



PALGRAVE STUDIES IN TRANSLATING  
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# CONSECUTIVE INTERPRETING

AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY

ALEXANDER V. KOZIN



# Palgrave Studies in Translating and Interpreting

## **Series editor**

Margaret Rogers

Department of Languages and Translation

University of Surrey

Guildford, United Kingdom

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Alexander V. Kozin

# Consecutive Interpreting

An Interdisciplinary Study

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Alexander V. Kozin  
Centre for Literature and Philosophy  
University of Sussex  
Falmer, UK

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*To Tanja*

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# 1

## Consecutive Interpreting and Its Many Facets

The subject of this book is consecutive interpreting. An orphan among its translation peers, consecutive interpreting appears to have a short life and little if any luster. It also evokes little wonder: standing close to the everyday and its dweller, consecutive interpreting invites us to take for granted both its existence and its meaning. In comparison to written translation and other types of interpreting, consecutive interpreting also spawns limited academic interest, producing exclusive empirical accounts which center on the interpreter's performance and its indicators or, when tackled in abstraction, accuracy of linguistic reproduction and cross-comparisons of linguistic outcomes. It is extremely rare that the phenomenon itself would be isolated for academic scrutiny, especially so when it comes to a philosophical inquiry. This book seeks to redress this state of affairs by offering an interdisciplinary respecification of the phenomenon. The term 'respecification' points to the work of hermeneutic phenomenology, which seeks to recover the authentic sense of a phenomenon, its original identity, including the name that would be proper to the new identity, its constitutive specifics as well as its aesthetics and the ethical potential.<sup>1</sup> Currently, consecutive interpreting appears under many guises, including such aliases as 'oral,' 'liaison,' 'dialogue,' 'community,' or 'interlingual.' In this book, I have chosen to present the subject of this investigation under

the name ‘consecutive interpreting.’ In contrast to other modifiers that designate this type of interpreting, the word ‘consecutive’ is free from the misleading associations with a specific language medium or the interpreter’s mediating role. In contrast, ‘consecutive’ implies live interaction, pointing to the embeddedness of consecutive interpreting in communication which makes it immediately distinguishable from other types of interpreting as both a presence and a consequence.

The connection of consecutive interpreting to the ordinary explains the use of phenomenology for this project. Originally designed to examine and challenge the natural attitude, phenomenology identifies this attitude with the human propensity to deproblematize the life-world by constructing it largely in functional terms, which emphasize ‘use,’ the preferred operation of mundane sociality. By employing phenomenology, we can examine the apparent ordinariness of consecutive interpreting in terms of its authentic rather than prescribed sense. Phenomenology distinguishes between the two because we often see the main purpose of consecutive interpreting in connecting us to a multitude of different worlds and their inhabitants. On the basis of this assumption, we have little doubt that in order to understand and therefore relate to these worlds, they must be communicated to us. Among many forms of interlingual communication, face-to-face communication stands out as the most effective tool of building an immediate bridge between different language communities. One of the most ordinary forms of interlingual communication, consecutive interpreting suggests a capacity of negotiating linguistic and cultural differences *in situ*, as we do by conversing with one another. At the same time, consecutive interpreting is not a phenomenon whose relation to human proximity means that it shall be easy to capture. Like speech itself, it ‘lives’ only as long as there is talk involved; after having marked its presence, it dissipates as quickly, apparently making little if any difference to the social world at large.

This ‘easy-to-see’ but ‘hard-to-get’ nature of consecutive interpreting points to yet another task this book is designed to undertake: in addition to recovering the authentic sense of the phenomenon, it seeks to establish the significance of this form of communication for the social realm. In performing both tasks, phenomenality of consecutive interpreting is not to be achieved experimentally or quantitatively in the fashion common

for social sciences, but, following the main phenomenological tenets, it must be discovered through the thick description and, as I am going to argue, be supplanted by the empirical analysis. The empirical connection is going to be carried out through those qualitative methods in communication that are compatible with phenomenology, namely, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. With this orientation we arrive at the preliminary question for this study: How does one respecify consecutive interpreting? I suggest that in order to answer this question, we must focus on the following concepts: structure (*eidos*), purpose (*telos*), and origin (*genesis*). This book attends to all the three foci in a comprehensive phenomenological-empirical inquiry.<sup>2</sup> Before launching this inquiry, however, I would like to describe various facets (manifestations) of consecutive interpreting, showing that in different capacities it indeed permeates our everyday life, making the phenomenon recognizable in its natural environment and therefore observable and describable. I call them ‘facets of translation,’ although it would be more apt to call them ‘faces’ since, from the mundane perspective, the activity of consecutive interpreting has but the front and is always embodied and thus enfacéd. I must reiterate that the purpose of this introduction is only to show how translation, in general, and consecutive interpreting, in particular, constitute the fabric of our ordinary lives. At the same time, by showing different facets of consecutive interpreting, I will be priming it, as it were, for the subsequent focused investigations. A variety of ‘real-life’ examples of consecutive interpreting and a number of theoretical accounts will be utilized to this effect.

If the existence of consecutive interpreting is beyond doubt, its significance for the social world and its affairs remains obscure. At critical times, however, when the human ability of living together falls under question, when we begin to question our capacity of communicating with a cultural other, our familiarity with the phenomenon turns into an aspiration to know interpreting as the very thing that makes this kind of communication possible, promising crucial insights into different human worlds and their relations.<sup>3</sup> This promise came particularly true for the current generation, which saw our subject in association with ideological, political, economic, and demographic crises that brought interpreting to the fore in the 1990s with a strongly critical emphasis. Appropriate to

the chosen method, this emphasis was reminiscent of the one described by the founder of the phenomenological movement, Edmund Husserl, in his monograph *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Written shortly before World War II, *The Crisis* argued that the development of natural sciences brought about idealization of the life-world, leading to its forgetfulness, creating in the same breath a certain belief in the primacy of the ideal, the belief that would foreshadow concrete experiences, their messiness, viscera, and wonder, prompting the human crisis that could not be mitigated in any other way but only by 'putting the most obvious into question' (Husserl 1970a, p. 180). Among the most 'obvious' facts, Husserl names presence, science, and ego. Our overwhelming belief in the latter over absence, intuition, and community often prevents us from reflecting on the life-world, our own world, and its social dimensions and variations. Husserl's major contribution to both phenomenology and the human sciences in that regard deals with the fact that he subsequently questioned and reversed the preponderance of exactitude in an elaborate argument that brought the philosophical science of phenomenology into being. In a similar reversal, I would like to reinstitute consecutive interpreting as a phenomenon which is grounded in the life-world and thus privileges intersubjectivity and sociality.

At the same time, by simply accepting the primacy of the social world over the individual, or of the many over the few, we are by no means guaranteed to arrive at the authentic sense of translation in any of its forms.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, when the twenty-first century marched in replete with remarkable technological advances, it also came carrying a promise that the new electronic media, diverse means of communication, and international social networks could provide equal access to information and other shareable resources. This century also promised a different kind of sociality, a mobile interactive sociality ensured by unhindered and therefore fast multiparty communication, which appeared particularly beneficial for all kinds of intercultural exchanges. The subject of this book, interpreting, seemed to be a natural extension of the communication revolution. Founded on the possibility of interaction across languages and cultures, virtual communication in the global world depends on the coding and decoding culture and therefore on translating it, regardless of

whether this translation involves an actual human face or an electronic screen, a human voice or a paper script.

Today, translated are not just works, words, ideas, or academic themes but entire political systems, such as the regimes of the post-Soviet Eastern Europe, Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia, China, and the newly developed political systems of Northern Africa. The acting presumption behind these translations is that there indeed exists a 'good' model, an original, if you will, and that it could be re-enacted across contexts, that is, be translated. As it has become increasingly clear from the recent events that took place in the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the exchange of a clear original for a corrupt copy does nothing more than swap authenticity for ideality, as was criticized by Husserl a century ago.<sup>5</sup> And when the best political intentions, economic models, and lifestyles—or as they are called by some, 'ways of life'—get lost in translation, creating bad copies, distorted reflections, unlikely phantasms, and blind paradigms of formal logic, shall we not realize that translation and its varieties are phenomena of their own which possess their own identities, appearances, and histories?

The answer to this question cannot be straightforward already because at all times we deal with two senses of translation: translation per se, or the idea of translation, and different kinds and species of translational practice, including consecutive interpreting. For phenomenological reasons it is not necessary to separate translation per se from the translational practice (*praxis*). Moreover, according to Martin Heidegger, the two senses can be fused in the symbolic realm where translation appears as a figure. The usefulness of this image for understanding the genesis of translation, the starting point of its phenomenality, is not to be ignored. In his 1942–1943 lecture course *Parmenides*, Heidegger explains that translation has the capacity of disclosing truth. In translation, truth appears as a mythological figure, a goddess. For the ancient Greeks, a divine figure is not some ethereal metaphysical or mythical entity but a form of materiality, even if a symbolic one. Its appearance is not to be interpreted in the human terms, for it points to the original in flight rather than to the repeatable sameness. From that perspective, the task of translation lies in reaching beyond the immediate, turning the act of translation into

a voyage, similar to the one taken by the Greek adventurer Parmenides who, during his travels, happened to meet with a goddess and was invited to her home.

The experience of being within the divine abode is beyond description; it can be understood only in retrospect, as a trace of some traumatic but not necessarily negative experience. In order to comprehend the encounter, the seeker of truth and knowledge needs to employ radical reflection. Only then is he or she granted an access to the realm of truth. The access is going to be partial, however: truth is handed over to Parmenides over the threshold. He is never invited inside. It is for that reason that Heidegger names 'transporting' as the essence of translation and assigns to interpretation, which is a hermeneutic of extension of translation, the task of carrying the 'word' over the threshold. An interpretation is considered to be embed in translation; it cannot emerge in any other way, argues Heidegger, because translation is transcendental: it thus includes all cases. The ancient Greek concept of *aletheia* (Ἀληθεία) embodies this relationship by showing that truth, the English translation of *aletheia*, always emerges from the hidden; it is obscure in origin and ambiguous in expression, temperamental like the goddess herself, and therefore never complete, like translation. Most important, however, is that *aletheia* is not a phantom of our imagination but a configured materiality of the sensual world, a symbol that makes a difference to the matter of things.

Heidegger's insistence on the relational inseparability of truth from the encounter with its figure points out the main task of translation: to disclose truth in a profound way, in the manner of a journey that implies a transformation of the voyager; hence, Heidegger's distinction between the divinational character of translation (understood as the other of the original) and the primary mode of its own appearance, which is the twilight drawn over by the withdrawal of the original. The work of 'unconcealment' in relation to the original comes as much from the work of *aletheia* as it does from translation, for the latter demands interpretation: 'Only a translation thoroughly guided by an interpretation is, within certain limits, capable of speaking for itself' (Heidegger 1998, p. 9). By emphasizing this relationship, Heidegger intimates the dual character of translation: it is guiding by way of explaining. To speak phenomenologically, Heidegger 'founds' interpretation on translation. After all, unlike

written translation, its oral counterpart faces the limits of which the most human one is the limit imposed by the activity of speaking. Moreover, the absolute inaccessibility of translation as truth (*aletheia*) matches the ambiguity of speech. In other words, if translation is there to ‘keep’ truth, which conditions the social world in the shadows, so to speak, interpretation stirs up this world, exposing ‘concealment’ as a condition for the appearance of both truth and its keeper, that is, translation itself. This amalgam—of the translation as the transcendental condition for disclosing truth in the face of the other and of the translation that speaks for itself by speaking in tongues—provides the original complicity of translation/interpretation, bringing us closer to the understanding of the meaning of translation, in general, and of interpreting, in particular.

From that perspective, it appears that the primordial objective of translation, its *modus operandi*, is truth, which is to be attained by turning unfamiliarity into a familiar presence. It is worth reminding ourselves in the same regard that the essence of diversity is unfamiliarity, because the encounter with a difference always implies a deception of the sensible. One can easily overlook this fact because, as a non-homogeneous entity, diversity is never given to us purely but comes to permeate our world as one difference among many, just as translation is never the only one but always one candidate among many, an unstoppable seeker of a permanent identity. At the same time, trying to achieve diversity, our immediate experience prompts us not only to distinguish among common variations of the same (internal diversity of the self) but also to take into account what appears as a radical difference at the extreme place of experience (the other in diversity), where comprehension cannot help but stop short challenged by the absolutely unknown. An in-depth phenomenological treatment of Heidegger’s notion of translation should be left to another study, however, for it would take us too far away from the subject of this book. The most important insight from this excursus should be the association of translation with the inaccessible figure of the primordial goddess, which cannot be encountered in the real world but may indicate its presence through the figure of the foreigner. The foreigner is a stranger, who always stands in abatement, as if unable to possess the divine gift of truth, which cannot be given fully, not even via a common language. We can say that the foreigner is a visitation.



With the focus on the foreigner, the dual phenomenon of translation exposes its complex materiality further, implying that the foreigner, who comes from a foreign land, has a *telos* imposed on him or her by the encounter with the unknown, which makes him or her *stand for* the absent original, as Julia Kristeva had it.<sup>6</sup> A foreigner can be an immigrant or a migrant, a tourist or a traveler, but in all these positions, he or she is inevitably a stranger who, by standing for what is no longer there, happens to *stand out* in the world that is neither his nor her own. Translation stands out as well, as it begins at the site of speech, bringing out the stranger as being completely outside: ‘The foreigner’s speech has no past and no future; it is entirely inconsequential’ (Kristeva 1991, p. 20). It might be helpful to remind ourselves that Kristeva’s own perspective originates as much from her own experience of an immigrant academic of Bulgarian descent, as it does from her psychoanalytic training.<sup>7</sup> The latter association allows us to speak of foreignness as a facet of one’s self.

This adds to the experience of living with the alien ‘melancholy’ and ‘nostalgia,’ which emerge as two parallel dispositions brought about by the state of no return. The consequence for interpreting is clear: once it is over, it is no longer to be, just like the original, which disappears shortly before its translation enters. The same is true when it comes to foreignness. There is indeed only ‘nowhere’ to which a former citizen, a former member of a community, but now a foreigner can return: ‘the foreigner is an orphan, who is deprived of parents’ (Kristeva 1991, p. 21). His or her roots are severed without ever letting him or her understand the finitude of this scission; hence, the chronic malaise and incessant fantasizing about returning to the world of the predecessors. It is hardly possible to regain this world, for the non-participation in the collective constitution of a community and ritualized practices of the local world results in the permanent lag before the experience of the former ‘same,’ who moves along, whether a former member is on board or not. We, as foreigners, recognize individual persons, objects, and ways, but there is no wholesomeness there. The experience of the former ‘own’ is available only as anticipation.

The notion of the ‘no return’ cuts to the core of translation prolegomena because the umbilical cord between the original and the translation is always severed at the roots of belonging. Translation must be rooted in

the original in order to break free from it, but once it succeeds, although still in flight, it continues to 'owe' its being to the original. As it is impossible to claim that there is no original in translation, it is only by owing to the original that translation makes itself possible. From that perspective, translation is always a migrant and a stranger whose foreignness is a foundational and not an associative quality. Once this quality is disclosed, it averts translation from the original, making it appear as quasi-native. Reading or hearing the original next to its translation, which is common among the students of foreign languages, brings up the schizophrenic experience that fuses together the simultaneous separateness and the mutuality of the two (many) beings, two (many) languages, and two (many) ways of experiencing and signifying. It is also a sad reunion, this face-to-face gathering of such close yet infinitely distant relatives. The same simultaneity characterizes consecutive interpreting to an even greater extent because moving utterance by utterance from the original to its translation retains the impression that the movement is governed by the same longing for some deeply hidden truth.

Translation is not only melancholic but paradoxical as a traveler would be when he or she is stranded far away from home without any hope of homecoming; the traveler keeps on looking back, desiring to recover his or her original way of being, yet the actual experience of moving away reveals the duality of that desire. When a former exile returns to the land of his or her birth after a long absence, his or her former memorable home, although still recognizable, inevitably brings the returnee to the discovery that during his or her absence the ways of the land and eventually its inhabitants, with their customs, habits, and traditions, have undergone an irreversible transformation by moving along some historical continuum, in which the absent one had not participated and thereby does not belong. Even a short sojourn in a foreign land estranges one from his or her home. The only thing that remains for the immigrant to hold onto in an attempt to retain the original sociocultural identity is indeed his or her mother tongue.<sup>8</sup> But even that does not guarantee the return to one's origin. Jacques Derrida's take on monolingualism in his 1998 book *Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin* elaborates this position lucidly enough as to show both the instability of the concept of 'mother tongue' and its suspicious primacy for the natural

attitude. The connection to the mother tongue is the first and the last condition of belonging: there is nothing before and there is nothing after. To emphasize this point, in his book *Of Hospitality*, Derrida quotes Hannah Arendt, who, after many years of living in exile in the United States, wrote that ‘she no longer felt German except in language; as if a language were the *remains* of belonging’ (2000, p. 89; *author’s emphasis*).

As if adding to Kristeva, Derrida formulates his thesis on monolingualism in a paradoxical manner: (a) we speak only one language and (b) this language is not ours.<sup>9</sup> This is to say that our linguistic identity is an assembled identity which is tied to the mother tongue only by way of identifying with it but without the possibility of claiming it as the origin of one’s self. In that regard, as an elaboration on the original language, Gilles Deleuze’s concept of ‘rhizome’ can be instructive: the rhizomatic sociality suggests that an individual would be an offshoot from a long and winding underground root that accommodates many without depriving any of their individual features; by nourishing all with the same kind of matter, rhizome nonetheless produces different outcomes at each juncture, so to speak. For humans, this interindividual, intersubjective matter always necessarily implies language. Translation factors into this model as an organizing force behind speaking a language, for example, when the center of a linguistic community and its periphery are so diverse as to be almost incomprehensible to each other; however, no translation as a practice is required in that case—a language has the ability of ordering itself into a discrete unity of forms. In contrast to Derrida, for Deleuze and Guattari, it is never one language that we speak: ‘We never speak one language and we never speak only one language [...] It is also the law of translation’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 10). As if Babel has never happened.

In support of that position, albeit on different grounds, Derrida calls translation ‘mad’ in a sense that it behaves inconsistently; it fluctuates and deviates; it goes astray; it wanders. At the same time, how could translation not be paradoxical, asks Derrida, since it has the same matter springing off from the same root, but at different spatiotemporal points, showing different rates of growth and, upon a linguistic autopsy, deviant morphologies? For Derrida, translation is rhizomatic because it keeps a trace of the same original in it, while the original continues by

reproducing itself in its actual and possible reproductions, leaving a different trace of itself in all of them. The original keeps, while its translation lets go. At the end, it might be apt to remember an anecdote that involves Roman Jakobson who was known to speak 15 languages fluently. Once, in response to someone's amazement about his extraordinary language abilities bordering on multilingualism, he said: 'Well, I don't really speak fifteen languages. In fact, I speak only one language: Russian. But it is true—I can speak it in fifteen different ways.' From this response we can deduce that multilingualism is but a laminate on the surface of one's mother tongue, while translation underlines that surface, making space for other tongues which may appear to be on the same plane, as is claimed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, but this appearance is an effect of translation, as Derrida wishes us to believe, and we can be sure of that when we see how, with aging, our ability of speaking foreign tongues diminishes, pushing us closer to the original, to the mother tongue, to the beginning. We rarely recognize our dependence on the original already because it is always there, at the dividing line, and it is only when the 'bridge' that separates the 'foreign' from the 'home' fails to hold that we come to notice that the failure is that of translation and that it cannot but fail.

The failures of translation become particularly noticeable once we shift our attention to the practice of translation, especially written translation, where failures tend to take place *post factum*, as, for example, the fact of 'bad' translation in a written text would be; there, 'bad' is defined outside of everyday affairs, human interactions, communications, and exchanges, and often becomes obviously bad only from the historical perspective, spawning a change of cultural sensibilities toward the original text, its subject, or the criteria for evaluating the actual body of translation, its empirical facts. The need to make over the past due to new social imperatives, that is, retranslate, presents itself as a form of historical reversal—a micro change of historical materiality. At the same time, the drive to retranslate does not always aim at a better translation but may seek to renew or revive the original by simply rephrasing it, with an eye on adjusting it for the current historical period and its social demands. When paraphrase comes to play, however, it only reaffirms the paradox of translation by denying the possibility for the original to ever settle. Paraphrase can only 'refresh' the original, showing thereby that a

written text is as volatile and vulnerable to moods as an act of interpreting. This fragility, once recognized, brings written translation closer to its oral sibling in that it implies the immediate context of its production. An example to that effect was presented half a century ago by Vladimir Nabokov, who advanced the concept of 'literal' translation by putting his own English translation of *Eugene Onegin*, Alexander Pushkin's novel, into verse, in an extensive historical context, which appeared separated from the original by secondary references and commentaries.

Unique in its approach, Nabokov's translation of *Onegin* produced two volumes: one was the translation proper, that is, a literal rendition of Pushkin's text in the prosaic style formatted after the presentational conventions of the four-step Iambic meter, while the other volume, ten times the size of the original, was intended as an extensive commentary on the translated text. Behind this effort lay Nabokov's conviction that any translation, whether of a poem or a novel or a document, should be divided into the 'surface' structure and the 'deep' structures, and that they should be presented separately, with extensive notes running parallel to the translated text. It is important to note that Nabokov did not mean the distinction between the same 'deep' and 'surface' structures as one finds in Noam Chomsky's fundamental work on language grammar. By surface structure Nabokov meant the expressive side of language, while by deep structure he meant the syntax. Unexpectedly, by exercising a strictly formal enterprise, he ended up making a strong claim about translation being a phenomenon of culture, that is, a way of being that does not deny translation the native perspective but requires that it shall provide an extensive interpretation, which comes about in the form of a culturological background. It is the latter that should count as the deep structures, since only expression provides the initial access to the unknown and the uncanny. A mystery is never a mystery if it cannot be expressed, regardless of whether this mystery originates in a revelatory experience of the divine or comes from an unmentionable family secret.

In the preface to his translation of *Onegin*, when critiquing his predecessors, that is, numerous other translators of the Russian literary classic, Nabokov made this point unequivocally: 'Anyone who wishes to attempt a translation of *Onegin* should acquire exact information in regard to a number of relevant subjects, such as the *Fables* by Krylov, Byron's works,

French poets of the eighteenth century, Rousseau's *La Nouvelle Heloise*, the rules of card games popular in Russia, Russian divinational songs, Russian military ranks, the difference between cranberry and loganberry, the rules of the pistol duel, and the intricacies of the Russian language' (1991, p. 137). For the purpose of this study, most important in this list is the emergent concept of a collective culture as that which is most tangible, mundane, and habitual, consisting of the words in use and action rather than the ideas behind this or that text or the presumed intention of the author.<sup>10</sup> It was no accident that language came last in this list. According to Nabokov, translation can only happen if it is handled as a cultural and not just linguistic endeavor, with the greatest attention given to the knowledge of the other and otherness in the strictly historical sense, reminding us of Alfred Schütz and his notion of intergenerational continuum, which implies the genetic constitutive link between past and future generations, with the social environment allowing for the transfer of most essential rituals, artifacts, and skills, in sum, a continuous reintroduction of the cultural knowledge.<sup>11</sup> As we have discussed earlier, just like the mother tongue, the 'authentic' meaning of this knowledge belongs only to the permanent members of a community and is not transferable, at least never fully, outside of the intergenerational continuum, least so by the word.

From this perspective, it might be worth revisiting Umberto Eco's view of translation as negotiation, for the term 'negotiation' has a special meaning for consecutive interpreting, which often conducts negotiating in situ, so to speak, in a variety of institutional but also private settings. For Eco, negotiating between two texts deals with 'the ghost of a distant author, the disturbing presence of a foreign text, and the phantom of the reader they are translating for' (2003, p. 173). The significance of this approach may become clear in light of the previous example as it points out that the ambiguity of translation is actual and not virtual. The distant author is the hegemonic signifier that commands more presence than the actual work could ever claim. Each text, each translation inspiring event, regardless of its mode of presentation, comes from some place, thus defying presentational universalism on the grounds of original localism. Translation, like immigration, is not an event but a position; tenuous as it might be, it still has the right to claim the place-bound authenticity

in order to negotiate the original from it.<sup>12</sup> The translator, whether he or she is trained formally or is self-trained, knows only too well of this cultural specificity from the indispensable inflection which cannot be reduced to style, but presupposes culture in its entirety, and here the native is always in the privileged position to understand linguistic and paralinguistic nuances, although this does not mean an automatic access to the sense of culture. This is precisely the point that Nabokov made earlier. Paradoxically, a good translator does not need to be immersed in a foreign culture to be able to understand the intricacies of what is going on in the translated text, but he or she does need to have a sense of the foreign language that could guide him or her to the preferred interpretation and ultimately the corresponding cultural differential. It is therefore within the cultural linguistic milieu that one must negotiate their relation with the foreign. The refusal to do so results not only in the failure to understand the original and its bearers but also in the denial of the very possibility of translation.

According to Eco, when the paradox of translation makes us hit the wall, so to speak, one should anticipate a return to the search for a perfect language. In the Middle Ages, such efforts were common due to the mystical tradition that arose from the Biblical concept of *glossolalia* or the ability to speak the ecstatic language which could be understood by everybody. The idea of a perfect language that would not require translation or be above translation was also entertained by Walter Benjamin who conceived of pure language that did not only condition the language for men but was in fact a universal medium of communication for all things dead or alive.<sup>13</sup> According to Eco, in practice, the perfect language does not have to be divine, but it must be exceedingly formal. The excessive formalization would then have to be rooted in the human mind whose workings are presumed to be common to all people regardless of their mother tongue. Creating such a language was the preoccupation of several generations of contemporary linguists, who rushed to announce the universal accessibility of Esperanto and Ido. The grammatical simplicity of these man-made communication systems could have made them the ultimate *lingua franca*, fulfilling the dream of Babel. In fact, it took almost the whole generation of 'users' to realize the ultimate failure of all artificial languages. The absence of the natural environment for growth

coupled with the unquestioned reliance on the existent vocabulary made Esperanto and its look-alikes generally useless past a possibility of very narrow applications. Artificial languages could neither replace natural languages nor compete with them because all of them are in essence translations of natural languages—the fact that underscores the importance of inner-communal communication but fails to provide an answer to the social meaning of translation. This meaning appears closer at hand when it comes to the surface, observable in the practice of all kinds of translation, and, specifically, consecutive interpreting. When translation is engaged as interpreting, it becomes displaced, and its immediate failures appear to be much more common, almost to the point of defining it as a prospective failure.

Due to its intrinsic impermanence as well as our expectation of roughness and incompleteness common to regular live communication, interpreting does not seem to yield historically significant consequences. Its failures are noticeable in the moment and made significant only if the event which exposes them is of significance in itself. Take, for example, the state visit of Hu Jintao, the President of China to Washington, DC, on 19 January 2011. During the visit, after the exchange of protocol-required speeches, where the parties praised each other for ‘friendly competition,’ ‘mutual respect,’ and ‘mutual benefit,’ came the ‘lost in translation’ moment, as one journalist put it, comparing it to ‘one long Chinese-language lesson,’ according to a CNN reporter. The moment emerged in the aftermath of the question about the state of human rights in China, which made it extra significant and, with it, prone to failure. While the US President was waiting for an answer from the Chinese President, his counterpart remained silent, provoking an outburst of follow-up questions that made it appear as if the public took Hu Jintao’s silence for the sign of avoidance. An interruption for clarification followed. Once the source of the misunderstanding became identified, the Chinese President responded: ‘I would like to clarify, because of the technical problem with translation, I did not hear the question about human rights.’

Technical difficulties continued, however, making the journalists themselves problematize both the quality of interpreting and also the mode in which it was delivered: ‘Because of the on-and-off interpretation from the simultaneous booths, I would like to ask the Chinese interpreter



to interpret my two questions correctly and accurately,' stated a Chinese reporter before asking his question. Although legitimate in terms of the sought-out outcomes, from the perspective of a practicing language professional, such a demand sounds as nothing more than naive and unrealistic. A rebuke to the interpreter by way of ascribing to a linguistic formulation a breach of some basic professional duties speaks volumes about the taken-for-granted understanding of consecutive interpreting as a practice but nothing about how it should be conducted so it could produce correct and accurate results. The belief that the failure of interpreting sits with the interpreter is ironic in light of the opposite belief about the impossibility of the mode of interpreting coinciding with the original 'completely.' The deeply seeded assumption about the ability of a non-professional observer to tell a good translation from a bad one characterizes the state in which this phenomenon tends to find itself most often: 'It is only in those rare moments when culture and language fail as resource that they develop a peculiar resistance that we experience in situations of disturbed mutual understanding. Then we need the repair work of translators, interpreters, therapists' (Habermas 1987, p. 134). Otherwise, I should add, translation is but invisibility.

The episode just described is significant because it not only defines the place given by the natural attitude to translation but also indicates the extraordinary nature of interpreting, the nature that has lifted it above otherwise mega-important proceedings. Most often, however, one lets the failures of interpreting pass unnoticed and unproblematized, concealed by the interpreter, although not necessarily intentionally, and by the inaccessibility of the foreign tongue. In his novel *A Heart So White*, Spanish writer Javier Marias described this phenomenon by presenting the reader with an instance of sabotage instigated by the main protagonist of the book, a professional interpreter, during a meeting between two European heads of state. At some point, out of boredom and mischief, the interpreter stages an experiment: he 'throws in' a question of his own, which is essentially a purposeful mistranslation of the actual question, and thus spawns an engaged interpersonal discussion between the two officials. He then directs the discussion to his liking, proving not only that the interpreter has the power to change the trajectory of the interpreted communication, but most importantly that this power

is consequential, which is particularly true in the institutional context, where translation is not used as a means but as a habit:

The truth is that translation is the only fully functioning element in [international] organizations, which are, in fact gripped by a veritable translatorial fever, somewhat morbid and unhealthy, for every word pronounced (in session or assembly) and every scrap of paper sent, whatever the subject, whoever it is, in principle or addressed to, or whatever its objective (even if it's highly confidential), is immediately translated into several languages, just in case. (Marias 1997, p. 49)

Marias notes and laments the incessant production of interlingual verbatim, most of which is irrelevant to the matter at hand, if not harmful to it. To add, in casual situations, the interpreter enjoys an even greater degree of freedom when characterizing the other's position. Exercising this freedom means the interpreter's ability of bringing something of his own into the ongoing talk, while abstaining from direct contributions and maintaining the pseudo-neutral position of a professional.

The possibility of sabotaging the direction of talk or changing its content in interpreting pales before the possibility of delivering translation without giving any content. It is the case when no interpreting takes place despite the performance of the activity itself. Here, I am referring to an actual case when an imposter sign interpreter from South Africa pretended to interpret at Nelson Mandela's tribute on 12 December 2013, when many world leaders gathered to speak at length about South Africa's first black President, who had died several days before the event. During all these speeches, the sign interpreter, a man in his early thirties, who was standing next to the speaker, was making non-verbal signs of some kind; yet, the signs he made had no meaning to the deaf community in South Africa, the members of which were watching the event from afar in a televised format. They immediately understood that the signs were not real but simulational. In other words, interpreting took place; yet, it didn't. We should ask ourselves: How is this even possible? The imitator, who later claimed that he heard voices inside his head and that they spoke throughout his interpreting, nonetheless, not only managed to get to the stand in the official capacity but also succeeded in producing no legible

content while interpreting for the duration of the entire event, with nobody interrupting him. Ironically, by failing in his job, he succeeded in creating an interpreting event that the non-sign-language reader took for the real thing. The interpreter was there, interpreting (or so he and others thought) too, while there was no interpreting coming to the receiving end: the sign language community of the country had no access to what was designed to provide that very access. The failure of interpreting was, however, unproblematic for those who took it only from the performative side. There were no interruptions, and pauses were minimal: the work of the interpreter appeared entirely professional to the non-sign-language audience, or perhaps nobody in the audience paid attention. In the wake of this event, the separation of the two poles (that of content and that of form) not only appeared to be a valid conceptualization of speech but also suggested a relational asymmetry: the translation that was performed but never happened—it is almost impossible to imagine this scenario without the recourse to ‘simulacrum.’

Owing to simulacrum, disregarding both successes and failures of translation, on the highest level of sociality and with different consequences for translation (interpreting) and its practitioners, foreign worlds have shown the same resistance to neutrality, or communal homogeneity, that presumes an accurate transfer of meanings, premises, and values from one linguistic and cultural terrain into another. Territorial remappings that took place in Europe, Asia, and Africa at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries spawned mass migrations of largely unqualified labor; it also triggered ethnic wars, separatist movements, military invasions and interventions, explosions of racial hatred and violence, and acts of terrorism, which are more common today than they were a few decades earlier. Bosnia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Central and Northern Africa, Ukraine—all these place-names signify an unequivocal refusal to accept the idea of the respectful neighborhood of the ‘global village.’ With belligerence and bitterness, the peoples of the European Union, unified Germany, and the Commonwealth of Independent States have countered the politics of integration by disintegration. Most recently, Scotland, which was a part of the United Kingdom since the Stuarts, announced that the country was in dire need for national independence and a referendum was carried

out to that effect in September 2014, and although the majority of the Scots voted against independence, the low margin of difference (less than 10 percent) indicated a great deal of support for breaking the union, or the *status quo* of the original relationship. If the Scots had voted 'yes' to independence, it would have meant, for us, that they preferred division and not unification as the existential category which defined such a complex sociocultural phenomenon as nationhood. Ironically, two years after Scotland's 'NO' vote, Great Britain went the same route when its citizens voted for the exit from the European Union and received 'YES.'

The war on terror that began a decade ago divided the world again, but this time in an extremely fragmented fashion, erasing the line between the good and the bad translation in favor of the forced one. The democratic institutions of Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan have never developed enough to bear the fruit of political and economic independence. No translation happened there. Moreover, trying to follow the basic model of capitalist democracy, developing nations have consistently taken broad economic considerations over local values. The reliance on the global economy as a substitute for a local culture and as an insurance against financial collapse quickly led to many an economic crisis that exposed globalism as a myth perpetuated by a few to justify their exploitative hegemony. A wave of most recent immigration restrictions in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia, Europe, and Russia put the freedom of movement in question yet again, this time at the initiative of the same communities that had encouraged their 'oppressed' neighbors to fight for that very freedom only a quarter century ago, when the Russian Federation, no longer the Soviet Union, was trying very hard but failed to define itself and its emergent politico-economic system past the 'Wild West' reference. All this led to the effective disintegration of the old value system, with nothing of value put in its place. A country without an identity is a country without a future. A translation without an identity is a translation that has never happened.

At the same time, on a strictly metaphoric level, we have begun to encounter translations of a different, shoddy kind: human trafficking in the twenty-first century has reached unprecedented proportions, contributing to the growing black market workforce and illegal immigration, promoting the tenuous co-existence of the 'good' insider speech

and the ‘bad’ outsider speech. Despite the pervasive appeal of the English language, outside of the English-speaking countries, the *lingua anglica* remains but an uninvited mediator that can provide only partial relief from the misunderstandings that have shown the professed commonality to be unsupportable outside of national and linguistic boundaries, while pluralistic intercultural models of mobile professionalism to be non-applicable. The idea of a common habitat where communication runs flawlessly and freely has clearly failed to bear fruit. Likewise, the inability of translation to secure a safe passage from the known to the unknown puts the very division in question, forcing us to ask: What are the limits of the knowable? Is it worth pursuing knowledge with translation? How can translation be a guide to anything stable, solid, robust, in other words, historical?

The failure of diversity to institute a significant social change manifests itself in explicit political statements to that effect. Thus, after many years of following the American model of multiculturalism, both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that the politics of multiculturalism resulted in the failure of bringing the much desired effect. The two announcements, separated by several weeks, show a strong agreement on the question that until recently has been the purview of special institutions which themselves were representative of the government and its political agenda. Bringing the discussion about multiculturalism to an end in this fashion, on the highest level, went beyond an ideological regression into nationalism. Rather, it signified the reality of ‘no effect’ for the investments that went into supporting multiculturalism by various diversity programs, including both actual and virtual translation projects designed for internal use. The German Chancellor confirmed this idea on 11 October 2010 without much equivocation. Speaking in front of the Bundestag, the head of the German State said that attempts to build a multicultural society in Germany ‘have utterly failed.’ Frau Merkel also said that the *multi-kulti* concept, which presupposed that people would ‘live side-by-side happily,’ did not work, and that immigrants needed to be integrated, meaning, in the context of her earlier statements, that they needed to learn the native language of the German Federation: ‘Immigrants should learn to speak German.’ Ironically, the return to the native language as the most basic

form of sameness not only contradicts the effects of linguistic pluralism but challenges the very idea of translation as a form of cultural mediation.

However, if for Chancellor Merkel, language was the main means of integration into the German culture, the British response to pluralism did not cite language as an alternative, but pointed to the foreigners and their ways, that is, their foreignness, as the main reason for the failure to maintain a pluralistic society. Prime Minister Cameron made this emphasis clearly when he spoke on 5 February 2011 during a State Visit to Germany: ‘Citizenry and multiculturalism could not be further apart,’ stated the Prime Minister, adding that ‘under multiculturalism, British values and ideals of liberalism would be lost forever.’ With this emphasis he raised the monocultural standard set earlier by his German counterpart even higher. If diversity could not rely on the co-existence of different languages, there was little chance that it could bear fruit if the unification of values were to be taken for the main requirement on the way to pluralism. The role of translation is particularly obvious in this respect because translating values presupposes separation rather than commonality. Neither written nor oral translation can satisfy the main criterion of the multilinguistic co-existence of different languages, namely, the existence of an overarching context, or a common foundation, or a unifying medium. When politicians speak about the failure of diversity to create such a foundation or medium, there emerges an important insight: a unifying medium of communication, if ever possible, will be disastrous, and the story of Babel is a testimony to that prediction. Unfortunately, it is this very scenario that is about to play out with the current US President Donald Trump, who is ready to exclude entire nations from joining the American community, seeing in immigrants not just a hindrance but a fully blown threat.

Diversity is irreducible. It overwhelms history with local significance, that is, with actual stories and narratives that make any textual streamlining of facts pale in the face of the richness provided by these forms of communication. The dynamic character of localism is inscribed in the prefix to Germanic, Romance, and Slavic words that correspond to the English *trans-lation*: German *Über-setzung*, French *tra-duction*, Russian *непе-вод*. What is being relocated in translation is not the truth or some truth (as we saw from Heidegger’s account in the beginning of this chapter, truth

itself is motion) but a difference because it is the only tangible matter that emerges from translation without fail. Expanding the semantics of the word ‘relay,’ we should think of translation as a relocation of differences, no matter how incomprehensible these may be. Hosting these differences should be translation’s main function, and, as Jacques Derrida pointed out, the main problematic of translation, rather than the problem of crossing-over from one field of meaningfulness to another. Binding differences together is as much a theoretical task as it is a practical one. As was demonstrated by Nabokov’s *Onegin*, this task can be performed with a greater or lesser finesse, but it ought to be done. ‘Reconciling the difference in translation does not mean transporting linguistic and cultural differences over some imaginary bridge but rather bringing them through some dense matter to settle’ (Nabokov 1966, p. 108).

This matter comes to us in both text and talk. Both are recognizable as such; however, only talk possesses the co-affective materiality. This distinction applies to translation as well. Although conceivable in and of itself, pure translation is but a formal concept. It therefore has no pertinence for experience and only secondary interest for the current study. If translation begets diversity, it can never be reduced to a single origin or function. If it promotes multiplicity by necessity, it does so only by way of reduction. It adds to plurality by breaking up wholes. It brings differences together violently; moreover, it is in the very act of binding that difference as translation is created. For reasons that will be outlined, this study focuses on oral translation as a phenomenon tied to the social world precisely through its interpersonal praxis. This means not only excluding written translation from our consideration but also questioning computer-assisted or machine translation as a competitor to both written and oral kinds of translation. With its aspiration to become a unifying instrument that could gather and connect diversity without having it regress into a multitude of intersecting meanings, machine translation has come to challenge not just translation praxis but Heidegger’s notion of ‘one translation’ as well.

The program of machine translation was designed to tackle translation from the practical side; yet, its anticipated implications, depending on whether they can be seen as success or failure, were more far-reaching: to ensure full translatability not just of languages but of every sign system

into a different one, just like Jakobson dreamt of. The program, which by now has proven itself to be indeed a dream, dates back to the late 1950s, when for the first time in the history of computing, a US-built super IBM managed to translate a written text (several official documents from English into Russian and back) in an unassisted manner, entirely on the basis of prior human input. The program was lauded as successful (the criteria were based on a wide range of approximations), and spawned a mass of similar projects whose number grew exponentially, following advances in mathematics and computer sciences. However, the practical quality of machine translation, although much improved in the last decade, continues to be inadequate for nuanced communication. At best, computer-aided translators produce 'fair' approximations in the case of simple texts, yet any deviation from the 'word-for-word' translation model results in sadly comical results as one can experience today with any Internet server that features a translation program. From the point of view of 'live speech,' the failure was utterly predictable. Just as Paul Ricoeur put it, 'language is not an object but mediation' (1974, p. 85).

Take the most powerful engine to date, Google Conversation, a translation program based on the Google database, which is the largest and fastest among the non-special applications. Launched in 2011, Google Conversation was originally restricted to English and Spanish, the two languages with the largest Internet vocabularies and audiences that ensured the greatest degree of latitude due to a highly extensive vocabulary and relatively simple grammar, which allowed both semantic and syntactic flexibility. The latter were presumed to be particularly helpful for translating spoken exchanges. At first, the program software called 'Translate' produced amazing results, bringing the universal translator to the state of science fiction, giving us hope that 'we could soon roam the electronic world as polyglots, freely conversing in any language or dialect.'<sup>14</sup> However, forewarn machine-translation experts, the dream of a universal translator continues to be but a fantasy: although excellent in assisting those who speak some foreign language with the help of a thesaurus, the electronic translator makes gross errors and cannot be used as a reliable tool in formal situations, or when it comes to translating those texts that play on words, using irony, hidden allusions, historical facts, literary references, and individual mannerisms. The end result of



machine translation would be reminiscent of what Nabokov offered in a systematic fashion in his supplemental volume to *Onegin*—a detailed description of what could easily go wrong with a translation if the translator does not take precise contextual details into account.

If the black box of the electronic translator fails to ensure a pure and unassisted translation program, perhaps the robot interpreter can do better. A phenomenologist would argue that such an interpreter, of course very much a product of one's imagination at this point in human history, would possess an extra advantage, especially if its embodiment is reminiscent of that of a human being. The bipedal position of a human being orientates him or her in space in a uniquely human way in relation to the ground, the sky, and the world, or, to put it in phenomenological terms, to the horizon, the figure, and the life-world. The world of a machine is incomparable with that of the human, naturally, but if a sophisticated robot could possess access to human experience, human emotions, and human ambiguities, it could have been qualified to be called a social non-human being, who belongs to a communicable sociality of the human race and who co-constitutes it in a manner similar to a human but very different from that of an animal. For one, a humanoid has a face which, although very much a surface, still provides the main condition for facing the other person: a neck, a head, a mouth, and eyes; in other words, all the approximations of an actual human entity. When such a humanoid speaks, its communication creates a semblance of interpersonal contact; the very idea of a translating machine that imitates the human being and not just the ability of this being to speak but to make gestures, show moods, and express opinions. All that fantasy is predicated on the assumption that face-to-face interaction facilitates and enhances communication, makes it stronger, encouraging on-site clarifications of inevitable mistakes. Although an artificial life-form would always lack any sensual grounding, even a half-man, half-machine, in sum, a cyborg, or a learning robot may in principle develop a pattern which can be experienceable as a substitute for personality, which could make up for the lack of a biological origin.

We encounter this kind of non-human personality in fancy, in the works of science fiction, for example, as it was imagined in the character of 'Data' from the US-American TV series *Star-Trek: The Next Generation*

(1987–1994) or in the figure of C-3PO Public Relations from George Lucas' cinematic series *Star Wars* (1977–2005). Well-versed in six billion forms of communication, by 'his' own admission, the gilded robot from *Star Wars* 'trots along' attached to the world by way of his movements (directed by a human being) and, co-extensively, by his presumptive emotionality and intellect. In Lucas' fantastic world, C-3PO can experience fear, anxiety, and affection and show these emotions during interpreting. Similarly to a human being, the robot interpreter stumbles, searching for words, responds with delay, offers personal commentaries, in sum, acts like a human interpreter, who does not know better. Although a hyperbolic imaginary rendition of the human interpreter, C-3PO is a species of its own and therefore represents the precise social position for its human counterpart: it is a modification of the general-service robot. In *Star Wars*, his kind is most often shown to be a part of the waiting staff. Capable of sharing an emotional atmosphere with others, capable of empathy, albeit situationally speaking, he does not only participate in the world of the face-to-face, he co-constitutes this world, thus pointing to the indispensable nature of the embodied interactive materiality for translation. Being of this world, the translator acts in the name of this world. Striving to perfect himself in the face of the human, the ideal interpreter exposes an unbreakable link between translation and biography, for he has a proper name and a history. He thus presents himself as a historical subject and a human artifact at the same time.

Utopian to the core, this scenario signifies the irreconcilable difference between translating a text and translating an event that involves interpersonal communication. A machine that deals with a text and a machine that deals with a speaking person are not one and the same. One is a gadget that lies close at hand; the other is a mechanical alien, a simulated entity that moves itself and is capable of affecting others. According to Derrida, 'one would translate all of the virtual and actual content but one could not translate the event which consists into grafting several tongues onto a single body' (1985, p. 99). The presence of the human body therefore creates a limit that is unsurpassable by the ways available to textual forms of communication. It imposes a constraint both for a physical object or objects being an object itself and as a willful subject for other subjects whose own identity cannot help but invite an exchange,

as the human world requires, beginning with the exchange of names and greetings. For translation, this exchange does not amount to an exchange of words, but implies translatability of the exchange itself, unearthing a logic that transcends both individual members of a community and the shared space of communication. Only in this way translation becomes self-evident, as it rises from the depths of the social world to the surface as the face-to-face encounter. In this sense, unlike the written translator, the interpreter is never ‘invisible,’ as was claimed by Venuti (2008). At the same time, paradoxically, he or she is made to be invisible *in prasentia* like the practice itself.

I would like to conclude this introduction with a short exposé designed as both a summary of the previously discussed topics and an orientation to the presentation of the subsequent material; it is also intended to provisionally define consecutive interpreting as a phenomenon of face, materiality, and visibility.

## Translation as Experience: A Preliminary Definition of Consecutive Interpreting

To experience consecutive interpreting in the face-to-face mode does not only to question the primacy of written translation; paradoxically, it also means to challenge the very medium (orality) as the basic condition for consecutive interpreting. To accept face-to-face as the key condition for consecutive interpreting means to establish interaction as its main form of appearance. It also means to approach translation as an equal to the original. In the situation of face-to-face, the role of the original is the same as the role of the translation. Whether it comes out as a single utterance or an extended discourse, it is always a response to something that has come before. This historical topography underscores the notion of responsivity; it also identifies the main types of cultural interactants in an interpreting event: the ones with a language, as it were, and the ones without it, including also some liminal types associated with translation, such as community mediators and facilitators, dictionaries, and glossaries. In this topography, the interpreter stands in a paradoxical position: on the one hand, he or she is a meta-commentator on the interpreted event; on the

other hand, he or she is a subservient figure who is obliged to repeat all that was previously spoken and to do so in good faith. From this perspective, interpreting is like giving a testimony, where testifying is about an account of the encounter with the radical other. The exact parameters of this encounter are not immediately clear; suffice it to say that the activity involves utilizing one's knowledge of two or more languages toward overcoming linguistic differences that stand in the way of communicating contextually motivated meaning.

From this preliminary definition we take that consecutive interpreting is simultaneously an activity of communication and a communication event. One encounters this event in both informal and institutional settings. In an informal multilingual environment, we often see a person who mediates between different language speakers by way of repeating what was said or meant in a language inaccessible to others. This kind of communication aid can be seen in the offices of various social services, for example, immigration, criminal, medical, as well as private institutions: banks and airports. Sometimes, as is often the case with new immigrants, interpreting becomes a family affair, where some members of the younger generation would help their less fluent older relatives to communicate their needs, problems, and concerns in a foreign language in an unfamiliar environment in the discourse that might be entirely unfamiliar to them. At the same time, one would have to hesitate to identify community interpreting with interpreting proper as it is given mostly as paraphrase, summarily, with the given content filtered by the interpreter and, if necessary, and with full agreement from the parties, censored by way of omissions and/or compressions.

As we have seen from the 'state visit' example described earlier, in the institutional setting, interpreting appears as more of a service than a co-activity, as it pursues the needs of an institution rather than those of an individual. By limiting communication to specific matters and by adhering to specific rules of interaction, institutional interpreting tends to define itself in terms of a particular discourse. This definition becomes the benchmark for the natural attitude that separates legal interpreting from medical interpreting, for example, while presenting both as visibly different from military interpreting. The degree of institutional specificity is sufficient so as to require focused training for those who select

interpreting as a profession. Importantly, professional requirements that separate community interpreters from professional translators are based not just on the difference in translation skills and strategies but on the difference in the manner of participation in respective communication events. Still, institutional specificity alone is not sufficient to override the difference simply on the basis of individual components, attributes, functions, and, most drastically, the limitations which come about to characterize the two events; initially, we recognize them as one in a version of another.

As a practice, interpreting emerges in the encounter between two or more worlds separated by a distance of difference as in different histories, cultures, and languages. The extent or depth of the difference is never given upfront: we cannot claim to be outside of our common human history. We travel to foreign countries, we live there, we learn about other cultures and their histories; we learn foreign languages; some of us do it for kicks, while others find that learning a foreign language well is a must if he or she is to succeed professionally in a foreign environment. There is little doubt that the foreign presence and the interpreter's attempt to mediate it 'constructs cultures, whether at home or far away from it' (Bassnett and Lefevere 1996, p. 112). Yet, those of us who go all the way to bridge the gap between our own and foreign worlds by immersing ourselves inside a foreign world should not expect to ever become the natives themselves. Even the 'look-alikes' are recognized as the other. At best, they adopt a mimetic identity which emulates native ways by enacting the minute details of their 'passage,' but the passage fails all the same when it comes to emotion- and attitude-based ways of perceiving the world. Our own cultures, histories, and languages weigh too heavily upon us; they consistently call upon us, holding us back from experiencing other worlds as our own. When this experience holds us back in deficiency, we turn to translation, hoping to recover a foreign dimension through a mediator, a cultural expert of sorts. Undoubtedly, the interpreter's mediating touch brings us closer to understanding the other. When translated, printed matters cannot help but offer an opening into a world other than our own. This opening, still too distant in the printed matter, becomes almost invisible when we actually stand face-to-face with the stranger. It is then that we go to speak with the foreign or invite the foreign to speak with us. In order to ensure maximum understanding, we bring an

interpreter, who transforms strange and incomprehensible speech into familiar speech. Although we never rely on the interpreter completely, we trust his or her voice as long as it is strong and steady, as long as it makes sense. The interpreter empowers us with knowledge that we long for to be able to say, ‘Yes, finally, we understand them.’

For all these reasons, interpreting should attract scholarly attention precisely as a phenomenon in its own right. However, it was not until almost two decades ago that this imperative led to the emergence of an independent discipline of interpreting studies. It came into its own by branching out from translation studies, the mother discipline which itself became recognized only in the early 1970s. Creation of interpreting studies implied that the unique status of interpreting in relation to other types of translation was recognized. However, in comparison to written translation, which has the privilege of having been highly theorized, oral types of interpreting so far have yielded mostly practice-oriented research. In addition, it will not be an exaggeration to say that before it turned into a discipline of its own, the study of interpreting was carried out on the margins of translation studies.<sup>15</sup> And so, it made few theories of its own, borrowing instead from the theoretical coffers of translation studies, incapable of or disinterested in generating its own set of foundational tenets, a pre-requisite for a proper *partum*. The manner in which consecutive interpreting finally acquired this status, whether by following globalization trends, or by benefiting from new methodologies in the human sciences, or by reaching the breaking point in the research corpus, is not as important as its ability to evolve independently by creating its own paradigms. This book therefore aspires to question current perspectives on consecutive interpreting in order to institute a communication-based and phenomenologically oriented paradigm that would be suitable for the phenomenon under examination. This task determines the basic composition of this book.

## Book Composition

In addition to this chapter, the book has five main chapters and a Postscript. Thus, Chap. 2 explores the two key resources that made significant contributions to the emergence of consecutive interpreting from

the mother discipline of translation studies. Specifically, I argue that phenomenologist Edmund Husserl and linguist Ferdinand de Saussure laid the foundational ground for approaching translation as a matter of experience. Although neither scholar developed a theory of translation per se, both inspired linguist Roman Jakobson and phenomenologist Jacques Derrida, who continued the work of Husserl and Saussure by singling out and examining the theme of translation as a theme that could straddle both approaches. While Jakobson, inspired by phenomenology, developed the first communication-based theory of translation, Derrida, by way of his critique of Jakobson's structuralism, deconstructed it to let in the productive materiality of voice. The latter provided a transition to the understanding of consecutive interpreting as a phenomenon in its own right, a proper subject for phenomenology and an interdisciplinary link to communication studies and their methods.

Chapter 3 presents an interdisciplinary methodology which is custom-designed for the study of consecutive interpreting. The need for a specific methodology rises from the mixed perspective on the phenomenon that involves two dimensions: phenomenological and empirical. In this chapter, I introduce three main analytical concepts and types of phenomenological analysis: static, genetic, and generative. I subsequently connect them to respective communication methods that are based on the analysis of the naturally occurring data (ethnomethodology and conversation analysis) and such artifacts as film. The direction of the analysis is progressive; it evolves from essential structures of consecutive interpreting to its symbolic meaning. Each account produces a specific sense of the phenomenon which accords with the applied analytical register.<sup>16</sup> The analytical procedure for the deployment of analytical registers is step-wise. It moves from the simplest and most concrete to the most complicated and abstract. A special attention in this chapter is paid to the relationship between general phenomenological conceptualizations and specific empirical research.

Chapter 4 introduces the phenomenon of consecutive interpreting as it is given to the natural attitude in its social scientific manifestation. A review of a small corpus of literature on oral translation/bilingual interpreting previews the static analysis of basic conversational structures as the first order of phenomenological analysis. The purpose of the review

is to expose the perspective of the discipline of interpreting studies on itself. With the help of static analysis the phenomenon of oral translation is detached from the immediate environment of its production for the microanalysis of basic conversational structures which condition consecutive interpreting as a form of interpreting. For the analytical (empirical) background of this analysis I use conversation analysis. I consider conversation analysis as an off-phenomenological method; it is therefore consistent with the overall methodological framework. At the end of the static analysis, I arrive at a refined definition of interpreting as ‘translation-in-talk.’

Chapter 5 proceeds to the next stage of this investigation: genetic analysis. The same method of conversation analysis is applied to an actual sample of interpreting. The sample consists of a 40-minute recording of a semiformal talk between a group of Russian police officers from the Russian Far East and their US counterparts from the West coast. The chapter clarifies some additional points of ethnomethodological and conversation analytic methodology, with a special emphasis given to the role of context in ‘doing’ translation. The main objective of this chapter is identifying local genesis of consecutive interpreting as a phenomenon which is collaboratively constructed by all the participants in the interaction that features a strong interpersonal component. By managing to negotiate their differences (and not only linguistic ones) in a successful interpreting event, the participants ‘create’ an interaction phenomenon, constituting its appearance as consecutive interpreting unfolding in time.

Chapter 6 explores consecutive interpreting at the symbolic level, using generative analysis and a conceptual basis from xenology, which is the newest strand of Husserl’s phenomenology and semiotic phenomenology. By using the ‘home/alien’ distinction, in this chapter, I allow a view of translation as a participant in world-making. For example, I use Sofia Coppola’s 2003 film *Lost in Translation*. In the analysis of the film, I rely on Gilles Deleuze’s writings about cinema that add to the xenological vocabulary the concept of simulacrum, which is particularly useful for the study of translation’s transformative effects. Different simulacra are visible throughout the entire film as being attached to the structure of the ‘encounter with the alien.’ At the end of the chapter, I invite Emmanuel Levinas to emphasize the ethical dimension of consecutive interpreting.



With him, the face-to-face relation with the alien is exposed as grounded in the ethics of responsibility, or the ‘face.’ Coppola’s film continues to provide me with examples for this section as well.

I end the book with a Postscript designed to feature a short summary of the findings from the study, emphasizing uniqueness and independence of consecutive interpreting in comparison to other types of translation. In addition, the Postscript focuses on the empirical phenomenological methodology used for this study. The importance of the empirical/conceptual interface shows many a contribution by phenomenology directly to the humanities. Only by making the relationship between phenomenology and empirical methods explicit and clear can we study social phenomena like consecutive interpreting as phenomena in themselves. I also find it necessary to note that this approach introduces a new opening when it comes to teaching consecutive interpreting. In order to underscore this point, at the very end, I offer a brief outline of a prospective interdisciplinary study that uses empirical phenomenology for educational purposes.

## Notes

1. According to Gadamer, the basic task of hermeneutics is to reformulate and rename the object of its investigation in the process of investigating it. For more on hermeneutic phenomenological method, see Gadamer (2004), pp. 4–38.
2. Chapter 3 of this book is dedicated specifically to the description of the ‘comprehensive’ phenomenological method. For now it is sufficient to say that ‘comprehensive’ means that the proposed analysis deploys a progressively developing sequence that begins with the invariant features of consecutive interpreting and culminates in addressing the question of the phenomenon’s genesis.
3. For example, one may turn to Luther’s *Open Letter on Translation* (1530) that does not only emphasize the importance of translating the *New and Old Testaments* into German for the sake of the general enlightenment of the population; it insists on the need for a particular (‘vulgar’) translation of the scripture because ‘translation should be at the service of those who cannot do any better [reading Latin]’ (Luther in Weissbort and Eysteinson (eds.) 2006, p. 58).

4. I believe that the term ‘translation’ is a master term for all the members of the translation family. From this perspective, as a member of that family, ‘consecutive interpreting’ is a subcategory.’ For this reason, when speaking about the entire category, I use the term ‘translation.’ I use the term ‘consecutive interpreting’ when a specific reference to this particular phenomenon is required and/or made.
5. In the introduction to Volume I of his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl writes about the intrinsic relation between logic and technology, where technology is taken for the material arm of logic; hence, the pervasive illusion—persistent to these days—that ‘a mastery of technology means a mastery of logic itself’ (1970b, p. 14).
6. Here and elsewhere in this study, I rely on Kristeva’s work on the foreigner, *Strangers to Ourselves* (1991).
7. Kristeva’s own position was heavily influenced by Lacan, whose significance for translation deals with the notion of re-symbolization. For the specifics, see his *Écrits: A Selection* (2004, pp. 123–145).
8. In his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty makes this point succinctly when he writes: ‘We may speak several languages, but only one of them always is the one in which we live’ (1958, p. 187).
9. Yet another take on the language that is not one’s own was presented by Said, who had both English and Arabic as seemingly his absolutely first languages, but ‘in fact, neither was’ (1999, p. 4). In contrast, for Russian writer Nabokov, both English and Russian were ‘his own’ languages. He claimed that he could comfortably live in both (2003, p. 17).
10. According to Derrida: ‘In the broad sense, the language in which the foreigner is addressed or in which he is heard, if he is, is the ensemble of culture, it is the values, the norms, the meanings that inhabit the language. Speaking the same language is not only a linguistic operation. It is a matter of ethos in general’ (2000, p. 133).
11. See Schutz (1967, 1970).
12. In his elaborations on translation, Eco relies much on his own experience of having his works being translated into many languages, some of which, as is the case with Russian and Chinese, are completely unfamiliar to the author and must be personally negotiated between himself and his translators.
13. See Benjamin (1978, pp. 314–332).
14. CNN News (2011), <http://www.cnn.com>, date accessed: 12 May 2014.
15. I use the word ‘marginalization’ without critical connotations. In the context of my argument, marginalization means an effect of the kernel theory, which defines the discipline at large and thus creates theoretical

boundaries around its sphere of influence, allowing some theories while disallowing others.

16. I use the word 'register' in the phenomenological and not linguistic sense. A register is a way of doing a phenomenological analysis: the static register follows staticity, which qualifies as a basic approach to the phenomenon. Subsequently, each register has different ends because it would orientate itself to a different point of view.

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# 2

## Consecutive Interpreting: From Language to Communication

For a phenomenological study of consecutive interpreting, it is essential that we begin by naming some key contributions that made this study possible. I suggest that the influences most directly responsible for the early development of the research on interpreting come from philosophical phenomenology and linguistics. While the contribution of linguistics is obvious, phenomenology is yet to show its significance in the same regard, especially when it concerns oral forms of translation.<sup>1</sup> One way to disclose this significance would be to determine the early impact on the development of the translation discipline at large, including its sub-field—interpreting studies. I suggest that two respective figures, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), should be considered as instrumental in this respect. By embarking on the same project—uncovering the concealed logic of meaning production—they revolutionized the modern view of language and society. Two texts are considered to be foundational here: *The Course in General Linguistics*, which is the only published work that survived Saussure’s sudden death in 1913, and the two volumes of *Logical Investigations* published in 1900/1901 considered to be the first major work by Husserl.

There is no direct evidence indicating that the two scholars either knew each other or read each other’s works, although the time frame as

well as some points of connection between the two figures, for example, the University of Leipzig, where both scholars taught at some point (first Saussure and later Husserl), makes it plausible that Saussure could have been familiar with Husserl's much debated, at the time, monograph on logic. This connection is not as important as the congeniality of thinking about language and society and the approach to language that both scholars chose to undertake. In this chapter I would like to outline the main concepts and tenets of each text and then show their impact on the study of translation in general and consecutive interpreting in particular. The work in this chapter is mostly historical and exegetic. Its key objective is to expose the roots of theorizing translation as they emerge from two very different sources to form an interdisciplinary relationship. In addition, this chapter functions as the basis for the following chapter that deals, besides a general introduction into phenomenology, with the empirical interface constructed from communication methods (ethnomethodology and conversation analysis). At the same, it should not be considered simply a supportive chapter; its own value lies in exploring the genesis of an overarching theory of translation and its subsequent problematization via interpreting.

*Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen)* is considered to be the first important work by Husserl.<sup>2</sup> It consists of two volumes or, following the original design, two parts: the introductory prolegomena and the actual six investigations. Originally, the first volume titled *Prolegomena to Pure Logic* appeared separately on account of its emphasis. Conceived as an epistemological critique of formal knowledge, the first volume suggested an alternative epistemology that took experience as a guide to knowledge because of it being 'capable of showing itself in all its exactitude, inward evidence, and law-like generalizations' (Husserl 1970a, p. 119). The second volume, *Investigations in Phenomenology and the Theory of Knowledge*, contained the actual investigations of logic as we know them today. These studies were numbered, sequentially organized, and addressed various 'logic' themes: meaning, abstraction, the relationship between parts and wholes, category, species, and others. Husserl's main accomplishment in that treatise, as far as this study is concerned, was the recognition that there were many logics and that the logics of natural sciences should not be considered foundational for the understanding of the world. Instead,

by focusing on the primary acts of consciousness, including signitive acts, and the process of meaning-fulfillment, Husserl came up with the makings of phenomenology as a rigorous science and a meta-method that could be used for the study of all scientific methods and their 'proper' subjects. This brings Husserl in a productive proximity to Saussure, who also conceived of his own science of language as a meta-method independent from any pre-set ontology.

In comparison to the two volumes of *Logical Investigations*, which were carefully revised by the author himself several times, *The Course in General Linguistics* was produced from the memories and classroom notes of those of Saussure's students (L. Caille, L. Gautier, A. Sechehaye, and F. Joseph) who helped assemble his lecture materials for publication. In doing so, they followed the principles of thematic connectivity and logical consistency. Although Saussure's own handwritten lecture notes existed, they were deemed unusable as he used to lecture from rough outlines and conduct his presentations in broad strokes, deviating from any prewritten presentational format, even when quoting, with extensive examples on almost all essential issues of linguistics, his favorite being phonology, which also happened to be his academic specialty. *The Course in General Linguistics* consists of five parts and one appendix. An additional part, 'Linguistics of Speaking,' was planned and even announced by Saussure to his students as the next new course, but his death interrupted its realization. As an artificially assembled text, *The Course* reads unevenly and can be perceived as non-definitive; however, upon focusing on certain essential—from the Saussurean perspective—concepts (e.g., syntagmatic vs. associative relations), one would be sufficiently equipped for the task of identifying the primary direction of Saussure's thinking, but also be able to understand his fundamental contribution to structuralism and post-structuralism.<sup>3</sup>

This direction stemmed from the previously researched and published material on Proto-Indo-European vocalism. The 'Appendix' that precedes 'Part I' recapitulates this work to illustrate the main principles of phonology, especially such notions as 'auditory impression' and 'spoken chain.' However, the edifice of the new linguistics was built by other sections: 'The Introduction' as well as the sections that deal with general, synchronic, diachronic, geographic, retrospective, and historical linguistics;

each section is supplanted with an individual method and a logic of its own. The conceptual groundwork that unites these different logics has not only established linguistics as a self-sufficient discipline since the beginning of the twentieth century, but also introduced the new science of semiology, which is grounded in the spoken or voiced language: ‘Semiology begins with tracking down, from the historical perspective, those phonological changes that occur on the plane of speaking but affect the constitution of language’ (Saussure 1959, p. 18). His emphasis on the constitutive role of speech for the living language makes it clear that for Saussure speech was a social experience from the beginning, which is congenial with Husserl’s position in the later years of his work. I take this congeniality as a confirmation of the direction for this study.

A disciple of Franz Brentano (1838–1917), who is considered to be the founder of act-psychology, Husserl outlines his own project as an attempt to clear the traditional syllogistic logic from extraneous components, thus reducing the number of logical operations in accordance with the existential requirement, as was promoted by Brentano. Although Husserl kept psychology as the formal starting point for his inquiry, he insisted that the relationship between psychology and logic had to be reconsidered because the laws of formal logic were ill suited to account for some significant deviations from their premises as a result of ‘empirical, psychological laws’ (1970a, p. 83). This reconsideration led Husserl to suggest a new foundation for logic in the theory of knowledge, that is, a theory that would explain ‘the possibility of a science as such’ (1970a, p. 21). The strongest point in his critique of psychologism centers on the relation between the real and the ideal. Husserl denied that this relation could be reduced to mental operations, arguing instead that the real and the ideal are straddled by ‘live phenomena.’ He further argued that the recovery of the phenomenal essence necessarily implies the distinction between the ideal content and the real content of the mental act that allows for ‘inner evidence’ or truth to appear. Accepting the indubitability of this appearance means to extend it to judgment that fixes, as it were, the inner truth, preparing to present it in a material form, as expression. The pertinence of this point for consecutive interpreting will become clear in the subsequent analysis.



Similarly to Husserl, Saussure opened his lecture course with a critique. He also proclaimed the existence of a crisis, albeit a local one, at the site of linguistics. Specifically, he claimed that the pre-modern linguistics had to be considered as relativist because it focused almost entirely on the study of separate languages in isolation, in an atomistic fashion, as a grammar without as much as comparing the structures common to all languages or families of languages. For the sake of his argument Saussure dates the appearance of modern linguistics back to the middle of the nineteenth century, to the work on Romance languages by Friedrich Diez (1794–1876), while he sees the main impetus for general linguistics in some contemporaneous Germanic scholars and especially American linguist William Whitney (1827–1894). According to Saussure, both scholars broke the ground in thinking of language as ‘a product of the collective mind of linguistic groups’ rather than ‘an organism that develops independently from human intervention’ (1959, p. 5). This juxtaposition is crucial for seeing how Saussure revolutionized linguistics: he did not only introduce the social dimension as one among many dimensions of any language, he also endowed it with indubitable primacy. Since for Saussure language was a social fact, he suggested that it had to be studied with the help of social psychology, the emerging discipline in the humanities of his times. In due time, his insights would directly contribute to the appearance of sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, semiotics, and, in this reading, translation studies.

The greatest significance of *Logical Investigations* and *The Course* in relation to each other, however, goes far beyond the attempts of the two scholars to reinvent their respective disciplines: philosophy and linguistics. It is rather their methods, key operational concepts (language, expression, sign), and the social consequences of their respective systematics that allow us to consider the two scholarships as complementary to each other. Moreover, they can be viewed as the two planes of an analytic interface, where the logic of experience acquires an empirical dimension, thus connecting phenomenological method to empirical research. I would like to briefly explain and compare some of this systematics. The purpose of the comparison is to establish a productive inter-relation between the two ways of ‘thinking a method’ in terms of each other and

in terms of their relevance for both translation studies as an emergent discipline and the place of consecutive interpreting within that discipline.

One of the most distinct discoveries in that respect was made by Saussure who stratified the linguistic field into subdivisions: *parole*, *langue*, and *langage*. Commonly, we take *parole* for speaking, *langue* for the system of rules, and *langage* for the totality of its use. However, a close reading of Saussure's text shows inconsistencies and contradictions about these distinctions. Among the three components, the most ambiguous item is language (*langue*). Upon Saussure's insistence, *langue* should not be confused with human speech (*parole*), of which it is only a definitive part: 'Speech [*parole*] implies both an established system and an evolution' (1959, p. 8); hence, the study of speech can be done synchronically and/or diachronically, or as the current changes and their effects on language as a system of rules and the actual system described comprehensively and comparatively. In comparison to speech, language (*langue*) was conceptualized as the social product of the faculty of speech and a collection of conventions that has been adopted by a social body in order to allow the individual to make use of this faculty.

It is impossible to discover the unity of language (*langue*), as it exists only as a mass of social facts, which relate each to each other arbitrarily and therefore should be singled out through a method that could reduce them to a 'would-be' unity suitable for linguistic analysis. Thus, Saussure refuses to study and even accept as operational the concept of 'natural' language and focuses instead on the evolutionary aspects of language (*langage*) as a system: 'What is natural to mankind is not a faculty of speech but the faculty of constructing a language that is a system of distinct signs that correspond to distinct ideas' (1959, p. 10). It is precisely the latter emphasis that spawns sociolinguistics and semiotics; it also contributes to the understanding of translation as a cultural affair that can be described in broadly systemic terms, rather than by the restrictive means of formal grammar. The system can be as extensive as an entire linguistic community. According to Saussure, 'the culture of a nation exerts influence on language, and the language, on the other hand, is largely responsible for the nation' (*ibid.*, p. 20). As to the position of orality or speech, we need to distinguish, as Saussure did earlier, between speech and speaking, where the former would be an ideal container for the materiality of the latter.

In comparison, Husserl is more traditional in his use of language, although one does find numerous deviations from and many refinements to a properly linguistic focus. For example, in the introductory part to *Logical Investigations*, Husserl clarifies that he takes language first and foremost as a formal instrument of attaining meaning: “The necessity of beginning an investigation of logic with linguistic analysis [...] deals with the meaning of “propositions,” a matter which stands “at the threshold” of the logical science itself” (1970a, p. 165). Husserl further calls linguistic discussions of propositions indispensable for the philosophical inquiry into pure experience because only language can supply a general system of formal laws that function both as a *modus operandi* and a unit (proposition) chosen for the analysis by that system. As a built-in property of language, an interpretative scheme is based on the ideal character of propositional logic. The role of speech here is to act upon this ideality by grounding it in the context of appearance, that is, ‘live interaction’: “The complete meaning of the spoken sentence does not, accordingly, lie in what its mere word and sound suggest, but is determined by the occasion, the relation to the person speaking at the moment” (Husserl 1970b, p. 327). Husserl’s understanding of language as a normative consciousness on the one hand and speech as a context-bound individual consciousness on the other, which is a close deviation from a norm, is reminiscent of Saussure’s assertion that ‘language should be taken as the norm for all manifestations of speech’ (1959, p. 9). However, for Saussure, speech (speaking) has its own structure and its own logic that do not necessarily correspond to those of language (*langue*). This is indeed a crucial point for this study: it makes the addition of an empirical component possible and needful.

In comparison, for Husserl, speech has relevance only when it connects proposition to expression, in other words, brings a concept to its fulfillment. He examines this very relationship in ‘The Third Logical Investigation’ by focusing on expression as it is related to psychological acts, with an emphasis on such concepts as color, extension, quality, and intensity of sound (Husserl calls them ‘moments’). The key significance of this ‘Investigation’ lies in the attempt at fixing a so-called formal ontology that focuses on the relationship between parts and wholes. Thus, Husserl suggests that expression can be understood qua its parts but would always connote the whole meaning separately from the meaning which can be

traced via the combination of these parts. The importance of this investigation for translation does deal not only with specific attempts at clarifying the parts-wholes relations in terms of the rules of their combinatorics but also with their a priori status that would be the same in all empirically apparent situations: 'all the laws or necessities that govern all sorts of non-independent items fall into the spheres of the synthetic *a priori*: one recognizes them as they are separated from merely formal countless items' (1970b, p. 19). The distinction between independent and non-independent items or parts is enriched by the distinction between 'mediate' and 'immediate' parts and wholes as well as 'nearer and more remote' parts of a particular whole. The discussion about parts and wholes, with a clear emphasis on the separate status of the whole, implies both speaking, as what needs to be understood as a whole, and translatability, as the possibility of turning one whole into another.

Importantly, for the discussion of translatability and the limits thereof, Husserl concludes 'The Third Logical Investigation' by claiming that not all parts can be wholes and that there exists a category of parts that require a foundation in order to be perceived as a whole, for example, a prefix. These parts are founded on their respective wholes in the same manner color is founded on the object it represents as color-full. The phenomenological principle of foundation contributes to a theory of interpreting by presuming the sequential constitution and organization of meaning without, however, denying the existence of a unifying foundation, which, in the case of Husserl, implies a transcendental portal which grants access to all of the variants together inside a clearly defined paradigm. Once there is a change, a system incorporates it by instigating a passable—for the purposes of the system's functionality—replacement. Incidentally, this emphasis became particularly important for the structuralist approach to translation theory.<sup>4</sup>

Thus, Saussure understands logic not in the traditional formal terms such as A+, which stands in apposition to A, for example, but already and from the beginning in terms of the linguistic idea of a 'grammar.' From this position, his semiology promises to improve the formal aspects of logic by introducing a comparative and a diachronic element in the study of language. The task of semiology in this respect would be to track down, from the historical perspective, those phonological changes that occur at

the site of speaking but affect the entire constitution of language. They would not affect the sign system, however, for 'there is nothing phonetic in the phenomenon' (Saussure 1959, p. 18). Only the outer comparison is able to demonstrate the relation of one language to another within a language family. As is the case with all the Indo-European languages, there is always a common root that points to a type of originality that expresses itself in a stable unit that serves as a radical paradigm. This unit is called a 'prototype' (Saussure 1959, p. 3). The significance of the prototypical language for translation is obvious: it allows for comparison in general and therefore translation, albeit also in general. In addition, prototype is closely related to exemplar, which is the most stable expression of experience, according to Husserl. At the same time, 'Comparison is required for any kind of historical reconstruction, but by itself it cannot be conclusive' (Saussure 1959, p. 4). With 'no basis in reality,' the historical comparative method makes language appear only in abstraction, ignoring the 'facts of language,' or the actuality of language use. According to Saussure, we should speak of prototype and comparison only when these facts are approached 'in their natural order [...] as the product of the collective mind of linguistic groups' (ibid., p. 5). In other words, it is not a system of language rules but a universe of communication that endows a linguistic group with a collective logic.

Only language as a formal system can be the source of pure logical grammar, argues Husserl. This grammar is based on the a priori laws 'that must more or less clearly exhibit themselves in the theory of grammatical forms and in a corresponding class of grammatical incompatibilities in any developed language' (Husserl 1970a, pp. 327–328). The a priori laws let meaningfulness transpire by connecting dependent constituent elements into an independent whole: 'to experience outer events means to *have* certain acts of perception, of this or that type of knowledge, directed upon them' (Husserl 1970b, p. 85). Once selected parts are integrated into a whole according to a correct use of linguistic rules, a sentence can be considered meaningful. For example, the words 'the,' 'on,' 'cat,' 'tree,' 'is,' and 'the' in the English language would mean nothing in a random series unless they are combined in a particular sequential order, for example, 'the cat is on the tree.' This thinking makes Husserl take 'sentence' or 'proposition' to be the basic meaningful form of a higher

categorical unity. Husserl calls this basic form syntagma, or 'a self-sufficient predicational whole' (1970a, p. 298). The a priori laws that govern the production of meaning are, therefore, the laws of syntagmatic combination.

Saussure also contends that language is founded on certain a priori structures, which let us perceive some sounds as meaningful, while others would be ignored as devoid of meaning. These structures are of two kinds: (a) 'the ones that are given *in praesentia*; they are supported by a series, and (b) the other ones that form associative relations *in absentia*; they are not supported by a mnemonic series or any other kind of pre-set series' (Saussure 1959, pp. 123–124). They are discrete and for that reason can form associative relations across different series or paradigms. Importantly, associative relations are also known as paradigmatic relations. They are therefore akin to Husserl's 'categorical intuition' in that they presuppose a close unity of similar forms, although the definition of similarity for the two scholars varies significantly. Both however speak of likeness and, as a binding medium, likeness should be sufficient for us to understand the two notions to be closely related to each other, that is, pointing to an identity, being identifiable as such. This kind of identity is preserved in the character of familiarity by way of repetition, for example, repetition of an idiomatic expression. An understanding of these expressions goes beyond their composition, or individual elements. Rather, they are perceived as fixed entities. As Husserl puts it, we grasp the meaning of these unfamiliar 'before mother-tongue translations' (1970a, p. 213). Saussure seems to share this view: 'From the associative and syntagmatic viewpoint, unit is like a fixed part of a building' (1959, p. 124). In order to understand the function of a unit in linguistic analysis, one needs to begin with the smallest unit of the kind. For both Saussure and Husserl, this unit is 'sign.' The significance of sign is obvious: it is not only what points to something beyond its own appearance; it also has a stable appearance, but arbitrary origin, indicating a specific structure and a particular context of use.

For Saussure, the sign is a relationship between the signified and the signifier, or between 'a concept and a sound-image' (1959, p. 66). Roughly speaking, the signified is the meaning-content while the signifier is the meaning-form. The relationship between the two terms is arbitrary:

there is no immediate connection between the composition of the word 'c-a-t' and its idea. Clearly, they are not one and the same. Yet, the sign as a single entity is quite concrete. Saussure states that the psychological character of the sound-image makes the spoken word secondary to the concept it seeks to evoke. In his example, a person may speak to himself/herself without uttering a single word. The primacy of the signified is further reinforced by entrusting the conceptual pole with the stability that the signifier does not possess due to it being constantly combined and recombined. For example, a slight change in the pronunciation of the word 'cat' as 'kaat' can render the combination of the sounds meaningless, while the concept 'cat' is always meaningful in itself. Clearly, for Saussure, it is only through the signified that the signifier exists. One can also say that, in this model, the signifier is founded on the signified; hence, the paradox of signification, where an appearance stands for the respective content but in a deviant manner.

This paradox consists in the simultaneous determination of the relation between 'concept' and 'sound-image' and the effects of other concepts within a short semiotic sign string or within the entire language as a sign system or even within the structure of another language, as translation requires it. To that effect, Saussure provides the following example: 'The concept "to judge" is linked in French to the sound-image "juger": in short, it symbolizes signification' (1959, p. 117). The orientation here is provided by value, the changeable aspect of any language (*langue*), making the intersemiotic exchange and communication between different sign systems (languages) possible. Values come into play in any kind of exchange: for example, where exchanged things are never the same but can be exchanged if their values are determined as the same. In addition, values allow similar things to be compared, excluding from comparison those things whose value remains undetermined. A word can be exchanged for an idea (as would money for bread) and/or for another word (as in the case of money being exchanged for a service). Thus, the English word 'sheep' may not have the same value as the French word 'mouton,' especially in the fashion context. In general, synonyms have value only in opposition to each other. For example, the French plural does not coincide with the Sanskrit plural because the latter can use plural in the singular. The same is true when it comes to the predicative

use of aspect in the Slavic languages. “The value of any terms is determined by its environment; it is impossible to define the value of even the term “sun” without considering its environment. In some languages it is impossible to say, “sit in the sun” (Saussure 1959, p. 116). In sum, the meaning (signification) of the word does not exist without the surrounding context, which gives the whole of the proposition a value.

For his definition of the sign, Husserl employs the structure of intentionality: ‘every sign is a sign of something [...] but not every sign has a meaning, a sense that a sign expresses’ (1970a, p. 23). The intentional structure is formed by indicative and expressive signs. These signs are predicated on two corresponding acts. The indicative act points to something that exists outside of itself. This absent something becomes meaningful when it is intended by consciousness. The indicating act and the indicated content are separate. The separation allows the indicating sign to be devoid of meaning-content drawn from the objective world. In Saussure’s terms, it is a signified without a signifier. In Husserl’s terms, the indicating sign is a species of inference.<sup>5</sup> In order for the paradigm to become concretized in the fulfilled meaning, it must be supplanted by expression. Unlike the indicating intention, the expressive intention is intuitive; it always has a meaning-content. However, although founded on indication, expression is not directly linked to it. In itself, expression does not express acts or objects. It is the signitive act that constitutes meaning in an expression. Its fulfillment is what animates expression with a particular meaning-intention drawn from the operation of indication. This engagement, between indication and expression, allows the sign to achieve its full presence to become the sign for something. When I say ‘fish,’ I do not need to point to the actual animal to be understood. A fish is a fish, whether it is an artificial or actual creation. All languages follow this principle.

Despite a radical difference in their approaches to language, both Saussure and Husserl show remarkable similarity in their respective treatment of the sign. First, both scholars find it necessary to bifurcate it. Although, for Husserl, the production of the sign is tied to the act of individual consciousness, which is already connected to other monads (individuals) as well as the world, for Saussure, the sign is produced by linking the concept and the sound-image directly. Another similarity lies



in the undetermined origin of the sign: both Husserl and Saussure consider the relationship between the signifier and the signified and between indication and expression as arbitrary. The separation of expression from the expressed and the sound-concept from the sound-image idealizes the sign. By placing the signified prior to the signifier and indication prior to expression, both Saussure and Husserl grant precedence to the implicit conceptual pole over the explicit expressive pole. This becomes possible because of the following two assumptions. First, Saussure and Husserl conceive of the signifying concept as a stable (Saussure) and originally (Husserl) embodied whole. The expression, on the other hand, is always a combination of its parts. Second, the relationship between the signifier and the signified is determined as regressive, that is, as developing in the direction from the signifier to the signified. This makes the signifier simply a delivery vehicle for some conceptual meaning. As a result, speaking—the executive side of language—becomes founded on language as a system of meaning-forms.<sup>6</sup>

From the phenomenological perspective, Saussure's approach to the social aspects of language cannot be called fully intersubjective. Although he approaches sociality as a community of speakers, Saussure, consistently with his formalization of language in the synchronic aspect, chooses to understand interaction as a turn-by-turn exchange largely because he locates the accomplishment of meaning in the mental sphere. From this perspective, interaction is not a self-sufficient phenomenon but a tool to assist the 'speaking-circuit' (Saussure 1959, p. 11). When the speaking circuit is engaged, the brain of the first interlocutor creates mental facts associated with the representations of the linguistic sounds. After mental facts come to expression, they 'unlock' a corresponding 'sound-image' in the brain of the other interlocutor. When set in an interaction mode, Saussure's speaking circuit is but a verbalized exchange of mental objects. This view of interaction is unacceptable to Husserl because of its presumption that in order for an individual consciousness to operate with mental objects, it must be separated from the social world. Yet, at the time of *Logical Investigations*, it is still individual consciousness that matters most for Husserl, something that would, in turn, be unacceptable for Saussure.

By using language as a source for the a priori laws of meaning production whether in language itself or in formal logic, both Saussure's *Course*

and Husserl's *Investigations* created the conditions for understanding speech (speaking) as separate from language, strongly suggesting that its meaning is constitutive in and by a social environment. The complementarity of Saussurean linguistics and Husserlian phenomenology does not occur on the grounds of either approach but takes social experience as a shared foundation that could be used for tracing the emergence of various social phenomena, including the phenomenon of interpreting. By arriving at this foundation from two distinctly different sides, Saussure and Husserl provide for the possibility of a synthetic semiotic phenomenological method, an ideal *instrumentarium* for the study of all kinds of translation. Russian linguist Roman Jakobson designed such a method from the linguistic side.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, he applied it to his theory of translation. In the next section, I present the manner in which he synthesized phenomenology and linguistics for this theory. Our understanding of how he carried out this synthesis will help explain both the method's privileging the study of written translation and the possibility of its alternative interpretation in relation to consecutive interpreting.

## The Phenomenological Structuralism of Roman Jakobson

In developing his theory and method, Jakobson amended Saussure's semiotic linguistics in a variety of ways. First, he no longer conceived of the sign as a product of a single relationship between the signifier and the signified. Instead, with Charles Sanders Peirce, Jakobson recognized the possibility that far more intricate relationships could govern the process of meaning production. As a result, he came to define the sign as a product of the difference between the series of related signifiers and signifieds. According to Jakobson, 'Peirce casts light upon the ability of every sign to be translatable into an infinite series of other signs which, in some regards, are always mutually equivalent' (1987, p. 443). The multiplicity of inter-related signs moved Jakobson to the idea of the universe of signs organized in accordance with the universal laws of selection and combination. According to these laws, the signifier is characterized by distinctive features (opposition of sounds), while the signified is characterized

by redundancy features (exclusion of irrelevant concepts). Note the use of the term *equivalency*, which is going to be the stalwart of the 'equivalency theory' in translation. For example, when uttered, the sound-image 'cat,' which stands in close phonemic relationship to the sound-images 'kad,' 'cot,' 'cod,' and others evoked at the same time, evokes semantically related concepts such as 'purr,' 'fluffy,' 'hunts mice,' and so on. At the same time, the same sound-image typically excludes such concepts as 'revolution,' 'mumps,' and 'fire' unless they are demanded by a specific context. This means that in order for the signifier to reach its intended signified, it has to travel a long way through multiple concepts associated with each other within a certain meaning-paradigm. What then guarantees that the signifier reaches its destination, that is, becomes understood? Jakobson identifies two moments that will secure the meaning for a sign. The first moment is the intracultural/intralingual unity of experience.

The sign does not exist on its own or serves one person only. Its life is in exchange by the members of the same culture, who speak the same language. The other moment is 'the convertible code,' which, according to Jakobson, controls the production of semiotic meaning (1971, p. 574). In order for the sign to propagate itself among the users of a particular language, it must, as a minimal requirement, possess a convertible code. Jakobson's intense focus on this code directly affected his theory of communication and, by association, his theory of translation. On the one hand, he corrected Saussure's view of communication by pointing out that the latter was not just 'language in use,' or an exchange of messages, but a complex interpretative system that involves a number of conditions, from context to contact, and a variety of semiotic systems indispensable for the understanding of signs. On the other hand, in contrast to the work of the linguist, who deals with the analysis of language from either the hearer's or the speaker's point of view, Jakobson urged researchers to approach language from both perspectives simultaneously. He stated that language would become an integral part of a semiotic universe only when it could be perceived from 'within the communication system' (1971, p. 575). Most importantly, this system is not only designed for accomplishing different pragmatic tasks; it can also perform seemingly perfunctory functions, such as 'phatic.' The latter ensures a relation between the interlocutors outside of their concerted pursuit of some conversational goal.

In addition, Jakobson expanded Saussure's notion of 'language community' by recognizing that, for the linguistic perception of an object, it was not sufficient to have two individual brains and their respective speech mechanisms. What one needed for the linguistic product to become meaningful was intersubjective validation on the part of other people, who could confirm, disconfirm, and sanction a specific case of language usage. For Jakobson, the process of intersubjective constitution is a historical one, as it requires generations of subjects who endow linguistic units with meaning before, during, and after a specific communicative event. The latter point made Jakobson reject Saussure's methodological prejudice about the synchronic validity of language study. Jakobson wrote to that effect: 'An insight into the dynamic synchrony of language, involving the space-time coordinates, must add to the traditional pattern of arbitrarily restricted *static* descriptions' (1971, p. 574; *my emphasis*).

By combining the static and dynamic poles, synchrony and diachrony, Jakobson arrived at presenting language in communication as a complex network of transformations and stratifications of 'the optimal, explicit, kernel code' (1971, p. 574). He also showed a strong methodological affinity with Husserl on that point: no static analysis is capable of explaining the meaning of communication as it is always already ongoing. Finally, and in line with his previous arguments toward a holistic understanding of meaning production, Jakobson distinguished between the sign *per se* and the sign as a verbal message. In the former, broader definition, the sign is presented as an overarching concept; it is also a basic unit of any semiotic system. The sign as a concept embraces different kinds of signs, including the verbal message. Although, according to Jakobson, the verbal message is the most widespread and richest source of meaning, it is but a kind of sign that follows the same semiotic rules of selection and combination that govern all meaning production.

More pertinent to this study is that Jakobson's expansion of Saussure's semiology combined with his rejection of Saussure's psychologism provided a 'natural' transition to Husserl's phenomenology. Jakobson embraced both phenomenology and, in the case of Husserl, *Logical Investigations*. The phenomenological exposure confirmed Jakobson's supposition that linguistic givenness is the sign that emerges out of an experience interpreted according to some immanent laws. The idea of

Husserl's pure or transcendental grammar moved Jakobson to search for the most basic linguistic relationships that would hold the entire system together. For such a network of relations, Jakobson selected syntax. Elmar Holenstein explains: 'Beginning from Husserl's formal definition of syntagmatic relationships that are constitutive of a whole, Jakobson has sought to uncover universal laws underlying the constitution of language' (1977, p. 147). With Husserl, the relationship between the signifier system and the signified system acquired a degree of structural complexity. By focusing on the Husserlian concepts of 'indication' and 'indicative sign,' Jakobson expanded the Saussurean notion of the signified. The signified was no longer defined as a single concept but rather as a conceptual paradigm. This phenomenological perspective allowed Jakobson to include intersubjective experience in his model of meaning production: it is through intuited experience that the empty indication becomes filled with the socially constructed meaning. For Jakobson, experiencing a sign means to remove its signification from experience at large. The employment of the phenomenological concepts of 'intuition' and 'intentionality' made Jakobson believe that the sign and its meaning could be given simultaneously as ideal, that is, removed from the experience of its constitution. His model of communication constructed in the ideal sphere acquired the same ideal properties as the sign, or language. Subsequently, idealism and universalism of the structuralist phenomenological method became definitional for all of Jakobson's own linguistic investigations, including his theory of translation, as he expressed it in his 1959 essay 'On the Linguistic Aspects of Translation.' I elaborate on this theory in the next section. The purpose of such close attention lies in the need to approach the transition from a foundational theory of translation to the phenomenon of interpreting slowly, for, as I have mentioned, one emerges from the other.

## Roman Jakobson: Thesis of Translatability

For his theory of translation, Jakobson reworked his model of communication by applying it to several languages. Unsurprisingly, he tackled the problem of translation as a derivative of his obsessive search for the

immanent structures in language. It was through the prism of this search that the subject translation was examined, that is, as a linguistic problem, or, to be more precise, a problem of signification: ‘the meaning of all words is definitely linguistic—or to be more precise or to be more narrow—a semiotic fact’ (1987, p. 144). Therefore, concludes Jakobson, translation should rest at the heart of generating linguistic meaning as we mundanely transform some signs (e.g., textual) into others (e.g., visual). Depending on what signs are substituted by what signs and whether other languages are involved, Jakobson differentiates among (a) intralinguistic translation, or the translation as a mental transformation of the experience into language; (b) interlinguistic translation, or translation proper; and (c) intersemiotic translation, or translation of one sign system (e.g., writing) into another (e.g., film, painting). Notably, by Jakobson, interlinguistic translation is always understood as written translation. Also missing is the relation between interpreting and translation, and the mechanism of, say, interpreting orally from a written text, which does not fall under either interlinguistic or intersemiotic translation, but comprises a provisional category for the translation family.

Multiple levels of sign substitution within language create an economy of sign that makes it appear as though everything can be translated. Hence, the thesis of translatability that rests on the claim that ‘all cognitive experience and its classification are conveyable in any existing language’ (Jakobson 1987, p. 147). In other words, Jakobson conceived of the world of experience as a shareable one. However, he did not insist that all cognitive experience was meaningful, that is, expressible: ‘the grammatical pattern of language determines those aspects of each experience that must be and must not be expressed in the given language’ (ibid). For translation, this statement presents an apparent difficulty as no one language is structured or used identically to another. Jakobson chose to overcome this problem by emphasizing a tremendous flexibility of sign substitution. In other words, where one level (verbal or non-verbal, lexical or syntactic) appears to be inadequate for rendering a specific meaning, another level can be employed to compensate for the omission. One can easily see the potential of creating a theory of substitution and not only for translation but its large-scale social derivatives, such as politics and economics.

From the thesis of translatability, Jakobson moved to the problem of the practical execution of translation, or the problem of adequacy. He pointed out that the translator would never translate just signs as information bits or code units but rather as propositional statements that he calls messages: 'Translation, as a process, involves two equivalent messages in two different codes' (1987, p. 146). In turn, messages belong to the larger meaning-wholes as their purpose is to gather selected signs. At the same time, as wholes, messages are also signs. Among themselves, they compose even larger semiotic systems. However, although signification is separated from its expression on three levels (signifier-sign-message), it can be accessed directly and immediately through intuition; here I see another phenomenological contribution. By engaging signification through intuition from a sign in one language, the translator finds its equivalent in another language and thus synchronizes an exchange of signs, and although intuited matters do not correspond to the expressed ones, intuition ensures their semblance to the point of an apparent coincidence.<sup>8</sup>

The latter point acquires a particular significance when one considers how radical Jakobson's intrusion of Saussure's theory into Husserlian phenomenology was. For Saussure, all the members of a speech community share the same signs as they refer to the same concepts. However, Saussure did not perceive a community of speakers beyond one language. It is with Jakobson, who turned the intuited sign into the sign subject to substitution that this community becomes a universal community, a concept later adopted by Noam Chomsky for his theory of syntax. In turn, by equating accuracy with adequacy, Jakobson proclaimed to have created a way for overcoming linguistic difference. As a result, as soon as difference was thematized as an obstacle on the way to an accurate meaning transfer, the mechanism of this transfer became the focal point of translation research. The presumption of universal language rules and, by default, universal experience adopted from Husserl in light of Saussure, created an unquestioned assumption about accessibility of the original meaning in the sign. The living person was reduced to the user of language and his or her interaction to an exchange of complex signs that became the main focus of translation research. By default, accuracy began to define translation ethics: translation was deemed good if it was being conducted according to the prescriptions of meaning transfer.

This is how Jacques Derrida summed up Jakobson: ‘He [Jakobson] supposes that everyone is expected to know what a language is and the relation of one language to another and, especially, identity or difference in fact of language’ (1992, p. 225). This quote is the core of Derrida’s critique of Jakobson’s theory of translation. By asking ‘Who knows what language is?’, Derrida focuses precisely on the linguistic orientation of Jakobson’s phenomenological structuralism and its ontology. This focus necessarily implies a critique of Saussure as well. According to Derrida, the problem with Jakobson’s understanding of language is a problem of its idealism as it emerged from a combination of Saussurean linguistics and Husserlian essentialism. In this section, I would like to examine Derrida’s critique of Jakobson’s theory of translation closely. My purpose is twofold: to deconstruct the structuralist treatment of language and sign vis-à-vis Derrida’s thesis of untranslatability, which opens a way to understanding translation as interpreting, and to describe the phenomenological procedure that could demonstrate that thesis beyond doubt.

## Jacques Derrida: The Untranslatable in Communication

In *Speech and Phenomena*, Derrida notes that Husserl does not define sign or, to be more exact, ‘there is a lack of precise definition’ (1973, p. 45). Earlier in this chapter I have shown that Husserl’s definition, although not extensive, does exist. Whether Derrida is in agreement with it or not is a different matter. In a different text, Derrida also points out that Saussure is ambiguous about his definition of sign: ‘As for sign, if we retain it, it is only because we find nothing else to replace it, everyday language suggesting no other’ (1996, pp. 99–100). One can attempt to resolve this ambiguity by conceiving of it as a lack. One can also extend it by thematizing it as a surplus. According to Derrida, Jakobson does exactly the former as he attempts to replenish the lack of a definition by systematizing invisible relations in terms of a priori laws of language. He thus suggests that signification originates on the border of linguistic experience and comes to life through mental processes for self-representation as images or names of objects, let them be linguistic or physical.



Derrida also observes that Jakobson's interdisciplinary synthesis of two different concepts—intentional givenness and differential oppositions—makes him think of sign in both phenomenological and structural terms, a combination that is possible only if language is taken as foundational for experience.

As a linguist, Jakobson naturally limits his inquiry to language. A phenomenological extension taken through Husserl who, in his *Logical Investigations*, sees language as a gateway to experience, confirms the linguistic nature of the hidden system of meaning production. To this effect, Derrida writes: 'Husserl draws a boundary which passes not between language and the nonlinguistic but within language in general, between the explicit and nonexplicit' (1996, p. 38). The co-existence of explicit and non-explicit content within language signifies that language is not transparent. A number of conclusions could be drawn on the basis of this thesis; for Husserl it is only important to emphasize that non-explicit content produces truth or ideality rather than simply recording it. For that reason alone, Husserl assigns a functionally superior status to indication. Derrida sums up his critique of the Husserlian prejudice as follows: 'All speech inasmuch as it is engaged in communication and manifests lived experience operates as indication' (Derrida 1996, p. 38).

This means that the body and its sensuality make every expression pass through the indicative sphere. Since the other person as a whole is never accessible completely, the inner meaning cannot be 'present to itself' but outside of speech. Therefore, concludes Derrida, for Husserl, only the solitary mental life is capable of restoring expression to its purity. In order to reach it, one has to turn inward. What remains as a result of this inversion, whether it would be motivated by deep reflection or a special procedure, is indication, which becomes the sign proper, albeit an ideal one. In a similar manner, by dichotomizing the sign into two co-determinate elements supported by the idea of differential and formal characteristics of language, Saussure was led to think of a 'concept signified in and of itself' (Derrida 1996, p. 211). We therefore deal with implicit ideality here as well. By agreeing with Husserl and Saussure along these premises, Jakobson commits himself to linguistic idealism, thereby determining his methodological procedures which transpire beyond his theory of translation and well into his poetics and the related studies.

Derrida further claims that by taking speech as separate from language, Jakobson repeats the mistake of Saussure who, although starting his investigation of language with speech, considers speech devoid of meaningfulness in itself, outside of its relation to language; for him, it functions only as a medium for the signified. Husserl's focus on syntax distracts Jakobson from approaching speech as speaking even more. As a result, Jakobson's conception of speech acquires the same structural backbone as language has it. Jakobson recognizes the closed fixed nature of speech as a system and develops a theory of communication, in which multiple functions (contact, context, person, etc.) make the exchange of signs a dynamic event. However, founded on horizontal differences between sound and sound, and supported by contextual, relational, and other factors, the functions serve to 'stabilize' a particular meaning on the surface of linguistic expression. Derrida traces the need to fix the sign to its presumed equivocality:

This equivocality, which weighs upon the model of the sign, marks the semiological project itself and the organic totality of its concepts, in particular that of communication, which in effect implies a transmission charged with making pass, from one subject to another, the identity of a signified object, of a meaning or of a concept rightfully separable from the process of passage and from the signifying operation. (1996, p. 214)

Derrida counters Jakobson's concepts of sign as ideal, language as foundational, and speech as expressionless with two concepts of his own: 'voice' and '*différance*.' According to Derrida, voice hears itself; it is 'tangible and material' (1985, pp. 23–24). However, the materiality of voice is different from the actual speech evoked to meet actual circumstances. According to Derrida, speech is born in and out of a specific context. It is indeed social and material. At the same time, no context can make meaning fully present; signification comes from a distance, which can never be traced completely as we can never walk outside language. Unlike speech, voice defies a possibility for language to be taken in abstraction. Voice is, therefore, the primordial condition for meaningfulness. Similarly to language, speech is an abstraction from voice once it is endowed with structure. What allows both Saussure and Jakobson to consider speech on

its own, outside of language, is the structure of the phonemic difference. According to Derrida, Saussure considers phonemes to be essential for the voice to be heard; thus, he equates the voice that can never be heard in full with phonemic opposition. It is at this point that Derrida draws the line between the structure of phonemic opposition and his concept of *différance*. If the former can be described and classified in formal oppositional taxonomies, the latter can be only glimpsed and striven for. Its evocation is the pre-originary experience that is always already separated from its origin by its continuously changing environment.

In this model, the original meaning of sign can only be retrieved if *différance* gets fixed as signification with either vertical or horizontal signifier-signified relations that form on the surface of the primordial experience. To recognize *différance* means to recognize the absence of these relations; it also means to acknowledge the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differences, and of the spacings by means of which elements are related to each other. According to Derrida, '*différance* is the becoming-space of the spoken chain' (1996, p. 216). Its movement is neither unilateral nor bilateral. It is generative. As such, it demands a historical dimension that would be incompatible with 'the static, synchronic, taxonomic motifs in the concept of structure' (Derrida 1996, p. 217). The transition from the understanding of meaning as grounded in linguistic experience and thus attainable to the understanding of meaning as grounded in pre-originary experience and thus unattainable is the transition from the structural phenomenology to the quasi-transcendental phenomenology.

The quasi-transcendental phenomenology is a phenomenology that takes *différance* as the condition for the possibility of specific differences, for example, for the difference between speech and writing.<sup>9</sup> *Différance* is then *quasi-a priori*. It is not a priori in the same sense in which space and time are a priori in Kant, who defines time and space as the conditions for the possibility of all experience. The reduction to *différance* does not lead to the phenomenon's constitutive core. In other words, Derrida's concept is transcendental but without possessing the constitutive ability of constructing difference in itself. It is constitutive in-between, as it were, and therefore it rejects both the stability of the signified and the instability of the signifier. At the same time, *différance* that exists as

if separately from being provides a foundationless phenomenology. This quasi-transcendental phenomenological position allows Derrida to retain metaphysical terms without defining the ontological status of these structures. In order to avoid being identified with traditional metaphysics, Derrida emphasizes that, in his use, the terms *différance*, or supplementation, or dissemination, or hymen, or trace, as they are also known, oscillate. By making them tremble, Derrida claims, we can reinscribe them into a different discourse and, therefore, avoid the trap of metaphysics.

When Derrida later replaced the spoken voice with the written voice, *différance* ensured the transition. Like phonemes, grams or texts function as aspects of difference, elusive in their pre-separated multiplicity. Writing is then essentially the same as speech, except for its precedence over it as a mode of symbolic and subconscious expression of the self. As a product of voice and *différance*, the Derridian sign loses both its universality and ideality. For Derrida, 'the sign is impure ideality, a membrane between the world and subject that remains entangled in the web of worldliness while inhabiting the zone of ideality—worldliness not in its simple materiality, which is always capable of being allied to the project of presence or of being reduced, but in its essential non-self-identity, its incapacity to be teleologically defined by reference to the actual or in-principle possibility of fulfillment' (Staten 1984, p. 58).

Voice and *différance* inform Derrida's understanding of translation as quasi-impossible. Translation is impossible as it can never translate the original word because that word is uttered in the 'voice' that belongs to no particular language. It is the First Word, or the Word of God. It is also the First Sign. The First Sign is inaccessible by definition. It arises from the primordial experience that is perpetually concealed in the play of *différance*. In this interpretation of translation, Derrida finds affinity with Walter Benjamin, who defined the model of all translation as 'the intralinear translation into one's own language of the sacred text' (1992, p. 220). From this perspective, Jakobson's classification of three types of translation appears Cartesian as it clearly features a mind/world split. For example, intralingual translation is an explicitly mentalist operation. Interlingual translation is already more than a cognitive process that cannot be reduced to two mental operations, but involves separate cultures and languages which are able to communicate on the basis of some

universal experience of the world. Lastly, intersemiotic translation is a completely idealized operation that does not even involve the psychology of the participants:

When it is a question of translation ‘proper,’ the other uses of the word translation would be in a position of intralingual or inadequate translation, like metaphors, in short, like twists or turns of translation in the proper sense. But how can we speak about translation as proper or improper? The word ‘Babel’ provides an example: can we say where this name belongs ‘properly and simply’? What is this sphere of universal rules and operations that generated the first signification? If we cannot make an originary attribution, how can we translate at all? (Derrida 1992, p. 226)

Despite an obvious lack of answers to these questions, Derrida urges us to translate. Striving for translation is not simply the desire for the unknown; it is an ethical imperative. The ethics of translation as accurate meaning transfer is only possible if language provides an ideal foundation for such an operation. For Derrida, there will be a different understanding of ethics if we begin not from the pre-given order of language but from beyond languages in the order of their relation to each other. This order is concealed by *différance*. Translation resides in it. An investigation of linguistic rules within one language or many will not shed light on their co-existence. Languages do not stand in abatement waiting to be explored. Nor do they exist independently, one from another. They are always next to each other influencing and being influenced by each other. In order to find an origin amidst many languages speaking at the same time is impossible: multiplicity turns into polyphony. The origin drowns in the generality of meaning. As a guide to the origin, translation points to its inaccessibility.

Moreover, Derrida asks: Is it not for the sake of a mystery of human existence that this origin is forever concealed? It is futile and dangerous to conceive of language as a system built on pure structures with all its sign elements orderly and available to a scientist’s scrutiny. Language that spits out recognizable signs is a transparent language. When brought to reason, such language demands universality; it becomes a container of universal truth and, finally, an instrument of colonial domination. The relationship

between language and translation is not reversible. By striving to understand translation, we do not necessarily understand language and vice versa. It is in striving, however, that we discover the ethical dimension of communication across totalities of languages. This dimension requires a new element—an embodied encounter of differences. Borrowing from Levinas, Derrida suggests that this intermediate structure is the ‘face’ or that which ‘stands for the beginning that invites forbidden transparency, impossible univocity’ (1992, p. 226). The plurivocity of translation makes it the first imperative: ‘the original is the first debtor, the first petitioner; it begins by lacking and by pleading for translation’ (ibid., p. 227).

By refocusing translation problematics from the ideal sphere of language to the sphere of originary experiential givenness, Derrida brought translation into the properly phenomenological realm. On the strength of voice and *différance*, which function as quasi-transcendental conditions for linguistic experience, Derrida degrammatized and semiotized language, yet he did it in an empirically friendly configuration. Difference functioned as the primary condition for the language before grammar and voice gave itself as the originary condition for expression before phonetics. With this reformulation, Derrida introduced a new structure of the sign: the co-determinate relation between the actual and the virtual, or empirical and transcendental; hence, the quasi-phenomenological approach.<sup>10</sup> The two concepts put the primacy of the written translation into question and, at the same time, introduced the possibility for taking the face-to-face interpreting as an alternative. Together with the pre-established phenomenality of voice and *différance*, the phenomenon of interpreting brought about a methodological extension to the general phenomenological procedure. For example, in his analysis, Derrida was convincing by showing that instead of starting with the eidetic analysis of relational and hierarchical essential features of what is being given (phonemes, morphemes, sememes, etc.), one should begin with the givenness itself.

Derrida’s quasi-transcendental turn reverses the structural phenomenological understanding of the world as a sign given to the ego’s semiotic apprehension and constructs it as a non-contingent play of differences that allows for an alternative reading of translation as an opening space for the originating meaning.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, by placing translation in the sphere of the First Word, Derrida turns the problem of translation

into *aporia*, that is, something that rests on a threshold of some sorts, in a place ‘where it would be no longer possible to constitute a problem because there is no longer any problem’ (1993, p. 12). Approached as *aporetic*, translation discourages an inquiry that seeks to understand its phenomenality as either an empirical or a transcendental phenomenon. It rather positions translation in the liminal sphere, between an expressed content and the underlying conditions for this expression. In this position translation appears necessarily abstract, thus requiring that we expand and complicate the quasi-phenomenological approach to translation with the traditional phenomenological approach that I present in the next chapter. The purpose of the chapter is to introduce basic phenomenological concepts, procedures, and registers, as well as types of phenomenological inquiry. The same chapter also presents compatible—to phenomenology—empirical or off-phenomenological methods, which are called so on account of their ability to be combined with certain kinds of phenomenological analysis. A description of the phenomenological/empirical interface (sequential analysis produced by both phenomenology and communications methods) ends the chapter.

## Notes

1. Among the established phenomenologists who tackled translation as a phenomenon in and for itself, I would like to note major contributions by Heidegger’s *Parmenides* (1992), Ricoeur’s *On Translation* (2004), and Derrida’s *Des Tours de Babel* (1985). More recently, one may find Sallis’ *On Translation* (2000). At the same time, there has not been any phenomenological work on oral forms of bilingual interpreting.
2. This does not mean that there is a general agreement about the significance of *Logical Investigations*. Often these disagreements arise from a lack of understanding that Husserl is a systematic philosopher and so it would be inappropriate, as Cairns insists, to call it a ‘preliminary work,’ ‘which presents a continuous ambiguity with respect to its fundamental philosophical significance’ (2002, p. 48). More forward about the significance of *Logical Investigations* is Mohanty, who cites anti-psychologism of the ‘Prolegomena’ section in *Logical Investigations* as Husserl’s commitment to view ‘the life of consciousness as the source of meaningfulness’ (1995, p. 45).

3. One must note in this regard that the term 'structuralism' began to be associated with Saussure only in the 1950s due to his semiological influences. In fact, writes Falk, the laurels of 'discovering' structuralism belong to Trubezkoy (2004, p. 116). For the argument about the far-reaching influence of Saussure on European structuralism, see Peuch (2004).
4. For the most illustrative examples of looking into translation from the structuralist (systemic) perspective, consider the works of Nida (1975), Toury (1980), and Shveitzer (1988).
5. Because indication always directs to the same object, it is considered by Sokolowski a 'paradigmatic case' (1974, p. 112).
6. Culler notes that Saussure's treatment of *parole* connects it 'to a concrete individual act of speaking founded on an abstract system of rules' (1976, p. 41). Mohanty finds a similar dynamics with Husserl: due to their anteriority, 'all expressions exhibit a real, transitory, and an ideal abiding aspect' (1964, p. 74).
7. Merleau-Ponty developed a similar method from the phenomenological side. For an example, see his *Signs* (1964). It is unfortunate that Merleau-Ponty's works cannot be treated in this study; they are too diverse and in themselves propose a different relevance to translation.
8. For a fully developed theory of translation based almost entirely on Jakobson's conceptualization of translation, see Shveitzer (1988).
9. Caputo gives another example of difference: blindness may be treated as a quasi-transcendental condition by analogy with 'the way a blind spot can organize a vision' (1997, p. 318).
10. In their turn, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) both question and advance this model.
11. Caputo states that for Derrida translation is a mode that reveals the original source of all languages as 'the unnameable, unknowable secret' (1997, p. xxvii).

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# 3

## Empirical Phenomenology for the Study of Consecutive Interpreting

In this chapter, I would like to solidify the preliminary relationship between phenomenology, linguistics, and their phenomenological amalgam as was discussed in the previous chapter. I would like to do so by presenting a working method that explains how phenomenology and communication methods create a stable methodological procedure, which is prompted by phenomenological insights with the subsequent analysis carried out on the basis of empirically obtained data by ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and pragmatics. This combination of related methodological strands makes this study interdisciplinary in three respects: (a) as far as the subject of investigation is concerned; (b) as far as methodological compatibility is concerned; (c) as far as the stepwise analytical procedure is concerned. Given the overarching role of phenomenology in this project I would like to begin with explaining its main tenets.

It has been over a century since phenomenology introduced an alternative reading of philosophy. During that time, phenomenology has both consolidated its resources and branched out into different strands (e.g., phenomenological pragmatics, eco-phenomenology, phenomenology of gender, race, and emotions) and other disciplines (e.g., psychology, sociology, and linguistics), diversifying and broadening the phenomenological

thematics and refining its analytical tools. Today, one is hardly able to find a universal approach to the phenomenological method. Partial adoptions from other disciplines, especially the humanities, but also social sciences, have undoubtedly expanded the phenomenological base. At the same time, some new phenomenological directions also obscured, if not vulgarized, the original insights offered by the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), and some of his most illustrious followers, who, despite their divergent ideas and approaches, are openly indebted to his works. Among these followers we find Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), and Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), most notably. It is not by chance then that the humanities which emerged after phenomenology became relatively known are closely related or orientated to phenomenology both in spirit and in its key concepts.

Amounting to many thousands of printed pages, *Husserliana* has been Husserl's legacy that continues to inform, direct, and orientate phenomenological research in all its forms. For that reason I wish to present the phenomenological method in the original, that is, fundamentally Husserlian, vein. The return to the beginning of phenomenology continues the work set up in Chap. 2. There, I ended with Derrida's quasi-phenomenological method, which exposed translation as a liminal phenomenon that is both material and immaterial, but in any event ambiguous and therefore unsuitable to be examined for its sense as an empirical phenomenon only, without first having to be re-examined. The purpose of this re-examination is to analyze consecutive interpreting as a phenomenon which is firmly grounded in sociality. Since there has been no attempt to do a phenomenology of consecutive interpreting, which would not only offer a theory but could supplant it with an empirical analysis, it seems to be prudent to present the phenomenological method in general terms at first and then to show its applicability to empirical analysis. In this chapter, I summarize and interpret the phenomenological method on the basis of the most significant texts by Husserl. In addition to the primary sources, I utilize a large corpus of secondary literature on Husserl's phenomenology, without however dwelling on the intricacies of each individual approach for the sake of a consistent and clear exposition.

The presentation of phenomenology as a method suitable for the study of empirical phenomena under the humanities is not a straightforward task; hence, the need to demonstrate not only the general relevance to the subject of this study but also to argue that phenomenology could be 'friendly' to empirical analysis and could indeed tackle, by itself, or, as a methodological tandem, communication phenomena, such as consecutive interpreting. From this perspective, we may benefit if we begin by addressing some key phenomenological concepts: 'phenomenon,' 'intentionality,' 'constitution,' 'horizon,' 'ground,' 'phenomenological attitude,' 'domains of experience' (remembering, imagining, perceiving and anticipating), 'natural attitude,' 'reflection,' 'reduction' (*epochè*), 'free fantasy variation,' 'the life-world,' and 'intersubjectivity.' Obviously, by themselves, these concepts cannot ensure a comprehensive or even a systematic understanding of phenomenology and/or its method. I would therefore like to explain these concepts in the context of their social significance with an emphasis on their suitability for empirical research in general and research on consecutive interpreting in particular. In the course of my explaining, I differentiate between two kinds of concepts: thematic and operative. If the former is used to elaborate the subject of this investigation, the other refers to the combined method. For experience, this distinction appears blurry; however, analytically speaking, the distinction is apparent. There, thematic concepts appear as basic phenomenological themes. One such concept is 'transcendental ego,' for example. In turn, operative concepts are used to explain these themes. The key themes in that regard are 'reduction,' 'constitution,' and 'phenomenon.' In my presentation of phenomenology, I also distinguish between different types of phenomenology ('eidetic' and 'transcendental'), with special attention to the corresponding types of reduction, and three phenomenological registers ('static,' 'genetic,' and 'generative'), which allow for a cross-sectional three-tier analysis. As for the order of analysis, it follows the original phenomenological procedure of 'questioning-back,' which is first applied by Husserl to the study of essential structures and forms, then employed for the study of time-consciousness, and finally brought into the analysis of sociality and history.

In this chapter, I also introduce the analytical interface that allows us to enrich eidetic and transcendental approaches with empirical content,

thus making the sociocultural world the primary resource for the study of consecutive interpreting. With this choice I intend to show that a post-Husserlian phenomenological path (called quasi-phenomenological in the previous chapter) is not only compatible with the methods practiced in the humanities, but that there are certain empirical methods that present an especially good fit for a phenomenological inquiry because they have established their original analytical platform on the basis of the key phenomenological premises. Here, I call these methods ‘off-phenomenological’ and explain their applicability for this study at the end of this chapter. Given that this study is the first of its kind in the area of translation and interpreting studies, in my presentation of the phenomenological method I consider my audience and thus err on the side of simplicity, omitting certain complexities which are typically confined to purely philosophical discussions.

## Husserl’s Phenomenology: Basic Concepts

When Edmund Husserl thought up phenomenology at the end of the nineteenth century, he considered it as an antidote to empiricist philosophy and descriptive psychology, both of which held that an individual consciousness made sense of the world by connecting to it through the work of the mind.<sup>1</sup> Husserl identified this perspective as a form of mentalism and, for his key objection, stated that there was no consciousness apart from its relation to the objects in the world. Consciousness is always a consciousness of something. There is no empty consciousness, only intentional consciousness. By ‘intentional,’ Husserl meant directed, rather than motivated, attention: all perception is always directed toward something. When we see, there is always something that we see; when we smell, we always smell something; when we touch, we always touch something. This something may come from far away or stand close by; it can be abstract or concrete; it can even be devoid of material presence. For example, in our memory, we deal with remembered objects only by way of recollections. In comparison, reflection deals with interpretation of these recollections, and not just by ourselves but often ‘in the company of others’ (Casey 1987, p. 113); hence, the relational dualism of

'live' memory. But in either case, there is still and always will be a something that calls to consciousness which, in turn, directs its attention to it. Therefore, there is no perceptual consciousness that exists on its own without being dynamically connected to an object of perception.<sup>2</sup> The relation between consciousness and the world gives us an original definition of 'phenomenon.' According to Husserl, phenomenon refers to (a) 'apparent objects and their properties; (b) experiences which constitute corresponding acts of appearing (experienced contents here are understood in the sense of sensations) and, lastly, (c) all experiences whatever' (1970b, pp. 347–348).

Thus, Husserl maintains that phenomenon is an intentionally ambiguous concept which includes both psychical states and physical objects, as well as their properties. Some types of phenomena, for example, emotions, dispositions, moods, seem to belong entirely to the psyche, while others appear as social at first. Take a work of literature, for example. In fact, as Husserl himself emphasizes, all phenomena straddle the divide between the subject and the outside world with its seemingly independently existing objects. In either case, for a phenomenon to be, it must have an object of perception, which is intended by an act of perception instigated by the perceiving subject.<sup>3</sup> In order to designate the intentional object and the corresponding intending act without running into unfortunate connotations, Husserl coined the respective terms *noema* and *noesis*, which he adopted from the ancient Greek language. Noema, or what appears, refers to the object of appearing; it is the objective correlate of intentionality. When a car appears as a car and a camel appears as a camel, one may say that the noematic correlate is fulfilled.

However, in order for noema to be fulfilled, it must be connected to an individual consciousness; hence, noesis, which is the subjective correlate of intentionality, or the event process. Noesis links an object of perception to the source of perception, that is, an individual. The intending act (noesis) and the intended object (noema) are not independent from each other, however; though clearly distinguishable, they co-exist within the structure of intentionality, or directedness-toward; hence the Husserlian concept of experience (*Erfahrung*). Intentional experience is always bound to consciousness; it is from consciousness that it seeks out the world, and it is back to consciousness to which this world returns.

This directedness-toward lays out a path, and it is through that path that the workings of consciousness become disclosed in the reflexive attitude. With the help of this attitude, the phenomenologist does not confine himself to the description of phenomena, but attends to them as they are intended, or meant. Husserl's discovery of intentionality is so significant that it yields a provisional definition for the science of phenomenology:

Pure phenomenology of experiences has, as its exclusive concern, experiences intuitively seizable and analyzable in the pure generality of their essence [...] This phenomenology must bring to pure expression, must describe in terms of their essential components and their governing formulae of essence, the essences which directly make themselves known in intuition. (1970b, p. 166)

Note two references to the empirical nature of the phenomenological enterprise: on the one hand, the description of phenomena is significant only if these phenomena can be expressed; on the other hand, a true description must be accompanied by a reflexive attitude, leading us back to the things themselves, as was famously proclaimed by Husserl in *Logical Investigations*.<sup>4</sup> What lies in the back of the essential enterprise is the *life-world* (*Lebenswelt*), which cannot be apprehended in full but provides all the necessary means for the human experience to be made meaningful as a social world. As noted by Robert Sokolowski, the life-world is not just all of the world or 'simply the world in which we live; it is the world we live in as contrasted to the world of exact science, or to the ideal world' (1993, p. 92). The process responsible for the emergence of meaningfulness is *constitution* (*Konstitution*). As a process most closely associated with static phenomenological conditions, constitutive analysis appears to deal with the description of structures toward an orderly understanding of sense or meaning. As a result of constitutive operation, consciousness achieves the ability to turn regions of experience into determinate fields (Welton 2000, pp. 148–149). The simplicity of the operation makes it accessible to both mundane and analytical reflection.

This is how an opinion is constituted: from a specific configuration of experience that draws on memory, perception, and imagination, one forms a judgment in the deductive sense by making a specific configuration



generalizable. Sociology calls these generalizable configurations activities or practices. In anthropology, they are known as rituals. For phenomenology, once a constituted object turns into a cultural object, whether it is a recognizable artifact (e.g., American Indian head dress) or a specific behavior (e.g., belching in public), it gets sedimented into a belief and enters the sphere of ownness (personal or communal), where it becomes a habit. Now, when a similar configuration occurs again, consciousness would take this event for granted, as what belongs to it, or as its own. From that perspective, as an intercultural accomplishment, consecutive interpreting de-habitualizes some of the earlier acquisitions, without eliminating them as habit, but putting them under the scrutiny of a sudden reflection. All four domains of experience—memory, imagination, perception, and anticipation—may participate in the production of consecutive interpreting; any cultural context is saturated with history and its correlate, allowing for the intergenerational transfer of local meaning. For this reason, it is particularly important to situate the phenomenon under examination correctly within one specific domain of experience or at the crossing of several domains, as is the case with consecutive interpreting, which involves memory, imagination, as well as action and expression.

Returning to the composition of the life-world, there are two most basic perceptual structures responsible for maintaining its totality: (a) 'horizon' and (b) 'ground.' The relationship between the two concepts is that of co-foundation. 'Horizon' is essential in that it conditions a perspectival apprehension of the world. Every person experiences the world differently on account of a local perspective, but every person demands a deep background, a horizon, in order to perceive the world at all. Horizon is therefore accountable for a multiperspectival perception, allowing us to perceive the same object as 'somewhat' different, yet not different enough for us to question its identity. A normal human being, when perceiving, is always able to obtain a different perspective by changing his or her position; a moving body is therefore a pre-requisite for perceptive acuity. In turn, 'ground' puts the perceiving subject in a vertical position, thus providing only a limited relation to itself; in order to compensate for this limitation, it complements 'horizon' with 'ground.' On the one hand, ground is what we are standing on with our feet and what we can touch with our hands. On the ground, our body can sit, lie, and wallow. Yet,

if we attend only to the ground, we will not be able to function to the fullest capacity of the human body or perceive the world as meaningful. The body needs horizon to orient itself in space and time. Socially, the body is always surrounded by other bodies, or figures. Thus, the two basic structures—horizon and ground—as well as one social structure—community—provide the possibility for constituting all perceptive meaning. In the case of its embodied apprehension, the life-world appears as meaning-bestowing, subject- and community-relative, and perceivable, that is, evident. It is easy to see that all these components pertain to consecutive interpreting, thus confirming its phenomenality, that is, the conditions for appearing.

To continue, in order to access the life-world, Husserl proposes a particular kind of reflection, called *epochē* after the ancient Greek, or ‘phenomenological reduction,’ which was designed to assist the generic phenomenological analysis. What distinguishes the phenomenological reflection from the mundane reflection is that the latter does not seek to understand the phenomenal world. Mundanely, we do not suspend our unhindered being-in-the-world in order to reflect on it. Rather we reflect on an event or action or any other kind of occurrence that happened to us or to others but which in reflection remains connected to our lives. For phenomenology, however, reflection functions differently: ‘it frees the world as intended from a certain opaque power of absolute existence which impregnates experience at the same time as it devours me, its witness’ (Ricoeur 1967, p. 94). The phenomenological reflecting-on is also different from a scientific one in that it does not take the phenomenon for an object of inquiry. Nor does it take physiology to be responsible for reflection, and, unlike any other philosophical reflection, the phenomenological kind does not seek a closure to a problem but suggests a thorough examination of it in terms of human matters. It is less important if these matters come out systematically organized; phenomenology does not shun from viscera; on the contrary, it encourages rough edges and vague contours, having the phenomenological reflection include them in its examination, especially when it comes to those social phenomena which are defined imprecisely from the beginning or have too many names, identities, and forms of execution, like consecutive interpreting.

Reduction is an elusive, albeit foundational, concept of phenomenology.<sup>5</sup> For Husserl, the initial purpose of phenomenological analysis was to obtain 'essences' of things. At that time, reduction was designed as what cuts through to these essences by way of suspending our common understanding of an object or belief. At a later period of his work, Husserl redefined reduction as the key methodological tool of transcendental phenomenology. It was supposed to assist reflection in its ability to grasp experience in a pure fashion, avoiding the naiveté of the natural attitude. Phenomenological reduction is an analytical procedure that 'brackets' epistemic presuppositions about the nature of the world by suspending judgment or belief about the content, causal referent, and subjective or theoretical value of what appears. In rejecting the independent existence of either a subject or an object, phenomenology challenges the world's 'taken-for-grantedness' and its presuppositions, which are investigated in terms of how the world assumes its sense, how it appears in itself for us. This world is always necessarily phenomenal: it includes a single life-world which stands as an infinite generator of plural other worlds (e.g., the world of nature, different human cultural worlds); it also conditions the ways these worlds appear to us (e.g., by way of themselves and by way of their phenomena). Beginning with its most general kind, bracketing, the phenomenon can be subsequently subjected to eidetic and then transcendental reduction. Due to the importance of this concept for the subsequent analysis of translation, where I employ one type of reduction for static analysis and the other kind for genetic analysis, I find it necessary to address the difference between eidetic and transcendental reduction in greater detail.

The difference between the two kinds of phenomenological reduction can be traced to the two main periods of Husserl's intellectual career: eidetic and transcendental. The difference involves both the subject matter and the direction of phenomenological inquiry. When Husserl began to investigate intentionality for the first time, he instigated his inquiry from the objective or noematic side of phenomenality. He thus urged us to appreciate phenomena as essence, giving special attention to the intended aspects or qualities of objects. Phenomenologically speaking, essences shall be understood as unities of meaning or *eide*, where *eide* should be understood, in the ancient Greek sense, as ideas behind

appearances. Whether these appearances are actual or imaginary is not as important as their possibility of assuming a material shape. One needs to only imagine a flying bird to have its idea. The bird can climb up very high, so high in fact that we will no longer be capable of seeing it; yet, we continue to assume that it is there because of its idea, even without the actual bird in sight. Husserl maintained that objects possessed essential structures that qualified these objects as species in the phenomenological rather than natural scientific sense. At the same time, in a truly insightful manner, Husserl named essence also to be an object, but a different kind of object from the object that it embodies. Husserl describes the key advantage of eidetic analysis in *Logical Investigations*: 'After the phenomenological reduction, scientific ascertainments regarding the phenomena are not possible, *nota bene*, if we wish to fix and conceptually to determine these phenomena as absolute, one-time particulars' (1970a, p. 224; *author's emphasis*).

In other words, eidetic analysis does not presuppose the discovery of universally applicable structures, only their effects on the constitutive processes matter. In itself, essence is invariant; all cases of the same phenomenon, whether material or immaterial, yield the same essence(s). However, although discoverable in sense-data, essences are not sense-bound. An invariant structure cannot show itself as is, on its own: the structure of intentionality prevents its complete separation from either an object of inquiry or an inquiring subject. Note, in this respect, Husserl's objection to scientific positivism. Bernet et al. explain it in the following manner: 'by liberating the fact from scientific inquiry, Husserl sought to show fact as an *arbitrary example*' (1989, p. 79; *author's emphasis*). With this statement, we might better understand the difference between scientific facts and absolute, one-time particulars, such as sentences or utterances. The latter are exemplifying categories; unlike scientific facts, they allow for an infinite range of phenomenal expressions. In contrast, scientific facts tend toward finitude by way of self-purification. Husserl's typical example for this tendency is a geometrical figure. In order for a geometrical figure to be 'proper' to its science (e.g., geometry), it must be 'perfect.' In contrast, due to the multiplicity and non-coincidence of individual histories, a spoken exchange is a phenomenon that is all about particulars, localities, and variations, which nonetheless must be

subjected to an interactive form, for example, a conversation. A form of talk provides only for horizon, however. Speaking as a ground and speakers as figures would still have to be present to give sense to a concrete interaction. By comparison, in science, it is sufficient for a figure to stand on its own, as in the case of a square. At the same time, this capacity of a geometrical figure is possible only because it is an ideal object.

In sum, eidetic investigations presuppose an inquiry into categorical or exemplifying consciousness. The ultimate task of the eidetic analysis is to determine the laws of necessity which govern those features, traits, and components that must necessarily belong to an object if it is to be perceived as an object of this kind: 'Husserl's theory of essences points to significations such as extension, phantasm, relation to circumstances, reality and substantiality that are read in the things themselves by direct inspection' (Ricoeur 1967, p. 44). This study needs an eidetic investigation for several reasons. First, eidetic phenomenology offers empirical flexibility that defies both empiricism and scientism, and, second, it opens the human world to all human beings. Since there are a number of competing definitions of translation, including the fundamental distinction between interpreting and translating, the determination of essential invariant structures that apply to different translation phenomena is a must. It is obvious that in order to reach such a determination, a methodological cooperation between eidetic and transcendental accounts will have to be ensured.

This is not an easy task; moreover, the advantages of using transcendental reduction are obscure because it is more complex but also farther removed from empirical research. However, transcendental reduction brings in a significant methodological benefit to the study of communication phenomena by allowing to be assessed symbolically, for example. The main limitation of the science of essences, as Husserl called phenomenology originally, lies in its central concern: the phenomenal core of an object. In comparison, transcendental reduction functions as 'the gate of entry to the world of pure subjectivity' (Husserl 1970b, p. 257). It should not appear from this quote, however, that transcendental reduction is confined to pure subjectivity. Indeed, it is easy to underplay the concept's significance because the progressive transformation of Husserl's thought repeatedly changes its orientation and definition. Beginning

with eidetic reduction that was intended to reduce the phenomenon's core to its essential structures, Husserl eventually realized the existence of sufficient and necessary conditions that would allow the phenomenon to possess essential structures immanent to a category or class of similar phenomena in the first place. Moreover, transcendental reduction indicated a realm of its own, a realm that dealt with the genesis of phenomena rather than their existence. For this reason, in addition to eidetic reduction, transcendental reduction should be an important concept for interpreting: as an analytical tool (procedural operation), it helps understand code-switching, for example; as an attitude shifter (from the natural to the phenomenological attitude), transcendental reduction introduces a different plane for analyzing a phenomenon whose materiality is tenuous or multidimensional, as is the case with consecutive interpreting. In sum, our understanding of the precise differences and commonalities between these two types of reduction can become a distinct asset for the analysis of various communication phenomena. Both types of reduction are employed in this study, clearly demonstrating their usefulness.

At the same time, not all the applications of transcendental reduction to an empirical context can succeed. For example, according to Bernet et al., there are three kinds of transcendental reduction (1989, pp. 75–85).<sup>6</sup> The first is called 'the Cartesian way,' and it deals with the reduction of the world to absolute consciousness. The Cartesian path emerged as Husserl's modification of Descartes' attempt to reach the point of indubitable existence. Descartes found this point in the *ego cogito*, or the transcendental 'I think.' Proceeding in the same direction, Husserl nonetheless critiqued the Cartesian 'I' for its impurity as a part of the world. The problem with the Cartesian reduction was seen by Husserl in the presumption of immanence or insularity of 'I' as the 'world-in-me.' Husserl argues that reducing the world to my ego beyond any doubt, as Descartes conceived of it, is a failed project because one cannot abstain from the world itself; it would be an impossibility in principle, since it would mean abstention from living like a human being, that is, a being among other human beings. For the study of translation in any of its forms, the Cartesian way is the least appropriate because it excludes the social component, which is indispensable for the study of interpreting as a form of intercultural communication.

Recognizing limitations to the egoic perspective, Husserl later relocated his project to the sphere of intersubjective constitution. Subsequently, he modified the notion of the world as an intersubjectively constituted unity of sense-making. Thus the modified aim of transcendental reduction was no longer what deals with the purity of the ego or a representation of some objective validity of the world, but the validity of this world as it is 'for us.' The role of transcendental reduction in obtaining intersubjective validation lies in a methodical exclusion of everything that is 'transcendentally individual [or regional] and, therefore, also all the transcendent essences, whose logical position lies in the theory' (Husserl 1962, p. 161). The latter point is especially important for this study as it reinstates the transcendental reduction in its intersubjective orientation, as what constitutes the world 'for us.' In this orientation, one can approach transcendental reduction as a general contribution to translation theory. Since we are concerned only with consecutive interpreting in this study, there will be no attempt to construct a logic of translation per se. Still, this kind of project seems worth pursuing at some point.

Subsequently, after a transcendental corrective, eidetic reduction acquires for Husserl a new meaning. The main aim of eidetic reduction becomes attaining the conditions for the possibility of consciousness and its regions, such as perception. As an analytic procedure that connects phenomenology to other disciplines, eidetic reduction involves 'bracketing,' or the suspension of preformed theoretical beliefs. Bracketing ensures that the transcendental core of a phenomenon cannot be reached by a phenomenological exploration unless the inquiry is free from numerous scientific contaminants that arise out of our existent theoretical beliefs. By suspending these beliefs, the phenomenologist attains a pre-theoretical understanding of the world from within this world. It is worth noting here that the search for the presuppositionless foundation of being did not mean that Husserl objected to theoretical conceptualizations of being itself. He rather objected to searching for the underlying order of the world with the help of a pre-advanced theory. This is most significant for the following analysis of consecutive interpreting as an empirical phenomenon: entering the field of translation studies puts one face-to-face with a theoretical tradition which must be abandoned in favor of an authentic examination based on emerging concepts.

The intersubjective turn makes Husserl revisit the concept of transcendental reduction in the last years of his work. This time, Husserl's modification concerns the direction of the phenomenological analysis. The new perspective on the phenomenological method is associated with the ontological path, emphasized by an increased awareness of the life-world. The ontological path also ends up reversing the search for the world's validity. Description in the ontological mode was supposed to begin from the objective side: 'This orientation toward natural experience precedes the transcendental turn, and it is through this orientation that the transcendental thematic itself receives from the very beginning a fullness of content and a stable guidance' (Bernet et al. 1989, pp. 70–71). The motivation behind the ontological turn came from Husserl's conviction that the objective world could not be comprehended one-sidedly from the ego alone, but requires that the social world be factored into the analysis of any phenomenon. Thereby, Husserl took an intersubjectively constituted view of the world as it drew upon psychology, anthropology, and linguistics and proceeded to reduce its findings to the transcendental core.

Of the above-mentioned human sciences, Husserl clearly prefers psychology as an alternative entry into the life-world. In 'Part III' of *The Crisis*, Husserl specifies his idea of psychology as an intentional psychology, or as a science that begins its inquiry 'from the co-performance of validity in the act of perception' (1970a, p. 237). In contrast to the positivist psychology of his times, intentional psychology centers on the descriptive understanding of the psychic life. It can therefore function as a foundational discipline for the entire humanities, including 'new' sociology and its qualitative methods. In his later years, Husserl came to believe that reflective inner experience of consciousness could become a thematization of transcendental experience. The purpose of intentional psychology was to expose the possibility of an amalgamation of individual consciousness and collective normativity. The significance of the psychological reduction in this regard lies in Husserl's conviction that an absolutely founded philosophy is possible only as a philosophy of the psyche, where the psyche is understood as initially primordial, but evolving toward becoming a monad, which is a self-developing subjectivity informed by the Other.



As it is necessary for a phenomenology of translation, whether written or oral, transcendental examination determines the conditions that allow for any kind of translation to assume a phenomenal form and to appear as such for us. In addition to the two types of phenomenological inquiry and the accompanying reductions, we might need to employ yet another kind of reduction, namely, 'free fantasy variation,' which was lauded by Husserl as 'the method of essential seeing' (1962, p. 340). The word 'essential' suggests what Husserl attempts to achieve with the help of this procedure. The purpose of the free fantasy variation is to assist the eidetic reduction in reaching the essence(s) of phenomena, the invariant core of their structures, and their idealities. Natanson points out that Husserl did not conceive of this procedure to direct it toward concrete objects but rather to show 'how ideal objects are created through exemplification' (1973, p. 67). Habitually, in the natural attitude, we start with an actual thing and then turn it into a type and a category.

Taken in reverse, free fantasy variation returns us to the actual thing but gives it to us as if refocused with those new features which are added as actually possible. In contrast to the actual variation when the features of the phenomenon are cross-checked by comparing them with those of similarly structured phenomena, free fantasy variation extrapolates the features of the phenomenon from the phenomenal field. One does it by taking a phenomenon and creating infinite possibilities of its existence in imagination and actual experience in order to discover the boundaries which a particular phenomenon cannot overstep without breaking out of its phenomenality. Finally, the power of reflection is such that it discloses elapsed phases of experience as well as the inner binding of these experiences, allowing for a critical examination of 'what made the other reflections possible, or that which those other reflections never managed to see' (Sokolowski 1974, p. 144). The purpose of free fantasy variation is to connect actuality and possibility, experience and imagination. One can add that the variation provides for an expansion of multiplicity, meaning that it has dynamism embedded in its operation. More practically, the rotational description shall become the basic point of departure, or a 'map' which guides the seeker to a higher type of phenomenological analysis.

I elaborate these highly technical distinctions among various reductive paths in order to clarify common misunderstandings about reduction, namely, that by replacing the natural attitude with the phenomenological attitude, reduction, rather than purifying, contaminates the world that we inhabit. It is therefore commonly believed that there is no place for reduction in sociological methods despite the fact that there is always a type of reduction in social sciences and qualitative research. As if to confirm the importance of reduction for analyses of any human phenomena, it was shown that in attempting to surpass the habitual ways of being, one did not have to leave the natural attitude, or construct the world as *irreal* (Fink 1970, pp. 84–92). The general direction of Husserl's phenomenological project and especially its latest twists and turns convincingly demonstrate that Husserl never intended to abolish the world in order to attain pure subjectivity. Moreover, the phenomenological reduction cannot be performed but from within the natural attitude, thus involving the living person, his or her social milieu, communication, and human life, as we habitually conceive of them. What distinguishes the transcendental reduction most radically from the analytical inquiry common to social sciences is that it 'concerns the essence of transcendental subjectivity that accepts the world and its life in this world' (Fink 1970, pp. 113–114). This is where the difference between the Cartesian and the ontological paths acquires the greatest lucidity. The type of reduction employed makes a difference as to what objectives a phenomenology poses before itself—eidetic or transcendental—and it is necessary to distinguish between them in order to give the subsequent analysis of empirical data the 'right' direction.

## Eidetic Versus Transcendental Phenomenology

Transcendental phenomenology differs from eidetic phenomenology on two counts: (a) its main object of inquiry is pure subjectivity and (b) the purpose of transcendental reduction is no longer confined to the determination of an object of experience, or an experiencing subject, but focuses on the conditions for an experience *per se*. This difference, although entertained already at the time of the *Ideas* in the early 1910s, appeared

in the center of Husserl's attention again in the *Cartesian Meditations* in 1929. The description of pure subjectivity tends toward completeness and universality. This means attending to absolute consciousness, which after the operation of the transcendental reduction reveals those experiences that can be considered as 'pre-individual and pre-objective precisely because they are prior to things, constituting itself by way of the relations between the structures rather than between the object and its consciousness' (Mensch 1988, p. 136). This is the line along which the distinction between the eidetic and transcendental realms is drawn: if eidetic analysis is interested in a phenomenon and its emergence within a category, transcendental analysis is interested in the conditions for the phenomenal world and its inhabitants, regardless of whether those are human or other beings. Later in this chapter, I will attempt to show how a syncretic analysis can accommodate both interests.

In comparison to eidetic phenomenology, which privileges a fixed object, transcendental phenomenology gives absolute priority to a dynamic object constructed by inner time-consciousness. In contrast to invariant structures, which are the main focus of eidetic analysis, the focus of genetic investigation is genesis. It thus necessarily implies social temporality. From this perspective, transcendental phenomenology 'is no longer limited to my ego but is linked to the intersubjective nexus' (Steinbock 1995, p. 57). This nexus is neither a singularity nor a totality. It is a juncture between the Self, the Other, and the transcendental consciousness. The concepts of multiple worlds and intersubjectivity are crucial for our understanding of interpreting. Engaged in bringing different worlds (in a specific definition) together, interpreting discloses itself as a form of human interaction. According to Husserl, a phenomenological analyst may access the intersubjective dimension in one of the registers (static, genetic, generative) or in a combination thereof. A register, in accordance with the phenomenological terminology is a mode in which a phenomenologist approaches his or her subject, for example, with consideration of time or without, or with consideration of the historical evolution. I discuss these analytic registers or modes of inquiry in greater detail in the next section, albeit briefly. More extensive descriptions of the registers preview every analytical chapter.

## Static, Genetic, and Generative Modes of Phenomenological Inquiry

The distinction among and between different types of phenomenological analysis is certainly motivated by the difference between eidetic and transcendental phenomenology; hence, so much attention has been given to it earlier. At least that is where the static, genetic, and generative analyses belong. Thus, Husserl's work on eidetic phenomenology brought him to static analysis, which he used to examine an object as it is given to consciousness. The relationship between parts and wholes is a separate theme for static analysis; its main concerns here are unity, multiplicity, and number. Therefore, static analysis is commonly, albeit often mistakenly, treated as belonging to the early period of Husserl's work, which is still far from the social world and is heavily influenced by mathematics. In fact, even in *The Crisis*, the latest published work by Husserl while he was still alive in 1936, he promotes static analysis as indispensable for the examination of the life-world and all of its object-phenomena. Regardless of whether an object of static analysis is concrete and real (e.g., a stone) or abstract and ideal (e.g., democracy), it focuses on the noematic description of that object, that is, its elementary composition. With the help of the obtained morphology the analyst can investigate those immanent contexts in which this object would remain the same in certain basic features, that is, show itself as belonging to a particular species. In the words of Bernet et al., 'static analysis has ontology as its guide and second it enquires into immanent experience' (1989, p. 196).

It is worth emphasizing that Husserl thought of static analysis not only as an analysis of essences but as a part of constitutive analysis as well. Being a part of constitutive analysis means (by virtue of this analysis taking place in the living time) that static analysis is endowed with certain genetic qualities, for, in addition to the ever-present syntagmatic combinatorics of parts and wholes, an object of perception must be able to undergo modifications within a higher order of the absent yet affective paradigm.<sup>7</sup> In his *Analysis Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*, Husserl demonstrates continuity between static and genetic qualities by arguing that although these qualities can be separated for the sake of an analytical

inquiry, to an experience, they are given simultaneously: a moving passenger car is apprehended as both a type (automobile) and an object in becoming. The latter means that static and dynamic types of constitution bleed into each other: a moving automobile is an object, and movement is one of its immanent qualities. A parked or broken auto may override the quality of movement but only by virtue of depriving the same object what is normal and typical to it. An ever-static car, for example, a non-moving replica, is an abnormal object; therefore, consciousness registers it as abnormal. At the same time, for Husserl, static qualities are never completely static, but, as in the above example with the moving car, or with any life-form for that matter, they are contaminated with genetic qualities because without them an object would not be able to show itself fully.<sup>8</sup> The implications of temporality for any development are clear, and it is for this reason that Husserl demarcated the two kinds of analysis in his 1921 manuscript 'Static and Genetic Method.'

At about the same time, Husserl elaborated a new set of concepts that dealt specifically with the notion of genesis. This introduction signified a change in the phenomenological procedure. While static phenomenology always begins with an object or objects, whether 'species' of objects or 'unique' objects, genetic analysis covers the genesis of a thing within its temporal constitution. Husserl's analysis of internal time-consciousness underscores the relationship between individual and collective subjectivity as a confluence of two different streams of time. One stream belongs to an individual consciousness and is necessitated by the demands of its individuated habits. The second stream emphasizes the history of contemporary and preceding generations, which become effective at infancy (if not in the mother's womb) and continue to shape an individual as time goes by:

Every unity of cognition [...] has its history or, correlatively, the consciousness of this thing has its history, its immanent teleology in the form of a regulated system of essentially appurtenant modes of manifestation and modification, which can be elicited from this consciousness, brought about for questioning. (Husserl 2001, p. 241)

In sum, the main difference between static and genetic phenomenologies lies in the latter's emphasis on the constitutive aspects of social experience and the former's emphasis on invariant essences. In a proper genetic phenomenology, the concern is no longer with the analysis of complete systems, but rather with the inquiry into their genesis. From this perspective, genesis has another meaning: bringing together those systems that cling to a particular consciousness and a particular subjectivity, meaning that the constitution of certain objectivities presupposes at the same time the constitution of others. Thus, for example, the constitution of spatial objects and the constitution of sensual objects could be coordinated on the scale of graduation, that is, lower level phenomena would have to give way to higher level phenomena as the analysis progresses. At the same time, from the perspective of time, no temporal priority can be given to one system or another. They could only be taken as co-existent. This feature of genetic analysis can be easily observed in the phenomenon of interpreting, which fluctuates between two systems of communication, each one with its own logic and performativity.

Husserl's scholarship considers generative phenomenology as his least developed kind of phenomenological inquiry, at least in contrast to two other types of phenomenological analysis: static and genetic. One could even argue that generative phenomenology is but a variation of genetic phenomenology. Generative phenomenology emerges as a theme mostly in posthumously published manuscripts, but it was systematized much later by some of his contemporary commentators. Here, I would like to present the conceptualization of generativity made by Steinbock. I consider his interpretation to be the clearest, albeit not uncontroversial, systematization of Husserl's method, which traditionally begins with the static analysis of the eidetic composition of the life-world and then proceeds to the genetic analysis that covers the genesis of a thing within its temporal constitution. In turn, the generative analysis takes the phenomenon in question to the problem of genesis, which, on the level of society, involves 'a synchronic field of contemporary individuals and intersubjectivity,' according to Steinbock (1995, p. 178). Furthermore, Steinbock argues that the generative analysis serves Husserl as the 'leading clue' that reorients phenomenological inquiry from the problem of 'individual genesis' to the problem of 'communal history' (1995, p. 262). With this, he

intimates the cultural aspect of generativity which takes it beyond historicity and tradition straight into those sociocultural processes that condition historical and intergenerational genesis of consciousness.<sup>9</sup>

It appears that we have approached the most difficult methodological question—the question of procedure. I would now like to outline the potential engagement of the mentioned conceptualization for the actual study. In order to access the world either as *eidōs* or as transcendental subjectivity, the phenomenologist must transcend the ‘natural attitude.’ The natural attitude is a sum of everyday, or naive, from the phenomenological standpoint, considerations about the world. Although the very taken-for-grantedness of the natural attitude is an obstacle on the way to understanding both essences and the conditions for their appearance, the natural attitude does not exclude the phenomenological attitude nor is Husserl critical about our non-phenomenological living. On the contrary, he names our ability to neutralize the world as the very source of phenomenology. Transcending the natural attitude results in accessing the mode or modes of givenness or that which constitutes the life-world, which in turn conditions the natural attitude.<sup>10</sup> A mode of givenness is then the way the life-world gives its sense to us as a phenomenal world. This means that, in itself, the life-world is an *abstractum* from concrete worlds, which exist only as social manifolds.<sup>11</sup> However, what is abstract becomes concrete once certain structures become redefined in terms of experience. For example, the experience of weightlessness is an immediate reminder of the structures of horizon or ground. Husserl writes at length about this in his article ‘Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,’ where he entertains the example of a space man who will still relate to the earth while hovering outside of its ground and far beyond its horizon. For Husserl, the man in space would remain an earthling, while his ship would constitute a miniature earth, whose horizon would be determined by the position of the ship toward the earth; even in those situations when the earth is out of view, the orientation remains.

Returning to the earlier point, the relationship between eidetic and transcendental phenomenology is based on complementarity: with *eidōs*, we understand phenomena in themselves through their invariance and self-categorization; with transcendental phenomenology, we come

to examine those structures that originate phenomena, making them appear for us precisely as generative. When not in use by consciousness, exact essences continue to motivate us. Thus, for the sake of an authentic understanding of interpreting, all three kinds of phenomenologies must be engaged for its analysis. As a phenomenon of language, interpreting discloses its linguistic essences; as an interactional phenomenon, it provides a dynamic view on constitutive inter-relationality; as a phenomenon of culture, it rehabilitates history by giving it as 'evidence' in contrast to 'facts.' In order to show how the relationship between eidetic and transcendental phenomenology is bound together on the analytical level, Husserl develops the notion of 'intersubjectivity,' which is the domain of communication, an indispensable domain when it comes to understanding the world and its inhabitants, including inanimate objects.

The so-called intersubjective turn introduces the main problem of sociality: 'How do we know what the other person means on the basis of what they are saying?,' asks Husserl in 'The First Logical Investigation.' His answer—difference, as a matter of perspective on the totality of the life-world—may not satisfy us as a solution to the phenomenological status of interpreting; however, it can be accepted as a broadly defined theme for its analysis. At a later time comes Husserl's realization of the constitutive potential of the social world and, with it, the possibility to conceive of culture as a social delimitation of the life-world. This latter emphasis is particularly pertinent for this project as it dovetails into the current interpreting studies problematics. For example, most recently, the cultural turn in translation studies that replaced linguistic difference with cultural difference resulted in the creation of a broader foundation for the study of interpreting. In accordance with this turn, the encounter with the Other in interpreting is an encounter with the cultural Other, who expresses his or her otherness most immediately by way of speaking a different language. Although much in agreement with this postulate, the ambiguity of the notion of 'culture' prevents us from accepting it as the most basic condition of interpreting, prompting us to refine the method further.

Now that I have briefly described those basic phenomenological concepts that might be relevant for our investigation, distinguished between eidetic and transcendental phenomenologies, and drawn the difference



between the three different types of reduction, in the next section I would like to present the sequential order of the phenomenological analysis as it is going to be applied for this project in three analytical registers: static, genetic, and generative. The importance of this distinction lies in the understanding of the phenomenological application as a stepwise process that creates an interface between the phenomenological and the empirical methods through a series of progressive focusings and refocusings on different ‘existents’ within different existential environments, which are provided by the use of the appropriate type of reduction. This cross-sectional analysis does not seek to resolve all the problems associated with consecutive interpreting. It only aspires to present it as a phenomenon in its own right. It therefore does not claim comprehensibility; instead it seeks to expose the phenomenal structure of this study’s subject.

## Consecutive Interpreting: A Categorical Phenomenon of Communication

In the ancient Greek language, *catégorio* (categorical) means the act of saying something about something for the purpose of providing proof. Phenomenology follows this etymology by showing how our experience is given proof by having it enter into syntax. ‘Categorical intentionality is the kind of intending that articulates states of affairs and propositions, the kind that function when we predicate, relate, collect, and introduce logical operations into what we experience’ (Sokolowski 2000, p. 88). In Chap. 1, I outlined the general significance of syntax for Husserl in relation to the sign, which he takes for the smallest meaning-bestowing unit. In contrast, syntax is used as a system of rules, providing the basic conditions for the possibility of the sign to appear. It should not be surprising then that Husserl took it as a template for his grammar of experience he outlines in *Logical Investigations*. All intelligible communication involves syntax. Any expression, any enunciation of language, any word that is being uttered—as opposed to it representing a grammar rule—requires that categorical intentionality be involved.<sup>12</sup> This means that a given experience develops on a higher plane of consciousness, where

syntax is not just a grammatical category but a spatiotemporal horizon, which is inclusive of multiple acts, activities, and events simultaneously involving objects and human beings, which are synthesized both passively and actively into a whole some-thing, a fusion of object and horizon, or object-horizon. This makes the categorial product undetachable from the context of its production. For this reason, categorial objects are necessarily intersubjective: one may not have the same perspectival view of the object but may share a mutual horizon, whether it is the same language or same 'culture.'<sup>13</sup>

From this perspective, consecutive interpreting is a categorial object *par excellence*. It is a complex phenomenon that involves at minimum several communal histories, rituals, and spatiotemporal horizons. One shall add actual people and their diversity within their own groups to appreciate the complexity of consecutive interpreting, which, as a categorial object, is not reducible to parts and wholes but which nonetheless upholds its identity in the form of a network which relates discrete things into a directed production of a specific syntax. The syntax in question is communication-specific or, to put it in more mundane terms, talk-specific. It is not a syntax of singular language or behavior but a discrete syntax of communication and exchange on the intersubjective level. Yet, unlike the notion of intersubjectivity, which is espoused by phenomenology as philosophy, here, at the site of consecutive interpreting, intersubjectivity is not a uniform or general concept but a relative one. Different humanities do not share the same notion of either truth or fact. Their valence is different; hence the challenge to a singular concept of intersubjectivity. In the case of consecutive interpreting, truth and reason may be presented in difference made uniform through the work of partial alignment or synthesis. In order to approach the dual character of syntax in consecutive interpreting, one needs to turn to actual examples or an exemplar, which can stand for the phenomenon to the extent which is sufficient for its capture in the process or as close as possible to the process of its production.<sup>14</sup>

As a social phenomenon, consecutive interpreting can be subjected to all types of phenomenological inquiry. It can be studied by eidetic phenomenology and by transcendental phenomenology alike. It can also be studied cross-sectionally, which is expected to yield the most fruitful

results. For that, we need to turn to a specific type of analysis which shall not only give direction to this study but also allow it to engage 'live' data. This is the reason for introducing phenomenology as a method rather than as a philosophy here. It is through the method therefore that it relates to the social and human sciences alike. Moreover, the method's analytical force shall not necessarily be confined to phenomenological concepts or procedures. According to Husserl, empirical validation, which pertains to truth and reason, is also a methodological affair. The study of the natural attitude is only possible if we understand how human beings go about accepting or dismissing certain objects or things as true or false or irrelevant. However, being true to the phenomenological method, one would not separate phenomenological from empirical investigations but would attempt to integrate them in line with the nature of the phenomenon under scrutiny.

It has been acknowledged that the systematicity of Husserl's thought made him reverse the notions of simple and complex when it concerned 'categorical' phenomena; in his *Crisis*, for example, Husserl assigns the status of the most complex to culture and not to idea, as he used to do at the time of *Logical Investigations*. In other words, he clearly begins with eidetic phenomenology and proceeds to transcendental phenomenology in the movement from simpler to more complex phenomenality, ending with culture-relative worlds and their communities. The interface between the two types of phenomenologies with their corresponding operations of reduction and succession of analytic registers is possible only if we show that it does not contradict the accompanying empirical data, but on the contrary opens it up, as it were. While the registers bring together the two emphases, on foundational structures and modes of givenness, empirical methods supply consciousness with empirical universals, which complement previously distilled essences by providing everyday validation of their treatment in communication. The directionality for this cross-sectional analysis of cross-sectional objects is determined by the general procedure of 'questioning-back.'

By 'questioning-back,' Husserl meant the possibility of both eidetic and transcendental forms of inquiry for examining the life-world in a parallel fashion. As he announced in the *Origin of Geometry*, genesis of the life-world is the ultimate objective of phenomenological inquiry, with

the problems of constitution considered an indispensable part of this objective. Both eidetic and transcendental phenomenological analyses can be utilized to this end. As what originates from the life-world, a phenomenon too may be approached in terms of its origin and constitution. However, for a phenomenon, it is important to be situated first, which is typically done by way of a thorough (thick) description of its experience. A phenomenon of consecutive interpreting is not an exception in that regard. Situated in the social world and observable in the acts and activities of human participants, the phenomenon itself suggests that we begin with the ontological path, that is, starting from the natural attitude in two directions: (a) by conducting a general description of consecutive interpreting from the subjective perspective; and (b) by examining consecutive interpreting in terms of the current research paradigm. At this point, the phenomenon is but a rough contour; it is no longer a typified idealization.

The first task will allow us to reformulate the phenomenon depending on the mode of its appearance, for us. This task is performed in the static register and involves a generic description of the phenomenon reduced to a minimum set of most basic structures. The search here is for the phenomenon's primordial foundation. The second task implies understanding the phenomenon as it appears to me. Here, the focus is on the active side of consecutive interpreting. In this case, we do not just describe structure but follow it in action, so to speak. This task must be done locally, meaning that we must turn to data, or to an empirical instance (transcribed from the recording) of naturally occurring talk. The instance will be presented in order to demonstrate that there exists a relationship between collaborative completion and associative synthesis; negative actions and difference in sameness; conversational trajectory and sequential development; constitution of a thematic object and figuration; acts of perception and conversational acts. The register in which this task is to be carried out is genetic. Finally, the generative register will bring us to the analysis of translation approached as a cultural artifact.

All three kinds of analysis (static, genetic, and generative) involve empirical data and off-phenomenological methodology. Since the quasi-phenomenological approach comprises a vast variety of methods (multitude is embedded in the etymology of the word 'quasi,' which means

items or concepts that resemble in some features but differ in others), due to its specific application in this study, I would like to present this combined approach qua the theoretical interface between Husserl's phenomenology, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, pragmatics, and xenology, which is the most recent strand of phenomenology. Although methodologically close, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis allow us to focus on the structural parameters of consecutive interpreting, whether static or dynamic, while pragmatics' focus on the interactional dynamics of face-to-face interaction fits the purpose and direction of genetic analysis in obtaining the sense of a phenomenon as it is constituted by and for the people involved, including myself, in action. In turn, the analysis of consecutive interpreting with xenology will allow us to return to phenomenology for the phenomenon's symbolic meaning.

## Phenomenological Methods in Communicology

So far, when I have spoken about interdisciplinarity, I have referred to empirical methods practiced in the humanities, without specifying them past their names (ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, pragmatics). The methodology that I would like to use in this study belongs to communication studies, which I would like to call 'communicology' after its founder, Richard Lanigan.<sup>15</sup> The relationship between phenomenology and communicology exists; however, the extent and the significance of that relationship are not clear, at least when it comes to traditional phenomenology. This is hardly surprising: in contrast to psychology and anthropology, both sociology and linguistics, which are most closely related to communicology, bore very little interest to Husserl. During his time, both sociology and linguistics were considered as prescriptive disciplines which espoused quantitative methods and operated with macro categories, such as 'population' or 'language,' for example. It is therefore commonly believed that it is Alfred Schütz, a pupil of Husserl and a founder of phenomenological sociology, who should be considered largely responsible for bringing phenomenology into sociology in general

and ethnomethodology in particular. Here, I would like to challenge this claim by (a) diminishing the significance of Schütz's contribution for the development of ethnomethodology and (b) by renewing an appreciation of Husserl and his main methodological insights in the same regard.

The main objection against the idea that Schütz is responsible for the birth of the new sociology by exerting a rather significant influence on its founder, Harold Garfinkel, lies in the fact that Schütz's subject matter ('social world') was set in phenomenological terms; it is in the same terms that he conducted his descriptions and chose the examples. That is to say, he did not bring phenomenology into sociology but took sociological subjects and ran them through phenomenology. Moreover, when developing his phenomenology, Schütz moved away from Husserl toward such metaphysical thinkers as Kaufmann and Whitehead, who, according to Michael Lynch, misled him toward the 'deradicalization' of many of Husserl's initiatives, insisting that (a) 'a historico-praxiological genealogy of scientific measurement begins with "ordinary" arts of measurement and that (b) the question about how numbers correspond to objective properties is to be addressed by investigating the practical contextual production of measurable phenomena' (1991, pp. 82–83). In comparison, when defining ethnomethodology, Garfinkel does not use either conceptual or terminological borrowings from Schütz, but relies on the sociological vocabulary inspired by Talcott Parsons. An indirect effect of phenomenology on ethnomethodology comes through Husserl's critique of scientism. On the one hand, it drew the sociologist's attention to the phenomenological concept of the life-world. On the other hand, it instituted the natural attitude as the primary subject for the new sociology in general and ethnomethodology in particular. In his early essay 'What Is Ethnomethodology?', Garfinkel references Husserl in the interpretation of Marvin Faber, who was one of the first American philosophers to introduce basic Husserlian concepts to American academia. Among these concepts, the most pertinent for Garfinkel appeared to be the notions of 'context' and 'actor:'

Husserl spoke of expressions whose sense cannot be decided by an auditor without him necessarily knowing or assuming something about the biographer and the purposes of the user of the expression, the circumstances of

the utterance, the previous course of the conversation, or the particular relationship of actual and potential interaction that exists between the expressor and the auditor. (Garfinkel 1967, p. 4)

‘Context,’ ‘purpose,’ ‘actor,’ and ‘interaction’ became operational concepts for ethnomethodology, and although their interpretations were still very much influenced by Parsons, the new conceptual setup gave him both a new orientation and direction. For that reason, I would like to outline the key position of Talcott Parsons with an emphasis on his famous ‘backdrop.’

In his 1937 monograph *The Structures of Social Action*, Parsons proposed that no science could afford organizing its facts ignoring basic scientific rules. In this critique hides the emphases on local production and interpretation of evidence. His work with regulated social institutions, which was a staple field for traditional sociology, allowed him to arrive at a ‘voluntaristic theory of action,’ which put the main emphasis on the actors themselves whose norms and values would be central in determining a particular course of action under the constraints of institutional procedures. For the main part, Garfinkel followed his teacher. Thus, he immediately accepted the ‘Parsonian backdrop,’ which required that a frame of reference be created for the participating actors to understand separate actions and concerted activities and communication events. Although similar to the Husserlian emphases, the difference between Parsons and Husserl is irreconcilable on methodological grounds. As John Heritage put it, ‘The differences between Parsons and his student would ultimately crystallize around the question of whether the actor’s point of view [...] should be analyzed by means which were intrinsic or external to the structure of the actor’s experience’ (1984, p. 9). Despite Garfinkel’s stress on experience, where one could see a phenomenological input of another kind, it is safe to assume that, as a fellow sociologist, Garfinkel was originally closer to Parsons in his way of thinking ethnomethodology. However, with time, Garfinkel realized that the radical thinking that distinguished his teacher was still based on outdated sociological presumptions about what made ‘context,’ ‘actor,’ ‘action,’ and ‘structure.’

By assigning great importance to the social being (actor), his or her experiences, and by accepting the constitutive force of interaction,

Garfinkel was led to believe that formal properties of the everyday life were neither imposed from above nor dictated by some supreme authority called 'society,' but were constituted by the participants themselves in a manner of communication.<sup>16</sup> Importantly for his own theory of action, by 'communication' Garfinkel understood 'interaction.' The latter intersubjective emphasis introduced several requirements: (a) co-presence; (b) other-directedness; and (c) purposeful collaboration. In order for communication or interaction to be effective, however, the participants must possess the intrinsic knowledge of the social world and not just in terms of how it is but how it is being done and how to communicate it. Communicative competence signifies the existence of a social order; and this is how Garfinkel explains the meaning of his methodological discovery: 'the task of ethnomethodology is to investigate the local production and natural reflexive accountability of the phenomena of order' (1991, p. 10). The term 'order' is crucial here because Garfinkel understands it in phenomenological terms, as a constitutive rather than an objective fact.

The emphasis on the local production and the requirement of reflexive accountability reaffirms the status of the new sociology by giving its actor the freedom to act and, through his or her action, constitute the social world in accordance with a particular locally stipulated purpose and a specific anticipation of the future (Suchman 1987). In this respect, phenomenology and ethnomethodology share the same problem: objectivism. For Husserl, the problem with objectivism was the forgetfulness of the life-world. According to Wes Sharock and Bob Anderson, this orientation made Husserl cast a 'philosophical doubt on the objective world' (1991, p. 55). We can understand his 'philosophical doubt' as referring to phenomenological reduction. This key methodological means of traditional phenomenology was reformulated by Garfinkel as 'radical reflection,' a means which allowed the new actor to make sense of his past, present, and future actions by accounting for them on the basis of self- and other-reflection. The same applied to the analyst, who could provide an immediate validation of this or that action even if on the most basic normality-abnormality continuum. According to Jeff Coulter, the new actor instituted a remarkable turn in sociology from the macrosociology of a generic society to 'the microsociology of its local communities, their features and orders of organization, logics and patterns' (1991, p. 27).



The 'new actor' was no longer a mindless dope who was meant to mindlessly follow societal rules, but a competent member of the society who could participate fully in the world-making, regardless of whether his or her actions have a positive or negative bearing on the outcome of the interaction because his or her main reason of existence is deproblematization of the world, its continuous resetting to 'zero,' that is, to what Husserl calls the natural attitude.

With this reorientation, Garfinkel not only put into question the 'top to bottom' approach which was practiced in sociology at the time, but made the entire macrosociological program suspicious. This might explain Garfinkel's strong critique of Parsons' allegiance to the sociological concept of 'system.' Once Parsons discovered the effects of his 'backdrop,' he moved to a systematization of his findings. In doing so, he was looking to describe context as a system, acting therefore as a traditional sociologist who believes in generalizability, give or take a facet, of all sociocultural contexts. Taking an issue with this approach led Garfinkel to the notion of context, which, with the help of reflexive accountability, did not need to expose actions, activities, and practices of the participants to the extent that they would have to be explained every single time but could be understood locally as reasonable actions for the current circumstances.<sup>17</sup> Dealing with actions and activities means dealing with the social structure which is central to how sociologists of any persuasion view social phenomena and formulate their research questions. For ethnomethodologists, social structure is 'what refers to some domain of orderly relationships among specified units, that is, the site of regular, repetitive, nonrandom events that stand in a systematic relationship to one another' (Zimmerman and Boden 1991, p. 5).

While in this study, ethnomethodology functions as an umbrella method which, in its main tenets, stands for the entire 'new sociology,' the microsociological emphasis comes about most strongly through conversation analysis which is the ethnomethodological offspring, defined by Garfinkel himself as a true discovery, and not just when it concerns a feature of context but the discovery of a method which deals with 'an entire domain of conversational phenomena whose existence was largely unexpected before' (1991, p. 16).<sup>18</sup> Not only was Harvey Sacks, founder of conversation analysis, a student of Garfinkel's, but he pushed

the ethnomethodological program into advancement by taking it one level up, as it were, by focusing on the structures of social actions in the medium of talk as they are approached or treated by the participants themselves.<sup>19</sup> Thus, the previously defined social structure acquired two additional senses: (a) as a situated activity whose meaning is based on the context constituted in a manner free from local circumstances and (b) as a locally constituted context which is sensitive to the ways in which participants act on the assumption that they as well as their co-participants are autonomous, morally responsible agents whose actions are neither determined nor random; we can call this kind of structure an 'enabled' structure or a structure in action. Once human action brings structure to life, as it were, it does not come out pre-packaged and ready to use. Rather, it emerges as a limited and somewhat prescribed set of means (defined as immediate context) which will help participating actors determine a type of interaction, interaction style, and interaction trajectory of the unfolding event.

In his early essay 'Notes on Methodology,' Sacks describes his indebtedness to ethnomethodology (EM) by positioning it next to conversation analysis (CA), prompting his followers to call this merger 'ethnomethodology/conversation analysis' (EM/CA). With this methodological fusion, the concept of 'social structure' allowed analyses of both micro and macro components, thus making it unnecessary to speak of a divide between micro and macro properties of talk.<sup>20</sup> Sacks also announced that the birth of the joint method signifies a qualitative turn toward descriptive psychology, the turn that reminds one only too well of Husserl's suggested entry into phenomenology. As Sacks put it, the unified method seeks 'to describe methods persons use in doing social life' (1984, p. 21). The emphasis on 'doing being ordinary' betrays the ethnomethodological espousal of common action. It is precisely this understanding of the social underpinnings of patterned actions that Sacks entrusted to conversation analysis. Similarly to Garfinkel, Sacks respecified the idea of 'language,' dropping conventional theory for the study of talk, which is not language, because in conversation analysis language is found in talk, or linguistic logic is found on the modes and rules of conversation. Sacks also assumed that this theme belonged to sociology, but under the rubric of 'organization of talk' rather than just 'language' (Lee 1991, p. 197).

Sacks' understanding of an orderly society was quite different from the traditional sociological one because he proposed that a social order can be found in such a conversational feature as hesitation, for example, and that some micro-features can be crucial for the social activity of conversation. In addition, from Garfinkel, Sacks inherited the phenomenological objection to both psychologism and scientism. Thus, the so-called traditional conversation analysis up to these days refuses to admit its participation in theory-making and prohibits discussions of motivation in the analysis of conversation. As John Heritage put it, Sacks fully subscribed to the main ethnomethodological tenet which was borrowed from phenomenology: 'the original data are neither idealized nor constrained by a specific research design or by reference to a particular theory or hypothesis' (1984, p. 238).<sup>21</sup> However, contrary to his mentor's view, Sacks took this microsociological kind of reduction not only as a lead from talk to action, he chose to explore action-in-talk, dismissing thereby what can be contributory to its course and inessential to it as a phenomenon, refusing, in the same breath, idealizations and generalizations of the social material in favor of data, that is, 'live' (recorded) instances of naturally occurring talk. In this way, he enhanced ethnomethodological features by reducing the social world and its actors to the overarching activity of talk.

Due to a vast variety of conversation analytic approaches that came about as a result of its collaborations with other humanities, such as anthropology, psychology, and linguistics, it is necessary to specify the type of conversation analysis used in this study. Given that it is impossible to constitute conversational context without attending to context, I select for the modification of conversation analysis in this study conversational pragmatics. A contribution of pragmatics lies in an even more minute focus on the practicalities of this or that interaction by taking into account the relationship between and among the participants. Such conversation analytic notions as alignment and affiliation reflect the interpersonal component, allowing the analyst to trace down their influence on the conversational trajectory, in general. The relationships, whether the ones that have existed previously or those that are newly formed, affect both the way agreement is achieved and the entire atmosphere of the meeting. The matters of history, culture, and personal attunement are also pragmatically relevant. If the latter has a negative valence, if the

relations between interlocutors are not strong or are superfluous, one can expect that their interaction will be modified toward an exit of some sorts. On the contrary, if the valence is positive, setting common goals and reaching agreement may be done more effectively, under a different set of practical concerns. In sum, with the aid of pragmatics, we can 'show various aspects of conversation as a form of talk, which "is centrally organized around usage and position"' (Levinson 1983, p. 284).

Finally, the combined microsociological method of ethnomethodology/conversation analysis (EM/CA) cannot be further removed from the traditional studies of language logic, which is 'the study of formal systemic parameters of a system taken in abstraction' (Sharock and Anderson 1991, p. 30). At the same time, the EM/CA method is closely related to ethnography because it requires 'participant observation' to situate the phenomenon by fixing it in a specific orientation, for example, 'institutional.' It is this very orientation that will serve as a matrix to the first order of empirical analysis. Conducted in the static register, the analysis is designed to identify those essential structures that distinguish the phenomenon of oral translation from similar phenomena within the same medium of talk. In order to show the difference between regular and translated talk, I employ the 'simplest systematics of talk' as it was developed by the founders of conversation analysis, H. Sacks, E. Schegloff, and G. Jefferson, in order to reveal alterations to the basic interaction pattern. For comparison I will use actual examples from several naturally occurring interpreting events in the German and English languages. This type of analysis is transcendental-eidetic as it is carried out with a background consisting of the pre-systematized structures of talk which are transcendental for all types of talk (e.g., turn-taking structure); however, the invariant structures which appear intrinsic to consecutive interpreting come out as its essences. On the basis of these essentials, we can expand the provisional name given to oral translation in the earlier analysis by showing its compositional modifications and invariant structures. The thus reformulated phenomenon will serve as the guiding clue for the subsequent empirical investigation of a longer complete segment of talk which will be approached in the genetic register and will employ some key analytical concepts and procedures adopted from EM/CA.

EM/CA is particularly fit for genetic analysis, which puts the redefined phenomenon of consecutive interpreting in a spatiotemporal perspective

of the dyadic or multiparty interaction. The analysis is decidedly transcendental as it seeks to find out how the dynamic deployment of essences in an actual event of oral translation creates local meaning by having the phenomenon disclose those social conditions that go beyond the structural makeup of the translated talk but are necessitated for its execution. In the empirical part of this study, I mainly employ the conversation analytic method with the ethnomethodological focus on translated talk as an activity which makes the practice of interpreting a local event through the use of ethnomethods or ‘folk methods that local participants employ toward the accomplishment of a specific social task’ (Lynch, 1991 p. 133). At times, this task takes place within a particular social frame; hence a specific contribution of Erving Goffman, who invented frame analysis as a means to get to interaction logic.<sup>22</sup> The latter can be disclosed only through close attention paid to the participants’ actions and the relational dynamics among interacting members.<sup>23</sup> For this reason, from the empirical side, the analogue of the genetic register is conversational pragmatics.<sup>24</sup> In the generative register, such an analogue is the communicological method of semiotics. I believe that it is a part of the basic communicological analytical toolkit, and I will argue for it in Chap. 6, which is dedicated to the generative analysis of consecutive interpreting. Its purpose is to solidify the findings from the preceding two registers by adding a symbolic dimension to the study. I access that dimension by analyzing a cultural artifact (feature film) which presents translation both as a metaphor and as an example of symbolic communication.

## Notes

1. In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Husserl is explicit about psychology’s dualistic and psychialistic presuppositions and prejudices when he writes: ‘Psychology had to fail because it could fulfill its task, the investigation of the concrete, only through a radical, completely unprejudiced reflection. Instead of seeking the concrete in the lifeworld, psychology began with the concept of soul which stemmed from Cartesian dualism’ (1970a, pp. 211–212).
2. According to Merleau-Ponty, intentionality is the condition for experiencing the world beyond perceptual acts in the ‘pure’ form (2002, p. 146).

3. This orientation made Sokolowski claim that phenomenon is essentially an intentionality and so are categorial phenomena, especially, because 'they elevate us into a properly human form of truth, the truth that involves speech and reasoning' (2000, p. 103).
4. The actual quote runs as follows: 'But to judge rationally or scientifically about things signifies to conform or to go from words and opinions back to the things themselves, to consult them in their self-giveness and to set aside all prejudices alien to them' (Husserl 1970b, p. 35).
5. Fink calls reduction the 'key concept of Husserl's method' (1970, p. 75). Such high appraisal also confirms the simplicity of Husserl's conceptual vocabulary. Reduction in itself is, however, a complex concept and 'extremely difficult to understand' (Natanson 1973, p. 70).
6. This approach to reduction differs from Patočka's approach, which offers a more traditional typology: 'eidetic reduction which is designed to attain pure immanence; transcendental reduction that allows us to reach beyond horizontal intentionality into the structures of consciousness'; and finally the third reduction that can be called 'cultural' and which intends to discover a 'historical self-formation of humanity' (1996, pp. 88–89; p. 128; p. 169).
7. Welton calls the thus situated object 'a unity of horizontal and vertical constitution' (2000, p. 171).
8. Sokolowski elaborates: 'Once we have gone through exact essences to get to functional relationships, we do not leave ideal forms entirely behind' (1993, p. 105).
9. I give an involved description of generativity in Chap. 6.
10. Sokolowski insists that the Husserlian life-world is 'a world that conditions all experience through the network of *a priori* structures' (1974, pp. 100–101).
11. According to Landgrebe, there is always 'a social plurality within the life-world' (1981, p. 133).
12. Tengelyi attempts to separate sensuous and categorial object, attributing to the latter dispositional sense, which 'refers to an event or a process' (2004, p. 2). Categorial object allows us to see 'something as something else' as compared to seeing 'something as its feature,' for example.
13. I must note that Husserl is hesitant about using the term 'culture.' He uses it extremely rarely in his main corpus; however, judging by the general usage of the term 'community,' it appears to be inclusive of 'culture' in most contexts but especially in Husserl's later works, where it becomes an operational term.

14. I understand 'exemplar' as a singular case that is illustrative of the culture that produces by disclosing what Ragin and Becker call 'central subject problems' (1992, p. 61).
15. See Lanigan (1988, 1992).
16. Here, we can find yet another link between phenomenology and ethnomethodology. Thus, according to Renn, communication, albeit understood differently, was an operational term for both phenomenology in the face of Schütz and ethnomethodological pragmatism in the face of Levinson (2006, pp. 6–12). Moreover, both approaches privileged interaction as a starting point for any investigation of social order.
17. In his critique of Parsons, Turner notices that the notion of 'system' espoused by Parsons 'was outdated as it did not take into account space and time and was for all practical purposes Newtonian, while the relation to embodiment remained Cartesian' (2001, p. 85).
18. An attempt to radicalize microsociology was made by Collins (2004).
19. According to Gumpertz, 'the major goal of conversation analysis is to show how the essentially social orderliness of even the simplest, most casual exchanges is produced, by focusing on the "methods" conversationalists themselves employ in managing verbal exchanges' (1999, pp. 457–458).
20. For the original discussion on the subject of micro-macro relations, see Alexander et al. (1987).
21. This is not to say that everyone believes in the success of 'bracketing' performed by conversation analysis in order to exclude theory from interpretation or present their data for analysis. For a pointed review of EM/CA's alleged 'shortcomings,' see Bogen (1992).
22. For more on the notion of 'frame' as it is used in discourse analysis, see Tannen (1993).
23. There is enough evidence to suggest that one can identify a genetic approach with the general strand of interactionism largely on account of Goffman, who viewed the world as 'a dynamic intersection of appearances and messages, social actors and institutions,' according to Atkinson and Housley (2003, p. 12).
24. The classical representatives of this approach can be found in the work of Maynard (1984), Scannell (1991), Drew and Heritage (1992), and Atkinson (1995), all of whom focus on talk in a specific institutional context, be it medical, media, or legal.

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# 4

## From Consecutive Interpreting to 'Translation-in-Talk'

In this chapter, I examine the essence of consecutive interpreting, its current state of research, and, on this basis, proceed to investigate the phenomenon in the static register, renaming it at the end in accordance with its emergent phenomenality. Two types of structural analysis are utilized to this effect: Husserl's static phenomenology of set forms and the empirical analysis of conversational forms. The relationship between the two types of analysis is built through an interface: while phenomenology provides the frame for examining consecutive interpreting in and of itself, conversation analysis provides the means which allow us to approach the phenomenon as it is given to us as 'live' data. In addition to localizing the phenomenon, the conversation analytic focus on the micro properties of talk shall give the phenomenological terminology empirical currency and, at the end, provide consecutive interpreting with a new ontology. The main objective of the combined analysis is to arrive at a renewed understanding of consecutive interpreting by supplying it with a phenomenologically stipulated and empirically validated definition, which however would apply only to the formal appearance of the phenomenon. In my earlier presentation of the phenomenological

method in Chap. 3, the section on static analysis was necessarily brief. Here, having the phenomenon closer at hand, I would like to present a significantly expanded version of static phenomenology.

### Static Analysis

In a certain way we can therefore distinguish 'explanatory' phenomenology as a phenomenology of regulated genesis, and 'descriptive' phenomenology as a phenomenology of possible, essential shapes (no matter how they have come to pass) in pure consciousness and their teleological ordering in the realm of possible reason under the headings "object" and "sense." In my lectures, I do not want to say 'descriptive' but rather 'static' phenomenology. (Husserl 2001, p. 629)

Husserl made this pronouncement during the so-called middle period of his work. According to his commentators, this period was characterized by an intense systematization of his previous research toward creating a coherent phenomenological method.<sup>1</sup> The emphasis on method brought Husserl to the question of an analytical sequence required for the actual performance (execution) of his phenomenology. Following the structures of the perceiving consciousness, Husserl established two phases or registers for a phenomenological inquiry: static and genetic. In the beginning of any phenomenological analysis, insisted Husserl, we focus on statically situated objects. When we perceive the world naturally, we almost always, at least under normal conditions, take it for an object. Even in the case of movement, we perceive it as a series; hence our ability to reproduce movement but only in a fragmented fashion, sequentially.<sup>2</sup> The same object-making fragmentation applies to events. Husserl notes in that regard that some phenomena do not at all appear to us as object-like; they are either momentous or abstract and some make sense only when observed in actual acts, actions, and activities, such as conversation or talk, or, to be more specific, consecutive interpreting. In other words, there is a temptation to separate object-like phenomena on the basis of their materiality from the non-objects, which can only be perceived *in absentia*, so to speak. From a phenomenological point of view, this is not surprising. In an attempt to deproblematize the world,

natural perception is *naturally* suspicious about complex entities, insisting on objectifying them. At the same time, methodologically, there is no difference between the shout as an object and the stone as an object. Both belong to the objective world as objective phenomena. This thesis made Husserl suggest that, in the beginning, a phenomenological analysis should necessarily be static; its key task should lie in identifying those objectifying immanence(s) or essence(s) that present an object as 'that' object, or an identity-object.<sup>3</sup>

For the basic analytical tool that would undress, as it were, the phenomenon in question to its most foundational components, features, and modes of presenting, Husserl proposes two phenomenological operations: 'bracketing' and 'free fantasy variation.' Since I have dwelt at length on these concepts in Chap. 3, I will not go into any great detail here. Suffice it to say that with the help of bracketing, reduced are those theoretical assumptions that lead to a pre-understanding or anticipation of a phenomenon prior to its rigorous examination for sides, aspects, and manifolds; reduced are also those positivist renditions whose validity is established by the phenomenon's surface value or presence. The suspension of explicit interpretations allows us to approach the phenomenon undergoing analysis as a stable construct, which is not to say that the stability in question can be equated with the permanency. For phenomenology, the world is always in a state of flux, developing, evolving, or simply moving. By putting a stop to the object's historization, bracketing does not stop the flux; instead it allows the phenomenologist to focus on the object's non-intermittent form or identity. Free fantasy variation comes in at this point as a means of investigating that identity by having our attention directed to the founding relationship between parts and wholes, as well as the relationship between the analyzed and similarly constituted phenomena. As a result of engaging bracketing and free fantasy variation, we arrive at the phenomenon's essence(s) or invariables, which serve as the conditions for perceiving the analyzed phenomenon as a stable form.

Importantly, static analysis is not limited to the description of individual 'objects'; it also offers an investigation of the phenomenal field, or, in phenomenological terms, a common ontology. This investigation also releases an ideal view of the phenomenon but this ideality belongs

to the public rather than the private sphere. In this way, static analysis incorporates intersubjectivity as a field of knowledge which is devoid of any temporal (historical) dimension. The combined emphasis lets us 'capture' both the essential features of consecutive interpreting and their natural scientific interpretations toward bringing the phenomenon to us as a particular 'species.' We can therefore define static phenomenology as a phenomenology of species and their constitutive essences. In static analysis, constitution refers to various ontologies and their corresponding teleologies that embed a phenomenal object qua the natural attitude. In the natural attitude, the object is presented as a flat figure posted against a flat horizon. Taking the object out of the natural attitude brings into relief those hidden sides and aspects of an object, its internal horizon, so to speak, that are ordinarily hidden from the two-dimensional presentation of the everyday. It also expands the external horizon of an object by way of presenting the possibilities (contexts) for its appearance as the same object. Finally, identifying the phenomenon as a species is set to be a hermeneutical task: as a unity of presence and absence, an identity is what we refer to when we name things. So, at the end of the static analysis, the phenomenon will appear as a form in two respects: perceptively as a shape (form 1) and nominally as a name (form 2).

The work of capturing the sameness (essence) of an object is subject to direction or orientation. By having contrasted the subjective time and common ontology in relation to a particular object, we have in fact allowed for two different vectors which can be utilized to undress an object to its essential structures: progressive and regressive.<sup>4</sup> Following Husserl's famous dictum 'back to the things themselves,' I would like to begin the static analysis regressively with that which is the most obvious, for example, the object's ontological status, and then proceed backward, as it were, toward the essential or founding structures using the findings from the ontological analysis as leading clues.<sup>5</sup> This means that we should put the public view of the phenomenon into focus first, looking for the informed arrangement of those sides, aspects, profiles, and manifolds that characterize consecutive interpreting as 'that' phenomenon. No reduction is needed at this stage. Here we simply describe what has already been interpreted and explained. From the ontological path we move to a subject-centered description of the phenomenon

which is placed in active memory and imagination. The procedures of 'bracketing' and 'free fantasy variation' are indispensable for this task. The purpose of this 'priming' here is to offer a preliminary critique of the natural attitude and its take on the phenomenon of consecutive interpreting by running its basic claims through the focused reflection. The critique of the natural attitude is not the end point of the phenomenological description, however, because it aims at supplying a new ontology or a field of knowledge for the emergent phenomenon. As was postulated before, this new ontology will have to be developed from within the empirical realm with the assistance of a suitable (phenomenology-friendly) empirical method.

In sum, static analysis provides both a description of the phenomenon as an 'object' and an analytical direction for its investigation. As for the former, I would like to reiterate my earlier statement that consecutive interpreting belongs to the interspecies 'translation,' in that, it shares the sense of translation to the extent that it falls under the species called 'translation' as a 'subspecies.' All oral forms of interpreting are 'subspecies' to the main category because they are associated with translation but do not exhaust the notion of translation by and in themselves. Among those we find simultaneous interpreting and consecutive interpreting, which stand on the opposite sides of the 'oral' continuum. While emphasizing the importance of founding for phenomenology, static analysis also distinguishes between vertical and horizontal founding. The former has a diachronic (historical) vector. Its constitutive modes deal with the formation of diachronic strata. The diachronic notion of history transcends these strata, pointing both back toward the past and forward toward the future. The strata are formed by events; they themselves can be considered as eventualities. The synchronic vector of the horizontal founding implies an immediate history that develops on the horizontal plane as an actuality. Both are considered a part of static analysis; however, as I have indicated earlier, my use of static analysis here is purposefully limited to its function as a guide for the next analytical phase. It helps me situate consecutive interpreting as a current ontology so that I can counter this ontology with a phenomenological alternative which is going to enable me to redefine the position of consecutive interpreting within its own 'species' as a discrete member.

## The Ontological Status of Consecutive Interpreting

How shall we determine the current ontology of consecutive interpreting? According to Husserl, an ontological status of an emergent phenomenon can be determined either by a current collection of informed, which, in this case, means 'academic' (theoretical), views on a phenomenon presented in a methodologically argued way or by way of key axiomatic positions. These positions represent robust bodies of knowledge or ontologies. The discipline of interpreting studies is one of them. As all disciplines, it claims a certain phenomenon or a group of phenomena to be its proper subject, which means that only certain methods could be considered proper to an investigation of that subject. At the same time, unlike the established discipline of translation studies, interpreting studies are still emerging, showing fuzzy methodological boundaries and a high dependence on other disciplines, especially those associated with the humanities which supply outside methodological resources. Moreover, as it becomes clear from a close look at the relationship between translation studies and interpreting studies, the former functions as an umbrella discipline for the latter by taking upon itself the responsibility for the selection of 'proper' subject matters and methods, as well as the amount of attention given to some themes (memes) and not others.<sup>6</sup> From this perspective, interpreting studies appears to be a subdiscipline, or, to put it in phenomenological terms, a 'subspecies' of translation studies. Formally, we can trace the birth of interpreting studies to the publication of *The Interpreting Studies Reader*.<sup>7</sup> In the introduction, the editors, M. Schlesinger and F. Pöchhacker, explain the need for recognizing a new subdiscipline by 'the growing academization of the field [...] and the rapidly expanding use of oral translation' (2002, p. 1).

*The Interpreting Studies Reader* was closely followed by *Introducing Interpreting Studies* by F. Pöchhacker who presented his introductory text as a matrix for or a 'map of interpreting studies' (2004, p. 2). In this chapter, I would like to employ Pöchhacker's 'map' in such a way



as to be able to distill from it the predominant sense of consecutive interpreting.

According to Pöchhacker, there are four main concepts in interpreting studies that help create the subdiscipline's self-sustaining research paradigms: 'cognition,' 'language,' 'culture,' and 'interaction' (2004, pp. 60–62). The research which uses these concepts as central for the subdiscipline comes from both the humanities and social sciences. The predominant contributors here are sociology, linguistics, ethnography, cultural studies, psychology, including cognitive studies, and communication. These 'outside' disciplines from the humanities and social sciences alike are relevant for all types of interpreting, albeit to a different extent.<sup>8</sup> The emergence and significance of the new media expanded the traditional resources for interpreting studies to media studies and electronically assisted interpreting (e.g., Cattrysse 2000; Minhua 2011; Hubscher-Davidson and M. Borodo 2014).

Having assisted the research on simultaneous interpreting for a long time, I can say that cognitive studies are a relatively new addition to the study of consecutive interpreting. At the same time, the emphasis on memory and recall makes this field or mode of inquiry quite relevant for the analyzed phenomenon (e.g., Danks et al. 1997; Tijus 1997; Tomolla 1999; Baddeley 2000; Shlesinger 2000, Ferreira and Schwieter 2015; Ehrensberger-Dow and Dimitrova 2015). In contrast, sociocultural research, especially in the area of language and social interaction, seems to respond to consecutive interpreting in a stronger way, as it tends to approach interpreting from the side of performance, specialized discourse (context), and interaction (e.g., Layton 1985; Wadensjö 1992; Gile 1994; Linell 1997; Dimitrova 1997; Krouglov 1999; Roy 2000; Kurz 2001; Angelelli 2004; Pym and Shlesinger 2006). Other, more traditional approaches which borrow from psychology and linguistics are universally well represented in interpreting studies as their focus stays consistently limited to the analysis of the interpreter's state or performance (e.g., Keith 1983; Wadensjö 1993; Anderson 1994; Dillinger 1994; Hatim and Mason 1997; Setton 2003; Kalina 2005; Grbić 2008). A recent trend on process research for interpreting can be identified as an attempt to pull all the emphases together (e.g.,

Tirkkonen-Condit and Jääskeläinen 2000; Alves 2003; Alvstad and Hild 2011). Unfortunately, and this I believe to be a side effect of the field's interdisciplinarity, the diversity of individual approaches and methods that one encounters in the emergent discipline of interpreting studies is too vast for individual appraisals and can only be mitigated by limited or constrained typologies.<sup>9</sup>

It is for this reason that I would like to take Pöchhacker's 'map' as the official typology and proceed with it. I believe that this introductory text provides the researcher with a set of coordinates that could specify the subject of interpreting studies across different disciplines and thereby give an anchor to a formal examination of consecutive interpreting. Pöchhacker's set of coordinates is built on eight elements: 'medium, setting, mode, languages (source and target), discourse, participants, interpreter, and problem' (2004, p. 23). We can say that these elements function as the conditions for the possibility of all types of interpreting. Specified in terms of these elements, as a discrete phenomenon, consecutive interpreting is placed on the interpreting studies' map as 'a continuum which ranges from the renditions of utterances as short as one word to the handling of entire speeches, or more or less lengthy portions thereof' (Pöchhacker 2004, p. 18). In other words, consecutive interpreting is conceived as a type of process, which prescribes immediacy and pursues 'communication across barriers and cultures' (Pöchhacker 2004, p. 10). In fact, all types of oral translation happen 'here' and 'now' and all of them deal with communicating across the barriers set by the foreign. Immediacy seems to bear equal importance for simultaneous and consecutive interpreting alike; however, the actual 'use' points to a radical difference in the function of immediacy for either interpreting type.<sup>10</sup>

Therefore, it is to the investigation of consecutive interpreting as a fixed type of interaction that I would like to turn next. Husserl's procedures of 'bracketing' and 'free fantasy variation' based on my personal experiences of the phenomenon will assist me during that stage. The focus of this second-order analysis is to identify and counter the current ontology of interpreting studies with a phenomenological description of the phenomenon as it is given to memory (recollections) and imagination (projections).

## A Phenomenological Reorientation of Consecutive Interpreting

The first order of phenomenological analysis, although subject-originated and subject-centered, is necessarily built on the results of the examination of the current ontology of consecutive interpreting. An earlier inquiry into the proposed conditions for the analyzed phenomenon yielded the following elements: 'medium, setting, mode, languages (source and target), discourse, participants, interpreter, and problem.' It also defined its process orientation ('immediacy') as well as its purpose ('communicating across languages and cultures'). A preliminary investigation into the concepts of immediacy gave us a refined understanding of consecutive interpreting as a type of proximal interaction conducted in more than one language, with face-to-face communication being its foundational mode of delivery. I also defined 'delay' as a necessary condition built into the consecutive production of bilingual or multilingual interaction. In this section I would like to scrutinize this understanding of consecutive interpreting, comparing it, whenever necessary, with its close kin, simultaneous interpreting. As I stated earlier, an examination of structural elements is based on the idea of leading clues, where the phenomenological procedure brings us back to the foundational structures, thus indicating the verticality of the analysis, while a cross-phenomenal comparison is going to help us establish an independent identity for consecutive interpreting within its own species on the horizontal level.

With this in mind, I begin by bracketing all the findings from the previous account and by suspending all the previously held theoretical assumptions about consecutive interpreting and its elementals. I also have to bracket myself as an interpreter and approach the interpreting event entirely as a bystander. After positioning myself in this admittedly artificially neutral way, I proceed by conjuring up a mental image of the phenomenon under any of its commonly used names. After remembering an event of consecutive interpreting, in which I myself participated at some point (never mind when or where), I step back and reflect on my memory of that event. I use the term 'event' rather than 'phenomenon' in order to underscore the heavy 'contamination' of the world when it

comes to the initial idea; it is simply not as refined, although not necessarily untrue. My first impression is therefore unsurprising as it does not come from the activity of interpreting *per se*, but from the context of its production. This context is not to be equated with a 'setting,' as, because of its mixed character, it is not just a place.

By way of a digression, the distinction between the internal or 'intra-lingual' and external or 'multilingual' would not matter at this point. Rather, it consists of an assembly of differences embodied by interacting human beings. On the general level, the context is but a background. Returning to the description, in addition to the differences in appearance and behavior, which I perceive before language, there are also differences that come to me auditorily by way of a foreign tongue or several tongues, some of which are accessible to me wholly, as is the case with the English language, while others are accessible to me only by name or by a vague reference to the region and the people who might speak these languages. Further, I observe different modes of communication depending on the language use and the extent of foreignness implied. It is already at this point that I distinguish between perceptual, linguistic, and communicative differences as contributory for the context of consecutive interpreting. At the same point, I note the effects of foreignness, but cannot attend to this notion as it appears too abstract to capture.

My observations of these differences become more focused when I shift to the activity of consecutive interpreting. An activity here is not a sociological but a phenomenological concept; it is more of a 'mode' than an 'activity.' While examining the mode in which consecutive interpreting is given, or appears to me, I immediately notice that this mode is not arbitrary or natural but rather non-arbitrary and unnatural, pointing to a specific purpose. Moreover, contrary to the previously defined purpose as 'communication across languages and cultures,' the phenomenological notion of purpose takes it as *telos*, which does not yield to generalizations but is always context-bound, that is to say, formed by the task at hand. The latter reformulates the activity of interpreting into an event of interpreting. The latter can be either formal (protocol driven) or informal; for example, a fellow passenger who is going through the passport control in a foreign or native country may volunteer, at the request of the border control officer or by his or her own volition, to interpret for his or her

fellow traveler, who does not speak the language of the country he or she wishes to enter or the language understandable to the officer. As an aside, the key purpose of an interpreting event is not just the resolution of some 'problem' in that there are some interpreting events which are organized for protocol only; they still connote a purpose, but their pragmatism is phatic, without having any problem stated or with no resolution required. The same can be said about community interpreting, which follows the general pattern of communication within a small group of familiars, as in an intercultural family, where some members speak the language of the foreign land and others do not.

Continuing my examination with the setting for consecutive interpreting, as it is juxtaposed to the overall context, which would have to include the experience of the foreign, I find its most typical expression not in a formal or an informal but in a semiformal meeting. The interpreted meeting, whether it takes place in a mobile or stationary fashion, under the roof or in the open, one-on-one or before a large audience, should count as the experience-based context for the interpreting process in the consecutive mode. At the same time, a meeting during which a perceiving subject comes into communicative contact with another not fully accessible human being is sufficiently unique to be called just a meeting. Some of this uniqueness comes from the fact that face-to-face communication requires a certain normative behavior which exposes such components as etiquette and procedure. These do expose cultural differences, just like the previous experience of interpreting, as some cultures, especially multilingual ones, for example, Belgian or Swiss, possess a knowledge and an expectation about consecutive interpreting which are suitable for some but not other cultures and occasions.

In comparison, moving to the horizontal level of analysis, the confined anonymity of the simultaneous interpreter frees him or her from taking into account this interactional necessity. Lending just a voice in comparison to lending a voice and a body to an interpreted interaction means a crucial difference between being a co-creator of the interpreting event in a full sense and a contributor to an event, no matter how essential the simultaneous interpreter's contribution may be. Apart from the difference between the two types of interpreting, in both cases, we deal with the figure of the interpreter almost in the same way. Although

a necessary condition for the interpreting event, this figure is placed in the background and, unless a breach of some kind occurs (e.g., when an interpreter hesitates and stops his or her interpreting), it stays in abatement for the duration of the encounter. The ability of a non-interpreting participant to disattend from the interpreting person and focus instead on the activity of interpreting brings consecutive and simultaneous interpreting in close proximity. A further investigation of that proximity leads me to the act of interpreting.

When I go one step further or back and focus on consecutive interpreting as an act, I notice that 'the interpreting-as' is not homogeneous but can be differentiated to the extent that it can include the product pole or 'the interpreting-that' and the process pole, or 'the interpreting-toward.' The intentional relationship between the two poles requires further reflection. At first, the phenomenon appears to me as a product, that is, as a phrase, a sentence, or a series of sentences uttered in a foreign or native language in a manner that links them to the body of the speaker. The figure of the speaker is bifurcated, however. There is a joint way of speaking that includes the 'first' speaker who speaks 'from himself or herself' and the speaker who speaks on this person's behalf, but in a way that differs only as a juxtaposition of comprehension and incomprehension. As a result, I end up distinguishing between two types of utterances: the original utterance spoken in a language other than the one used by the interpreter and the interpreter's utterance produced in response to the original message. Both utterances comprise the act of consecutive interpreting, forming a dual utterance or an adjacency pair, as the conversational analysis has it. I, however, wish to suspend this theoretic and simply state that in the case of consecutive interpreting we rarely take the act of speaking for granted as we would have done within the same communicative environment. I attribute the reason behind this partitioning to the interpreter's turn. Within this turn, divergent utterances do not appear separate but create a sequential co-presence without simultaneity or a semblance thereof as is the case with simultaneous interpreting.

In pursuit of this difference, I isolate the interpreter's utterance as an act of speaking in and of itself so that I can reflect on the conditions for its production. I then see that behind the interpreter's turn stand other acts, such as the acts of hearing, memorizing, and transforming the 'original'

utterance that belongs to someone else into the interpreter's utterance. In fact, it is through the acts of attending, retaining, and recalling that the speech act of interpreting is made possible. At the same time, the operation of bracketing and my allegedly neutral stance prevent me from exploring these acts either separately or together. Back to the interpreter's turn—the interpreter may perform his or her interpretations right after he or she hears a translatable utterance in a foreign language, or take time in completing his or her interpretation of it. This is what makes consecutive interpreting an explicitly delayed process, and the cause of the delay emerges as a strategically placed pause that interrupts the ordinary flow of a conversation to serve an unnatural purpose: to link similar (in content) utterances in one whole of a double utterance with two separate origins; hence, the previously distilled sense of duality. Since only one of these utterances is a source of attention at a time, it might be legitimate for us to speak of consecutive interpreting in terms of a co-determinate or co-extensive whole.

Retaining my focus on the dual appearance of interpreting, we come to experience it as a non-homogeneous 'stop-and-go' activity: after one speaker utters several phrases or sentences, the interpreter re-acts them as a whole, rearranging their sequential order, altering their form, and, finally, transferring this product to the other speaker. After the other party speaks, the process repeats itself. It is therefore this pendulum-like movement that produces an impression of the whole despite the position of the two languages *vis-à-vis* each other in a linguistic standoff. The interpreter embodies the whole; standing between the parties, who wish to communicate through him or her, makes him or her resemble a medium. When observing an interpreter in action, it is hardly possible to ignore the fact that he or she is a substitute in at least two ways: as a person who stands for himself or herself but also as a person who stands for any other party. Substitution, therefore, emerges as a universal condition for the possibility of consecutive interpreting. In addition to the figure of the interpreter, it applies to both the activity and the act of interpreting. To sum it up, 'separation' as 'division' and 'substitution' as 'standing for' embodied by two different languages deployed one right after the other with their speakers taking one turn at a time appear to provide for the possibility of interlingual communication under the extraordinary conditions of its production.

Further attending to the extraordinariness of the analyzed phenomenon makes it apparent that the 'extra' in question refers to talk and its modification. In other words, if the delay appears to be created by the intermittent pace of the interpreting activity that interrupts the flow of conversation, the regularity of the interruption points to an optimization of talk in light of the encounter with alienness.<sup>11</sup> Unlike interruption, which prevents unilateral completion of utterances and therefore encourages a return to the incomplete material later or leads to stalling or even abandoning the current conversational trajectory, delay appears to be built into the interpreted talk structurally. A close investigation of this structure allows me to identify it as 'repeat.' In contrast to repeating, which is a conversational act, repeat is a conversational structure. Once the distinction between the two is recognized, the role of the interpreter stops being central to consecutive interpreting. In its place comes repeat which signifies the intersubjective property of a specific communication event rather than the actor's motivated response within the order of this event. This distinction brings us away from the founding dependence of the interpreting phenomenon on the actor and brings us to the foundational role of talk. It appears that the use of delay as a socially acceptable form of communication creates an interactional irregularity which modifies the ordinary talk to the extent that it develops into a particular form of talk. This makes talk the foundational order, with its logic motivating the structure of consecutive interpreting. In order to see the relationship between consecutive interpreting and talk from the interactional perspective, I would like to engage the empirical method of conversation analysis. At the end, I expect us to come up with the conversational identity for the phenomenon of consecutive interpreting. Subsequently, this identity shall receive a new ontological status and an updated definition.

## Organization of Talk

As explained in Chap. 3, the transition from phenomenology to conversation analysis is carried out through an empirical interface. Due to the embeddedness of translation-in-talk, the empirical side is represented by conversational data. I draw this data from a 'live' event in which I per-



sonally participated. For the analysis of this data I would like to use the basic turn-taking systematics that was originally explored by the founding members of conversation analysis, Harvey Sacks, Emanuel Schegloff, and Gail Jefferson, in their seminal 1974 article 'A Simplest Systematics for the Organization of Turn-Taking for Conversation.' This work has been programmatic for the conversation analytic tradition, and, although frequently challenged, it continues to define its foundations. In order to establish its relevance for this study, I would like to recapitulate the article's key points. Along with many other types of social activities, Sacks et al. defined conversation as a 'speech-exchange system' (1974, p. 696). This economic metaphor presupposes that the system is based on trading some kind of commodity. For the conversation analyst, the conversational commodity in question is a 'turn.' A turn is defined as a sequential presentation of utterances in action. Its lexical shape can be that of a word, a phrase, or a sentence. Several utterances may comprise the speaker's turn. In talk, turns are designed for trading by adhering to certain pre-specified rules. Sacks et al. define these rules as follows: '(a) upon a completion of one turn, the first speaker may select next speaker; (b) if the current speaker doesn't select next, the next speaker may self-select; (c) the current speaker may continue. If the current speaker continues the whole set of rules re-applies at the next transition-relevance place' (Sacks et al. 1974, p. 704).

Transition-relevance place is a place in talk where a transfer of turns occurs. This concept is particularly pertinent for consecutive interpreting. As I indicated earlier, the bifurcation of interpreting into two kinds of utterances with different origins creates a problem for the interpreter as far as moving in and out of the interaction is concerned. An exchange of turns is hardly possible without a coordinated effort of some kind. In normal interaction, the speaker designates a transfer of turns in a variety of ways: syntactically, by completing a sentence; semantically, by completing a topic; prosodically, by the falling intonation; and, non-verbally, by turning to the other party, looking up, nodding, even gesturing a completion. For the interpreter, these means are also operative; however, their use is limited, depending on the formality of the interpreting event. In light of the preliminary investigation, which emphasized the interruptive character of interpreted talk, this place seems to be particularly important

for the understanding of the difference between the sequential production of talk and the consecutive production of interpreting. By focusing on this place, we can examine other provisions that govern conversation and are relevant for interpreting.

With Sacks et al., we can identify these provisions as follows: 'speaker change occurs'; 'overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time'; 'occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief'; 'transitions with no gap or overlap are common'; 'turn order is not fixed but varies'; 'turn size is not fixed but varies'; 'length of conversation is not specified in advance'; 'what parties say is not specified in advance'; 'relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance'; 'number of parties can vary'; 'talk can be continuous or discontinuous'; 'turn-allocation techniques are used'; 'repair mechanisms exist to deal with turn-taking errors and violations' (1974, pp. 700–701). Conversation analysts claim that these grossly observable facts are standard for any conversational activity, be it a business negotiation or an after-dinner chat. In combination with the rules of turn allocation, they make the turn-taking system a transcendental structure that does not depend on a particular context yet is somewhat modifiable by it. In conversation analysis, this dual property of conversation is known as 'context free' and 'context sensitive.'<sup>12</sup> On the one hand, the system is insensitive to such parameters of context as 'times, spaces, and identities of parties to interaction' (Sacks et al. 1974, p. 699). On the other hand, it can be altered by specific conditions. However, even in a speech-exchange system other than conversation, its particularities 'are exhibited in systematically organized ways and places' (Sacks et al. 1974, p. 699). In other words, modified components may allow the speech economy to function more efficiently; yet, no modification overrides any of its fundamental principles.

Another way to describe this relationship is through the local versus interactional management. The turn-taking system is locally managed in that it is 'directed to "next turn" and "next transition" on a turn-by-turn basis' (Sacks et al. 1974, p. 725). This allows turn sizes and turn orders to vary significantly in different contexts without shutting down the system due to prolonged stretches of talk, simultaneous talk, or unrecognized transitions. The system is also interactionally managed as it presupposes that the participants are familiar with the rules that govern the talk and

exercise them together in a manner that allows them to achieve their goals collaboratively. The local management of talk extends this collaboration into 'recipient design.' Recipient design is the awareness that speakers exhibit toward specific features of a context, whether it is an institutional setting or the relationships with their interlocutors. With the help of recipient design, participants manage 'topic selection, word selection, admissibility and ordering of sequences, options and obligations for terminating and starting conversations' (Sacks et al. 1974, p. 727). The relationship between the organization of single turns and the system of turn allocation is maintained by a repair mechanism that allows the talk to proceed unproblematically without interruptions or overlaps.

Approached in terms of their problematic effects on the system, some interruptions can be more damaging than others. Sacks et al. distinguish between gaps, lapses, and pauses depending on their disruptive potential as well as their specific placement in talk: 'Intra-turn silence is a "pause," and initially not to be talked over by others; silence after a possible completion point is, initially, a "gap," and to be minimized; extended silences at transition-relevance places may become "lapses"' (Sacks et al. 1974, p. 715). The relationship among the three kinds of inner conversational silence is that of mutability. A gap may become a pause if the other self-selects at a potential transition-relevance place and continues to talk. Likewise, a gap may become a lapse if no party speaks next. Of the three types of silences, the most problematic for turn allocation is gap; in terms of the turn organization, the most problematic is pause. Because it is conversation terminable, lapse does not influence conversation management to nearly the same degree as do gap and pause.<sup>13</sup>

When gaps, pauses, and other potential sources of conversational trouble occur, the participants engage repair mechanism. In conversation analysis, the issue of repair is undertaken systemically in terms of 'the social organization of conversational interaction' (Schegloff et al. 1977, p. 362). Correction is traditionally defined as 'a reference to the replacement of an "error" or "mistake" by what is "correct"' (Schegloff et al. 1977, p. 363). In order to avoid the unfortunate behavioral connotations, the same authors suggested that the term 'repair' should be used rather than the term 'correction.' In the conversation analytic literature, repair is understood as a means to maintain the sequential organiza-

tion of talk in its unproblematic development. They recognize two types of repair: 'self- and other-repair.' Although they have different origins, both types of repair may be initiated by the same 'repairable' or 'trouble source.' There are three types of trouble sources that can be addressed by either self- or other-repair: 'word replacement, repair on person reference, and repair on next-speaker selection' (Schegloff et al. 1977, p. 370). The two types are also ordered relative to each other. 'They are positioned successively and alternate turn-by-turn between positions between self- and other-initiations' (Schegloff et al. 1977, p. 372). The self- and other-correction are not symmetrical: the analysis of empirical data shows a distinct preference for self- versus other-correction.

According to Schegloff et al., these findings point to a social organization that 'prescribes' that most repairs are done by the speaker who produces a trouble spot; most self-corrections are done in the same turn or at the next transition-relevance place. At the same time, 'other-initiations overwhelmingly yield self-corrections' (Schegloff et al. 1977, p. 376). In identifying a trouble source and moving to repair it, the parties orient to the trouble source's place of origin as what is 'belonging' or 'not belonging' to them. In the case of an error, they subsequently attempt to redeem it by returning to the 'trouble spot' and eliminate it before the other person; a participant in the conversation 'catches' the error, turns it into a theme and a problem, and offers a correction. The latter is, however, treated as an intervention and is not taken for granted by the party in error. The preference for self-correction is, therefore, an issue of ownership, which is particularly pertinent for the translator who is often thought to 'stand for' the original speaker by body and voice, but also, and this is where an expectation of neutrality comes from, by his or her position.

In sum, the turn-taking systematics is a basic mechanism that regulates talk-in-interaction. As a regulative system, turn-taking predetermines certain rules that accompany the conversational economy just described. Most of the rules are sufficiently flexible to allow for a wide variety of speech-exchange systems, of which conversation is the primordial one. Turn-taking rules make conversation a social vehicle for producing norms and thus normative behavior. The norm-producing character of conversation connects it to translation, which, as I have shown in the previous section, is also a normative practice. In the next section, I would

like to explore this relationship through the analysis of context-free conversational properties. I therefore reduce the concrete circumstances that generated a specific instance of consecutive interpreting to its most basic conversational features. The purpose of the analysis is to identify the phenomenon as a type of speech-exchange system. I then proceed with a local analysis that will determine the effects of the context on the analyzed example.

## The Interpreter's Turn

Upon the initial examination of interpreting carried out in the previous sections, it becomes immediately evident that conversing with the linguistic and cultural other in interpreting is not possible without the interpreter's turn. My thesis here is that the interpreter's turn should constitute the primary condition for the possibility of consecutive interpreting. I therefore suggest that we conduct a brief investigation of the interpreter's turn as far as its function and structure are concerned. I have already mentioned that, from the conversation analytic standpoint, the function of the interpreter's turn is that of repeat. Although never an exact replica of the previous turn, the translator's turn is designed to repeat its syntactic, semantic, and lexical composition. What makes the translator's turn radically different from any other structure in an interaction is the unique mode of code-switching. Switching from one language code to the other consistently and repeatedly throughout the interaction contrasts the translator's turn to other turns in the same interaction. As consistently as the translator's turn switches from one code to the other, other turns adhere to one specific code, that is, one language.

Although a definitional moment of translation-in-talk, the translator's turn does not determine the phenomenon on its own. In the previous sections, I showed the impossibility of reducing communication with the cultural other to the translator's manipulations with two codes/languages. The co-determinate relationship between two languages and cultures rather conditions the possibility of translation-in-interaction, calling for the intersubjective focus. This means an exploration of the translator's turn in relation to other turns. As a repeat, the translator's

turn already points to its intersubjective properties: it is clearly contingent on the preceding and following turns. The code-switching structure also indicates the dependence of the translator's turn on the preceding and following codes. That is why the relationship between the translator's turn and other turns can be defined as co-determinate: no translation-in-talk is possible without two independently performed codes and the code-switching performed in the translator's repeat. These features force a modification of talk in a way which is significantly different from the conversation matrix proposed by Sacks et al. (1974).

In what follows, I would like to investigate the unique features of translation-in-talk in terms of its deviations from the following basic parameters: 'turn order is not fixed but varies'; 'turn size is not fixed but varies'; 'length of conversation is not specified in advance'; 'number of parties can vary'; 'talk can be continuous or discontinuous' (Sacks et al. 1974, pp. 700–701). My overall objective is twofold: (a) to show the extent to which the translator's turn alters the basic organization of talk; and (b) to determine those features that condition the possibility of translation-in-talk as a speech-exchange system. This time I will use actual examples of interpreting that have been shared by those of my colleagues who work with languages other than Russian and English. The structure of the translator's turn does not depend on the structural makeup of an individual language, whether this language is Slavic, Germanic, Romance, or Chinese. As for the period of time when this event took place, it is irrelevant. I suggest that we assume that the analyzed recording was made during an interpreting event that took place in the United States between 2010 and 2012. The examples are transcribed following basic conversation analytic conventions.

### **Number of Parties**

Since the interpreter does not repeat himself or herself but always someone else, and only one such someone else at a time, similarly to some other kinds of institutional talk (debate, interview, deposition), interpreted talk restricts the number of parties. Typically, this number is limited to three: the guest, the host, and the interpreter. I use the singular here, but could have as well used the plural. However, I cannot conceive

of a situation (nor have I experienced one) when this number would be less than three. One can imagine a written text taking the place of one of the parties of course. In this case, the text will function as a proxy, extending what would have otherwise been the speaker's utterance indefinitely but precluding any further kind of sequentiality which links consecutive interpreting to talk. In a situation where there are more than two language codes involved (e.g., one party speaks French, another party speaks German, and still another Japanese), there may be more than one interpreter, or the same interpreter may switch to more than two codes. However, no consecutive interpreting is possible without at least three parties involved. For an illustration, please consider the first instance. It was collected in the office of an immigration attorney. In addition to the attorney (A), present are his German client (K) and an interpreter (T):

*Instance I:*

- 1A: Good evening Mister Klepner. Thank you for coming over on such a short notice=  
 2T: =Guten Abend Herr Klepner. Vielen Dank, dass Sie so: ahhm (.) kurzfristig vorbeikommen konnten.  
 3 (2.0)  
 4K: Guten Abend Herr Smith (.) Ich bin gekommen so schnell ich konnte. Ich hoffe es  
 5 gibt keine schlechten Nachrichten?  
 6T: Good evening Mister Smith (.) I came as fast as I could, I hope there is no bad news  
 (1.0)  
 7A: No:↓ No:↓ of Co:urse not. I just invited you because there is some movement with  
 8: your case (.) and we need to-ah discuss some matters in that regard. Shall I stop ↑here  
 9: and let you translate.  
 (1.0)  
 10T: Yes. Thank you. Ahmma nein. ↓Nein. *natürlich* nicht. Ich habe Sie nur eingeladen

- 11 weil ah (1.0) es neue Bewegungen in Ihrem Fall gibt. und wir  
müssen einige
- 12 Angelegenheiten besprechen=  
13K: =Ich glaube, ich verstehe, was er sagt, also übersetzen Sie bitte  
einfach nur, was ich
- 14 sage. Wenn ich nicht verstehe, frage ich Sie. Ist das in Ordnung?  
15T: Ja. Natürlich [turning to A] Mister Klepner wants me to translate  
only what he says.
- 16 He understands some English.

As was proposed earlier, the interpreter 'owns' her repeat due to the recipient design set up by the other two participants in the meeting. However, as we can see from this instance, the interpreter does not control the deployment of his or her repeat. So, deployment itself becomes a negotiable feature of talk. Here, Herr Klepner, who speaks some English, lets the interpreter know that she can skip interpreting the other person's line because he understands English but would prefer not to speak it; otherwise, the expectation is that the interpreter would translate every preceding turn. With this, the non-English speaker confirms the interpreter's standing, no matter how marginal it appears to be, as a continuous presence which defines interaction even if the interpreter does not translate every turn. In comparison, this possibility would be inconceivable for simultaneous interpreting, which disallows negotiations about what to translate and what not to translate on structural grounds: there is no local sufficient proximal context to do that. Thus, consecutive interpreting makes a modification to the already modified talk which deviates from the normal rule ('talk is conducted by at least two parties') by adding an interactional dimension: in interpreted events, 'talk is conducted by at least three parties.'

## Turn Order

Another basic condition for the possibility of consecutive interpreting is a specific turn order (sequence) determined by the function and structure of the interpreter's turn. As a repeat, the interpreter's turn must have



a preceding turn to follow. In Instance I, this distribution of turns is presented quite clearly as A/T+K/T+A/T+K/T. This order is not broken even by an aside produced by K, who wishes the interpreter to limit her interpreting to one direction only: German-English. It is likely that the interpreter can open an interaction by posing a question or making a self-introductory statement; however, his or her turn under these circumstances will lack precisely its function as a repeat. Even if the interpreter makes a comment in two different languages, he or she will not be repeating himself or herself but express herself in two different languages. Therefore, it is the relationship of the interpreter's turn to the preceding turn that comprises one of the most important deviations from the basic rule described by Sacks et al. which is 'turn order is not specified in advance' (Sacks et al. 1974, pp. 700–701). Regular conversation is governed by the rule 'one party first—second party next,' while, in comparison, the rule that governs consecutive interpreting can be defined as 'one party first—interpreter next.'

The 'one party first—interpreter next' rule emerges as a recurrent feature of consecutive as opposed to simultaneous interpreting where the speaker does not orient to the interpreter, presuming that a different rule can be in place for this type of interpreting: 'one party and one or more interpreter(s) speak at about the same time.' The obscurity of 'about' points to the indeterminate character of delay in simultaneous interpreting. Although it does exist, it is not considered to be structurally relevant as the key objective of simultaneous interpreting is to minimize the delay caused by the interpreter's turn by way of overlaying the original statement with the interpreted one. In consecutive interpreting, after one monolingual party completes its turn, the interpreter would have to speak next, unless an exception to this rule is clearly stated, as it is in the first example, when K insisted that the interpreting be one-way. Another limitation can be presented by overlapping talk, which occurs exclusively within the same party. Yet, most overlapping talk can be considered as background noise, as it were, which may be present at any public event when people comment about the event while the event itself continues without being interrupted. A general hindrance to communication, this type of noise does not suspend the interaction unless a break from the interaction is requested. Another type of exception is the request for clari-

fication that can be made by any party to the interpreter or another party, including a clarification about what is being discussed in the background, so to speak. Note that neither case requires code-switching, but it still can be provided for the other party upon request, so, technically speaking, neither affects nor deviates from the function and structure of the interpreter's turn.

## Turn Size

In addition to causing such deviations from the basic turn-taking systematics, the interpreter's turn affects turn size. Collected instances show that turn size varies from several words to several sentences; yet, it is rather uncommon that a preceding turn would include more than, say, ten utterances. Extremely short turns, for example, ones that consist of only one word (except for affirmations or disaffirmations), are equally uncommon and dispreferred. In recognition of this, the size of the turn that belongs to a non-interpreting party is often specified in advance by way of a pre-agreement, for example, when monolingual parties in an interpreted interaction, who have never witnessed an interpreter at work before, approach him or her shortly before the event to inquire about how long and/or how slow they should or can speak. The preferred size is several complete sentences. Although utterances to be repeated tend to be shorter than in a normal conversation, some interpreted turns may be rather long, especially when it comes to providing information. If the interpreter does not have an opportunity to take notes and feels that he or she cannot possibly memorize the material contained in one long turn, he or she may start her turn prematurely in overlap or indicate his or her readiness to interpret non-verbally, for instance, by taking a deep breath at a transition-relevance place as if getting ready to speak. An interpreter may issue an explicit interruption of the current speaker, but in formal settings, such interruptions are undesirable for protocol reasons. Despite these variations, consecutive interpreting features a strong preference for shorter yet complete turns. Turns that consist of only one phrase or half a sentence (e.g., 'When we went to visit our colleagues in Berlin [pause]') are typically dispreferred. For an example of an extended turn size and its

management, consider the instance where an American head of a packaging material manufacturer (M) introduces his company to an audience of Russian business people:

*Instance II:*

- 1M: Our company is a small business (.) ugh (.) it is managed by only  
 thirty people (.) who  
 2 work in two departments: accounting and personnel (1.0)  
 3T: Unsere Gesellschaft (-)  
 [
- 4M: We also have one production plant with  
 over two hundred workers.  
 5 (1.5)  
 6T: Unsere Gesellschaft akhkhkh  
 [
- 7M: By the way, we have in our group the head of  
 personnel Brenda Cox.  
 8 She will be happy to explain how our company is set up and  
 what positions we  
 9 have there.  
 10 (2.0)  
 11T: Ahm (.) Western ist eine kleine Gesellschaft mit nur zwanzig  
 Managern und  
 12 zweihundert Angestellten in einer Produktionsstätte. Wir haben  
 die Personalchefin  
 13 Frau Cox hier bei uns, und sie wird erklären, wie unsere  
 Gesellschaft organisiert ist.

As is clear from this example, M twice claims a turn out of his turn when that turn has already been taken by the interpreter and quite audibly so. The interpreter takes his turn at a transition-relevance place when the German-speaking guest pauses (line 2). Yet, as this instance shows, pauses are not always intended for the interpreter. Here, M does not acknowledge his pause as a transition-relevance place but takes it as a self-interruption: he continues in overlap with the interpreter's turn, thereby

continuing his own turn. The interpreter relinquishes this turn to the speaker, allowing him to continue. The pause that occurs next (line 5) is much more pronounced already because it is longer and falls on the completion-relevance place. Surprisingly, the speaker ignores the interpreter's claim to his turn as well as the signs of dissatisfaction that the interpreter shows about being interrupted (clearing one's throat, line 6). Although there are only three utterances which were produced by the speaker, their sequential non-consecutive production causes a delay in the process by actually delaying the interpreter's turn. The latter can still rely on memory or note-taking; by continuing without giving the interpreter a chance to repeat creates a hindrance to the conversation itself, leading to an unwelcome feature of interpreting, namely the summarial translation as is seen in lines 11–13. A linguistic analysis of the interpreter's summary can easily point to numerous losses in the content. In this regard, we need to note the significance of the collaborative maintenance of recipient design and the importance of self- and other-monitoring.

## Length of Interaction

The relatively fixed turn size in the exemplar brings us to another modification of the general conversational rules: the length of translated interactions is generally fixed in accordance with some scheduled activity and its purposes, whether it is a work-related or an extracurricular event. In most situations, institutional context requires scheduling, and meetings with foreign representatives run on the predefined schedule together with other activities, such as transportation and meals. It is rare that interpreted meetings would last more than two hours. It is as common, however, for the interpreting event to run late; those organizers who are not used to doubling the time allocated for a meeting on account of interpreting would often cut such meetings short or make an impromptu adjustment to the schedule. For example, the meeting that is analyzed in the next chapter lasted one hour and ten minutes. The US contacts, who actually arranged for the meeting and brought the Russian group over, took upon themselves the responsibility of reminding the host of their arrangement, who then stopped shortly after the designated period of time. I do not consider the length of interaction intrinsic to translation-in-talk. It is

rather a characteristic of any oral discourse. Any objective circumstances may terminate or, on the other hand, prolong the talk. However, I find it necessary to mention it here because it is still a constraint that tends to add to other similar constraints and preferences that modify an interpreted situation.

## Continuity of Talk

The final deviation from the set of regular conversational rules concerns the freedom that all speakers apparently have in a regular interaction to continue or discontinue their talk. Although this principle appears to apply to any talk, institutional discourse poses strong general restrictions on the continuity of interaction already because it is explicitly agenda-driven. In some context, for example, informal or judicial inquiries, it is only for objective reasons (running out of time) that conversing is stopped prior to achieving the desired result. Although generally not a physically restrictive activity, as a police interrogation would be, for example, consecutive interpreting seems to feature a stronger preference for continuous talk than regular conversation. In the environment where only one code is employed at a time, the need to switch to a different code after each preceding turn puts pressure on all the parties to continue their interaction. In the interruptive environment, where the interpreter follows the rule of non-interruption, he or she functions as an agent for continuous talk, turning completion into a task which would be different from the normal circumstances. Unlike a regular situation, where interaction is continuous only as long as it is deemed necessary by the conversationalists, with some of them speaking and others keeping quiet, or some being voluble and others curt, an interpreted situation encourages to continue conversing because the presence of the interpreter reminds the participants that his or her professional role is hinged on speech; hence a strong dispreference of silence. The very person of the interpreter can be considered a continuer for those monolingual participants who do not have access to both linguistic codes and who tend to await instructions before completing. It is particularly instructive, in this respect, to examine the ways in which monolingual parties organize transitions, especially in those cases where the same party wishes to continue.

In conclusion, when approached from the outside of concrete contexts, the turn-taking systematics of the interpreted talk shows noticeable deviations from the general rules of talk on account of the interpreter's repeat. These deviations are sufficiently strong to claim that consecutive interpreting is a particular form of talk, which I call 'translation-in-talk,' where translation is defined as a code-switching operation immanent to all types of translation. Consecutive interpreting differs from other types of translation on account of its essence and the structure that upholds that essence, with the interpreter's turn (repeat) emerging as the central or, rather, essential feature of the modified talk. This makes consecutive interpreting appear as interruptive, while simultaneous interpreting appears as continuous and uninterrupted. At the same time, although I consider both types of interpreting as two inner-related subspecies, the hierarchy of their relationship is not as easy to pinpoint. On the one hand, simultaneous interpreting seems to be a more advanced type of interpreting, featuring a developed technological aspect, which should appeal to the modern sensibilities more than the consecutive 'stop and go' activity. At the same time, one may argue, as I wish to do here, from the communication perspective, consecutive interpreting represents an archaic or primordial form of interpreting primarily because (a) the delay in the delivery of the speaker's lines is openly pronounced, adding a strong interpersonal component and (b) since it is not possible to eliminate the delay completely, we may consider it to be a foundational feature for all types of interpreting subspecies in general, but unique to consecutive interpreting because of its explicitly interactional character.

From this point on, after having primed the phenomenon outside of a specific context, we can proceed to a genetic investigation which treats translation-in-talk as an explicitly intersubjective phenomenon. In this analysis, in addition to the thick description that focuses on the temporal co-constitution of translation-in-talk, I would like to offer an empirical investigation that examines such features of talk as opening and closing, as well as alignment, affiliation, collaboration, and other relational structures. However, since it is hardly possible to cover all the constitutive moments, the main emphasis in the next chapter falls on managing disagreements in the adverse environment created by the interpersonal rift between one of the participants and one of the two interpreters. For

the data in the genetic analysis, I use a complete 40-minute episode of translation-in-talk that comprises one meeting from beginning to end and involves about 20 participants. As I explained earlier, the genetic analysis points to the pragmatic orientation that can be deciphered with the help of the mixed ethnomethodological/conversation analytic key, which can be considered as an evolutionary extension of the previous chapter due to its accent on the spatiotemporal and relational aspects of interaction.

## Notes

1. Welton explained the difference as follows: ‘One could say that Husserl introduced the idea of a method in juxtaposition to the idea of a system’ (2000, p. 259).
2. I am not mentioning the generative register here because Husserl considered it as a part of a general genetic investigation at the time when he made the distinction between the static and genetic modes of inquiry. This is to say that the division between and among different registers of phenomenological analysis is not as clear-cut already because it replicates the organization of consciousness itself. Therefore, the distinction between different registers should serve just a heuristic purpose. In relation to genetic and static analyses, Husserl himself writes: ‘If we compare the genetic and static nexuses, then we should ask whether one can achieve a systematic phenomenology of static nexuses (like that of *noesis* and *noema*), that is whether the genetic dimension can be completely suspended here’ (2001, p. 633).
3. According to Sokolowski, ‘the entire static analysis can be understood as dealing with the experience of identity’ (1974, p. 29).
4. Compared to the regressive method, progressive directionality, which is not utilized here, starts with the phenomenon itself, which is only possible after a transcendental reduction. Given the analytic link to the empirical realm, such a reduction would be counterproductive in this study.
5. To that effect, Husserl asks: ‘*Is not static phenomenology a phenomenology of leading clues*, the phenomenology of constitution of leading types of objects in their being?’ (2001, p. 644; *author’s emphasis*).
6. For a typology of memes for interpreting as opposed or compared to those for translation, see Gambier and van Doorslaer (2010–2014).

7. I say 'formally' because much has been written on the relationship between interpreting and philosophy and literature that dates back far into the past (e.g., Takeda and Baigorri-Jalón 2016).
8. Since this book is considered as a part of academic research on consecutive interpreting, I would like to exclude from the examined ontology a number of practical guides for interpreters such as Setton and Dawrant (2016). I also see community interpreting as a special kind of interpreting, but do not find it helpful for this study. To those who are interested in that kind of interpreting, I recommend consulting Hale (2007).
9. For all this research, interpreting is a subject, which makes interpreting studies an essentially interdisciplinary project (see Ferreira Duarte et al. 2006; Gambier and van Doorslaer 2011).
10. I explore this connection further in the following section.
11. At this point, I am not discussing the experience of alienness, which is as affective to consciousness as the structural anomaly is. The reason for this abstention is a full-bodied discussion of this topic in Chap. 6.
12. Sacks et al. defined context as a social rather than linguistic phenomenon (1974, p. 699). The emphasis is phenomenological: the social allows the subjective (individual-specific) and intersubjective (group-specific) poles to co-exist without canceling each other. In comparison, a systemic logical approach would find this relationship contradictory.
13. Nofsinger also emphasizes special significance of gaps and pauses for conversation (1991, p. 96).

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# 5

## From 'Translation-in-Talk' to 'Translation-in-Interaction'

In the previous chapter, I conducted a first-order phenomenological analysis in the static register. This analysis demonstrated that the conditions for the possibility of consecutive interpreting rose from its foundational status as a phenomenon predicated on talk. The subsequent transition to the conversational sphere showed consecutive interpreting to be a type of speech-exchange system, with the translator's turn appearing as its essential structure, that of 'repeat.' Modified to meet the requirements of a particular form of talk, repeat emerged as a norm-making interactional constraint. As a result, the mundane definition of consecutive interpreting was replaced by the preliminary phenomenological definition of 'translation-in-talk.' In this chapter, I continue to investigate translation-in-talk focusing on action and its pragmatic aspect. For this I employ the genetic register. In order to endow the analysis with the necessary concreteness, for the analysis of a multiparty interaction of considerable duration, I again utilize 'live' data. The data consist of one complete recorded and transcribed episode of translation-in-talk which I approach here as an exemplar, as it was defined by Husserl (see Chap. 3), that is, as a typical representation of translation-in-talk. In the next section, I explain the use of the genetic register and then connect it to the

corresponding method of conversational pragmatics. In the light of the earlier exposition of the relationship between different analytical registers in Husserl's phenomenology in Chap. 3, I present genetic phenomenology in the same way I presented static phenomenology in the previous chapter, that is, by emphasizing the key terms and concepts and by indicating their direct relevance to the analysis of translation-in-talk.

## Genetic Analysis

It is only possible to undertake an absolute consideration of the world, a 'metaphysics,' and to understand the possibility of a world first through a genetic consideration of individuation. (Husserl 2001b, p. 632)

This quote clearly confirms that for Husserl the genesis of a personal identity draws from the world. It also confirms the status of static analysis as preliminary to genetic analysis, since the former's aim does not exceed setting a formal identity for the phenomenon, its frame, as it were. In contrast, genetic analysis reaches outside of the tangible sense-data into a 'metaphysics' which Husserl deems to be the main condition for the apprehension of the world but only qua the spatiotemporal constitution of an individual. In this sense, Husserl's use of the term 'metaphysics' functions quite similarly to the Aristotelian definition: metaphysics is the science of first principles, which, for Husserl, points to the existence of the pre-predicative horizon.<sup>1</sup> The pre-predicative horizon allows for all matter to be constituted as sensible, be it constitution of an individual, constitution of a community, or a phenomenon, be this phenomenon 'natural' or 'artificial.' In sum, the pre-predicative horizon creates the conditions for the possibility of individual (subjective) and communal (intersubjective) genesis.<sup>2</sup>

Despite its centrality for genetic phenomenology, the emphasis on the pre-predicative horizon for the understanding of genesis is neither self-explanatory nor consistent. The problem lies in Husserl's complex and at times contradictory approach to temporality. In a systematizing attempt, Klaus Held distinguishes between two senses of genesis: one that participates in the production of optimal horizons, for example, social horizons, which are founded on the familiar, known, and otherwise accepted

'realities'; and the elementary genesis of passive forms. The two types of horizons are intricately related: the elementary genesis leads to the optimal genesis by allowing previously sedimented matter to be habitualized in individual and communal manifestations and thus exposing its constitution. Because of sedimentation, the constitution of the elementary horizon is not accessible to the posterior experience: every experience always has its first, and there is no way of reaching back in order to 'see' how it began. Moreover, every individual consciousness has elementary horizons at its disposal, indicating that it is constituted passively without the need to repeat the same apperceptive achievement. This allows elementary horizons to function as foundations in such domains of experience as the 'living present,' 'association,' and kinesthetic consciousness. In other words, elementary horizons secure the active genesis of primordial constitution. In turn, the optimal horizon is designed to benefit the natural attitude directly, by deproblematizing the world and our being with each other, creating unquestioned normality of the 'already' constituted local social order. This activity in turn is surrounded by the means of the "secondary passivity" of habitualization' (Held 2003, p.53).<sup>3</sup> This is to say that habitualization, as a type of genesis, is founded on sedimentation, which we can call here the foundational structure of individuation.

Despite its secondary character, sedimentation provides for the unity of signification, thus contributing to the categorial experience of types. The preceding chapter dealt precisely with such a type in translation-in-talk. It therefore cannot be ignored, although for this study it is decidedly secondary in import. If sedimentation, once set, cannot be modified within the parameters of its habitual use, habitualization on the other hand is the source of self- and other-alterity. To take this distinction further, we can say that, in the case of sedimentation, constitution is vertical while for habitualization it is horizontal, that is, it implies intersubjectivity or, to be more specific, communal intervention. By allowing for the Other-induced modifications, habitualization subjects itself to immediate observations, albeit only as a recognizable habit. Let us take, for example, linguistic or corporeal sedimentations. We all speak a native language but, unless a disability stands in the way, we feature such significant variations in speaking the same language that it becomes difficult, although not impossible, to understand one another. The natural attitude

creates an appearance that we learnt the native language in the same way, but despite progress in the area of language acquisition, a linguist would not be able to provide convincing evidence as to how the native language was acquired in the first place. We can only tell how it is being acquired in the second place, when the work of habitualization begins to show itself. This does not mean that the origin of habitualization can be traced to its source, although, sometimes, when we see a toddler walking like his father or mother, we can attribute the acquisition of habit through the intergenerational transfer, which is largely predicated on imitation. In sum, habit can be recognized only in 'becoming' through observable repetition or reiteration of acts, activities, and practices.

Returning to the difference between the two analytical registers, genetic phenomenology does not only pursue the same objective as static phenomenology, seeking out object identity in its manifold appearances, but extends the search to the level of the world, where formation of an individual consciousness requires spatiotemporal constitution as well as active participation of other individuals. It might appear that there should be a separation of the two types of analysis. In fact, as the previous chapter demonstrated, both static and genetic analyses deal with space, time, and the self. However, only genetic analysis can tackle problems of intersubjectivity and the genesis of a community. Another crucial difference concerns the difference between the constitution of an object for itself, which falls in the domain of static phenomenology and the object for us or object use, as genetic phenomenology would have it. To put it differently, for Husserl, static analysis describes an object as it stands, while genetic phenomenology focuses on the 'history of that object [phenomenon] as it is constituted over time' (Husserl 2001b, p. 634). The task of genetic phenomenology is therefore to reach back in the history of formation, which can be approached as a history of objectification. Leading back to the beginning of such a history does not mean for us to attempt a regressive salvage of the pre-predicative horizon, however. On the contrary, the purpose of genetic analysis is to demonstrate how an object which is constituted statically comes into being and remains in being, kept there by the others, as it were. In other words, a genetically stipulated phenomenon cannot be isolated from the mode(s) of its intersubjective production.

The focus in this chapter is therefore less on the external conditions for the appearance of an object, for example, on the intensity of light, or on the exposure to the elements and more on the identity of the translated talk, which is held to function toward satisfying some purpose ‘in a co-constitutive manner’ (Husserl 2001b, p. 634). This is where genetic phenomenology is going to contribute most to this study: by shedding light on the kind of constitutive genesis of translation-in-talk as an intersubjective (intercultural) phenomenon first. When compared to a passive apprehension of an object in perception, the task of intersubjective co-constitution necessarily involves an active synthesis both in the act of producing the object by an individual, for example, by uttering the name of an object, and also in the activity of collaborative accomplishment, which necessarily presupposes purposeful interaction. Thus, although genetic analysis also deals with intentionalities and, like static analysis, examines facets, sides, and profiles, it does so in a manner by which these phenomena come into becoming, so to speak, where ‘becoming’ is an active way of co-constitution in real time. Importantly, the activity of co-constitution does not replace its passivity; the latter simply moves to the background, as it were.

According to Husserl, co-constitution presupposes a unity of dispositions that makes for a modality of being that engages a number of monads for aligning their lived experiences in a manner that can be described through modes of givenness; orientation to time and space; constitutive unity and self-sameness; state of affairs and propositions; as well as community bound facts of life. Under the name ‘monad,’ in addition to the definition of an encapsulated being where nothing is discrete but everything is interconnected, Husserl means the unity of living becoming, its history. This history adumbrates not just the sides of a phenomenon as an inner-relational entity but, more importantly, its becoming as an inter-relational object: ‘Genetic intentional analysis is directed to the entire concrete interconnection in which consciousness and each intentional object as such actually stand’ (Husserl 1977, p. 316). In turn, interconnections can be scrutinized as concerted acts, activities, and practices.<sup>4</sup> Self- and object-constitution and the constitution of the world in all its phenomenal being and diversity coincide at the intermediary state of active genesis in such a way as to make a



phenomenon that interconnects monads and their experiences for a purpose come into relief.

Earlier I used the term 'co-constitution.' Co-constitution presupposes still a different type of genesis: collaborative genesis that takes place on the basis of mutual horizons which synthesize meaning into a commonly understood world. In process sociology, this kind of shared understanding is also endowed in action, prompting a substitution of 'co-constitution' with 'co-construction' once the engagement of empirical data takes place. The definition of 'co-construction' commonly includes the joint creation of form, interpretation, stance, action, activity, identity, institution, skill, ideology, emotion, or other culturally meaningful reality. Only when all the components are engaged toward producing a meaningful event can we speak of 'complexity theory,' which this chapter aspires to construct on the basis of phenomenology and communication studies.<sup>5</sup> Just to understand this reality alone is not sufficient for a concerted action. In order for two dancers in motion, or two debaters in conversation, to make sense together, in addition to passive and active types of synthesis, we must consider associative synthesis. Associative synthesis is a productive achievement, not just in terms of being but precisely in terms of mutual accomplishment and cooperation, which means diverse yet unidirectional roles and positions; hence, its expressivity that cannot help but make itself noticeable as cooperation. In contrast to passive synthesis, which can be done only on the grounds of individual subjectivity, or active synthesis, which can involve a singular purpose and thus would not require participation of another individual, associative synthesis in communication, on the level of speech, refers to 'the conscious or deliberate production of different ideal complexes of understanding or real cultural complexes from pre-constituted elements or objects' (Welton 2003, p. 279). Associative genesis is therefore intersubjective in a different way than the other two types of synthesis: it presupposes a mutually constructed context. Mutuality spells out shared participation or collective action, as it were, but it does not have to be a matter that could be resolved within the parameters of one context or belong to one practice.

Genetically, context can be understood as a combination of discursive actions recognizable across times and generations: 'The genetic analysis studies the dynamic interplay of experience and discourses as they are

deployed over time and as a part of a process, historical in nature, that accounts for the concrete configuration of various domains of experience' (Welton 2003, p. 278). We can understand this quote to mean that a cultural experience can be approached in the genetic register as an associative synthesis with an emphasis on the relation between experience and discourse. In a situation where interacting parties cannot speak in an unmediated manner, that is, directly to each other, without any intervention, their associative acts become of the utmost importance. Only by acting in a concerted fashion will the participants understand what is going on, what their position(s) is (are) and how they should maintain or change that (those) position(s). Associative synthesis does not only participate in the constitution of complex cultural systems, it also helps us determine the interconnections of actions within a designated activity. Only through concrete abilities and habits can the world can be comprehended as the 'cultural horizon.'

The analysis of this horizon provides an account of that very interconnectedness in which our acts stand out. I take this characterization as the guiding clue for the following empirical analysis. An analysis of interactivity inevitably positions an individual consciousness against another individual consciousness. Position here should be understood in the phenomenological sense, as positionality, or the standpoint from which several monads are able to capture the same intentionality (phenomenonality). As a philosophical/sociological concept, positionality originally resounded in the works of Helmut Plessner, who conceived of it as 'the way in which an organism takes place in the environment' (1961, p. 75). In the segment that we are going to analyze next, positionality is achieved mainly by the mode of speaking, through coordinated acts of speaking.<sup>6</sup> The intersubjective level, which is fully operational in the genetic register, is appropriately the one that Husserl associates with intercultural genesis. It gives an intersubjective phenomenon a concrete presence. In a dynamic fashion, it elicits and coordinates our acts, actions, and activities, as well as our roles or positions from which we express ourselves.

Most important here, however, is interactivity that overcomes static structures to present an event (dynamic phenomenon) through its development. By attending to the expressive side of that event, one can both access the history, albeit in its current state, of a phenomenon, and

indicate the means that participate in an interaction allowing for meaningful adjustments of different roles and positions while performing some collaborative task. Cooperative genesis accounts for various lateral relationships between different vertical lines of constitution. These lateral relations define the diachronic interplay of language, experience, and appearance in terms of background and context, an interplay which is at work in constituting all categorical phenomena, including translation-in-talk. According to Welton, 'studying discourse genetically supplies us with a theory of context' (2003, p. 279). It also supplies the distinction between micro and macro parameters of interaction. It is this theory that I am going to bring in for the empirical analysis later in this chapter.

I plan to begin with the concept of context as it is approached by microsociology. So far, the phenomenological definition of context indicated a fusion of horizons. From the empirical (conversational pragmatic) standpoint, context includes pre-conditions or physical conditions for any ongoing interaction as well as those conversational features that construct a context as 'that' context, focusing on the synthesis of subjective and intersubjective acts. 'Context for a conversation analytic account of any unit of talk must be displayed in the local details of the ongoing talk' (Mandelbaum 1990, p. 340). Associated with one another, these acts disclose the direction of the interaction as it is stipulated by the interpreting constraints. A closely related concept of horizon will change its meaning in the genetic analysis as well, turning us away from the 'object-horizon' which gives but a formal account of horizon due to its emphases on aspects, sides, and manifolds, and approach it as a world or what discloses the conditions for the possibility of the interactional background itself.

In turn, the latter presupposes an involved participation of communal life, that is, on the social plane, horizon cannot be understood in any other way but through continuous contributions of many subjects who find themselves in a co-constitutive and therefore, from the interactional point of view, co-dependent relation. Therefore, 'positions' of those subjects need to be closely examined. Genetic analysis will study these positions on intercultural grounds, where the operations of alignment and affiliation replace, as sociological categories, such staple phenomenological notions as 'other minds' and 'empathy,' but retain the constitutive force in the constitution of the horizon itself. Thus, when referencing

the indispensable involvement and the importance of the interpreter, the constitution of the interpreter's subjectivity itself should be taken into account, but should not receive primacy of any kind. Instead, the primacy of genetic investigation should lie with 'what is going on' in the event that the participants unequivocally recognize as interpreting, which the phenomenological perspective earlier defined as translation-in-talk.

## Matters of Context: Conversational Pragmatics

For the genetic description, I suggest that we move to concrete matters that involve the background or the horizon for consecutive interpreting. From this point on, I will treat 'context' in a mixed fashion, fluctuating between phenomenological and conversation pragmatic terms. This kind of conceptual intermeshing is essential for the interface between empirical and phenomenological analyses. For the phenomenologist, context is embedded in the experience of a phenomenon and reaches the whole of the life-world: 'the world is the referential context' (Husserl 2001a, p. 48). Any feature of experience can therefore be contextually significant. Likewise, any feature of context can be definitional for the participants, their interaction, interpersonal dynamics, and communication objectives. From the latter perspective, context permeates all talk to the point of making it 'a unity of publicly displayed and continuously updated intersubjective understandings' (Heritage and Atkinson 1984, p. 11). In my analysis of context, I pay close attention to all features, with a special emphasis given to pragmatic orientations. I consider context constitutive of and in itself but it is also constituted by talk in acts and activities that allow the participants to go on interacting. As a form of interaction, talk is not the predominant mode of existence for human beings, even as social beings, but it is certainly the most habitual way of expressing oneself. Therefore, as interaction, context should be considered in terms of two components: (a) the source of conditions for the existence of interaction and (b) its (local) treatment by the participants. This perspective is ethnomethodological: social actors have the ability of adjusting context in accordance with local requirements and states of affairs, including participants' special attitudes, dispositions, and relations.<sup>7</sup>

Both definitions of context are essential for this study, especially since there is no methodological divergence or contradiction between them. I therefore suggest that we bring them together through the concept of relevance. According to Levinson, context embraces a wide scope of matters which are 'linguistically and culturally relevant to the production and interpretation of utterances' (1983, p. 23). I presume as relevant those features of experience and talk that make it possible for the experiencing participants in a concrete interaction to make sense of the phenomenon as it is constituted intersubjectively, that is, collaboratively, and in real time. At the previous stage of the analysis, I explored the phenomenon of consecutive interpreting both from the perspective of natural attitude and by utilizing my own experiences of the phenomenon taken from memory and imagination. The subjective focus allowed me to bring into relief the necessary conditions for the possibility of consecutive interpreting as an empirically accessible phenomenon. As a result, the phenomenon of translation emerged as being founded on talk. In turn, the life-world with its multiple modes of givenness was subsequently reduced to a single mode of conversational focus: pragmatics.

The etymology of the word 'pragmatics' can perhaps be the best indicator of its particular way of inquiry. In ancient Greek, *pragma* roughly means action, or deed, as well as business, activity. It is commonly believed that pragmatics originated in the works on semantics of Charles Morris, who was in turn indebted to Ferdinand de Saussure and C.S. Peirce; hence, an association of Morris' semantics with semiotics or semiotic, as Morris called it. Originally, pragmatics was conceived as one of the three domains of Morris' semiotic, together with semantics and syntactics, and was designed to examine the relations between signs and their users. Moreover, as Stephen Levinson points out, even the discipline of linguistics that has laid a claim on pragmatics as a part of its field of study is not clear as to how to define pragmatics, especially where its main themes are concerned. It was not until psychologists Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin Bavelas, and Don D. Jackson introduced a descriptive element into the theory of pragmatics and eventually blended it in with communication studies, extending its main emphases from referential tokens and discourse markers adopted from linguistics to the study of inferential context or the study of implicature, that pragmatics managed to unite the

focus on the language structure with the focus on the outside context, associating reference with inference and indexicals with performatives. From this perspective, pragmatics embraces at least three major themes: 'implicature,' 'speech acts,' and 'deixis.' The following three sections will briefly touch upon all of them, starting with implicature.

The first fundamental problem of pragmatics, implicature, was introduced by H.P. Grice with the purpose of distinguishing between the surface or the referential structure of a sentence or an utterance and its inferential structure, or between what is said and what is meant. Here, we also find the notion of presupposition which imposes restrictions on truth-conditional statements and therefore has direct relevance to the understanding of pragmatics as language use. It is important to note, however, that for Grice implicature is conceived as a mediating structure that unites what is said and what is meant in a way that points to the direction (rather than force) of the utterance. Implicature can be either special or general. General implicature, for example, the statement 'it is hot,' refers to the experience that can be immediately validated. In comparison, special implicature demands the knowledge of a local context or specialized discourse (translation would also figure in this scheme) in order for its meaning to come out. For implicature to be examined, one must be guided by grammatical markers, which are also known as contextualization cues or microcontextual features. As their name suggests, they cue the participants toward an appropriate (i.e., shared) understanding of what is going on.

In sum, referential markers provide cohesion and consistency within the ongoing discourse (Halliday and Hassan 1976). Their lexical forms vary from those of common places to labels as well as to proper names. Unlike a narrower category of deixis that points to this or that aspect of the external world, contextualization cues ensure the link between the said and the meant by providing broader and more concrete information on the basis of thematized inferences. In that same connection, Grice forwarded a thesis that inferences are founded on some general principles that he called maxims, for example, 'quality,' 'quantity,' 'relation,' and 'manner.' Obviously, the maxims are not to be followed as pre-set rules of interaction but shall serve as a guide for efficient interaction. For example, being brief (perspicuous) gives discourse more force, and

such a speech act as 'command' testifies to that. However, in line with Roman Jakobson's notion of phatic communication or communication for the sake of communication, this very principle is likely to be violated in actual interaction. Other markers such as clarifying determinants of color or size cannot be sufficiently accurate either. Contradictions are not only expected in this case, but are welcome as they create ambiguity, which is essential for the existence of implicature. Such discourse genres as jokes or rhetorical tropes play on this very ambiguity, and although ambiguity challenges rational discourse, it does not negate it, allowing to investigate institutional discourse as a form of talk in covert action.

As far as deixis proper is concerned, for both philosophy and linguistics, they refer to the mechanism that allows interlocutors (language users) to establish context on the surface level, as it were. For interaction, they mean what Hanks defined as the 'core into the human orientation in time and space and, relationally, to each other' (1992, p. 44). Etymologically, deixis takes its origin in the Greek word that translates as 'pointing and indicating' (Levinson 1983, p. 54). Essentially, deixis is singled out either to indicate the direction of an interaction or to identify interaction as a series of speech events that allow interlocutors to provide correct attributions in the absence of proper names which otherwise could have supplied full information about this or that communication situation. Grammatically, person deixis are expressed by personal pronouns, such as 'I,' 'you,' 'we,' and so on. As is clear from their grammatical usage, the first person refers the speaker to himself or herself, while the third-person deixis points to the other. For example, we commonly use the third-person plural 'we' to deflect attention from ourselves attributing a reference to some other party, thus soliciting a semblance of a collective identity that represents, returning to the beginning of this article, the belief in the existence of an agreement. Likewise, when someone uses the pronoun 'that one,' this person might want to exclude the other person as someone who does not belong to the group and whose opinion therefore is dissociated from the undergoing discussion. At the same time, the use of the pronoun 'we,' although intended to include, can produce an opposite effect, if its user does not seek association with the initiating party, functioning as a trigger for a dissociative action. Social deixis also include honorifics that designate the position of a person within a social

group, such as the military. Importantly, social deixis do not only concern lexicology or morphology, but syntax and phonology; in other words, the interpretation of social deixis is imbued with complex meaning, or 'grammaticalization' (Levinson 1983, p. 93).

Time and place deixis are simpler in a way that they do not include the vagrancies which are typically associated with the human person.<sup>8</sup> They are more tightly bound to the syntactical structure of a sentence or utterance, yielding simple distinctions such as distal and proximal, far and near, or here and there. Although the range of differences from one language group to another demonstrates significant variations in their use and gradation, they are designed to designate human geography in a relatively straightforward manner by way of spatial orientation. One may say that they connect us to the objective world in a physical sense. At the same time, the lived world presupposes that time and space would transcend the specifics of the physical surroundings to involve dispositions. Unlike deixis of time, which are subjectively bound to one's perception of reality and life events, that is, personal experience, deixis of place position the world strictly within the reach of our capacities, no matter how far-fetched or even imaginary those appear to be. This difference of origin suggests a separation that does not manifest itself on the level of grammar or syntax but on the existential level, prompting analytical philosophy to assume deixis as its own province, placing an investigation of deixis under the umbrella of semantics rather than pragmatics. However, the overall participation of deixis in the refined understanding of meaning as it unfolds in the spatiotemporal environment of discourse that involves interacting persons makes this debate aporetic.

The theory of speech acts fits into the pragmatics prolegomena as a generalization of language usage on the level of action. The founder of speech acts theory, J.L. Austin, undoubtedly exercised logical positivist theory when he suggested that all utterances and sentences can be divided into 'performatives' and 'constatives.' The difference between the two for Austin lay in the ability of the former to 'do things with words,' that is, possess a certain force capable of moving the interlocutor into performing a certain kind of action. In contrast, constatives simply state the state of affairs. In accordance with his philosophical background, Austin was interested in the truth-conditional nature of performatives.



The performatives that satisfied those conditions were called felicitous for they fit certain requirements, such as (a) producing a conventional effect; (b) ensuring complete and correct execution of the procedure; or (c) specifying consequent conduct. Another distinction suggested by Austin concerned the difference between 'explicit performatives' and 'merely implicit performatives' (1962, p. 45).

However, this difference does not hold for all the performatives: while some explicit performatives are somewhat or to a great degree implicit, any implicit performative can be out in the form of an explicit one. Likewise, Austin rejected his earlier distinction between constatives and performatives in favor of a general theory of illocutionary acts, in which explicit performatives form a special subclass that can take the adverb 'hereby' in order to express the action required and agreed upon by the participating parties. Later, this situation gave J. Searle the reason to announce a general principle of expressibility, which stated that anything that is meant can be said. From here emerged a class of performatives that allowed Austin to distinguish them by their specific 'force.' In order for this force to be enacted, however, Austin suggested that illocutionary acts that contain a promise or a threat be supported by the formal structure of the sentence on the one hand, which he calls 'locutionary act,' and produce a visible effect on the other, which bears the name 'perlocutionary act.'

Honing in on the latter allowed Searle to expand the formal side of the tripartite structure into a formal typology of speech acts: (a) representatives (asserting, concluding, etc.); (b) directives (requesting, questioning); (c) commissives (promising, threatening); (d) expressives (thanking, apologizing); (e) declarations (christening, declaring war, etc.). Importantly, for Searle, a 'speech act' is not 'a token or symbol, [...] but rather the *production* of the token in the performance of those speech acts which constitute the basic unit of linguistic communication' (1965, p. 222). Unfortunately, both the definition of speech acts and their typology shall be considered a theoretical disappointment since the definition is too general and the typology is neither exhaustive nor formal enough as to include all the exceptional cases that are bound to specific contexts and their users. Note, for example, an almost complete absence of such an act as listening, which is an expressive act, as mundane experience teaches us. For it to be included into Searle's typology would be to admit

of interaction rather than action alone. This should explain my employment of speech act theory specifically in the interactional manner, thus extending Searle's model to the sphere where different speech acts overlap and, like in the case of listening, are able to appear and signify *in absentia*. In my analysis, I rely on speech acts most often whenever and wherever they demonstrate the force and direction of the interaction as well as the disposition of their participants.<sup>9</sup>

## Units of Conversational Analysis

When, at this stage, I move from static analysis of translation-in-talk to the analysis of an extended episode in the genetic register, the relational temporal frame guarantees multiple modes of givenness of conversational action. We can therefore approach context not in abstraction as some passive taken-for-granted background out there but as the cooperative constitution of the developing event. Nor do we need to rely on the subjective experience in only two phenomenological modalities: memory and imagination. With conversation analysis, we can move the central concern of communication that deals with 'elucidating the mechanisms of sequential organization of interaction, that is, the way participants construct their interaction turn by turn over its course to accomplish an accountably coherent exchange' (Wilson 1991, p. 22). This perspective allows for the conversational context at large to be reduced to the context constituted by the conversing interactants through their conversational actions. The focus on conversational action signifies a methodological alteration of the conversation analytic lenses employed in the previous chapter. From the orthodox conversational analysis that seeks to identify formal structures of translation-in-talk, I would like to turn to its pragmatic dimension. The two strands are mutually informing.<sup>10</sup> The structural analysis of talk sets the stage for the pragmatic approach, which emphasizes locally deployed means of producing conversational action. The transition from the structural analysis to the pragmatic analysis is stipulated by the movement from the abstract to the concrete: after the analyst formulates the type of speech-exchange system that characterizes certain interactions, the general parameters of that system can be analyzed

under the concrete circumstances of its use. In other words, the pragmatist centers on how the participants are trying to achieve a concrete interactional objective within a specific conversational context, taking into account those interaction devices they employ toward that effect. This orientation defines conversational action as a purposeful and collaborative accomplishment of a particular social goal. By following a trajectory that leads to that goal we are able to understand genesis of translation-in-talk or its becoming in action.

As a unit of analysis, conversational action exhibits a hierarchy, which manifests in the 'sequential size of the action as well as the mode of its production' (Crow 1994, p. 161). The smallest unit is called 'conversational act.' A single utterance or several turns may contain a conversational act, which 'belongs' to an individual speaker. A conversational act is similar to a speech act in that it intends to produce a certain effect on the other speaker in a conversation. The difference lies in the form this act can be expressed: unlike the speech act theory, it is not prescribed in advance. In the previous chapter, we identified the translator's turn as 'repeat,' while conversational action associated with repeat is 'repetition.' For example, my request to my friend to loan me his car intends to convince him to do exactly that, to loan me his car. My friend may ignore my request, in which case I may repeat it. My request brings both of us to the intersubjective level of the analysis, where the smallest unit is 'conversational sequence.' Also known in conversation analysis as 'adjacency pair,' a conversational sequence requires a contribution of two or more participants. Such adjacency pairs as 'greeting/greeting' or 'question/answer' are typical examples of a conversational sequence. They consist of two-pair parts determined by individual conversational actions. In other words, performed within the constraints of the conversational sequence, my friend's response is limited to the choice of either accepting or rejecting my request. By either accepting or rejecting my request, he will complete the first pair part (request) with the second one (acceptance or rejection). Although the size of a conversational sequence is not specified in advance, for example, the answer to a question may not come immediately after the question, a conversational sequence rarely takes more than several turns. For the interpreter, the adjacency pair is always the preceding non-interpreter's turn first and the interpreter's turn next,

quite similar in its form to the adjacency pair 'greeting/greeting' and as much subjected to the sanction of politeness.

The rule that governs the relationship between pair parts is described by Schegloff and Sacks as follows: 'given the recognizable production of a first pair part, on its first possible completion its speaker should stop and a next speaker should start and produce a second pair part from the pair part type of which the first is a recognizable member' (1973, pp. 295–296). Another rule—that of 'structural preference'—is evoked during the alignment of pair parts. For example, let us say that my friend rejects my request to loan me his car. In this case, rejection, as opposed to acceptance, is a dispreferred pair part, not only because I failed to achieve my objective, but for the reasons of conversational continuity. For the same reason, the interpreter cannot maintain silence if a conversation is still under way. It is therefore important to note that dispreference in question is not a psychological but rather a structural constraint: the fact that my friend will have to give an account for his rejection, just like the interpreter would have to give an account for his or her inaction, complicates conversational alignment and therefore challenges the cooperative constitution of interpreting as an activity.

The next two types of conversational enactment are 'conversational segment' and 'conversational episode.' It is worth remembering again that these are analytical concepts. In actuality we do not conduct interaction in segments or episodes (the psychological notion of episode aside, of course). The difference between them is quantitative: a conversational segment is a smaller topical unit that contributes to the overall accomplishment of a conversational episode, which may comprise the whole of a conversation. In this analysis, the entire 47-minute recording falls in the category of a conversational episode. In order to underline the co-constitutive base for producing a conversational action, I attempt to analyze the exemplar mainly in terms of conversational sequences and conversational segments. Emphasizing the significance of analyzing longer stretches of talk, Schegloff points out that 'no analysis, grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, etc., of utterances taken singly and out of sequence, will yield their import in use, will show what co-participants might make of them and do about them' (1984, p. 31). Due to the mediated complexity of translation-in-talk, the minimal unit for its analysis should

be a conversational segment supplanted and therefore mitigated by an alternative literal translation offered for comparison due to the inaccessibility of the original.

The emphasis on the 'sequential organization of talk' means that it embraces both 'the immediately local configuration of preceding activity in which an utterance occurs, and also the "larger" environment of activity within which that configuration is recognized to occur' (Drew and Heritage 1992, p. 18). Thus, there is a need to differentiate between two types of sequence: a local sequence of the talk at hand and the historical sequence that embraces the talk by preceding and informing its trajectory in anticipation or pre-agreement. The social actor always acts toward something. The future orientation of the planned action suggests that it rises out of previously constituted formations in genesis. Genetic phenomenology explains this relationship by way of emphasizing a specific sociophysical environment as well as pre-existent interpersonal relations. Although traces of interpersonal relationships and/or institutional context can be found in the talk itself, they are often insufficient for evidentiary interpretations and demand a preview. As an eyewitness to the exemplar I am about to analyze, I would like to take advantage of my observations and expand on the context that precedes the transcribed interaction by describing the place, the time, and the circumstances of the analyzed episode. I also elaborate on the relationships that have been formed between the interactants prior to the recorded event. The exemplar provides the rest. This view of the context as an extended sequence that connects talk to the world that precedes and surrounds it enriches our understanding of both the talk and the world, which makes it, according to Gumperz, 'an interaction phenomenon' (1992, p. 230).

After I introduce the outside context, I proceed with the investigation of conversational action within the institutional activity of translation-in talk. The context that transpires from the analysis of conversational action 'renews the outside context in its own specific features' (Heritage and Atkinson 1984, p. 6). My objective is to identify the effects of the translator's turn on conversational action in terms of such microsociological concepts as 'frame,' 'footing,' and 'contextualization cues.' I select these concepts because they fulfill the key procedural objective of my research: to combine micro and macro properties

of the conversational action on a contextual continuum. The concept of 'frame' for this investigation is borrowed from Erving Goffman, an inventor of 'frame analysis' (1974). For him, frame is an interactional format which helps the participants organize the ongoing interaction. A specific frame is constituted both by the participants in interaction and this interaction as a specific setting. For the interactants, frame functions as a resource. According to Drew and Heritage, Goffman's notion of frame responds 'to the current social activity—to what is going on, what the situation is, and the roles which the interactants adopt within it' (1992, p. 8).<sup>11</sup> The participants can choose, maintain, and abandon a frame that no longer serves their objectives in favor of another one. The selection of a frame can be influenced by the outside context, such as institutional setting. For example, in the interactional setting of a university, a lecture can be used as a formal frame. In the course of its constitution, the students or the teacher may decide to replace the lecture frame with that of a discussion and/or a debate. In order to conduct this transition, they must shift their communicative roles, for example, from 'listeners' to 'conversants.'

The change of frame is a disruptive interactional event as it changes the constructed conversational activity and its design. It rarely happens instantaneously but rather occurs over a period of several sequences while the participants change their roles. In pragmatics, a conversational role that an interactant holds within the selected frame is called 'footing.' Footing is a specific position in an interaction that an interactant assumes in order to produce a meaningful joint action. One footing may encompass several interactional roles that a person takes in relation to his/her utterances. According to Goffman, interactants design most production formats at the intersection of three co-determinate roles: 'animator,' 'author,' and 'principal' (1981, p. 145). The 'animator' is someone who utters a phrase or a sentence within one or another kind of conversational design. The 'author' is the person who composes the utterance. Finally, the 'principal' is someone who originates the beliefs expressed in the utterance. These roles may coincide in one person or be assumed by a number of individuals.

For example, someone who repeats a statement made by someone else is the animator. The author is the person who made the original

statement. Finally, the principal is the one who conceived of the ideas used by the other two. Most of the time, a speaker embodies all three roles. However, there are instances when 'a person deflects the other identities from themselves and (commonly) onto some other party' (Clayman 1992, p. 165). When someone uses the pronoun 'we,' this person might want to include the other person as another author and principal for the expressed sentiments. As our common experiences show, the use of the pronoun 'we,' although generally intended to include the other, can be problematic if the other party does not seek association with the first party. Needless to say, these distinctions, which are not very clear-cut to begin with, get modified to suit an activity in question. For example, an interpreting activity requires that the interpreter animates what has been said, but if what has been said is also performed in front of the same audience, it may be appropriate to speak about 're-animation' rather than 'animation.'

The concept of footing is especially pertinent in an institutional setting where interactants' footings are contingent on specific positions in their professional environment. So, here, we deal with overlapping roles. For example, a person who stands on a lower step of the professional ladder in his/her company may be sanctioned for the use of 'I' in a meeting that involves his immediate superiors. The sanction will target not the use of 'I' in itself but the person's inappropriate footing in the context of an institution where the emphasis is on the collaborative construction of workplace identities. The pro-term 'I' will become a 'contextualization cue' that indicates the employee's adherence to one footing (e.g., individual accountability) over the other (e.g., collective accountability) cued by the pro-term 'we.' According to Gumperz, a 'contextualization cue' is a 'micro contextual feature' (1982, p. 162). It helps the participants maintain or change their footing. Although contextualization cues are not limited to auditory features but include gestures (as was shown by and in the previous chapter), the absence of a visual context for the exemplar forces me to restrict my examination to predominantly linguistic cues. In specific institutional contexts, such as a high court, a ministry, or a company, the institutional footing will be a preferred one in most cases except when individual responsibility is at stake and when a personal account is required.

The participants deploy ‘implicature,’ ‘speech acts,’ ‘contextualization cues,’ including ‘deixis,’ ‘footings,’ and ‘frames’ as context-building resources that help them align their conversational actions in order to achieve a common conversational goal. My objective for the subsequent analysis is, therefore, to identify the ways these resources are used in the analyzed episode of translation-in-talk. More specifically, this chapter is to understand how translation-in-talk may influence the choice of a frame. I also seek to determine how and to what extent the translator’s turn affects the selected frame’s parameters. As a result, by focusing on how the participants achieve, sustain, and alter their footings in the course of their interaction, I expect to be able to determine whether they treat the chosen frame as adequate for the translated interaction. For example, it is often presumed that the translator’s footing is that of ‘animator.’ It, therefore, presupposes neutrality. Hence, it becomes particularly important to see if this is indeed the case, and this is how the participants treat the translator’s attitude. This can be done by observing what devices are employed by the translator to maintain his or her neutral stance. The focus on contextualization cues is essential here, for the translator’s lexical choices may directly affect the outcome of his or her repeats to the degree of altering the subsequent conversational action far beyond the intended parameters. In addition, the deixical analysis will help expose the positions of the parties in terms of their referential worlds. We will then be able to understand what specific references indicate their ‘homes’ and ‘non-homes’ and how these two worlds relate to each other. In the following section, I explore the context that precedes the recorded event. I therefore begin with the context’s institutional facet.

## Institutional Context<sup>12</sup>

To begin with institutional context in the case of translation-in-action shall not be considered unusual. Since we deal with a form of talk that transcends contexts, it would only be pertinent to explain the term ‘institutional’ as it is being used in this study. By ‘institutional,’ in the context of this study, like Schegloff, I mean ‘talk for the occasion’ (1992, p. 102). These definitions are united in their emphasis on the operation



of transmutation, which implies 'the study of institutional discourse through ethnographic observations of change in organizational environments' (Maynard 1988, p. 320). To elaborate this emphasis in strictly conversation analysis terms, change of a human order should read 'the modification of talk for the achievement of receptivity in a particular context' (Heritage and Greatbatch 1991, p. 95). The context chosen for this study is explicitly institutional. However, this is not to say that it is necessarily formal. According to interaction ritual theory, 'any context begins with a situation' (Collins 2004, p. 3). It is therefore from the perspective of a situation that formality or informality is assigned by the participants, providing them with a greater flexibility for designing talk in situ. In this way, the procedural setting and the relational atmosphere do not have to coincide with each other; however, institutional context desires linear communication. This kind of communication, plus the presence of a work space (conference room) as the chosen meeting place, the pre-arranged time for the meeting which had the duration of a school lesson, all that is typically negotiated in advance by the foreign guests, who make an offer, and the local hosts, who might accept or refuse the offer. If the meeting takes place, they define its 'broad' objectives as 'business.' At the same time, the meeting in question was not designed to resolve any particular problem or end in any kind of a formal agreement. It did not have a fixed agenda. Moreover, it was requested by the guests, although its purpose did not intend to exceed the broadly set parameters of the professional exchange between mid-level American and Russian law enforcement officials, as was specified in the program. The project was funded by the US State Department and had for its executioner the International Association of the Chiefs of Police (IACP) with the headquarters in Washington, DC. All in all, 12 such exchanges were funded. In selecting appropriate pairs of hosts and guests, the organizers from IACP took into account a wide range of variables, from the size of the police department to the size of the city and its demographics, to the geographic location of the region and its economy.

Nonetheless, despite the precision in selecting 'similar' places, there was no pragmatic reason for it. Indeed, as my work for the program has shown, interpersonal dynamics was far more important than assumptions that representatives of the police in Tbilisi, Georgia, will be anything

like their counterparts in Houston, Texas. In sum, exchanges within the framework of the program centered mostly on the commonality of interests related to law enforcement. In this particular case, the interests that the two parties shared did not exactly match, plus there was a matter of business brought about by the foreign hosts. The functions of the Russian police and their representatives from the Russian Far East at the meeting only partially overlapped with the functions of a district police station in one of the largest cities of the American North West. As it becomes clear from the recording, the overlap led to a change of both schedule and venue. In turn, the latter largely determined the main topic of the discussion, namely, the problem of organized crime that developed alongside the topic of collaboration.

However, since no party enjoyed the authority of establishing any concrete form of collaboration, it was mostly as an expression of goodwill that cooperation was mentioned. I have already mentioned that the recorded meeting was not a part of the original agenda but was added on the second day of the visit at the request of the Russian delegation whose head police officer voiced the need to see local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). He explained his deviation from the protocol by the fact that the police in the city of visit do not deal with organized crime, while the Russian police handle all sorts of crimes, including those committed by Russian crime gangs, which had grown into the biggest problem for the Russian police in general and in the home city of the visitors in particular. Following up on this request, a local contact arranged for a meeting with the head of the organized crime unit from the local FBI. At the request of the Russian delegation, for protocol reasons, the purpose of the meeting was defined in broad terms: to familiarize the Russian delegates with the work of the American FBI.

From the preliminary description of the institutional context, it appears that the encounter between the US law enforcement officers and the Russian militia was intended as a semiformal activity, which was pre-planned, conducted at a workplace, and limited in time but not by subject matters. However, as I have pointed out earlier, a mere description of the circumstances that surrounded the meeting is not sufficient for its characterization in terms of a frame. From the pragmatic perspective,

no discursive frame can be imposed by a pre-existent social structure. It must be constituted in the order of conversation through specific conversational means, such as contextualization cues and participants' footings, among others. Organized in a conversational design, developing a relational atmosphere, the means which the actors employ for interaction exhibit their preference for a particular conversational action and its projective trajectory. As a result, an institutional context is constituted in terms of 'orientations to institutional tasks and functions, structural constraints, and interactional inferences' (Drew and Heritage 1992, p. 25). The result of these orientations is an interactional frame. In order to see how the institutional frame emerges in the interpreted talk, let us turn to the following exemplar.

## Selection of Frame

As a semiformal activity, the meeting could have accommodated a number of different frames: informal discussion, technical consultation, general lecture, seminar, specific case debriefing, interview, and several others. As we can see from the recorded interaction, D, the head of the FBI unit that deals with Russian organized crime, opts for the question/answer format that is utilized in a large number of various institutional settings. For the meeting with an open agenda, this format would appear natural. D introduces this interaction design at the outset of the meeting in lines 1–2:

- 1D: I don't know whatuh: if you have any specificuhh- questions that you wanna ask  
 2 me (1.3) uhm I'm a lead supervisor on the Russian organized crime squad.=  
 3R: = угу. Я не знаю есть ли у ↓ вас какие-нибудь каа:н(.) ↓ кретные вопросы мне  
 4 здать. (0.5) Я-а отвечаю за (.) <<подразделение>> по борьбе с организованной  
 5 преступностью российского происхождения. -да.  
 6 (1.0)

Translation: 'I don't know if you have any concrete questions you want to ask me. I am in charge of the unit that fights organized crime of the Russian origin.'

As this instance shows, D's weak prefacing 'I don't know whatuh,' the prolonged ending of 'specificuhh,' and the 1.3 second pause in line 1 display hesitated delivery. This is to say that D's delivery matches the content of his utterance, namely the previously undecided agenda for the meeting. The question/answer frame appears to be appropriate for a meeting that does not have a concrete pre-established topic. It also underlines the contextual peculiarity of a situation which was instigated by the visitors on account of their request. At the same time, the 'host'/'guest' roles remain unchanged; as a part of the rules of politeness, they override the specifics of the modified talk. In line 2, after a short pause, D indeed introduces himself. Syntactically and semantically, we can consider the micropause in line 2 a transition-relevance place. Following the 'one party first/translator next' rule of translation, R, the translator, could have taken his designated turn at this point. However, D's rising intonation and hesitated performance could have indicated the possibility of a continuation. R treats this possibility as actuality and so lets D continue. In the next turn D produces the first several lines of his upcoming introductory overview. After the translator's turn, in line 7, D expands his self-introduction into a general overview:

- 7D: I personally had worked with a number of dif- different Russian  
law  
8 enforcement ah officers on some cases. (1.0) Currently? uhm I  
was two months in  
9 Moscow this past summer, as an assistant legal attache  
over there  
[  
10R: угу (.) Ммхм  
11 Ммхм. >>Я работал с<< аа- (1.0) самыми различными  
российскими  
12 правоохрнительными органами по целому ряду дел (.)  
связанных с право- с  
13 нарушением правопорядка (.). Прошлым летом я аа:хм два  
месяца провел

- 14 а: в Москве, где я был помощником аа- атташе по  
 юри↓дическим  
 15 вопросам.  
 16 (1.0)

Translation: 'I worked with very many different Russian law enforcement agencies on a number of cases, dealing with breaking the law. Last summer I spent two months in Moscow where I was assistant attache in charge of legal matters.'

Obviously, for an informative question/answer session to make sense, it must involve some background information about the participants. Without it, a conversational trajectory may become difficult to develop since, from an interactional perspective, the introduction serves as a topical resource for the subsequent questions. Eighty lines later, alternating with R, D finishes his overview and returns to the original question: 'do you have any questions?' (line 86). The question is identical to D's question in line 1. It confirms the selected question/answer frame, but this time nothing hinders the Russian party as far as posing questions is concerned. The transition to questioning was made easy after D's overview as it introduced the main theme of the interaction: 'fighting Russian organized crime.' During the interaction, the theme settles as the key topic. D's self-introduction in terms of a common theme helps him establish his relevance to the participants' visit by identifying with their professional duty, namely, fighting Russian organized crime. Alluding to his position and specific experiences of working with Russian law enforcement officers in Russia and the United States allows D to construct his credibility as an expert who has the position of informing the visiting party. At the same time, as a matter of fact, D also separates the US party from the Russian party by employing the place deixis: 'we are one of the four offices in the United States.' The use of the inclusive pronoun 'we' establishes a membership category, which is 'law enforcement officers in the United States.' The relevance of this category becomes clear in contrast to the place-name 'Moscow' which, according to D, includes the visiting party, 'you,' or the 'law enforcement officers in Russia.' Along with the use of 'we,' D's overview is characterized by an extensive use of the personal pronoun 'I.' The first-person pronoun allows D to attribute most

of the experiences of the Russian-US police collaboration to himself. An emphasis on himself as an individual makes him immediately responsible for subsequent assertions. Notably, D does not request the Russian party to introduce themselves, nor does she give them his name, thus avoiding the traditional 'reception' protocol. This may be a legitimate omission for a semi-informal environment. However, as the analyzed exemplar is going to demonstrate, the anonymity of the Russian party becomes increasingly problematic in the course of the interaction.

The informative question/answer frame selected for the meeting presupposes certain corresponding footings. Since the Russian delegates are requesting to be informed, they hold the footing of the report elicitor (RE). This footing allows C and others from the Russian party to initiate most of the topics for discussion. However, it makes it difficult for them to proffer assessments, or, rather, makes it easy for them to withhold assessments (Button 1992). In contrast, D puts himself in the position of the report provider (RP). By responding to the other's questions, the report provider is responsible for making assessments. These assessments are typically made within the topics initiated by the other party.<sup>13</sup> Both parties account for their footings by committing to the syntactic patterns of their respective turns. The effort to manage the question/answer sequences is decidedly concerted. As such, it also involves the translator. The translator, R, constructs his turns on the model of the previous turns by repeating them as questions and answers, respectively. This allows us to define the translator's footing as that of the report repeater (RR). Moreover, the translator's footing cannot help but modify the adjacency pair that underlines the selected frame from 'question/answer' to 'question/repeat-answer/repeat.' In turn, the selected frame acquires the format of the question/repeat-answer/repeat session. Note the dash symbol that separates the first pair part (question) from the second pair part (answer). The separation is a result of the inserted 'repeats' that transform the two-pair part structure into a four-pair part structure. However, in comparison to the question/answer adjacency pair, the repeat does not seem to allow for an action of its own. It attaches itself to the previous pair part, replicates its organization and, by default, its action. In this configuration, the repeat presupposes that the translator would assume a neutral stance. Although it is rarely specified in advance, there is a strong

expectation that the translator would not let his or her personal opinions penetrate the discussion process. One way to secure this expectation is for the translator to repeat previous turns in the first person with minimum additions and as close (syntactically and semantically) to the original as possible. At the same time, there is a wide range of options for the translator to deliver his or her repeats, for example, second-person speech, or a mixture of the second- and first-person speech, as in 'She said, I don't want to talk to you any more.'

D's selection of the semiformal informative question/repeat-answer/repeat frame for the meeting seems to be consistent with the general purpose of the foreign delegation's visit to the FBI's regional organized crime section: to inform the Russian guests, who also happen to be colleagues, about the unit's work. The frame is typical for institutional settings as it 'presents an efficient way to introduce newsworthy materials' (Drew and Heritage 1992, p. 38). However, exchanging information cannot be equated with conversational actions pursued by the participants. A common action produced by the answer that contains assessments is agreement or disagreement with these assessments (Pomerantz 1984). A cursive examination of the entire exemplar shows that it features a most explicit disagreement. We find it at the very end of the recording in lines 784–788, where C rejects D's critical assertion about a lack of cooperation with the Russian counterparts and introduces an alternative vision of the discussed problem:

- 784 (1.5) и как раз (.) наши преступники все что или те кто  
имеют отношение к  
785 организованной преступ[-] не переводят сюда деньги а  
наоборот (1.0) сюда  
786 кораблями везут все ↓то о чем я назвал. А отсюда как раз  
получают  
787 соответствующие де:ньги (.) валю:ты и некоторые иные  
товары. вот это для  
788 нас >>в большей степени<< ↓проблема а не перевод в  
американские банки.  
789R: hh hhh· ((sigh)) And the colonel changes his tac agai:n saying  
that ah: their

- 790 land is rich and bountiful ah- in oil and ores and products of bio-  
diversity barebile
- 791 frutti di mari whatever name it so for them the problem is not so  
much ah- the
- 792 laundering of dirty moneys in this country ·hh as a exportation by  
tank and
- 793 shipful of these stolen goodies uh: to this country with the moneys  
then a:h as he
- 794 said traveling back to Russia (1.5) °take over there is too much  
bullshit° ·hhh khhh

Translation: ‘...and so our criminals all those or those who deal with organized crime do not transfer their money here but the other way around they send ships full of all that I have just named. And from here they receive all that money as hard currency and some other goods. This is what the biggest problem is for us and not having their money transferred to American banks.’

This disagreement is unusually explicit, for C not only states that he disagrees with D and his assessment but changes his footing of the report elicitor to that of the report provider, thus challenging the selected frame and its report elicitor/report repeater/report provider (RE/RR/RP) design.<sup>14</sup> In the next turn, R makes a request to leave the interaction. The placement of R’s request is significant, given that R previously rejected my earlier offers to transfer his turn to me. There is also a reason why R chooses to exit the interaction at that particular point. In line 794, he gives an account for that action: ‘°take over there is too much bullshit° hhh khhh’ (line 794). The fact that R’s critique is made in the language inaccessible to C makes me consider C as the target of R’s criticism about the interaction in general and C’s words, in particular. By meta-commenting on C’s interaction at large, R abandons his own neutral footing. By default, he also strains the selected frame and introduces potential for conflict.

The sheer negativity of the above assessment makes me suspend the analysis of this segment and turn instead to the beginning of the interaction. My objective here is to investigate the sequential evolution of disagreement sequences. A further examination of the previous material



shows that R's statement in line 794 is not an isolated instance but a culmination that had risen from a series of previous disagreements. Since not all disagreements are negative, I find it necessary to elaborate on the construction of negativity in disagreements through negative assessments as it is approached by the conversation analytic methodology. I attempt to do so by tracing the evolution of negative assessments through the categories of access, orientation, and valence. These categories are epistemologically relevant for genetic analysis as they disclose the pre-conditions for the categories of alignment and affiliation which stand for structural and relational genesis, respectively.

## Construction of Negative Assessments

According to Pomerantz (1984), in making assessments, the parties necessarily establish their knowledge base with respect to the assessable, or what is being assessed. An assessable is not accessible in the same way to all parties. Therefore, Pomerantz (1980) distinguishes between two types of knowledge: knowledge based on the direct experience of an assessable and indirect knowledge occasioned by the other party. In other words, if I report a conversation with a friend to another party, I rely on the first type of knowledge. The other party, with a limited access to the event, draws this knowledge from my telling about the knowable and/or by observing my telling. In other words, the other party has to obtain his or her knowledge from me. Therefore, following the given classification, his or her knowledge is of the second type. For example, if a conversation with my non-present friend were somehow distressing, the other party may observe my distress and thus acquire an understanding of how I treated the conversation. The two types of knowledge are not clearly separated: the other party may know my friend from their previous interactions. However, if the assessed is not a common friend, and my conversation with him or her is not accessible to the other party as a direct experience, the original distinction holds.

An intercultural/interlingual situation adds a level of complexity to this schema. In the preceding chapter, I distinguished between foreign and native experiences. I linked these experiences to the country of origin

and to the language of origin. I claimed that original experiences are not accessible to the alien party. In light of this claim, I can conclude that even when a conversation conducted in a foreign language is accessible to both monolingual participants, the native party cannot help but claim more access and therefore more knowledge about it than the foreign party, even if the foreign party is familiar with both the alien language and the alien culture. In reverse, the foreign party cannot claim the same access to a knowable and must constantly assert his or her right to it in a conversation by either self-referencing general expertise or by requesting confirmations from others. In a situation where the languages employed by the communicating parties are mutually inaccessible to them except through translation, they negotiate their relation to the assessable item also through the translator.

The implications of limited accessibility are both structural and relational. Structurally, it is preferred if an interactant with direct access to the assessable makes assessments. As a result, direct knowledge is treated as authoritative: 'The witness's or outsider's version is treated as a report of an appearance, as evidence; the final say as to what the event was, however, rests with the subject-actors' (Pomerantz 1980, p. 190). If access to an assessable is in question, as in the example of both people participating in the discussed event, the participants may negotiate their orientation to the assessable by establishing the level of certainty about it. The level of certainty can be determined by how the other participants treat the previous assessment but also by specific contextualization cues employed in its construction. For example, the use of phrasal units such as 'I think,' 'it appears,' 'if I remember correctly,' or adverbs such as 'maybe,' 'perhaps,' 'kind of' may indicate uncertainty about the assessable. On the other hand, the use of descriptive modifiers, such as 'coarse,' 'bright,' and 'nagging,' can show the interactant's certainty about what he or she is reporting.

Finally, no assessable is negative in itself. From the conversation analytic perspective, it becomes negative, positive, or neutral in its impact depending on its valence, or how it is treated by others. For example, we tend to identify criticisms as assessments when the latter emit great negative force. However, approached in a specific relational context, as in a trainer/trainee situation, criticisms may be treated as positive and

even desirable. Brown and Levinson suggest that we should approach negative criticisms in terms of their threat to the other's positive face, which is the 'positive consistent self-image of "personality" (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved) claimed by interactants' (1987, p. 61). Being alert and self-reflective in regard to the construction of their face by others, interactants are particularly sensitive to criticisms, complaints, and other types of negative assertions which directly implicate them or the world with which they associate. The latter point bears an immediate relevance to this study, which deals with two cultural worlds that serve to identify the interactants' membership categories on a much larger scale than if they were produced within one cultural world. The issue of inaccessibility only complicates this design. The membership category of the foreigner is an overriding membership category that includes the world of the foreign participants at large. Together with other membership categories (e.g., police officer), it gives a particular face to the foreign. At the same time, the face of the foreign is not a given. Being largely inaccessible due to cultural and linguistic differences, it may hide behind sedimentations of shared and familiar membership categories, preventing an immediate appearance.

An important distinction needs to be made at this point. Earlier I mentioned different types of assessments such as criticisms and complaints. Both criticisms and complaints can be used to construct negativity. However, despite their common force, the direction and relational orientation differ significantly. According to Tracy et al. (1987), complaints are typically produced by the people who occupy a lower status. In contrast, criticisms are made by people with a higher status, even if the latter is obtained informally through family connections. Occasionally, when there is a close interpersonal component in a relationship, people may reverse their status and therefore switch from complaints to criticisms and vice versa. However, for an institutional context, it is more common that superiors criticize their subordinates rather than complain about them to their face. The direction of complaint is also different than that of criticism. A criticism usually implicates one of the interactants directly. In other words, it is a negative assessment against this particular

interactant's face. The focus of a complaint is directed to someone else and his or her face. A complaint may also implicate the present party indirectly. In this case, it is again about how this party treats the assessable that draws the line between the two kinds of speech acts.

The assessable is therefore the smallest unit that determines the first or the second part of the adjacency pair. Taking the difference between a conversational act and a conversational episode into consideration, the assessable may belong to both. However, it cannot be separated from the general conversational trajectory. In a conversation, the latter can be identified as a theme that the participants have chosen to pursue. In other words, what they assess and how they go about it affect the content of the interaction on a scale that exceeds either an individual action or a specific episode. Since the purpose of this chapter is to examine translation-in-talk as an intercultural activity, I will focus my investigation on those assessables that specifically reference the foreign. The overall objective is to see how the original asymmetry between the guests and the hosts in the analyzed episode as well as the inaccessibility of both to each other may assign the negative valence to a specific interaction.

From the previous research, we know that a typical outcome of negativity is disagreement (Pomerantz 1984). Given a tendency for the participants to align to each other when conversing or interacting, the participants will attempt to manage their disagreements by trying to eliminate negative outcomes. An examination of the techniques that they employ toward that goal will show how the asymmetry between the guests and the hosts or between the native and the foreign is managed in terms of alignment. Returning to the phenomenological theory of genetic constitution, I would like to claim that interpersonal alignment is a genetic concept which generates context by having the participants accomplish a particular objective together in 'real' time. We will also see the effects of interpreting on the ways the participants align to each other. In the next section, I would like to elaborate on the most common techniques involved in accomplishing agreements and disagreements in translation-in-talk. Both are basic examples of conversational acts which do not exist other than when they are embedded in some ongoing talk.

## Managing Disagreements

Mundanelly, agreements and disagreements are accomplished by taking a turn without a delay or with a short delay, as in the case of agreements, or by delaying claiming the incoming turn, as in the case of disagreements. As I have already mentioned, in conversational interaction, disagreements are considered as dispreferred (Pomerantz 1984). Interactants tend to avoid them by mitigating their production. Their mitigation devices vary and may include (a) requests for clarification (sequential delay); (b) prefacing agreements by agreement tokens (syntactic delay); or (c) disagreeing by downgrades (semantic minimization). De-escalation of disagreements is usually accomplished within several sequences and involves moderating the trouble spot by gradually weakening previous assessments. Socially, disagreements perform an important function for they prevent interactants from aligning well. It is in this regard that participants 'manage' them. We may say, therefore, that structurally the two parties will act toward aligning with each other along the lines of the selected topics. In addition to assessments, the alignment techniques comprise newsmarks, continuers, formulations, collaborative completions, and various prefaces, such as 'revisions' and 'preventatives' (Nofsinger 1991). Briefly, a newsmark is a display of the informative value of an utterance, that is, 'really' or 'oh.' Newsmarks display that their producers are now informed participants, that is, they have experienced a change of state. Continuers are similar to newsmarks in that they too can display the participant's appreciation of the information given to him or her. They are usually expressed by such tokens as 'uh huh,' 'mm hmm,' and 'yeah.' However, their somewhat superficial nature makes conversation analysis experts believe that their function is different, namely, that they allow the previous speaker to take the contestable next turn; hence, the term 'continuer.' Formulation is a summary of the previous speaker's turn. Collaborative completions are carried out with the next speaker's assistance to the previous speaker in accomplishing the next turn. Revisions are produced by inviting or offering the other party an excuse whenever a rejection is expected.

For example, if I make an offer to my friend to go to the movies with me, I may clear the path for his or her rejection of my offer by

overlapping my interlocutor's turn that begins with 'well, I don't know if...' by saying 'actually, I may not go myself at all—too much work to do.' Preventatives, which are also known as disclaimers, function as a face-saving device as well but are structurally different. They are usually applied when an invitation to display knowledge is made. For example, I may ask a friend if he or she knows how to translate the technical term 'wheel well' in Russian. My friend may withhold a direct answer of 'yes' or 'no' and respond by saying that he or she has not worked on technical assignments, thus insuring against a possibility of my understanding his or her lack of knowledge as a sign of incompetence. In sum, conversational alignment is a collaborative achievement and is performed by employing various devices toward avoiding misunderstanding, confusion, and argument. Alignment is a relational property of talk. It engages the same domain that we tend to experience when a stranger we have never met before becomes instantly familiar after the initial encounter.

The constrained context of institutional talk, such as a job interview, cross-examination, or deposition, exhibits preference for some of these devices, while dispreferring others. For example, in his study of news interviews, Greatbatch (1992) identifies the main constraint for the news interviewer as a way of asking questions without producing assessments. The interviewee, on the other hand, is constrained by abstaining from asking questions, for his role is rather to supply answers, which creates an opportunity to produce assessments. When disagreements occur, they are managed within the news interview design. Both the interviewer and the interviewee may disagree but within their question or answer formats, respectively. They rarely switch from asking questions to answering them. Maintaining respective footings allows the parties to produce symmetrical discourse with explicit formal aspects (e.g., distribution of conversation authority; areas of respective responsibilities) that could be later treated by the natural attitude as a 'good' or 'bad' conversation.

Greatbatch also shows that disagreements in news interviews 'are not systematically delayed and mitigated by the occurrence of the preference features that are associated with the latter. Thus they are rarely qualified and are not normally prefaced by agreement components or delayed sequentially' (1992, p. 279). Sequentially, disagreements occur following the response to the interviewer's question, or the prior response.

Depending on the strength of the disagreement, the speakers may opt to maintain or step out of their interactional roles, or footing. Sometimes, when a disagreement is particularly strong, the parties attempt to change the frame. For example, in the case of job interviews, the job interview frame will be defined by one participant being the interviewer, that is, someone who asks questions to subsequently decide about the interviewee's ability to perform the job. The other party is the interviewee, that is, the answerer (responder), who attempts to persuade through his or her answers that he or she is the right candidate for the job. The interviewee may start asking questions about the job and the interviewer may answer them, although this reversal usually happens after the interviewer asks all the questions he or she has. By maintaining the role of the interviewer and the interviewee, the participants sustain their respective conversational footings. An interviewee who asks too many questions may be perceived as 'aggressive' and, therefore, inappropriate. The interviewee's refusal to 'play by the rules' will then be assessed as a sign of his or her social incompetence. The same can be said about the interpreter whose shift from the role of the 'repeater' to the role of the 'author' of his or her own opinions will undoubtedly result in a sanction, even if a delayed one.

If the structural design prefers agreements over disagreements, the emergence of the latter within such a design is usually the result of an interactional asymmetry. One facet of the asymmetry is the conversational design. If we examine the frame of the question/answer session selected for the meeting between the FBI and the Russian police, we will find a structural asymmetry located in the difference between the conversational force of the question and that of the answer. As a conversational action, the question is typically a request. As such, it can be accepted or rejected. The rejection will be dispreferred. The answer is typically an assessment. Therefore, it can be agreed or disagreed with. The disagreement is also dispreferred. The force of rejection has greater consequences for a conversation than the force of disagreement. The structural asymmetry between the report elicitor and the report provider creates an interactional unbalance. The party who assesses can claim all kinds of knowledge, while the other party, who is confined to the structure of the question, does not enjoy the same structural openness and must work much harder to achieve the same results. Some research shows that it is

easier to affiliate with another person through his or her assessments than through requests (Atkinson 1992). Therefore, structurally, the question/answer frame creates a possibility for the misalignment, disaffiliation, and miscommunication. The translator's turn enhances this possibility. As a repeat, it is designed to reproduce the previous action. However, it is also a response directed to someone. It is a conversational action in its own right. Therefore, it may increase, decrease, or altogether alter the force of the previous action.

Structural asymmetry can be set in motion through intercultural and interpersonal asymmetries. According to Levinson, parties from different cultures in a conversation 'may create miscommunication by employing the same conversational structures but for different outcomes' (1992, p. 95). The inaccessibility of the foreign world prevents easy access to the cultural difference. In the case of translation-in-interaction, the interpreter provides for some of the access through the interpreter's turn. At the same time, being a structural constraint, the interpreter's turn also affects access to the alien. The extent of access appears to depend on both the interpreter's skill in reflecting the difference and his or her relations with the conversing parties. People tend to like or dislike each other in all contexts; an interpersonal judgment is built into the experience of being with the other person. People also tend to exhibit different positions, allegiances, and social statuses. All these factors are exacerbated in an intercultural context. All of these can lead to negative effects in a disagreement. In the following section, I present the interpersonal facet of the context that precedes the talk. The purpose of this preview is to expand the contextual background for the subsequent analysis.

## Interpersonal Context

The interpersonal facet of the context which is associated with the interpreting event concerns local relationships between interacting participants. There are five kinds of relationships that I distinguish as primary and contextually relevant: (1) between the Russian guests and their US hosts from the West Coast Police Department (WCPD); (2) between the Russians and the interpreters; (3) between the interpreters and the



American hosts; (4) among the Russian guests themselves; and (5) among the Americans hosts themselves. The first type of relationship was mostly business-like. Both hosts from WCPD, A and E, were present at the meeting. Due to the difference in rank and responsibilities, A, a WCPD Lieutenant who worked directly with the Chief of WCPD, was mainly in charge of the organizational side of the visit. For example, he was the one who arranged for the meeting at the FBI office. E, a veteran detective with over 25 years of service, was responsible for transportation, accommodations, and meals. As a result, the group had mostly interacted with E, who was with the group every day and also organized a small reception in his house at the end of the Russian group's visit. In addition, E spoke a little Russian, which he learned during his Army service at the Monterey Military Language School. A did not speak any Russian. Both E and A had a good sense of humor and seemed to have affiliated with their Russian colleagues quite well.

The relationship between the members of the group and the interpreters was somewhat different. Due to the fact that both the interpreters and the Russian guests lived at the same hotel, they had spent more time together than the Russian guests and their US hosts. The relationship started on a wrong foot, partly as a result of my request to audiotape translated interactions at the very first meeting. The purpose of the first meeting was orientation. After I placed my request and received a sweeping permission from the American side, C, who was an official head of the Russian group, also agreed to audio recording; however, he did so reluctantly. As it turned out later, he suspected that both R and I worked for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the National Security Agency (NSA) in a capacity other than translating, implying that we held some kind of an intelligence job and that interpreting was a secondary professional occupation. During the first break on the first day of the group's visit, he approached us and asked both R and me if we were on a special assignment. Our attempts to dissuade him failed, and he kept on returning to his theory even after it was confirmed by the Russian-speaking program manager from the IACP that both R and I were indeed Russian citizens and were hired as freelance interpreters. C tested this theory twice by inviting both R and me to have a drink with him and the rest of the group. During these get-togethers, C pursued his theory about

our 'agency' and its functions. It was not until after one of C's colleagues explained it to us that in his place of work C headed the Internal Affairs Division designed to investigate members of the local police force, that we could put his persistent attitude in a positive perspective.

A career military man (the police in Russia is considered to be a para-military organization), C particularly disliked R, a career intellectual about the same age as C. C joined the military when he was ten through a special cadet program for the WWII orphans. At the age of 18, C was drafted into the Soviet Army. After 2 years of Army service, C joined the city police and continued to serve there for over 20 years, with a 2-year break for his study at the Higher Law Enforcement Academy in Moscow. In contrast, R was born in Batumi, Georgia, where his family of Lithuanian descent was exiled for political dissent. He graduated from high school with the highest honors ('gold medal') and was admitted without entry exams to the Moscow State University, where he majored in geography, an 'allowed subject' for someone with his heritage. In his senior, year he went abroad to India for a 12-month exchange program. At the time when student foreign exchange programs were extremely rare, this trip signified either an unusually high academic potential or special connections. R's background excluded the latter. The fact that after the graduation R was immediately invited to stay in a highly competitive graduate program at the Moscow State University points to the former. R received his PhD at the age of 25 and was offered full professorship at the age of 30. An author of several books on human geography, an emerging field at the time, he was invited to teach in the United States in 1991. He taught at the University of North Carolina for five years. In 1995, he decided to leave academia and began to work for the State Department as a freelance interpreter.

As I remember them, R and C presented the most striking contrast to each other in both their personalities and appearances. R was a tall and lanky man with a head full of thick blond hair. His movements and voice were soft, his posture slightly slouched and relaxed. Sarcasm and irony were his two most favorite attitudes. C, on the other hand, was a man of about five feet, bold and plump, with a rather crude sense of humor and a strong tendency to argue. If R was quiet and introspective, C was extremely energetic and somewhat loud. Highly educated, R liked to

share his knowledge and opinions, some of which I considered extreme. C, on the other hand, did not possess any erudite knowledge. However, he liked to tell stories and did so in an explicitly opinionated and simplistic way. Often, the two personalities would clash when fighting for the floor. An expert in geography, R knew very well the region where C and the rest of the Russian group lived and worked. His knowledge was both first-hand (he visited the Russian Far East as a student) and secondary, obtained from books. Given his phenomenal memory and eloquence, R tended to win the arguments with the colonel, which made C even more suspicious as to R's allegiance and intentions.

In addition to the differences in appearance, education, and personality, R and C occupied rather divergent roles in the social organization of the former Soviet Union. For R, C symbolized the other side of living in the Soviet Union: military control and secret surveillance—everything that R and his family opposed driven by strong convictions. From both occasional remarks as well as extensive commentaries made by both C and R, I received the impression that for C, R was a typical representative of the good-for-nothing intelligentsia, the source of all trouble, and especially the collapse of the Soviet monolith. In response, R took C for an undereducated and intellectually deprived Army grunt with enormous ambitions and unbridled appetite for power. C considered R an arrogant snob and a softy who betrayed his motherland by defecting to the other side. Another point of irreconcilable difference concerned R's Moscow connection as opposed to C's provincial roots. Many times, residents of Soviet provinces expressed distrust about the residents of Moscow, who tended to think of the rest of the country as poor in intellect and generally backward. This attitude often provoked a strong sense of resentment from those who did not have much access to various privileges that Moscow promised. In sum, R and C argued on numerous occasions, mostly in their interpretations of the current political events and in their knowledge of Russia and the Far Eastern region.

The personal histories of C and R intersected at the point when the Soviet Union was no longer a superpower that stood in opposition to the United States. The new democratic Russia was going through an identity crisis that had affected all of its institutions, including the much hated KGB and the militia (police). It was difficult for both organizations to

reorient their activities away from collecting information about Russian citizens and to focus primarily on investigative work. It is a well-known fact that the fallen Iron Curtain prompted mass migrations, ethnic conflicts, and an explosion of serious crime, which challenged all the Russian law enforcement agencies that were completely unprepared to function in a non-totalitarian environment. At the same time, the new mass media brought corruption and mismanagement in the police ranks to the forefront of their reports. In his conversations, C openly blamed the Russian democrats for replacing the order and stability of the former Soviet Union with the chaos and fragmentation of the poorly patched-together Commonwealth of Independent States. Even when abroad, C continued to express his patriotic views. It was he who made an unplanned visit to the Russian Consulate in the host city for a debriefing on the current situation, which, at that time, dealt with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) bombings of Serbia. It was also he who made a request to meet with the representatives of the FBI. In general, C noted his deep discomfort about having to learn from the Americans.

As for myself, I attempted to assume a more or less neutral position in regard to C. That, however, did not absolve me from C's suspicions, but, on the contrary, gave him a reason to suspect my membership in the CIA even more strongly. Therefore, it is more correct to say that, despite my attempts, I doubt that I succeeded in being personally neutral toward C. My descriptions of him in this text also testify to a bias. Although I never argued with him explicitly, our relationship was tense, which showed during our evening activities, when we toured San Francisco or played pool and table tennis at the local gym. Once, after having lost two sets in a row to me, C refused to stop playing until he ended up winning the last game, after which he proclaimed that the match was over. My relationship with R, on the other hand, was based on my appreciation of his vast knowledge and general kindness. Although I never detected many similarities in our personalities and was often irked by my colleague's arrogance, I felt much more affinity with him than with any other person involved in the project. It was not only because we were long-time professional partners but mostly because of our involved conversations about academia and other matters of mutual interest. I also respected R's interpreting abilities for, unlike me, he was not trained as an interpreter, but

had what I considered a 'natural' talent for languages and interpreting. Ideologically, I was less inclined to consider the Soviet Union as the 'evil empire,' as R did, but I never discussed my position with either C or R.

The relationship between C and the rest of the group was also uneasy. The other five Russian participants seemed to dislike C to various degrees. For example, K, a colleague who was superior in rank to C, exercised a polite and differential attitude toward C. After several days of staying in the host city, he became R's companion in exploring the place. Although K refused to take sides and remained relatively neutral in this conflict, he told us several stories about C that implicated him as a talentless career opportunist. N, the youngest member of the group, was openly resentful of C, and spent most of his free time with R and me. He clearly underwent a culture shock during the visit, was very confused, contemplated defecting, and was closely attended to by both sides. Finally, G, a Captain of militia who served in the same department as C, kept close to C but never sided with him during arguments. G happens to be the only other speaker in the translated segment. As for the relationship among the Americans, all I know is that A, who arranged for the meeting, had a business relationship with D, the head of the FBI's organized crime unit, and that A and E had a close working relationship determined largely by their respective positions within the police department.

I certainly acknowledge that this description of the interpersonal context is not necessarily neutral. It clearly shows my own preferences, which are sure to affect the scope and depth of my insights despite an attempt to 'bracket' them. I account for these constraints by trying to show that there were pre-existent relational strains that emerged in the context preceding the recorded interaction. The aforementioned relational dynamics accompanied the interaction and undoubtedly influenced its outcome. At the same time, I can imagine the same scenario developing during the translation session without any pre-conditions when, for example, let us just imagine, the parties did not know each other. In the next section, I would like to analyze the exemplar for disagreement sequences. My overall objective is to investigate how negativity is created by the participants in translation-in-interaction. The focus on negativity is not primary, however; by focusing on negative assessments I wish to show the genesis of a collaborative accomplishment of the event which takes place despite

the interpreter’s negativity. In order to show this, I would like to identify (a) how disagreements are displayed; (b) how they affect the frame of the question/repeat-answer/repeat session and the respective footings of the participants; and (c) how the disagreement in the analyzed episode reflects on the interpreter’s neutrality stance. In addition, by analyzing disagreement instances, I seek to understand not only the conversational trajectory but also the effects of the translator’s action on the relational dynamics between the monolingual parties.

## Creating Negativity in Translation or ‘°Take Over There Is Too Much Bullshit°’

In what follows, I single out those segments that lead to the disagreement at the end of the recording when R gives the floor to me. The shift is designated by the interpreter’s words: ‘°take over there is too much bullshit° hhh khhh’ (line 794). The segmentation of disagreement sequences helps me illustrate those actions that underline disagreement as well as the development of the themes that embed these actions. With the help of this focus, I understand not only how the interpreter’s turn influences disagreements but also how the parties orient to them in terms of referential coordinates, such as deixis of place, person, and time. I begin with Segment 1, which features the first disagreement sequence.

Segment 1. This segment evolves in lines 88–107 from the preceding material, namely, D’s overview of himself and his unit (D is the regional FBI section head in charge of Russian organized crime, R is the translator, and C is head of the Russian delegation). This material ends by D asking his Russian counterparts if they have any questions. After R’s turn that repeats D’s utterance in Russian, C self-selects by confirming his interest in asking questions and then formulating his first question after a three-second pause:

- 88C: Есть (3.0) с профессиональной точки зрения человека  
который занимается  
89 организованной преступностью русской этнической  
группы/(1.5) um

- 90 чем это вызвано (1.5) что русские оказались либо а::[...]  
либо ↓мудрее всех
- 91 остальных проживающих в Сан-Франциско. Речь идет о  
мо::шенничестве (1.0)
- 92 отмывании де:нег о ↑серьезных так называемых  
организационных
- 93 устойчивых группах которые совершают очень серьезные  
преступления (.)
- 94 Чем это вызвано.=
- 95R: =The colonel says eh literally eh since you're an expert in Russian  
organized crime
- 96 ah. what is your theory uhm (1.5) to explain why you have the  
Russians outwitted
- 97 everyone else uh in Bay area in going into big time fra:ud, and  
↓money laundering.
- 98 (1.0)

Translation: 'yes, from the professional point of view of a person who deals with the organized crime of the Russian ethnic origin, what is his opinion that the reasons for this situation are, that the Russians turned out to be either smarter or wiser than everyone else who lives in San Francisco. I mean in terms of fraud, money laundering, other serious so-called organized formations that commit very serious crimes. What is the reason?'

Notice that C's question contains a formulation of D's previous assessment. As I have mentioned earlier, the use of formulation is typically considered as an affiliative device. It is employed to mitigate a potential disagreement by giving the other party a chance to account for the problematic content. The problematic is D's assessable that links the ethnic association of the criminals to that of the visiting police officers as in 'Russian organized crime.' With the help of the qualifiers 'smarter' and 'wiser,' C appears to be reconstructing this association in positive terms as a favorable reflection on the intelligence of the Russian nationals. In line 95, R responds to C's question by repeating it in the English language. Neither the structure nor the function of R's response differs from his previous responses. It is still a repeat that features a code-switching operation. However, this turn is radically different from all the others

preceding the interpreter’s turns. In line 95, for the first time, R introduces the reported speech performed in the third person:

- 95R: The Colonel says eh ↓literally eh since you’re an expert in Russian organized crime  
 96 ah what is your theory uh to explain why you have the Russians outwitted  
 97 everyone else uh in Bay area in going into big time fra:ud, and money laundering  
 98 Well.  
 99 (1.0)

The transition here has more than simply stylistic implications. The reported speech ‘contaminates’ R’s neutral stance of the report repeater when he switches from being an ‘animator’ of the other’s words to being somewhat an ‘author’ and a ‘principal,’ who assumes the responsibility for his opinions. R’s own opinion is given by way of the interjection ‘↓literally.’ The adverb ‘literally’ contains the crux of R’s meta-commentary. Although, as an assessable, ‘literally’ is neither positive nor negative in itself, its placement as well as the subsequent material endows it with misaligning and disaffiliative qualities. It is misaligning because, structurally, R’s interjection is an anomaly for the repeat designed to reproduce the previous statement as closely to itself in form and content as possible. In this reproductive, that is, quasi-neutral mode, there is room for the translator’s commentaries in general but no room for his or her explicit assessments of the previous speaker(s) or the content of their talk. For the translator to produce his own assessment alongside the repeated one means to assume an alternative ‘authorship,’ which also means disaffiliating with the ‘author’ of the previous statement in principle.<sup>15</sup>

Specifically, R’s meta-commentary ‘literally’ dissociates R’s own opinion from the one proffered by ‘The Colonel.’ Note the placement of this attribution. Placed in the very beginning of R’s opening lines, the term ‘The Colonel’ functions as a cue for the switch to the reported speech. R’s choice of the term that describes the head of the Russian delegation confirms its disaffiliative function. As a term of formal address used in a semiformal situation, ‘The Colonel’ gives the adverb ‘literally’ an ironic



twist with a negative spin. In contrast to D, who R met for the first time at this meeting, but would call by his first name later in the interaction, R had known C and worked with him for several days, and, as far as I remember, he had never called C by rank to his face in the Russian language. The use of the term 'The Colonel' in the code inaccessible to either the Colonel himself or the rest of the Russian party makes me believe that it is intended specifically for the English-speaking party, that is, me and the English-speaking US hosts. It, therefore, functions as an explicit affiliative device employed to show that R sides with the English-speaking party by disaffiliating with the previous speaker.

The content of R's repeat contributes to his disaffiliation with C. R's 'literal' rendition carries a strong vocal emphasis on the words 'outwitted' and 'fraud and money laundering.' If we compare my translation with R's repeat, we will see that C's assessment does not have an emphasis on 'either smarter or wiser.' On the contrary, the syntactic structure of the 'either/or' employed by C displays ambiguity. Vocal hesitation markers such as micropauses and in-breaths reinforce the impression of C's hesitant delivery. All these markers are removed by R in his turn. Lexically, by rendering the Russian adjectives 'smarter' and 'wiser' in the verbal form of the English Past Tense as 'outwitted,' R upgrades C's assessment to a fact. He also introduces a potentially ironic characterization of D himself by upgrading him to 'an expert' and requesting from him 'a theory' instead of just an 'explanation' as it was requested by C. My translation shows that the word 'theory' does not appear in C's original utterance.<sup>16</sup> Syntactically, C's formulation of the question is delayed by several re-starts. The delayed production weakens C's assessment of both D's position as that of 'a person who deals with the Russian organized crime' and his possible response by way of 'an opinion.' In contrast, R upgrades C's syntax by repeating C's disjointed utterances in one cohesive sentence. Given the inaccessibility of C's original statement, D cannot help but respond to R's upgraded rendition. In the following instance, D cues his response to the word 'outwitted' as follows:

100D: Uh-uh- I don't know if they ah outwitted everybody oraatha- they just this ah one

- 101 of the- one of the things we’ve found. is that becuj- because uh  
de educational
- 102 system. (.) the former Soviet Union ha:d. (2.0) the Russian  
criminals, at least  
[
- 103R: Uhmu
- 104D: the ones that are running these organizations tend to  
be (.) sharper than some of  
[
- 105R: Uhmu
- 106D: older groups such as uhm Colombian organized crime or Italian  
(.) organized
- 107 crime.
- 108 (1.5)

Note that D prefaces his disagreement by the phrase ‘Uh-uh- I don’t know.’ The prefacing phrase ‘I don’t know if...’ may indicate that D treats C/R’s formulation as an arguable. However, previewed by this particular prefacing, D presents his disagreement as weak. It is further mitigated by a subsequent agreement in which D compares Russian organized crime with Italian and Colombian organized crime. The comparison seems favorable for Russian organized crime. Notably, in describing this entity, D uses the word ‘sharper,’ which is semantically close to C’s ‘smarter.’ Through this particular comparison, D diminishes his previous disagreement without rejecting C’s assessment outright. Interestingly, D does not refer to rather sophisticated and technologically advanced European organized crime groups. He references them later as the newest and the most sophisticated international crime groups, which include the Russian mafia but also go beyond the Russian nationality. Instead, D limits his comparison to the traditional groups that appear to be inferior to their Russian counterparts. Note in this respect how D employs the deixis of place and time that point to the same ethnic association that prompted C’s question in the first place: ‘the educational system the former Soviet Union had’ (line 102). This assessment accomplishes several things. First, D’s reference to ‘the former Soviet Union’ distinguishes it from ‘Russia,’ thus establishing his familiarity with C’s country in its historical perspective. Second,

D's assessment gives a positive interpretation of C's country in terms of its solid educational system. Third, D's reference dissociates the Russian criminals as the product of the past Soviet Union from the Russia that C represents now. All these acts tend to mitigate D's previous disagreement. R's translation follows:

- 109R: Ага. Ну- тут сказать трудно что они↑а: так сказать  
перехитрили всех.  
110 оказались ловчее всех. но можно сказать что  
определенные а: (2.0)  
111 преимущества в уровне образования ну новейших  
этнических преступных  
112 группировок включая российскую <<позволяют им  
делать (.) действовать  
113 ловчее чем такие ↓более традиционалистские и старые  
группы  
114 как ска:же:м аа: °колумбийского и итальянского  
происхождения°.  
115 (1.5)

Translation: 'And it is hard to say here if they turned out to be smarter than everybody else but one can say that certain advantages in the level of education of the most recent ethnic criminal formations including the Russian one allow them to act in a more sophisticated fashion than those traditional and old groups like, say, Columbian and Italian groups.'

In his translation, R renders line 100 as follows: 'Well, it is hard to say here if they turned out to be smarter than everybody else...' Note R's translation of D's 'I don't know' as 'Well, it is hard to say...' Although both prefaces function as formal token phrases, there is a semantic difference: 'I don't know' connotes a lack of knowledge, or uncertainty, while 'Well, it is hard to say' connotes a strategic difficulty of expression. As a result of R's rendition, D's weak preface becomes slightly upgraded to a stronger disagreement preface. In addition, R changes the first-person speech to the indefinite person. This alteration allows R to affiliate with D by creating a space for his own opinion within an anonymous attribution. R's affiliation with D is also displayed by numerous continuers

deployed in various strategic places in D’s turns, namely, those places that feature potentially criticable terms.<sup>17</sup>

R’s repeat omits D’s reference to the ‘former Soviet Union’ as well as the past tense used by D to designate the relation of the criminals to the former regime. Instead, R uses the present tense and a generalized description of Russian organized crime as one of the newest organized crime groups. Thus, he considers the Russian criminals as a matter of the present system rather than of the past one. In this formulation, the relationship between the Russian criminals and the police appears to be a symbiotic one. The silence that follows R’s repeat belongs to C and indicates his disagreement with D/R. In the following lines, C attempts to manage his disagreement by deploying an exit strategy:

- 116C: А вот его отряд↓ или подразделение (1.0) ну которое  
занимается всем  
117 что имеет отношение к организованной преступности  
(1.0) с кем он больше  
118 контактирует. с федеральной службой безопасности  
России. или ну: с  
119 министерством внутренних дел. (1.0)  
120R: Uh who does uh organized crime squad interact more with, uh  
eh the Minischer of  
121 the Interior of Russia or the FSB.  
122 (2.0)

Translation: ‘This his group or section that he heads with everything that has to do with the organized crime who does he keep in closer contact with, the Federal Security Bureau of Russia or the Ministry of Internal Affairs?’

C’s new topic is a request for information. The information that C is requesting is not new, however, but is linked to the developing topic of cooperation. Its function is to broaden the theme of cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. This topical contraction allows C to not only dilute D’s criticable but also move it to the ‘safer’ grounds of general contacts between the two governmental entities. The theme’s movement from the concrete sphere to the abstract sphere makes it less

threatening to the immediate face of the Russian party. C's question also seeks to establish appropriate membership categories for the present parties. R renders C's lines in a structurally straightforward fashion. For one, he cleans up C's disjointed syntax by removing C's opening line: 'This his group or section that he heads...' (line 116). By default, R also eliminates C's second-person address as in 'the section that he heads...' (line 116). His alteration results in C's lines losing an affiliative component of a formulation that replicates D's previous attribution to himself as 'the head of the group.' By compacting the previous turn, R also removes the softened effect of C's hesitant opening. As a result of this management, C's question loses the trace of indirectness and acquires an authoritative tone.<sup>18</sup>

Segment 2. The next disagreement develops in lines 130–152 immediately after D's answer to C's question. Thematically, it is linked to the previous disagreement. However, it has a significantly different direction. If the disagreement in Segment 1 dealt with C's misformulation and was quickly clarified on the grounds of the knowledge that belonged to D only, the next disagreement evolved from the conflict between two competing knowledge bases. After D/R's response in lines 124–125 that establishes the fact of the growing ties between the FBI and the Federal Security Bureau (FSB), there is a three-second pause. The placement and the length of the pause make me believe that C treats D/R's response as dispreferred. As an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), C might see the cooperation between the FSB and the FBI as an irrelevant development. The FSB, which used to be known as the KGB, had been a competing law enforcement agency during the Soviet time and remained as such at the time of the visit. Moreover, the FSB enjoyed much wider powers than the Russian militia and was considered as an otherwise privileged agency. This could explain the long silence that precedes C's turn, which was eventually taken by D:

- 130D: One of the interesting things I've found and perhaps you can eh  
ah address this.
- 131 In most of my investigations - the (1.0) the success of the case or  
lack of success
- 132 has to do with - how much corruption in regards to the political  
situation um

- 133 we've been eh encountering in our cases over there. That these  
 criminals tend to  
 134 be protected by - various – khkh- political – elements=  
 135R: =Uhmu uhmu  
 136 (1.0)

D's self-selection indicates that he might have treated C's silence as a pre-disagreement. Earlier, I mentioned that there is a preference for continuous talk in an institutional setting that has a fixed time slot allocated for an interaction. It is therefore D's responsibility as a host to arrange for that continuity. D mitigates C's silence in two ways: he accounts for his previous assessment by providing an illustration; he also relinquishes his RP foreigner by requesting information, that is, switching to the RE footing of his guests. The latter feature marks this instance as a critical moment for the interaction. By reversing the pre-established interactional design, D puts the selected question/answer frame into question. This certainly counts as a serious attempt to align with the other party.<sup>19</sup>

D's gesture of alignment is accompanied by other conversational devices also aimed at stalling a potential disagreement. For example, in D's request for a clarification there is an acknowledgment of the supremacy of C's cultural knowledge as a native of Russia. The fact that D embeds the supremacy of this knowledge in the present tense indicates that D sees C as being in a position to comment on the current situation in Russia as opposed to the events that D witnessed himself as an attaché in Moscow some time ago. As a marker of shared experience, D's request is decidedly affiliative. By proffering an example, D continues to develop the theme of cooperation, albeit choosing to do this along the lines of problematic cooperation. The problematic element in D's reference is the term 'corruption,' which characterizes the actions of some Russian authorities. He mitigates the potential negativity of his assessment by using indefinite formulations. He begins his turn with the general 'one of the things,' continues with 'in most of my investigations,' then employs the comparative 'how much' and, finally, uses the verb 'tend.' D's lexical choices are accompanied by paralinguistic markers that also signify hesitancy. Similar to D's and C's previous utterances that displayed hesitancy,

the hesitant delivery may stand for the difficulty of trying to find the 'right' words and be used as a strategy to diminish the possibility of a disagreement. For example, in line 134, D pauses several times before finishing on the word 'elements.' In a similar vague manner, D refers to C's home country. The use of 'over there,' which stands for Russia, allows him to avoid a direct attribution of the criticable material to C's home since 'over there' first connotes 'anywhere that is not here.' As long as D's statement does not challenge the positive face of C personally, it may be defined as a complaint. His question to C therefore bears an affiliative component, as it requests an evaluation of the corrupt bureaucracy that, as a common enemy, not only hampers US-Russian cooperation, but stands in the way of C's performing his concrete duties. Let us now look at how R renders D's lines:

- 137R: Интересный момент↓ (1.5) на опыте ведения этих дел  
совместно с российскими  
138 правоохрнительными органами/они убед↓ились что ама:  
успех расследования в  
139 многой степени зависит от того (2.0) в какой мере  
группировка имеет кх-кх  
140 крышуувиде>>коррум↓пированного(1.0)поли↓тического  
(1.5) при-кры-ти-я.  
141 (1.5)

Translation: 'An interesting moment from the experience of working on these cases together with the Russian law enforcement, they became convinced that the success with an investigation depends to a larger degree on how and to what extent organized crime groups are protected by the corrupted political apparatus.'

The comparison of the two translations shows that R abandons D's request for clarification and, consequently, his change of footing. Instead of repeating a request posed as a question, R constructs his turn as a statement. The change of syntactical structure is not accidental: R's performance clearly reflects the assertive character of his statement. In contrast to C's hesitant delivery and rising intonation, R's rendition displays a most definitive tone. His intonation is falling. His rate of

speech is high. There are no pauses and few micropauses. R’s lexical choices also display certainty. For example, D’s indefinite characterization ‘one of...’ turns into ‘all the cases.’ R further upgrades D’s assessables to facts by changing ‘I have found out’ to ‘they became convinced’ and ‘various political elements’ to ‘the corrupted political apparatus.’ These changes affect the process of alignment in several ways. On the one hand, structured within the reported speech, D’s personal opinion turns into ‘their’ opinion, while individual corrupt Russian politicians become the entire ‘corrupted political apparatus.’ R’s attribution of D’s personal opinion to the collectivity finds its match in the collective description of the Russian government. Here lies another important lexical distinction. The English word politician is defined by the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* as ‘someone, who works in politics, especially an elected member of a parliament or a similar institution’ (1978, p. 1090).

Until very recently, with Russia functioning as a centralized state, the Russian word ‘politician’ was used to connote the Communist elite that comprised the USSR Central Government all the way down to local Soviets whose heads were the last fence of privilege. Despite the country’s transition to the democratic rule, the word ‘politician’ continues to connote negative undertones of corruption. Used in conjunction with the word ‘apparatus,’ it reinforces the negative connotation to the Federal Government. Being an employee of the Federal Government, C becomes indirectly implicated in the ‘corrupted political apparatus.’ Therefore, from an affiliative request for clarification and an attempt to align with the other party through a change of footing, in R’s translation, D’s action loses its mitigating devices of a complaint and turns into a strong critical assertion.<sup>20</sup> With no response following after 1.5 seconds, D takes another turn and volunteers an example:

- 142D: Like for instance. currently (1.0) Sku-ratov who’s the prokutor  
 general - who - is  
 143 assisting uh us in investigation over there. ↑First he’s fired and  
 then he’s- rehired then  
 144 fired and rehired - and now my understanding is hes heass  
 back in- power- again.



It appears that D's self-selection for the next turn and the design of his turn point to D's treatment of C's second silence as another pre-disagreement. Then D's next turn can be characterized as a preventative deployed to downplay the potential disagreement through a clarification. Similar to the previous turn, D offers a change of footing by requesting an update from C. Ultimately, the change of footing offers a change of frame, which is consistent with D's attempt to align with the Russian party. As an affiliative gesture, D uses the deixis of person that concretizes his request: 'Prokurator General Skuratov' (line 142). Note the way D pronounces Skuratov's title. In Russian, it is pronounced as 'prokuror.' In English 'prokuror' is 'prosecutor.' D therefore collapses the Russian and the English words together. On the one hand, D displays his own cultural knowledge; on the other hand, by addressing his question directly to C and the Russian group, D gives them an opportunity to display their own cultural knowledge in a way that is superior to his. The paralinguistic markers in his delivery—micropauses, re-starts, and 'uhm' particles—indicate the disagreement-avoiding hesitancy. R responds as follows:

- 146 Нуу: примером политических игрщиц (.) которые затрудняют  
работу органов (1.5)
- 147 являются <<например>> ↓то что↑ происходит вокруг  
генерального прокурора
- 148 Скуратова/которого уволь↓няют нани:↓мают об↓ратно  
увольняют. (.) Сейчас уже
- 149 даже потеряли нить (1.0) он занимает этот пост. (.) или ↓нет.

Translation: 'Well, an example of the political games that make it difficult for the law enforcement to function is, for example, that which is happening with Prosecutor General Skuratov who gets fired then gets rehired then gets fired again. Now they even lost track whether he still has the position or not.'

In his response, R omits D's question, thus preserving D's original RP footing. He also removes the hesitancy of D's formulations. Furthermore, he upgrades D's assessment of the situation with the Prosecutor General by adding an assessment of his own: 'an example of the political games that make it difficult for the law enforcement to function.' Similar to

his previous renditions, R leaves this addition unmarked. Note R’s use of the pronoun ‘they’ as in ‘they don’t have a clue.’ In comparison, D’s utterance features the first-person pronoun ‘my’ as in ‘my understanding’ (line 144). By relying on the third-person attribution within the parameters of the reported speech, R blends his assessment with the one that originated in the previous turn. A shift from the individual to collective attribution downplays D’s personal responsibility as the ‘author’ of the previous statement by turning him into the ‘principal,’ who expresses ‘their’ opinion. Through these alterations, R again changes C’s conversational act of requesting a clarification into an assertion. R’s focusing on the problematic material in C’s turn upgrades the interpreter’s repeat to a criticism. As a result, D’s affiliative gestures become lost in a direct critique of the Russian party. By omitting D’s ambiguous ‘over there,’ R leaves no other reference to Russia except for the ‘person of the Prosecutor General.’ The negativity of this assessable colors the entire assessment of the Russian situation in negative tones. In the meantime, despite his disaffiliative gestures, R sustains his neutral footing by avoiding first-person attributions or meta-commentaries that would be accessible to both parties at the same time. His affiliation with D, on the other hand, comes across through both the upgrades and his use of continuers during D’s preceding turn. Because of their strategic placement (they all fall on the key words that designate the critique: ‘fired’ and ‘rehired’ and ‘in power again’), the continuers display R’s agreement with D.

Unaware of the offered choice to change the footing and the frame, C responds to D/R’s lines by retaining the RE footing. He clearly treats the preceding turns as containing negative assessments and, in response, employs the same exit strategy that he used in the previous segment.<sup>21</sup> In line 150, he expands the previous topic by way of asking another question:

- 150C: А есть ли случаи (1.5)/Давайте вернемся из поли↓тической  
 плоскости к  
 151 плоскости борьбы с преступностью. А здесь имеют ли  
 случаи не в  
 152 прошлом году а:: в этом году. Где крышей являлись  
 полицейские Лос-  
 153 ↓Анджелеса.

Translation: 'And are there cases? Let's return from the political sphere into the sphere of fighting crime. Over here, are there cases when last year or this year, [the criminals] have been protected by the police officers of Los Angeles?'

The design of the question indicates that C indeed took D/R's assessments as critical. The criticable is C's home in the face of the Prosecutor General, C's superior, who is mentioned immediately after 'the corrupted political apparatus.' C manages the criticable in a two-fold fashion. On the one hand, he preserves the topic of corruption by concretizing it in individual 'cases.' On the other hand, with the help of the deixis of place and person, he reverses the criticable, from D's 'over there' to 'here,' with the responsible party being now 'the police officers of Los Angeles.' C previews this reversal by a meta-commentary: 'let's return from the political sphere to the sphere of fighting crime' (line 150). The commentary displays C's wish to avoid political topics. As a topic management device, this meta-commentary aims at diffusing potential disagreements in the future talk. It is difficult to say if C goes meta to sanction D or R or both. In the next lines, after some repair work on C's error (confusing Los Angeles with the host city), R offers the following translation:

- 158R: =Uhmu. Ah have you had any cases to where the Russian crime groups uh had uh 159  
 in the cover ehh (1.2) •hhh in the corrupt officers of SFPD? Hhh  
 160 (3.0)  
 161D: Oh eh SFPD.=  
 162R: =Uhmu  
 163D: Russian? (1.0) Uh- not that I- not that I'm aware of.  
 164R: Такие случаи ему не известны.  
 165 (2.0)

Translation: 'He is not aware of such cases.'

Curiously, R chooses to omit C's commentary. One reason for the omission could be that R took the meta-commentary as directed to R himself in relation to his upgrades. As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, the inaccessibility of both codes to the monolingual participants does not prevent them from attending to the translator's turn and its

delivery as meaningful. This makes me believe that R’s omission accounts for the possibility of C questioning R’s repeats of his lines as biased.<sup>22</sup> R’s omission is accompanied by the lexical upgrade ‘corrupt officers’ that, on the one hand, indicates C/R’s treatment of their existence as a fact. On the other hand, R recycles D’s own term ‘corruption,’ thus affiliating with his discourse. D treats R’s repeat as unexpected and responds with a repeat followed by a categorical denial of such possibility. Once again, C diffuses a potential disagreement by exiting the previous theme and introducing a new one. From then on, the talk develops along the lines of some technical aspects of D’s work.

Segment 3. The next disagreement sequence arises in lines 186–200, when D makes another assessment that concerns the inflexibility of his Russian counterparts from the MVD:

- 186D: We had one investigation in which we were trying to get an  
M.V.D. officer  
187 assigned full time- to us in an undercover role- who would have  
traveled back  
188 and forth. However his superiors said that they could only allo-  
allow him to do  
[  
189R: Uhmu  
190D: that- ah a few times so for us it- it- didn’t work, because we  
would need him  
[  
191R: Uhmu  
192D: (0.1) more to get in-vo- to get deep cover- there was going to be  
more trips.=  
[  
193R: Uhmu

This example presents one more case of a complaint that is being delayed and mitigated lexically and syntactically. As in the previous segment, D’s assessment qualifies as a complaint since it does not directly involve C and his regional operations. Following the US law enforcement structure, which accords significant autonomy to local law enforcement, D may not have considered a possibility of implicating

C, a regional representative, in his complaint about his Moscow colleagues. Yet, D attempts to mitigate potential negative effects of his complaint by employing certain conversational devices. For example, in lines 188 and 190, D produces re-starts on the words 'could only allow' and 'didn't work.' The placement of the re-starts is strategic as both terms contain references to the problem: the first term attributes the problem to the MVD, while the second term accounts for the US non-acceptance of the Russian terms. D accomplishes the problematic place by connecting the deixis of person, 'an M.V.D. officer,' to the deixis of personal place, 'us.' In the next line, D uses the deixis of place to produce a critique of the officer's superiors who refused to cooperate in full with 'us' by taking 'their' officer off the case at a very crucial moment. Note the self-correction 'to get in-vo- to get deep cover-' (line 192). The self-correction downgrades the activity from the general notion of 'involvement' to a more technical 'to get deep cover.' In turn, the downgrade mitigates potential disagreement by weakening the negativity of the assessable in the immediately preceding 'more' as in 'perhaps too many.' In this interpretation, D lets the Russian MVD save face by presenting them as pursuing a different agenda rather than being unreasonable. R's translation follows:

- 194 =Аха. По одному из этих глубоко расследуемых ↓дел они и  
а: (.)
- 195 пытались добиться от МВД- чтобы им передали одного  
сотрудника для
- 196 глубокого внедрения в группировку (.) чтобы имел он  
свободу вместе с этими
- 197 преступниками перемещаться свободно между двумя  
странами туда и а: (.)
- 198 обратно(.)норуководствоМВДсказало.чтонеограниченной  
свободы
- 199 такому сотруднику оно не может предоставить. только на  
несколько поездов
- 200 что а: (1.0) было недостаточно.

Translation: 'In one of these widely deeply investigated cases they tried to get from the M.V.D. an officer assigned for the deep undercover work in

the group, so that he had the freedom to travel together with these criminals freely between the two countries back and forth but the M.V.D. officials said that such unlimited freedom can be given to this person only for several trips, and that wasn't sufficient.'

From comparing the two translations, we can see that R shifts the emphasis of the assessable to the word 'freedom' repeated twice in lines 196 and 198. R doesn't only replace the phrase 'could only allow him to do that a few times' with the word 'freedom,' but also upgrades it to the expression 'unlimited freedom.' For a Russian police officer who, during the Soviet regime, was used to numerous restraints on individual freedoms, the criticable 'freedom' is an especially unwelcome assessable. R also changes the order of D's accounts in ways that upgrade their impact: he starts with the specific 'only for several trips' and ends with the summarizing assessment 'that wasn't sufficient.' As a result, R's repeat eliminates all the devices employed by D to soften potential negativity. By default, he upgrades D's complaint to a criticism that directly implicates the MVD officials (rather than the superiors of a particular MVD officer), including the Colonel himself.

In the next turn, C indeed treats D's complaint as a direct criticism by resorting to a familiar strategy of a topic shift. The shift is not abrupt. The movement is still along the lines of the cooperation theme. What is shifted is the level of concreteness, from D's specific example of his work in Russia to the abstract matter of the US-Russian international agreements. This is the second time that C employs this strategy of moving the topic of cooperation to the 'safer' grounds of abstract official agreements. The move simultaneously absolves C from direct responsibility for concrete actions of the mid-level law enforcement personnel and returns the criticable to the realm of contractual obligations, the inadequacy of which may account for the disagreement between the FBI and the MVD. In performing this topic shift, C employs the deixis of institutional place 'M.V.D.' and 'F.B.I.' The conjunction indicates C's preference to continue the topic of cooperation between 'us' and 'them':

201C: Какие-то соглашения между подразделениями ФБР (1.0)  
все а: те ↓кто (1.0)

202 >>занимается организованной преступностью.  
соглашения между министерством

203 внутренних дел России и федеральным бюро имеют место<<. И какие.

Translation: 'Any agreements between the FBI units with all those who deal with the organized crime, the agreements between the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and the Federal Bureau of Investigations, are there any and what are they?'

D/R's response to C's request takes the topic of cooperation to the logistical side of the FBI's work. C's subsequent questions center on such topics as the definition of organized crime, structure of various organized crime groups, structure and organization of the FBI's organized crime unit, the use of informants, and, finally, internal cooperation between the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) and the FBI. The question/answer sequence remains undisturbed as well. Briefly, the topic of internal cooperation is reintroduced in lines 502–507. These lines immediately precede lines 535–537, where C requests a clarification of his previous statement in regard to Russian organized crime. In his response, D switches back to the topic of international cooperation between the FBI, the SFPD, and Russian law enforcement. Not until line 566, when the conversation stalls following a long stretch of overlapping talk, does another disagreement sequence ensue.

Segment 4. In this segment, the disagreement arises after R offers the following formulation to the American guest. It is called to summarize C's previous talk:

572R: Uh uhm (1.5) uh<sup>h</sup>h↓ a problem of certain urgency for Russia is the vast illegal  
 573 outflow of capital uh which uh finally settles down in foreign banks including  
 574 those in the Bay area/so they wrestle with whether you uh actively rather hm-  
 575 proactively investigate uh cases like that trying to - track down those those dirty  
 576 monies and to see if they you would then a:h >>share your leads and  
 576 information<< with the Russian °counterparts°.

Following R’s translation, D treats C’s formulation as correct and offers an emphatic agreement ‘Uh absolutely’ (line 578). Then, taking C’s question as pointing to the common problem with bureaucracy and being unaware of C’s request to limit the conversation to non-political topics, D reintroduces the topic of political influence by presenting an example:

- 629D: And my understanding is – the problem with tha- we send- our  
 ↓leads- over to-  
 [
- 630R: Uhmu=  
 631D: = let’s say Moscow for instance that the investigator can only go  
 so ↓far because  
 [
- 632R: Uhmu uhmu Uhmu  
 633D: he’s being blocked because of some political influence. (.) And  
 we therefore don’t  
 [
- 634R: Uhmu  
 635D: get the documents that we ↓need to show the unla-awful  
 activity.  
 [ [ [
- 636R: Uhmu Uhmu Uhmu

In line with his previous strategy to mitigate potential negativity, D constructs his assessment as weak on account of the prefacing ‘And my understanding is...’ Similar to the previous instances, D generalizes the exact place or person involved in a concrete event. In this case, D previews his reference to C’s home place, ‘Moscow,’ by the phrases ‘let’s say’ and follows it by ‘some’ and ‘for instance.’ All the three lexical choices connote indefiniteness. Thus, again, D mitigates the negative effects of his utterances as a complaint. R responds by lexically and syntactically upgrading D’s assessment to a criticism:

- 637R: А: подобного рода си↓гналы с американской стороны  
 российской стороне



- 638 поступают регулярно. но на ка: (1.0) ком-то этапе в Москве  
они упираются в
- 639 глухую стену. по-видимому политической протекции. Им  
не удается
- 640 доказать источник грязных денег в России.
- 641 (2.0)

Translation: 'And such signals from the American side go to the Russian side regularly but at some point in Moscow they meet the dead wall of, most probably, political protection. They are not able to prove the source of dirty money in Russia.'

R begins his response by removing D's token of weak disagreement. He also eliminates his hesitancy markers and generalization terms, such as 'some' and 'only so far.' At the same time, he eliminates D's concrete term 'documents' that D forwards as the key problematic. Instead, R adds the modifier of action 'regularly' and the idiomatic 'dead wall' that stylistically intensify the assessment as a systematic occurrence of a highly problematic nature. In the next line, C responds to D/R's assessment by changing his footing and producing a long (16 lines) account. In its middle part, in lines 649–650, C's account corrects D's view of the problem by way of a solution: 'This is what I think is lacking in our cooperation, this link that does not concern the M.V.D.' What C offers instead is to cooperate locally through the Far Eastern regional department. The offer is affiliative. C uses it to align with the US side toward offering a practical solution toward an unproblematic cooperation. He also takes personal responsibility not only for his views but also, as a representative of the regional MVD department, for the concreteness of his offer. C mitigates his initial disagreement by ending his turn in lines 662–663 with a preface and an affiliative statement: 'I think that this is a question of strategy or everyday work that holds true for them and for us.' Note the absence of R's continuers. In comparison with D's turns that feature multiple continuers regardless of their length, a rather long C's turn has no continuers whatsoever. After a short pause, R delivers his translation that begins with a meta-commentary on the kind of translation R was about to do, a formulation:

- 661R: Uhm the thrust of Colonel's ah: Colonel's message was uh that  
uh eh eh Moscow
- 662 M.V.D. organized crime bureau aside from the federal bureau  
(1.0) there are ↓six
- 663 bureaus eh including the one in Vladivostok which holds the  
whole of the Russia
- 664 Far East. And that it might be much more beneficial and sup-  
posedly political
- 665 protection free if you/guys made a shortcut to those regional  
bureaus right away
- 666 since they have all the technical means computer clo- computers  
clever guys
- 667 what not anda: somehow it might be a ↓mo:re rewarded  
relationship.

The formulation marks a footing shift as R abandons the neutral stance of the ‘animator’ in favor of the ‘author/principal’ position. He reinforces this position in line 664 by the characterization ‘supposedly.’ The term indicates doubt and disbelief. Together with the first meta-commentary, which emphasizes R’s treatment of C’s total message as redundant, his opinion in the phrase ‘supposedly political protection free’ indicates R’s disagreement with the ‘colonel’s message,’ that is, C’s assessment. At the same time, it indicates R’s disaffiliation with C. On the other hand, R’s use of the direct address ‘you guys’ in line 665 shows his affiliation with the other side, D. The informality of the personal address as in ‘you guys’ stands in opposition to R’s use of the term ‘Colonel,’ repeated twice in R’s opening lines to the ‘guys.’ In the next turn, D responds with an account:

- 668D: Well I know as he – eh our legal attaché in Moscow has- does  
travel to that
- 669 region. [Has he] met um or any eh uhm of the officers met any  
of the F.B.I. agents
- 670 that were assigned to Moscow anda: (1.5) then traveled there.

Similarly to the previous instances of R’s attempts to affiliate, D does not acknowledge any of the former’s affiliative gestures. His second-person

address 'you,' although ambiguous, as it is used as a component of the set phrase 'you know,' is semantically aimed at C, who, in contrast to R and the rest of the group, has a direct professional connection to Moscow. By abstaining from reciprocal affiliative gestures, D, inadvertently, helps R maintain his neutral footing. At the same time, D retains his own footing and, therefore, sustains the whole of the question/repeat-answer/repeat frame. In line 668, he disagrees with C by questioning C's knowledge of the current situation with US-Russian cooperation: 'well you know.' His self-correction in the same line, 'has- does travel,' furthers his disagreement: the emphatic 'does' clearly connotes regularity of action that emphasizes the current state of affairs. It is worthwhile at this point to compare D's previous strategy of acknowledging the supremacy of C's knowledge (exhibited in Segment 2) with his claim to the first-hand knowledge of the current Russian situation in this instance. Alternatively, D might have requested a clarification from C by way of asking him a question. This would have also helped alleviate the consequences of C's footing shift. Instead, D rejects C's attempt at restating the problem, and thus escalates the disagreement.

In his turn, C rejects D's attempt at keeping the original frame by changing his footing again. He also enhances the disagreement by producing another assessment that explicitly states his dis/affiliation: 'and we work with those countries that are interested in our assistance and we don't do through any Moscow...but cooperate with such countries as Japan, Korea, and many others' (lines 689–692). On the one hand, by referring positively to the countries other than the United States, by default, C disaffiliates with the US side. On the other hand, he affiliates with the US party by agreeing that Moscow could be a problem. He also offers a 'solution' to the problem by suggesting that the US side should follow suit: 'That is why we should have professional rather concrete communication links, and then the end result is going to be much better' (lines 696–697).

From the conversational action standpoint, C's turn is an offer for cooperation. This is C's second offer of this kind. However, in comparison to the previous offer, C concretizes his new offer by evoking the name of D's prospective contact, 'General Menovschikov.' At this point, I would like to return to the first lines of the interaction and the previously noted

omission by D of an offer to the Russian party to introduce themselves. I argue that, as a result of this omission, C was deprived of a resource that could allow him to make direct attributions to himself in terms of his position. That is why, in order to concretize his offers through a personal reference, he makes an indirect attribution to his superior's position. C might also construct the credibility of General Menovschikov in contrast to the person named ‘Prosecutor General Skuratov,’ who was somewhat discredited in the previous lines. With the help of this attribution, C brings the theme of cooperation to his hometown, which allows him to dissociate himself from the Federal administration of ‘any Moscow’ and embrace regional autonomy by offering his regional superior and his regional police department as a venue for future cooperation. R's rendition of this particular segment begins with an account of C's offer by way of a personal reference to General Menovschikov:

- 698R: Ah- he says that their Eastern regional bureau is uh located in  
the city of  
699 Kharovsk itself and uhm he makes no secret of the fact <<°which  
is probably  
700 internationally known°>> that its headed by one General  
Manovschikov. um an able  
701 guy apparently – and uhm he said (1.0) they have a lot of direct  
um uhh direct contacts  
702 which uhm undercut the meddlesome interference of Moscow  
with such countries  
703 as Japan and the nations of the-a: Pacific Rim/and that uh such  
direct cooperation  
704 may ultimately be much MORE fruitful and that uh just as you  
said that sometimes  
705 youre umph investigations ah are backwalled by Moscow and by  
political  
706 protection there (1.5) they sometimes feel that they don't get  
enough information  
707 and leads uh about uh laundered money from uh foreign coun-  
tries and that this  
708 firewalls should be broken in those sites for successful results.

Note how in R's colloquial formulation, C's personal reference to the General becomes ironic: 'an able guy.' R previews this reference by another meta-commentary, 'he makes no secret of the fact which is probably internationally known.' Although R's irony is clearly directed at C and his attempts to establish international contacts by himself, it is displayed for the other party. Both ironic assessments display a shift of footing from the neutral 'animator' to the 'author/principal.' R's use of the adverb 'apparently' after the characterization 'able guy' dissociates his opinion from that of C's most explicitly, as it expresses doubt and disbelief about C's assessment. By default, C is constructed to be a less than credible source, and a laughable of sorts. As a result, C's offer of cooperation becomes less concrete and, therefore, practical. Similarly to the previous shifts of this kind, R's disaffiliation with C allows him to affiliate with D.<sup>23</sup> R does so by acknowledging D's earlier statement, 'as you said' (line 704).

Segment 5. The following lines present D's response as an example and a story. Thematically, the example arises out of the preceding material and is directly linked to the previous topic: (a) C's offer of cooperation and (b) C's call for concrete measures. However, I would like to single out this instance as a separate segment. I do this for two reasons. First, D's story serves as a general illustration of the difficulties he had when he was working on a case with his Russian colleagues. Second, by way of this story, D restates the same problem of working together with the Russians, namely, their protracted reaction to D's requests. In other words, D's story becomes a metaphor for the state of the US-Russian cooperation. In addition, the last segment serves as a structural summary of the previous disagreement sequences. I now present D's story in full:

709D: Ah- I'll give you a:m example (.) of a case I had

710 (4.0)

711D: I (.) identified (.) uh:m a bank account over twenty five million dollars (.)

712 uhm (.) here (.) that had come from the ah- Akusik? °is that right Akusik°

713 region (unintelligible)

[

714R: Oh Okhotsk

- 715 (2.2)
- 716D: Yeh- Yakusik?=  
717S: =Yakutsk  
[  
718D: Yakutsk  
[  
719R: Oh Yakutsk Aha (.) Mmhmm
- 720D: U:m (.) By the ti:me I got (.) the answer ba:ck (.) the money had  
already been  
[  
721R: Uhmu  
722D: transferred (.) to (.) Cyprus. and what I was told was that that  
money (1.0) uh:m  
[ [
- 723R: Uhmu Uhmu  
724D: was transferred it was supposed to build (.) miners' (1.0) some  
mine- uh some  
[  
725R: Uhmu  
726D: new ah:m (1.2) ah homes for minors and instead it was diverted  
(1.0) to the  
[  
727R: Uhmu  
[  
728S: hhhh. davaj ya  
729D: United States, and then (1.0) from by the t- like I said they (.)  
transferred  
[  
730R: Uhmu  
731D: And I did I did not do anything be-cause by the time they- they  
came back to ↑me  
[  
732R: Uhmu  
733D: it was already (0.5) rewired back to Cyprus. Had I- had I (was)  
able to get that  
[  
733R: [Uhmu

- 734D: information quicker, we would've been able to:ave seized it (.)  
 °while it was here°.
- 735A: How lo::ng (1.0) did it take to ↓get the information,
- 736D: Oh- six months↑
- 737A: Six ↓months
- 738S: [ °Давай я°

Translation: 'Let me do it.'

Clearly, D's story is a critical assessment of what appears to be a delayed Russian reaction to US prompts. The criticable is 'they,' who came back with an answer too late (line 730). The personal pronoun is the only reference to the Russian MVD officials. However, we do not know if these officials are from Moscow or from the Far East. Note also that the criticable immediately follows another 'they' (line 728) that refers to Russian criminals. The closeness of the two instances of deixis of person, both of which carry negative connotations, may intensify D's criticism. There are two features that may enhance it even further: (a) concreteness of D's response; (b) collaborative completion. The concreteness of D's example matches C's offer for concrete measures. By not clarifying its origin, D places the criticable in reference to the region of which C is a representative, thus making it less of a complaint and more of a direct challenge to C's positive face. Note D's stress on the key words 'seized,' 'couldn't do anything,' 'answer,' 'transferred,' 'rewired,' and 'homes for minors.'

These emphases fulfill two objectives. On the one hand, they make the Russian side accountable for the failure to get back to their US colleagues with a timely response, which problematizes the US-Russian cooperation. On the other hand, they construct D as a credible actor by emphasizing his own concrete efforts to establish unproblematic cooperation with the Russian side. Unlike previous instances, this one features a collaborative construction of the story. The request for the details is made by A, a local police officer, who hasn't been a part of the talk until now. As an English speaker, A is the only other participant in a position to make a collaborative completion. Because of its

placement, A's intervention could be considered as affiliative with C. A takes the next turn out of order at the transition-relevance place, where D sums up his story. In requesting a clarification from D, A may have detected his problematic attribution of some ‘they.’ As a host responsible for the Russian guests he may be extra-sensitive to the developing negativity. By requesting a clarification, he may have also attempted to give D's example a constructive extension.<sup>24</sup>

However, R takes A's request as an extension of D's criticism and incorporates it in his translation as such. In the meantime, D's own delivery indicates that he still attempts to mitigate the story's potential negativity. His formulations are delayed by numerous re-starts and self-repairs (see, for example, line 730). Another mitigating device could be D's use of the person deixis ‘they’ that shows ambiguity in assigning blame for the Russian actions or the lack thereof. R's translation is given below:

- 739R: A:a Джо а: с вами согласен. что ускорение обмена  
 информации и устранения  
 740 невидимых препон на ее пути способствовало бы  
 достижению нашей общей  
 741 цели а информация необходимая им из России обычно  
 приходит с задержкой  
 742 месяцев на::а ↓шесть. Так °к примеру° он обычно  
 расследовал дело когда более  
 743 двадцати пяти миллионов долларов легли здесь на счет.  
 Они точно знали что это  
 744 деньги из Якутска и что эти деньги на самом деле  
 назначались на строительство  
 745 приютов для бездомных детей и были кем-то благополучно  
 там украдены.  
 746 Тем не менее пока он получил из России долгожданный  
 ответ подтверждающий  
 747 преступное происхождение этих денег деньги эти уже  
 были благополучно  
 748 переведены в банк в Кипре и сделать было ничего нельзя.  
 749 (4.5)



Translation: 'And Joe agrees with you that a speedy exchange of information and the removal of invisible barriers on its way should contribute to our common goals but the information that they need from Russia arrives with a delay of about six months. So, for example, he usually investigated a case when over twenty-five million dollars landed over here on an account and they knew for sure that this money came from Yakutsk and it was allocated to help build houses for the homeless children and then it was successfully stolen by someone and by the time he received the long waited response that confirmed the criminal origin of that money, the money was transferred to a bank in Cyprus and nothing could be done.'

R's response is clearly designed to intensify D's critique. R begins by presenting D's token agreement with C, 'and Jack agrees with you.' Note that there is no explicit agreement in D's original lines. R's use of the person deixis 'Jack' fulfills the purpose of explicitly affiliating with D before C. Then, R embeds A's request for clarification and D's answer about how long it actually takes to get information from the Russian side ('six months') in the opening of his turn. By moving the requested material to the beginning of his turn, R strengthens the subsequent criticable by starting with the specific news. By blending D's and A's lines and by omitting an attribution to A, R annuls A's potentially affiliative impact and makes both D and A responsible for the criticable. R upgrades the criticable by putting vocal emphasis on 'six months.' The phrasing of 'six months' and R's placement of the phrase at the end of the sentence signify regularity of such delays. R also replaces D's otherwise ambiguous 'they' with the deixis of place 'Russia.' In line 745, R misinterprets D's 'miners' as 'minors' (as it becomes clear from subsequent conversations with the Russian police officers), thus adding a dramatic effect to the fact of theft.

Furthermore, R removes all the mitigating devices that characterize D's delivery, such as hesitated speech, re-starts, and micropauses, and delivers his lines in a straightforward fashion in just two long sentences. R's meta-commentaries such as 'successfully stolen' and 'long awaited response' upgrade D's assessment of C's previous assessment to a disagreement with C's assessment of the situation in Russia and lead to a subsequent rejection of C's offer. A long pause in line 749 immediately follows R's turn. It

falls on C's turn. C's abstention from taking his turn points to the possibility that he treats D/R's assessment as critical and, therefore, chooses to manage the disagreement by silence. In the next turn, A intervenes again by requesting another clarification from D:

750A: What kind of documentation would you require from another police agency to be

751 able to stop and hold that bank account?

[  
752D: Yeah uhm

In his lines, D proceeds to explain what is actually required to freeze an illegal account:

756D: We would take an affidavit from ah a law enforcement officer (.)  
uh:m using the

757 Prokutor General or- or senior law enforcement and that affida-  
vit is enough to for

758 us to tie the money up at least. Then we would then have to go  
there and take –

[  
759R: Uhmu

760A: 'n continue the investigation=

761D: =Yeah but we- at least we could keep the money and it wouldn't  
go anywhere=

762A: = So its (1.0) just a letter.=

763D: =Yeah well see w'd it be- it would be an equivalent of an  
affidavit

[  
764A: Mmhmm.

As in the previous episode, A's interjection serves to soften the negative undertones of D's assessments. It occurs right after C's silence, which indicates disagreement. A manages the disagreement by concretizing possible practical steps that could have helped resolve the situation. The

clarification maintains the theme of cooperation and, therefore, may be considered as an affiliative device. Since it is hard to say what affiliation A may indeed be pursuing—affiliation with his US colleague or affiliation with his Russian guest—I assume that he affiliates with the talk as devoid of negativity and potential disagreement. R's response summarizes the exchange between A and D in an explicitly critical register. His opening lines 769–771 state the ease with which the Russian side could have helped itself: 'As we have just found out in order to freeze the accounts at least for the time of the investigation what is needed is very little.' In contrast to D's and A's actual accounts, which focus on the technical aspects of obtaining an affidavit from the Russians, R's statement upgrades the discussed technicalities to a criticism. His description of the due process by way of comparing the slow-moving Russian side with 'any police officer over here' intensifies the misalignment. Although there is no contrast between 'here' and 'there,' the deixis 'over here' is sequentially next to D's critique of 'over there.' After another long silence, C shifts his footing from RE to RP and responds with a disagreement by way of assessing the current situation in Russia:

780: (3.5)

779C: Для зоны Сибири и востока (1.0) особенно- для той территории на которой  
 780 мы проживаем. и являемся сотрудниками хабаровской милиции. для нас  
 781 несколько иные и другие ценности (.) дальний ↓восток это: сырье и биоресурсы  
 782 лес это: полезные ископаемые это: выход в море в том числе Японское (1.5)  
 783 это ↓порты такие как Советская гавань. Владивосток и некоторые другие/  
 784 (1.5) и как раз (.) наши преступники все что или те кто имеют отношение к  
 785 организованной преступ[-] не переводят сюда деньги а наоборот (1.0) сюда  
 786 кораблями везут все ↓то о чем я назвал. А отсюда как раз получают

- 787       соответствующие де:ньги (.) валю:ты и некоторые иные  
товары. вот это для  
788       нас >>в большей степени<< ↓проблема а не перевод в  
американские банки.

Translation: ‘For the region of Siberia and the Far East which territory we inhabit and where we work as police officers. For us there are some other values. The Far East means raw materials it means bioresources it means timber it means minerals it means seaside including the Japan Sea it means ports such as Soviet Haven, Vladivostok, and some others and so our criminals all those or those who deal with organized crime do not transfer their money here but the other way around they send ships full of all that I have just named. And from here they receive all that money as hard currency and some other goods. This is what is the biggest problem for us and not transfers to American banks.’

The silence that precedes C’s response is indicative of a disagreement. However, unlike the previous cases where C employed silence as a management device before shifting a topic or producing a formulation, this time the silence functions as a preview to the actual account. The account leads to disagreement, which, nonetheless, does not take full force right away. In the opening line, C mitigates his statement by employing a self-repair. The repairable is the prepositional pronoun ‘for us’ that C chooses to replace with ‘which territory we inhabit.’ By replacing a self-attribution with a descriptive qualifier, C somewhat reduces the impact of his statement. Yet, he returns to it in the following line when speaking about ‘values.’ These values are ‘somewhat different.’ The list of the values is constructed as the newsworthy material. It introduces C’s home region in terms of the elements that might be unknown to D/R, thus allowing C to claim first-hand knowledge of the situation in his region. In a sense, the list also serves as a resource, and so it justifies C’s switch to the RP footing. So far, it has been only D who has provided reports and offered newsworthy material. With the help of the list C does not just reverse his footing but replicates D’s previous turns, albeit summarily. The list is preceded by the word ‘values,’ which does not appear to be a particularly appropriate category for the listed items. However, C’s choice of the word is significant as it places the problematic in the sphere of norms

and values rather than the technical matters that follow. He associates with the norms by putting an emphasis on 'for us' and by repairing the subsequent 'our criminals' to 'all those who have something to do with the organized crime' (lines 784–785). The repair frees the term 'our' from its negative criminal implications.

The force of C's assessment is disaffiliative. Not only does C disaffiliate with 'his' criminals, the repair also expands the category of the criminals to other nationalities. The following line shows that the main nationality that benefits from the criminal activities of Russian organized crime is the United States, which receives illegal shipfulls of 'goods' and 'seafood.' The United States is constructed as the country that pays for 'all those stolen goods' by hard currency' and 'some other goods,' thus perpetuating the criminal activity (lines 786–788). According to C, this is 'the biggest problem for us' (line 788). This construction makes C's assessment of the situation not only different from D/R's assessment but also explicitly critical of the US side. By shifting his footing, reversing the critical sequence, and restating the problem, C reassigns the blame for the current situation to organized crime and, finally, agrees to misalign. The force of C's assessment is so strong that R chooses to misalign with C by first making a critical assessment of C's response, then by upgrading the contrast between C's assessment of the situation and, finally, by leaving the interaction and handing his turn over to me:

- 789R: ·hh hhh· ((sigh)) And the Colonel changes his tack agai:n saying  
that ah: their land  
790 is rich and bountiful ah- in oil and ores and products of biodi-  
versity [-] frutti  
791 di mari whatever name it so for them the problem is not so  
much ah- the  
792 laundering of dirty moneys in this country ·hh as ah exportation  
by tank and shipful  
793 of these stolen goodies uh: to this country with the moneys then  
a:h as he said  
794 traveling back to Russia (1.5) °take over there is too much  
bullshit° hhh khhh

R's translation culminates the disagreement sequences. It begins with an audible sigh. R's sigh displays irritation followed by an account: 'and the Colonel changes his tack again.' The use of the sigh is explicitly disaffiliative since the paralinguistic nature of sighing makes it accessible to both parties at the same time. Unlike the following account or R's other negative commentaries about C in the language other than his own, R's display of irritation is made accessible to C.<sup>25</sup> The use of the word 'colonel' followed by the pronoun 'their' reinforces R's disaffiliative gesture. The juxtaposition of the deixis of place 'this country' with 'Russia' establishes the coordinates that separate the two countries. C's affiliation with his country by way of evoking its 'values' becomes lost to D in R's ironic translation of C's phrase 'stolen goods' as 'goodies.' R ends his turn by changing his footing from the report repeater into that of the report provider. He also changes the direction of the address, from the other party to me.

He accounts for his request to switch by making a meta-commentary about the talk in general, 'take over there is too much bullshit hhh khhh.'<sup>26</sup> Although the commentary does not explicitly implicate either party, the fact that it is made in the language inaccessible to C, but audibly enough for D to hear it, points to D, other American participants, and me as addressees and C as a source of R's critique. I take over from this point.

## Summary

The analysis of the exemplar produces the following findings. Together with the institutional context that precedes the interaction, translation-in-interaction may influence the choice of an interactional frame. In the exemplar, the chosen frame was that of a question/answer session. This frame arises from the restricted environment in which the conversing parties are linguistically inaccessible to each other. The practice of translation further restricts the frame by altering its design to the question/repeat-answer/repeat format. The fixed nature of the translator's turn constrains the frame and delimits the parties to their clearly delineated footings. These footings are distributed as follows: (a) report elicitor

(RE); (b) report provider (RP); and (c) report repeater (RR). In terms of the conversational action, the RE footing implies 'making requests,' the RP footing presupposes 'making assessment,' and the RR footing suggests 'making repeats.'

As a result of the translator-added alterations to the question/answer frame, the asymmetry of the original question/answer format increases. In the analyzed episode, the choice of a frame is made by D, who agrees to the meeting, determines its duration, and receives the Russian party in his place of work. His position allows him to select a specific frame for the meeting. From a number of alternatives, D selects a frame with an asymmetrical interactional design. From the two roles designated by the frame, D chooses the role of the report provider. This footing puts D in a position to make explicit assessments that open a possibility for critique. In the analyzed example, D resorts to such critique. The position and the structure of the translator's turn allow R to construct D's criticables in negative terms by challenging C's positive face.

In turn, the position of the report elicitor deprives C of an immediate possibility of explicitly disagreeing with D by way of producing counter-assessments. For C to disagree with D's assessments means to challenge the frame by shifting his footing from responding to D's answers by asking more questions to responding to D's answers by making assessments of them. In the semiformal setting mediated by the translator, C's role of a guest inhibits his ability to change his footing and the frame at will. The translator's turn further complicates the negotiations of the frame and the footings. Reinforced by negative interpersonal dynamics, the translator's turn creates an effective buffer to the preceding action. On those several occasions when D offers to exchange the parties' footings and C changes his footing, the translator effectively subverts the form and content of both D's and C's actions. With the unavailability of the monolingual parties for direct address and the presumed neutrality of the translator, the translator's turn creates a critical mass for the structural asymmetry to explode in a series of disagreements.

My analysis of the five disagreement segments from the exemplar indicates that, similarly to ordinary conversation, an exemplar of translation-in-interaction as a question/repeat-answer/repeat session shows a preference for agreement. However, when disagreements arise, they are managed

predominantly with the help of the following devices: (a) prefaces of disagreement; (b) display of hesitancy; (c) weak agreements; (d) revisions and formulations; (e) change of topic; (f) silence. The distribution of the devices is not identical for the two parties. The US party, D, shows a strong preference for prefacing devices and hesitant delivery. The Russian party, C, exhibits a preference for change of topic, revisions, formulations, and silence. Both parties consistently use weak agreements. As for the third party, the translator, his renditions of the alignment devices employed by the other two parties tend to alter—omit or upgrade—their form and function toward creating relational negativity.

The parties' preferences for specific management devices are directly related to their footings. The report elicitor is not in a position to employ prefacing devices without changing his/her footing. On the other hand, the report provider has difficulties with a change of topics without altering his/her role. The report repeater is also restricted to his footing as certain devices resist his modifications better than others. My preliminary observations show that phonetic markers of hesitancy become altered first, then lexical devices fall, and finally the syntactic order gives way. Obviously, all the grammatical alterations affect the semantic makeup of the utterance. The only device that tends to withstand the altering effects of the translator's turn is silence. The resistance of silence to modification can be explained by its paralinguistic accessibility to all parties simultaneously.

The alterations of the micro management tools of the monolingual parties that occur in the translator's turn made me question the status of the turn as a repeat. Indeed, syntactically, the translator's turn is designed to replicate the preceding turn. A close examination of the turn reveals, however, that it does not create sameness in difference but rather difference in sameness. Not only does the translator's turn alter the form and content of the preceding turn, it also produces its own conversational action. This action may sufficiently differ from the previous one to turn a complaint into a criticism. Moreover, the translator's action is often produced by way of affiliating with one party and disaffiliating with another. In the analyzed exemplar, R aligns with D over C by upgrading D's critical assessments, producing repeated continuers on D's turns, meta-commenting on the content of C's turns, shortening the turns produced in response to C's turns, and, finally, making critical assessments about C



in the language that is inaccessible to C. As a result, R's turns intensify the disagreement that could have been diffused through the devices employed by both C and D. By modifying these devices or excluding them from his renditions, R moves both parties toward a prolonged disagreement and ends up constructing C as incompetent, untrustworthy, and shallow.

At the same time, the translator manages to exempt himself from accounting for his alterations. The environment which allows his utterances to have limited accessibility for all parties, my own silence, and the structure of translation turns as repeats help him maintain the neutral footing. The presumed neutrality of the 'animator' role lets the translator blend his opinions with the previous speaker's opinions to create parallel 'authorships' without taking an explicit 'principal' stance. The key device that upholds the translator's neutralistic stance is reported speech. Given its preference for formulations with lexical and syntactic upgrades, reported speech opens room for the translator's assessments within the previous speaker's assessments. It makes it possible to upgrade complaints to criticisms. It also allows the translator to change the syntactic organization of the participants' turns, thus manipulating their strategic changes of footing. Most importantly, reported speech allows for the replacement of an individual opinion with collective attribution by changing 'I' to 'they.' The latter change directly affects the ability and the need for the parties to account for their conversational actions.

This analysis of the disagreements was accompanied by an indexical analysis that linked the participants' actions to their respective worlds and thus locked the theme that related these worlds to each other. The person, time, and place deixis pointed to various facets of those worlds disclosing the characters of the involved parties. These worlds appeared simultaneously as the home-worlds for one party and the alien-worlds for another. Such worlds form clusters that embrace workplaces, countries, regions, cities, and, most importantly, communities. They also include histories, such as the history of Russia, the former forward of the Soviet Union, or the historical place of the Russian militia, a cultural institution *par excellence*. Concrete people associated with these worlds provide for their stability by expressing themselves, and they do not express themselves through their worlds independently, but only vis-à-vis other worlds. The analyzed episode showed that the role of the US law enforcement in the

United States came about in contrast to and not in line with that of the Russian militia. The relationship between these worlds was neither proportionate nor symmetrical but showed a preference for the home-world, whether it was a home country or a home city. Thus, the US party's attempts to affiliate with the Russian side were based on their 'home' understanding of what their Russian colleagues did in their own country, and it appeared that they did the same kind of thing, and thus were institutional colleagues, so to speak.

The analysis of disagreement sequences also demonstrates that the parties attempted to align over their asymmetrical positions by pursuing a common theme of cooperation or collaboration. However, in talking about collaboration, the parties undertook two distinctly different routes: the US party tended to *assess* the status of the US-Russian projects that had already taken place in the past. Their description of the projects presented them as problematic. As a result, judging by the response, the whole of the Russian normative world was made problematic as well. In its response to the complaint of the counterparty, the Russian party chose to ignore the previously made assessments, but instead made a positive move by suggesting future paths of collaboration. In other words, it downplayed the existing problems by rejecting some aspects of the US portrayal of the Russian side as problematic and offering various ways to solve them. The misalignment between the two parties and their actions widens in the translator's turns, which intensifies the trajectory of the US party, simultaneously diminishing the import of the Russian party's agenda.

Performed in the third person, the translator's turn affected the theme of cooperation by distancing the parties' worlds in the third-person attributions to 'them.' By becoming 'them' both the Russian and the US worlds sunk into the corresponding mythical worlds beyond the immediate reach of each other. At the same time, the translator's world remains unknown to the parties. This makes the translator a phantom without a home or destination. In this position, the translator is beyond critique or responsibility. The 'invisibility' of the translator, who, nonetheless, affects the interaction, poses the question of translation ethics. I suggest that, in the next chapter, we explore the ethical side of the translation phenomenon by attending to the symbolism of the encounter of the parties as the encounter of their respective cultural worlds.

## Notes

1. For example, Lohmar argues that this horizon is 'an *a priori* element of constitution' (2003, p. 106).
2. According to Bernet et al., the necessity of genetic phenomenology as a separate methodological strand lies in the fact that it focuses on the genesis of the 'graduated structure,' which itself is founded on the principle of foundation (1989, p. 197).
3. Ricoeur considers passivity as the operation responsible for the sedimentation and the emergence of habitus. Passivity is seeded deep down in consciousness, while 'what remains on the first level is the active anticipation of a "sense," of a unity of signification (thing, animal, person, value, state of affairs)' (Ricoeur 1967, p. 193).
4. The difference between activity and practice lies in their respective etymologies: while activity presupposes any kind of, including spontaneously generated, actions and can involve a single actor, practice, in the sociological sense, is always collectively constructed. It therefore makes sense only intersubjectively; in any case, 'practice cannot be treated as an object, nor can it be treated as an essence' (Barnes 2001, p. 22). If anything, practice is a communal enterprise (see Wenger 1998).
5. According to Turner, 'complexity theory' can be defined 'as a type of systems theory that provides explanations in terms of cause and effect, but at the same time seeks to avoid any mechanistic and deterministic view of causality' (2001, p. 86).
6. Speaking in conversation analytic terms, positionality can be equated to 'membership categorization' defined by Sacks as 'a collection of categories' (1997, p. 4). To this Psathas added that 'the analysis of these categories must include at minimum the question of how the participants make these categories relevant, if they are relevant for the ways in which the parties interact and, finally, if they are interchangeable' (1999, p. 140).
7. Schütz calls persistent dispositions and moods a 'biographically determined situation' and defines it as a combination of a particular physical and sociocultural environment as well as various 'positions,' including status, role, and ideological and moral standings (1970, p. 73).
8. A phenomenological perspective on the relationship between spatiotemporality and culture can be found in Carr and Chan-Fai (2004).
9. This would be the approach most closely associated with that of Nofsinger (1991), who constructs his theory of conversation analysis based almost

entirely on the speech act theory, approaching conversational action as the main unit of conversation analysis.

10. Mandelbaum links the two types of analysis, stating that both types of analysis, 'describing the structure (practices of conversation) and describing interaction (practices in conversation), are intrinsic to the conversational analytic understanding of context' (1990, p. 347).
11. Certainly, this is not the only definition of 'frame.' Thus, Tannen associated frame analysis with a type of linguistic analysis called to elucidate on the 'structures of expectations' rather than objective formalities (1993, p. 15).
12. All the personal names, including place-names, are invented to protect the anonymity of the informants.
13. A study of the ordinary conversation shows that both questions and answers may contain assessments, although the latter have a preferred structure for assessing things in an explicit manner (Schegloff 1984).
14. Since neither monolingual speaker has access to the foreign language, they may take the translated content as a joint product of the other language party and the translator. In order to reflect this possibility, I use the slash symbol that unites and separates the first and the second pair parts of the adjacency pair and the translator's turn.
15. When I heard R's switching to the reported speech, I noted the switch because my formal interpreting training recommended against the use of reported speech. I also remember our discussions about different ways of rendering the other's utterances and possible implications, depending on the mode of delivery. In these discussions, R explained the use of the reported speech as what allows him to distance himself from the content of the said by the speaker.
16. By that time, I was used to R's lexical choices. In addition, taking into account his excellent interpreting skills and the tendency of the English-speaking audience to focus on substantive rather than presentational matters, the latter did not appear to be too damaging for his translation.
17. I couldn't help but notice R's continuers; however, at the time, I attributed them to his translation style.
18. I would go as far as to describe R's manner as 'lecturing,' which would not be surprising given his academic background.
19. Due to my directedness to the lexical/syntactical side of the translated material and the translator's work, neither of these moves made by other parties was clear to me at the time.

20. This particular translation reminded me of R's frequent forays against political establishment, whether he was speaking about the United States or Russia.
21. At this point, I could not help but sense the brewing conflict between two positions, C's and D/R's. I also couldn't help but admire C's collected way of dealing with R's negativity, which was obvious to several participants on both sides.
22. This is also how I 'read' the omission at the time.
23. And not just D but I as well, for R would consistently turn to me at the end of his lines as if wanting to make his point stronger. As I stated earlier, I did affiliate with him, in general; however, I felt that, at times, his translations were overpersonalized, although I was not exactly sure about how to deal with R's deviations at the time, short of offering that I could take over.
24. Note also my attempt at intervening. In line 727, I make R an offer to switch. I do this for two reasons: it is much past R's 20-minute stretch, and, so, it is my turn to interpret, but also because I am beginning to worry about the outcome of this conversation. Sooner or later, I would have to take over, and, it is in the best interests for our tandem to do this before the conflict goes too far.
25. As it was accessible to me and, judging by explicit non-verbal responses, to others as well.
26. R's comment made me somewhat uneasy and resentful of his presumption, although, at the time of the talk, I took his comment for granted, attributing it to R's personality and style.

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# 6

## The Generative Aspect of 'Translation-in-Interaction'

In the previous chapter, the phenomenological analysis of interpreting was carried out in the genetic register which allowed us to refine the communicative parameters of translation-in-talk in terms of account, repair, and other dyadic conversational structures. We have also seen the significance of local relational dynamics, the role of cultural context, and the implications of the interpreter's turn on the trajectory of interaction and on the choice of interpreting strategies. Most important, however, was the determination of 'interaction' as the foundational structure of bilingual interpreting. On the basis of this structure that belongs to the realm of face-to-face communication, I proposed that translation-in-talk should be considered as embedded in interaction. Therefore, if in the static analysis, consecutive interpreting was discovered to be founded on talk, in the genetic analysis it was shown to be conditioned by interaction; hence, the modified name for consecutive interpreting: translation-in-interaction. This chapter completes the phenomenological analysis of bilingual interpreting by offering a generative reading of the phenomenon. The main focus of this chapter falls on the genesis of translation-in-interaction.

This chapter differs from the preceding analytical chapters in that instead of empirical data it utilizes film as a cultural artifact appropriate to generative phenomenology. In the next section, I explain the main tenets of generative phenomenology.

## Generative Phenomenology

As I have already mentioned, in the late period of his work, Husserl switched from treating the Other as the opposite of the Self, as he did in *Cartesian Meditations*, to posing the Other as the limit to the Self. With this reorientation, the Other acquired a different epistemological status within the transcendental problematic, which made Husserl become interested in the question of historical genesis and, subsequently, in the possibility of its relativism in relation to cultural or, properly speaking, 'communal worlds' [*die Kommunitaswelten*]. He thus recognized that the life-world did not allow for its own experience but is responsible for instigating particular kinds of experience regarding its generative potential. One of the implications of this potential is the plurality of lesser worlds, which are populated by both people and objects. Although these worlds do not coincide with each other, they form meaningful and stable unities. At the same time, they are not coincident but are delimited from each other on the level of constitutive genesis. In other words, these worlds preclude any kind of cross-comparison beyond comparing surface structures, or the possibilities of similar appearances and expressions: there is always a limit that separates one world from another, making it alien and, focusing on the reversed outcomes of constitutive genesis, making the alien. In Husserl's own words, 'there are problems emerging here of creating concrete understanding and mutual understanding; at issue here is to somehow accomplish making a home of the alien, as if it were home. Of course, there is also the question of the limits of such knowledge and the question of justifying the idea of complete understanding' (1973, p. 625).

It is this line of thinking that allowed some contemporary phenomenologists to propose that in the last period of his work Husserl turned to a particular kind of phenomenology that aspired to provide a mixed

kind of essentialism, where essences would not be considered only as structures which are deeply hidden behind appearances providing them with sufficient and necessary conditions for existence but as materialities of their own. The extension of essentialism to empiricism implied a more intimate relation between two phenomenological methods, transcendental and eidetic, and thus between the life-world and various social or communal worlds. In *The Crisis*, Husserl explains that 'through an eidetic method we investigate the essential form of transcendental accomplishments in all their individual and transcendental types, that is, the total essential form of transcendently accomplishing subjectivity in all its social forms' (1970, p. 178). As a result of extending eidetic analysis to transcendental problematics, transcendental phenomenology became endowed with the task of respecifying the theory of intersubjectivity based on the experience of the Other as the theory of interculturality (understood as differentiated sociality or communalism). It is this respecification that justifies the separation of the generative register from the genetic register and the use of the former for the final part of this study. The difference is mainly methodological: if the purpose of genetic phenomenology is intersubjective constitution based on associative synthesis, generative phenomenology deals with the constitution of limits and divisions that separate 'cultures' or 'other worlds,' that is, it focuses on interculturality. The implications of this move for translation is obvious: as the reader may remember, division is one of the essential structures of translation.

For Husserl, the new focus comes with a new terminology regarding both the life-world and its material extensions. When he refers to some radical and, for that reason, inaccessible difference between different worlds, he uses the term 'alien' (*das Fremde*), which has two senses: (a) the transcendental structure 'home-world/alien-world' (*Heimwelt/Fremdwelt*) and (b) all that stands in the way of our immediate and thus mundane apprehension of a sense. Concerning the former, Husserl approaches the structure 'home-world/alien-world' as one of the two most basic or elementary transcendental structures which participate in the constitution of foundational experience. The other transcendental structure is defined as 'earth-as-ground/world-as-horizon.' Both structures are essential for experiencing the life-world in all its manifestations; however, only the

first structure bears explicit social implications. The relationship between the home-world and the alien-world is a relationship between what belongs to the recognizable 'home' and the experience of the unrecognizable 'alien' that encompasses everything that is constituted by a world other than my home-world. If we translate this passage into the objective of this study, its inclusion as well as the inclusion of the following passage is intended to clarify the notion of 'difference' that functions in translation, in general, and implies consecutive interpreting through the intercultural encounter, in particular.

Thus, similarly to translation, which struggles in its relation to the original, the primacy in the relationship between home and alien belongs to the 'home.' It is only from the 'home' that I can observe and thus experience the alien. Importantly, the home is recognized by everything that can be claimed as 'own' and is therefore in my possession, as is, for example, language. In contrast, the alien is inaccessible to me in general and although its rituals and customs can be observed and, most importantly, practiced by a representative of any other culture who can learn how to track an animal, for example, only the members of a tribe who, for generations, have depended on catching wild animals for food could understand the ritual of drawing hunted animals to themselves. Or, closer to our study, the translation that takes place at home differs from the translation in the alien land. Being out of reach from each other does not mean that lesser worlds are denied a certain mutuality of experiences; however, constitutive genesis provides these experiences with different culture-specific interpretations, and only one of these interpretations can count as authentic. It is precisely because of this asymmetry that individual subjectivity can be approached interculturally, or cross-culturally, in the manner of 'traveling,' as was put by Cronin (2000). Since the alien-world co-constitutes the home-world and vice versa, the relationship between the home-world and the alien-world is two-sided and mutually dependent: they require each other to co-exist and continue. Moreover, the encounter with the alien has a methodological benefit: as our previous chapters have indicated, it functions as a form of reduction that leads to a radical reflection.

One of the first questions that we should ask ourselves in that regard is: How to situate the object to be analyzed? At this juncture, I would like

to suggest that the relationship between the home and the alien evolves and involves a particular kind of constitutive space. In phenomenological terms, this space can be defined as liminal, that is, a symbolic space which consists entirely of limits, borders, and boundaries that separate and therefore stand in separation themselves. Another reminder: 'Alienness does not proceed from a division but consists in a division' (Waldenfels 1990, p. 21). Liminality is what delimits us from the inside and therefore reaches the outside; it resides 'in-between' (*das Zwischen*), which is a different kind of logos: 'We encounter the alien as something that can not be said or done within our order. The extraordinary makes its appearance as an order existing elsewhere' (Waldenfels 1996, p. 115). This extraordinary order resides in the twilight and feeds on ambiguity. This is the reason why limit-phenomena cannot be appropriated, assimilated, brought home, or made whole. At the same time, the alien cannot be ignored: as a generative phenomenon, it gives rise to cultural artifacts that take hold only on account of their relationship to the alien; in other words, they generate them in the liminal sphere of being. I take the latter as a suggestion that, as an artifact of culture, film provides a proper phenomenon for the subsequent investigation of the symbolic dimension of translation. In addition, film is a world as much as the narrative that underlies its imagery.

When describing different alien-worlds, Ludwig Landgrebe, following Husserl, establishes the continuum for their inaccessibility by distinguishing between 'far-worlds' and 'near-worlds' (1981, p. 132). The principle of building this continuum is based on abnormality. Those worlds that appear most abnormal are the farthest. Furthering this distinction, I should note that if one is to take the experience of the alien as the experience of the own in the process of its transformation, two types of experiencing the alien would be possible. One is the experience of the alien from within, as a past or possible alien. The other is the experience of the alien at the outskirts. Close alien-worlds evolve from within; hence their abnormality appears to be the easiest to comprehend. In turn, far away alien-worlds dwell on the outskirts. The farthest of the alien-worlds known to humans is possessed by the animal. This might explain why Husserl consistently refers to the animal as 'dark.' Then comes the child who is characterized by 'the non-recognition of temporality and spatiality

and [exhibits] a unique mode of connecting to the others through fulfilment' (Husserl 1973, p. 605). As far as the madman is concerned, Husserl writes: 'Isn't it possible that we all become insane and that many subjects live without relying on a life-world, without any communal experience?' (1970, p. 32). As the quote indicates, for Husserl, madness is a paradoxical form of sociality. The madman is without his own community, although at the same time he remains within a community. Translation incorporates abnormality through the contrast between the 'optimal' home and the far-fetched worlds of the alien.

I inferred this list of the abnormal subjects because of the figure of the foreigner, or the bearer of what translation requires most and interpreting exposes best. For Husserl, the foreigner is a special kind of subject because he or she epitomizes community as the primary type of human sociality. Only by communal living does a human become a human in general and a cultural linguistic spatiotemporal being, in particular. In addition to natural sciences, mathematics, and psychology, Husserl's other non-philosophical academic interest was anthropology. In line with the anthropological thinking of the time, he often models his alien on the exotic alien, the savage (*das Wilde*). The coincident use of the two terms (*das Fremde* and *das Wilde*) is significant as it points to the extreme end of the position that Husserl assumes toward the foreigner. The savage is someone whose home is founded on 'irrational' myths and rituals or, in other words, special social activities that engage an entire community of people identifying it not just as a form of sociality, but as a culture. As long as a foreigner is separated from another foreigner by language, territory, and customs, he or she may embrace a wide range of manifestations, from another European to a prehistorical humanoid. The research on translation has long been interested in the creation of cultural stereotypes when translation is done in the mode of 'foreignization,' that is, by making the original to appear strange to a foreign reader.

However, for Husserl, the unifying principle for these manifestations is not the natural language or a predefined territory but rationality which is predicated on the logical schema of language: 'The world of humans is fundamentally and essentially determined by language' (Husserl 1973, pp. 224–225). The encounter with the alien makes this point exceedingly clear when language signifies a limit rather than a means. Our experiences

with foreign languages and journeys to foreign countries strongly testify to the generative powers of symbolic language. Speaking in foreign tongues or participating in foreign customs often feels like an actual limit being imposed on the Self by the Other. But, no matter how advanced we may be in communicating our original selves otherwise than in our home language, no matter how much at home we feel in a foreign country, when abroad, we ourselves become savages crippled by the force that continuously pulls us back to the primordial home, that terrain which constitutes the beginning and continues to do so even after we physically place ourselves inside a foreign world. The foreigner is thus the paradigmatic Alien other who is always in a relationship with other alien Others. In comparison to the animal and the child, the Alien foreigner designates multiplicity within the species, forwarding linguistic communication as the mediating type of rationality, rational community.

The main structure of this rationality, phenomenologically speaking, is the encounter with the alien. As indicated earlier, the encounter takes place in the liminal sphere and therefore presupposes a liminal method of inquiry, which deals with ambiguous organizations and multifaceted phenomena. Operating in this space disallows clearly defined types and typologies. It is for this reason that it was needful to employ a sequential and mutually informing use of static and genetic phenomenologies prior to using the generative analytical register. In contrast to the previous two registers, generative phenomenology does not unwrap or open its phenomena, as it were, but turns them inside out. In other words, it pursues its subject in the symbolic realm, which yields the first conceptual definition of the phenomenon, which is, as mentioned earlier, 'encounter with the alien.' The definition follows from the previously intuited understanding of intercultural communication, as well as the ways of approaching it analytically. Thus, considering the two previous chapters, in eidetic analysis I began from the ontological (theoretical) dimension and proceeded with the static description of the key facets of the phenomenon. In genetic analysis, I investigated the constitutive (interactive) structures of interpreting such as frame, footing, and contextualization clues. In comparison, the generative register focuses on the intercultural contact of mutually divergent worlds, including both humans and artifacts, their inhabitants. As I have mentioned earlier, the data for this part

is taken from film. Film was chosen because it allows us to take images and their series as symbolic forms and interpret them in a symbolic fashion, narratively. Moreover, the film's title, *Lost in Translation*, testifies to the problematic types of translation that have to be faced and attempted to counter: there can be more of translation, but there is always the possibility of less. Taking the title as an idiom, I pursue the film's symbolism toward yet another respecification of consecutive interpreting, this time by focusing on its generative potential.

## The Encounter with the Alien in Film

When applied to translation-in-interaction, the common phrase 'lost in translation' designates a loss of things, but it is rare that it becomes immediately clear what it is that has gotten lost: a proper name, a date, a number, or a significant number of an original sentence are typically the easiest to detect, but there is so much more that is lost. Misinterpretations tend to produce substitutions which mask the most deplorable loss, that of the original meaning. Although this meaning can be recovered, as the previous chapter has shown, it tends to be a late and partial recovery, which is going to take place in a differently temporalized context. This means that the losses necessarily include time and space, as well as the original interpersonal dynamics, including the interpreter's standing. Although static and especially genetic analyses do show constitutive alterations of time and space, generative analysis is designed to take them from the immediate production into the realm of history as it surpasses generations by way of transferring the sense which is authentic for this or that community. By focusing on the symbolic production of meaning, generative analysis allows us to see the virtual as actual. Film comes about as a perfect artifact in that regard as it is situated at the intersection of time and space: it has an internal spatiotemporal structure, which allows it to produce special kinds of signs that exist only as symbols because they are detached from the reality of viewing on account of its independently mediated visual imagery. I suggest that we take this imagery as data and analyze it with Gilles Deleuze, whose work on film is written in the tradition of semiotic phenomenology, in a rare fusion of the two approaches.



## Gilles Deleuze: The Symbolic in Film

According to Deleuze, in film, image or rather sequences of images do not produce a seamless story but appear as a frame, or framing, that is, essentially, a closed system. The concept of frame, which we have encountered in the previous chapter as a static phenomenon, is consistently interpreted by Deleuze as dynamic, for it does not contain the image in itself but moves it along, collapsing movement and image into movement-image, which is 'the mobile section of duration' (1986, p. 22). As a visual unity, an image appears only through an assemblage, or montage. In montage, one can differentiate among three different types of movement-image: perception-image, which relates to a center of indetermination (subjectivity is built into this type of image); action-image, which has a material connection to subjectivity (this kind of image refers to possible action); and affection-image. When the change concerns the body, its organs, and inner determinations, perception-image becomes affection-image. In turn, montage constitutes the overarching image for these three varieties.

With this systematics, Deleuze allows us to approach translation in general as the possibility of 'a differentiation of two correlative subjects in a system which in itself is heterogeneous' (1986, p. 73). In the same breath, Deleuze reiterates his critique of linguistics, claiming that the latter is concerned only with homogeneous systems. The capacity of montage to create gaseous perception overcomes homogeneity of image because film forces one to differentiate action not by itself but by its narrative function, such as a change of frame, for example. The distinction and relation between large and small forms for cinema become important in this regard: 'while the large form singles out an action from a situation, in the small form, we deduce the situation from the action' (Deleuze 1986, p. 162). The passage from one form to another is carried out by the symbolic figure which presupposes transformations, deformations, and transmutations—in other words, translations. In this model, figures are actual interactional (attractional) images that circulate through action-series. For Deleuze, figure is not much different from a figure of discourse, including a figure of thought. The relation between rhetorical

figures and cinematographic figures is that of 'correspondence' rather than 'association' (Deleuze 1986, p. 183). At the same time, there is a difference between pre-set figures and their actualization. Here, one can find an implication for the new rhetoric or visual rhetoric introduced and practiced by Deleuze in his book *Francis Bacon. The Logic of Sensation*.

The main aspects of Deleuze's visual rhetoric deal with the assumption that an artwork can provide the ground for the appearance of a particular real or unreal phenomenon; in the case of *Francis Bacon*, this phenomenon is sensation. Not only does Deleuze propose that sensation can be painted, he suggests that it can be painted in a mode specific to the medium and to the subject, for example, hysteria. In this way, painting becomes affective for the audience in the manner of self-disclosure. The disclosed elements shall be understood as affectants. They include states, emotions, dispositions, and moods. Deleuze's reading of a painting for affectants is based on the classical relation between the figure and the background called 'figuration.' As a relation, figuration belongs to tropic logic because it utilizes a space of signification (e.g., speech) toward producing a specific effect (e.g., 'make-believe'). This space can be visually or auditorily organized within a specific frame and in a series, implying 'the relationship of an image to an object that is supposed to illustrate, but it also implies the relationship of an image to other images in a composite whole which assigns a specific object to each of them' (Deleuze 2003, pp. 2–3). The order of appearance follows the perception of an aesthetic image, starting from perceiving the imprint through its affects to seeking an interpretation of these affects within the parameters of a certain culture-historical period.

Returning to Deleuze's study of film, in the first volume of the *Cinemas*, one cannot help but notice a close similarity of the book's language to the language of interactional discourse. Consider, for example, the notion of correlative subjects that coincide in an interactional system of conversation, or the notion of 'face' as the primary figuration of affection-image. Once translated into empirical terms, the figure yields the concept of face-to-face interaction. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, in a parallel—to philosophy—fashion, this concept was developed by Erving Goffman for the 'new sociology' project in the 1960s, and, since that time, face-to-face interaction has been the foundational principle

of speech communication and the direct contributor to the method of conversation analysis.

Hence, the validity of interactional analogy that plays out on several different levels for both Deleuze and Goffman. It also forms a level of analysis, bringing us from microsociology to the sociology of medial forms. Take another common concept, that of 'face.' Deleuze defines 'face as the character of the person' (1986, p. 97). Goffman considers face-to-face interaction as 'the basic mode of constituting one's self in a ritualized exchange' (1967, p. 31). Another connection with the name of Erving Goffman comes about via the notion of frame. Since the conversational frame and the cinematic frame appear to be grounded in interaction for both thinkers, we can speak about social symbolism, which is important for phenomenology, sociology, and semiotics. At the crossing of the three disciplines, we find the operational concept of 'simulacrum,' which serves as a guiding clue to our understanding of the cultural implications of the encounter with the alien. Simulacrum can be defined as an effect of encountering the alien in discourse. I believe that *Lost in Translation* demonstrates several versions of simulacrum and thus several ways of attending to the alien within the frame of consecutive interpreting. I describe simulacrum in the next section.

## Simulacrum

The simulacrum is not just a copy, but that which overturns all copies by also overturning all models. (Deleuze 1995: xx)

Deleuze refers to simulacrum in a number of texts. However, the strongest sense of this concept comes out in his *Difference and Repetition*, as the quote above shows, as well as in *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*. Although simulacrum has a relatively straightforward dictionary definition, its contemporary analyses have demonstrated a degree of complexity that demands a continuous refinement. While dictionary definitions emphasize the mimetic quality of simulacrum, its ability to imitate in reproduction, what remains outside of the common semantic usage is the fact that by imitating, simulacrum does not just copy but transforms

the original matter into an entirely different matter. The latter feature points to the problematic character of simulated phenomena. Deleuze defines simulacrum as a signifying affect that traverses semiotic systems, linking different spatiotemporal dimensions, creating new openings for discursive formations. The ability of simulacrum to transform matter has been noted since the pre-Socratic times, albeit in a highly cursive manner. Hence, simulacrum is not just a special kind of sign but a separate class of signs that belong to the symbolic kind. A culturally consistent and stable idea of simulacrum can be utilized for the subsequent analysis of film in two capacities: as a product and as a means of the generative method. In what follows, I would like to recover the original sense of simulacrum toward showing its potential for a generative analysis of translation as a symbolic key.

A historical investigation into the origin of simulacrum has immediate bearings for translation. That was the approach taken by the Epicureans, whose idea of simulacrum was that of an imprint, a physical manifestation of some past presence, an image. For them, the image of translation would be necessarily endowed with a generative concept. Plato could have found this definition fitting his idea of traveling souls; however, in his reformulation, the relation between a thing and its likeness is not that between the original and a copy but between the 'true' thing and an 'untrue' thing, as in 'just' and 'unjust' souls. The 'untrue' or 'bad' likeness can be as natural as water or mirror reflection. It can also be created by way of interweaving words that cover the main meaning by rerouting it to some other place, as it were. As opposed to the natural simulacrum, which is attached to the original, like in the case of the not yet translated material, the latter does not have the original. It is therefore deceptive and should be scrutinized as such.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, it is important to remember that not every distortion is misleading or concealing. Plato holds the media responsible for the false reproduction of 'sophistry' and relates it not only to rhetoric but also to certain fine arts, for example, sculpting, painting, and dance. For the contemporary consciousness this perspective is particularly attractive. When barraged by multimedia from all directions, making it constantly accessible through a variety of personal and public devices, the post-modern person does not even know the world outside of its simulation.

In his *The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy*, Deleuze addresses this view by arguing that Platonism is in fact the ‘dialectic of rivalry, a dialectic of rivals and suitors’ (1995, p. 292; *author’s emphasis*). For Deleuze, the main problem with this dialectic lies in the notion of the original, which reflects Plato’s overall vision of *cosmos* as the eternal movement of souls, where time repeats itself *ad infinitum*. The reconsideration of the role of the original necessarily implies a reconsideration of simulacrum. Deleuze further argues that in that world there would be no history and no place for philosophical thought: a perfect original produces either good or bad copies. In contrast, he suggests that we reconsider the notion of the original in spatial rather than temporal terms as an opening, or a space in-between that separates the two components of the real: not the original and its copy but the actual and the virtual. In addition, with Alain Badiou, ‘Simulacrum is not a corrupted copy. It contains positive strength that denies both original and copy, model and its reproduction’ (1997, p. 62). Simulacrum is therefore an image that rises from the fold between these two planes of experience, and it is the fold that allows us to experience the becoming of both.<sup>2</sup>

The co-presence in the given makes Deleuze underscore the significance of the visual medium, whether in film or in painting, because the image ‘does not just present itself, it surrounds itself with a world’ (1989, p. 68). This means that images are neither reflective nor reflexive, but participatory; Deleuze is careful to explain that a mirror image, which is most commonly associated with simulacrum, is not just a reverse image because a ‘Mirror is a turning crystal, with two sides, if we relate it to the invisible character [...] and the crystal turns over on itself’ (Deleuze 1989, p. 88). Although signs and their assemblages created by the visual media are based on the reality of the crystal, that is to say, what I see on the cinematic screen I could have either observed or imagined, film is inevitably a distortion of the mirror image. A film shows more than a reflection and more than just the actual, while a mirror never allows the image to exceed the actual it apparently reflects. These constraints, which are inherent in simulacrum, make it a perfect vehicle for describing imaginary worlds, the way they are made, and the effects they produce on the individual and collective alike, disclosing the situated meaning of the monstrous and the divine in the actual emotional states (e.g., horror, resentment, adoration).

Often Deleuze writes about simulacrum as the trace of the actual in the virtual.<sup>3</sup> With this definition, he frees simulacrum from the dependence on the content of its production, filling this gap with the contextual matters which form a narrative horizon. In simulacrum, context overflows the signified, drowning it in the extra of the world that upholds the image in the consistency of its narrative unfolding. The relation between narrative and simulacrum can be described on the micro level as the unifying relationship between the word and the image, where the image is a reduction of what does not exist as a corresponding word, but only as a series, which in turn consists of image sequences. Deleuze calls a product of the sequential unfolding of an image 'speech act.' Thus, he modifies an original speech act theory by John Searle. Traditional speech acts refer to the typology of act types, which in turn correspond to intending acts. The image-act from this perspective would be the structure that functions as the smallest unit of narrativity. To put it differently, image-act always implies a story behind it. A visual story in this case is an organization of image-acts within a frame that points to the past and the future simultaneously as 'the storytelling of the people to come' (Deleuze 1989, p. 223). The making of a story by reducing it to specific imagery and accompanying this imagery by an extensive commentary leads to the formal appearance of simulacrum, giving it form and turning it into an analytical unit that represents both phenomenology and semiotics by communicating their limits as well as the limits of the phenomenon under examination.

I would like to call this limit the encounter with the alien in film. In the following analysis of this limit, I suggest simulacrum as a symbolic analogue of the encounter with the alien. Two other concepts come from the previous theoretic and precede the reading of simulacrum; they are liminality and the alien. The main objective here is to show an exemplar of cross-cultural communication. The analyzed film is Sofia Coppola's 2003 feature film *Lost in Translation*.

## ***Lost in Translation***

Coppola's film has been chosen for this chapter because it presents culture as a phenomenon which is communication-based and also because it explicitly refers to culture as a symbol of encountering the alien in

translation. The plot of the film revolves in our time around a simultaneous arrival and a subsequent meeting in a luxury hotel in Tokyo of two Americans, a recent philosophy graduate Charlotte (Scarlett Johansson), who joins her husband, Scotty (Giovanni Ribisi), when he was commissioned to photograph local bands in Tokyo, and American actor Bob Harris (Bill Murray), who comes to Tokyo at the same time for an advertising gig: he is being paid two millions dollars for advertising the Japanese whisky 'Suntori.' His character is reminiscent of the actor himself: once very popular, he has lost much of his former luster and has not sat on top of the world for a long time. At the time of his arrival, his acting career seems to have dwindled irrevocably and his fame is associated almost exclusively with the past, the films made in the 1970s and early 1980s. The jetlag deprives both Bob and Charlotte of sleep, and after several sporadic encounters in a hotel bar late at night, they begin to hang out, visiting accidental friends and strange places (strip bar, late-night food stands, private apartments). Eventually, they formed an unusually deep emotional bond, which is interrupted for good by Bob's departure. The film is the story of the relationship between Bob and Charlotte; it is therefore from their perspective, the perspective of the American guests, that the encounter with the Japanese alien is represented by Coppola.

In addition to serving as a metaphor for translation, the film shows actual instances of translation gone wrong or, rather, gone astray, just like Bob Harris' reputation had gone astray in the United States long before his visit, but nonetheless in Japan he is approached in a revered manner, showing Bob as if in the broken mirror. Coppola's selection of the cultures confronting each other cannot be more apt: both the US research on the Japanese culture and the Japanese research on the US culture demonstrate a fascinating fusion of the two opposites that took place after World War II and that resulted in the creation of a model of cultural adhesion, where the influence of the US economic aid to Japan translated into incoherent variations of popular and business cultures. Akin to the actual mistranslations and non-translations that we see in the film taking place in the studio, in the restaurant, in the subway, and in the hospital, these variations testify to the failure of translation to render the translated. They also speak about the new original which emerged in Japan after adopting from and adapting to the American culture, making

it barely recognizable to an American; yet, it is recognizable, but only and mainly as grotesque. In the next several sections, I would like to elaborate on these preliminaries, focusing, in my reading of the film, on the conditions that could allow us to consider the encounter with the alien as an event of translation. Three phenomenological concepts (liminality, the alien, and simulacrum) will inform this discussion.

## Liminality

As discussed in the theoretical part of the chapter, the encounter with the alien occurs in the liminal sphere. In the film, the liminal opens up already in the very beginning, creating the pre-conditions that designate the alien land from the moment Bob Harris arrives in Tokyo. He is flying from New York City and has to change so many time zones before he reaches Japan that he feels constantly half-awake in Tokyo. His physical disposition matches the alien environment. He arrives at night, but the brightly lit city is like his home city; Tokyo never sleeps, its luminous neon signs and high rises are punctured by light all night long, its late-night bustle creates an impression of a continuous twilight that never becomes either day or night. There is no enveloping darkness, only semi-darkness, or diffused darkness in the liminal 'on-the-way-to.' The liminal is given as twilight. Like day and night, twilight is a discrete state of being for both man and nature here. Twilight is continuous and dynamic, yet, stable and densely consistent. In the natural attitude, we experience twilight as a transition. In the phenomenological attitude, we experience twilight as a disclosure of liminality that takes place in the space formed across two opposite domains: actuality and virtuality. The film shows this blend as the enmeshment of light into the physical infrastructure of the city. The impression continues during daytime: with its extremely high humidity and human discharges, Tokyo is wrapped in the permanent blanket of gray smog.

By choosing twilight as one of the conditions for the encounter with the radical alien, Coppola presents this condition by way of an atmosphere, or a background which, in itself, is neither social nor natural but outside of the human home. Driving with Bob Harris in a limo



through the dark blue scape-space of Tokyo, one finds that this background is confrontational; the confrontation pulls together the strange (as it seemed to appear to a New Yorker) light of the East Coastal Pacific and the familiar man-made light of city lights only to divide them into two intersecting senses of twilight: the elemental non-human and the human taken in a wide sense that one may call culture. The withdrawal of light into darkness distinguishes and fuses the non-human with the culture, thus creating a double-sided phenomenon of ambiguity. The relation between day and light develops sequentially: light is always introduced at the beginning of twilight. In this light, we encounter familiars and tend toward them as we tend toward home. Even the alien seems familiar in this light, in translation: one who does not speak the language that is being translated would still recognize its relation to language in general. Never is human speech completely unrecognizable. At the same time, only our own speech being spoken makes us feel completely at home, no matter where we are or what the circumstances for speaking to each other may be.

## **The Encounter with the Alien**

Twilight characterizes communication (translation) as what is embedded in the natural talk unnaturally: in fact, the light generated by twilight is scattered light, which looks like the speech of a madman. In the same manner, a shadow stands in the way of the light, moving with it, revealing its path, although it is never the primary element for the union with the light, leaving it to the liminal. One may rethink at this point the Platonic allegory of the cave. With the liminal in play, there is no need to rush out of the shadows into the light of revelation but explore the very conditions that make the light possible. Entering that state means to enter a psychosomatic transformation, a change, which in the film manifests itself in the inability of the key characters to sleep. *Insomnia* is imposed equally badly on Bob and Charlotte, who become sleepless by virtue of the alien in the very moment its difference manifests itself as image-signs, or those symbolic images that come to characterize the alien. I will present examples of actual alien signs in the next section.

The protagonists in the film are subjected to both alien signs, that is, purely cultural images, and alien affectants, which can or cannot be equated with the alien as it is seen or heard. Both can be passively registered and as passively ignored. For example, both Charlotte and Bob identify the Japanese alien as Japanese but without having been taken by its specific affectants, they are poorly equipped from seeing it beyond inaccessible speech and strange ritual chains. In other words, the first symbols that announce the arrival of the alien are stereotypical traits applicable to any foreign culture, whether far or close: language, bodily behavior, dress, attitude. Living in the contemporary world makes us get used to the alien in general. We habitually look at the alien along the lines of semblance. For Bob and Charlotte, the semblance of the Japanese world becomes more specific because the experience of the alien comes to both from within the liminal sphere in the state of insomnia that modifies their home, and everything culturally common that they share, and which they can observe now, albeit in a unique perspective. Being firmly attached to home gives them simultaneously an opportunity to recognize not only the semblance of the alien land, but its alien atmosphere and its alien images. Yet, despite their common home, the protagonists do not experience the alien in a similar way. The film gives us an example of their divergent ways of comprehending incomprehensibility: while Charlotte appreciates her new surroundings as alien but seeks to position them against those of her home, Bob finds himself utterly uncomfortable amidst this difference and upfront defiant of its effects. His inability of adjusting to the alien disorients him. After an accidental encounter in the night bar, Charlotte becomes his much needed guide into the alien land.

## Simulacrum

In the film, the focus on alien signs allows us to observe many different kinds of simulacrum. Simulacrum comes into the strongest relief from the perspective of Bob Harris, for example, during the confusing filming of Suntori ads; the unexpected *rendezvous* with a prostitute in his hotel room; his mimicking in the 'Johnny Carson of Japan' show, all of which was nothing that could have been expected by an actor who turned busi-

nessman when abroad. This transformation envisioned no complications. However, dealing with this alien was fraught with complications from the beginning: with the misunderstandings in the studio, which resulted in Murray's character pretending that he follows the director's instructions, thereby simulating the practice he knew only too well. The gift of a prostitute from the producer turns the act of her routinized seduction (a simulation in itself) into a parody: 'Lip my stocking' reveals a common stereotype of an oriental person who has a difficulty to pronounce 'r,' and who, as a result, substitutes it with 'l.' It is also the most literal of the alien signs. In turn, the idea of the 'Johnny Carson of Japan' is obviously adopted from the famous US TV show but merely as an idea. This is why it appears to Bob Harris as a travesty, while in fact it is a regular comedy show to millions of Japanese viewers. This example discloses the sense of simulacrum as a generative phenomenon which is capable of creating a cultural artifact of its own, independently of the original.

The game gallery presents another alien sign. Not quite a simulacrum, it nonetheless mesmerizes Charlotte. Here Coppola uses two opposite ends of the Japanese cultural continuum, connecting the impassionate Japanese type with the crazy one, bringing them together in a 'fun' space, but also throwing in the mix a 'cool' character. They enchant Charlotte, and bring her to the state of wonder. Not much younger than herself and therefore particularly suitable for an evaluative comparison, these gamers are nothing like the ones in a similar context of the United States. The overall performance of coolness here comes off in a manner of either excess or deficit. Thus, one gamer is shooting at targets impassionedly, without as much as moving a muscle, while the other one, right next to him, is jumping and hitting the buttons on the keys of the Galactic Battle machine as if he is playing an instrument rather than a battle game. The young man, who is playing an electrical guitar nearby is conducting himself as if he is a rock star: all wrapped in a tight leather jacket, sporting gelled hair, with a cigarette hanging out of the corner of his mouth, he also has a girlfriend next to him who is standing reverently behind, watching.

Their grown-up compatriots are not very much different: they hang out in bars, night clubs, and strip bars, but, in contrast to their US counterparts, they behave as if pursuing no particular interest or desire

in what is going on or, rather, they rarely associate their environment with a committed act if the act itself is not a 'real' one, as if they perform vice just so. This mix of suited men who thrive on being alike next to the inappropriately behaving adolescents who want to have it otherwise would not have been accepted in the US context despite its innocent nature. In the US context, public places have different rules of behavior that emphasize restraint and respect of the other's space, which appears to be the opposite in Japan. In either case, the produced modifications of the US rituals do not produce a lesser variation or a bad copy but a difference within the paradigm of possible variations, although, from the standpoint of the original, unlikely ones because simulacra belong to the alien host but can be identified as such only by the alien guest. This is because the Japanese culture is produced by its own means and not by the means of the culture from which this interactional artifact was borrowed in the first place.

The Japanese simulacra of the American culture are contrasted with bad or corrupted copies of the American culture carried out by the Americans themselves. This includes the jazz singer who is 'dying slowly' in the main bar and ends up befriending Bob for a one-night stand, a friend of Charlotte's husband's, and a couple of young American businessmen. They stand out as the original that all of a sudden met its translation, unperturbed. All these people are in Japan for business reasons, but their belief that the idea of business is common for both cultures is not a correct one: their imitation of the original is nothing but an imitation, an original corrupted by a lack of talent. There is nothing strange in their singing nor is there anything strange in their conversation. It is bad, and it is bad in the same way: as the unfulfilled original. The role of the phenomenological Husserlian concept of fulfillment receives a special significance here. The contrast between the unfulfilled original and the lost original underscores the difference of a much higher level, that is a cultural difference, where the means of the own override imported ways toward producing a unique modification of the original artifact. The recognition of the difference is granted to both Charlotte and Bob Harris by the awakened reflective attitude, which is sufficient for differentiating between genuine and false, individual and mass, heartfelt talk and small talk.

Yet, reflection alone turns out to be insufficient for embracing the alien for what it is, without dismissal or mockery. Traditional stereotypes pervade the conversation between Bob and Charlotte. Both take the micro differences they encounter along their adventures together very much in jest: thus, during a late-night snack, they make fun of the restaurant menu, where Bob Harris shows impatience and behaves rudely toward the obediently waiting staff, holding a conversation that references the present company who does not speak English in the face of that company. The same attitude transpires in the next scene, where, during a party, he mocks a Japanese person who attempts to strike a conversation with him in English. The presumption that one would speak their language and not only speak it but also make themselves understandable runs against the delayed realization that a guest has an obligation toward the alien in that respect and that the alien should accommodate the guest unconditionally.

## Face-to-Face

At the end, I would like to discuss the ethical side of the encounter with the alien. For examples, I will again be referring to *Lost in Translation*. I would like to begin by reminding the reader of the opening shot: Charlotte lying in a hotel bed in her t-shirt and underwear, with her behind in full view turned toward the viewer. We do not see her face at first. But when we do, we immediately realize that she was being reflective and pensive, pondering about the world. Philosopher by education, she was trained to observe and so she observes. She has an open countenance and her looking, even gazing, has an aura of neutrality about it. Then she turns over and we see right next to her in bed sleeping is her husband, Scotty, whose deep sleep prevents him from waking up to Charlotte's amorous advances. So, she gets up and ledges herself on the windowsill. In front of her we see the city that never sleeps. After Scotty gets up and leaves for work, Charlotte calls her mother, but just like Bob, whose fax keeps on receiving samples for the carpet upholstery from his wife and whose subsequent conversations with her about refurbishing their home make him feel that she does not understand his situation at all, she feels more of

an alien than the aliens around her. Scotty's non-understanding is parallel to that of Bob's wife, except that he is here, with Charlotte, but in a way, he could have been as far away from her as home. Thus, from the very beginning, the two characters find themselves unaccompanied, meeting the condition for their own rendezvous. Unlike the previously mentioned Goffmanian notion of face-to-face, which provides a genetic dimension to translation, there is only the notion of face, which opens up not a path to the other, but to the world. This formulation brings this examination from ontology and epistemology to ethics. The phenomenological figure most apt for such an enterprise is a student of Edmund Husserl's, Emmanuel Levinas, who turned phenomenology face out, as it were, by first identifying the human condition with ethics and then presenting the notion of face as the condition for Eros and fecundity, both of which become present after Bob and Charlotte find each other.

In Chap. 5, we already came across some ethical considerations concerning the practice of the face-to-face translation and considered the implications of interpersonal and professional ethics. It therefore appears like it would be a good time to return to the theoretical part of this study in order to show the potential of generative phenomenology outside of interpreting live data, as a symbol. In order to understand the implications of this elaboration, I would like to begin with Levinas' description of a particular phenomenology that he chose for defining his project:

I have attempted a 'phenomenology of sociality' starting from the face of the other person—from proximity—by understanding in its rectitude a voice that commands before all mimicry and verbal expression, in the mortality of the face, from the bottom of this weakness. (Levinas 1987, p. 109)

In this quote, phenomenology is put in quotation to mark the radical character of his departure from the traditional phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. In contrast to Husserl and other foundational figures in phenomenology, the phenomenology of sociality approaches experience before an experience is given to the ego, as pre-predicative, 'before presence in perception ... before all particular expression ... before all human intending' (Levinas 1998, p. 145). Unlike the encounter with the alien, or communicating face-to-face, to experience face as face is possible only

in the moment, from the height, as Levinas would have put it. To establish contact before expression means to recognize the Other and their humanity before the words of greeting are uttered. Phenomenologically speaking, the most obvious implication of such a radical 'before' means that there is no experience exclusively proper to the Self, but that experience emerges from the proximity of the Other who is always there as an embodiment of sociality itself, free from any particularizing means of constitution and the corresponding constitutive effects. It is also free of culture and, adding to the various modes of constitution discussed earlier, yet another one: ethical proximity. With this reversal, the traditional phenomenological method undergoes two major modifications: one sets the priority for the phenomenological inquiry, which is the relationship to the Other, while the other establishes the context or horizon for such an inquiry, namely face, the ultimate proximity. Both modifications concern translation directly as they put the significance of cultural specificity for the relationship with the Other in question and simultaneously engage history by putting the origin of translation in question.

Importantly, this methodological reversal does not eliminate the empirical connection; therefore, it does not prevent the concept of 'face-to-face,' which was suggested to be a matrix for any empirical inquiry, from finding place in the phenomenology of sociality. When I spoke earlier about Ervin Goffman and his idea of the social Self that emerges by interacting with others, this Self was described as 'touched' before the face-to-face structure became fully formed. The Self that is in a constitutive relationship with the Other, does not negate the Self that experiences the moment of responsibility for the Other, but has it as a pre-condition. Following Sartre, Goffman conceived of the Self to be an unstable construct, dependent on the Other for its specificity, its uniqueness lasting only as long as the 'line' [of behavior] allows it. Our previous investigation showed this uniqueness to be intricately linked to voice, that is, to the material extension of the communicating body. This extension dictates, qua the imposition of the Other, a certain way of being, which, at a later stage, becomes sedimented for the Self, who no longer would recognize the uniqueness of the Other, except for its alienness, which, in the previous example, leads to experiencing the characters of *Lost in Translation* as home-bound. In other words, they gravitated toward each

other after 'having a moment,' which called them to each other. It is only after it had happened and the face was shown and the call was heard that Charlotte and Bob found 'face-to-face' and, with it, the communicative mutuality of their being together.

Levinas introduces the concept of face in *Time and the Other* and keeps it as the operational concept throughout his entire corpus. He develops and refines it in *Totality and Infinity*. For Levinas, the concept of face features a wide array of interpretations; it is both the human face and the relation to the social world represented by and in the Other. Minimally, face is what is posed before reason, in the infinite. This means that it is a sign, but of the infinite, as in the infinite responsibility for and before the Other, the moment which I described earlier, but also in the infinite of translation. The relationship between language as a system of signs and face as the sign of the infinite is that of irreconcilable dialectics. To this effect, Levinas writes: 'The Other is the signifier, he who gives a sign' (1969, p. 181). The same signifier, who 'represents' the radical alterity of the other human being, reveals face. Moreover, this other human being is by no means a specific human being. Nor is it an abstraction of a human being: 'The signifier, he who gives a sign, is not signified' (Levinas 1969, p. 181). Based on this elaboration, the signifier is the speech and its giver: 'the signifier must present himself before every sign, by himself—present in the face' (Levinas 1969, pp. 181–182). In other words, meaning is impossible if there is no Other, whose physical presence signifies the presence of speech and whose absent origins can point in any direction, allowing for infinite translation.

By taking the face of the Other as 'first signification,' Levinas addresses both Jakobson's so-called idealism and Derrida's so-called theology by approaching them as two kinds of transformable sociality. Translation is significant for both as it connects community's future hopes and aspirations with its purposes and agendas; in other words, it directs it but does not impose any constraints on content, thus confirming the thesis of arbitrary genesis of word, as Saussure suggested, correctly. Subsequently, Levinas respecifies the concept of the sign as a container of meaning or a guide to the holy by replacing it with the encounter with the face as the becoming of all meaning. The encounter with the face does not just make an opening for translation; it commands translation. Signification



of the face is extraordinary; it is pre-predicative; it is before language but not before expression; and it is expression that puts context, culture, language, and consciousness into question. The face disconcerts the intentionality of the 'I.' It is not against the face's nudity but precisely because of it that the Other is called to respond. What shows in the nudity is not Derrida's unassimilable surplus or Jakobson's semiosis but the idea of infinity that disconnects the idea of intentionality and stops us from avoiding responsibility. This opening from which face comes, this beyond, is the absence with signifiedness in which the other is not converted into the same. From this perspective, translation shall be taken as the revelation of face. Both Charlotte and Bob experience that type of translation, albeit to a different degree. Both sense the responsibility of meeting each other. For both the alien enhances this realization. Their relationship is based on infinite translation.

Levinas gives translation studies another insight: the revelation beyond the signified and the symbolic is only possible in the trace of the other, its cultural artifacts, its views, and visions. This is where ethics and expression blend together into voice, gaze, and vocal or visual production of cultural artifacts: literature, dance, song. The pertinence of trace for translation deals with the juxtaposition often associated with the concept of the third, which is a late addition by Levinas called to clarify the relationship between the Self and the Other. Trace arises or becomes visible in the third person as the condition of irreversibility. In other words, there is some of my Self in the Other and vice versa, but I cannot take it as mine. The translated speech performs the same function; it introduces the 'third' in the saying (oral discourse) in the role of a witness. By analogy, translation would appear as the trace of the third, an associated yet independent phenomenon; hence, the irreversibility of its appearance. To extend the analogy into the Japanese context means to take the alien as the trace of the third who is constantly present, making infinite translation going. The invisibility of the trace is that it signifies by itself without making signification appear. The mundane attitude is quite aware of this paradox: when hearing translation, we do not approach translation as translation but rather focus on what it delivers, as it were.

Only when translation is exposed through failure, for example, does it disclose the third and, in its trace, the infinity of the absolute Other,

who acquires quasi-presence of something that has never been there: a past, a diachrony, and a history, or a relationship. One may only speculate how the relationship between Bob and Charlotte emerged, but the viewer knows that it did emerge and is now in passing. It will become infinite translation when the characters part way; then, it will reach the archive of memory, become sedimented as a particular kind of experience which is predicted on responsibility. Responsibility for the Other in a story will remain. Concerning translation, it also shows that translation itself is a passing toward the past more remote than any past—the absolute past that unites all times by muting historicity. In itself, translation is without history. But it is not without a response. It is the need for response that, in the last scene of the film, moves Bob to rush and find Charlotte for the final moment that endows them with a personal history.

Proceeding further with Levinas, with the help of translation the Other binds time together in the present for the 'I,' who sees and speaks; that is, faces the Other. By gathering alterity into presence, translation produces a unifying effect on the ego that perceives all that is presentified in the now as the same. The appropriative power of translation gives birth to the synchronicity of the 'I-Other' relationship, allowing us to speak of sameness in difference, which is a mundane perspective on translation and its effectivity. The translating other is always next to me as if it is given to complement something I lack. I differ from the Other only as long as the Other differs from me. Linguistic differences point to the same thesis, albeit only on the surface. The linguistic plane is governed by symmetry and synchronicity; it leads to formalization of the world in foundational ontologies of being such as mathematics, linguistics, and physics. The same effects can be attributed to the traditional research on translation, and Jakobson's theory can be taken as an exemplary illustration of this kind of research. Moreover, there is no need to discard it, for there is nothing wrong in reducing language to its structural core if it is undertaken as one of many modes of origin for humanity:

We can take an interest, accordingly, in the said, in its various genres and in their various structures, and explore the birth of communicable meaning in words, and the means of communicating it [this meaning] most surely and effectively. We can thus attach language again to the world and to the

being to which human enterprises refer, and thus attach language to intentionality. (Levinas 1998, p. 71)

A positivist rendition of language is therefore not an unworthy task for the 'first philosophy.' There is a sure place for Jakobson and his phenomenological structuralism in phenomenology even as radical a phenomenology as that of Levinas'. However, in light of the latter's elaborations of language, it would be incorrect to substitute the act of saying as a linguistic message for the saying itself because the former reinforces the search for the same in the Self, while the latter reminds us of the path to the difference instituted by the Other. Responding to the Other in translation means to acknowledge that the ethics of the Other belongs to expression, which is the harbinger of difference. It is not by chance that Levinas takes expression as that which precedes and, at the same time, exceeds language, finding its true place in the temporality of the encounter with the Other and therefore the encounter with translation. Time solidifies the ethics of translation by denying the possibility that it might run a synchronous course: 'Time means that the other is forever beyond me, irreducible to the synchrony of the same' (Levinas 1986, p. 21). We are born into a communicative relationship with the Other, into translation and into our responsibility to bring the Other to the light of difference.

At this point, we can unequivocally say that Levinas' notion of 'proximity' becomes the pivot in that very interface that expresses the position of the Self and the Other, but also Bob and Charlotte, who had the experience of 'being together' beyond face-to-face experience. In other words, the position can be understood in both terms: empirical, as physical proximity, which evolves out of spatiotemporal constraints in absolute terms, and in the proximity of the transcendental divine, and although Levinas deems the former secondary due to its relativity (each one of us is in possession of a unique perspective when we experience spatiotemporal phenomena), he cannot help but endow this kind of proximity with the tasks of pondering, mediating, negotiating, and finally deciding whether the proximity unites or, on the contrary, separates. We take these distinctions for granted because the specificity of a context laminates the social in categorial forms, which add responsibility to responsibility. The same is true when specificity concerns culture. In his essay *The Trace of the*

*Other*, Levinas draws a sharp distinction between cultural signification as a mode of horizontal givenness, which is but a variation of reality, and an interference with the whole of humanity as 'the phenomenon which is apparition of the other [and] is also a face' (1985, p. 351). The stranger, the foreigner always comes from a height. His or her entry is vertical, as it were, and although it does match the depth of the transcendental, strangeness is always somehow elevated, sublime. He or she comes as if dispatched by the whole of humanity. Translation comes into play at the moment of arrival, as the first expression of the relation between the Self and the Other. The exchanges between Bob and Charlotte reveal that they follow the same mode of suspending the alien for themselves and expressibility that does not require translation.

Their transcendental connection, or the other side of the relationship, does require translation because it cannot be put into either abstract or concrete terms: 'It is an awakening to the other person—the first arrival in his proximity as neighbour—irreducible to knowledge. ... It is non-in-difference to the other, where love breaks the equilibrium of the equanimous soul' (Levinas 1987, p. 108). It is also 'extreme exposure—before all human intending—as to "being shot at point blank"' (Levinas 1998, p. 145). It is what calls, before expressing a wish to act. It is like holding a stranger in one's hands, as if what one holds is not a stranger but holding itself. The absolute Other cannot be given otherwise but in the mode of revelation. And it is in that very mode that translation discloses. In the film, it is disclosed by the call, for it is issued by the responsibility of the face. We will never know what it connotes but we know and suspect what it entails: proximity and passivity. Proximity holds speech in abatement. It is, therefore, a measure of goodness without reciprocation (and so without equivalence, or adequacy); it is not a union but what precedes everything that is given, including the ontological Other. In his or her passive waiting for expression, the Self is liberated from oneself in order to connect to the Other. A space emerges where passivity and activity coincide, making any sacrifice possible, including that of foregoing the original, that is, an accumulation of sedimented forms and layers, one's history.

For Levinas, the relationship between the original and the translation is given in reverse. The Saying (translation-in-talk) defies logos by preceding

all that is Said (the original), all systematic discourse and thematization; it cannot be caught as a theme just like the Said cannot be discoursed upon as a fact of history. However, one has the ethical obligation to recognize the uniqueness of the face that commands and that seeks to become different in translation by remaining the same in the original: 'the Saying is the fact that before the face I do not simply remain there contemplating it, I respond to it. The Saying is a way of greeting the Other, but to greet the Other is already to answer for him' (Levinas 1985, p. 88). Here, the analogy between the conversational pair 'Saying/Said' and 'original/translation' calls for conceptualizing translation as an expression that does not precede expression but serves as a response to it. Expression as responding to the Other becomes the only way to capture the responsibility for the said and the saying as they coalesce in the encounter with the Other. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas compares his view with that of Plato, who 'maintains the difference between the objective order of truth, that which doubtlessly is established in writings, impersonally, and reason in a living being, a living and animated discourse' (1969, p. 73). In this discourse, one can defend oneself and one's ideas. A communal good emerges out of this interaction, and a possibility of a better being beyond death. A translation is an exposure and a relation; it cannot be bypassed or forgotten; it can only be carried out.

## Notes

1. Take, for example, *Simulations* (1983) by Baudrillard.
2. There is a productive connection here to the concept of fold in Deleuze's discussion of Baroque in *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (1992). In this text, Deleuze underscores the significance of those organic structures that can be reproduced in cultural artifacts (music, painting, dance, architecture). The latter can be considered as simulacra. An application of Deleuze's 'fold' theory to the study of a communication phenomenon can be found in Kozin (2007).
3. Derrida, who owes his interpretation of simulacrum to Deleuze, chooses to alter it somewhat: 'simulacrum is a myth, a legend, and a phantasm which is offered as a pure concept (life in its pure state)' (2008, p. 22).

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# 7

## Postscript

In the previous chapter, I described translation as an imprint that affects consciousness toward disclosing a sense of translation in the image-sign as a result of encountering the alien. The examination was conducted in the generative register that allowed us to approach translation as a matter of aesthetics. As was shown, a result of the three-tier analysis, consecutive interpreting also known as ‘oral,’ ‘liaison,’ ‘dialogue,’ ‘community,’ or ‘interlingual’ interpreting, became reformulated on several different levels: first, as translation-in talk, then, as translation-in-interaction, and, finally, as infinite translation grounded in human receptivity and relationality. The last chapter concluded the investigation of the phenomenon formerly known as consecutive interpreting with an ethical account. By leaving ethics to the last, I meant to emphasize the importance of translation beyond the static and genetic analyses and the corresponding ontological and epistemological questions associated with these modes of inquiry. The inclusion of ethics in this study also concluded the construction of the methodological interface between philosophical and empirical components on the basis of generativity, and it is to this connecting tissue between the two approaches that I dedicate the remainder of this book.



Here, I present the phenomenological/empirical interface not in abstraction as I have done before in Chap. 3 but in light of the findings gathered from the entire analytical part of this book, including Chaps. 4, 5, and 6. In my presentation, I abstain from relying on any technical academic jargon, or overtly intricate if not complex and multipositional problems that either the phenomenological or empirical methodology pose before themselves.

Therefore, in this Postscript, I would like to review the joint method of phenomenology and empirical humanities which is approached not just as a custom-designed methodology for the study of translation, whether oral or written, but as a method which can address a variety of communication phenomena. In the beginning, I explain the key principles of each methodological component. Next, I compare these principles in order to select the closest ones in terms of both their own and their complementary relationships. I continue by clarifying the term ‘interface,’ which I consider the central concept for any interdisciplinary approach, of which this study is but an example. I therefore present ‘interface’ in a general manner, as both a singular method and a method that can be deployed in a piecemeal fashion, depending on the task at hand. Before I proceed, however, I would like to return to the concepts of ‘phenomenon’ and ‘world’ as crucial for the understanding of the interdisciplinary interface. I would like to begin with the term ‘phenomenon.’

A phenomenon can be either concrete or abstract or both, like translation. Some phenomena are given passively, for example, in listening, and some are given actively, as in speaking. Both activities also have extensions: listening may extend to writing, and speaking to direct action. Phenomenology helps us figure out not only these connections but also the relations that stabilize this or that appearance, including its essential features, that is, a number of basic features which constitute its phenomenal core. The foundation consists of invariable structures or essences. One obtains the sense of these through bracketing and free fantasy variations that strip the phenomenon from the natural attitudinal, that is, the mundane, perspective. Getting out of the natural mindset is the necessary procedure that helps us distinguish between the common approach to the phenomenon as a happening or an event and the phenomenological perspective, where a phenomenon is first and foremost an

appearance. During this procedure, the phenomenon must remain static. Once the essential makeup of the phenomenon is in place, it reveals its foundational essence. In the case of the present study, this essence transpired as 'talk'; hence, 'translation-in-talk,' where translation is founded on talk. The idea that in order for an essence to come out, that is, become identified, it must be founded on invariable structures, presupposing a relational whole. Adhering to this whole for the search of essences means approaching the phenomenon as an object.

We can see, for example, how mass media, the current darling of communication studies, can be considered as 'it,' but without an analysis that takes mass media out of its association, which is prompted by the natural attitude, we are inevitably brought to such notions as modes of production while its essence is predicated on such modes of delivery as audio or visual (we have witnessed a similar bifurcation between the oral and written types of translation). Likewise, it appears natural that the discourse of mass media tends toward 'common' or 'recognizable' perspectives, values, and events. A further investigation may indicate that mass media is predicated on newsworthiness, which, although an abstract category, is a quality and thus a close sibling of everything that stands out as meaningful. Although mass media employ talk in a number of different forms, all of them exceed it by introducing imagery and uncommon forms of discourse, for example, interview. The same can be said about conversational performance, which is founded on the imitation of one's identity in expression. In either case, in order to obtain an essence of an object, one has to unwrap it to the barest, making it unrecognizable; yet, with the basic foundation exposed as true, we obtain the phenomenon's essence.

Every phenomenon has its essential core grounded in the phenomenal world. The world can be local: for example, we often call this world a context. Although we are always in a context, as our investigation of interpreting in the genetic register demonstrated, the phenomenal world cannot be reduced to either static or genetic features of a phenomenon; neither the phenomenon's stable core, nor its 'living being.' The presence of the phenomenal world as a general background that guarantees all meaningfulness calls for a symbolic outlook. A combination of the three registers then yields a sufficiently complete profile for the phenomenon,

albeit only in a phenomenological sense. Just a phenomenological review is not sufficient for making the analyzed phenomenon accessible to us as evidence. The humanities require that the thus obtained evidence is returned to the world we live in, accentuating its most pertinent features. In the case of interpreting, such features were linked to communication, making communication studies especially fitting for the empirical analysis as they bear, from the beginning, a connection to phenomenology by virtue of their origin.

Ethnography of communication, ethnomethodology, conversation, and narrative analyses are but the most obvious examples of this connection. Their main task is to add to the initial phenomenological description, to refine and texture it. Thus, in addition to doing the work of unconcealment, releasing the essential, contextual, and symbolic meanings, communication methods explain these meanings further, by focusing on a particular communication theme. Yet, not all of the communication methods are suitable for a combined analysis of the same object. A certain degree of relatedness, at least as far as this or that method's major tenets are concerned, is required. I believe that the four communication methods mentioned earlier are particularly useful and not only because they are compatible in both their general qualitative ethnographic approach and conceptual concordance, but also because each communication method pairs up best with a corresponding phenomenological register, namely, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis go best with the static register, narrative analysis with the genetic register, and ethnography or communication, or, alternatively, symbolic interactionism and semiotics with the generative register.

The contribution of ethnomethodology/conversation analysis to static analysis deals with the structure of human action. In the genetic register, the analysis no longer focuses on the objective properties of communication phenomena, but shows how they are constituted by the participants themselves through a concerted action and what structures can designate the activities that allow the analyzed phenomenon to develop in time. In order to arrange for the generative analysis, one needs to perform a different kind of description other than the one that was utilized in Chaps. 4 and 5. In this register, constitution and genesis become the central concepts adopted from phenomenology; their communication counterparts

are interactivity and conversational trajectory. Face-to-face, which is both a microsociological and a phenomenological concept, counts as the central field for the study of communication phenomena. The genetic register defies solipsism and cannot function if analysis isolates participants and discounts the communication event as an inter-relational phenomenon. The search for foundational relations in the sphere of live communication is extremely difficult; however, what the natural attitude ignores and what phenomenology of sociality finds of necessity is precisely the notion of event. A conversational event is a matter which is much more complicated than any essential structure. A quick comparison of the two explains the difference: the priority of a communal form over an abstract structure is what phenomenologists would call 'evidence' or 'fact.' The closer a human being reflects on the way he or she proceeds along the ordinary matter or matters, the more strongly he or she realizes the power of 'We' over 'I,' the collective over the singular and the development in time with others rather than alone. Communication studies realize the potential of 'live data' and 'immediate production,' where the use of a recording easily proves that a phenomenon of communication presupposes a specific, minutely or simply significantly placed response.

In turn, the issue of response generates the issue of responsibility, introducing ethics as a domain of experience, which, for this study, focused on the ethical relation between the members of the home community, with its counterpart, the alien, forming the background. There, interpreting becomes an activity and a practice, a concept and a category, a structure of experience and a conversational structure. Given in the symbolic form, it underscores the movement from the simplest to the most concrete. The most complex and the most concrete turn out to be symbols and not essences. They are independently given as sedimentations, if you wish, separately from the communal history with its layers and strata intertwined, but on their own as in enriched representations, paradigms, and super-species of what the ordinary consciousness knows. Here, phenomena transform into their own mirror images and sometimes 'other images,' as was shown by the analysis of *Lost in Translation*. Because of responsivity, which is imbedded in both live and mediated communication, the union of phenomenology and communication methods proves to yield straight rather than inverse or reverse images. Here, the absence

of response, or silence, as our analysis in Chap. 5 demonstrated, is as meaningful as a long informative speech. The relational aspect quickly turns into an ethical one: for non-communication at the time when communication is needed, this non-responsivity, points to the same ethical moment as refusing help to someone who needs it the most, and although conversational structures alone cannot prove the moral underpinnings of the response, as well as whether it is sincere or not, it can show the ethics of responsivity and thus comment on the person and their identity.

This turned out to be the main theme of the last chapter, which suggested that generative analysis should culminate in a phenomenological inquiry. In comparison with the two other types of analysis, it is broader and includes culture as a special domain of meaning, where the topic under analysis is neither an object nor a subject, but a cultural artifact. Here, context, which has already shown its significance in the preceding chapter, becomes especially telling, and the 'home/alien' structure is called to confirm the volatile nature of the horizon, which moves in and out of the figure/ground perspective, creating effervescent shimmering meaning. In employing the generative register, one should not expect to obtain a definitive revelation of sense about translation or any other communication phenomenon. On the contrary, moving through the registers, we arrive at the most abstract domain I call 'liminality.' Exposed through the encounter with the alien, liminality shows phenomena as 'simulacra,' which are formal by-products of semiotic interactionism. In comparison to the mirror image, simulacrum is not a reverse reflection of an actual thing, but a generative phenomenon, which has a unique organization of its own, where essential components are assembled in such a manner that allows for the creation of this or that simulacrum. Cultural artifacts and communication go hand in hand with each other: the former function to generate a cultural meaning, whose transcendence for the community is maintained only as long as its sense is defined as 'culture.' As a communication phenomenon, translation is a cultural phenomenon and a simulacrum *par excellence*.

In order to briefly illustrate an alternative application of this joint method, I would like to turn to child's play as I see in it a communication phenomenon that can be productive to the study on the basis of the phenomenological/empirical interface. The objective of this study would be

twofold: (a) to outline child's play as a communication phenomenon and (b) to show how the analysis of this phenomenon is arranged sequentially with the help of both phenomenology and communication methods. For example, in the first step, one should determine (create) a particular field site needed to create a contained (from the perspective of the participating subjects) environment for participant observation. These observations can be used as data for subsequent analyses. Participants may include two to three to four preschool children who know each other from previous occasions and who play together regularly, preferably at least once a week for about two hours per stretch. In order to keep play maximally but also naturally contained, and therefore to make it observable, its field site should be determined by a particular kind of toy world. Maximum containment is provided by system toys, such as 'Playmobil' or 'Lego.'

The next step could involve observing children as they habitually play with particular worlds, for example, 'Knights,' 'Future Planet,' and 'Pirates.' The analyses of these worlds can be conducted in any one or all three phenomenological registers: static, genetic, and generative. Phenomenology is yet to explore the phenomena of play and playing; however, its emphasis on experience and concrete appearances makes it a particularly suitable tool for this study, I wish to argue. As for communication studies, there is much research on children playing; however, none of it seeks to answer the questions that pertain to structure or symbolism of that activity, least so its communicative component, and there is not a study of children at play that employs the same methodological amalgam as does the joint method of phenomenology and communication studies which pursues at minimum two co-extensive tasks: (a) to liberate the object of the study from the natural attitude; (b) depending on the type of phenomenological analysis (register), to identify the phenomenon; and (c) depending on the outcomes of identification, to specify it anew.

In an investigation carried out in the static register, with an emphasis on essences and stable identity, one can begin by predefining the material pre-conditions that make children's playing possible in general. If the play involves play-specific objects, as is the case with 'Playmobil' or 'Lego,' for example, they have to be defined, and it is hardly going to be a surprise that at the end of the static analysis the toy's essence is going to come out. It can be a particular toy, a figurine ('Playmobil') or a fixture,

for example, a cube ('Lego'). Subsequently, the cube or the figurine could be examined as discrete objects, whether a 'species' of objects or a 'unique' object, undergoing, in the meantime, a thorough description of its sides, profiles, and key associated elements (e.g., parts of landscape), which will be examined individually and systemically in their inter-relational structure. In addition to the material side, explored will be those human conditions that make playing possible, for example, the child's physical compartment, including actual hand, head, and body positions. Special attention will be dedicated to the constitution of the physical space chosen by the children for playing. In sum, the purpose of static analysis with this subject (phenomenon) is to determine the range of possible applications when it comes to setting up and conducting a game. As a field site, most advantageous seem to be the home; its advantage to the study of playing is to ensure a stress-free environment where 'strangers' and familiar ones are both present, and they do not 'walk into the game' unless allowed, changing its trajectory or sabotaging it, even if inadvertently.

Observations of individual and group playing in 'real time' sets the analysis in the genetic register, with an emphasis on a particular game unfolding in time. The main difference between the static and genetic types of analysis lies in the former's emphasis on invariant structures and essences and the latter's emphasis on the constitutive aspects of social experience, that is, interaction. Here, the key emphasis falls on children 'moving' the game together, as it were, with the help of making and negotiating plot or plots, and characters, and putting these characters into action in accordance with the preliminary or immediate agreements. Children's identification with certain figurines will allow us to carry out an analysis of 'imaginary' ways of communication. Here, it is possible, if not tempting, to expand the proper genetic analysis to a sequential construction of the accompanying or prompting storyline, which the participants maintain by adhering to a game-relevant discourse. This discourse is imbedded in the general children's discourse, which can be considered as a modified form of the real 'adult' discourse, whether modern or historical.

At the next stage, I conduct informal (open-question) in situ interviews with the children, and, if necessary, their parents, all aimed at solidifying my observations of communication patterns during play sessions

and especially the constitution of the plot, looking less for familiar plots than for modified patterns and forms. Here, I no longer deal with genetic phenomenology. At this stage, the analysis does not focus on action or the activity of playing, but, minding that playing is being studied as a communication phenomenon, it focuses on those narratives which, in the long run, shall expose the 'ways' of playing 'Playmobil' as well as the structure of the master narrative, with the emphases on characters, their relations, their actions within the set plot, including planned and impromptu deviations from that plot. Children's narratives, as they have been witnessed so far, tend to follow simple agonistic and sometimes general everyday schemes that would emerge in the context of playing as well as during discussions in other contexts, for example, at school and playground meet-ups. However, the micro parameters of children's stories are unique to their culture and therefore most elucidating about play as well as the child. In order to understand these parameters, children's narratives would be thoroughly recorded and then studied with the help of narrative analysis.

On the phenomenological side, this analysis can be carried out in the spirit of P. Ricoeur, J. Derrida, or M. Heidegger. The actual phenomenological figure is not as important for this examination as the same roof that houses both the communication-based (story-telling) and the phenomenology-based (history-making) narrative analyses. In order for a play group to achieve continuity, it must construct a story, which with time becomes a history. The generative potential of the story-telling and history-making is beyond contest, for their combination provides meaning for the participants' current actions on the basis of both future and past actions which relate to the same activity. The analysis of the story's plot in terms of performance, identity, structures and components, units and figures, their modes of communication and negotiation, essentially, rule-making, makes me expect to arrive at the sense of children playing together with a system toy. The conclusion can be drawn in ludological terms ('ludology' is an official name for the subdiscipline that studies play and playing), emphasizing playing as a special kind of activity with a unique developmental and instructional value. A special role of system toy or any other kind of toy for playing shall be discussed as well.



This example of a project that can benefit from the joint method of phenomenology and empirical studies should illustrate the range of its possible applications in the realm of the humanities. It is difficult to imagine an empirically observable phenomenon for which the three-tier mixed analysis could not be used. Of course, the presentation of the analysis and the data will vary widely depending on the conventions of the discipline that would determine the empirical component of a prospective study and the phenomenon under investigation. It is, however, important to remember that the phenomenological stance dictates that no pre-advanced theory should determine the course of a prospective study, and that the distinction between natural and phenomenological attitudes should make the researcher abstain from taking the analyzed phenomenon for granted. Rather, the reliance on thick description at each stage should release the sense of the phenomenon as well as the world that allows for its appearance, regardless of a specific analytic objective, be it directed to identity, genesis, symbolism, or the relational dynamics and thus interpersonal ethics.

From this example I would like to shift to the implications of empirical phenomenology for teaching consecutive interpreting. Since this study aspires to be interdisciplinary, it should lend itself easily to being applied in a classroom as one of the instructional methods or can be taught on its own under the heading 'Empirical Phenomenology' or 'Phenomenological Ethnography,' depending on the emphasis. Teaching this kind of a method can be covered in the course of two semesters. As I have argued, the main advantage of the proposed method is its compatibility; it can therefore be beneficial in at least two ways: as a contribution to the general education of language students, who are rarely exposed to philosophy and even rarer to phenomenology, and as a template for combining related methods from different disciplines into a progressively developed analysis. By itself, phenomenology can help familiarize the students with a critical approach which can be used as an alternative to the social scientific and some humanities perspectives on consecutive interpreting. With an emphasis on appearance rather than on motivation or equivalency, phenomenology prioritizes description without pre- or post-theorizing its analytical findings. Likewise, an interpreting curriculum can benefit, albeit differently, from engaging communication methods associated with different

phenomenological registers. Some of these methods, for example, conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, have already been used to study interpreting; however, neither performance studies nor ethnography of communication has ever been engaged for an investigation of translation in any of its forms. Yet, and I hope that this study is a testimony of the viability of the joint method, the latter offers not only an in-depth investigation of the entire phenomenon but a possibility to examine one feature at a time, for example, ‘interjection’ or ‘gap.’

To be more specific, an empirical phenomenological module designed to teach consecutive interpreting as a practical discipline could begin with the notion of evidence as it is understood by phenomenology and be compared with the notion of data known in communication studies. The way the course will teach the students how to identify and localize their field sites, which may or may not require direct participation, will determine the subsequent choice of observation and participation techniques, including recording, if possible. The next step I imagine is to collect ‘live’ data, by treating this data as evidence, that is, facts of appearance. The last preliminary step for the instructor will be to educate the students in the presentation techniques of oral data for self- and group analyses. Importantly, data do not have to be received from direct personal observations; there is also no need for the student to participate in the interpreting event. Suffice it to observe it in a natural setting, including a variety of different electronic media outlets: Internet News sites, YouTube, C-SPAN, for example. It is essential, however, that, while preparing for the analysis of the collected data, the students be encouraged to perform bracketing as in, following a phenomenological procedure, abstaining from any pre-given theory and psychologism, as well as traditional notions in translation and interpreting studies such as equivalence, correctness, and validity, with much attention given to memorizing, vocabulary building, speed of processing, and so on.

Instead, the main focus of the course will be on the phenomenological notions of the home and the alien, which presupposes the understanding of the non-confluence of the two cultural domains outside of language (practically speaking, the interpreter will be taught to make specific and delicate commentaries by way of marked additions about untranslatable or poorly translatable items with their subsequent elaborations,

all this without losing time or having to perform ‘compression,’ which is common in actual situations). The course will also introduce speech acts and ethnomethods, meta-language, and the possibility of identifying the trajectory of the interaction as well as the possibility to change it within the parameters acceptable to the participants. Finally, special attention shall be given to voice and its training in terms of modulation and consistency of pace, and the ability to speak in one’s own voice without imitating the speaker’s vocal pattern shall be taught without prejudice. This emphasis can and should be accompanied by the study of intercorporeality, including gesture and demeanor. Here, a student may easily find an opportunity to compare the work of an interpreter who is not at ease because he or she does not have enough experience or has to fight nervousness. They are not at ease because they do not possess the previous knowledge about appropriate methods (another theme for both phenomenology and communication studies). Both phenomenology and the humanities (communication studies or other) have a long history of research in this area, so, once again, the much sought-after interdisciplinarity is going to find an exploration of these themes as lacking any conflict of incongruity and therefore unarguably applicable as a tandem methodology. Compatibility of methods from different disciplines should be taken into account and perhaps even extended to collaborations from other disciplines in the humanities. Co-teaching this course would be particularly useful. I hope that this book has been convincing in showing the methodological advantages of empirical phenomenology when it comes to its applicability to communication phenomena in general and examination of consecutive interpreting as a phenomenon and a sense in particular.

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