in language: the discourse of Being and Time pointed toward a way to transgress the limits of the literary text itself. In his later work, Heidegger rethinks the question of naming and starts to retrieve that which is not yet named or could not be named and is thus forgotten within the structure of metaphysical thought. In the first of three lectures collected under the title of "The Nature of Language" he expands upon this notion of being open for that for which we have no word:

> When does language speak to us as language? Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us. Then we leave unspoken what we have in mind and, without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being.[30]

According to Heidegger, there are various kinds of naming, one of which includes using already existing names and concepts without thinking, a mode

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[30]Martin Heidegger, "The Nature of Language," in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 59.

he argues results in little insight about the nature of thinking. The poet's/translator's mode of naming, in contrast, comes closer to letting language speak as language, in order to undergo the experience of language and think in that gray area which has no name, no concept defining it. The second lecture on "The Nature of Language" prepares the ground for being open in such a fashion. Heidegger moves away from raising questions about the nature of Being and becomes more interested in "merely" listening. Every question carries with it the presence of what is brought into question by virtue of raising the question, and therefore, is there [da] to be listened to:

> Every question posed to the matter of thinking, every inquiry for its nature, is already borne up by the grant of what is to come into question. Therefore the proper bearing of the thinking which is needed now is to listen to the grant, not to ask questions.[31]

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[31]Ibid., 75. Heidegger is difficult to translate because of the deliberate non-static nature of the words--nouns, verbs and especially prepositions--he employs. The movement of the language not only is part of its "meaning," but may be the only part. The German reads, "Jedes Anfragen bei der Sache des Denkens, jedes Nachfragen nach ihrem Wesen, wird schon von der Zusage dessen getragen, was in die Frage kommen soll. Darum ist das Hören der Zusage die eigentliche Gebärde des jetzt nötigen Denkens, nicht das Fragen." I suggest the possible alternative: "Every inquiry into the matter of Thinking, every question about its nature, is already present in the affirmation of the inquiry itself. Therefore the essential act of Thinking that is now needed is the listening to the affirmation, not the question." For example, one problem is presented by the word "Zusage," which is derived from the verb "zusagen," meaning "to say yes to," functioning as a noun, verb and preposition and thus is difficult to fix (in translation). As a noun, I suggest "an affirmative answer," or "a promise to accept." Yet, according to Heidegger, "Sage" acts as a bridge between the thing itself and language. "Sage" as a noun means "the saying," yet as a declinated verb (lower case) means "I say." It thus acts as a noun which speaks. Poetic speech [dichterische Sagen] for Heidegger implies a path, a way of going towards. The prefix "zu" implies this movement as in "zugehen" [to move nearer to] or "Zugang" [entrance way]. To poetic speech belongs this movement along a path toward the nature of language, which is implied in the title of the volume of essays.

Heidegger feels that by listening, language will reveal itself to us, not in what is heard, but in what is not heard:

> If we are to think through the nature of language, language must first promise itself to us, or must have already done so . . . The essential nature of language makes itself known to us as what is spoken, the language of its nature. But we cannot quite hear this primal knowledge, let alone "read" it.[32]

Heidegger has progressed to the point Foucault suggests is characteristic of a certain kind of twentieth century thought: rather than any one person speaking, language is speaking itself, and man is listening. If such a listening is possible, what does one hear? Heidegger argues that we do not hear everything, for there is something essential to the nature of language which cannot be heard or read. Something is withheld as language speaks. Words not only reveal what is there--"language is the house of Being"--but language also holds back. If we let language speak for itself, what is revealed is something about the nature of language: words not only show what is there, but also show what is there and at the same time is not [*was es gibt und gleichwohl nicht ist*].[33]

Heidegger refers to this aspect of the nature of language as a denial, a holding-back, or a withdrawing quality, one whose articulation marks an important development in his writing. The best demonstration of Heidegger's theory of translation is found in his practice. Thus, I turn to his own translations and accompanying prose of the Anaximander Fragment, the oldest fragment of Western thinking, the interpretation of which becomes

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[32]Ibid., 76.

[33]Ibid., 88.

crucial for Heidegger's entire philosophical project.   Heidegger rereads early

Greek thinking primarily to substantiate his claims about general tendencies

in Western metaphysical thinking by finding an alternative way of viewing

the world in pre-Platonic and pre-Aristotelian terms.   The fragment plus its

definitive translations in German during the late nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries, the ones motivating Heidegger's retranslation, follow:[34]

Anaximander:

ex on de he genesis esti tois ousi kai ten phthoran eis tauta ginesthai
katu to khreon didonai gar auta diken kai tisin allelois tes adikias
kata ten tou chronou taxin.

Nietzsche (1873):

Woher die Dinge ihre Entstehung haben, dahin müssun sie auch zu
Grunde gehen, nach der Notwendigkeit; denn sie müssen Busse zahlen
und für ihre Unrechtigkeiten gerichtet werden, gemäss der Ordnung
der Zeit.

[Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away
according to necessity; for they must pay penalty and be judged for
their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.]

Herman Diels (1903):

Woraus aber die Dinge das Entstehen haben, dahin geht auch ihr
Vergehen nach der Notwendigkeit; denn sie zahlen einander Strafe und
Busse für ihre Ruchlosigkeit nach der festgesetzen Zeit.

[But where things have their origin, there too their passing away

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[34]The Anaximander fragment seems first reproduced about 530 A.D. by
Simplicius in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, some 1000 years after
Anaximander pronounced his saying.   Nietzsche's translation was part of a
lecture course offered in Basel in the 1870's and not published until 1903 in
Die Philosophie im tragische Zeitalter der Griechen.   Diels' translation also
appeared in the same year in Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.   See Martin
Heidegger, Holzwege, Gesamptausgabe, Bd. 5 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1977), 321-22;   English from Martin Heidegger, "The
Anaximander Fragment," in Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western
Philosophy, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1974), 13-14.

occurs according to necessity; for they pay recompense and penalty to one another for their recklessness, according to firmly established time.]

Despite the different intentions and methods by the two translators, Heidegger notes the similarity of the two translations, not just in terms of their literal "faithfulness," but also regarding the "conception" of Anaximander underlying both versions. The standard for judging the pre-Platonic or pre-Aristotelian philosophy is much the same, and is taken from the very philosophers who set the standard. Heidegger argues that this view has become firmly entrenched in Western philosophy (and Christian theology) as "universal conviction."[35]

Heidegger raises the question regarding whether the fragment can still speak to us after all these years. Can the translator somehow circumvent the weight of history, the domination of historical interpretation and explanation? He believes that at the very moment that the essence of being disappeared--when the saying was covered up and veiled by its Platonic interpretation--something else occurred: at the outmost, most marginal point, as the essence disappears, a "gathering" in the sense of coalescing and fleetingly holding fast also occurred--a sort of "dawning" of the essence of Being simultaneous in its suppression. In order to unearth the fragment's meaning, the translator is not helped by resorting to classical philology, historical interpretation, or psychology. By listening, however, being in tune with language, a "bond" which is "broader and stronger, but far less apparent" develops and points the translator in the right direction:

If only once we could hear the fragment it would no longer sound like

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[35]Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," 14.

> an assertion historically long past. Nor would we be seduced by vain hopes of calculating historically, i.e., philologically and psychologically, what was at one time present to that man called Anaximander . . . Only in thoughtful dialogue with what it says can this fragment of thinking be translated. However, thinking is poeticizing, and indeed more than one kind of poetizing, more than poetry and song. Thinking of being is the original way of poeticizing. Language comes first to language, i.e., into its essence, in thinking.[36]

Heidegger then proceeds to offer his own translation of the fragment.

Translation is conceived of as a leap over an abyss [*Graben*], springing over twenty-five hundred years of historical distance to the dawning [*Frühe*] of that history, thus allowing the manifestation in its withdrawal of the essence of Being. Because of the gap between our conceptual thinking and pre-conceptual early Greek thinking, in order to translate the fragment, Heidegger suggests that we first must cast off all theoretical presuppositions. The first terms Heidegger calls into question are *on* ["being"], *ta onta* ["beings"] and *einai* ["to be"] and upon their translation turns all of Heidegger's philosophy. If one translates them "correctly," if one adopts uncritically what the classical philology and traditional philosophy reads, if one translates such terms as they are usually translated, what is gained and what is lost? Heidegger does not challenge the factual correctness of such a translation, but he does raise the question whether or not anything is thereby thought:

> Most often we thoughtlessly catalogue the words *on* and *einai* under what we mean by the corresponding (but unthought) words of our own mother tongue, "being" and "to be." More precisely, we never ascribe a significance to the Greek words at all: we immediately adopt them from our stock of common knowledge, which has already been endowed with the common intelligibility of its own language. We support the Greek words with nothing except the complacent negligence of hasty opinion . . .

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[36]Ibid., 18.

But what if *ta onta*, *on*, and *einai* come to speak in language as the fundamental words of thinking, and not simply a particular kind of thinking but rather as the key words for all Western thinking? Then an examination of the language employed in the translation would reveal the following state of affairs:

Neither is it clear and firmly established what we ourselves are thinking in the words "being" and "to be" in our language;
nor is it clear and firmly established whether anything we are liable to come up with suits what the Greeks were addressing in the words *on* and *einai* .
Neither is it at all clear and firmly established what *on* and *einai* thought in Greek say;
nor can we, granted this state of affairs, administer an examination which might determine whether and how far our thinking corresponds to that of the Greeks.

These simple relations remain thoroughly confused and unthought. But within them, hovering over them, Being-talk has drifted far and wide, all at sea. Buoyed by the formal correctness of the translation of *on* and *einai* by "being" and "to be," drifting right on by the confused state of affairs, being-talk deceives. But not only do we contemporary men err in this confusion; all the notions and representations we have inherited from Greek philosophy remain in the same confusion, exiled for millennia.[37]

Heidegger then offers his own translation of the fragment, in which he disassociates himself from literal equivalents, transports himself to that saying, and listens to the language speaking itself--to the tone, the mood, and that silent tracing which lingers as the saying is completed. For example, when he thinks about the word *adikia*, Heidegger disassociates himself from literal connections and opens himself for something else. Its literal translation is "injustice," but Heidegger suggests that our urge to use "injustice" may arise more from our own juridical-moral notions than from the text. Instead, he suggests that *a-dikia* suggests *dikia* is absent, and that *dikia* is normally translated as "right." But if we suspend our presuppositions and listen to the saying, then what we come to hear is "wherever *adikia* rules

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[37]Ibid., 24-5.

all is not right with things," which Heidegger suggests means something is out of joint, and that disjunction is the fundamental trait of those "things" (Nietzsche/Diels) or "beings" present. Heidegger writes:

> "They must pay penalty," Nietzsche translates; "They pay recompense," Diels translates, "for their injustice." But the fragment says nothing about payment, recompense, and penalty; nor does it say that something is punishable, or even must be avenged, according to the opinion of those who equate justice with vengeance.
> Meanwhile, the thoughtlessly uttered "injustice of things" has been clarified by thinking the essence of what lingers awhile in presence as the disjunction in lingering.[38]

Much is at stake in the translation of these early Greek fragments. Heidegger suggests that their appropriation by Platonic conceptual thinking has precipitated present day conceptions of reality and of notions of objectivity in not only Western philosophy but in all scholarship, science and technology included. A translation theory which focuses on how language defers/denies reference can subvert the entire Western metaphysical tradition of not just translation theory, but philosophy in general. Heidegger concludes by offering an unscientific but considered alternative of the latter half of the fragment:

> Could a mere translation have precipitated all this? We may yet learn what can come to pass in translation. The truly fateful encounter with historic language is a silent event. But in it the destiny of Being speaks. Into what language is the land of evening [Abend-land] translated?
> We shall now try to translate the Anaximander fragment:
>
> . . . along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder.
>
> [. . . entlang dem Brauch; gehören naemlich lassen sie Fug somit auch Ruch eines dem anderen (im Verwinden) des Unfugs.]

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[38]Ibid., 42-3.

> We cannot demonstrate the adequacy of the translation by scholarly means; nor should we simply accept it through faith in some authority or other. Scholarly proof will not carry us far enough, and faith has no place in thinking. We can only reflect on the translation by thinking through the saying.[39]

Clearly, Heidegger is using the translation to achieve a kind of double writing. First, to displace and unsettle preconceived notions which Western readers bring to language in order to let something else occur. Second, to again raise the very question of Being as raised in Being and Time, but this time by trying to let language do the speaking, not man. The language he is trying to let speak is that of a pre-Platonic, pre-Aristotelian text in which pre-ontological, pre-theoretical (theory in terms of knowledge) understanding is perhaps more informative for adequate translation than any kind of linguistic or structural approach. One aspect of the metaphysical thought he is calling into question here is the very subject/object grammatical categories which condition such thought. In contrast to the "objective" semantic associations carried by the term logic in Western society, the *logos* of the early Greek language, he argues, actually refers more to language hearing itself, language letting itself be seen, and less to any authority showing or a subject stating. Heidegger's translation attempts to demonstrate thought without a mediating subject, thought in which a reader's learned knowledge has no place and plays no role. Whether we accept his translation or not is less a goal of the essay; what matters to Heidegger is the recovery/return of the hearing, thinking, or silent resonance of the saying. If this activity happens, language and thought yield to some other meaning, not some definitive entity outside of language,

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[39]Ibid., 57. German from Heidegger, Holzwege, 371-2.

but something which dwells in, yet is covered up by, the dominant structures of language. The forgotten elements in the etymologies of words, the forgotten grammatical structures (middle voice) begin to resonate, are given priority, are allowed to return and be felt, and a different way of speaking begins to develop. For example, "reck" [*Ruch*] in the above passage is a word that has disappeared from the language as we know it, but Heidegger deliberately retrieves it, reviews its etymology, and raises questions as to why it has been passed by in the contemporary world. We retain the term "reckless" in today's English speaking world, but "reck" in reference to care, consideration, or respect, has become obsolete. Heidegger deliberately takes advantage of its obsolescence and adopts it anew as part of his translation strategy. According to Heidegger, however, meanings never entirely dissipate; rather, they linger in the very event that covers them up and denies their presence.

Despite apparent differences, Heidegger's translation theory is not all unlike Translation Studies. He does assume that translations are conditioned by the conceptual categories governing any given epoch, despite attempts to circumvent them. He also believes that with study and historical re-contextualizing, one can come to some sort of conclusion as to what the author's intent was and thus uncover layers of obfuscation in order to arrive at some sort of originary intent or presence before its distortion. He then chooses words which defamiliarize, which function differently in today's society, to try to achieve the same effect or response which the original version evoked, in the process breaking down the conceptual categories of his reader. In the above text, he clearly presumes an originary intactness

which has been covered over by the Greeks; the poet/translator is able to translate/transport himself to that original culture and recover that original naming which linguistic naming obscures. The intentional fallacy would apply no less to Heidegger's early Greek translations than it would to any purely functionally-oriented theory.

Reservations about residues of originary presence notwithstanding, Heidegger's translation theory marks a significant shift, for he is not uncovering any author's original intention, but recovering a property of language itself. Heidegger's comes to terms with that which a language denies and which no theory outlined in this dissertation remotely approaches. What is revealed to Heidegger by letting language speak for itself is that "the word implies the relation between the 'is' which is not, and the work which is in the same case of not being a being."[40] Heidegger points to a new kind of thinking--not thinking about what is there, what is named, but thinking about what is there and simultaneously not yet named, and can never be named, for it is not. One could relate this silent non-entity borne by language to what Foucault calls The Other, the twin of man, which is always carried by man (cf. above the *Zusage* carried by the question), which has come to define the mode of being for modern (post-modern?) man. Thinking about what can never be named is difficult--Heidegger calls it a "simple ungraspable situation"--but for all its difficulty, theoretically it has become "properly worthy of thought"[41] and may force reconsideration by any

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[40]Heidegger, "The Nature of Language," 87.

[41]Ibid., 88.

contemporary theory of translation. The question of how man has disappeared as a speaking subject and how one can illuminate that which is silent in language is not answered, but used by Derrida, as I will attempt to show in the following section, to dismantle previous attempts to arrive at a theory of translation.

Derrida: Translation and *Différance*

Derrida's thinking about translation begins with the Heideggerean "concept" of a showing of that which is there and yet "is" not. In his essay "*Différance*" from Margins of Philosophy, Derrida coins the neologism "*différance*" to refer not to what is there (language), but what is not there, and thus calls into question any ontological approach that attempts to determine a notion of Being based on presence:

> It is the determination of Being as presence or as beingness that is interrogated by the thought of *différance*. Such a question could not emerge and be understood unless the difference between Being and beings were somewhere to be broached. First consequence: *différance* is not. It is not a present being, however excellent, unique, principal or transcendent. It governs nothing, reigns over nothing, and nowhere exercises any authority. It is not announced by any capital letter. Not only is there no kingdom of *différance*, but *différance* instigates the subversion of every kingdom.[42]

The term *différance* is derived from the Latin verb *differre*--meaning both to defer, to delay (implying a temporal horizon) and to differ (implying a spatial horizon)--yet with one distinct alteration: Derrida deliberately alters a letter, making a mistake, albeit inaudible: instead of writing *différence*-- the substantive derived from the verb according to the rules of grammar--he writes *différance*, which sounds the same, yet graphically forces the reader

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[42]Derrida, "Différance," 21-22.

to think in terms of the unheard--thereby invading the reader's

subconscious with a non-existent sound.[43] Recalling Foucault's definition of

"The Other" as man's mute twin, Derrida's rhetorical strategy not only uses a

term which explicitly refers to scission and division, but also, via its violation

of the laws of writing with its inaudible mistake, uses "mute" irony to create a

discourse of graphic disorder below the surface of audible conformity.   The

technique works to defer traditional notions of reference and to delay its

subsumption within the discourse in which it occurs--not allowing it to be

passed over, subsumed, understood and thus silenced.   The method is not

unlike certain formalist theories of translation, but Derrida's strategy differs

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[43]Derrida points out how the term also calls to mind the gerund derived from the present participle *différant*, which does not exist in present day French.   Derrida thus is also locating a non-term directly between a verb and a non-existent noun, suggesting a verb/noun between a subject and object, neither passive nor active, temporal or spatial, but something that has been lost (or repressed) in the development of the language.   Derrida likens the term to something like the middle voice, talking about an operation "that cannot be conceived either as passion or as the action of a subject on an object."   Heidegger, too deconstructs traditional philosophy by thinking of phenomena not as things which show themselves to subjects, but as things which show themselves to themselves.   In section seven of the introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger first introduces the middle voice as a possible way of thinking about "phenomenon":   "If we are to have any further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends upon our seeing how what is designate in the first signification of *phainomenon* ('phenomenon' as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second ('phenomenon' as semblance) are structurally interconnected.   Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes a pretention of showing itself--that is, of being a phenomenon--*can* it show itself as something which it is *not*; only then can it 'merely look like so-and-so.'   When *phainomenon* signifies 'semblance,' the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded."   See Derrida, "Différance," 9; and Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 51.   Not incidentally, the term "phenomenon" itself is derived from the verb *phainesthai* to appear, a middle-voiced form of the Greek verb *phainein* to show.

slightly. Whereas formalist approaches are very much bound by the laws of grammar, and are calculated in order to achieve graphic accuracy and precise reference, Derrida's tack is more an empirical wandering, not bound to the responsibility of philosophy, to tradition, to evolution of language or thought systems, foregrounding instead movement along a surface of the written language, play without calculation, wandering without an end or *telos*.

Heidegger has pointed the way to try to think about the concept of "language" without a subject, or in Foucault's words, a text without an author. For Heidegger, listening to the language showing itself reveals a process in which language moves, unfolds, plays, connects, carries, not via a shaping and ordering subject, but in and of itself. Any sort of identification, semblance, subject/object relation, or understanding is based upon the prior condition of a language functioning without a subject. The older process is based not on certainty, semblance, and identity, but on ex-standing, non-semblance, and in-definition. As Heidegger talks about an aspect of language holding back, of withholding, so Derrida suggests the thinking in terms of *différance*, of deferring/differing, of an indeterminate play without an end, a referent, or a specific function. Derrida has also hypothesized that such thinking is impossible in this day and age, but he suggests that we may begin thinking at the margins of metaphysical categorical thinking and speculatively follow the detours of language instead of the agreed upon central path. In terms of translation, he suggests not looking at the original message, nor its codification, but the multiple forms and interconnections through which it must pass in order to speak, to refer at all. Derrida thus

speculates, "supposing a play of forms without determined and invariable substance, and also supposing in the practice of this play a retention and protection of differences, a spacing and temporization, a play of traces."[44] By extension, one could also project a translation theory aimed at protecting differences, reinvigorating language with lost etymological resonances, thereby opening up new avenues of thought.

This is, of course, precisely the "ungraspable situation" Heidegger referred to as being older than writing, older than the pre-ontological questions even he raised, and certainly older than the "truth" of Being as pursued by Greco-Western philosophic investigation. Such an approach is alien to the psyche of man--the discourse which governs our thought, forces us to make reference to objects, narrows meaning, closes off alternative possibilities. Derrida's project is one of trying to unveil such a play of covered-up but subconsciously discernable traces without referring to some sort of deep underlying meaning. The problem, according to Derrida, is that the trace (of that particular thing which is not) can never be presented as a phenomenon might. (It) is always differing and deferring, erasing itself in the act of disclosure. Despite the difficulty of thinking this "inaudible" thought, Derrida does give us some valuable guidelines as to how one might approach the "concept" of understanding an unheard thought:

> Perhaps we must attempt to think this unheard-of thought, this silent tracing: that the history of Being, whose thought engages the Greco-Western *logos* such as it is produced via the ontological difference, is but an epoch of the *diapherein*. Henceforth one could no longer even call this an "epoch," the concept of epochality belonging to what is within history as the history of Being. Since Being has never had a

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[44]Derrida, "Différance," 15.

> "meaning," has never been thought or said as such, except by dissimulating itself in beings, then *différance*, in a certain and very strange way, (is) "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of Being. When it has this age it can be called the play of the trace. The play of a trace which no longer belongs to the horizon of Being, but whose play transports and encloses the meaning of Being: the play of the trace, or the *différance*, which has no meaning and is not. Which does not belong. There is no maintaining, and no depth to, this bottomless chessboard on which Being is put into play.[45]

As Heidegger before him, Derrida is suggesting that the entire "history" of Greco-Western thought--wherever metaphysics "normalizes" as within Western discourse--can be thought of as a single epoch produced by "*diapherein*" interpreted as ontological difference. Derrida also is suspicious of how Greek texts have been translated and offers another interpretation. Referring to the Heraclitean play of *hen diapheron heautoi* as one differing from itself, on the surface, now, at this moment, as it presences, Derrida suggests that frame of reference for the term "to differ" was lost as the definition as ontological difference came to the fore.[46] Derrida is interested in both the literal and metaphorical resonance of the Heraclitean expression: the verb *diapherein* is based on the root *diaphero*, which means 'to carry from one to another, to carry across, to bear through, to transport.' In addition, the Greeks used the term metaphorically to convey 'to put the tongue in motion, to speak' and Derrida relates the phrase to language, especially to oral language (and the inaudible). Heraclitus used the term to mean 'to toss about, to be disrupted'; Aristotle used it to mean 'to tear asunder, to disjoin'; and Plutarch used it to convey 'to distract.'[47] It is only much later

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[45]Ibid., 22.

[46]Ibid.

[47]See A Greek-English Lexicon, ed. Henry George Liddel and Robert Scott (Oxford: Claredon, 1925), 417.

that the term solidifies into its literal meaning of 'to make a difference.' Derrida is trying to restore to the term a sense of the early Greek usage, revitalizing the word to convey a sense of movement along the surface, simultaneously bearing meaning as it also eliminates, distracts, and defers meaning. The play of the trace thus "transports" and "encloses," always already revealing and concealing. Derrida is listening to the middle-voice aspect of the verb--resurrecting the sense of something that is disjoined or disrupted from within--in language itself--as opposed to something set apart and distinct from others as viewed from the outside--with "objective" distance--and trying to reinscribe that voice or lost mode of discourse within the current dominant dualistic mode.

The etymology of a single term outlined above also informs our understanding of what Derrida is suggesting when he talks about the history of Being as being an epoch of the *diapheron*. The play of the trace belongs not to a translation which carries identifiable meaning across boundaries, but to a movement along an absent road, one that has disseminated or evaporated, of a voice which tells but cannot be captured, an echo disappearing as it is heard. It is a bearing via "a notion of motion" which is more conveyed by the movement of Heidegger's prose and Derrida's rhetorical inventions rather than that which they are trying to literally express. Yet, although the techniques are related, they are not the same. For with Heidegger, especially in his translations, there is always the sense that he is searching for some sort of pre-ontological presence, which, if we could break down our closed conceptual framework, we could conceivably

understand as (more) meaningful than culturally agreed upon meaning. Derrida, in contrast, seems to suggest that the play of trace can never be presented, for as it is named, as one tries to stop its movement and grasp it, it disseminates, separates and continues to move on, crossing over to another place. Translation can also be correspondingly redefined. Instead of being defined merely as a crossing over in order to grasp something, translation can also provide a place or forum for the practice of a crossing over which disseminates and escapes. Instead of translations fixing the same meaning, translations can also allow further room for play, extend boundaries, and open up new avenues for further difference. Translation can be conceived of as an action in which the movement along the surface of language is made visible, the play without calculation is made manifest. The focus of such a redefinition shifts away from the "meaning" of a text, for, according to Derrida, the play has no meaning. There is no maintaining différance--it is metaphorically conceived of as "this bottomless chessboard on which Being is put into play."

The differences between Heidegger's and Derrida's views regarding translation can best be seen in Derrida's response to a question posed by Rodolphe Gasché in a roundtable on translation collected in The Ear of the Other. Gasché asks how Derrida situates himself in relation to Heidegger, especially with regard to Heidegger's recognition of a fundamental lack in every mother tongue (in this case, the Greek language, and by extension, every Western language, including French). Derrida responds by suggesting that the difference between his translation theory and Heidegger's is that Heidegger presumes some sort of "archi-originary intactness" or an intact

"kernel," which although covered over, forgotten and mistranslated by the Greeks, is nevertheless presumed to exist:

> [Heidegger] presupposes something like an archi-originary intactness that has been basically forgotten in advance, immediately covered over with oblivion from the first, for example by the Greeks. This explains, in effect, Heidegger's remark that we should avoid interpreting his text, according to well-known motif of German thought, as a nostalgic return to Greece. Nevertheless, if it is not a question of returning in the direction of the Greek language, it is at least necessary to presuppose something absolutely forgotten and always dissimulated in advance behind the Greek language--an archi-mother tongue, a grandmother tongue, a granny of the Greek language who would be absolutely virginal: an untouchable, virgin granny. This motif of the untouchable is not insignificant. One also finds it in Benjamin's text were we read that translation cannot "touch" or attain something. There is something "untouchable," something of the original text that no translation can attain . . . The kernel of the original text is untouchable by the translation, and this untouchable something is the sacred, which says: Don't touch me.[48]

Derrida's response to Gasché's question points out, I think quite justifiably, the quasi-religious tone assumed by Heidegger's writing, one from which Derrida must distance himself if the deconstructionist project is to legitimately challenge traditional philosophy. Yet his position vis-à-vis Heidegger/Benjamin is not as distant as it may first appear. In fact, he historicizes the discourse of Heidegger/Benjamin within a Greco-Western paradigm which always has wished for--and theoretically presumed--an intact originary presence, be there one or not. Whether the unified "kernel" is fiction or fact, Derrida does acknowledge that the desire for such an entity is very real, and it is precisely that upon which every saying, every appeal--including that of literature and philosophy--is based:

> The desire for the intact kernel is desire itself, which is to say that it is irreducible. There is a prehistoric, preoriginary relation to the intact

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[48]Derrida, "Roundtable on Translation," 114.

kernel, and it is only beginning with this relation that any desire
whatsoever can constitute itself. Thus, the desire or the phantasm of
the intact kernel is irreducible--despite the fact that there is no intact
kernel. I would oppose desire to necessity, to *ananke*. The *ananke* is
that there is no intact kernel and there never has been one. That's what
one wants to forget, and to forget that one has forgotten it. It's not that
something has been forgotten; rather, one wants to forget that there is
nothing to forget, that there has been nothing to forget. But one can
only forget that there has never been an intact kernel. This phantasm,
this desire for the intact kernel sets in motion every kind of desire,
every kind of tongue, appeal, address.[49]

By calling into question that upon which language is founded, Derrida

actually goes one step further than Heidegger. Derrida calls into question

any definition of translation as transporting, reproducing, representing, or

communicating the "meaning" of the original. Instead, he suggests

translation might better be viewed as one instance in which language can be

seen as always in the process of modifying the original text, of deferring and

displacing for ever any possibility of grasping that which the original text

desired to name. In fact, from the deconstructionist position, translation is

viewed as one activity that continually conceals presence and thwarts all

desire. Reinforcing Derrida's position, ironically, is that the very thwarting

of desire is a necessary condition for desire itself to unfold, the always

already silent twin accompanying the emotion as we define it, and the

accordingly impossible presence uncannily manifests/conceals itself within

Derrida's argument. In a similar fashion, translation can be viewed as a

lively operator of *différance*, as a necessary process that distorts original

meaning while simultaneously revealing a network of texts both enabling

and prohibiting interlingual communication.

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[49]Ibid., 116.

Elaborating upon this redefinition of translation, Derrida refers to

Benjamin in a more favorable light, adopting Benjamin's concept of

Überleben, the "survival" of language, to explain how translation modifies or

supplements the original instead of determining it.   Responding to remarks

by Christie McDonald in the "Roundtable on Translation," Derrida talks not

only about his notion of translation as transformation but also about the

survival of language itself:

> Given the surviving structure of an original text--always a sacred text
> in its own way insofar as it is a pure original--the task of the translator
> is precisely to respond to this demand for survival which is the very
> structure of the original text . . .   To do this, says Benjamin, the
> translator must neither reproduce, represent, nor copy the original, nor
> even, essentially, care about communicating the meaning of the
> original. Translation has nothing to do with reception or
> communication or information . . . The translator must assure the
> survival, which is to say the growth, of the original.   Translation
> augments and modifies the original, which, insofar as it is living on,
> never ceases to be transformed and to grow.   It modifies the original
> even as it also modifies the translating language.   This process--
> transforming the original as well as the translation--is the translation
> contract between the original and the translating text.   In this contract
> it is a question of neither representation nor reproduction nor
> communication; rather, the contract is destined to assure a survival, not
> only of a corpus or a text or an author but of languages.[50]

Translation puts us in contact not with some sort of original meaning, but

with the plurality of languages and the multiplicity of meanings rather than

this or that specific "meaning."   According to Derrida, one never writes in

just one language, but is always already writing in multiple languages,

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[50]Ibid., 122.   See also Walter Benjamin, "Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers,"
in Illuminationen (Frankfurt: Surkamp, 1955); Walter Benjamin, "The Task of
the Translator," trans. Harry Zohn, in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt (New
York: Shocken, 1969), 69-82; Carol Jacobs, "The Monstrosity of Translation"
Modern Language Notes 90.6 (December 1975), 755-66; Paul de Man, "Walter
Benjamin's 'The Task of the Translator'" in The Resistance to Theory
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 73-105.

composing new meanings while eradicating others. Even "correct" translations conceal, and, as Borges points out, even exact replication carries different meanings. Originary intactness dissolves, and those gray areas between languages--the borderlines--begin to appear. Traces, marks of dissipated meaning once again become visible--neither intact nor objectified--but still somehow living on, surviving. Derrida's translation theory is not one proposing a better model of transporting, but one that reveals languages in their relations to other languages. Marks, traces, affinities with other languages are present simultaneously with the presentation of whatever the text purports to be about. For in translation, languages do touch before they again separate, possibilities present themselves before the act of naming and identifying stops the interactive play. Fleeting moments of what Heidegger refers to as the ungraspable situation perhaps can be uncannily sensed by the translator during the activity of translation. Derrida's interest in translation therefore is in the process before the naming takes place, while the "thing" still is not. Thus the process of translation deconstructs texts and returns to a point before a thing has been named, thereby making visible a path in which meaning has been rerouted or diverted.

Derrida often cites the Biblical story of Babel to better illustrate his own thoughts pertaining to both translation and deconstruction in general.[51] The story from Genesis resonates metaphorically for Derrida,

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[51]Derrida, "Roundtable on Translation," 100-102. See also, Jacques Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel," trans. Joseph Graham, in *Difference in Translation*, ed. Joseph F. Graham (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 165-207.

"representing" architectural construction, incompletion, the impossibility of finishing, of totalizing, of imposing structural orders. He sees not only a story about the dangerous power of one language over others, but also within the story something about the internal limits to formalization, a limit within any one particular language. Finally and significantly, he views the story as an origin itself--a beginning of the multiplicity of idioms. Yet more than using the story to illustrate general themes important to the deconstructionist cause, he uses it to cite a specific translation problem, one that he finds symptomatic of all models of translation: the translation of the proper noun. In the story, the tribe of Shems try to raise a tower not only in order to reach the heavens, but also in order to make a name for themselves, imposing their "tongue" upon the entire universe. God becomes angry with their presumptuousness, interrupts their project, and imposes instead his name on their tower: Babel, meaning 'father' (*Ba* in oriental tongues) and God (*Bel*), father, in this case, of Babylonia. But Derrida suggests that this proper noun, theoretically untranslatable, is also already understood as 'confusion,' as in 'to babel incoherently,' thus the proper name simultaneously gets translated into a common noun. A double problem is thus presented to the translator: first, one cannot translate the name of God because it is a proper noun; secondly, one cannot not translate it without resorting to associations common throughout the receiving language. Translation would be impossible if there were only proper nouns. One condition precluding the possibility of interlingual communication is that every language must already find itself tainted with impurities, possibilities of multiple reference. The translator cannot help but signify some sort of

ambiguity or confusion in addition to the intended reference. Derrida uses

the translation of the proper noun "Babel" and its already confused

reference to 'confusion' to illustrate such ambiguity. To what is the

"confusion" actually referring? Does it mean that the architects'

experienced confusion after their tower reached a certain height? Or the

confusion of tongues which resulted from God's intervention? Both? The

problem of translating the word "Babel" is one that is always present in

every act of translation, and it becomes one of Derrida's best vehicles to

illustrate his "concept" that at the source of a translated text, one finds less a

unified meaning and more an entity half-completed, open for further

development:

> I would say that this desire is at work in every proper name: translate
> me, don't translate me. On the one hand, don't translate me, that is,
> respect me as a proper name, respect my law of the proper name which
> stands over and above all languages. And, on the other hand, translate
> me, that is, understand me, preserve me within the universal language,
> follow my law, and so on. This means that the division of the proper
> name, insofar as it is the division of God--in a word, insofar as it divides
> God himself--in some way provides the paradigm for this work of the
> proper name. God himself is in the double bind, God as the
> deconstructor of the Tower of Babel. He interrupts a construction. The
> deconstruction of the Tower of Babel, moreover, gives a good idea of
> what deconstruction is: an unfinished edifice whose half-completed
> structures are visible, letting one guess at the scaffolding behind them.
> He interrupts the construction in his name; he interrupts himself in
> order to impose his name and thus produces what one could call a
> "disschemination"* which means: You will not impose your meaning or
> your tongue, and I, God, therefore oblige you to submit to the plurality
> of languages which you will never get out of.

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*Derrida condenses at least four senses in this invented word:
dissemination, deschematization, de-"Shemitizing," and rerouting or
diverting from a path (the word *chemin* meaning path or road).--Tr.[52]

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[52]Derrida, "Roundtable on Translation," 102-3.

The scaffolding to which Derrida alludes is not a structure in the traditional sense, but a phantasm of a structure, a non-presence which is, again, the bottomless chessboard, one which escapes the moment we try to define it, one which finds new "depths" the moment we try isolate it. What is revealed in translation thus is not some material thing, but something about the nature of language and about the nature of knowledge. Translation supplements the language in which it is trying to express itself. In the products of translation there remain in addition to those things specifically named other things that cannot be communicated: the evolving nature of languages themselves, languages at play, languages enjoying a life without man's imposition of interpretation and meaning. In Foucault's words, herein languages speak themselves, form without man, and in an uncanny way, although mute, lost in that space between signified and signifier, inhabit and comprise our own subjective selves.

Thus Derrida's main point seems to be that there is no pure meaning, no thing to be presented behind language, nothing (in an absolute sense) to be represented. Therein lies the radicality of the deconstructionist project. Similar to the formalist position, what does exist, according to deconstructionists, is a continuous chain of signification comprised of languages in a constant state of interplay, mutually supplementing each other. Yet in addition to such a continuous chain, the formalists tend to posit unified works of art as a goal within the system, a very fragile assumption, according to Derrida. In addition, formalists imply some sort of underlying structure to the linguistic system and some sort of order to the evolution of language, while Derrida implies bottomless chessboards and random,

accidental development, without an end. Derrida thus demythologizes the forms underlying formalism as distinct systems with orderly regulated evolution.

Translation, accordingly, ceases to be viewed as an operation from one language system into another, and instead is seen as a process constantly in operation in single languages as well. Borderlines between languages disappear. In every linguistic system several languages are always already in operation--all languages contain impurities from other languages, as well as an instability, an ambiguity, within their own terms. Translation theories historically--both before and after Jacobson--presume different systems, of the integrity of each system independent from the others. According to Derrida, in translation, the impurities manifest themselves, the accidents occur and the deschematization process becomes visible. There are parallels between "translate" and "differ/defer" that Derrida and anyone who has translated are well aware.[53] By experimenting with possible word choices,

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[53]There are also etymological connections between "translation" and "diaphero." "Translate" is derived from the Latin word *translatus*, 'carried over.' *Translatus* is the past participle of *transferre*. If divided into *trans* and *ferre* , we can see the proximity of the word to *dia* and *phere*. The Latin term *ferre* means 'to carry' or 'to transport' as in carrying a shield, and was often used to mean to bear or convey with the notion of motion (Homer), as in ships borne by the forces of wind. It also meant to endure, to suffer, as in to bear a mental burden, and survives in expressions such as "you're not faring well." In addition, significantly, for the deconstructionists, it refers to the sense of roads or ways which lead to a place, as in a door leading to a garden, or a road leading to a city, conveying a sense of stretching or extension towards. In addition, the Old English verb *faran* means 'to go' or 'to travel.' Following the word back through Old High German, we find *beran*, which means 'to bear' or 'to carry,' and from which a long string of German words evolve, such as *bären* in terms of giving birth. German also preserves the travelling aspect, the notion of movement towards, of bearing forth, carrying over, transporting. In English, *ferre* is the root for differ, difference, defer as well as a host of other words such as transfer, vociferate, suffer, refer, prefer, and even metaphor. The derived form *"latus"* can also

what becomes apparent are the minute differences between very similar words, exposing the limits of languages. That very exposure of limits and impossibilities also gives birth to new alternatives in that very gray area which is neither one language nor another, but a silent differing space not delimited by one or the other. By putting pen to paper, by choosing one possibility, what occurs is that the silent thought that seemed possible between the languages is deferred, delayed, erased by the delimiting chosen term. Derrida's work suggests that translation theory might be the best "field of study" to begin to explore these unheard traces, these possibilities that are covered up as we speak. Translation theory is equipped, as Popovic has demonstrated, to follow the "dirty" play of all the mistakes, problems, accidents, insufficiencies, divergences, and differences. While still not what Derrida is referring to with his term *différance*, which is not to be maintained or grasped, it may be as close as one can come to a more thorough analysis of this property of language. To ignore such possibilities, as translation theory has historically done, only perpetuates its own inadequacy. Derrida prefers the term transformation over that of translation, for he argues we will never have the pure transport of pure signifieds from one language to another:

> Difference is never pure, no more so is translation, and for the notion of translation we would have to substitute a notion of transformation: a regulated transformation of one language by another, of one text by

be traced back to the French *tl* of the Indo-European *tel* or *tol*, which also means 'to bear' or 'to carry,' and from which *tollere*, 'to lift up' or 'to raise' follows. French words evolving from this derivation include *relater*, 'to relate' and *reterrer*, 'to bring back.' See *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 1922-23, and Ernest Klein, *A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1966), 157 and 1640.

another. We will never have, and in fact have never had, to do with some "transport" or pure signifieds from one language to another, or within one and the same language, that the signifying instrument would leave virgin and untouched.[54]

Certainly such an approach would tend to break down the power of the transcendental signified and free the field from evaluating translations in terms of their proximity to pure equivalence. Finally, it would perhaps help the literary scholars to free themselves from the constrictions of naming in order to actually listen and think--not in terms of just one language or another, but in that gray area that as yet has no boundaries, that is barely visible, that which has no name and is not. Translation Studies is equipped to begin a study of writing about the differing and deferring "spaces"--of *différance* in action--and the theory needs to catch up to the possibilites of the methodology.

Joyce's Translation of *Finnegans Wake*

Examples of translations which actually employ strategies preferred by deconstructionists are not many, but one very good one is James Joyce's own translation of two passages from Finnegans Wake. The last thing he worked on before he died, it demonstrates just how a translation illuminates and elaborates upon the original, giving scholars a better sense of the original's transitory nature. Jacqueline Risset, who first published an edited version of Joyce's translation as early as 1973 in Tel Quel, only later coming across the original version, suggests that such a text demonstrates Derrida's thesis that translation transforms the original as it brings it into a second language:

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[54]Derrida, Positions, 20.

> But this Italian text from *Finnegans Wake* cannot really be called--
> in the usual sense of the word--a translation at all; for what takes place
> is a complete rewriting, a later elaboration of the original, which
> consequently does not stand opposite the new version as "original text,"
> but as "work in progress."[55]

Clearly the English text of Finnegans Wake is one example of the multiple

linguistic possibilities within one language; nearly every word of the text is

rich with foreign language reference and pushes the parameters of

monolinguism to the extreme. What is ironic about Joyce's translation is that

nearly every foreign language reference is erased; nevertheless the text

retains its multilinguistic frames of reference by continuing to explore the

furthest limits of the Italian language. Joyce achieves this plural quality of

the language, not by coining new terms and neologisms, but by using

multiple levels already existing within the Italian language--various idioms,

dialects and archaisms--in order to achieve the resonance of the original.

In her article "Joyce Translates Joyce," Risset talks about how she came

into possession of the translation, briefly compares Joyce's version with the

later edited version which was the first published translation, and then talks

about Joyce's translation's deconstructive virtues. The translation and

publication history is not uninteresting. Joyce apparently decided around

1938 to translate some of the same passages which had already appeared in

France, translated by a group which included Ivan Goll, Adrienne Monnier,

Philippe Soupault and Samuel Beckett. When Joyce first consulted the young

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[55]Jacqueline Risset, "Joyce Translates Joyce," trans. Daniel Pick, Comparative Criticism 6, ed. E.S. Shaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 3. Not incidentally, Risset is a poet and translator herself, her most recent project being a translation of Dante's Divine Comedy into French, the first two volumes of which are complete. See Dante Alighieri, La Divine Comédie: L'Enfer, trans. Jacqueline Risset (Paris: Flammarion, 1985).

Italian anti-fascist Nino Frank, who was in Paris working on the journal

Novecento while taking refuge from political happenings at home, Frank was

skeptical, thinking the task impossible because of the plural quality of the

original and the fixity and inadaptability of the Italian language. Yet they

persevered, meeting twice weekly, Joyce playing with the language, Frank

reading aloud, Joyce listening and explaining. During a process in which

Frank read aloud and Joyce listened and explained, they discovered the

diverse sense of not just the Italian, but the English as well:

> Joyce éprouvait à jouer avec le vocabulaire italien la même volupté qu'à
> se livrer à ses jeux en anglais . . . Je lisais et interprétais le texte à ma
> façon, apès quoi Joyce me l'expliquait mot à mot, me révélait ses divers
> sens m'entraînait à sa suite dans la mythologie complexe de son
> Dublin.[56]

Although Joyce was highly pleased with the result, this is not the version

which was first published. A co-worker appeared on the project--Ettore

Settanni--and it is his edited version of the Joyce/Frank text that first

appeared in 1940 in the Rome review Prospettive and which Risset later

republished in Tel Quel. Frank, still living in Paris, read the Settanni version

and then sent Risset the earlier unpublished version, which Risset analyzes

in the article cited above. Risset suggests that some of the changes were

made for political and sexual reasons, which could be expected considering

the political and publishing climate of the time and place. However, other

changes were made which Risset suggests can only be attributed to Settanni's

being "out of tune with Joycean poetics." Allusions disappear and resonances

are lost:

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[56]Nino Frank, Mémoire brisée (1967), quoted by Risset, "Joyce
Translates Joyce," 4.

For instance in the Joyce-Frank version we have "un ghigno *derriso* del *corcontento*, ma chiazze *galve* dal cervel *debolino*" which retains in the Italian the series of Irish place-names to be found in the English ("and his *derry's* own drawl and his *corksown* blather and his *doubling* stutter and his *gullaway* swank."); whereas Settanni's rendering we are given "E la voce che ogni frase si trascina, gonfiabocca a doppia tartaglia" whereby Ireland disappears . . . Or else "ruhrlavano" becomes "riurlavan" thus losing the suggestion of the river Ruhr (in English, "her bulls they were ruhring"); "aniemia" becomes "nienia" ("a reedy derg") taking away this time the allusion to the river Aniene.[57]

While the analysis of textual changes for political and moral pressures is interesting, and the tendencies to generalize and lose rich associations typical, of more interest within the scope of this dissertation is the revelation of Joyce's translation strategies and the process of "affirmative productivity." Risset, while examining the two translated versions in comparison with the original, immediately sees that something different is going on with the Joyce-Frank version, something that cannot be analyzed in terms of right or wrong terms, better or worse lexical equivalents, but for which one needs to revise one's definition of the process of translation itself:

What emerges above all from the detailed analysis of the Italian version is that *this* translation is no pursuit of hypothetical equivalents of the original text (as given, definitive) but a later elaboration representing (in relation to the first text seen as really--literally-- "work in progress") a kind of extension, a new stage, a more daring variation on the text in process.[58]

The first systematic strategy that Risset notes as deviating from a traditional emphasis on fidelity is Joyce's tendency to make the translated text more colloquial and common, almost as if the English text were a provisional stage. The spoken register, for example, is even more emphasized in the

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[57]Ibid., 6.

[58]Ibid.

washerwoman's talk, with more exclamations and fewer anaphoras, and overall a more familiar form of address. Yet surprisingly, despite its emphasis on idiomatic speech, the Italian also retains a poetic quality, for Risset points out the rich rhythmic patterns of the language, actually scanning Joyce's prose in complete lines as one might verse. This particular tendency is characteristic of Joyce's overall strategy, one that involves a complete suppression of reference beyond Italian without sacrificing the poetic and referential possibilities. Instead of using foreign language references to suggest multiple possibilities, Joyce chooses to resort to the heterogeneous capabilities within one language--in this case Italian--to accomplish the same allusory effects and levels of meaning.

The skepticism which Frank raised when first approached about helping with the translation--the resonance of Joyce's English vs. the fixity of Italian--is perhaps doubly confounded when one suggests a strategy which suppresses foreign language reference entirely. How is Joyce able to accomplish the translation of the richness of the English without recourse to other languages? Risset suggests that Joyce exploits the "plurilinguism" inherent in the Italian by drawing on dialects, tones, literary references, archaisms, and special idioms. When the English phrase clearly suggests words from other languages, Joyce systematically eliminates the foreign language allusions, substituting instead a monolingual version in which all deformations are rendered within the _one_ language. Thus, for example, in the phrase "Annona gebroren aroostokrat Nivia, dochter of Sense and Art, with Spark's pirryphlickathims funkling her fran," Joyce eliminates all reference to Latin, German and Greek and the phrase becomes "Annona

genata arusticrata Nivea, laureolate in Senso e Arte, il ventaglio costellato di filgettanti."[59] Yet because the length and depth of the history of Italian culture with all its aristocratic auras and classical airs are combined so well with the regional, uncultured, rural colors and tones, the deformations in the Italian serve to provide a similar resonance to the English, and in fact perhaps more dramatically reveal the heterogeneous quality inherent in the language so important to Joyce's project.

Surprisingly, Joyce is even able to Italianize proper nouns without drawing on the resources of other languages while nevertheless retaining the pluralistic quality and multiple lexical references of the original. Risset cites the following example in which all English references, even important literary figures, are removed and Italian names are substituted:

Joyce:

Ask Lictor Hackett or Lector Reade of Garda Growley or the Boy with the Billyclub. How elster is he a called at all? Qu'appelle? Huges Caput Earlyfouler.

Joyce's translation:

Chiedi a Manganelli, o al Randelloni, o al Mazzaferrata, o al Fracco la Frombola. Che saarebbe il suo superanome? Hugh Capeto l'Eccellatore.

Despite the lack of English sounds, elimination of sexual symbols, and suppression of literary allusion important to the "meaning" of the text, the Italian proper names within the context of merely Italian nevertheless convey the overtones of the English. Risset tells us that the Italian reader will immediately recognize the proper names as characters of popular comedy as well as designations of the phallus. Just looking at the main

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[59]Ibid., 9.

character's name, we can see the Joycean technique at work: HCE's name is Italianized and enhanced by its deformation of "uccellatore" to "eccellatore" with the double reference to "bird-hunter" and its clear sexual allusion-- "uccello" having the same slang sense as "cock" in English, as well as allusions to "deceiver" or "tease--while nevertheless retaining its allusion to classical Italian, thus lending the phrase its ironic power.[60] The Italian proper noun appears to have more resonance and levels of allusion despite its monolingual, even colloquial, transformation.

Joyce's technique is so successful that he takes it one step further: he actually changes common nouns with their broad associative nature into proper nouns which translation theory traditionally tells us cannot be translated because of their unique and specific reference. This technique serves not only to introduce more characters into the text, but also increases its provincialism and monocultural specificity. Risset cites the example of Joyce translating "It was put in the newses" as "Il Marco Oraglio l'ha ben strombazzato," with reference not only to the famous emperor, but a well known newspaper--the Marco Aurelia--of that particular period, and finally with its deformation to "Oraglio" and reference to a donkey's bray ("raglio"), a socio-political overtone inherent in the original, as a case in which translating the general into the specific but transformed broadens reference and makes the satire more biting.[61] Through such a method of radical Italianization, enhancing specific and local reference, drawing from ancient

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[60]Ibid., 10 and 18.

[61]Ibid., 11.

reference within one culture, using local dialects and popular figures as well as literary characters and archaic usages, Joyce is able to fuse multiple layers of association into a fabric of language just as rich and diverse as that in the English text. As deconstructionists argue that such multiple levels are always already inherent in every language despite attempts to define stable structures and meanings, so Joyce's translation technique shows, restoring to terms certain lost connotations and adding new associations perhaps hitherto unseen and unheard, but nevertheless there. Perhaps because Italian was not his first language he recognized associations to which native speakers had become blind. By emphasizing the common speech and various dialects, he contaminates the lofty, high literary register of classical Italian; and the deconstructive practice of subversion from within can be viewed in practice, opening up avenues for new invention and recreation. Risset concludes that Joyce's translation strategy is aimed not just at finding textual equivalents for his original, but that it also reveals something about the nature of language:

> This ceaseless textual invention is made possible by a very particular linguistic freedom: namely the freedom of *dialect*; it is in dialect (more than in the national tongue) that the creation of new words is always in process, and always rapidly assimilated by other speakers.
> Nevertheless, if Joyce's reference to the dialectal discloses itself as absolutely central in his work of translation, curiously when one is obliged to point to specific instances of dialect in the text, one soon discovers that these are far fewer than they seemed. What one has in fact is something else, an operation that could be defined not as the rearrangement, employment, quotation of dialect(s), but as *language itself treated as dialect; it is language whose field is disturbed, moved in accordance with a forgotten creativity.*[62]

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[62]Ibid., 13.

In such a fashion the translation also illuminates the original and perhaps helps better explain the reasons for the obscurity and multiple language reference in the original. Inherent in every noun, proper nouns included, are a myriad of events, emotions, associations that are always alive and capable of explosion, cutting across borders and linguistic boundaries as well as delving deep into the psyche and collective subconscious of a single race. Joyce, in two distinct texts, has chosen to push the boundaries of language out beyond margins hitherto contemplated: the English always moves outwards and the Italian inwards, but both are always undoing and calling into question stability and definition as they create anew and open up new avenues for thought.

In summary, Joyce's translation strategy seems to be one advocated by Derrida: one which foregrounds a movement along the surface of language, playing with language without calculation. Joyce seems to be looking not at the "meaning" of his original text, but at the levels of language with which it connects as it speaks. Yet in his translation, what is emphasized even more strongly than in the original is the sense of something disruptive about the nature of language which arises from within, not as something coming from a foreign source. As Derrida tends to make deliberate mistakes in order to create graphic disorder within an oral context, so too Joyce deliberately deforms language within a colloquial and very much spoken context to achieve similar results. Certainly Joyce's translation challenges traditional modes of reference and has delayed/deferred its own subsumation and silencing. A translation strategy merely interested in linguistic equivalents and similar meaning would miss the point of the original in its attempt to

recreate it. A translation technique aimed at subversion and invention of the very text it attempts to bring across, certainly in the case of Joyce's Finnegans Wake, would be more to the point. Translation theory needs to allow for such an approach, and perhaps by applying the insights of deconstruction to its own practice, translation theory can begin to question the definitions and strategies that threaten to impede its development and marginalize its discourse.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In the course of this dissertation, I have reported upon and critiqued several of the more influential approaches governing the field of translation theory. Although developing in different parts of the world, these seemingly mutually incompatible theories do reflect some sort of historical pattern characteristic of twentieth-century investigation of literature and language in general. Despite certain misgivings about the nature of the specific theories, I have found that the field has sufficiently developed to the point that, with a minimum degree of cooperation among the various approaches, it can begin to make a significant and positive impact on contemporary literary theory. Current translation theory is just beginning to view the translated text in a way similar to Louis Althusser definition of the "subject." Althusser argues that as "subjects" we have a double constitution: on the one hand we live in a "logos," a logic, a way of thinking and perceiving that "subjugates" us; on the other hand, we are free and ethical subjects capable of creativity and of changing those relations which constitute our very existence.[1] Translations likewise are subjected by dual systems (source and target languages), but nevertheless capable of informing and changing those very structures to which they owe their

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[1]See Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1971), 161.

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existence. Language, by this analogy, is thus never reducible to a formal system, nor to a static concept, be it literary or linguistic. Translations demonstrate such instability of language in every act. As I hope the dissertation has illustrated, most translation theories make such reductions, but the translations themselves demonstrate an additional lack of conformity. For in the act of reproducing the textual relations (of the original text), this double constitution becomes quite lucid: the language restraints imposed by the receiving culture are enormous, yet the possibility of creating new relations in the present are also vivid--not just the old relations transported to a new time and place, but also a myriad of signifying practices which both reinforce and alter present signifying practices. In addition to reporting on the various approaches governing translation theory today, I have also tried to point out how each particular translation theory may help us better understand this double movement, this "interpellation" which simultaneously interrupts and propels forward our own subjective identities.

Ironically, Althusser's theory of the subject rests on the notion of misrecognition, a subject thoroughly neglected by translation theory. Althusser suggests that even the act of speaking of ourselves as subjects is itself an historically determined effect that causes us to misrecognize our own condition. Translation as well may give the illusion of correspondence, but it is always imperfect, always an act of mistranslation or misrecognition. While translation strives to reproduce an identity, it also, by definition, must fail to achieve equivalence, mutilating the original text in the process. Yet translation criticism historically has valorized translations which measure up to some ideal, smoothed over contradictions, and ignored or dismissed

those which did not cohere. Nevertheless, the translated text must project into the present a fractured version that necessarily disturbs our way of conceiving. If such be the case, why should anyone even attempt a theory of translation? Because it is also unavoidable; all reading, writing, talking, communication in general, is, in a certain sense, an act of translation. This process, however, is often obscured and performed unconsciously. In her essay "Taking Fidelity Philosophically," Barbara Johnson describes the process as follows:

> In the process of translation from one language to another, the scene of linguistic castration--which is nothing other than a scene of impossible but unavoidable translation and normally takes place out of sight--is played on center stage, evoking fear and pity and the illusion that all would perhaps have been well if we could simply have stayed at home.[2]

If done well, the translation will disturb enough to stimulate new avenues of thought and reveal something about the nature of the unconscious movement that takes place in between languages, in the space left, to use Johnson's image, after the castration, that is always present and non-present, bearing that which is unthinkable in a given language and context to an impossible presence.

Although none of the translation theories discussed in this text conform to the notion of translation alluded to by Johnson, I am optimistic about the direction translation theory in general is taking. Because translation "is played out on center stage," certain misrecognitions, "shifts" from the source text, can be identified and analyzed. Using translated texts to better

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[2]Barbara Johnson, "Taking Fidelity Philosophically," in _Difference in Translation_, ed. Joseph F. Graham (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 144.

understand subjective translation strategies, Holmes, Popovic, and Lefevere suggest examining precisely those shifts to pursue such an investigation. Because of its unique nature, translation thus gives us access to those very unconscious and "out of sight" manipulations which result in mistranslation and misrecognition. Derrida and Risset suggest that "recovering" that out of sight place may be possible, or at least as far as it may be possible, translation will be the place where it may become visible.

The most exciting development in recent translation theory is its descriptive methodology, which, based on actual texts, documents such shifts as they occur in the history of the life of one original text, in other words, "uses" translation to reveal how the literary mind under real historical circumstances interprets the world. By examining actual translated texts instead of hypothetical models, Even-Zohar and Toury expose an horizon of real cultural and institutional manipulation affecting the process both synchronically and diachronically. Translation histories thus are beginning to provide the theorist with case studies revealing the unconscious work that can be read symptomatically for the out-of-sight *non-dit* which is also a part of every literary text.

Texts, according to Althusser, do not always say what they mean; every text contains a certain silence, which he identifies as a material silence, a "matter" which gives the text its form. In order to say anything, certain things also cannot be said. Freud, upon whom Althusser bases his conception of symptomatic reading, relegates this absence of certain expressions in the text to the workings of the unconscious; thus the conscious expression exists coterminous with the unconscious, a silent *impensé* in the dark corners of

the mind. As Johnson suggests, and as recent translation theory documents, that hidden entity become visible in the translated text. That silence doesn't necessarily tell us anything, but as literary theorists, it does inform us of the conditions necessary for any utterance, and, ironically, dispels any notion of truth or litereral meaning. In such an approach, the very concept of "meaning" is thus altered, becoming visible as an unstable entity, cohering to a degree in the relation between the implicit and the explicit. If indeed it is the case that in translation the *non-dit* is brought out into the open, then as literary critics, we need to measure that which is said against that which is not nor cannot be said in a particular context in order to begin to unveil the "meaning" of any given text.

In contrast to most other kinds of literary texts, translated works, because they can be compared to other translations in different cultural contexts and different historical periods, lend themselves well to such an analysis. For the scholar who works "monolinguistically," for example, such relations tend to remain out of sight and thus become very difficult to grasp in a concrete way. Freudian slips and idiosyncrasies may give us clues, but in general there is not much material to base a such a reading on. As a result, literary criticism is dominated by "correct" interpretation or rearticulation of that which has already been said. However, the advantage of working with translated literature begins to emerge: with careful study, the shifts, the misrecognitions, and the relations which constitute them become more visible than the one-to-one correspondences. Traditional translation theory, based upon notions governing traditional monolinguistic criticism, tended to dismiss such shifts as "errors" and "mistakes" and is

governed by a right-wrong measure. As I have suggested, such standards imply notions of substantialism and textual equivalence that limit certain other possibilities of translation practice, marginalize unorthodox translations, and impinge upon real intercultural exchange. Current translation criticism, however, is just beginning to compare the nature of the mistake to the original, analyze the relation, and identify the causes. What becomes apparent when analyzing the evolution of one text in history, viewing its multiple forms and the processes of reintegration into different historical epoches, are not the eternal verities of the original, but the mechanisms of history which mask any sense of the original at all. By recognizing the limits imposed by the receiving culture, by problematizing those discursive constraints, one can hope as critic not only to open up translation theory for its own possible transformation, but to help open the receiving culture for possible social change (through the practice of translation).

A deconstruction of the authorities governing the field of translation, of literary criticism, of culture in general is beginning to emerge within the field of translation theory. As the varying approaches begin to mutually inform each other, some unusual intra-disciplinary investigations are occurring. For example, the problem of access to the classics by the everyday reader troubled Pound, as illustrated by his comments to Rouse quoted above, and continues as a cultural problem in the West today. Ironically, however, the movement to make the classics more widely available is being addressed not by Pound scholars, but by a group of Marxist literary critics, who use actual translations of classical texts as vehicles to expose those institutions--

the schools, museums, journals, and media in general--of Western society which perpetuate certain metaphysical claims about the nature of the original text and restrict their interpretation to an cultural elite.[3] The unlikely union of Marxist literary critics addressing a problem laid out by Pound, however, may be characteristic of the cross-fertilization process now occurring in the field. Danny Weissbort, editor of <u>Modern Poetry in Translation</u>, a journal which traditionally published those very literary translations which claimed to avoid theoretical presuppositions, has added Romy Heylen, a scholar much influenced by Translation Studies, to the editorial board to incorporate a theoretical component in the journal. Similarly, Rainer Schulte, editor of <u>Translation Review</u>, a journal devoted to publishing literary translations and reviews of translation, in an editorial entitled "Translation Theory: A Challenge for the Future" suggests that Translation Studies and Anglo-American literary translators can mutually help each other. He argues that the study of multiple translations of a single poem can enlarge the literary translator's understanding of the text, and, at the same time, translation theorists can learn from the literary translators' research into criteria for the evaluation of translations.[4] Another unusual approach is being suggested by certain translation "scientists." Admitting

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[3]See Pierre Macherey, "Problems of Reflection," trans. John Coombes, Literature, Society and the Sociology of Literature: Proceedings of the Conference Held and the University of Essex, July 1976 (Colchester: University of Essex, 1977), 45. See also a brief analysis of five translations of Homer's <u>Illiad</u> in John Frow, <u>Marxism and Literary History</u> (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 170-181.

[4]Rainer Schulte, "Translation Theory: A Challenge for the Future," <u>Translation Review</u>, No. 23 (1987), 2.

that neither psycholinguistics nor socio-linguistics can offer explanations for certain semantic shifts in translation, theoreticians at the third international conference on the science of translation, led by East German and East European scholars, read papers calling for the incorporation of subjective factors into their objective science, including such an unscientific rationale as "it sounds better" as a possible category.[5] And as we saw above, deconstruction, which dismantles all literary theories, enters very precarious ground, one which threatens to undermine its own stance, by suggesting that in translation, that impossible presence, that ungraspable situation--*différance* at play--may become visible. Recognizing that the various approaches, while retaining differences, are in many ways interconnected, Gideon Toury and José Lambert, have established a new journal called Target to provide a platform for discussion of ideas of theoretical, methodological, and descriptive nature.[6]

Such interdisciplinary activity seems strange in a field in which different groups of scholars remained until recently largely unaware of what fellow colleagues were doing in other parts of the world. Even the few times conferences have brought scholars together, ignorance of advances made by the alternate camps remained the norm rather than the exception. Some radical rethinking of certain positions is taking place within the scope

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[5]See Semantik and Übersetzungswissenschaft: Materialien der III. Internationalen Konferenz "Grundfragen der Übersetzungswissenschaft," ed. Gert Jäger and Albrecht Neubert (Leipzig: Enzyklopädie, 1983), especially Vladimir Ivir, "Reasons for Semantic Shifts in Translation," 62-67, and Albrecht Neubert, "Translation und Texttheorie," 100-110.

[6]Gideon Toury and José Lambert, eds., Target: International Journal of Translation Studies, 1:1 (1989).

of translation theory, and certain surprising risks are being taken as definitions within the field get called into question. I hope that this text has served to aid future collaboration and to break down misconceptions of competing viewpoints. Although modern translation theory has evolved a long way since its structuralist beginnings, I suggest that it has just reached the precipice of a very exciting new phase, one which can begin to unpack the relations in which meaning is constituted, and thus better inform our post-structuralist conception of language and literary discourse, as well as our selves. With such insight, perhaps we will be less likely to dismiss that which does not fit into or measure up to our standards, and instead reevaluate those standards in order to open our selves to alternative ways of perceiving--in other words, to invite real international communication.

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